This thesis was produced as a digital iBook in order to facilitate its performative premise, where text, image, film and sound interact to disrupt the monologic authorial voice.

nonsense
nonserious
nonfiction
nonexistent
nonevent
nonfunctional
nonlinear
nonstop
Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule

Marilyn Allen (MA)

Director of studies: Professor Karen Ingham
Second supervisor: Dr. Paul Jeff

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Three is a crowd

A potential exception to an oppositional rule
Acknowledgments

Allen would like to thank Matthews
Abstract
'To explore the rule is to be emancipated from it by becoming the master of its potential for surprise' (Bök 2001: 71). The oppositional rule, established upon the philosophical traditions of binarism and dialecticism, situates the two protagonists in this research as antithetical systems. This discourse proposes a disruption to a metaphysical dichotomy between the noetic authorial text and the poetic paratext.

The non-oppositional premise of collaborative dialogue is proposed as a method to resist the oppositional logic of dialecticism and the homogenous ‘third hand’ of collaboration theory. Michel Serres’ assertion that to ‘hold a dialogue is to suppose a third man and seek to exclude him’ positions the ‘third man’ of communication as a disruptive force (Serres 1982: 67). The excluded third is a noise in the background of ideological unity, the ‘potential for surprise’, an intervallic exception in a paradigmatic order.

This collaborative game breaks the rule of opposition and subsequently generates a third space where the indeterminate relation between the scholastic text and matthews and allen’s paratext performs disruption in the authorial system. ‘The exception explicates the rule, testing its limits, defying its fields,* forsaking the nomic work of one paradigm for the ludic risk of another paralogy’ (Bök 2001: 71).

*Because half a dozen grasshoppers under a fern make the field ring with their importunate chink, whilst thousands of great cattle, reposed beneath the shadow of the British oak, chew the cud and are silent, pray do not imagine that those who make noise are the only inhabitants of the field.

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Illustrations

Gilbert & George, 2008, Manifesto Marathon, Serpentine Gallery Pavilion, photograph

Bas Jan Ader, 1970, Fall II, photograph
Intercession is a form of positive dissonance, made possible through an openness to interferences that disturb one’s regular harmonic vibrations. (Bogue 2007: 14)

Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule proposes disruption to the stasis of unitary phenomena, dialectical consensus and stable oppositions. The protagonists in this research, the academic author and the artistic collaboration matthews and allen, introduce a fluid third space that is resistant to the hegemonic principles of the monograph. ‘Academia with its need to identify and quantify and its notion of original contributions to knowledge lags behind the critiques of authorship and origin’ (Warr 2008). The metaphysical oppositions implicit in academic writing (author-reader, one/many, noetic/poetic, theory/practice, serious/non-serious) operate as a paradigmatic standard from which an indeterminate third space is proposed.

We should seek our instruction [… not from] any singular form of understanding, but should rather seek to occupy the spaces of transformation which lie between - neither one nor the other but [a] ‘third space’ (Brown 2002: 12)

Philosophical tradition characterizes the third term as a site of stability where the triadic structure of the dialectic (thesis, antithesis and synthesis) effects consensus. A comparable condition is performed within a binary logic, predicated upon the construction and maintenance of stable oppositions. Binarism operates as a hierarchical system where one term is privileged over its other, thus the traditional relation between author and reader operates within a binary paradigm. The artistic author is traditionally perceived as the sole custodian of meaning, a perspective established upon the legacy and idealism of authorial expression, situating the reader as the subordinated other.

This discourse proposes an intervallic disruption to the oppositional relation between author and reader, adopting the proliferative characteristics of ‘the clinamen, the parasite, the crowd, […] background noise,] and the collapsed tower of Babel, all of which function as tropes gesturing toward […] the multiple’ (Abbas 2005: 145). The multiplicity of language generated through intervallic disruption is theorized in relation to the Derridean concept of différance (inferring both difference and deferral) where unitary meaning is situated as an unstable hypothesis. The collaborative double matthews and allen will seize control of the footnotes in this text as a means to perform the concept of différance and a proliferation of meaning (consequently the academic text will adopt a parenthetical citation system). matthews and allen adopt a satirical approach to citation wherein the rules of referencing are intermittently performed and discarded; ‘There are no preexisting rules; each move invents its own rules; it bears upon its own rule’ (Deleuze 2004[b]: 70).

The paratextual space of the academic footnote is proposed as a site of potentiality where anecdotal, speculative, conjectural, digressive and unofficial narratives may interrupt the autocracy of the authorial text.

Ostensibly outside the text that both contains and is framed by it, with a subservient role that nonetheless possesses an authority to trump the text that would seem to master it’ (Dworkin 2005: 9)
Footnotes, prefaces, prologues and epilogues are anomalous paratextual apparatus within the supposed linearity of the monograph, operating as ‘excesses that replace what they augment, operating against but within the limits of the system that must exclude them. The anomalos is the repressed part of a rule which ensures that the rule does not work.’ (Bök 2001: 38). Comparable to the concept of parasitism, paratextual and prefatory writing is both within and peripheral to the limits of the text and as such articulates a ‘problematic limit between an inside and an outside that is always threatened by graft and by parasite.’ (Derrida 1991: 196).

The parasitic operations of matthews and allen’s footnotes endeavour to unsettle the notion of a stable denotative meaning. These paratexual asides position the reader as an active participant in the proposition to generate multiplicity. The paratext serves as a method to punctuate and interrupt the reader’s consumption of the authorial text. To read this text as a linear narrative is to misunderstand the premise of the research. matthews and allen’s paratextual system compels the reader to turn from the determinism of the authorial discourse toward other phenomena. matthews and allen’s footnotes, akin to the disruptive character of background noise, interrupt the striated trajectory of the authorial text and subsequently introduce an anomalous multiplicity. The relation between text and paratext compels the reader to traverse the territories within and between narratives thus disrupting the hegemony of a traditional authorial system.

the reader's body is put into motion: the eye moves, the head tilts, the hands and fingers work the pages, the arms and torso shift as the book is handled and manipulated. (Dworkin 2005: 16)

In the act of turning from the noetic academic text to the poetic paratext, the reader effects an indeterminate third space and subsequently performs disruption in a system arguably predicated upon the language of opposition. The third space is proposed as an anomalous multiplicity, a site of chaos, and thus any inclination toward ‘the order of logical dependency’ should be resisted (Derrida 1988: 90). Both heritage and historicism suggest that ‘we must begin with the ‘standard’, the ‘serious’, the ‘normal’, etc., and we must begin by excluding the ‘non-standard’, the non-serious’, the ‘abnormal’, the parasitical.’ (Derrida 1988: 90). This text attempts to generate a culture of equivalence between the ‘standard’ and the ‘non-standard’, the noetic and the poetic, performing a resistance to the language of oppositional stasis and dialectical synthesis. The inclusion of both an academic preface and a prologue written by matthews and allen (a literary device commonly associated with poetic writing) gestures toward an equivalence between noetic and poetic narratives. matthews and allen’s concept of ‘equivalence facilitates the development and dissemination of organized absurdities.’ (McCaffery 2012: 179).

The philosophical voice of the academic author and the art practice of matthews and allen (situated in the annotational space of the footnote) are distinguishable by a variation in typeface; this island of order is situated in an ocean of proliferative disorder. ‘Disorder is the end of systems, and their beginning’ (Serres 2005: 13). This rhetoric of digression is augmented by its digital configuration and the possibilities generated by the implementation of textual hyperlinks. The digital hyperlink offers pragmatic potential for disruption to authorial linearity. The hyperlink suggests a system of digression and deferral and is ‘a quasi-scientific system for displaying the vicissitudes of textual transmission’ (Tribble 1977: 229-30).
The hyperlink generates a system wherein a theoretical and physical link may be established with *Two is company: Dialogic interplay AND the collaborative double*. This text, authored by Helen Matthews, functions as both a physical appendix and a theoretical *paratext* to *Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule*, exceeding the boundaries of the text, proliferating beyond the unifying logic of traditional authorialism. This potential literature *must convolve both writer and reader in a tangle beyond the potency of an epistemic unwinding*’ (McCaffery 2001: 206).
Prologue

we are serious comics
Introduction
Since each of us was several, there was already quite a crowd
(Deleuze & Guattari 2004[a]: 3)

The title *Three is a crowd: a potential exception to an oppositional rule* references the colloquial language of the idiom ‘two is company, three is a crowd’. The counterpart to the partial phrase ‘three is a crowd’ is located in the text *Two is company: Dialogic interplay AND the collaborative double* by Helen Matthews. This idiom implies that duality may be destabilized by the actions of a third character, a character analogous to the excluded third man of Serresian philosophy. The ‘third’ conceived as an anomalous crowd infers both a homogenous mass and, paradoxically, an indefinite multiplicity. The concept of the crowd is introduced in a Deleuzoguattarian reflection on collaboration where each man is posited as a multiplicity. The aforementioned ‘Deleuzoguattarian’ contraction is effectively the performance of linguistic homogeneity, a third unitary term, collapsing the Deleuze and Guattari signatures into ‘a third authorial identity effacing the individual artists themselves’; its modernist genealogy effecting critique within the authorial system (Green 2001: x).

Collaboration may be perceived as that which operates within all philosophies, their histories and potentialities, as such ‘collaboration cannot simply

1 annex, affix, super add, supplement, subjoin, superpose, throw in, clap on, tack to, append, tag, engraft, saddle on, saddle with, sprinkle, super induce, introduce, work in, furthermore, and also, and else, besides, to boot... and so forth...
be opposed to solo or individual practice [...] since the solo artist or author was never self-present or self-identical in the first place.' (Cull 2012: 10). The proffering of 'individual' practice as that which harbours the multiple suggests the Bakhtinian theory of dialogism. The 'solo author' in this research acknowledges the impossibility of a 'self-present' authorial voice through the purposeful interdiscursive play of multiple and diverse voices. This 'diversity [of voices and heterglossia enter the [text] and organize themselves [...] into a structured artistic system.' (Bakhtin 1981: 300). This discourse acknowledges Bakhtinian dialogism as implicit in all language systems, whilst simultaneously, and perhaps paradoxically, recognizing the pervasive traditions and culturally entrenched concept of the individual author.

if we extend the concept of collaboration to include individual practice and to include the ways we work with nonhuman others, then collaboration becomes a vacuous term, a placeholder for everything and nothing. (Cull 2012: 11)

This narrative reflects upon the language of consensus associated with collaborative practice and the theoretical formation of 'a third artistic identity

The phrase "Tom, Dick and Harry" is a placeholder for multiple unspecified people; "Tom, Dick or Harry" plays the same role for one unspecified person. The phrase most commonly occurs as "every Tom, Dick and Harry", meaning everyone, and "any Tom, Dick or Harry", meaning anyone, although Brewer defines the term to specify "a set of nobodies; persons of no note". (wiki.org accessed 25.02.2014)

* matthews and allen are every Tom, Dick and Harry.
superimposed over and exceeding [...] individual artists’ (Green 2001: 179). This conflated third identity arguably performs a reiteration of traditional authorship, thus maintaining the language of autocracy implicit in metaphysical authorialism. The gesture of authorialism within a metaphysical paradigm establishes a binary relation between the characters of author and reader. Metaphysical duality presupposes a culture of stable oppositions where one term assumes greater authority. A traditional reading of this text presupposes the language of opposition: noetic/poetic, theory/practice, author/reader, one/multiple, order/chaos, serious/non-serious, stoic/ludic. This research attempts to unsettle the dominant discourse of opposition and subsequently reposition the third as a site of potentiality ‘embodying the idea of opposites as equivalent.’ (Hugill 2012: 11)

In an act of resistance to the homogenizing principles of collaboration theory (a theory positioning the collaborative double as a synthesized ‘third force’) the protagonists matthews and allen adopt the non-oppositional process of collaborative dialogue. The Serresean assertion that ‘to hold a dialogue is to suppose a third man and seek to exclude him’ positions the ‘third’ in communication as a disruptive force (Serres 1982: 67). The process of collaborative dialogue arguably resists the clamour of dialectical perspectives and as such may hold the potential to include the Serresean ‘third man’. This discourse situates the excluded third of Serresean philosophy as a site of potentiality, a potential that ‘generates a new process rather than an old
product’ (Bök 2001: 71). In the refutation of the ‘old metaphysical product’ (opposition and/or consensus), poststructuralism posits meaning as that which is deferred and always in process, and thus ‘rejects the search for origins, stable meaning, universal truth and the ‘direction’ of history.’ (Barker 2004: 161).

If thought searches, it is less in the manner of someone who possesses a method than that of a dog that seems to be making uncoordinated leaps. (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 55)

The proposed disruption to hegemonic order situates this discourse within a constructivist paradigm where ‘knowledge’ is constructed (as opposed to discovered) as the result of an interpretative, perspectival response. ‘Constructionism accepts that there are multiple knowledges, and that knowledge is highly contingent on time and cultural location’ (Potter 2006: 81). The paradigms for inquiry in this research facilitate an exploration of potentiality, rather than a summative ‘or an enclosing process’ (Sullivan 2010: 31). The traditions of research position the paradigm as a set of general theoretical principles. This research is interpreted within a qualitative approach to research positing ‘knowledge’ as proliferative phenomena and is thus resistant to the
measured and systematic empiricism of quantitative research. Qualitative research permits the implementation of diverse theoretical, methodological and epistemological strategies. A quintessential characteristic of qualitative inquiry is a resistance to the generalizations and universalities that arguably limit potentiality. Poststructuralist qualitative research suggests that a universal foundation for knowledge is impossible.

*Post-structuralist qualitative researchers deny that there is a knowable and objective social world or that it is possible to unproblematically represent that world in a text.* (Brewer & Miller 2003: 241)

This discourse adopts a poststructuralist qualitative research paradigm wherein essentialist and privileged perspectives are resisted. If structuralism is understood to be the philosophical practice of systems and conventions, then poststructuralism may be characterized as a practice seeking to deconstruct those systems, thus, within a poststructuralist paradigm universal epistemology is untenable.

‘The concept of praxis involves a deconstruction of the binary pair of theory and practice involving recognition that each belongs to and in each other.’ (Barker 2004: 166). This research adopts the principles of praxis where research is performed in the interplay between theory and practice. The term praxis, introduced by
Aristotle, seeks to collapse hierarchical distinctions between theory and practice. The collaborative practice of Matthews and Allen is embedded in the philosophical document in order to establish a culture of equivalence between these historically opposed modes of inquiry. This discourse proposes the collapse of oppositional thought and as such the concept of praxis-based research offers a potential equivalence between\(^6\) noetic (the academic author) and poetic phenomena (the practice of Matthews and Allen). ‘By using the principle of equivalents as its point of departure, the game is free: the situation can completely construct itself.’ (Jorn 1961).

The interrelation between the noetic and poetic phenomena in this text effects disruption in the authorial system and unsettles the conventions that constitute traditional research and as such may perform a ‘new paradigm’ for inquiry.

This discourse is characteristically poststructural, performative and proliferative and as such generates disruption in empiricist systems by means of a postparadigmatic inquiry into potentialities and the ‘vagaries that diverge from what directs them, escaping the events of the system that controls them.’ (Bök 2001: 43).

The research paradigm is posited as a diagram mapping a site of proliferative potentiality. ‘The diagram is not precise, or representational, but charts the relation of forces that can be utilized or made’ (Zdebić 2012: 7). A proliferative approach to research attempts to generate conditions whereby multiplicity and potentialities between a rock and a hard place and between the devil and the deep blue sea: In a very difficult position; facing a hard decision. I couldn't make up my mind. I was caught between a rock and a hard place. He had a dilemma on his hands. He was clearly between the devil and the deep blue sea.

(idioms.thefreedictionary.com)
operate without determination and conclusion. Etymologically the term paradigm is taken from the Latin paradigm and the Greek paradeigma derived from paradeiknunai meaning ‘what shows itself beside’. The etymology of the paradigm suggests that which is situated beside what is shown, beside the dominant ideology of a given system. That which ‘shows itself beside’ the academic monograph manifests as a paratextual practice, the performance of intervallc background noise.

A ‘significant means of disclaiming validity is to remove the single voice of omniscience and to relativize it by including multiple voices within the research.’ (Denzin & Lincoln 2000: 1028). The Deleuzian assertion that each of us is several gives credence to a principle of multivocality. A multivocal approach to research extends beyond an acknowledgment of heteroglossia to ‘the active management of voicing in the text’ (Yancey 1994: 159). This discourse operates within a multivocal research paradigm where the centrality of the authorial voice is unsettled by the citational practice of matthews and allen.

Performativity is the writing and rewriting of meanings that continually disrupts the authority of texts. Resistance is a kind of performance that holds up for critique hegemonic texts that have become privileged stories told and retold. (Finley 2005: 687)

7

B side. The other song that isn’t the ‘hit’ (A side) on a 45 (7inch) vinyl. Less popular second choice. Also known as the flipside.

(urbandictionary.com accessed 08.10.2013)
In the practice of academic writing citation is used as a method to substantiate the author’s conceptual position, essentially an affirming gesture, and as a strategy to differentiate the authorial text from existing scholarship. The paratextual practice of matthews and allen is generated almost entirely from existent phenomena and as such the concept of citationality is adopted as a method to question the romanticized notion of artistic inspiration and autonomy. Citationality has the potential to liberate the artist from the servitude of artistic expression and effectively disrupt the anticipated centrality of artistic authorship. matthews and allen’s use of citation adopts the concepts of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, where established configurations are unsettled. In the context of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy deterritorialization is that which breaks or fractures the established system and reterritorialization is that which stabilizes a new configuration. The principles of deterritorialization and reterritorialization operate under the precondition that a territory is never fixed and is rather a ‘malleable site of passage. As an assemblage, it exists in a state of process whereby it continually passes into something else’ (Message 2005: 275).

matthews and allen’s use of the concepts deterritorialization and reterritorialization is developed as a poststructuralist challenge to the homogeneity of traditional authorialism. This poststructuralist paradigm is effectively a site of...
multiplicity wherein phenomena may resist fixed designation and context specific
determinism.

Since meaning is negotiated between and across subjects and through
language, it can never be fully secured: meaning comes to be
understood as a negotiated domain, in flux and contingent on social
[…] investments and contexts. (Jones & Stephenson 1999: 2)

The proposition that ‘meaning is negotiated between and across subjects’
situates the protagonists in this research as perspectival qualitative researchers.
Nietzsche’s philosophical perspectivism implies that there can be no definitive view,
only a myriad of perspectives. Perspectival thought is analogous to Wallace Stevens’
poem Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird wherein there can be no single
narrative relating to the blackbird,¹⁰ no single representation and no intrinsic
characteristic. Each imagining of the Blackbird unsettles the concept of resolute
meaning, appearing in green light and in shadow, both in flight and sat in cedar-
limbs.

One perspective’s subversiveness may be another’s aesthetic
decadence; incompetence from a certain viewpoint may be a refusal
of the established codes from another, and so on. (Baldwin, Harrison &
Ramsden 2006: 194)

¹⁰ David Shrigley, This Is Me, This Is Also Me
Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule performs one perspective (albeit that the one harbours the multiple) on the subject of collaborative dialogue as a site of potentiality, and Helen Matthews’ text Two is company: Dialogic interplay AND the collaborative double performs another. The two intersecting theses serve as a metaphor to articulate a resistance to consensual thought and epistemological prerequisites.

The multitude of voices and perspectives in this discourse are performed through digital methods of dissemination. The Twenty-First Century researcher invariably employs digital methods of research; however, a thesis is characteristically disseminated by means of a printed document. The conventional printed thesis ‘necessitates a linear, largely monomodal medium for the presentation of the research.’ (Andrews 2012: 32). Within this research digression and multiplicity are fore-grounded and as such the confines of the printed page limit the potential for meaning to proliferate. Digital dissemination ‘offers insight into reading and writing practices that do not yield a finite production of cultural artifacts but become part of an interanimating relationship’ [sic.] (Andrews 2012: 233). The use of hypertext-applications generates a temporal and fluid text that effectively situates the reader as a participant in the performance of digression. The digital thesis effects an interlacing of perspectives and performs a proposed resistance to stable oppositions and unified phenomena. The digital methods employed in this text perform, as
opposed to simply theorise, the digressive and multiple character of the praxis thesis. Thus, a comprehensive understanding of the research may not be attained without engaging with the relation between the traditional philosophical writing and the paratextual art practice. This research adopts an active reader\textsuperscript{12} paradigm that recognizes ‘the capability of ‘readers’ to be dynamic creators of significance rather then being understood as simple receptors of textual meaning’ (Barker 2004: 1).

In an act of resistance to the grand narrative and totalizing metanarratives that seek to categorize and unify thought, this discourse operates as a proliferative and temporal praxis. Lyotard proposed that the metanarrative should give way to ‘petits r\'ecits’, or ‘small narratives’. The ‘petits r\'ecits’ are the exception to a metanarrative rule and as such serve to disrupt the totalizing principles of the grand narrative. It may be suggested that the noetic academic text operates as a metanarrative, offering explanation and legitimation, whereas matthews and allen’s paratextual practice operates as a Lyotardian ‘petits r\’ecit’. matthews and allen’s ‘small narratives’ manifest as a paralanguage of idioms, colloquialisms, old wives tales, image, verse and NOISE. These ‘small narratives’ function as catalysts for the destabilization of a grand authorial narrative.

This discourse considers six philosophical perspectives relating to the third position as a space of both metaphysical tradition and poststructural proliferation. The Third Term and The Excluded Third situate this research within the metaphysical

\textsuperscript{12} a person who reads written matter; a person who is able to read, one who reads the work in hand

expressed in due literary form

conveyed a thought or feeling in words

an idea or opinion produced by thinking, or occurring suddenly in the mind

a view or judgement formed about something, not necessarily based on fact or knowledge

a particular way of considering or regarding something

a thing that is unspecified or unknown
traditions of oppositional stasis and consensus, thus establishing a cultural canon from which this discourse takes its departure. The ‘Pataphysical Third introduces the clinamen as an element of fluctuation in a system predicated upon the language of stable oppositions: noetic/poetic, theory/practice, author/reader, one/multiplicity, order/chaos, serious/non-serious, stoic/ludic. The clinamen, Lucretius’ term for the indeterminate swerve\textsuperscript{13} of the atom, serves as a metaphor in the proposition to unsettle presupposed dualities in academic writing.

The philosophical narratives contained within The ‘Pataphysical Third and The Parasitic Third align the clinamen with the concept of background noise. Noise is commonly perceived as an irritant in the process of communication and characterized as the excluded other, an incomprehensible, homogenous mass: a crowd. This discourse seeks to unsettle a metaphysical heritage situating difference as negation and thus resist the homogenization of noise into the oppositional other of communication. In the proposition to destabilize this binary paradigm, noise is repositioned as a productive force, an agent of chaotic and anomalous multiplicity.

The Parapoetic Third proposes matthews and allen’s paratextual practice as a generative machine. This ‘diagrammatic or abstract machine does not function to represent’ but rather ‘plays a piloting role’ (Deleuze & Guattari 2004[a]: 157). matthews and allen’s parapoetic machine is conceived as a dysfunctional device generating new sequences, continually bifurcating through the inclusion of noise. In the context
of a parapoetic discourse noise and anomaly are reconsidered as a means to unsettle linear and determinist phenomena: ‘forsaking the nomic work of one paradigm for the ludic risk of another paralogy.’ (Bök 2001: 71). The Parapoetic Third is proposed as a Jarry-esque solution to the question of how the dichotomous relation between an official noetic discourse and an unofficial poetic discourse may be unsettled to generate a culture of potentiality.

The Potential Third examines a systematic production of possibility. ‘How do we create knowledge and theory that explores what is possible? Rather than seeing inquiry merely as a linear procedure, or an enclosing process’ (Sullivan 2010: 31). Potentiality is proposed as a process resistant to the language of representation and as such situates a potential work as ‘a work which is not limited to its appearances’ (Motte 1998: 65). The Potential Third adopts a machinic attitude to confound the metaphysics of authorship. Matthews and Allen implement a quasi-scientific system where ludic rules displace the hegemonic principles of authorialism.

The repetition of a past constraint (the regress) swerves into the intimation of a future potential (the digressus).
(Bök 2001: 80)
The protagonists in this research propose potentiality as a proliferative and indeterminate third space wherein the ‘resulting structure is a complex fabric, without center, hierarchy, or single organizing principle’ [sic.] (Abbas 2005: 6).
The Third Term
‘To explore the rule is to be emancipated from it by becoming the master of its potential for surprise, whereas to ignore the rule is to be imprisoned in it by becoming the slave to the reprise of its intention.’ (Bök 2001: 71). The rule of traditional western metaphysics is effectively established upon the logic of opposition. This oppositional discourse arguably persists within contemporary culture: author/reader, one/many, theory/practice, serious/non-serious, noetic/poetic. A cultural perception of the noetic (the ‘science of the intellect’) and the poetic (that which is ‘of or like poetry’) suggests a binary order and consequently hierarchical positioning through the maintenance of an oppositional logic (Pearsall & Trumble 1995). Opposition quintessentially serves to eliminate anomaly and difference\(^{16}\) from those systems predicated upon the homogeneity of master narratives. The oppositional language of binarism and dialecticism effectively subsumes anomaly and exception (difference) into unity. Theoretical perspectives associated with binarism and dialecticism are frequently and arguably inaccurately considered to be indistinguishable; however, binarism operates through the maintenance of stable oppositions whereas dialecticism seeks to synthesize contraries into a unified third term. The language of duality permeates this discourse wherein two narrative constructs and two collaborative protagonists appear to simultaneously reference and unsettle metaphysical dualisms (being neither opposed nor unified).
The associative relation between unity and opposition appears paradoxical; however, the binary machine operates via a process of mutual affirmation. This mutuality is where two interrelated concepts are effectively defined through their reciprocal relation.

Oh no it isn’t
Oh yes it is

The relation between the stereotypical characters in a comedy double act, the straightman and the funnyman, appear ostensibly oppositional; however, the straightman and funnyman are effectively simultaneously contributing to one narrative field. Thus, the serious is not in opposition to the non-serious but in relation to it.

We are constantly told: to respect the order of logical dependency we must begin with the ‘standard’, the ‘serious’, the ‘normal’.
(Derrida 1988: 90)

It is in binarism that the concept of hierarchy is perhaps most overtly demonstrated, where one concept is privileged over its other, the serious over the non-serious. In the lexicon\textsuperscript{17} of Jacques Derrida this binary logic is a logocentric

\textsuperscript{17}LEXIPHANIC – Given to the use of pretentious terminology, such as the word lexiphanic.

(Bowler, P., 2009, The Completely Superior Person’s Book of Words, Bloomsbury: 182)
theory. Logocentrism is the belief that God (the word) or some other authority is the foundation for ‘meaning’ and subsequently the dominant ideology of a binary relation. Perhaps the most explicit manifestation of binarism is in language, where one of two interrelated terms is afforded greater significance. Logocentrism is used to validate a system that privileges present phenomena and thus a ‘system structured by a valorization of speech over writing, immediacy over distance, identity over difference, and (self-) presence over all forms of absence, ambiguity, simulation, substitution’ (Derrida 2004[a]: 44). The logos may be said to produce a culture that performs from the binary positions of centre/margin, major/minor, author/reader, one/many, theory/practice, serious/non-serious, noetic/poetic. In the proposition to resist hierarchical positioning, this discourse considers the significance of a cultural heritage that articulates meaning through an oppositional logic and thus situates logocentrism as that which homogenizes exception and anomaly (reductio ad absurdum).

[A] minor literature does not occur ‘elsewhere’ or ‘apart from’ a major literature (this is not a dialectic) but on the contrary operates from within, using the same elements as it were, but in a different manner. (O’Sullivan 2005)

that cannot be refuted

In a cursory tale of major and minor terminology privilege is given to the major language; however, it is in the parasitic operations of the minor literature that the stasis of an oppositional logic is arguably opened to an anomalous multiplicity. ‘What defines majority is a model you have to conform to […] A minority, on the other hand, has no model’ (Deleuze 1995: 173). If a minor literature operates from within the major system, then the implication is that a minoritarian holds the potential to generate disruption to the illusory stasis of a major ideology (Matthews and Allen perform a minoritarian discourse).

‘I hear two speaking together, but are they in agreement or tenaciously contradicting each other?’ (Lomax 2004: 13). A critique of oppositional thought commonly manifests itself in the sublation of contraries into a third term (sublation is a dialectical method where existing principles, rather than being countered and erased, become part of a ‘new’ ideology). The construction of a third term leads to a consideration of classical dialectics and Platonic philosophy. Traditionally, the dialectic is conceived as a process of argumentation seeking resolution; this perspective presupposes a synthesis between opposing perspectives. Plato’s dialectical model is considered to operate in contrast to Plato’s eristic where participants engaged in dialogue seek victory over their opponent.

19 cont.

Can’t! Don’t! Shan’t! Won’t! Pass it along the line!

(Kipling, R., Parade-Song of the Camp Animals, IN, The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, (2nd Edition), London)
Man: Is this the right room for an argument?
Other Man: I've told you once.
Man: No you haven't!
Other Man: Yes I have.
Man: When?
Other Man: Just now.
Man: No you didn't!
Other Man: Yes I did!
Man: You didn't!
Other Man: I did!
Man: You didn't!
Other Man: I'm telling you, I did!
Man: You did not!

(Monty Python, 1972, The Money Programme)

The Platonic dialectic is a system of argument and counter-argument, and serves as a method to establish the culturally desirable condition of unity. The foundational principle of Platonic dialectics is the ‘reasoned’ argument of opposing hypotheses with a view to establishing unity (unity in Platonic terms is established as ‘truth’).

18 cont.

A fine line between two things: there is no clear and easy-to-define distinction between two things. ..........................

The Hegelian dialectic is understood as the stating of a thesis proceeded by the antithesis and subsequent synthesis. The operative terms in Hegel’s philosophy of dialectics are contradiction and sublation. The process of contradiction is integral to our understanding of Hegelian dialectics, where a thesis gives rise to contradiction or antithesis and, ideologically, the tension between these polarities sublate into synthesis. Sublation is a translation of the German word *aufheben* and is a dialectical principle that resists the displacement of one concept by another through its duplicitous inference. Sublation etymologically refers to both cessation and preservation. Dialectic sublation suggests that synthesis may be attained through the movement between dialectically opposed positions. The dual concepts of thesis and antithesis are invariably altered through the principle of sublation and thus cease to exist in their original context, yet are arguably preserved within the sublated third term. The paradoxical etymology of the term sublation, meaning to preserve and to end, contains a third inference, to elevate. This ‘lifting up’ suggests that synthesis is elevated beyond presuppositions toward a ‘higher meaning’. The Hegelian theory of sublation effectively produces a synthesized third term and consequently perpetuates the ideology of unitary stasis.

The binary oppositions of thesis and antithesis permeate the language of philosophy from the Cartesian dualities of mind and body to the Socratic method. The Socratic method may be considered to operate in a culture of negation where a
series of questions are formulated to eliminate hypotheses that reveal contradictions. The premise of the Socratic method is to test hypotheses through argument and opposition in order to reveal a consensual ‘truth’. The privilege awarded to unity and consensus in classical philosophy suggests a cultural heritage that resists multiplicity, heterogeneity and anomaly. Lyotard states that dialectical consensus in classical philosophy ‘does violence to the heterogeneity of language games’ (Lyotard 1995: 28). A Lyotardian resistance to dialectical methods situates unity as an illusory condition and further questions the oppositional relation of thesis and antithesis by suggesting that ‘consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value’ (Lyotard 1995: 37).

A ‘propensity for hierarchy, fixity and stasis (or simply representation) with which we are all involved’ suggests a cultural inclination toward determined phenomena (O’Sullivan 2006: 12). How can a philosophical inheritance of opposition and consensus be disrupted? A search for disruption is essentially a gesture that seeks escape from the stasis and fixity of a unitary system. Perhaps it is in the word stasis that this discourse begins to turn.21 In its general usage stasis refers to a motionless state, a standing still. Thucydides, an historian of ancient Greece, proposed stasis as a complex condition in which diametrically opposed forces enter into stasis whilst retaining ‘internal disturbances’.

**stasis** inactivity; stagnation; a state of equilibrium. (Pearsall & Trumble 1995)

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21

‘The Lady’s not for turning’

18 cont.

the Vice, a stock character in medieval morality plays; he is a cynical kind of fool in the service of the Devil, and tries to tempt others in a comical but often sinister manner. .................................................................

Stasis is where ‘thinking comes to a standstill in a constellation saturated with tensions - there the dialectical image appears. It is the caesura in the movement of thought. Its position is naturally not an arbitrary one. It is to be found, in a word, where the tension between dialectical opposites is greatest.’ (Benjamin 1999: 475).

Walter Benjamin’s ‘dialectics at a standstill’ may be articulated in terms of a momentary constellation where dichotomies enter into a state of reciprocal contention. This conception of dialectics may be said to generate confusion with regard to traditionally distinguishable dichotomies.

Historically, dialectical reason is proposed as a culture of conflict and resolution; however, Benjamin’s perspective is resistant to a progression from argument to conciliation and alternatively suggests a constellation of forces. Benjamin utilises the supposedly dichotomous relation of history and the present to articulate the appearance of a dialectical image ‘in the now of its recognizability’. The ‘now’ that Benjamin refers to is a temporality that ‘in the next moment is already irretrievably lost.’ (Benjamin 1999: 473). Tiedemann suggests that ‘dialectics at a standstill’ attempts to temporarily ‘halt the flow of [...] movement, to group each becoming as being.’ (Tiedemann 1999: 943). Benjamin’s perception of dialectical stasis suggests the possibility for disruption in the reciprocal language of dualisms, a disruption that operates from inside the dialectical system; a system saturated with tensions.

18 cont.

A fools paradise. A state of entertainment or happiness founded on unreal, fanciful or insecure foundations.

there is something else involved that ceaselessly escapes the mastery of understanding and the logic of binary opposition (Lomax 2000: 149)

‘Perhaps what is happening here is that the binary tale turns into a Derridean tale of oscillation and undecidability’, a movement that attempts to resist the oppositional logic informing western thought (Lomax 2000: 64). Derrida’s writing on the aporias of meaning proposes a culture of ‘undecidable situations’ that ‘interrupt and suspend all established programmes’ (Wortham 2010: 15). The aporetic language of Derridean philosophy performs an indeterminacy and undecidability in meaning and consequently resists traditional philosophical methods of homogenization. This concept of undecidability operates within the ‘verbal properties (nominal or semantic) that can no longer be included within philosophical (binary) opposition, resisting and disorganizing it, without ever constituting a third term, without ever leaving room for a solution in the form of speculative dialectics’ (Derrida 2004[b]: 40). (Matthews and Allen’s paratextual practice attempts to resist and disorganize the traditional oppositions between text and footnote, noetic and poetic, theory and practice, author and reader, without reaching a consensual condition).
'There are multiplicities which constantly go beyond binary machines' (Deleuze & Parnet 2007: 19). In the text *Pharmacy* Derrida deconstructs the Greek word pharmakon, meaning both poison and remedy, to demonstrate the multiplicity of language. In the Derridean lexicon of undecidable words the pharmakon, being neither good nor evil, serves to unsettle the binary paradigm.

Derrida’s resistance to homogenized third terms gives rise to the question of how the concept of a third term may be reconfigured. The oscillating space of Derridean undecidability serves to unsettle the stable oppositions in a binary system and, in broader terms, may be understood as dismantling Platonism (the belief that consensual ‘truth’ is structured in terms of oppositions). Derrida’s undecidable terms (pharmakon, supplement, trace, différance, *et al.*) gesture toward the deferral of meaning and resistance to homogenized third terms. Derridean undecidability is not the paralyzing of decision (as implied by its common usage) but rather the play of tensions and contradictions within the language of opposition.

In its overt resistance to the traditions of metaphysics, Derridean undecidability finds an alliance with the 'pataphysical laughter of Alfred Jarry. 'Pataphysics, a pseudoscience, observes the laws governing exceptions and subsequently challenges the metaphysical conceptions of unity and consensus. 'Pataphysical laughter may be considered to be both dual and unitary: ‘Pronounced slowly, it is the idea of duality’; ‘ha’ ‘ha’;23 however, when ‘[p]ronounced quickly […] it is the idea of unity’, ‘haha’ (Jarry 1965: 228). 'Pataphysical laughter is thus a Derridean undecidable, being neither
dual nor unitary yet both, it ‘is able to slide through that dimension of reasoning which everyday logic reductively conceives of as a single immobile point.’ (Daumal 2012: 8).

The traditional doctrines of dialecticism, duality and binarism provide a contextual framework for a proposed disruption to oppositional logic. ‘The static classification of dual oppositions and of third terms’ articulates a philosophical propensity toward finite cultures, stable oppositions and unities (Derrida 2004[a]: 19). A culture of opposition and the constitution of third terms establishes a major ideology from which matthews and allen may perform disruption and digression. Within a binary paradigm the academic author is afforded a logocentric position (the serious) wherein a reference to Monty Python (the non-serious) proffers an exception to the logic of an oppositional rule (serious/non-serious).

The exception explicates the rule, testing its limits, defying its fields, forsaking the nomic work of one paradigm for the ludic risk of another paralogy. (Bök 2001: 71)

they make the language take flight, ceaselessly placing it in a state of disequilibrium, making it bifurcate and vary in each of its terms...


Do not even lines of flight, due to their eventual divergence, reproduce the very formations their function it was to dismantle or outflank?

The Excluded Third
Critical theory relating to the collaboration between artists generally focuses upon the construction of a third term and as such sustains the propensity toward unity established by the dialectic tradition. This cultural inclination toward unified third terms arguably persists in the formation of artist-to-artist collaboration. ‘Another entity emerges in artistic collaboration […] a third artistic identity super imposed over and exceeding the individual artists.’ (Green 2001: 179). The third artistic identity proffered by Green echoes the Hegelian concept of sublation, inferring that a synthesized third term exceeds its constituent parts. The collaborative lexicon includes reference to a third hand, a third force and a third mind, all of which situate collaborative identity as a homogenous force. This perceived homogenization or synthesis appears explicit in relation to the artistic ‘double act’ Gilbert & George where two identities are unified through a deliberate mirroring of behaviour and dress. In 2011, during an interview at the Hay Festival, George stated that; “we are two people, but one artist”. This declaration suggests that the collaborative double actively work on homogenizing their two physical and metaphoric bodies into a third identity. The decision to ‘have no friends’ affirms Gilbert & George’s closed, and arguably insular, collaborative methods and affirms the unified third character of the artist. Gilbert & George emerge as a series of considered communications and gestures that resist reference to their ‘individual’ parts. This carefully rehearsed persona proposes the collaboration between artists as a single
unit, a notion reiterated by the collective label ‘Gilbert & George’ which effectively performs a third term. This label (‘Gilbert & George’) does not reference individual components connected by a grammatical conjunctive (&) but alternatively operates as a single homogenous machine.


two is company, three is a crowd
like a three-ring circus throw your hat into the ring
wear more than one hat uneasy lies the head that wears the crown
The homogeneity of a third identity may be observed in the associative relation between the characters Vladimir and Estragon in Samuel Beckett’s play *Waiting for Godot*. [Waiting for] Godot has long passages where the two men’s dialogue, if that is the word, is almost homogenous: their antiphonal lines sound like answering echoes within the same poem.’ (Peter 1988: 14)

Estragon: What shall we do now?
Vladimir: While Waiting.
Estragon: While Waiting. (Silence)
Vladimir: We could do our exercises.
Estragon: Our movements. 26
Vladimir: Our elevations.
Estragon: Our relaxations.
Vladimir: Our elongations.
Estragon: Our relaxations.
Vladimir: To warm us up.
Estragon: To calm us down.
Vladimir: Off we go. (Vladimir hops on one foot to the other. Estragon imitates him.)

(Beckett 2010)
In the collaboration between Tim Noble and Sue Webster the concept of ‘working together’ is overtly articulated in their attempt to sublimate the two collaborators into a unified third artist. Comparable to the identical attire of Gilbert & George and the homogenized gender identities of Ulay and Abramović, Noble and Webster enact a literal process of physical convergence through the use of the same black hair dye and the wearing of identical clothes. ‘Their work derives much of its power from its fusion of opposites, form and anti-form, high culture and anti-culture, male and female, craft and rubbish’ (timnobleandsuewebster.com). This ‘fusion’ of opposites adheres to a process of synthesisation and consequently raises the question as to whether or not artist-to-artist identities (perceived as a third force) perform the preservation and privilege of homogeneity. A ‘third entity represents the midpoint between two systems. It is here, at the center of the tension of opposites, that collaboration is born. The process does not mirror one energy system or the other but the integration of these dualities.’ [sic.] (Crawford 2008: 263). This statement suggests that an oppositional relation exists between collaborators and that the integration of these dualities must be enacted in order to generate collaboration. Artistic collaborations may be considered to ‘run a common risk of becoming incorporated into the system they are reacting against.’ (Billing 2007: 8).

Collaboration is a method of artistic practice commonly utilized in the deconstruction of authorialism and ‘as an alternative to contemporary individualism

Not left, not right, but somewhere in the middle with all the worst aspects of both left and right. Is there a fourth way?

(Murray H., 2009, It’s Not Rocket Science and Other Irritating Modern Clichés, Piatkus Books Ltd: 153)

We: A way of saying ‘I’ when you feel like sounding schizophrenic.
and the traditional role of the romantic artist as a solitary genius.’ (Billing 2007: 28). It is perhaps necessary to situate this collaborative discourse in a theoretical framework relating to authorialism, thus establishing the historical centrality of the artist as author. Foucault states that the author is an ‘ideological figure by which one marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation of meaning.’ (Foucault 2002[b]: 953). Foucault’s statement suggests that the traditionally privileged position of the author effects a limitation on potentiality. Barthes proposes the author as a tyrannical figure insistent upon an almost quasi-theological reading. This proverbial author-God appears to articulate a logocentric attitude toward authorship and as such affirms authorial centrality. The historical author/artist, when believed in, is regarded as an expressive, individual voice, an author-God, and is commonly considered to be an originator of meaning. In The Death of the Author Barthes suggests that assigning a text an author is to impose a single meaning on that work and thus limit its potential. (The supposed ‘death of the author’ in the Twentieth Century may be seen as analogous to the supposed death of God during the enlightenment of the Nineteenth Century).

*The Gods are dead but they have died from laughing, on hearing one God claim to be the only one. (Deleuze 2006: 4)*

believe 1. accept as true or as conveying the truth


The real truth an incalculable gamble

The Sun, 8 Jan 2013 The Guardian, 8 Jan 2013
To accept an authorial meaning is arguably to reinforce the hierarchical binary opposition between the author and the reader. This binary relation may be perceived as the persistence of an oppositional logic and the maintenance of a reciprocal condition between major and minor ideologies. A deconstructionist response to the ‘death of the author’ may be said to manifest itself in the birth of the reader, a concept theoretically offering the possibility for meaning to proliferate beyond a single trajectory. Paradoxically, the birth of the reader may be perceived as a simple reversal of major and minor positions where one term continues to form the axiomatic foundation of the other. This text attempts to destabilize the hierarchical relation between the author and the reader through a digressive movement between the noetic text and the poetic footnote. This gesture does not simply proffer the production of multiplicity but operates as a process to displace the pursuit of finite meaning.

A process implies the idea of a permanent rupture in established equilibria. (Guattari 2006: 420)

The established equilibria of a collaboration may be said to manifest itself in the stasis of a third identity. This third identity appears to replicate a traditional

(Dramatic theme tune) PRESENTER: And so to our first contender. Good evening. Your name please? CONTESTANT: Ah Good Evening. PRESENTER: Your chosen subject is answering questions before they are asked, this time you have chosen to answer the question before last each time, is that correct? CONTESTANT: Charlie Smithers. PRESENTER: And your time starts now. What is Palaeontology? CONTESTANT: Yes absolutely correct. PRESENTER: What is the name of the directory that lists members of the peerage? CONTESTANT: A study of old fossils. PRESENTER: Who are Len Murray, and Sir Geoffrey Howe? CONTESTANT: Berks. PRESENTER: Correct. What is the difference between a donkey and an ass? CONTESTANT: One is a trade union leader, the others a member of the Cabinet. PRESENTER: Complete the quotation ‘to be or not to be’. CONTESTANT: They are both the same.

The Two Ronnies, 1980, Mastermind
model of authorialism and thus exchanges one dominant ideology for another, a single authority for a collective authority. Gabri ‘cautions against collaboration as formalism, a risk that intensifies when interest in collaboration increases’ (Billing 2007: 14). Gabri’s cautionary statement gives emphasis to collaboration as an established practice and its subsequent incorporation into the stabilizing system this text attempts to disrupt. This discourse seeks to rearticulate the ‘third’ of artist-to-artist collaborations through the affirmation of the dialogic process implicit in collaborative practice. The ‘product’ of art practice, whether a traditional art object or the identity of an artist (Gilbert & George) typically holds a logocentric position and thus, a proposed emphasis upon dialogic process is, in itself, a repositioning; a digression from the centrality of representation.

\[\text{Digression – the life of dialogue – is one of the main antagonists of the monologic principle. (Sandywell 2010: 298)}\]

The non-oppositional process of collaborative dialogue resists the inherited culture of negative dialectics (thesis/antithesis) and as such may hold the potential to resist the stasis of a third term. Collaborative dialogue is theoretically opposed to monologism and its cooperative premise positions dialogic triumph as an act of

\[\text{Ten Commandments for matthews & allen (after Gilbert & George)}\]

Thou shalt never say never
Thou shalt not have mind over matter
Thou shalt count your chickens before they are hatched
Thou shalt not stand to reason
Thou shalt not stitch in time to save nine
Thou shalt not keep a stiff upper lip
Thou shalt be a fool like an old fool
Thou shalt go backwards and forwards
Thou shalt have your cake and eat it
Thou shalt not keep your friends close and your enemies closer
futility. ‘Thesis and antithesis, through noise, provide synthesis at rest, in equilibrium. But this work of the negative drives out, banishes, excludes the middle, the third position.’ (Serres 1997: 78). This ‘third position’ introduced by Serres is not the consensual third of collaborative unity or Hegelian synthesis and as such suggests a potential disruption to the stasis of the metaphysical third term.

We have known places where dialogue [has] flourished: two people in search of truth struggle to exclude the noise between them that prevents their hearing each other, and try to include in their midst the meaning born from the intersection of their vocabularies and the interlacing of their good will. Dialogue is played out between [three] people, the two who appear to speak, plus the excluded third, their demon. (Serres 2008: 330)

Serres suggests that to ‘hold a dialogue is to suppose a third man and seek to exclude him.’ (Serres 1982: 67). Perhaps it is in the duplicitous etymology of the term collaboration that a connection to the Serresean third man may be found. Our general understanding of the term collaboration is to ‘work jointly esp. in a literary or artistic production’; however, a second meaning shadows this conception; to ‘cooperate traitorously with an enemy’ (Pearsall & Trumble 1995). The Serresean third is

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1949, The Third Man
not a unifying force, a third hand or a gesture toward consensus but rather the background noise that is with or through (dia) all matter.

Macbeth: What is that noise?
(Act V, scene IV)

Serres suggests that the clamour of opinion vociferated in dialectical battle or in dialogic triumph serves to render the third man imperceptible; however, a collaborative dialogue conceived as a non-oppositional process is arguably uninhibited by the noise of a dialectic and thus may permit the Serresean third man to be heard. If collaborative dialogue resists the language of opposition and conflation, then how does this practice operate? Collaboration, perceived as an act of alliance, does not presuppose unity but acknowledges the non-oppositional practice implicit in ‘working together’. ‘At the outset, it was less a matter of sharing a common understanding than sharing the sum of our uncertainties’ (Dosse 2001: 8). Perhaps it is in the Deleuzian conception of ‘a’ multiplicity that a suitable theoretical perspective for this discourse on collaborative practice may be established. Deleuze suggests that we should adopt the word multiplicity as a noun inferring ‘a’ multiplicity.
Multiplicities are not parts of a greater whole that have been fragmented, and they cannot be considered manifold expressions of a single concept or transcendent unity. (Parr 2010: 181)

The non-oppositional process of collaborative dialogue silences the clamour of dialectical battle; however, in order to resist a culture of synthesis, collaboration may be re-imagined as ‘a’ multiplicity, a force that is multiple in itself. ‘In a multiplicity what counts are not the terms or the elements but what there is between’ (Lomax 2000: 138). Serres proposes background noise as the excluded third man, a force that is between and within all matter. The excluded third is situated as an agent of potentiality, a noise, an exception to the rule, a jolt of chaos that fluctuates to disrupt equilibria.

Listen twofold. But listen even harder to that which is relegated to the background. Yes, listen to that other noise, which is in the background, just within earshot.

And what can be heard? Indeed, what is sounded?

Answer: the restlessness of the world; the agitation that lies at the bottom of the world; the turbulence that turns the world; the boundless sounds of the world as it perturbs and excites itself as it

MATTHEWS: What is it?

ALLEN: My question is this. Is dialogue, capable, is dialogue capable of sustaining demagoguery..............................
ceaselessly becomes and comes undone. And what a cacophony comes from this, what a commotion. Some would call this chaos. And some would call this disorder. (Lomax 2004: 11-12)

Lomax suggests a common cultural perspective wherein chaos and disorder are perceived as negative conditions. It is in the story of Babel that this privilege of unity and order may be reconsidered.

The Tower of Babel remains incomplete, never to become numerically one. (Lomax 2004: 27-8)

The myth of Babel describes the construction of a tower. The Tower of Babel is an attempt to reach the heavens and its initial success is the product of linguistic unity. According to biblical account, punishment is placed upon the people of Babel, serving to confound their language: Etymologically, Babel is taken from the Hebrew word ‘balal’, meaning to jumble. The homogenous language uniting the people of Babel in the single act of constructing a tower is confused, thus transforming Babel into babble.

37 cont.

MATTHEWS: Demagoguery?

ALLEN: Demagoguery..............................................................................................................................
Babble, babel - whichever way you say it, it's a confused medley of sounds, a noisy assembly. Babel, babble, babel, babble: the ignorant are accused of this; it is said they don't understand. Make sense. Don't babble. (Lomax 2004: 27-8)

To babble is to make an incoherent noise that refuses conformity to traditional linguistic systems. Our cultural understanding of the term babble is the communication of nonsense, idle talk and noise; however, what latent potentialities reside in the unofficial locutionary act of babbling? The confusion of tongues articulated in the myth of Babel is comparable to the complexity and multiplicity of meaning and suggests the impossibility of universal understanding. ‘The tower of Babel does not merely figure the irreducible multiplicity of tongues; it exhibits an incompleteness, the impossibility of finishing.’ (Derrida 1985: 218). In the myth of Babel, God confuses a homogenous language to create plural tongues and thus an anomalous multiplicity. The mythical scattering of language is perceived as having confounded the unity necessary for raising the tower and consequently heterogeneity is reinforced as a condition of failure.

Babel is not a failure, it is at that very moment when the tower is dismantled that we begin to understand that one must understand without concepts. (Serres 1997: 123)

MATTHEWS: By demagoguery you mean?

ALLEN: By demagoguery I mean demagoguery..........................
Noise, babble and disorder commonly hold negative connotations amidst the ideology of unity and ‘as for loud theories, don’t they in their shouting out drown out that background noise which I am trying to hear?’ (Lomax 2004: 24). The narrative of Babel suggests the concept of incompleteness, heterogeneity and multiplicity. The attempt to construct a tower at Babel was dependent upon a universal language, a condition perhaps paralleled by the normative traditions of noetic writing; however, this attempt to preserve universality is unsettled by an anomalous and chaotic multiplicity. The footnotes in this text attempt to perform the confusion of tongues articulated in the myth of Babel and thus serve to unsettle the cultural privilege awarded to homogenous and unitary systems.

The disruptive concept of babble suggests a connection to the elements of dialogue commonly considered superfluous to a traditional and idealized model of communication.

37 cont.

MATTHEWS: I thought so.

ALLEN: I mean UM highly charged oratory, persuasive, whipping up rhetoric. Listen to me! Listen to me! If Plato had been British would we under similar circumstances have been moved, charged up, fired up by his inflammatory speeches or would we have simply laughed. Is dialogue too ironic, to sustain Platonian styles. Would his notion have simply run false in our ears…………………...
[In] the dialectical game, the relationship from Self to Other (sender to receiver, as interchangeable roles) is too easily seen as antagonistic, as two interlocutors doing battle, each trying to enslave the other. (Rasch 2000: 58)

Serres suggests that a dialogic battle of thesis and antithesis is unified through a mutual gesture seeking to overpower the pervasive background noise. Paradoxically, a dialectical method cannot offer an antithesis to noise; the only means of eliminating noise is to create more noise (the clamour of opposing perspectives). This discourse situates the anomalous elements of dialogue (the background noise), elements commonly considered to be nonsensical and disruptive, as potentialities: ‘applications, translations, interferences, communications, passages and distributions which would draw its fluctuating map, sometimes its labyrinth, its metastable network, its becoming’ (Serres 2008: 331). If western metaphysics has traditionally opposed anomaly and exception through privileging unity and dualism, then how can the Serresean third man be perceived above this dialectical noise? It is perhaps in the concept of interruption, a force generally considered disruptive in an idealized model of communication, that the digressive third position of Serresean philosophy may be performed.

37 cont.

MATTHEWS: We are talking about things running false in our ears.

ALLEN: UM. May I compartmentalise. I hate to, but may I? May I? Is dialogue a function of our British cynicism, tolerance, resistance to false emotion, humour, and so on or do those qualities come extrinsically, extrinsically from the dialogue itself. It’s a chicken and egg problem..................................................................................................................
POZZO: (angrily) Don’t interrupt me! (Pause. Calmer.) If we all speak at once we’ll never get anywhere (Pause.) What was I saying? (Pause. Louder.) What was I saying?

(Beckett 2010)

In Blanchot’s text The Infinite Conversation, the concept of interruption is introduced as an integral component of dialogue. Interruption for Blanchot does not always perform a rupture or disruption in conversation but may serve to facilitate communication. As two protagonists engage in conversation the ‘coherent discourse they carry on is composed of sequences that are interrupted when the conversation moves from partner to partner, even if adjustments are made so that they correspond to one another. The fact that speech needs to pass from one interlocutor to another in order to be confirmed, contradicted, or developed shows the necessity of interval.’ (Blanchot 1993: 75). This necessity of interval suggests that a dialogue is always fragmented as it moves from one interlocutor to another and that interruption permits exchange. The dialogic adjustments introduced by Blanchot may be considered to perform within the vectors of dialectical synthesis: ‘Interrupting for the sake of understanding’ (Blanchot 1993: 76). However, for Blanchot, like Serres, dialectical opposition does not represent a decisive separation but rather two enemies in a

MATTHEWS: We are talking about chickens. We’re talking about eggs.

ALLEN: UM. Let me start a duologue here. UM. There’s language (pause) and there’s speech. Um. There’s, there’s a speech (pause) and there’s a dialogue. Mark the difference for me!? Mark the difference for me please!!
relation of unity. Blanchot offers a further conception of interruption understood as
foreignness, ‘a curvature of the universe; that is a distortion preventing any
possibility of symmetry and introducing between things, and particularly between
man and man, a relation of infinity.’ (Blanchot 1993: 81). Blanchot reconsiders the
notion of interruption through eliminating negative connotations and repositioning it
as a generative and infinite potentiality seeking escape from the limitations of third
terms and unified phenomena. Interruption is a ‘subtle ventiloquism’ extend[ing]
the principle of dialogue far beyond the two interlocutors who are […] actually
present.’ (Womack 2011: 15).

The principles of dialogue may be extended to include digression, the
interposition of delay and deferral from presuppositions and linear trajectories. The
concept of digression as a process of deferral may be aligned with Derridean
différance, a neologism derived from the French verb différer combining its double
meaning (‘to differ’ and ‘to defer’) to create a noun that oscillates between the two.
The acknowledgment that logocentrism cannot be deconstructed by an oppositional
logic may have given rise to the concept of différance, where meaning escapes the
metaphysical tradition of unity to encounter the undecidability of meaning
(undecidability is not indecision but an acknowledgment of alterity and anomaly in
language). The interplay between perspectives in this text (an interplay between text
and footnote and between the two interrelated theses) is conceived as a gesture

PUPPET: against the dialogizing
background this is the end of an epoch

MATTHEWS: We have moved on to dialogue.
toward Derridean différance where meaning enters into a process of deferral. The Latin differre, meaning to detour or delay, is considered in relation to the verb differ, suggesting a temporality that delays completion and presence to encounter difference and exception (presence, in this context, is aligned with concepts of representation and stasis). Différance may be said to dislocate presence and subsequently generate a trajectory that fluctuates between traditional binary oppositions. The movement of différance is that ‘which disorganizes ‘historically’, ‘practically’, [and] textually, the opposition or the difference (the static distinction) between opposing terms.’ (Derrida, 2004[a]: 6). Derrida demonstrates this oscillating gesture through the metaphysical privilege afforded to speech over writing (proposed by Austin, et al.), a privilege disrupted through the philosophy of différance: The discreet change from difference to différance silently deconstructs the binary order of speech and writing. Derrida suggests that différance belongs to neither speech nor writing and alternatively exists in a space beyond or between these two terms: ‘It belongs to no category of being, present or absent.’ (Derrida 1968: 259). The mark of distinction between the terms difference and différance remains inaudible. This mute irony may be overlooked as an erroneous deviation from linguistic convention; however, the mere recognition of this infraction serves to reinforce the disruptive potential of différance. In the 1968 paper Différance Derrida proposes the concept of ‘interposition’ where what is possible or present is made impossible by a process of

Movement; the act or an instance of moving or being moved
Course; a continuous onward movement or progression
Process; a course of action or procedure
Direction; the act or process of directing; supervision
Clockwise; in a curve corresponding in direction to the hands of a clock
Veer; change direction
Change; the act or an instance of making or becoming different
Instance; a particular case
Exception; an instance that does not follow a rule

deferral and delay. Différance suggests that every concept is part of a sequence or system within which it is subject to the ‘play of difference’. For Derrida the concept of play is not simply an activity but the production of difference though a movement of deferral. Différance is ‘the de-limitation of ontology (of presence)’ and therefore deconstructs the hierarchy privileging presence over absence, thus ‘play [jeu] remains beyond this opposition’ (Derrida 1968: 259 & 272). The theory of différance questions and disrupts the determination of presence as finitude and thus ‘[d]ifférance can refer to the whole complex of its meaning at once.’ (Derrida 1968: 260). Différance resists the collapse of multiplicity into a consensual third term and may offer an alternative to the limitations of opposition and consensus in collaboration’s history.

"a closer analysis of collaborative and collective art practices can reveal a more complex model of social change and identity, one in which binary oppositions of divided vs. coherent subjectivity, desiring singularity vs. totalizing collective, liberating distanciation vs. stultifying interdependence, are challenged and complicated. (Kester 2001: 89)"

multiplicity, profusion, host, swarm, flock, herd, drove, flight, hive, brood, litter, nest, crowd …
It is proposed that différance performs between either/or dichotomies and as such serves to generate a culture of deferment, continually postponing unity to encounter anomaly and difference. When différance is applied to collaborative dialogue it ‘includes stuttering, ellipses, and inarticulate sounds’, digressions that are commonly considered extraneous in the cultural inclination toward homogeneity (Dosse 2001: 9).

The proposition that a master narrative ‘is a multiple reduced to the unitary’ acknowledges the theory of dialogism as being implicit in all philosophies, their histories and future potentialities (Serres 1997: 108). Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism effects disruption in the monograph, suggesting the interplay of perspectives rather than their consensus. Bakhtinian dialogism may be perceived as the interaction of concepts that potentially proliferate to create an ‘open work’, thus performing resistance to the fixity of authorialism. An undialogised work may be considered to be authoritative and absolute thus, as Lomax suggests, all acts of determination are also acts of negation (negating difference). Bakhtinian dialogism suggests that an author cannot remove the marks of citationality or an inherent ‘interaction between meanings.’ (Bakhtin 1981: 426). The homogeneity and apparent indivisibility of Gilbert & George is no exception to the Bakhtinian rule. Gilbert & George retain the citational marks of the odd couple Morecambe and Wise, George’s Eric to Gilbert’s Ernie. Dialogism provides scope for the inclusion of peripheral matter, the
background noise that is traditionally excluded from an idealized model of communication or the search for autocratic meaning.

Dialogism and différance suggest that a 'text must have retained a mark of what it lost or put in reserve, set aside.' (Derrida 1968: 275). The ‘aside’ proffered by Derrida aligns this discourse with the notion of paralogism and the proposition that there is something to the side of the logos (the logos conceived as a major language) and thus proposes all phenomena as multiple. The inherent multiplicity in the term différance (meaning both to defer and to differ) serves as a metaphor for the existent multiplicity in all language systems.43

In the end, it is a strategy without finality. (Derrida 1968: 259)

The parallel relation between the metaphysical third term and the third hand of modernist collaboration44 affirms a cultural propensity toward unity. In the context of a proposed disruption to autocratic meaning, the synthesized third of collaboration theory may be reconfigured as a non-oppositional multiplicity. The non-oppositional process of collaborative dialogue is proposed as a method to include noise,45 babble, exception46 and anomaly, effectively generating difference through dialogic différance. The collective intention of collaborative practice suggests a resistance

43 I wonder if illiterate people get the full effect of alphabet soup. (Jerry Seinfeld)

44 Well, here’s another nice mess you’ve gotten me into. (Laurel and Hardy)

45 My definition of an intellectual is someone who can listen to the William Tell Overture without thinking of the lone ranger. (Billy Connolly)

46 I never forget a face, but in your case I’d be glad to make an exception. (Groucho Marx)
to traditional notions of opposition and ‘implies shared aims and objectives, win-win, equality.’ (Fremantle 2012). The Derridean theory of différance and Bakhtinian theory of dialogism suggest that multiplicity is implicit in all systems; however, this inherent flux\textsuperscript{47} is arguably obscured by a cultural heritage that privileges the stasis of representation, metaphysical third terms and unified phenomena.

\textit{Any power is a multiple reduced to the unitary.} (Serres 1997: 108)
The ‘Pataphysical Third
In *The Birth of Physics*, Serres suggests that the logic of duality must be opened to plurality. It is within the metaphysical traditions of dualism and opposition that the possibility for digression may be generated. It is proposed that the term ‘versus’, commonly positioned between the opposing arguments of a dialectic (one versus other), may be reconsidered in the context of its Latin root ‘vertere’ meaning to turn. Turning is ‘an agitation that produces turbulence, which in its turning may, possibly, open up the chance for the creation of the new.’ (Lomax 2004: 29). In Serresean philosophy turbulence serves to disrupt and unsettle the reiteration of ordered phenomena, the normative and the standard.

References to the clinamen in recent theory deal with the entry of chance into an ordered universe and the subsequent breakup of order and chaos into a universe lodged between the probable and the exceptional. (Abbas 2005: 61)

The clinamen is a concept taken from ancient atomic theory referring to the spontaneous deviation of an atom, a movement comparable with the digressive

Deleuze mockingly refers to the dialectic as a donkey, wearily carrying the weight of the world on its back as it laboriously works its way through history.

character of Derridean différance. Différance rejects the concept of a reductive binary paradigm and yet operates within this logic of opposition to enact its oscillating multiplicity. As Derrida suggests, différance resists finitude and dislocates presence through a process of deferral. ‘The clinamen then may stand for différance, and for the moment of invention among the play of constraints [or rules]’ (Brannigan 1999: 130). It may be suggested that the ‘constraints’ introduced by Brannigan refer to the conventions that govern a logocentric culture and thus the clinamen signifies that which generates ‘vagaries that diverge from what directs them, escaping the events of the system that controls them.’ (Bök 2001: 43). The clinamen proffers the potential to digress from a hegemonic order and a reconsideration of the supposed binary positions of noetic and poetic practices.

The clinamen is a scientific concept that metaphorically generates potential to resist the stasis of determinism (the oxymoronic phraseology of a ‘scientific metaphor’ is suggestive of an equivalence between metaphysical dichotomies wherein oppositional characters are situated within the same narrative field).

*If it were not for this swerve, everything would fall downwards like raindrops through the abyss of space. No collision would take place and no impact of atom upon atom would be created. Thus nature would never have created anything.* (Lucretius 2007: 43)

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49

**Gablehauser:** I need your official answer.

**Sheldon:** Well, it's not what he said.

**Gablehauser:** Then what is it?

**Sheldon:** I want a different question.

**Gablehauser:** You can't have a different question.

**Sheldon:** Formal Protest!

**Gablehauser:** Denied!

**Sheldon:** Informal Protest!

**Gablehauser:** Denied! I need your official answer.

**Sheldon:** No, I decline to provide one.

**Gablehauser:** Well, that's too bad, because the answer your teammate gave was correct.

**Sheldon:** That's your opinion.

(The Big Bang Theory, *The Bat Jar Conjecture*, series 1, episode 13)
Serreanean philosophy offers a reimagining of the clinamen and adopts Lucretius’ poem *De rerum natura* (On the nature of things) as a ’creative science of change and circumstance [which] interrupts the reign of the same’ (Serres 1982: 3-4). For Lucretius the swerve of the atom (clinamen) serves as a metaphor for multiplicity in language and arguably anticipates a contemporary understanding of non-linear dynamics and chaos theory. ‘Lucretius draws an analogy between atoms and words, arguing both substance and utterance result from a random complex of combinations and permutations.’ (Bök 2001: 44). The permutations implied in Lucretius’ text may be applied to the interposition of the letter ‘a’ in the word difference that enacts Derridean différance. Similar combinations and permutations may be observed in McCaffrey’s poetics where letters are replaced in a process that interrupts the expectation of textual linearity. ‘The unpredictable swerve of the letter from the laminar flow of syntax and grammar invalidates the notion of a fixed, inert meaning.’ (McCaffrey 2001: 21).

The binary system that Derridean différance attempts to dismantle may be perceived as a system of constraints within which a turning may be performed. This system of constraints ‘must not be rigid, there must be some play in it, it must, as they say, ‘creak’ a bit; it must not be completely coherent; there must be a clinamen’ (McCaffrey & Rasula 2001: 534). It is in this ‘creaking’ between order (the constraint) and chaos (the clinamen) that an exception to the oppositional rule may be situated.
In the context of writing, a clinamen indicates digression from monologism to deviation and anomaly.

A small deviation (a swerve) that can operate as the germ of something new, a deviation that creates schizzes in an existing regime whilst opening up a gap where possibility can enter. (These glitches, or points of indeterminacy open up the possibility of a multiplicity of pathways, and thus a multiplicity of possible worlds). (O’Sullivan 2006: 154)

Matthews and Allen’s footnotes attempt to perform a series of ‘schizzes’ within the existent regime of academic writing. The ‘glitch’ that O’Sullivan refers to may be conceptualized as an act of turning away from a noetic ideology and thus serves as a method to generate anomaly and difference. ‘To affirm an elsewhere we have to turn from that which is already here.’ (O’Sullivan 2009: 251). Both the glitch and clinamen resist the fixity of representation and operate as indeterminate phenomena deviating from the fate of contrivance. Lucretius refers to atoms as the ‘seeds of things’, particles that are perpetually moving and colliding. For Lucretius, the logic of the clinamen is located in the constant motion of the atom where the anticipated trajectory of particles deviates to generate anomalous collisions. ‘Such assemblages
empower the clinamen to install puns, acrostics, anagrams, metagrams, paragrams, and textual parapraxes’ (McCaffrey 2001: 21). The movement of the clinamen is proposed as a resistance to determinism and as an advocacy of the exception to the noetic rule. In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze proposes the clinamen as an ‘irreducible plurality’ and thus characteristic of the impossibility for unitary and subsequently closed systems to be maintained. (Deleuze 2004[b]: 269). The clinamen creates turbulence in a striated system and enables particles to form temporary alliances (alliances akin to those formed between the noetic text and the poetic footnote). The clinamen, conceived as ‘the tiniest possible angle of contingency that initiates a turbulence within the laminar flow - needs no other referent than the intrinsic one of the flow.’ (Lomax 2004: 29). A striated system suggests linearity, a system in which Lucretius’ atomic flow may remain laminar; however, Deleuze and Guattari propose smooth space as a means to ‘disrupt the striations of conventional space’ (Parr 2010: 257). In many of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical texts the virtual is aligned with ‘smooth spaces’ wherein that which is smooth suggests the mathematical idea of a structure with infinite derivatives. The concept of smooth and striated space should not be perceived as that which adheres to an oppositional logic but rather as a relation where striated space emits smooth spaces. In The Birth of Physics, Serres proposes the clinamen as an element of smooth space, a space where a generative turning is enacted.
The turbulence generated by the clinamen effectively performs a resistance to the binarism of cause and effect and thus enters into a philosophy of *causa sui*, the cause in itself. *'The clinamen, the 'swerve' and the turning [...] are not a deviation from the straightforward path of order, [but] rather a path which invents itself'* (Lomax 2000: 201). The concept of ‘a path which invents itself’ finds an association with autopoiesis and, as Serres suggests, a system that is both productive and destructive, ordered and chaotic. Autopoiesis, taken from the Greek meaning ‘self’ and ‘creation’, implies that difference may be generated in itself. The notion of difference, in its traditional conception, may return this discourse to a binary order, presupposing difference as the variance between two conditions. Difference has traditionally been understood as difference from a dominant ideology; however, through the concept of ‘difference in itself’ Deleuze suggests that this oppositional logic may be disrupted from within the system: a ‘difference in itself’.

Deleuze proposes that each repetition (repetition conceived as the reiteration of cultural norms) generates difference. *'The marking of the same territory takes place against the background of a variation in intensities between one parade and another.'* (Williams 2003: 12). Deleuze proposes that each repetition is not a repetition of the same but a variation understood as difference. Deleuze refers to Nietzsche’s *Eternal Return* and denies repetition as a cyclical system that repeats mimetically,

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53 An alphabet is a finite set $A$ of letters, and a finite sequence of letters is a word in $A$; if $A := \{a; b; c; o; t\}$, then words include act, boat, and obbbt, for example. The vertex set $W$ of the associated word graph $\Gamma(A)$ consists of all possible words in $A$. Words $w_1$ and $w_2$ are joined by an edge if and only if they differ by one of
1. inserting or deleting a letter
2. swapping two adjacent letters
3. replacing one letter with another.

Then the 'word metric' $d_w$ on $W$ is the edge metric on the associated word graph. Thus $d_w(\text{act, boat}) = 3$ and $d_w(\text{act, obbbt}) = 4$, via paths such as act, bact, baot, boat and act, abt, bbt, bbbt, obbbt respectively.
repositioning our thinking of repetition as produced by means of difference. For Nietzsche, the *Eternal Return* is the production of diversity and the repetition of difference. The *Eternal Return*, for Deleuze and Nietzsche, must be considered as that which is opposed to stasis and thus the *Eternal Return* itself belongs to difference. It is not being (stasis) that returns but the act of returning that affirms a process of becoming (flux). The *Eternal Return* resists the cyclical philosophies that replicate static being and alternatively affirms a culture of difference in itself, *causa sui*. A principle of return positions the reiterative and citational methodologies existent in both text and paratext as proceeding within ‘a variation in intensities’ and proffers this text as that which ‘invents itself’.

*Being taking a turn and producing difference in itself.* (Lomax 2000: 210)

‘What is the logic of this process by which order becomes chaos and chaos becomes order?’ (Abbas 2005: 57). The interplay between order and chaos and the implementation of the clinamen as metaphor leads this discourse toward the principles of chaos theory. According to a deterministic model of science, every event is the result of a preceding event without deviation from predetermined rules. Determinism functions on the principle of cause and effect (a binary order) and as
such requires the study of what are termed ‘initial conditions’ (initial conditions refer to a set of preliminary values belonging to or imposed upon the system). Traditional scientific principles, including Newton's laws, are deterministic because they suggest that given the same initial conditions an identical effect will be produced. Scientific determinism is principally opposed to the notion of ‘difference in itself’ where repetition is the agent of difference. Contemporary scientific research, however, acknowledges that measurement is not infinitely accurate and therefore concedes that uncertainty is implicit. The scientific ambition to eradicate the minimal inaccuracies that lead to instability has been countered by speculation that the presence of chaos within the deterministic principles of physics (in an infinitesimally small quantity) may paradoxically generate ordered structures. Serrecean philosophy acknowledges the concept of chaos within Lucretius’ text and imagines an ‘ordered chaos’. The concept of ordered chaos denotes a condition wherein disorder emerges from apparent order. ‘Laminar flow, the figure of chaos, is at first sight a model of order […] Turbulence seems to introduce a disorder into this arrangement […] Disorder emerges from order’ (the academic text is a model of order wherein a clinametic movement between text to paratext effects disorder) (Serres 2001: 27).

The concept of ‘difference in itself’, the emergence of disorder from order, is comparable to the metaphoric turning of meaning from a fatalistic state of inertia to the performance of an exception to the metaphysical rule, thus escaping the binarism
of cause and effect. If the clinamen is conceived as a movement without cause or origin then it must be positioned philosophically, beyond a homogenized and determinable order. ‘We call this dark precursor, this difference in itself or difference in the second degree which relates to heterogeneous systems and even completely disparate things, the disparate.’ (Deleuze 2004[a]: 147). The dark precursor, or somber precursor, is introduced in the Deleuzian text *Difference and Repetition* as an imperceptible force that resists categorization. Deleuze suggests that every system or series contains dark precursors, agents that perform and in doing so interrupt the continuity of the existing system. The dark precursor may be aligned with those small inconsistencies, imperceptible differences, which create a turning from laminar flow to the production of anomaly and exception. Deleuze refers to the dark precursor as the differentiator, an operative third force that creates a relation between heterogeneous series, between text and paratext. The dark precursor generates a rupture in supposedly stable systems and creates a relation between supposedly disparate potentialities. ‘[E]very system contains its dark precursor which ensures communication of peripheral series’ and when two potentials enter into communication a reaction or event emerges (Deleuze 2004[a]: 145-6). The Deleuzian mark of a zigzag (Z) or lightening bolt, is that which illuminates after the imperceptible dark precursor (matthews and allen’s paratextual practice is a Deleuzian zigzag, a lightening bolt that materializes in the wake of the dark

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**Glossary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>zanyism</td>
<td>buffoonery</td>
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<tr>
<td>zazzy</td>
<td>flashy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zeroable</td>
<td>able to be omitted from a sentence without any loss of meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zetetic</td>
<td>proceeding by inquiry; a search or investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zeugma</td>
<td>use of a word to modify two or more words in different ways</td>
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<tr>
<td>zoism</td>
<td>doctrine that life originates from a single vital principle</td>
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<tr>
<td>zonary</td>
<td>of or like a zone; arranged in zones</td>
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<tr>
<td>zonelet</td>
<td>a little zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>zonoid</td>
<td>like a zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>zonule</td>
<td>small zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>zwischenzug</td>
<td>chess move made to play for time</td>
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<tr>
<td>zwitterion</td>
<td>ion carrying both a positive and negative charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zygodactylic</td>
<td>having two toes in front and two behind</td>
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<tr>
<td>zygology</td>
<td>science of joining and fastening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zygon</td>
<td>connecting bar</td>
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<tr>
<td>zygopleural</td>
<td>bilaterally symmetrical</td>
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precursor, the imperceptible background noise). ‘Something ‘passes’ between the borders, events explode, phenomena flash, like thunder and lightening’. (Deleuze 2004[a]: 144). The dark precursor performs a transgression of traditional borders, borders between noetic and poetic positions, and thus interrupts the establishment of a linear trajectory. Exceptions and anomalies generated by the dark precursor effectively connect ‘conscious acts and representations to determination by an unconscious, shifting, and insecure ground.’ (Smith & Sommers-Hall 2012: 42). The imperceptible character of the dark precursor resists determination and as such emerges as an aleatoric practice, nonsense, unthought. ‘It is the ultimate and self-determining source of determination, behind which there is nothing at all’ (Hallward 2006: 27).

The movement of the dark precursor serves to unsettle the equilibrium of ordered systems and yet this imperceptible force has the capacity to generate phenomena that may subsequently create other ordered systems, thus this dark precursor is commonly characterized as a paradox. The notion of paradox appears significant in a discourse where order and chaos perform simultaneously; doxa referring to the dominant ideology (order) and paradoxa placed in opposition (chaos). The paradox is situated ‘to the side’ of the doxa and always makes reference to it. In an attempt to question the relation between doxa and paradoxa Barthes formulated a third term, the Neutral (±). ‘I define the Neutral as that which outplays the paradigm.

the darkest hour is just before the dawn
before you can say Jack Robinson
all work and no play makes Jack a dull boy
play both ends against the middle
in the middle of nowhere
appear out of nowhere
or rather I call Neutral everything that baffles paradigm.’ (Barthes 2008: 6). The Neutral is that which unsettles and baffles the paradigmatic binary and thus offers the possibility for a reconfiguration of the traditional third position of dialectical consensus. The Neutral adopts the character of plus-minus (±), a ‘pataphysical symbol, as a means ‘to equate things to each other in a system that values the norm of difference’ (Bök 2001: 11). (matthews and allen adopt the concept of a plus-minus relation (±) wherein a philosophical discourse and an idiomatic colloquialism may equate to each other).

Deleuze refers to the dark precursor as that which is invisible and imperceptible, suggesting that any attempt to determine the dark precursor’s origin will result in an approximation from which the initial conditions are indeterminable. If we accept that the dark precursor is an element without origin then it may be possible to escape the limitations of a cause and effect paradigm. (matthews and allen do not attempt to determine their dark precursors but rather invite these agents of disorder into their collaborative system).

The elusive dark precursor finds a parallel with Lewis Carroll’s Snark, a
The Snark is resistant to a traditional configuration of identity and, like the dark precursor, is a disembodied force. The interplay between sense and nonsense in Carroll's writing posits language as an inventive and fluid process. In *The Hunting of the Snark* Carroll introduces a map (an object traditionally associated with the determination of territories) that contains nothing, a 'perfect and absolute blank!' Carroll’s map is a blank domino, a joker, the Snark, having no character of its own it is a potentiality. (Carroll 2009: 56).

*These are the procedures of the dark precursor, the elements of chance and necessity and the transversal movements that induce resonances in collateral objects and infuse new forms into the lifeless matter of the virtual.* (Sheerin 2009: 101)

The concept of the clinamen is of significance in Alfred Jarry's *pataphysics, a science of exceptions which attempts to challenge notions of universality. 'Pataphysics is described as the science of imaginary solutions and proposes a culture of equivalence through the collapse of the traditional dichotomy between science and poetry. This dichotomy arguably persists in a culture where the 'scientific and the novelistic are opposed to and repel one another' (Abbas 2005: 10). (The proposed equivalence between text and paratext in this research may therefore

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**Falstaff:** How now, how now, mad wag! what, in thy quips and thy quiddities?
(Shakespeare *Henry IV*, Act I Scene i)

**Fool:** Thou hast pared thy wit o' both sides and left nothing i' th' middle.
(Shakespeare, *King Lear*, Act I, scene iv)

**Clown:** It is like a barber's chair that fits all buttocks, the pin-buttock, the quatch-buttock, the brawn buttock, or any buttock.
(Shakespeare, *All's Well That Ends Well*, Act II, scene ii)

**Bottom:** No more words: away! go, away!
(Shakespeare, *Midsummer Nights Dream*, Act IV, scene ii)
be characterized as ‘Jarry-esque’).

The implementation of the clinamen (a scientific concept) as a metaphor (a poetic device) for 'pataphysical thought effectively generates a culture of equivalence between noetic and poetic disciplines. ‘The ‘pataphysician does not counteract science so much as exaggerate science, adopting it parodically and applying it excessively, in order to destroy it ultimately by exhausting its imaginary potential.’ (Bök 2001: 102). (Matthews and Allen parodically adopt the academic footnote ‘exhausting its imaginary potential’). Pataphysics is frequently described as a pseudophilosophy or an antiphilosophy, observing that which lies beyond metaphysics: ‘Put metaphysics behind pataphysics and you merely make it into a façade for a belief. But the essence of pat. is that it is a façade for a façade, with nothing behind it.’ (Torma 2003: 58). A façade suggests that what is actual is only one perspective and thus situates the supposed continuity of actuality as illusory. Deconstructionists frequently refer to the Nietzschean assertion that determinate truths do not exist, thus proffering the concept of perspectival interpretation. Nietzschean perspectivism is resistant to the concept of objective reality and alternatively suggests that all ideations take place from particular perspectives, inferring that there can be no universal truth only a myriad of potentialities. The philosophies of Jarry and Nietzsche reject the notion of a panoptic view and any subsequent claims to universality. Perspectivism serves to undermine a
methodological orthodoxy and the assertion that a complete understanding may be attained through multiple perspectives (an assertion which, for the ‘pataphysician, is the affirmation of paradigmatic unity). *The truth of the ludic abides by no belief; instead, such truth is entertained as one of many hypothetical alternatives. It is merely a “potentiality”.*’ (Bök 2001: 73).

Jean Luc Nancy, in his text *The Inoperative Community*, proposes a mythic community that performs by means of universality, commonality, the normative, and the standard. Nancy attempts to subsume multiplicity into a unity founded upon consensus and conciliation. *Perhaps the problem is [...] that there is too much forced commonality and prescribed collaboration today in the sense of social unanimity and political consensus*’ (Billing 2007: 19). ‘Pataphysics attempts to introduce uncertainty into a systematic ideology that privileges consensus.

> Jarry offers a poetic theory of contradictory undecidability, continually inverting a dyadic hierarchy, while momentarily subverting its mutual exclusion – neither cancelling nor surpassing the dialectic: not *Aufhebung*, but *Steigerung*. (Bök 2001: 33)

*Aufhebung* is a German word meaning both contradiction and synthesis, thus reminiscent of the dialectic; however, Jarry proposes *Steigerung*, meaning to

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What if there were no hypothetical situations?
increase, thus implying multiplicity. ‘Pataphysics is an imaginary science; there is no such authority as ‘pataphysics. The science of ‘pataphysics offers an alternative to the closed system of logocentrism by ‘making reality itself nothing more than a figment of our imagination.’ (Bök 2001: 126). In *Pataphysics and the Revelation of Laughter*, Daumal suggests that anything may be elevated to the category of God if we ‘adopt the attitude of the gentlemen who doesn’t laugh’. Under these circumstances everything and anything may assume the position of God: ‘And there it is: absurd and absolute multiplicity.’ (Daumal 2012: 12).

The ‘pataphysical exception, the exception to a logocentric rule, may find an associative relation with the concept of singularity in Deleuzian philosophy. In the Deleuzian lexicon the term ‘singularity’ has become integrally linked to a discourse on difference and exception. For Deleuze, singularity is a universal condition; the universal in this context does not refer to a common element but is an acknowledgment of the universality of continuous change. From a Deleuzian perspective, matter is in a constant state of flux; however, when some alteration or anomaly occurs it is, paradoxically, described as an exceptional or unique
phenomenon. The singular is the point at which something differs and defers from that which is commonplace. ‘There is no other to singularity’ and therefore no governing power to which the exception must refer (Lomax 2000: 178). ‘Surprise breaks the promise of the expected: it is the exception that disturbs the suspense of what we know must happen next’ (Bök 2001: 11). (The anticipated trajectory of this academic text is arguably ‘broken’ by a series of paratextual interruptions).

The complexity of ‘pataphysical thought lies in its resistance to classification and categorization; to attain an understanding of ‘pataphysics is to misunderstand this science of exceptions. ‘Pataphysics proffers an anti-systematic philosophy of exceptions. The Exploits of Dr. Faustroll is the imagining of an alternative ‘reality’, a world that may replace this world. Jarry suggests that ‘reality’ is never as it is but always as if it is, in that ‘reality’ only exists as one possibility. ‘Pataphysics narrates not what is, but what might have become.’ (Bök 2001: 8). A ‘pataphysical emphasis on potential rather than actual phenomena generates a culture of equivalence between

I know now that in the beginning
Chaos was lit by an immense burst of
laughter. In the beginning, Faustroll
laughed the world. (Daumal 2012: 12)

This we, those verses, Susan’s tears, these notes at the feet of certain pages. All shall be made clear, in time.

(Barth, J., 1982, Sabbatical, New York: Putnam)
traditionally opposed forces. ‘[Pataphysics] proceeds to become the plus-minus, embodying the idea of opposites as equivalent.’ (Hugill 2012: 11). In Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There, ‘pataphysical equivalence is established through the equality of cabbages and kings, sense and nonsense. The plus-minus (±) of ‘pataphysical equivalence represents that which is and is not simultaneously. The concept of a plus-minus (±) finds an association with Derridean undecidability where no hierarchy or privilege is established. It is in a ‘pataphysical turning from empirical science to aleatoric poetry that we encounter the particular, Deleuzian singularity, the exception to the rule. The ‘pataphysical clinamen ‘is the knowledge of the particular and the irreducible, therefore the reverse of physics.’ (Daumal 2012: 7).

What is the function of a clinamen in a ‘pataphysical (il)logic’? The movement of the clinamen is not an external force but a coextensive potential affirming the impossibility of determined phenomena. The ‘clinamen finds a way to detour around things in a system that values the fate of contrivance.’ (Bök 2001: 11). The clinamen creates turbulence within the system, performing in an intermediary position between order and chaos. The fluctuation generated by this clinametic swerve operates ‘as the germ of something new.’ (O’Sullivan 2006: 154). The clinamen ‘is able to slide through that dimension of reasoning which everyday logic reductively conceives of as a single immobile point.’ (Daumal 2012: 8). The clinamen is a temporal agent of multiplicity.

I before E except after C
Pride goes before a fall The bigger they are the harder they fall We’re number two, we try harder You never know what you can do till you try Never say never Don’t make me say it again! Make do and mend If you don’t make mistakes you don’t make anything Two heads are better than one Something is better than nothing And now for something completely different How now brown cow?
You tell me that a fluctuation is a tiny jot of chaos, indeed, a tiny jolt. And then you say that the jolt is an element of motely multiplicity. You say that it is a jot of noise. (Lomax 2004: 29)

The concept of background noise is proposed by Serres as a clinamen, an element of fluctuation and turbulence. In French the word for noise has multiple meanings inferring both a battle and auditory noise. Serres conceives communication as a game played between two interlocutors united in battle against the background noise that threatens to disrupt their dialogue. They are ‘united against the phenomena of interference and confusion, or against individuals with some stake in interrupting communication. These interlocutors […] battle together against noise.’ (Serres 1982: xxvi). In Serresean philosophy noise serves as a disruptive element, a ‘third man’, a
clinamen in communication. If, in a traditional model for communication, a message is to be passed between interlocutors then there must be no interference; the interlocutors must engage in a mutual battle against the background noise, thus resisting collaboration with the ‘enemy’.

No matter what their argument, the interlocutors are in no way opposed (as in the traditional concept of the dialectic); on the contrary, they play on the same side and together battle against a mutual enemy. And what is the enemy? The noise of the world that hums in the background and perpetually threatens to hum between them. (Lomax 2004: 13)

Traditionally, the dialectical game is understood as two interlocutors in battle, thus establishing an oppositional logic, however, in Serresean philosophy this dialectical battle is reconfigured as two interlocutors united against a common enemy, a third man, an unwelcome guest, a clinamen. Serres proposes that ‘to hold a dialogue, is to suppose a third man and seek to exclude him.’ (Serres 1982: 67). A Serresean dialogue requires two interlocutors and a method of communication from one to the other, thus a message moves through a middle. The space between interlocutors has the potential to effect communication and as such transform homogenous meaning. The

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**logical reasoning, ratiocination, dialectics, induction, generalisation. Argumentation, discussion, pourparler, controversy, polemics, debate, wrangling, logomachy, disputation, disceptation. (Phrases)** A paper war; a war of words; a full-dress debate. (Roget, P., 1912, *Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases*)
effective capacity of background noise upon which a dialogue is held is proposed as a space of potentiality wherein the message is exposed to multiplicity.

This research situates collaborative dialogue as a non-oppositional practice that, in its resistance to the ‘noise’ of dialectical tradition, has the potential to include the Serrecean third man. Collaborative dialogue may be understood as that which quietens the clamour of opposition associated with dialecticism and binarism. The fluctuating background noise of the Serrecean third man generates a jolt of chaos that schizzes and turns to disrupt the laminar flow. Serres proposes background noise (the excluded third man of dialogue) as a force that is within all matter. This continual presence of background noise suggests the possibility for exception and anomaly to be generated within what may be perceived to be stable and logocentric systems. In Serres’ *Genesis* we are encouraged to think outside of the metaphysical categories of unity and order. Serres suggests that multiplicity, although not necessarily reasoned or ordered, may be heard beneath the logocentric proclamations of rationality imposed by history and tradition.

*If noise is introduced, then the received message contains certain distortions, certain errors, certain extraneous material, that would certainly lead one to say that the received message exhibits, because of the effects of the noise, an increased uncertainty.* (Hainge 2013: 205)

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**generalisation** a general notion or proposition obtained by inference from particular cases. (Pearsall J., Trumble, B., 1995, *The Oxford English Reference Dictionary*)

**proposition** It is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no ground whatever for supposing it is true. (1941, *The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*)

**undesirable** a noun from the adjective indicating a person or thing that is unwanted. An undesirable is usually a foul creature that is detested by society. (www.urbandictionary.com)
Serres imagines background noise as a disruptive clinamen, a noisy potential. For Serres, homogenous systems are merely pockets of ordered relations resting upon a cacophony of noise. ‘Order is a rare island; it is an archipelago. Disorder is the common ocean from which these islands emerge.’ (Serres 2005: 13). Noise is commonly perceived as an unwelcome guest in an ideological system of dialogic exchange; however, for Serres, noise is aligned with multiplicity and potentiality. The parasitic third man of a dialogue is elevated from the role of irritant to a force from which a digressive and generative multiplicity may emerge.

In conventional academic writing a traditional binary relation may be said to exist between the author and the reader; however, when a digressive or parasitic force enters that system (matthews and allen’s footnotes) this closed field of communication may be said to escape linearity. matthews and allen’s footnotes attempt to articulate the possibility for meaning to bifurcate. These footnotes are indicative of the metaphorical noise situated in the background of all phenomena. matthews and allen’s footnotes compel the reader of this text to perform a clinametic movement between text and paratext, disrupting the striations of conventional academic space. The relation between the noetic academic text and poetic paratext suggests a ‘pataphysical plus-minus (±), the equivalence of cabbages and kings.

The resulting structure is a complex fabric, without center, hierarchy, person a category found in many languages that is used to distinguish between the speaker of an utterance and those to or about whom he or she is speaking. (2010, Random House Dictionary, Random House, Inc.)

utterance great opportunity for a hidden double meaning here. Utterance of course means 'saying,' or 'something said,' but an archaic use of the term means 'the bitter end,' i.e., as in 'fight to the utterance.' (Bowler, P., 2009, The Completely Superior person’s Book of Words)
or single organizing principle. The composite field is instead one of multiple elements, cohesive at one layer but disjunct in relation to others’ (Abbas 2005: 6).

**double talk** talk that is calculated to mislead.

(Gulland, D., 1986 The Penguin Dictionary of English Idioms)

**mislead** to reason ill, falsely, to pervert, quibble, equivocate, mystify, evade, elude, gloss over, varnish, misjudge, miscalculate. (Roget, P., 1912, Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases)

**reason** without rhyme or reason without sense, reason or a logical system.


**system** I must Create a System, or be enslav’d by another Man’s; I will not Reason and Compare: my business is to Create. (Blake, W., Jerusalem, IN, 1953, The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations)
The Parasitic Third
The parasite intervenes, enters the system as an element of fluctuation. (Serres 2007: 191)

The parasite is proposed as an agent of disruption within a system arguably constrained by an oppositional logic. Serres proposes the oppositional dialogue synonymous with traditional dialectics (A-B) as effectively performing a reciprocal gesture. The interlocutors engaged in dialectical battle\(^6\) share a common objective, to exclude the unwelcome guest that threatens to disrupt their communication. This common objective paradoxically positions the dialectic as monologic (A-A), thus establishing consensual stasis. The parasite is an unwelcome guest in communication serving to interrupt this monologic encounter.

The parasite is a background noise that fluctuates to generate anomaly and exception in dialogue. This parasitic noise is ‘loud or unpleasant or undesired’, a ‘confused sound of voices and movements, irregular fluctuations accompanying a transmitted signal but not relevant to it.’ (Pearsall & Trumble 1995). ‘Like the noise of the crowd that thunders and rumbles, at times breaks up and at times gets bigger.’ (Serres 1997: 57). This thundering, rumbling noise (the parasite) is commonly regarded as an obstacle or irritant in an idealized communication system.
During the *In-Dialogue* Symposium, Nottingham 2012, a panel comprising of curator Rhiannon Slade, artist John Newley and the collaborative doubles WochenKlauser and Harrison & Harrison attempted to enact a traditional academic presentation. Slade and Newley were physically in attendance whereas WochenKlauser and Harrison & Harrison attended the symposium virtually via Skype. The two collaborative doubles participating in the symposium via Skype could hear each other but not the speakers and curators at the symposium site. As a consequence of this digital malfunction WochenKlauser and Harrison & Harrison began conversing with each other, the resultant conversation appearing on a large screen in front of the symposium delegates. This interaction took place in the background of Newly’s presentation. The expectation of a monologic presentation was disrupted by breaks in connection, intermittent signals and static in the communication system. The interaction between WochenKlauser, Harrison & Harrison and the malfunctioning digital phenomena effectively became the parasitic background noise of the symposium.
The parasite is commonly identified as an unwelcome guest, an irritant; however, within Serrecean philosophy the parasite is repositioned as an agent of fluctuation generating an adaptive response in the system to which it is annexed.

As though ‘supplanting’ were a simple operation, the object of a simple cognition! As though ‘to add’ something like a ‘parasite’ constituted a simple addition! As though an addition were ever simple! As though that to which a parasite is ‘added’ could possibly remain as it is, unaltered! As though an addition or reception did not alter! (Derrida 1988: 103)

In aligning the parasite with the disruptive character of Matthews and Allen’s footnotes it may be possible to reconsider the parasite as a generative force creating excitation in its host system (the academic text). ‘If some equilibrium exists or ever existed somewhere, somehow, the introduction of a parasite in the system immediately provokes a difference’ (Serres 1997: 182). The difference generated by the presence of a parasite disrupts the stasis of the system.

The old idiot wanted indubitable truths at which he could arrive by himself; in the meantime he would doubt everything, even that $3 + 2 = 5$.


[...] it is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound
Signifying nothing.

(Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act V, scene v)
Resistance to parasitical energy suggests a cultural preoccupation with unity and order, the desire for a ‘single God and identifiable individuals.’ (Serres 1997: 3). When a system settles into a perpetual state of stability it effectively becomes closed; however, when a parasite enters that system its trajectory is interrupted and subsequently an adaptive response is generated. This change comes from a rupture in equilibrated exchanges’ (Serres 1997: 182). Serres proposes the parasite as static in the system, a crackling radio signal, an intermittent communication, or a fluctuation. In French the word parasite has multiple meanings, referring to a disruptive noise, an unwelcome guest, and a life form that lives off another. When a system is host to a parasite that system must either adapt to its presence or actively expel the ‘unwelcome guest’. ‘Parasitology, as we shall soon realize, uses the vocabulary of the host: hostility or hospitality.’ (Serres 1997: 193). The supposed dichotomy between the terms ‘hostility’ and ‘hospitality’ are aligned in the undecidable character of the parasite; however, Serres continues to assign the character of the parasite the label of ‘devil’ and ‘evil’, arguably perpetuating its negative connotations.

The parasite will always generate disruption in the ideological unity of an ordered system, whether it is considered a welcome or unwelcome guest. The ideological unity of the artist Gilbert & George actively seeks to expel the presence of parasitic elements. The collaborative double intentionally adopt a principle of

Hosting houseguests involves a little more effort than just pulling out the foldout couch. To help make visits more pleasant for everyone involved (including you!) we asked Lizzie Post—great-great-granddaughter of etiquette arbiter Emily Post, author of How Do You Work This Life Thing?, what she does to keep guests happy during an extended stay. A word of warning: If you play by her rules, be prepared to welcome visitors back for years to come.

1. Set a specific start and end date for the visit.
2. Be a prepared hostess.
3. Don’t make friends feel like intruders.
5. Be clear about the house rules.
‘friendlessness’ in order to create a closed and unified equilibrium. In a conversation with Trisha Andres, Gilbert & George respond to the question what do you think of artists of today?

George: *We are very supportive of young artists. We think every country needs more artists*
Gilbert: *But we are not very, ... gallery going. We have never been because we don't want to be, ... we don't want to be ...*
George: *Contaminated*

George suggests that a ‘contaminant’ would create interference in, or disruption to, their collaborative system. A cultural resistance toward the contaminant or parasite suggests the persistence of order, unity and homogeneity. ‘The work of the parasite changes systems’ and as such offers the possibility to recast its negative character of disorder (the unwelcome guest) as potentiality (Serres 1997: 57). Looking toward instabilities and denying fixed representation effectively articulates a culture of exception and anomaly.

In the Serresean communication model a message is passed between two stations; the movement from one station to another requires a medium, a middle, through which it is channeled. The word medium is etymologically derived from the Latin adjective medius meaning intermediate, or middle ground. This middle space.

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**space:** an interval between one, two, or three dimensional points or objects *(Oxford English Reference Dictionary)*

**Intermittence**
means that every look in space meets with a new constellation *(Benjamin 1999)*
through which communication passes produces effects and as such is a space of potentiality. Interlocutors must adjust their communication to expel or incorporate this parasitic middle. The common response to a parasite is its exclusion. This exclusionary act serves to acknowledge the presence of a parasite and as such affirms the inevitability of alteration through a process of expulsion. Conversely, what potentialities are generated when the parasite becomes a welcome guest in collaborative dialogue? A parasitic philosophy of meaning may suggest a condition where ‘other’ systems are always in relation to that which is central. This theory of relations may be said to bring the force\textsuperscript{74} of the parasite into focus.

The parasite performs an undecidable relation between the supposed dichotomy of the external and the internal, being neither the host system nor separable from it. The Derridean supplement, like the parasite, ‘is neither a plus nor a minus, neither an outside nor the compliment of an inside’ (Derrida 1998: lxxii). The concepts of supplement and parasite superficially suggest a superfluous element added to existent phenomena. In French the term supplement has duplicitous meaning, inferring both an addition and a substitution. Derrida continues to complicate our understanding of language by introducing terms that resist a single definition. A supplement is generally perceived to be something secondary, serving as an addition. Rousseau’s use of the term supplement reiterates this perspective and is used to designate the relationship between a first and second force.\textsuperscript{75} Rousseau suggests that the secondary force\textsuperscript{76} of the supplement is superfluous, merely adding

\textit{May the force be with you}

\textit{I felt a great disturbance in the force, as if millions of voices suddenly cried out in terror and were suddenly silenced}

\textit{The force will be with you always}

\textit{(Star Wars, 1977)}
itself to that which is complete and fully present. A consideration of the supplement leads to an intentional paradox where Rousseau’s superfluous addition is complicated by the Derridean assertion that the supplement is also a substitution. Derrida suggests that nothing complete can be added to and therefore proposes the notion of an ‘originary lack’ in supposedly present phenomena. In the metaphysical system, that which is perceived as complete and present is considered contaminated by the presence of a supplement. Derrida proposes the supplement as both an accretion and a substitution, as such the supplement is ambiguous, a Derridean undecidable. ‘Undecidability - which might also be understood in terms of ‘the experience of the impossible’ - does not, then, merely paralyze decision, but instead gives it its very chance or possibility’ (Wortham 2010: 30). Undecidability does not simply refer to indecision between opposing forces (affirming logocentrism through stable oppositions) but suggests that what is present or decided could be otherwise.

\[\text{[a] break with this structure of belonging can be announced only through [...] a certain strategic arrangement which, within the field of metaphysical opposition, uses the strengths of the fields to turn its own stratagems against it, producing a force of dislocation that spreads itself throughout the entire system, fissuring in every direction and thoroughly delimiting it.} \] (Derrida 2001: 34)

Schrodinger’s cat walks into a bar… and doesn’t.
The theory and practice of the footnote is comparable to the supplement in its designation as a secondary gesture. The gesture of the footnote is commonly perceived as an addition or accompaniment to a ‘primary’ text; however, the footnotes in this document attempt to resist categorization as extraneous matter. Grafton suggests that footnotes are often treated as ‘the offhand production and disposal of waste products’ (Grafton 1999: 7). Matthews and Allen’s footnotes do not attempt to usurp the academic text but rather perform a fluctuating and undecidable relation that resists the stasis of an authoritarian discourse. The supplement and parasite do not replace existing systems but alternatively compel those systems to adapt to their presence. This adaptive response results in the production of difference. The supplementary gesture of a footnote implies that the ‘primary’ text to which it is annexed is incomplete, thus inferring that meaning is never complete. If meaning is proposed as incomplete then both the supplement and parasite serve to disrupt the illusory conditions of unity, completion and stasis. ‘The supplement and the turbulence of a certain lack fracture the limit of the text, forbidding an exhaustive and closed formalization of it’ (Derrida 2004[b]: 42). For Derrida, the supplement is not simply an additional component but an indispensable supplementarity.

The Derridean critique of logocentrism is integrally linked to the supplement through the suggestion that a dominant ideology is always subject to a process of supplementation and deferral, unity defined in relation to multiplicity. This
undecidable relation between unity and multiplicity is articulated in Lomax’s narrative of the twittering tree.

To have said ‘The tree is twittering’ or ‘The birds in the tree are twittering’ would have been to attribute the twittering to a tree-subject or a plural bird-subject. But, strictly speaking, the twittering of the twittering-tree could not be attributed to either, or both, of these said subjects. (Lomax 2004: 22)

Lomax’s twittering tree gives the illusion of unity; however, this oscillating phenomenon resides in neither the tree nor the birds. This undecidable condition may be considered to unsettle the supposed dichotomy between unity and multiplicity. The twittering phenomenon articulated in Lomax’s narrative is comparable to the indistinguishable relation between the host (tree) and the parasite (birds). The indeterminacy of this relation arguably unsettles the persistence of an oppositional logic (the oppositional logic of text and supplement).

To the inexpert, footnotes look like deep root systems, solid and fixed; [...] however, they reveal themselves as anthills, swarming with [...] activity. (Grafton 1999: 9)
The footnote traditionally operates as a stratagem to augment the position of a ‘primary’ text; however, Matthews and Allen adopt the footnote as a system that proffers fluctuation and oscillation. Matthews and Allen are mindful of the relation between the ‘primary’ text and the footnote being perceived as a dichotomy; however, the footnotes within this discourse are not opposed to the academic text but serve to ‘excite the host system’. Neither the academic text nor the footnotes remain unchanged through this relation. The host (the academic text) and the parasite (the footnotes) interrupt each other, in a process of bifurcation and digression.

Footnotes are also the essential digressions of textual praxis, writing’s polyphonic reflexive sites... Digression – the life of dialogue – is one of the main antagonists of the monologic principle (closed language knows no digression) (Sandywell 2010: 298).

The footnote is commonly referred to as a paratext. A paratextual practice has the potential to articulate the ‘divergent practices under history’s apparently stable surface.’ (Grafton 1999: 7). Genette defines the paratext as an element accompanying a primary text, not simply an addition but rather that which generates an undecidable space between ‘text and off-text’ (Genette 1997: 1). This act of looking to the periphery of an authoritarian text may be perceived as entering a liminal space.

**How to interrupt**
- Actually...
- Excuse me...
- I’m sorry, but...
- I just want to say...
- May I interrupt here?
- Do you mind if I say something?

(www.englishpond.com/speaking)
The digression implicit in paratextual practice suggests a process of turning away from the dominant ideology. Rogoff suggests that the destabilization of logocentrism requires a process of Looking Away. Rogoff expresses discomfort with the obligation placed upon the reader to invest in a singular consideration of a text. Rogoff recounts a visit to a Jackson Pollock exhibition at the Tate gallery and the inevitable slippage that occurs from the ‘single’ art object to and from other phenomena. Rogoff’s unauthorized act of Looking Away (from the central tenets of culture that invariably demand our attention) results in a process of digression.

In the process [of looking away] we produce for ourselves an alternative mode of taking part in culture in which we affect [...] modalities of attention and subjugation, that break down the dichotomies of objects and viewers. (Rogoff 2004: 133)

―Breaking the fourth wall‖ relates to any practice which seeks to dispel the illusion that the audience is watching a slice of ‘real life’. The same expression is also used in relation to film and fiction to describe a text’s acknowledgement of its own artifice.

(Cuddon, A., Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theories, Penguin: 288)
The active process of digressing from a central subject suggests a philosophical perspective that permits parasitic background to enter a supposedly autocratic system. In *Looking Away* from a sanctioned script our attention is diverted from the master narrative to encounter other potentialities. This digressive act of turning brings into focus that which is situated ‘beside’ the supposedly central discourse. Etymologically the English term ‘beside’ is aligned with the Greek word ‘para’, thus paralogism infers that which is beside or beyond the logos. Lyotardian paralogism does not simply attempt to revivify the system but rather seeks an exception to the rule\(^83\) that will generate difference. Lyotard makes a distinction between the innovative moves of modernity and the ‘impossible’ move aligned with postmodernity. Paralogism seeks an unforeseeable trajectory that will disrupt and digress from the systematic order, effectively changing the rules\(^84\) by which that system operates. ‘Paralogism legitimates a continued search for new moves which challenge the consensus of dominant paradigms.’ (Haber 1994: 25)

The language of digression may be said to permeate contemporary culture (the digital hyperlink being a significant example); however, the process of digression arguably still holds negative connotations in the paradigms of noetic practice. A digression is a veering off, an aside, an anecdotal condition, and as such resists a cultural inclination toward unity and order. It is proposed that through a process of digression a dominant ideology may be opened to multiplicity. [T]he production of

\(^{83}\) a principle to which an action conforms or is required to conform

\(^{84}\) a prevailing custom or standard; the normal state of things

Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both are too much of a burden.

meaning in the process of signification is continually deferred and supplemented in the play of more-than-one.’ (Barker 2004: 52).

It is possible that our cultural heritage (operating by means of an oppositional logic) will coerce the reader to assign this academic writing a noetic value and Matthews and Allen’s footnotes a poetic value. It is in the continuous deferral between text and footnote that this oppositional expectation is arguably confounded. Matthews and Allen’s footnotes, akin to the parasite, find their way into the relation between the academic author and the reader. These footnotes seek to generate digression within the ‘master narrative’ and thus provoke an adaptive response in the reader. The academic text in this research performs an illusory noetic order whereas the parasitic footnotes perform an illusory poetic disorder. The relation between these supposedly opposed forces attempts to generate alteration in both the noetic and the poetic, the host system and the parasite, the academic text and the footnote (as supplement).

The parasite is etymologically described as ‘one who eats at the table of another’ and as such suggests a movement that proceeds in one direction. In Serres’ most concise definition of the parasite, it is described as ‘a thermal exciter’, which positions the parasite less as a destructive force than something that excites the host system. The disruption generated by the presence of a parasite, either through an act of its expulsion from or absorption into the system, raises the question of what may be possible when a parasite is actively sought.

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85 aesthetic, ascetic, athletic, cosmetic, eidetic, frenetic, gametic, genetic, hermetic, herpetic, kinetic, magnetic, pathetic, phonetic, phrenetic, prophetic, prosthetic, synthetic …
matthews and allen are positioned as a parasitic voice ‘dining at the table’ of academic writing. When the parasite’s narrative (‘one who eats at the table of another’) is applied to matthews and allen’s footnotes, an association to citationality appears implicit. matthews and allen’s footnotes perform a citational gesture (citationality as a method to question the authority of ‘original’ texts and ‘master narratives’), ‘feeding off’ cultural phenomena. Citationality, in addition to the theories of intertextuality, appropriation and dialogism, implies that the monograph is a façade behind which multiple potentialities are situated.

- But they repeat each other, still; they substitute for each other...
- Nonsense: they don’t replace each other, since they are added...
- Precisely

(Derrida 2004[a]: 170)

Serres reminds his readers that the French word ‘hôte’ translates to infer both host and guest in English. ‘The host, the guest: the same word; he gives and receives, offers and accepts, invites and is invited, master and passer-by.’ (Serres 2007: 15). The undecidable relation between the character of host and guest suggests that these supposedly opposed forces interrupt each other. The movement between text and footnote creates digression in the anticipated linearity of traditional research and serves to resist the performance of homogenous meaning.
If the social and cultural response to an oscillating disorder is to expel or subsume that which oscillates (with a view of returning to a systemized order) then ‘an observer seated within the system […] overvalues the message and undervalues the noise’ (Serres 2007: 68).

The problem, in a word, is that the logic of parasitism is not a logic of distinction or of opposition. (Derrida 1988: 96)

The parasite performs its disruption from within the host system, difference in itself. The parasite, akin to a minor literature, operates from within the hegemony of a major language. The parasite offers the potential to extricate meaning from the ‘hell of dualism’, being neither the same nor other (Serres 1997: 131). The parasite is part of the host system, it is the clinamen that disturbs the laminar flow, a background noise that disrupts communication, an oscillation that is ‘neither the same nor different from that which it parasites.’ (Derrida 1988: 96).

Serres aligns the parasite with ‘the joker’. The joker may represent any existing card: king, jack, seven or ace, et al. Akin to the blank domino, the joker has no character of its own; it is a Derridean undecidable. The joker is both included and excluded from the system to which it is annexed. This blank figure oscillates between the supposed antithetical relations of noetic and poetic genres, treating both
as emergent effects of the same ordering practice. Conversely, J.L. Austin attempts to perpetuate a dichotomy between the serious and the non-serious. ‘[A] performative utterance will, for example, be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy. [...] Language in such circumstances is [...] not used seriously [thus] parasitic upon its normal use.’ (Austin 1975: 22). Austin suggests that language performed on stage or in poems is a parasite of ‘serious’ language, thus arguably perpetuating the dichotomy between noetic and poetic practice. The indeterminate character of the joker in a game of cards serves as a metaphor for disruption to Austin’s dichotomous positioning of serious and non-serious language. The joker may assume the role of king; however, it is neither king nor joker, serious nor non-serious, noetic nor poetic, host nor parasite, message nor noise, and yet it is arguably both.

Noise is a joker necessary to the system. It can take on any value, and is thus unpredictable so that the system is never stable. Instead, it is non-knowledge. Systems work because they do not work. Dysfunctioning remains essential for functioning. The model, then, is free of parasites, free of static [...] while the system is always infected with parasites. (Serres 1994: 98)

Get **serious**!

When the going gets tough, the tough **get** going.

**Going** according to plan.

Cut one’s coat **according** to one’s cloth.

Turn one’s **coat**. (To change from one side to another. The image is of having a coat which is a different colour inside out).
The citational practice of Matthews and Allen situates the collaborators as a pair of Serrecean jokers. Their parasitic footnotes are both included (via the implementation of a conventional referencing system) and excluded (as unwelcome guests) from the system to which they are annexed (the academic canon). Matthews and Allen attempt to confound the pursuit of ideological authorialism through parasitological methodologies. Citationality, understood as a parasitic practice, situates the collaboration as agents of instability, Serrecean jokers that may ‘take on any value’ (Serres 1994: 98).

“What matter who’s speaking” someone said, “What matter who’s speaking” (Beckett 1994: 85)
The Parapoetic Third
a ludic language-game that must systematically (ap)prove its own inconsistency and inefficiency by convolving problems, invoking anomaly for the sake of what is abnormal and unknown. (Bök 2001: 14)

The Oxford English Dictionary designates what is ‘para’ as that which is to one side, beside, aside, amiss, faulty, irregular, disordered and improper. McCaffery suggests that ‘the lateral adjacency of ‘beside’ offers a multiplicity of satellitic invocations: the friend, neighbor, relative, lover, guide, witness and judge.’ (McCaffery 2006: 323). These auxiliary classifications are commonly understood as secondary to a primary one, a margin to a centre. The para is situated beside a dominant ideology; however, ‘beside is also between, interstitial and intervallic, as well as extra, outside’ (McCaffery: 2006: 323). Parapoetics is situated ‘to the side’ of its governing ideology; however, it is also that which interrupts ideological authority, disrupting from between and within the axioms of power. Matthews and Allen’s paratexts find an alliance with the concept of parapoetics wherein the intention to disrupt ideological authorialism is performed from between and within the axioms of academic writing.

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To soliloquise, to say or talk to oneself, to say aside, to think aloud, to apostrophise.

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Every speech, written or otherwise, has to have punctuation. Tonight I am the punctuation.

The concept of parapoetics suggests a gesture that is situated to the side of poetry. Comparable with the parasitic supplement, parapoetics is a simultaneous relation to and disruption of the system to which it is annexed. McCaffery suggests that the concept of that which is para evades janiformity (a reference to the Greek god Janus) in that it resists the oppositional logic of an inside/outside binarism and is alternatively situated beside and between these conditions. David Caroll’s description of paraesthetics offers an associative relation to the practice of parapoetics: It is ‘something like [a poetics] turned against itself […] a faulty, irregular, disordered, improper [poetics]- one not content to remain within the area defined by the [poetic]’ (McCaffery 2004: 91). Parapoetics may be considered analogous to the Serrsean parasite in its relation to a host system (poetry) and its potential to disrupt that system. The theory of parapoetics proposes a culture of potentiality rather than a predetermined or fixed designation. ‘Deracinated and detached from poetics proper, and maintaining its distance from any discourse that seeks to master or explain, it can be likened to a hesitation within a caesura.’ (McCaffery 2006: 324). To hesitate suggests the interrupted flow of matter, static in the system, a cut-flow, a glitch, a clinamen. Parapoetics is effectively a departure from the traditions of generality and universality (systems that invariably subsume multiplicity into unity) toward a cultural practice that explores the possibilities of anomaly and exception. Parapoetics is the practice of ‘uncertainties and [operates] as a force of disruption

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you really are a poet, aren't you?

did grasp that fact, did you?

What I need is a theory to explain it all.

That's a very interesting theory.

... merely a system of differences.

You imply, of course, that what matters...is not truth but difference.
among stability, it aims to transform a total unity into multiplicity.’ (McCaffery 2006: 323). Parapoetics resists predetermination and actively situates itself in an indeterminate condition where metaphysical aspirations of unity encounter anomaly. McCaffery’s conception of parapoetics imagines a relation between poetics and architectural theory where (in the manner of ‘pataphysical equivalence) supposedly discrete disciplines are opened to possibility. ‘Multiplicity, before reaching unity, or without unity, has gaps, it has margins, it is riddled with exceptions’ (Serres 1997: 111).

McCaffery introduces typographical exceptions through the scribal practice of scriptio continua, suggesting that ‘parapoetics will situate interstitially, the way punctuation falls between meaning.’ (McCaffery 2001: 326). Scriptio continua or continuous script is a method of writing without spacing or punctuating marks between words and sentences. Scriptio continua or continuous script is a method of writing without spacing or punctuating marks between words and sentences. The use of scriptio continua demonstrates semantic indeterminacy and subsequently disrupts the systematic meaning generated through a punctuative tradition.

confluence of language, nonsense, and desire – is experienced as a kind of scriptio continua; as a process not of separation but of segmentive erasure. Because segmentive clarity is dissolved, words in

92 cont.

A presence or an absence?

and

Having them both in the same title would be more or less irresistible.

but with a trace of something.

you don't think it was chance?

no chance.

then what?
continua are initially encountered as letters-becoming-words, presignificatory instabilities and uncertainties in a protosemantic continuum. Punctuation and spacing – as well as its complicated conceptual incarnation as Derridean différence – can be thought of as severing activities that slice a continuum into culturally recognizable sequences but may also be seen as clinamen. (McCaffery 2001: 110)

The unintentional and intervalllic transgressions of parapoetics suggests a connection to Deleuze and Guattari’s writing on minor literatures. A minority is, in its common usage, perceived as diametrically opposed to a majority; however, a minor literature may contrarily be considered to operate from within a major language ‘using the same elements as it were, but in a different manner.’ (O’Sullivan 2005). Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the minor may be aligned with a discourse on parapoetics in its intention to interrupt the trajectory of a major language. In *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, Deleuze and Guattari assert that a ‘characteristic of minor literature is that in it everything takes on a collective value’. The collective value of a minor literature disrupts the logocentric tradition of individual authorialism and gestures toward a ‘collective enunciation’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1986: 17). Deleuze suggests that a major language should be understood as a force of

92 cont.

But when did you ever discover that in a question-and-discussion session?

it is not a to-and-fro process, but an endless, tantalising leading on...

...combining fiction and non fiction, fantasy, criticism, confession and speculation.

Everything—and then some.
constancy and a minor language as variability, potentially a culture of exceptions. If a minor literature operates from within a major language then minor variations are implicit in major systems: Variations understood as glitches, digressions, clinamens. This relation is 'neither a union, nor a juxtaposition, but the birth of a stammering' (Deleuze & Parnet 2007: 9).

A minor literature, perceived as a foreign language, is situated within the homogeneity of a major language. This ‘foreign language cannot be hallowed out in one language without language being toppled or pushed to a limit.’ (Deleuze 1997: 5). Deleuze’s use of the phrase ‘hollowed out’ implies an internal disturbance, a clinamen that serves to disrupt the centrality of homogenous language systems. A rupturing of representation. A minor literature is both part of a major language and foreign to it, thus parasitic. Deleuze suggests that a minor literature ‘opens up a kind of foreign language within language, which is neither another language nor a rediscovered patois, but a becoming-other of language, a minorisation of this major language, a delirium that carries it off [and...] escapes the dominant system.’ (Deleuze 1997: 5). The paratexual practice of matthews and allen is a minorisation of a major academic language, a delirium that escapes the dominant monographic system.

Katarina Zdjelar employs the concept of parapoetics to articulate the transgressions that occur in the literal process of translation between a major and a minor language. Zdjelar suggests that the ‘failings’ in the process of translation yield similar results to that of parapoetics.

92 cont.

many twists and turns.

like playing tennis with a ball made of Krazy Putty that keeps coming back over the net in a different shape.

isosceles triangle?

Certainly not. What makes you think so?

shall I tell you the story?

from the beginning
Translation is not simply about transcribing one system into another, nor for that matter is it about trying to transfer narratives and concepts, it is also concerned with transporting the logic of one system into another, and producing excess. (Zdjelar 2007: 15)

The ‘excess’ described by Zdjelar may be aligned with the Serresean third man, a superfluous character in an idealized model of communication, and that which generates a stuttering of language. In *He Stuttered*, Deleuze suggests that stuttering is a poetic comprehension of language where language itself is stretched. This stretching of language is the effective process of a minor literature where ‘language trembles from head to toe.’ (Deleuze 1997: 109). When this stuttering and stretching of language is recontextualized within the field of parapoetics it resists the derogatory classification of failure and adopts a generative third character. Parapoetics is not the poet’s facility for invention and intentional digression from tradition but the aleatoric gesture of language and its relations.

Zdjelar’s implementation of parapoetics relates to a mode of communication where an unfamiliar language is articulated through hesitation, irresolute utterance and misunderstanding, and where an unintentional poeisis is generated. Zdjelar suggests that parapoetics ‘refers to all that takes place outside of meaningful language’ (Zdjelar 2010). A literal understanding of Zdjelar’s statement may suggest an

92 cont.

*Both know the inevitable conclusion of a narrative sequence that begins thus.*

*It all comes back to the same thing in the end* 

*you really are a poet, aren’t you?*

oppositional logic, an outside opposed to an inside; however, parapoetics utilises existing phenomena, stretching its language beyond an idealized unity. In Zdjelar’s film _Shoum_ we hear the sound of the 1984 Tears for Fears song _Shout_. Two men from Belgrade attempt to decipher the lyrics as though decoding a complex code. The two men do not speak English and consequently, they phonetically translate and interpret _Shout._

_Shoum_ functions as a corrupted form of English akin to the grammatical distortions and nonsensical linguistic constructions of Stanley Unwin. Unwin, the third man in the straightman/funnyman formation of Morecambe and Wise, speaks unwinese; a ludic language where the question ‘What is the use of atoms?’ might receive the reply ‘Deeply fully enters here and the calculodes of the incubus soon send the pi-R-squared up the polly, which is enough in all condescience to make the useful ploy in the atomole…’ (Unwin 2002)

93

To boldly go where no man has gone before

(English translation)

V vay’ bolDly nuqDaq pagh

(Klingon translation)
Unwinese may be considered to operate in a similar manner to that of a mondegreen. The mondegreen, introduced by Sylvia Wright in *The Death of Lady Mondegreen*, refers to the accidental mishearing and misinterpretation of a song lyric or poem. The terminology generated through mishearing and misinterpretation may be said to resist predetermined phenomena and subsequently attains ‘new’ meaning (comparable to Zdjelar’s film *Shoum* where a ‘new’ language generated). In Wright’s 1957 essay *The Death of Lady Mondegreen* she recounts a childhood memory in which she hears the ballad *The Bonny Earl of Murray*:

\[
Ye Highlands and ye Lowlands,
Oh, where hae ye been?
They hae slain the Earl Amurray,
And Lady Mondegreen.
\]

The last line\(^{94}\) of the ballad should read: *And laid him on the green.*

Lady Mondegreen had never existed prior to this mishearing; however, the process of misinterpretation led to Wright’s narrative construction of Lady Mondegreen’s tragic death. ‘Language stops being representative in order to now move toward its extremities or its limits’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1986: 23). The mondegreen, like the clinamen, appears to operate by means of an aleatoric gesture.

\(^{94}\) "Roads? Where we're going we don't need roads." (Back to the Future 1985)

"Louis, I think this is the beginning of a beautiful friendship." (Casablanca 1942)

"That's right, that's right. Attaboy, Clarence." (It’s A Wonderful Life 1946)

"A man's got to know his limitations." (Magnum Force 1971)

"Well, nobody’s perfect!" (Some Like It Hot 1959)

"God damn you! God damn you all to hell!" (Planet Of The Apes 1968)

"The greatest trick the devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn’t exist. And like that – poof – he’s gone!" (The Usual Suspects 1995)

"Oh Good. For a moment there, I thought we were in trouble." (Butch Cassidy And The Sundance Kid 1969)
if you lay yourself open to mondegreens, you must be valiant. The world, blowing near, will assail you with a thousand bright and strange images. Nothing like them has ever been seen before, and who knows what lost and lovely things may not come streaming in with them? But there is always the possibility that they will engulf you and that you will go wandering down a horn into a mondegreen underworld from which you can never escape. (Wright 1954: 51)

Mondegreens, mishearings and misunderstandings may be considered to digress from, or detour around, the intelligibility of an anticipated trajectory and thus encounter anomaly and exception. These exceptions reveal ‘that everything has the potential to be anomalous’ (Bök 2001: 40).

The aleatoric departure from homogenous meaning toward anomaly and exception are arguably made manifest in the literary characters Mrs Malaprop and Officer Dogberry. A malapropism is the unintentional use of an incorrect word in place of a word with a similar sound. The word malapropism is derived from the French ‘mal à propos’ meaning inappropriate. Mrs Malaprop, a character in Richard Brinsley Sheridan’s 1775 comedy The Rivals, habitually misuses words, resulting in a nonsensical, often humorous utterance. Officer Dogberry, a character in Shakespeare’s Much Ado About Nothing, similarly includes nonsensical words in his speech due to their comparable sounds.

you say tomato
and I say tomato
Mrs MALAPROP: There, sir, an attack upon my language! what do you think of that? – an aspersion upon my parts of speech! was ever such a brute! Sure, if I reprehend any thing in this word, it is the use of my oracular tongue, and a nice derangement of epitaphs! (Sheridan 2004)

It is perhaps in the construction of characters such as Mrs Malaprop and Officer Dogberry that semantic slippage has been consigned to the nonsensical utterances of comedy and thus considered superfluous to a noetic ideology.

Montegreens, Malapropisms and Dogberryisms are effectively background noise, ‘the clinamen of speech effecting an oral deviation’ (McCaffery 2001: 94). These transgressions are comparable to the noise that Serresian philosophy attempts to detect, that which homogenous language attempts to silence. These disruptive and digressive phenomena operate as minor literatures performing from within a major language. The conception of a language situated between the meaningful and the meaningless may be observed in the ‘Anna Livia Plurabelle’ section of James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake where the overheard exchange between two washerwomen on opposite sides of the Liffy oscillates in an undecidable condition. The background noise96 of washing activities and the movement of the river disrupts the interlocutory trajectory between the women, making their words fluctuate between sense and nonsense.

96

Heark in your Ear *

* I cannot conjecture what the Author means here, or how this Chasm could be fill ’d, tho it is capable of more than one Interpretation.

Can't hear with the waters of. The chittering waters of. Flittering bats, fieldmice bawk talk. Ho! Are you not gone ahone? What Thom Malone? Can't hear with bawk of bats, all thin liffeying waters of. Ho, talk save us! My foos won't moos. I feel as old as yonder elm. A tale told of Shaun or Shem? All Livia's daughtersons. Dark hawks hear us. Night! Night! My ho head halls. I feel as heavy as yonder stone. Tell me of John’97 or Shaun? Who were Shem and Shaun the living sons or daughters of? Night now! Tell me, tell me, tell me, elm! Night night! Telmetale of stem or stone. Beside the rivering waters of, hitherandthithering waters of. Night! (Joyce 2012: 215-16)

Semantic slippage effects a deviation from the standardized language system; however, this digression retains that from which it deviates. The interplay between intentional and unintentional words included in the literary texts of Joyce, Sheridan, Shakespeare and Wright generate an oscillating language. This stuttering and stammering of language enacts an anomalous slippage between sense and nonsense (for Deleuze, stuttering is an effect of language rather than a literal affectation of speech). This slippage, in Derridean thought, vibrates between supposedly oppositional terms suggesting the impossibility for the discrete categorization of
language and meaning. A culture of parapoetics suggests a poetics derived from the supposedly extraneous irregularities generated through semantic slippage, digression, deviation, misunderstandings and misinterpretation.

Like a ship of the tongue
the clinamen is less a
performance than a
harpooning.

Like a slip of the tongue
the clinamen is less a
performance than a
happening.

(McCaffery 2001: 18)

McCaffery introduces the concept of ‘error’ into the language of poetics through the resultant exceptions and anomalies generated through typographical inaccuracies: ‘The unpredictable swerve of the letter from laminar flow of syntax and grammar invalidates the notion of a fixed inert meaning.’ (McCaffery 2001: 21).

“I only took the regular course.”
“What was that?” inquired Alice
“Reeling and Writhing, of course, to begin with,” the Mock Turtle replied; “and then the different branches of Arithmetic - Ambition, Distraction, Uglification, and Derision.”
(Carroll 2010: 94)

In the relation between supposedly oppositional language systems (the scholastic language of noetic reason and/or the language of poetic unreason) a potential third language may be conceived. McCaffery’s alignment of poetics and architecture suggests the possibility for a dialogue to take place between theoretically discrete practices. ‘The dialogue between these two practices occurs as much within, as between, each other, and the integrity of both practices should be risked.’ (Matthews and Allen attempt to put the integrity of both text and paratext at risk) (McCaffery 2004: 99). McCaffery suggests that it is necessary for seemingly homogeneous disciplines to risk contamination through their interrelation: potentiality exists in the space between familiarity and foreignness. Parapoetics challenges a cultural resistance to error and anomaly and ‘focuses on the interval where contamination, paralogicality, uncertainty, and misprision precipitate discovery’ (McCaffery 2006: 326). The contaminant serves to interrupt the impasse arguably reached within autocratic systems and discrete classifications. If parapoetics proposes the reconfiguration of error and failure as generative principles, then the
stuttering and stammering of language may resist homogenization to effect difference.

What is noise in the paradigm of nostalgia is music to the prognosis of paralogy. (Bök 2001: 58)

The anomaly is a glitch, a sudden irregularity or malfunction in a system operating by means of generalities, universalities and presuppositions. The term glitch has been used to describe a mode of electronic music that essentially implements the ‘aesthetics of failure’.100 Glitch music operates in a cultural space where malfunctioning, stuttering, errancies and system failures are perceived as generative phenomena. A glitch is a fault, a malfunction that creates a cut in the flow of contrivance. Cut-flows, static, electrical humming and scratching may be understood as gestures that, in a Rogoffian sense, ‘look away’ from the conventions of composition toward a culture of instability and disorder. ‘Indeed, the glitch – in whichever regime it operates and ruptures – is the “sound” of this something else, this something different attempting to get through.’ (O’Sullivan 2009: 251). This glitch machine may be aligned with Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of a desiring-
machine that only operates when it malfunctions. In the text *Anti-Oedipus* the desiring-machine is described as a flow producing and flowing interrupting force. ‘A machine produces a flow’ (the flow of the scholastic text), ‘another machine coupled to this interrupts the flow’ (Matthews and Allen’s paratexts) (O’Sullivan 2006: 24). Deleuze and Guattari speak of ‘cut-flows’, ‘break-flows’ and ‘schizz-flows’, trajectories that are punctuated and disrupted through their relation to other machines. Desiring-machines are essentially forces that are capable of autopoiesis. Interruption, in the context of a desiring-machine, is not a negation of an existent trajectory but the relation between conjunctive and disjunctive forces: ‘and then, and then... and then...’ (Deleuze & Guattari 2004[b]: 39). Deleuze and Guattari’s desiring-machines are analogous to the bachelor-machine of ‘pataphysics in its operative cuts in the flow of matter. Dr. Faustroll’s painting machine, bearing the name *Clinamen*, ‘devastates’ a museum of ‘masterpieces’ through its revolving, gyroscopic movements, ‘like a spinning top it dashed itself against the pillars, swayed and veered in infinitely varied directions’ (Jarry 1997: 88). Bök suggests that this ‘pataphysical machine is a deviant device, an apparatus of anomaly, arguably evoking Serresean noise. Bachelor ‘machines always constitute a system of interruptions in which every component behaves like a clinamen.’ (Bök 2001: 57).
Machines with such freedom never have to prove their ability, since they fulfil no real purpose, no true command. (Bök 2001: 55)

Parapoetics, bachelor-machines and deleuzoguattarian desiring-machines are machines used in a contrary way to that which they were intended. Disruption, rupture, stalling, errancy, cuts, glitches, breaks, fits and starts, all suggest movements which baffle the paradigm of contrivance. Matthews and Allen’s ‘footnote-machine’ disrupts the anticipated function of an academic footnote. The traditional academic footnote serves as a complimentary accompaniment to a scholarly text whereas Matthews and Allen’s footnote-machine sways and veers in ‘infinitely varied directions’, like the swerve of Bas Jan Ader’s bicycle in *Fall II*, it is a clinamen.

Bas Jan Ader, 1970, *Fall II*¹⁰²

Laurel and Hardy
A parapoetic gesture, a misinterpretation, a digressive clinamen or the interruptive operations of a desiring machine, all gesture toward Lyotard’s paralogism. Paralogism, suggesting that which is beyond or beside reason (beyond/beside the logocentric text), creates a break in the flow of continuity and uniformity. Paralogism is not false reasoning, as a standard dictionary definition may suggest, but rather a resistance to totalizing metanarratives. Lyotard makes reference to a paradigm shift that has arguably taken place in postmodern science, from deterministic principles to the study of uncertainties and anomalies. That which invokes anomaly ‘serves the will to disrupt.’ (Bök, 2001: 38). The conception of a para-machine implies an anomalous and uncertain practice which, like the science of the particular (‘pataphysics), studies that which escapes generality and commonality; the exception.

Matthews and Allen’s footnotes, conceived as disruption amid stability, perform anomalous asides and disordered digressions in relation to the academic text. These irregular movements accent the effective disruptions of a parapoetics that is commonly characterized as extraneous matter. The faulty irregularity of disordered hesitations and chance encounters attempt to generate an oscillating space between author/reader, one/many, noetic/poetic, theory/practice, serious/non-serious, that is resistant to the totalizing traditions of Western metaphysics.

103

104

SCIENCE - A little science takes one away from religion and a lot returns one to it.

(Flaubert, G., 2010, Dictionary of Received Ideas, [Trans. Gregory Norminton], Oneworld Classics Ltd: 85)
matthews and allen’s footnote-machine serves to articulate the possibility for digression within the anticipated cohesion of an academic text. This footnote-machine operates by affirming the anomalous condition of parapoetics and thus resists the metaphysical traditions of unity, synthesis and the conflated third term. Parapoetics, being ‘emancipated from a predetermined destination, and able to install itself within the dialectical tensions and determinants of any number of target fields’, suggests a means through which the dialectical paradigm may be disrupted (McCaffery 2006: 323). matthews and allen’s footnote-machine seeks to include anomaly, the exception¹⁰⁵ to the rule, the parasitic third man, and the stuttering and stammering of a minor literature that is commonly ‘crushed and denounced as a nuisance.’ (Deleuze & Parnet 2007: 14).

The non-oppositional process of collaborative dialogue is proposed as a method to affirm parapoetics, where intervalllic error, background noise and parasitic phenomena are perceived as equivalent to a traditional conception of noesis. ‘To be

¹⁰⁵

the exception proves the rule. prov. something that does not follow a rule shows that the rule exists. Ellen: Men are always rude. Jane: But Alan's always polite. And Larry and Ted are polite, too. Ellen: They're just the exceptions that prove the rule. Bill: All the shows on TV are aimed at people with low intelligence. Alan: What about that news program you like to watch? Bill: The exception proves the rule.

(www.freedictionary.com)
noted here again is how two speakers, irreconcilable adversaries, find themselves forced to turn together against the same third man for the dialogue to remain possible’ (Serres 1982: 16). Through collaborative dialogue, matthews and allen attempt to affirm the pervasive and generative character of interruption and digression. Cultural perceptions of dialogue commonly adhere to historical traditions of a dialectic. The Oxford English Reference Dictionary defines a dialogue as ‘a discussion, especially one between representatives of two political groups’ (Pearsall & Trumble 1995). The lexiconical reference to ‘two political groups’ implies a culture of argumentation and opposition. This oppositional logic aligns dialogue with a metaphysical heritage of thesis and anti-thesis where, as Serres suggests, the parapoetic third is imperceptible amid the clamour of dialectical battle. Collaborative dialogue (conceived as an act of alliance) is arguably uninhibited by the noise of dialectical systems and as such may enable interruptive phenomena to escape designation as extraneous matter. Blanchot suggests that interruption is already a component of dialogue in that ‘when two people speak together, they speak not together but each in turn: one says something, then stops, the other something else (or the same thing), then stops’; they interrupt each other (Blanchot 1993: 75). Blanchot situates certain modes of interruption as integral to a traditional system of communication: A ‘pause between sentences, pause from one interlocutor to another, and pause of attention, the hearing that doubles the force of locution.’ (Blanchot 1993: 75). Intervals (marked by pauses, blanks, and gaps) do not alter the
trajectory of a dialogue but may be implemented as methods to reinforce the structure of interlocution. It may be suggested that this model of communication seeks to homogenize the process of dialogue through the implementation of accepted interlocutionary rules.

We are constantly told: to respect the order\textsuperscript{107} of logical dependency we must begin with the ‘standard’, the ‘serious’, the ‘normal’, etc., and we must begin by excluding the ‘non-standard’, the non-serious’, the ‘abnormal’, the parasitical. (Derrida 1988: 90).

matthews and allen’s footnote-machine attempts to resist a ‘logical dependency’ on normative systems through a process of including phenomena generally perceived to be superfluous. Blanchot compels us ‘to cease thinking solely with a view to unity, and to make the relations of words an essentially dissymmetrical field governed by discontinuity’ (Blanchot 1993: 77). matthews and allen attempt to invent a stammering space through the consideration of events and phenomena that take place in the interstices of dialogue.

In the proposition to utilize dialogue as a method to encounter anomaly, it is perhaps appropriate to reference Bohm’s text \textit{On Dialogue}. Bohm’s conception of dialogue is resistant to a dialectic and proposes shared meaning, where ‘nobody is

\textsuperscript{107}LAW AND ORDER - How many crimes are committed in your names!

(Flaubert, G., 2010, \textit{Dictionary of Received Ideas}, [Trans. Gregory Norminton], Oneworld Classics Ltd: 60)
trying to win. Everybody wins if anybody wins (Bohm 2004: 2). This non-oppositional conception of dialogue is, superficially, coherent with the premise of collaborative practice; however, Bohmian dialogue infers a conflation of perspectives, arguably conforming to a tradition of synthesis. It is perhaps in Bohm’s scientific heritage where the greatest disparity between matthews and allen’s dialogic-machine and Bohmian dialogue may be observed. Bohm states that ‘in dialogue you have to be serious. It is not a dialogue if you are not’ (Bohm 2004: 16). Bohm’s conception of dialogue supports a cultural propensity toward noesis and consequently effects an oppositional logic between serious and non-serious phenomena. matthews and allen’s footnote-machine seeks to generate a culture of equivalence wherein poesis is not simply characterized as the inverse of noesis. This footnote-machine attempts to recast the figure of parasite, clinamen, and anomaly, as something other than the antithetical relation of order, thus ‘ceasing to think only with a view to unity. And this means therefore: not fearing to affirm interruption’ (Blanchot 1993: 82).

Here we have made use of everything that came within range, what was closest and as well as farthest away. (Deleuze & Guattari 2004[a]: 3)
If artist-to-artist dialogue resists the dialectical logic of opposition and subsequent collapse into unity, then what is the operative language of this practice? ‘[N]ew ideas seem to emerge from the dialogue without “belonging” to either of the pair’ (Farrell 2003). An ideological model of dialogue may be characterized as the linear trajectory from one interlocutor to another; however, a ‘line does not go from one point to another, but passes between the points, ceaselessly bifurcating and diverging’ (Deleuze & Parnet 2007: viii). Matthews and Allen’s footnote-machine articulates digression and anomaly through the incorporation of elements commonly excluded from the prevailing academic discourse. Matthews and Allen may be said to escape the limitation of an oppositional logic through their inclusion of tangential phenomena. The inclusion of peripheral phenomena is generated through a process of listening to the metaphoric background noise of the master narrative. This act of looking away from the dominant discourse is the performance of digression and deferral.

At the feast everyone is talking. At the door of the room there is a ringing noise, the telephone. Communication cuts conversation, the noise interrupting the messages. As soon as I start to talk with this new interlocutor, the sounds of the banquet become noise for the new ‘us.’ The system has shifted. (Serres 2007: 66)

| go    | 1. Go to hell. |
| good  | 2. A man’s got to do what a man’s got to do. |
| got   | 3. Over play one’s hand. |
| green | 4. Here’s your hat, what’s your hurry? |
| had   |                             |
| hand  |                             |
| has   |                             |
| hat   |                             |
| have  |                             |
| he    |                             |
| head  |                             |
| help  |                             |
| her   |                             |
A ringing telephone, a barking dog, a noise, a distraction, an absent item from a shopping list, an advertising jingle, a mishearing, a rumour, an anecdote, a colloquialism, an old wives tale, a malapropism, a stutter, then a stammer, and then the murmur of anomaly sounds above the proclamations of unity. ‘Chance speaks of the limits of reason as a faculty that, finally, reflects only its own presuppositions.’ (Kavanagh 1993: 4). The operative language of matthews and allen’s footnotes involves what may be termed a ‘play of constraints.’ The constraints (or rules of the game) employed by the collaborative double are, to some extent, intended to confound their own limitation: A typographical error that breaks the continuity of a word game and thus baffles the imposed paradigmatic rules.

be exist; occur; be present. have a specified quality, position, or condition

c-condition the state something is in: (conditions) circumstances. Something that is necessary if something else is to exist or occur

ever else in addition. instead, other

d-other distinct from one already present or mentioned; extra, further, different, the one of two people or things not already mentioned or accounted for

t-other two one more than two

(matthews and allen, 2010, Collaboration [excerpt])

110 Does the name Pavlov ring a bell?
In the work *Collaboration*, the rules of the game stipulate that matthews and allen must produce a series of textual digressions by selecting a word from each definition to generate a supplementary meaning, each definition serving to alter the trajectory. matthews and allen’s constraints are subject to exception when a slippage occurs in the definition of the word ‘two’. A definition that should have read ‘one more than one’, through typographical error, reads ‘one more than two’. This parapoetic gesture generates an aleatoric play of meaning between the collaborative double and the traditional formation of a third collaborative identity.

The exception that explicates the rule serves as a reiteration of the impossibility of a totalizing systematic order. The system stutters and stammers to generate anomaly and thus resists the displacement of one authorizing system for another. matthews and allen’s footnote-machine does not seek to invert the hierarchical positions of noetic and poetic practices but rather attempts to ‘graph its drifts and meanders, sounding out its blanks and gaps’ (Maharaj 2010).

Is it not fair to say that, wherever a norm prevails, chance seems to intervene on behalf of an anomalous behaviour? (Bök 2006: 27)

Mind the gap!
A parallel\textsuperscript{112} may be observed between the anomalous operations of matthews and allen’s footnote-machine and the parapoetic gesture of Tom Stoppard’s tragicomedy \textit{Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead}. Stoppard’s absurdist play focuses on Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, two minor characters from Shakespeare’s \textit{Hamlet}. Stoppard’s play is literally situated ‘beside’ Shakespeare’s \textit{Hamlet}, implying an equivalence between major and minor narratives. In \textit{Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead} scenes from \textit{Hamlet} operate as a background to the dialogues between Stoppard’s two confused protagonists (similarly, this academic document operates as the background noise in the workings of matthews and allen’s footnote-machine and vice-versa). \textit{Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead} creates a stammering narrative that oscillates between the major character of Hamlet and the minor characters of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. This play situates itself beside and between the Shakespearean canon, generating disruption from within the dominant discourse.

The dialogue between Rosencrantz and Guildenstern frequently manifests as a series of misunderstandings and through the inclusion of asteismus in their conversation multiplicity in meaning is affirmed.

\begin{quote}
\textit{Rosencrantz:} We might as well be dead. Do you think Death could possibly be a boat?
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{112}\textsuperscript{PARALLEL} - One must only choose between the following: Caesar and Pompey, Horace and Virgil, Voltaire and Rousseau, Napoleon and Charlemagne, Goethe and Schiller, Bayard and Mac-Mahon...

(Flaubert, G., 2010, \textit{Dictionary of Received Ideas}, [Trans. Gregory Norminton], Oneworld Classics Ltd: 74)
Guildenstern: No, no, no¹¹³ ... Death is... not. Death isn’t. You take my meaning? Death is the ultimate negative. Not-being. You can’t not be on a boat.

Rosencrantz: I’ve frequently not been on boats.

Guildenstern: No, no, no - what you’ve been is not on boats.

An asteismus is essentially a play on words where a second speaker alters the (non)sense of terminology spoken by their protagonist. The use of an asteismus is commonly considered to be a comedic device; however, in this ludic conversation between Rosencrantz and Guildenstern the supposedly finite dichotomies of being and nonbeing, sense and nonsense, appear impossible.

*it is as if the language were stretched along an abstract and infinitely varied line.* (Deleuze 1997: 109)

The ‘abstract and varied line’ of this discourse bifurcates and deviates to generate a stammering space that is resistant to metaphysical dichotomies and totalizing narratives. Matthews and Allen’s footnote-machine is a malfunctioning device that resists the anticipated explanatory function of academic annotation. This (dys)functional footnote-machine affirms a parapoetic practice, situating anomaly, exception, error and interruption as generative potentialities.
The Potential Third
we should view the constraint as a generator of potentialities, only some of which will be actualised in concrete form. (James & Perloff 2009: 155)

Matthews and Allen’s footnote-machine utilizes the effective concept of constraints to generate potentialities. These machinic constraints operate in the space between the traditional dualities of order and disorder. This tensive space attempts to resist homogenization through the implementation of constraints (a method paradoxically suggesting unifying stratagems). The play of constraints in Matthews and Allen’s footnote-machine seeks to generate ‘vagaries that diverge from what directs them, escaping the events of the system that controls them.’ (Bök 2001: 43).

The language of a rule and a constraint differs in that a rule is commonly perceived as an accepted norm whereas a constraint is perceived as an excessive exaggeration of the rule (Matthews and Allen adopt the word rule as a satirical gesture that implies both cultural convention and the ludic vocabulary of childhood games). The constraint may be said to go beyond the rule forcing ‘the system out of its routine functioning’, thus generating anomaly (Motte 1998: 41). The purposeful construction of constraints is intended to parody the unifying rules implicit in traditional metaphysical thought. This parodic gesture affirms that '[t]he classical

1. Note my square shoulders and expanded chest as the Policemen pull tight the straps of the jacket at the back.

6. And so, in less than a minute I am free. Simple, isn’t it? — When you know how.
playwright who writes his tragedy observing a certain number of familiar rules is freer than the poet who writes that which comes into his head and who is the slave of other rules of which he is ignorant.’ (Queneau 1998: 41). The concept of constraint-based practice was introduced in the first OuLiPo manifesto as an alternative to the romanticized notion of artistic inspiration. OuLiPo is a contraction of Ouvroir de la Littérature Potentielle, translating to ‘workshop for potential literature’. For the Oulipians, the objective of a constraint is to establish ‘techniques which can dismiss inspiration from their affectivity.’ (Lescure 2001: 67). Writing\textsuperscript{115} under constraint operates as a method to destabilize the traditional centrality of the artistic author and thus to liberate the artist from the servitude of artistic expression. Constraint-based practice operates as a machinic paralogy where ‘acts of prosthetic automation do not simply assist in the process of writing so much as replace the concept of writing itself.’ (Bök 2001: 67). Matthews and Allen adopt the notion of constraint-based practice through the formulation of ludic rules. The ludic rules of Matthews and Allen’s game attempt to destabilize the ideological figure of the author who traditionally imposes homogenous meaning. Homogenous systems are arguably dependant upon the implementation of and adherence to determined rules. Matthews and Allen observe the playful character of OuLiPo and their use of constraints to disrupt the rules that govern cultural contrivance. This observation serves as a point of departure for Matthews and Allen’s footnote-machine where ‘a machinic calculus has the potential

\textsuperscript{115} WRITING - \textit{Currente calamo}: that’s the excuse for poor style and faulty grammar.

(Flaubert, G., 2010, \textit{Dictionary of Received Ideas}, [Trans. Gregory Norminton], Oneworld Classics Ltd: 99)
to generate the novelty of anomaly.’ (Bök 2001: 65). Matthews and Allen establish constraints that serve to generate potentialities. This constraint-based practice manifests as a series of rules in a dialogic game between the collaborative double where ‘potential generates a new process rather than an old product. The exception to the rule implies not a freedom from but the outcome of such an exhaustive constraint.’ (Bök 2001: 71). This exception to the rule is a swerve, a clinamen deviating from the fate of contrivance.

The ideal game is defined by chance and the production of rules. And this production of rules is not arbitrated by some benevolent and wise force which would guarantee lawfulness and regularity, but by an aleatory point, by pure chance. (Hughes 2008: 112)

Georges Perec’s lipogrammatic novel A Void is composed entirely without the use of the letter ‘e’, excepting the author’s name. A Void is an example of constraint-based practice where the exclusion of the letter ‘e’ generates an inventive potentiality.

A gap will yawn, achingly, day by day, it will turn into a colossal pit, an abyss

The News At Ton, a comedy sketch by the double act The Two Ronnies, appears comparable to the linguistic constraints implemented by Perec and the OuLiPo group. The News At Ton implements a constraint generated by the faulty mechanisms of a dysfunctional machine - a typewriter that substitutes the letter ‘o’ for the letter ‘e’. These machinic errors give rise to an anomalous language where the ‘Queen’ becomes the ‘Quoon’ in a continuous and ludic slippage of meaning.

‘Letters no longer remain gridlocked in the striated space of their lineated pages; instead, they flit and dart within a smoother space of volatile links that spiral outward from any starting point’ (Bök 2006: 29). Christian Bök’s text Eunoia, the shortest word in the English dictionary\(^\text{117}\) to contain all five vowels, adopts the principle of constraint demonstrated in Perec’s A Void. In Eunoia, the rules of the game constrain the writer to use only one vowel per chapter: Chapter A, Chapter E, Chapter I, Chapter O and Chapter U. ‘Enfettered, these sentences repress free speech. The text deletes selected letters. We see the revered exegete reject metred verse’ (Bök 2008: 31).

\(^{117}\) DICTIONARY - Say of it: “Only for ignoramuses.” A dictionary of rhyme:\(^{118}\) to use or not to use? Shameful!

(Flaubert, G., 2010, Dictionary of Received Ideas, [Trans. Gregory Norminton], Oneworld Classics Ltd: 27)

\(^{118}\)

I’m, chyme, chime, dime, lime, climb, clime, slime, mime, rime, crime, grime, prime, cyme, time, thyme, Trondheim, Sondheim, Mannheim, sublime, quicklime, brooklime, birdlime, begrime, daytime, playtime, foretime, wartime, bedtime, halftime, lifetime, ragtime, full-time, sometime, meantime, noontime, springtime, longtime, pastime, peacetime, mistime, part-time, enzyme, isocheim, mesenchyme, paradigm ...
The OuLiPo method of constraint-based practice places ‘emphasis on potential rather than actual literature’ (Hugill 2012: 58). In attempting to understand the intentions of the Oulipians it is perhaps advantageous to think outside of the traditional notions of completed literary works and alternatively place emphasis upon the term ‘potential’. ‘Potential’ suggests that which is possible as opposed to actual. The OuLiPo group ‘has been concerned not with literary works but with the structures and procedures capable of producing them.’ (Brotchie & Mathews 2005: 213). The Oulipian distinction between ‘created creations’ and ‘creations that create’ reflects matthews and allen’s distinction between the footnote (being one possibility among many potentialities) and the footnote-machine (a device capable of generating a field of potentialities). The Oulipian use of terminology such as ‘workshop’ and ‘potential’ suggests an emphasis upon the process involved in generating language rather than the static product of literary activity.

The emphasis on process in the Ouplipian machine is integral to the concept of a generative practice. Process refers to a ‘continuous series of facts or operations that can lead to other series of facts and operations. A process implies the idea of a permanent rupture in established equilibria.’ (Guattari 2006: 420). Guattari’s definition of process articulates the collapse of an order/disorder dichotomy and effects an associative relation to the ‘initial conditions’ (order) of scientific experimentation and the subsequent rupture of the clinamen (disorder). ‘Disorder is the end of

The slash is most commonly used as the word substitute for ‘or’ which indicates a choice (often mutually exclusive) is present.
systems, and their beginning. Everything always goes toward chaos, and, sometimes, everything comes from it.’ (Abbas 2005: 13). The clinamen is the affirmation of anomaly within a system that privileges the standard and the serious. The clinamen is ‘the opening of difference and of play.’ (Barker 2012: 200).

The Oulipian constraint effectively operates as the rule in a game, thus analogous to the language of childhood games and notions of play. The associative language of play is commonly perceived as activity without serious or practical purpose. This dichotomous language of the serious and the non-serious suggests a connection to the Derridean concept of the ‘play of differences’ (a play of difference being an oscillating movement between traditional dichotomies: the serious and the non-serious). This play of difference renders the static classification of dichotomies ‘impossible’, and thus suggests the affirmation of ambiguity and anomaly. Deconstructionist philosophy responds to a system of homogeneity that limits play by establishing codes and conventions that appear innate and perform ‘as is’. The hierarchical duality of noesis and poesis, the serious and non-serious, effectively operates as a metaphysical ‘as is’. As Jarry suggests in his science of ‘pataphysics, the actual is never ‘as it is’ but always ‘as if it is’, in that actuality only exists as an interpretative speculation, thus ‘pataphysics ‘narrates not what is, but what might have become’ (Bök 2001: 8). The OuLiPo group respond to the ‘pataphysical science of exceptions ‘by inflecting the mathetic intensities of numerological forms, arguing

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**standard 1.** an object or quality or measure serving as a basis or example or principle to which others conform or should conform.

*(Oxford English Reference Dictionary, 1993)*

**double standard**

Do as I say, not as I do.

Jill: Why are you walking on the grass when I told you not to?

Jane: But you’re walking on the grass.

Jill: Do as I say, not as I do.

*(thefreedictionary.com)*
That exception results from the constraint of programs.’ (Bök 2001: 64). It is in this exception to the rule that a language of anomaly and difference is arguably generated.

‘From which point it’s but a hop, skip and a jump to grasping why so much was built on so rigorous a constraint.’ (Perec 2008: 177). The construction of rules and constraints appear frequently in the practice of collaborations, collectives and groups. The rules of the collective game suggest an operational logic that permits the participation of multiple players.

The weed overflows by virtue of being restrained. (Deleuze & Parnet 2007: 30)

George: We go shopping every two years, so we don’t have to shop on a daily basis. We buy enough lavatory paper, toothpaste, shampoo, soap to last us quite some time. (Gilbert & George 2012)

The constraints at play in the collaboration between Gilbert & George operate as a method to maintain their homogenous third character. In THE LAWS OF SCULPTORS Gilbert & George utilize constraint-based practice to introduce the
concept of control: ‘Always be smartly dressed, well groomed, relaxed, friendly, polite and in complete control’ (Gilbert & George 2012). The practice of Gilbert & George adopts the concept of control (control employed as a deliberate strategy to confound social expectation) as a method to simultaneously construct collaborative rules and disrupt cultural convention (the interplay of order and disorder).

Deleuze and Guattari employ dialogic constraints in their collaborative-machine to generate a practice of anomalous multiplicity. Their dialogic systems and regimes appear to resist the conversational character commonly associated with the process of dialogue. Francois Dosse, author of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari: Intersecting Lives, describes deleuzoguattarian dialogue as something akin to a ‘purification ritual: while one spoke, the other listened silently.’ (Dosse 2001: 9). This deleuzoguattarian dialogic constraint ensures that all concepts are played-out within a culture of equivalence. ‘If I told him that the center of the earth was made of raspberry jam, his role would be to find out how to make that idea work.’ [sic.] (Deleuze 2001: 9).

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Wit and vivacity are two highly important ingredients in the conversation of a man in polite society, yet a straining for effect, or forced wit, is in excessively bad taste. There is nothing more insupportable in society than the everlasting talkers who scatter puns, witticisms, and jokes with so profuse a hand that they become as tiresome as a comic newspaper, and whose loud laugh at their own wit drowns other voices which might speak matter more interesting.

(Hartly, C., 2006, Gentlemen’s Book of Etiquette, University of Michigan: 12-13)

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J. R. Hartley
matthews and allen’s decision to abide by a series of constraints is, in part, an acknowledgment of the rules at play in all aspects of culture and the assertion that ‘no rule can be undermined by pretending that the rule does not exist’ (Bök 2001: 67). matthews and allen adopt the concept of dialogic constraint as a means to generate machinic potentialities that resist the traditions of artistic authorialism. A-typical matthews and allen constraint reads as follows: ‘A written dialogue will take place between matthews and allen via the medium of email. The dialogic constraint stipulates that matthews and allen may communicate using only the concluding lines of a text to generate potentialities from what others perceive as a finite work’ (see matthews and allen’s epilogue). matthews and allen are ‘rats who must build the labyrinth from which they propose to escape.’ (Motte 1998: 22). New constraints are drafted for each potential footnote and although constraints recur, no system is permitted to settle into government. The establishment of dialogic constraints reinforces the non-oppositional character of matthews and allen’s collaborative machine and affirms that it is the footnote-machine that speaks and not matthews and/or allen. These machinic constraints perform a ludic code that attempts to resist the metaphysical tradition of homogeneity. Through a process of incorporating anomaly, exception, and the noise of the Serresean third man into the academic text, the footnote-machine seeks to perform digression from the traditional centrality of
authorial meaning. Deleuze suggests that ‘creating has always been something different from communicating. The key thing might be to create vacuoles of non-communication, circuit breakers so we can elude control.’ (Deleuze 1995: 175).

Matthews and Allen attempt to evade authorial control through the implementation of ludic rules and constraints performed by an abstract machine.¹²⁵ (The ‘abstract machine’ is associated with the mathematician Alan Turing who imagined a hypothetical machine that had the ability to perform infinite mathematical calculations. Turing’s abstract machine serves to question the definitude with which traditional mathematics is associated.)

The constraint is a condition of possibility that suggests diagrammatic thought. Deleuze differentiates the figure of the diagram from structure, suggesting that ‘there is no diagram that does not also include, besides the points which it connects up, certain relatively free or unbound points, points of creativity, change and resistance.’ (Deleuze 2006: 44). The character of the Deleuzian diagram is that of a

¹²⁵

Awareness is like consciousness. Soul is like spirit. But soft is not like hard and weak is not like strong. A mechanic can be both soft and hard, a stewardess can be both weak and strong. This is called philosophy or a world-view.

RACTER [raconteur] (an artificial intelligence computer programme that generated English language prose at random), 1984, The Policeman’s Beard is Half Constructed.
fluid and unstable abstract machine which appears to resist any definitive definition: ‘As we get close to it, it remains elusive.’ (Zdebik 2012: 178). The diagram is a non-representational machine mapping an undecidable and indiscernible space, a space between stable structures (between collaborative constraint and footnote). The diagram, in the context of architectural practice, is situated between the concept of a building and the actual building. ‘The house described is ‘floating’, its parts detached. This is not a stable house. It is incorporeal’ (Zdebik 2012: 122).

Deleuze articulates a distinction between the mimetic operations of tracing (the repetition of what is already present) and mapping as a site of potentiality. Etymologically the diagram is a contraction of ‘dia’, from the Greek meaning through, and gram meaning that which is drawn; thus the diagram may be said to operate through that which is marked. The diagram’s ‘secondary connotation of marking or crossing out’ generates an undecidable condition and positions the diagram as analogous to the Derridean concept ‘under erasure’ (Knoespel 2001: 147). Derridean under erasure effectively refers to a text wherein what is written is struck-through. The process of crossing out connotes that which is both present and absent, thus undecidable. Matthews and Allen’s footnotes metaphorically place the academic text under erasure, effectively dislocating traditional perceptions of unitary meaning.

‘The diagram is not precise, or representational, but charts the relation of forces that can be utilized or made’ (Zdebik 2012: 7). Akin to a map, the diagram does
not trace static and determinable phenomena but rather generates conditions for possibilities. A map has no determined entry or exit point, no indication of when or where a journey is to begin or end, only possible trajectories, possible terrains.

there is no longer a subject that tries to conform to the image, and either succeeds or fails. Rather, a zone of indistinction, of indiscernibility, or of ambiguity seems to be established between two terms, as if they had reached the point immediately preceding their respective differentiation: not a similitude, but a slippage. (Zdebik 2012: 160)

Deleuze refers to the diagram as ‘the map of relations between forces’, an indistinct and undecidable condition (Deleuze 2006: 37). The footnote-machine operates as an abstract machine, a map of relations between noetic and poetic forces. The footnote-machine is neither the academic text nor the footnotes but a series of functions that make up a system. The diagram does not attempt to close the gap between phenomena (this is not a gesture toward synthesis) but rather attempts to widen this fluctuating space of potentiality. Thus the diagram performs a ‘fluctuating process occurring between static structures. As a concept it describes the flexible, elastic, incorporeal functions before they settle into a definitive form’ (Zdebik 2012: 1).
Matthews and Allen’s footnote-machine performs diagrammatically, describing the functions and constraints of the academic/paratextual system. The constraints of the footnote-machine suggest the operations of an abstract machine that may be applied ‘beyond a specific state – to heterogeneous situations.’ (Zdebik 2012: 9). The abstract machine values that which is fluid and unformed, thus adhering to the language of process (a Guattarian conception of process being a rupture in established equilibria).

The diagram is highly unstable or fluid, continually churning up matter and functions in a way likely to create change. (Deleuze 2006: 30)

The diagram suggests the interplay between order and chaos; analogous to the clinamen, it is the emergence of ‘unexpected conjunctions or improbable continuums’ (Deleuze 2006: 31). The diagram, perceived as that which is drawn, suggests an alliance with the concept of a ‘sketch’, which etymologically may be considered to perform the language of the clinamen-machine. Zdebik contextualises the word ‘sketch’ in the German ‘skizze’, a term derived from the Italian ‘schizzo’ meaning ‘to splash or to squirt’. This splashing and squirting is comparable with the movements of Faustroll’s clinamen-machine, movements that rupture the flow of matter.
The manipulation of chance generates a paradox in Oulipian practice in the tensive relation between order (constraints) and disorder (clinamen). This diagrammatic and uncertain relation of forces is effectively articulated in the title of Mallarmé’s poem *A throw of the dice will never abolish chance*. Bök proposes chance as that which performs two contradictory operations: the dispersal of associative phenomena and the assemblage of disparate phenomena (deterritorialization and reterritorialization). ‘Is it not fair to say that, wherever a norm prevails, chance seems to intervene on behalf of an anomalous behaviour?’ (Bök 2006: 27). Nietzsche correlates the dice-throw with multiplicity and the affirmation of chance, where each throw generates potentialities.

*it is not a matter of unbridled spontaneity or sheer chaos. On the contrary, in these cases the operation of chance occurs only in the context of certain predetermined conditions, much like a deck of cards or a pair of dice. Within those constraints, a process is set in motion that has unpredictable results.* (Iversen 2010: 19)
The truth of the ludic abides by no belief; instead, such truth is entertained as one of many hypothetical alternatives. It is merely a “potentiality” (Bök 2001: 73).

The concept of potentiality has traditionally been perceived as contrary to actuality (an Aristotelian inheritance). This oppositional logic historically privileges the concept of actuality and subsequently positions potentiality as marginal. The actual connotes a condition of certainty and stasis, thus adhering to a cultural propensity toward ordered systems and known phenomena. Contrarily, the concept of potentiality is traditionally perceived as a temporary and uncertain state, suggesting that which subsists in a minoritarian condition. An inclination toward actualizing potential may effectively be perceived as the negation of potentiality. It is perhaps in Giorgio Agamben’s account of potentiality that we find a means to escape this oppositional impasse. Agamben’s essay On Potentiality offers a critical trajectory beyond the binarism of an actual/potential relation. Agamben offers a theoretical perspective where potentiality resists the homogeneity of majoritarian actuality; ‘here we are confronted with a potentiality that conserves itself and saves itself in actuality.’ (Agamben 1999: 184). Agamben argues that the binarism assigned to

You could obtain some useful information from an unexpected source.  
(Aries 8 Jan 2013, theastrologyroom.com)

That may be true.  
(Sagittarius 11 Jan 2013, dailymail.co.uk)

Knowledge is power.  
(Taurus 11 Jan 2013, russellgrant.com)

Obstacles will disappear when you shine the light of knowledge.  
(Aries 14 Jan 2013, dailyhoroscopes.com)

Two heads are better than one.  
(Aries 14 Jan 2013, theastrologyroom.com)
Aristotle’s philosophy of an actual/potential binary may be reconsidered. Potentiality, rather than being designated as that which has yet to be actualized, may be repositioned as a potential ‘not to be’. For Agamben, this ‘impotentiality’ questions the traditional primacy of actuality. ‘What is essential is that potentiality is not simply non-Being, simple privation, but rather the existence of non-Being, the presence of an absence’ (Agamben: 1999: 179). Agamben describes the persistence of potentiality as that which remains in the actual (in the context of matthews and allen’s paratextual practice, a multiplicity of potential footnotes may be said to reside in the footnote which is actualized). This persistence of potentiality in actuality suggests an association to Thucydides’ proposition that stasis, the actual, is a condition in which oppositional forces enter into a static state yet retain ‘internal disturbances’. Deleuze and Parnet suggest that dualisms are inherent in all language systems and as such they do not disregard duality, but rather propose the stammering of language between actuality and potentiality (Deleuze & Parnet 2007: 34). Deleuzian philosophy suggests the coupling of actuality and potentiality where ‘actuality is unfolded from potentiality’ (Colebrook 2010: 10).

It fluctuates, it does not remain. Or if it remains, it does so by fluctuating. It is one, it isn’t one, unstable. (Serres 1997: 50)

more supported and better understood. (Capricorn 14 Jan 2013, dailymail.co.uk)

It is possible though, that you could talk your way around this. (Aquarius 14 Jan 2013, horoscopes.co.uk)

We want to know who to love and cheer, who to hate and boo. We don't really want to be troubled with extenuating circumstances and reasons to reconsider our opinions. (Sagittarius 11 Jan 2013, dailymail.co.uk)

Sudden revelations can be unsettling. (Aquarius 14 Jan 2013, patrickarundell.com)
Agamben’s potentiality suggests that the system actualized or unfolded is only one possibility among many potential systems. Agamben’s collapse of the actual and potential dichotomy suggests that potentiality persists in that which has been actualized, thus making actuality unstable (this ‘collapse’ of actuality and potentiality does not give way to unity but rather generates a stammering space). ‘The multiplicity of the possible is here, it is now. It is intermediary between the phenomena, it rustles in the midst of the forms that emerge from it’ (Serres 1997: 23-24).

The persistence of potentiality in that which is actualized implies that both the noetic text and the poetic footnote are situated in a stammering space. Matthews and Allen’s footnote-machine attempts to affirm the possibility for other potentialities to persist in that which has been actualized. ‘When the first sonnet was written almost a thousand years ago, what counted was not the poem itself but a new potentiality of future poems.’ (Brotchie & Mathews 2005: 213).

Agamben states that ‘[every] written work can be regarded as the prologue (or rather, the broken cast) of a work never penned, and destined to remain so, because later works, which in turn will be the prologues or the moulds for other absent works represent only sketches’ or diagrams (Agamben 1993: 3). Agamben’s suggestion that every work is prefatory situates the text as diagrammatic, thus generating a condition of undecidability between text and diagram, actuality and potentiality.

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This could be a time when mixed messages are possible.
(Scorpio 14 Jan 2013, patrickarundell.com)

More than the facts, the figures or the good communication, you need the connection.
(Taurus 14 Jan 2013, cosmopolitan.co.uk/horoscopes)

There's no smoke without fire. But sometimes it is easy to confuse steam with smoke.
(Aries 11 Jan 2013, dailymail.co.uk)

A bigger and better sense of possibility.
(Pisces 15 Jan 2013, cosmopolitan.co.uk/horoscopes)
matthews and allen’s footnote machine, comparable to the Oulipian constraint and the Deleuzian diagram, attempts to map the imaginary space of potentiality. This space of potentiality is characterized through the concept of anomaly, the principle of variance, differing from the norm, the standard, the orthodox, and the actual. The digressive operations of the footnote serve as a one possibility in the mapping of potentiality. Several ‘anticipatory plagiarists’ have utilized the footnote as a method for disruption. Anticipatory plagiarism is a ludic and somewhat paradoxical phrase employed by the OuLiPo group to ‘identify its predecessors: authors who have previously used methods now seen as “Oulipian”.’ (Brotchie & Matthews 2005: 211). matthews and allen’s anticipatory plagiarisms may include, for example, Danielewski’s labyrinthine text House of Leaves. The copious footnoting in House of Leaves disrupts the concept of linearity where every permutation of the page leads the reader toward digression.

Beyond what is seemingly obvious.
(Taurus 11 Jan 2013, dailymail.co.uk)

You might even doubt your own mind.
(Aries 15 Jan 2013, horoscopes.co.uk)
words

in

ludic formation

a typo graphical lacunae,

a single word in the
isolated
space of an otherwise blank page. These digressive devices compel the reader to perform disruptive gestures: an inclining motion of the head, the rotation of the text, the flitting from one section of text to another. Danielewski’s exceptions to the literary rule appear to affirm Louis Borges’ assertion that ‘the book and the labyrinth [are] one and the same.’ (Borges 1999: 217). Auster’s novel Oracle Night may also be perceived as generating a Borgesian bifurcation where the use of footnotes perform an almost hypertextual practice. The fictional terrain depicted in Auster’s footnotes is presented as one among many possibilities. The use of paratextual material in Oracle Night and House of Leaves, et al. is intended to ramify rather than unify the narrative field. The digressive paratexts of matthews and allen also suggest a relation to Mallarmé and the 1897 text Divagations; ‘a new mode of writing that moved between the critical essay and the prose poem, constantly challenging and redefining their limits’ (Forsdick & Stafford 2005: 233).

I’ll tell you a story
About Jack a Nory;
And now my story's begun;
I'll tell you another
Of Jack132 and his brother,
And now my story is done.

131 Stories and ever more stories that know only too well that each one uttered is but one possibility amongst a much vaster set of possibilities (Lomax 2004: 82)

132

The Oddment Emporium
A CARNIVORA OF ECLECTIC DELIGHTS

132

Spring-heeled Jack is a character in English folklore of the Victorian era who was known for his startling jumps. The first claimed sighting of Spring-heeled Jack was in 1837. Later sightings were reported all over England and were especially prevalent in suburban London.
The paratextual matter generated by matthews and allen’s footnote-machine articulates one possibility among a multiplicity of future possibilities which remain in a state of potentiality, thus ‘a potential work is a work which is not limited to its appearances’ (Motte 1998: 20). matthews and allen’s footnote-machine operates via a series of constraints that simultaneously question artistic decision and the romanticized notions of inspiration and expression associated with authorial activity. These collaborative constraints include non-oppositional dialogue devised as a means to include the Serresean third man and consequently generate a circumstance wherein the dialectical relation between noetic and poetic practice falters. matthews and allen attempt to question established authorial noesis through the methodological inclusion of informal or ‘small narratives’; the idiom, the proverb, the joke. matthews and allen utilize humour as a device to question the authority of the standard and the serious and the traditional dichotomy between the serious and the comedic. The informality of jokes, urban myths, anecdotes, et al. is positioned as equivalent to the supposed centrality of an academic text. The rules of matthews and allen’s game serve to perform différance in the anticipated monocracy of the academic text. ‘There are no preexisting rules; each move invents its own rules; it bears upon its own rule’ (Deleuze 2004[b]: 70). These constraints reside ‘more in the ordering of the means than in the intuition of the ends’ (Motte 1998: 49).

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How to Tell a Joke

Very little in Comedy is a sure thing; however, there are steps you can take to help build the favorable response you want from your audience, whether you're onstage or amongst friends.

**Difficulty Level:** Easy  **Time Required:** Varies

**Here's How:**

Avoid detours. As a rule, jokes work best in a straight line. 134
The Oulipians are the anticipatory plagiarists\textsuperscript{135} of matthews and allen’s constraint-based practice where ‘[w]hat is potential generates a new process rather than an old product. The exception to the rule implies not a freedom from but the outcome of such an exhaustive constraint. The exception explications the rule, testing its limits, defying its fields, forsaking the nomic work of one paradigm for the ludic risk of another paralogy’ (Bök 2001: 71).
[In]conclusion
There are multiplicities which constantly go beyond binary machines. (Deleuze & Parnet 2007: 19)

Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule is a complex of gestures serving to unsettle the metaphysical legacy of authorialism. This discourse considers six philosophical perspectives relating to the third position, from metaphysical monocracy to proliferative potentiality. The crowd, clinamen, parapoetic gesture and parasitic background NOISE operate as tropes for multiplicity, generating disruption within a traditional authorial paradigm (the word ‘trope’ taken from the Greek ‘tropos’ meaning to turn). This disruptive discourse suggests that ‘behind the visible facade of the system, [...] the rich uncertainty of disorder’ persists (Foucault 2002[a]: 84).

This research is contextualized within the metaphysical tradition of dialecticism, aligning dialectical synthesis with the conflated third hand of collaboration\(^{36}\) theory. The language of opposition and consensus permeates philosophical tradition manifesting in the sublated third term and/or the stasis of binary opposition. Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule performs the destabilization of the oppositions at play in this text (noetic/poetic, theory/practice, author/reader, one/multiplicity, order/chaos, serious/non-serious,
stoic/ludic) whilst attempting to resist the stasis of stable opposition. The complexity of this research resides in the inclusion of two narrative constructs (text and paratext) and two collaborative protagonists (matthews and allen), wherein the language of duality (albeit an intentional system of dualism implemented by the collaboration) may ostensibly be perceived as a series of oppositional gestures; however, the relation between the noetic text and the poetic\textsuperscript{137} paratext is resistant to an oppositional reading as these two textual spaces are not theoretically opposed. matthews and allen’s paratexts are not contradictory gestures that attempt to subvert or usurp the academic text, more accurately they are ‘the idea of opposites as equivalent.’ (Hugill 2012: 11).

Contemporary philosophy acknowledges that every single harbours the multiple; however, this discourse has situated the language of unitary thought (the standard, the normative, the rule) as a persistent precept in the construction of meaning. In the proposition to unsettle unity (that which is ‘formed of parts that

\textit{By using the principle of equivalents as its point of departure, the game is free: the situation can completely construct itself.} (Jorn 1961)

Poetic Licence\textsuperscript{138}

LIBERTY - O liberty! What crimes are committed in your name! We have all the liberties that are necessary. Liberty\textsuperscript{139} does not mean license (phrase for conservatives).

(Flaubert, G., 2010, Dictionary of Received Ideas, [Trans. Gregory Norminton], Oneworld Classics Ltd: 61)
constitute a whole’ (Pearsall & Trumble 1995) this discourse has introduced the concepts of exception and anomaly. Akin to Jarry’s ‘pataphysical science of exceptions, matthews and allen’s paratextual practice seeks to generate anomaly in the authorial system, ‘inciting a riot in the prison house of language’ (Andrews 1996: 45). matthews and allen perform the metaphoric Serresean third man in Sillman’s prison-house of language, being neither prison guard (the autocratic author) nor prisoner (the acquiescent reader). This third man is proposed as a NOISE in the background of ideological unity, an intervallic exception in a paradigmatic order.

matthews and allen recast the homogenous character of the collaborative ‘third’ as a site of proliferation. In an act of resistance to the unitary principles of collaboration theory, the protagonists matthews and allen adopt the non-oppositional process of collaborative dialogue as their modus operandi. The Serresean assertion that ‘to hold a dialogue is to suppose a third man and seek to exclude him’ served as a foundational point of departure in the proposition to reconfigure the collaborative third position (Serres 1982: 67). Collaborative dialogue (conceived as an act of alliance) is posited as that which is uninhibited by dialectical systems and thus positions the dialogic triumph of one participant as futile. This non-oppositional process disrupts both oppositional traditions of argumentation and singular subjectivities and as such is proposed as a method to enable interruptive phenomena to enter the dialogic system.
Linearity\textsuperscript{141} is already questionable when two interlocutors interact within a given environment, bringing about other circumstances, having instable and mutual perceptions, thus, constituting a chaotic system. In fact, such variables are well known. They are what we call noise (Ferraz 2007)

Matthews and Allen generate a stammering space through the inclusion of events and phenomena that take place in the interstices of their collaborative dialogue. This reimagining of artist-to-artist dialogue is proposed as a method to include the ‘noise of the world that hums in the background and perpetually threatens to hum between them’ (Lomax 2004: 13). Matthews and Allen’s collaborative dialogue contains dark precursors, indistinguishable elements that generate a clinametic movement. The dark precursor is that which precedes the event (the footnote is an event preceded by an indeterminate dark precursor); it is an agent of inconsistency, an imperceptible difference, which generates the turning from laminar flow (the academic text) toward anomaly (Matthews and Allen’s footnotes). If ‘every system contains its dark precursor which ensures communication of peripheral series’, then when two potentials enter into communication a reaction or event emerges (Deleuze 2004[a]: 145-6). The imperceptible character of the dark precursor is
situated as an operative third, force that creates a relation between heterogeneous series (between text and off-text); the dark precursor is that which precedes the paratextual event.

It is the ultimate and self-determining source of determination, behind which there is nothing at all. (Hallward 2006: 27)

Matthews and Allen’s footnote machine is a collaborative apparatus effecting the internal collapse of metaphysical authorship. Matthews and Allen’s paratextual practice, conceived as a ‘foreign language cannot be hollowed out in one language [the scholarly text] without language being toppled or pushed to a limit.’ (Deleuze 1997: 5), Matthews and Allen appropriate both in the physical space allocated for academic citation and in the infrastructure of scholarly writing as a means to articulate ‘the problematic limit between an inside and an outside that is always threatened by graft and by parasite’ (Derrida 1991: 196). The character of the footnote is recast as a parasitic device operating as a stratagem to question the linearity of the academic discourse. This ‘parasite intervenes, enters the system as an element of fluctuation’ (Serres 2007: 191).

Matthews and Allen’s footnote machine [dys]functions via a system of constraints employed by the collaborative double as a strategy to escape the tyranny

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1. With one another
2. Or any two
3. With a third

of authorial decision. Furthermore, the implementation of constraint-based practice questions the precepts of a system wherein ‘vagaries [...] diverge from what directs them, escaping the events of the system that controls them’ (Bök 2001: 43). Perec (matthews and allen’s anticipatory plagiarist) is cited as a writer working with the productive potentialities of constraint-based practice wherein limitation (the omission of letter ‘e’) generates new phraseologies:

Any form of constraint, including this ludic constriction, works to limit authorial control and acts as a machinic approach to artistic production. Limitations working to constrain an author mark a shift in opinion from a traditional romanticism surrounding authorial autonomy to an anomalous multiplicity. This story turns from a tradition of totalizing conclusions to a condition of possibility. This poststructural account positions finality as an affirmation of unitary thought and as such aims to cast-off a cultural inclination towards stasis. It is an

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The art of writing is the art of applying the seat of your pants to the seat of your chair. (American proverb)

Art is long, life is short. (From the Greek physician Hippocrates (c.460–357BC) comparing the difficulties encountered in learning the art of medicine or healing with the shortness of human life)

How long is a piece of string? (Traditional saying, used to indicate that something cannot be given a finite measurement)
The paratextual practice of Matthews and Allen is generated by the purposeful inclusion of events that escape a conventional authorial system, the inclusion of NOISE. This metaphoric NOISE manifests as a paralanguage of idioms, colloquialisms, old wives tales, image, verse and audial digression (the resonant NOISE of Lyotardian ‘petit récits’). Matthews and Allen’s ‘small narratives’ are citational gestures serving as a strategem to unsettle the autocratic position of the author and as an escape from the servitude of artistic expression. Plagiarism by anticipation is proffered as a concept wherein the principles of metaphysical authorship falter. Both academic text (unwittingly) and poetic paratext adopt the concept of anticipatory plagiarism; however, the traditional academic text acknowledges its predecessors as a means to validate a monocratic position whereas
matthews and allen recognize anticipatory plagiarism as a philosophical position from which the ideological figure of the author (as originator) is problematised.

For PLAGIARISM read also PLA[Y]GIARISM, for the process of writing at work here is also playful – it is a demonstration, a game, a performance. (Federman 1993: 51)

This discourse characterizes Bakhtin, Bök, Carroll, Deleuze, Derrida, Guattari, Lomax, Lyotard, McCaffery, Perec, Serres, *et al.* as anticipatory plagiarists. The philosophical perspectives introduced in this discourse operate as a playful performance of Bakhtinian dialogism (the inaudible NOISE of intertextual phenomena), exceeding the metaphoric boundaries of the text. Paradoxically, the academic voice employs citationality as a means to reinforce authorial opinion, albeit a theorizing of proliferative phenomena, deterritorializing and reterritorializing the voices of its anticipatory plagiarists ‘into a structured artistic system.’ (Bakhtin 1981: 300). It is this propensity toward structure and systemization that the collaborative footnote-machine attempts to unsettle.

matthews and allen’s citational practice effects a culture of parasitism where the collaboration metaphorically ‘eats at the table of others’. Parasitism holds a two-fold significance in this research being both a device to displace the centrality of
the authorial voice (through the appropriation of cultural matter) and the theoretical relation between the text (host) and paratext (parasite). ‘As though that to which a parasite is ‘added’ could possibly remain as it is, unaltered!’ (Derrida 1988: 103).

When drawn in relation to the philosophical discourse of repetition, citationality infers both reiteration and difference.

Nietzsche suspends Lucretius’s atomic downward descent but preserves the agency of the clinamen in this obvious emblem of eternal recurrence.

(McCaffery 2001: 23)

In Zarathustran ‘Pataphysics McCaffery’s bifurcation146 between theory and practice takes the form of two columns; the right column expounding the ‘correct’ text, with the left column performing an ‘erroneous’ text. McCaffery suggests that the ‘correct’ column of text ‘involves a disposition toward the normative modes of signification: grammar, syntax, sentence integration, and the covering rules that guarantee unproblematic, intersubjective communication’ (McCaffery 2001: 6). It is this cultural privilege of normative modes of communication (between interlocutors and

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speak with a forked147 tongue

147

zigzag148

148

the knight’s move149

149

chess – (game of) – Too serious to be a game, too futile to be a science.

(Flaubert, G., 2010, Dictionary of Received Ideas, [Trans. Gregory Norminton], Oneworld Classics Ltd: 17)
between author and reader) that Matthews and Allen’s footnote-machine serves to disrupt. The clinametic exceptions introduced in McCaffery’s text are characteristic of Matthews and Allen’s inclusion of ‘error’ and cultural NOISE. Matthews and Allen’s footnotes find their way into the relation between the authorial text and the reader: ‘interstitial and intervalllic, as well as extra, outside’ (McCaffery 2006: 323). These quasi-footnotes operate as a method to disrupt the reader’s habitual absorption of master narratives, generating an oscillating third space between text and paratext.

Matthews and Allen’s footnote-machine performs the excluded third of Serresean philosophy through the inclusion of NOISE. The footnote-machine attempts to generate possibilities that exceed authorial intention. Matthews and Allen establish ‘rules of the game’ that serve to disrupt singular subjectivities. These ‘acts of prosthetic automation do not simply assist in the process of writing so much as replace the concept of writing itself.’ (Bök 2001: 67).

The clinamen is proposed as an agent of disorder, it is ‘the end of systems, and their beginning. Everything always goes towards chaos, and, sometimes, everything comes from it.’ (Abbas 2005: 13). In the interplay between ordered text and clinametic paratext the word ‘sketch’, situated in a philosophical discussion relating to the Deleuzian diagram (chapter 6), bifurcates in the interstices of collaborative dialogue to generate reference to a spirograph. The digression from theoretical discourse to ludic game suggests an unintentional equivalence between standard
and non-standard texts, with the spirograph serendipitously reflecting the diagrammatic conditions of possibility.

The indistinguishable condition established between skill and chance in Deleuze’s ‘ideal game’ infers a culture of equivalence between supposedly dichotomous concepts. A culture of equivalence, akin to the equality of cabbages and kings characterized by Carroll, is denoted in Matthews and Allen’s implementation of humour as a strategy to unsettle the dialectical relation between serious and non-serious phenomena. ‘Instead of thinking in terms of the concept as a law that governs what we say, humour and satire focus on the […] particularities, noises and disruption that are in excess of the system.’ (Colebrook 2003: 132).

The footnote is commonly characterized as a site where marginal narratives and ‘petit récits’ are in excess of the primary textual system. ‘Scholars […] tend to become infatuated with their prose […] and so when in the midst of crafting a subtly curving thought, the scholar may very easily feel the footnote is merely an

**given half a chance**

six of one and half a dozen of the other being neither one thing or the other neither rhyme nor reason run one’s rhyme run a risk
matthews and allen’s ‘inopportune interruptions’ perform disruption in an authorial system predicated upon metaphysical consensus. In the traversal gesture between text and paratext an excess of narrative possibilities is generated, possibilities that serve to unsettle the authorial paradigm. The footnote machine functions in a tensive space between order and disorder (the condition of order is existent in both the systematic conventions of academic writing and the parodic system of constraints implemented by matthews and allen, with disorder manifesting as NOISE). The footnote is traditionally utilized as an apparatus to augment and affirm the primary text; however, matthews and allen’s paratextual constructions are comparable to the production of NOISE. The scholastic ‘machine produces a flow, another machine [matthews and allen’s footnote machine] coupled to this interrupts the flow’ (O’Sullivan 2006: 24).

The paratextual practice of matthews and allen operates via a system of citationality wherein a process of deterritorialization, comparable to the ‘pataphor (a metaphor that creates its own context), is effected. The footnote machine is a [dys]functional device implementing contextomy (the inclusion of citations taken out of context) as a gesture to invalidate the notion of a fixed, inert meaning. matthews

That which occurs when a lizard's tail has grown so long it breaks off and grows a new lizard.
and allen’s citational practice operates in a similar manner to Bruce Andrews’ quotation collage wherein fifty-five references are reterritorialized to construct a ‘new’ narrative.

28. You’d depict not the structure of the world or its physical things, but the structure and set-up of language and its rules and ways of use. Language gets elucidated, not some ‘separate reality’. 29. Use language to cover a space rather than to uncover meaning.


matthews and allen’s citational practice adopts the dictionary as an apparatus associated with the hegemonic principles of finite knowledge and the designation of meaning. The footnote-machine utilizes the dictionary as a means to perform digression where one definition leads to another and another and another and so on… in a continuously bifurcating gesture. matthews and allen’s proliferative and digressive methods attempt to destabilize logocentric perspectives and articulate the NOISE that resonates in the aporia of authoritarian texts. This inquiry explores the ‘interval where contamination, paralogicality, uncertainty, and misprision precipitate discovery’ (McCaffery 2006: 326).

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Hamm: We’re not beginning to…to…mean something?

Clov: Mean something! You and I mean something! Ah, that’s a good one.

(Beckett, S., 1958, Endgame followed by Act without Words, Faber & Faber: 45)
The academic texts, authored by Helen Matthews and Marilyn Allen, generate a noetic space wherein matthews and allen perform a disruptive, collaborative poiesis. The two\textsuperscript{154} theses metaphorically articulate a resistance to dialecticism (in that the two perspectives proffered do not assume dichotomous positions) and furthermore reject the synthesizing traditions of collaboration theory (the two theses do not conflate). \textit{Two is company: Dialogic interplay AND the collaborative double}, authored by Helen Matthews, functions as both a physical and theoretical paratext to \textit{Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule} and provides a textual site wherein the traditional boundaries of this text proliferate. The dialogue between and within the two theses is analogous to a ‘pataphysical spiral infinitely expanding in an outward gesture, rendering the metaphysical centre imperceptible. The dialogue between the two theses, and text and paratext, is disseminated and performed digitally. The digital thesis effects an interlacing of perspectives and performs a proposed resistance to stable oppositions and unified phenomena. The digital methods employed in this text perform, as opposed to simply theorize, the digressive and proliferative character of this research (performance characteristically resists conclusion, and equally resists the definitions, boundaries, and limitations associated with traditional academic authorship).

Hyperlink technology permits the computational mechanisms of digression to
pervade this text. ‘Such cases of cybernetic literature begin to dramatize a philosophy of ‘pataphysical perspectivism, insofar as they attempt to imagine a multitude of divergent realities created simultaneously from the same text.’ (Bök 2001: 77-8). Hypertext-applications effect a process of digital différance\(^{155}\) where a text is contingent upon the conditions of deferral and difference that proliferate beyond the unifying logic of traditional authorialism. Digital methods of dissemination generate an inter-animating space wherein the practice of matthews and allen is situated in the same textual space as the written academic thesis, thus complicating the traditional relation between theory and practice.

To oppose the structural underpinnings by an anti-systematic detonation – dizzying... elasticize... by flashes... nonsigns... scrambled – by a blowing up of all settled relations. sentence can dislocate. mangled matter. So that the relational system that seems to underlie the very possibility of signifying would be exploded. Internally collapse. (Andrews 1996: 25)

matthews and allen’s method of digital dissemination unsettles the archetypal division between theory and practice and suggests a computational paradigm for

\(^{155}\) Only taxis allow true freedom of movement. By travelling varying distances in a set time, they contribute to automatic disorientation. Since taxis are interchangeable, no connection is established with the traveller and they can be left anywhere and taken at random. A trip with no destination, diverted arbitrarily en route, is only possible with a taxi’s essentially random itinerary.

critical praxis research. ‘It’s not a product that is produced, but a production, an event, a praxis, a model for future practice.’ (Andrews 1996: 12). The digital configuration of this thesis facilitates the proposition to perform its philosophical narrative. The digital différance between text and off-text situates the reader as a participant in the performance of digression. The deferral between theses and paratexts compels the reader to traverse both the peripheral and interstitial territories of the text. The interplay between the two scholastic texts and the ludic site of matthews and allen’s paratexts generates a third indeterminate space, a stammering space that problematizes notions of opposition, resolution and authorial precedence.

*It presents itself as an exuberant encyclopedia of narrative possibilities, while at the same time problematizing narrative through dramatic excess and through plurality and fragmentation of the various stories.* (James & Perloff 2009: 106)

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read between the lines
be on the right lines
we’ve got a right one here!
here, there and everywhere
if ifs and ands were pots and pans

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*“but I digress”*
(Ronnie Corbett)
Epilogue

The curtain rises.
The play begins.
He waited for someone to tell him who to be next
with the uniform stillness of chaos.
But that is the beginning of a new story—the
story of the gradual renewal of a man, the story
of his gradual regeneration, of his passing from
one world into another, of his initiation into a
new unknown life.
That might be the subject of a new story, but our
present story is ended.
That is a beginning.
So that, in the end, there was no end.
And thus the cycle begins of the whole.
Addendum
This addendum introduces an elucidatory voice that is intentionally absent from the praxis thesis. *Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule* incorporates both a ‘conventional’ contribution to knowledge, written by the PhD candidate, and the collaborative art practice of Matthews and Allen.

Collaboration is an accepted mode of practice in contemporary visual art; however, the concept of collaboration is problematised in the context of PhD research wherein ‘individual’ contributions to knowledge are a prerequisite. As collaborative practitioners it was necessary for Matthews and Allen to formulate a research model that would be both permissible within an institutional context and incorporate their collaborative methodologies. The disjuncture between an ‘individual’ contribution to knowledge (singular subjectivity) and collaborative practice (inter-subjectivity) provoked a reconsideration of these two modes of inquiry and posed the question of how a conjunctive space may be formulated.

The paradigm for this research was designed to facilitate the production of two ‘individual’ theses, thus two ‘individual’ contributions to knowledge, with a collaborative component situated in the space traditionally assigned to the footnote. The physical composition of the thesis attempts to provide an equivalent space for both the scholastic text and the collaborative practice of Matthews and Allen. This methodology provides a structure for the individual voices of the two PhD candidates to be perceived and for the inclusion of a collaborative voice. The writing of this thesis has been informed and affected by the traditions of PhD scholarship, in terms of both institutional regulations and an apparent resistance to collaborative voicing. *Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule* is intended to proffer an exploration of the regimes of academic writing using collaborative methods.

The collaborative art practice of Matthews and Allen typically problematises monovocal practices; as such, the concept of an ‘individual’ contribution to knowledge (an arguably monovocal approach to research) provided a point of departure for *Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule*.

The methods used to generate Matthews and Allen’s collaborative practice are alluded to in the thesis but are not articulated in definite terms. Peggy Phelan, although principally examining the practice of writing about performance rather than performative writing, suggests that writing on performance ‘necessarily cancels the “tracelessness” inaugurated within this performative promise.’ (Phelan 1993: 149). Matthews and Allen’s disinclination to enter into a critical discourse relating to their methods maybe contextualised within Phelan’s perspective; in that, by writing about their ‘collaborative performance’, Matthews and Allen may ‘cancel’ its ambiguity and thus return the artistic author to a position of centrality.

The ambiguity employed in the praxis thesis attempts to reflect the philosophical perspectives included, where fixed and stable systems are resisted in the search for a proliferative paradigm. This research situates
itself within the field of Poststructuralist philosophy. The research proposition, to unsettle entrenched dualistic systems (author-reader, noetic/poetic, major/minor, individual/collaborative), philosophically necessitates the exclusion of definitive and explanatory language; however, this addendum provides a space where the ‘game-playing’ of both the academic voice and the voices of Matthews and Allen is suspended and methods and modes of practice elucidated. The inclusion of this addendum is an acknowledgement of the requirements for PhD research.

Matthews and Allen is the name given to the collaboration between Helen Matthews and Marilyn Allen. Collaboration within the visual arts can assume many forms: ‘groups of artists, circles, associations, networks, constellations, partnerships, alliances, coalitions, contexts and teamwork’ (Lind 2007:16). It is commonly adopted as a method or mode of practice to challenge a conventional understanding of individual artistic authorship. ‘Collaboration’ may be considered an umbrella term incorporating numerous approaches to the practice of working to shared agendas and it has been suggested ‘that collaboration goes beyond achieving a common objective and breaks down the need to identify individual contributions.’ (Fremantle 2012). Maria Lind’s text, The Collaborative Turn, acknowledges the heritage of collaborative practice from the Baroque studios to what Lind defines as the seminal transition from Modernist to Postmodernist perspectives. The Collaborative Turn proposes the emergence of collaboration as ‘an alternative to contemporary individualism and the traditional role of the romantic artist as a solitary genius.’ (Lind 2007:16 & 28).

Matthews and Allen’s collaboration takes the form of a partnership between two artists: Two female, white, British, educated, middle-class artists. This epigrammatic account of Matthews and Allen attempts to contextualise the cultural phenomena referenced by the collaboration for their readers. Matthews and Allen’s footnotes conform to the perceptions of two female, white, British, educated, middle-class artists and thus within a philosophical discourse on difference it may be argued that these perceptions could have been extended to include additional social and cultural perspectives.

In the context of this research Matthews and Allen’s collaborative methods centre on responding to the philosophical voice presented in the thesis. The voice adopted to write the traditional academic component of the thesis is intentionally affirmative in its stance in order to provide ‘material’ from which Matthews and Allen attempt to perform a digressive and disruptive response. The academic voice is posited as illusory, whereby what appears to be authoritative and affirmative is continually displaced and unsettled through the inclusion of multiple perspectives and multiple voices. The text is intended to operate abstractly in collaboration with Deleuze, Derrida, Serres, et al. and to playfully construct an equivalence between established Poststructuralist perspectives and the cultural objects introduced in Matthews and Allen’s footnotes. The alignment between prominent Poststructuralist philosophers and the collaborative practice of Matthews and Allen may ostensibly appear hyperbolic but is intended to reflect Kenneth Goldsmith’s
suggestion ‘that all data on the network be treated as equal, whether it be a piece of spam or a Nobel laureate’s speech.’ (Goldsmith 2011: 34).

A reference to ‘pataphysical laughter in The Third Term (Chapter 1) defers to matthews and allen’s 23rd footnote, in which a comedic voice is introduced in the form of a joke. The opening line from the joke reads: ‘One day an Englishman, an Irishman, a Scotsman and a Welshman walk into a bar’. This familiar phrase is introduced by the collaboration as a stratagem to disrupt the anticipated trajectory of the academic discourse. This footnote does not simply create an oppositional relation to the academic text in that the narrative of the joke turns toward philosophical quotation in a confusion of voices similar to the interlacing of comedic and philosophical voices in the academic text (Monty Python, The Two Ronnies, Stanley Unwin, et al.). The methods used to produce this footnote are characteristic of matthews and allen’s collaborative practice. A dialogue was conducted between the two artists via email with each email consisting of a quotation liberated from its former context. In a similar manner to the constraint-based practice introduced in The Potential Third (Chapter 6), the dialogue between matthews and allen was subject to a set of prescribed rules. Each quotation in the email dialogue was limited to 140 characters in accordance with the 140-character message limit employed by the social media platform Twitter. This absurdist gesture alludes to the act of ‘twittering’; short bursts of idle talk or babble.

matthews and allen’s footnotes attempt to include ‘other’ voices within the strictures of the PhD document. The inclusion of an ‘other’ voice may be observed in Kenneth Goldsmith’s work Soliloquy. Soliloquy is an unedited document that contains every word spoken by Goldsmith during the week of April 15-21, 1996. Soliloquy although first realised in print also appears in Volume One of the Electronic Literature Collection. The Web version of Soliloquy includes many Web specific functions including the option to arbitrarily select a day of the week and thus escape a linear reading experience. The reader is instructed to move the cursor across the screen wherein banal textual utterances appear and disappear as fragmentary and temporal narratives.

Don’t for heaven’s sake, be afraid of talking nonsense!
But you must pay attention to your nonsense.

(Wittgenstein 2001)

References to comedy double acts (Abbot and Costello, the Two Ronnies, Vladimir and Estragon, et al.) are intermittently introduced in Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule as a stratagem to associate matthews and allen with the hypothesis that ‘humour has been philosophically attributed to betraying and undermining hegemony’ (Higgie 2007: 56-7). In The Excluded Third (Chapter 2) the academic voice asserts that ‘Gilbert & George retain the citational marks of the odd couple Morecambe and Wise, George’s Eric to Gilbert’s Ernie’. The associative relation established between Gilbert & George and Morecambe and Wise makes
reference to the theory of intertextuality, with footnote 42 formulating a further dialogic relation with the odd couple wherein an image of matthews and allen bears a citational mark of the Two Ronnies through the inclusion of spectacles comparable to those used to form the motif for their sketch show. This constellation of references alludes to an interaction between texts and arguably the impossibility for meaning to remain under authorial control.

The reader of this thesis is compelled to establish connections between cultural and philosophical matter and as such actively construct meaning within the text. This active reader paradigm attempts to question the traditional position of the author as the sole custodian of meaning; however, it is perhaps necessary to acknowledge that the intertextual references implied in the thesis may go unobserved by the reader.

The inclusion of six perspectival chapters in this thesis is a gesture that attempts to establish a culture of potentiality where no single perspective is able to attain authority. It may be observed that the complexity of both the philosophy and vocabulary included in the academic writing is almost parodic in its performance of scholarly authorship. This parody of authorship is in effect a discourse that mocks by imitation and as such contains two voices, that of the parodied and the parodist.

_Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule_ situates itself within the field of praxis research, a process wherein theories are performed or enacted: an attempt has been made to perform parasitic philosophies by appending matthews and allen’s ludic discourse to the academic text, and to enact Derridean différance through the reader’s movement from text to paratext, from hypertext to hypertext, from voice to voice to voice to voice… as such, the thesis may be contextualised within performance writing practices. The thesis attempts to resist a conventional approach to practice-based research (writing about practice) and to perform the philosophical premise of the thesis (writing as practice). Kosofsky-Sedgwick’s paper _Teaching ‘Experimental Critical Writing’_ provides a noteworthy context for _Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule_. Contrary to the majority of performance writing practices encountered in this research, Sedgwick’s paper explores experimental writing within an academic context. _Teaching ‘Experimental Critical Writing’_ considers a graduate programme of study wherein the ‘main function is to trouble and interrupt the process of professionalization’. (Kosofsky-Sedgwick 1998: 104). One of Kosofsky-Sedgwick’s writing experiments compels the student to adopt quotation as a method to explore a pluralisation of voices, creating ‘a fabric of quotations, a _catalogue raisonné_ of quotations […] a range of metaphors for the process of quotation and for the relations reflected or produced by quotation.’ (Kosofsky-Sedgwick 1998: 109-110). The intention of this thesis is to unsettle autocratic authorialism, an unsettling enacted in part through the inclusion of a plethora of quotations.

The relatively unfamiliar references to ‘pataphysics, parapoetics and potentialities are employed as a method to generate a discursive space where ‘marginal’ philosophies attempt to unsettle major ideologies. The authorial voice of a PhD thesis may be regarded as a major ideology in
academic writing; however, the authorial voice of this thesis presents a theoretical discourse that proposes the destabilisation of singular subjectivity therein attempting to destabilise its own position by proffering philosophies that problematise major ideologies.

Pragmatically, matthews and allen’s footnotes are a response to the philosophical voice of the thesis, and emerge from a process of collaboratively reading the academic text, a process involving verbalisation, articulation, intonation and aural cognition, systems subsequently generating mispronunciation, misinterpretation, mishearing and misunderstanding. Footnote 98 alludes to the potentiality of matthews and allen’s [dys]functional dialogic system where the word ‘ship’ emerges as ‘sheep’, ‘snip’ and ‘chip’. This footnote parodically references the concepts of repetition and difference discussed in the thesis.

When an author uses a conceptual form of writing, it means that all of the planning and decisions are made beforehand and the execution is a perfunctory affair. The idea becomes a machine that makes the text. (Goldsmith www.epc.buffalo.edu)

Prior to the realisation of matthews and allen’s footnotes, a set of rules are established. The rules for each footnote differ; however, recurrent strategies are discernible. A prevalent method adopted by matthews and allen is the use of dictionary definitions. The dictionary is a culturally accepted system for the establishment of meaning; however, matthews and allen utilise the dictionary definition in an effort to problematise the concept of denotative meaning. In The Third Term (Chapter 1), the word ‘meaning’ generates a footnote that continues over six pages, a strategy that compels the reader to temporarily suspend their engagement with the academic text. This footnote (18) opens with a definition from the Oxford English Reference Dictionary, published by the Oxford University Press and thus affiliated with the academic gravitas attached to Oxford University. matthews and allen’s rules of the game specify that a word from each definition should be selected and another definition generated, and so on. This footnote manifests as a narrative journey that digresses from the word ‘meaning’ to ‘a fool’s paradise founded on unreal, fanciful or insecure foundations.’ This footnote includes dictionaries of quotation, idioms and of phrase and fable as a method to explore a proliferation of voices. matthews and allen’s footnotes frequently reference Web-based material commonly excluded from academic research; notably Wikipedia and the crowd-sourced lexicon Urban Dictionary. The inclusion of these materials is an attempt to establish their equivalence with academically revered sources.

matthews and allen commonly utilise digital modes of communication to generate their dialogic footnotes. The opening footnote in The Excluded Third (Chapter 2) responds to Gilbert & George’s declaration of ‘friendlessness’. The footnote (24) consists of a text-based film that references the social networking website Facebook. The footnote manifests as a dialogue between two characters whose conversation is appropriated from Samuel Beckett’s text Waiting for Godot. In utilising the ineffectual
dialogue of Beckett’s protagonists Vladimir and Estragon, the footnote attempts to parody the conventions inherently associated with Facebook. Over a period of several months, matthews and allen held a conversation on the social networking website Facebook, with the ‘rules of engagement’ set by the collaboration restricting the characters’ conversation to a weekly utterance, using quotations from Beckett’s characters Vladimir and Estragon. In a gesture toward equivalence, an excerpt from Waiting for Godot appears in the academic component of the thesis with a footnote comprising of a reference to Gilbert & George. This dislocation of voices is intended to complicate any inclination toward oppositional thought. The inclusion of Beckett and Facebook in this footnote (24) is characteristic of matthews and allen’s use of appropriation as a stratagem to problematise notions of ‘authorship’ and ‘originality’.

Kenneth Goldsmith’s concept of uncreative writing is derived from a class taught at the University of Pennsylvania where students were ‘penalized for showing any shred of originality.’ (Goldsmith 2011:8). Goldsmith’s students were rewarded for plagiarism and permitted to plunder ideas and repurpose knowledge. matthews and allen’s use of appropriation conforms to many of the principles of uncreative writing; however, it is acknowledged that these plagiaristic practices do not necessarily eradicate traditional authorial ideologies but rather require a reconfiguration of the authorial role, a reconsideration that recognises the coordination of material rather than its ‘creation’. Marjorie Perloff suggests, the contemporary writer is ‘more a programmer than a tortured genius’, indicating that the traditional character of the ‘tortured genius’ is an inadequate representation of an author in a contemporary digital culture (Perloff 2011:1). matthews and allen’s footnotes are generated almost entirely from appropriated material with several footnotes repurposing identifiable artworks in order to complicate the reader’s perception of the artistic author; notably, footnote 10 wherein David Shrigley’s This Is Me, This Is Also Me is proffered as a ludic response to the concept of denotative meaning.

The use of appropriation in this thesis is adopted as a method to generate a state of indeterminacy where authorial precedence resides neither in the voices of matthews or allen, Helen or Marilyn, Deleuze or Guattari, Gilbert or George, et al. but emerges as a constellation of perspectives, a disjunctive network of knowledge.

Walter Benjamin’s Arcades Project (focusing on the arcades of 19th Century Paris) is a collage of quotation that forms a complex compositional field. Benjamin’s interlacing of quotation is consistently cited in the field of performative writing and may be associated with the concept of ‘remixology’ introduced by Mark Amerika in his text remixthebook. remixthebook is described as ‘an experiment in creative risk management where the artist, also the professor, is willing to drop all academic pretense and turn his theoretical agenda into (a) speculative play.’ (Amerika 2011: xi). remixthebook is an exploration of what Amerika calls ‘remixology’, in both practical and theoretical terms. The ‘mash-up’ of material presented is posited as a reflection of the remix culture of the digital age. This culture is one of collage,
montage and the readymade, a culture that adopts quotation and plagiarism as necessary methods and thus provides a relevant research context for matthews and allen’s digital text. These aleatoric techniques find an alliance with many Oulipian writers and notably William Burroughs’ ‘cut-up’ technique. It is perhaps worth observing that \textit{remixthebook} is published by a prestigious academic press (University of Minnesota Press) and in the context of academic convention may be viewed as avant-garde. Amerika preserves the printed book format in a similar manner to matthews and allen’s use of the digital iBook, which also retains many characteristics associated with a conventional printed text; however, the parameters of \textit{remixthebook} are extended to include a Web-based counterpart, remixthebook.com. The Web component for this project consists of over twenty-five contributing artists, poets, and critical theorists. The contributors were invited to ‘sample’ from \textit{remixthebook} and reconfigure the source material within their artistic and theoretical practices. \textit{remixthebook} is effectively an inquiry into postproduction and serves as a pertinent example of research in the field of digital literature.

The concept of remixology provides a relevant context for the plagiaristic tendencies of digital users wherein material is subject to a ‘cut and paste’ approach. Several of matthews and allen’s footnotes are in effect ‘remixed’ across the two theses. The repetition of footnotes across \textit{Two is company: Dialogic interplay AND the collaborative double} and \textit{Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule} is adopted as a method to explore the concept of context-specific meaning and to position matthews and allen as context providers rather than content providers.

One example of repetition between the two theses utilises David Lodge’s campus novel \textit{Small World} in the form of a dialogue. In \textit{Two is company: Dialogic interplay AND the collaborative double} the footnote (33) is a digressive response to the word ‘fiction’ appearing in a citation, and in \textit{Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule} the footnote (92) interrupts a parapoetic discourse. It is intended that the reader’s deconstruction of this footnote be affected by the differing theoretical contexts in which it appears in each thesis. The appropriation of Lodge’s text can be thought to unsettle the cultural preconception of matthews and allen as artistic authors.

Goldsmith makes reference to the phrase ‘context is the new content’ and acknowledges the Internet as facilitating plagiaristic tendencies (Goldsmith 2011: 3). matthews and allen’s methods for constructing their footnotes frequently include the culturally entrenched practice of inputting terms into a Web search engine. This process, although predictable in a contemporary context, is appropriate to the intentions of matthews and allen, as the material appropriated from the Web is publicly accessible and thus holds no hierarchical position: This mode of research adopts what Goldsmith refers to as ‘net neutrality’.

matthews and allen’s decision to utilise the digital iBook is a response to the expectations generated by the printed text tradition where words may be
perceived as ‘imprisoned on a page’ (Goldsmith 2011: 25). The iBook adheres to many of the conventions associated with the printed text tradition; however, its digital configuration provides scope for the inclusion of multi-media reading and writing practices.

Marshal McLuhan’s proposition that ‘the medium is the message’ places emphasis on the digital iBook as the medium and, from a McLuhanian perspective, the message of this research. It may be suggested that to accept the medium as the message conceptually disregards the nuances of language and the interplay of voices implemented by both the PhD candidate and the collaboration; however, the iBook ostensibly connects this thesis to the fields of digital literature and digital practice.

The Electronic Literature Organization, founded in 1999, operates as an infrastructure for the exploration of reading and writing practices in a digital context.

Readers come to digital work with expectations formed by print, including extensive and deep tacit knowledge of letter forms, print conventions, and print literary modes. Of necessity, electronic literature must build on these expectations even as it modifies and transforms them. (Hayles 2007)

The Twenty-first Century reader is indubitably conversant with digitally disseminated texts, and Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule is an attempt to explore how the digital book may be employed to question the regimes of academic writing. An Arts & Humanities Research Council project entitled The Academic Book of the Future emerges as an acknowledgement of digital reading and writing practices.

Matthews and Allen’s collaborative project utilises the iBook as a system to pragmatically situate philosophical writing and art practice in the same discursive space. Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule is presented as a digital text that incorporates hyperlink technology and multimedia components. The hyperlinks included in this thesis are intended to explore the possibilities that electronic links may provide for a reader and the connections that may be established between Two is company: Dialogic interplay AND the collaborative double and Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule.

The hyperlink is employed to perform several functions within the thesis: to indicate the location of a textual component (in the prefatory text a reference is made to Two is company: Dialogic interplay AND the collaborative double as a paratext wherein the word paratext relocates the reader to Helen Matthews’ thesis), and typically to establish a process of digression from one voice to another.

In the introduction to the thesis, the term ‘placeholder’ is used to refer to contemporary perceptions of collaborative practice. Matthews and Allen proffer a footnote (2) in response to this term in the form of a definition from
the collaboratively sourced internet encyclopedia Wikipedia. The definition references the idiom ‘Tom, Dick and Harry’ as a placeholder name for multiple unspecified people. The footnote proposes matthews and allen as every ‘Tom, Dick and Harry’ (every Gilles, Jacques and Michel) with the name Harry forming a hyperlink to Helen Matthews’ thesis Two is company: Dialogic interplay AND the collaborative double. matthews and allen attempt to generate a non-linear reading experience wherein the reader may escape the academic text. In Landow’s text, Hypertext 3.0, a parallel is proposed between the computer hypertext system and poststructural thinking. Akin to the language of the footnote, the hyperlink has the capacity to connect distinct areas of inquiry ‘and thus move entirely outside the scholarly article itself.’ (Landow 2006: 3).

A customary ‘back-button’ is included in the iBook thesis as a device to return the reader to the hyperlink’s point of origin and to construct a system wherein the voices introduced to the reader are added to the academic discourse in a physical and theoretical performance of the parasite. An attempt has been made to utilise the hyperlink’s digressive characteristics as a method to construct ‘a text which very materially provides and actualises the notion of its own performance’. (Bergvall 1996: 94).

Compositional decisions relating to text as a visual component in this research include adopting capital letters to connote NOISE and aligning text to either the right or left side of the page to infer an aside or paratext. The PhD candidate’s use of italics for passages of quotation attempts to accentuate the multiplicity of voices incorporated in the thesis, and an alternate use of black and grey text in matthews and allen’s footnotes is adopted as a stratagem to imply the presence of two characters. The implementation of a Times New Roman typeface for the voice of the PhD candidate is a subtle gesture toward the antiquated tropes of academic writing, whereas the use of a Courier New typeface for the poiesis of matthews and allen is a paradoxical gesture which attempts to reference both the analogue and the digital; the typewriter and the computer.

The iBooks Author software used to construct the digital text includes a widget for a pop-up text system. The title page for The A Potential Third (Chapter 6) includes a ‘play-button’ icon. This familiar icon encourages the reader to interact with the digital page and, when selected, the play-button activates a pop-up text-box in which the voice of William Burroughs is introduced; as such, this digital apparatus provides a method for the disruption of the printed page.

The digital methods employed in the thesis attempt to unsettle the performance of a traditional author/reader paradigm. The field of electronic literature incorporates a community of researchers and practitioners that explore the affects and effects of digital reading and writing practices. The Anthology of European Electronic Literature is an example of networked creativity that includes innovative approaches to interactive reading practices. BA-TALE, by Zuzana Husárová and Lubomír Panák, is an interactive work that demonstrates how practitioners within the field of digital
literature have responded to the author/reader paradigm. \textit{BA-TALE} necessitates that readers/users reposition the cursor on the computer screen to encounter keywords wherein fragmented sentences formulate. The textual fragments in \textit{BA-TALE} are determined by the reader's/user's interaction and therefore each encounter effectively produces a different literary work. \textit{BA-TALE} includes an audial component wherein sound is arbitrarily selected from a database with the 'keyword' from each fragment of text generating a corresponding sound from freesounds.org, a Website that conforms to Goldsmith’s concept of ‘net neutrality’. \textit{BA-TALE} employs digital methods that challenge the expectations of reading and writing practices, methods that may be used to extend the parameters of matthews and allen's research.

matthews and allen adopt the footnote as their modus operandi with the intention of unsettling a linear reading of the thesis. matthews and allen's footnotes do not consistently follow the trajectory of a traditional annotation system with several footnotes encompassing further footnotes rather than returning directly to the academic text. This process of digression from one footnote to another and another and another attempts to effect a pluralisation of voices; however, it may be noted that ‘a presentation of confusion need not be the same as a confused presentation’. (Goldsmith 2011: 114)

A discerning reader might observe that a footnote has been omitted from the thesis. Footnote 63 proceeds directly to footnote 65; a response to the concept of exception introduced in the scholarly text. The omission of footnote 64 is an exception to the rule and thus an anomalous gesture. The discourse relating to anomaly within \textit{Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule} is proffered as an oblique reference to matthews and allen's collaborative voice as an anomaly within the PhD system.

This thesis emerges as an experimental inquiry into whether collaborative methods can be utilised to disrupt a perceived dichotomy between a noetic authorial text and a poetic paratext. The limitations of this research arguably reside in the culturally entrenched dualities of major and minor ideologies (theory and practice as discrete phenomena) and as such it is possible that, upon a cursory reading, the noetic and poetic spaces within the thesis may retain their dualistic heritage; however, the discourse proffered attempts to challenge a conventional reading of these textual spaces through the inclusion of perspectives that resist and problematise an oppositional logic.

The structure of the thesis attempts to remove the reader from the academic text and situate them, be it temporarily, within the ludic space of matthews and allen's footnotes; this process is described as a footnote machine. The footnote machine proffered in \textit{Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule} is not a literal configuration but a philosophical concept that attempts to articulate the act of departing from a major ideology to encounter marginal narratives.

At the time of writing \textit{Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule} emerges as one of the first digital iBooks submitted for a postgraduate research degree. The digital configuration of this thesis may
offer practice-based researchers a method for the dissemination of multidisciplinary praxis. It is common practice for universities to create a digital repository for the preservation of PhD theses; however, the digital book provides scope for the transformation of reading and writing practices in a digital age. The decision was taken to adhere to some of the conventions associated with printed text; however, as new technologies are encountered it is apparent that there is scope for matthews and allen to extend the interactive and participatory role of the reader.

matthews and allen’s research paradigm is a response to an apparent resistance to collaborative voicing within the regimes of PhD research. Two is company: Dialogic interplay AND the collaborative double and Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule, while interrelated, may be read and evaluated independently, thus equivalent research contributions are made by each collaborator. This thesis is an initial gesture toward the inclusion of artist-to-artist voicing in PhD research, a gesture that may be extended, developed and improved upon. matthews and allen’s encounter with the academic establishment has prompted the decision to extend their research (this may take the form of a lecture tour and/or a publication) and engage relevant academic communities in a discourse relating to collaborative research practices.

matthews and allen will continue to play their collaborative game: ‘with regard to what is serious and what is not; [for matthews and allen] there is no distinction’. (Vain, 2003: 61-62).
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Two is company

Dialogic interplay AND the collaborative double
Acknowledgments

Matthews would like to thank Allen
Abstract
‘We do not work together we work between the two’.

(Deleuze and Parnet 1977: 17).

Collaboration between the two is generally considered as seeking to undermine a ‘singular subjectivity’. Whilst the construction of the self-sufficient artistic figure is undeniably highlighted through the presence of multiple authors, the collaborative double, popularly viewed as a divisible oppositional dichotomy or/and an indivisible imploded ‘third’, may be seen to merely replicate and perpetuate the established model of singular artistic authorship. This preoccupation with consolidating the two may be seen to negate the potential of the ‘middle’, the space between the two, the AND, as a site for multiplicity.

This discourse explores how the dialogic space between the collaborative double may function as a ‘stuttering and stammering’ oscillation of possibilities and perspectives. These possibilities manifest as misunderstandings, amusements, confusions, interruptions, preoccupations and preconceptions that may serve to disrupt the authorial voice and resolute meaning; a process that is performed within the structure of the document by matthews AND allen.

*  

BOBBIE: Oh – I’ve got two.
NAT: Two what?
BOBBIE: Two feet. Give me one more and I’ll have a yard.
NAT: You’ve got hold of the wrong end of the stick.
BOBBIE: What stick? [...] 
NAT: ‘Oh, let’s – get – on – with –it.’

(Bradby 2001: 41)
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Preface
The only thing the reader will see marching past him are inadequate means, fragments, allusions, strivings, investigations. Do not try to find a well polished sentence or a perfectly coherent image in it. What is printed on the pages is an embarrassed word, a stuttering.

(Deleuze 2004: 113)

Title and Title

What’s in a name? The titles of the documents, Two is company: Dialogic interplay AND the collaborative double and Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule draws upon idiomatic cultural expression. Idioms are defined as ‘tyrannical, capricious and utterly incalculable’ and as ‘manifestations of the peculiar’ and as such serve to disrupt the logic and convention of definitive names and naming as distinction (Gowers 1987: 35) and (Fowler 1926: 251). The use of the idiom in two halves alludes to the double and may be seen to generate a site between where meaning differs and and and defers.

Document and Document

As a collaborative project this document contains the thesis of Helen Matthews and the thesis of Marilyn Allen as appendix. The documents also take two forms, that of a paper document (that conforms to the requirements of academic submission) and a digital iBook. The documents are intended to be read as digital iBooks in order to facilitate a performative and proliferating dialogue between the voices of Helen and Marilyn and matthews and allen and reader and reader and.

Author and Author

Within the documents Helen Matthews and Marilyn Allen superficially assume the voices of traditional authors and construct the assumptive conception of an academic authorial presence: The paradigmatic territory of the academic; the methodology, the language, the scholarly pursuit of knowledge, the times new roman font, the academic rules of the game.

Collaborator and Collaborator

The written academic texts provide the context for the multi-media footnotes of matthews and allen. The dialogue between the collaborative double is performed within the document by the matthews and allen footnotes and it is the performative play of these footnotes that offers the potential to disrupt the notion of an authorial, stable and finite meaning.
Praxis and Praxis

The theoretical perspectives contained within the document do ‘not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice’ (Foucault, as cited in, Bouchard 1980: 116). The document is praxial and performative and aims to produce divergent and reflexive possibilities rather than formulate definitive conclusions.

Perspectives and Perspectives

The text and footnotes are sometimes illusive, occasionally allusive and frequently elusive, inviting the reader to participate in a dialogic and citational proliferation that serves to disrupt the logic of a language in equilibrium.

Citations and citations

Within the document Helen and Marilyn conform to a standard Havard citational system. Matthews and Allen do not, however, conform. We do not do not ‘play by the rules’ but play with ‘the game of the [academic] world’ (Derrida 1997: 259).

Prologue and Epilogue

Abe: You used to be behind before
Mawruss: Now I’m first at last

(Abe and Mawruss 1936 Another Misunderstanding)

The text has no stable identity, no stable origin, no stable end. Each act of reading the “text” is a preface to the text. The reading of a self-professed preface is no exception to this rule.

(Derrida OG xii)
Whether/Or
Collaboration between the two within the visual arts takes many forms, but is generally considered as that which consists of multiple authors that seek to disrupt a ‘singular subjectivity’ (Gisbourne 2007: 16). It is suggested that the precondition of history has established a compliant belief in the artist as singular, the individuated self-conscious I of subjectivity, the autonomous and authorial artist as the self-sufficient genius with a unique experience and resolute vision to impart to the world.

It is within this context that collaboration may be seen to seek multiple models of arts practice as a strategy to disrupt or displace the dominant figure of the solo artist, ‘collaboration which emphasizes a critical interrogation of the processes of production through artistic practice, the loss of the so-called autonomy of the work of art, and the subjugation of the heroic, individual artist to the cultural embeddedness of the artwork’ (Rogoff, Production Lines in collaborative Arts: Conversations in Collaborative Art Practice).

The collaborative double, as an artistic multiple model, seemingly suggests ‘twice as much or many’, supposedly the contrary to the individual or the ‘I’ (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 422). In this most literal sense the collaborative double may appear to be the obvious case to disrupt the solo artist as a site of origination. Whilst the construction of the self-sufficient artistic figure is ostensibly highlighted through the presence of the two, the collaborative double may be confounded by the assumptive and persistent belief in the singular artist, thereby proffering the double artist as a problem that requires resolution. Hence, the problematic collaborative double may be perceived as that of a divisible oppositional dichotomy and/or the indivisible unified third that may be seen to merely replicate and perpetuate an established model of singular artistic authorship and resolute meaning. This research, therefore, aims to explore how the collaborative double may be utilized to disrupt the hegemonic regime of the either/or or/both, the unified authorial figure of the solo artist, the creative originator as a site of reason, surety and truth.

The theoretical premise for this research resides in a cultural, historical and philosophical precedence of viewing the double, as two in opposition. It may be suggested that when the two (of the double), are placed in relation, a cultural tendency to construct a binary opposition emerges. The double seen as an associative relationship founded on difference and sameness may, therefore, become susceptible to the Derridean violence of hierarchy where a struggle to establish order and meaning emerges. It is commonly said of the collaborative double that “they finish each other’s sentences” / “which one does which bit”, either/or through sameness and difference subjugating and conflating the two of the collaborative double, the ‘logocentric longing to distinguish one from another’ (Levine 1995: 176). The logocentric legacy may be seen to reside in a philosophical, dialectical and dualistic stance that predicates that truth or finite meaning resides in the centre or the ‘I’ and reinforces that all may be reduced, through opposition and division, to the unified singular, the one.
The associative relation of the two of the double, as double, however, may also be seen as inseparable and interdependent. Thus, the double may proffer that of the or/both. The or/both, however, of the collaborative double may likewise be subsumed into the assumptive logic of opposition; the collaborative double as cultural anomaly situated in opposition to that of the single artist, the self sufficient artistic figure; the creative originator. Thus, the collaborative double as the aberrant ‘odd couple’ may predicate uncertainty, divisibility, opposition and dichotomy, the conflicting situation that invokes resolution.

It is within this context that the visual arts discourse of the collaborative double emerges. The collaborative double is commonly theorized in terms of the creation of a third; a third as ‘indifferent’ phantom identity’ (Green 2001: 155); a ‘third hand’ (Green 2001), a ‘third force’ (Green 2001: 179), a ‘third mind’ (Burroughs and Gyson 1978), that is purported to supplant the individual identity and disrupt singular subjectivity.

For Green, when artists become a collaborative double ‘[a]nother entity emerges[...]: a third artistic identity superimposed over and exceeding the individual artists’; ‘the creation of an authorial character exceeding the identity of two collaborating artists’ (Green 2001: 179). Green proposes that the third hand is that which offers a dramatic alternative to the dominant ideological figure of the lone artist. The construction of the double as third, as the or/both of collaboration, however, may be seen to merely reaffirm the compliant belief in the myth of the unified singular artist as a site of definitive and resolute meaning; the focus on resolving the double negating the potential to utilize the two in an ‘eternal interplay’ (Derrida 1981: 38), as a double that ‘does not work together but works between the two’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 17).

We are Helen, Marilyn, matthews and allen, characters and authors and editors, present and absent, determined and ambiguous, and agreeable and discordant, equal and divergent, compliant and derogatory, we are undecidable differential selves, schizophrenic singularities. We are an assemblage of differences. We are all and we are either/neither. We are double. This research proposes that it is not, therefore, merely the interplay between the collaborative double as anomalous to the logic of the single artistic authorial figure, but the interplay of, neither/AND, AND/between, the double that offers the potential to incite the play of difference; a stuttering and stammering oscillation of dialogic possibilities and perspectives. As Bakhtin proposes, dialogue is a proliferating and divergent interplay between social forces and meanings. Thus, it is the process of dialogue between, and not a dialogue with one and then another, that creates a ‘dialogically agitated environment of alien words’, a foreign language, a stuttering, where ‘value judgements and accents, weave in and out of complex interrelationships, merg[ing] with some, recoil[ing] from others, intersect[ing] with yet a third group: and all its semantic layers, [...] complicat[ing] its expression [...]’ (Bakhtin 1981: 276). This discourse, therefore, seeks to explore how the collaborative double may serve to disrupt the hegemonic principles of monologic authorialism and resolute meaning through interplay between the inclusive polyphony of ‘academic’ voices (Helen and Marilyn), the voices of the collaborative double (matthews and allen) and the voices of the reader.

This research will be broadly framed within a constructionist paradigm. A constructionist paradigmatic approach suggests that ‘knowledge is not something we acquire but something that we produce’ (Maunter 1996: 111). As the premise of this
thesis is to consider how the dialogic space between that of the collaborative double may function as a *stuttering and stammering* proliferation of possibilities, perspectives and voices, this methodological approach provides a structure that utilizes ontological and epistemological tenets to question the social construction and reconstruction of the origin and production of knowledge and meaning.

The methodological premise for this research is qualitative and dialogically reflexive. Qualitative research is generally considered as that which is *‘grounded in a philosophical position which is broadly ‘interpretivist’ in the sense that it is concerned with how the social world is interpreted, understood, experienced or produced’* (Mason, 1996: 4). A qualitative approach, therefore, provides a basis for questioning hegemonic authorialism and the production of meaning and allows for a multiple, interpretivist, reflexive and dialogic method to be performed.

According to Denzin, texts that are performative are creative, passionate, visceral, and kinetic; focus on process over product; are critically reflexive on the part of the researcher; and experiment with form including popular arts forms—they are open texts with multiple meanings and multiple ways of relating to the work, allowing dialogue with [and between] research participants (Denzin 2005: 84).

This document, however, seeks to disrupt the belief in a dichotomy between producer, product and process and envisages all bound in praxial mode of generative and reflexive dialogic production, a production that is performed within the documents. *‘Performance creates an open, dialogic space for inquiry and expression through an interpretation of events and their contexts. Performance creates opportunities for communion among participants, researchers, and research audiences’* (Denzin 2005: 75). The dialogic framework within this document allows the research to be performed between all emergent participants in the site *between* the collaborative double; not only, but also, Helen and Marilyn, matthews and allen, text and reader, but between academic text and footnotes, past and present, reality and fiction, sense and nonsense and; a dialogic interplay of praxis that produces divergent and reflexive possibilities rather than formulate conclusions. *‘Reflexivity [...] encourages an ironic sense of the ‘said before’, that is the feeling that one cannot invent anything new but merely play with the already existent’* (Barker 2004: 174).

The divergent interplay of dialogue within the documents takes the form of Helen and Marilyn, who adopt conventional (ish) academic voices. The written *academic* texts provide the context for the multi-media *footnotes* of matthews and allen, and it is the performative play of these footnotes that offers the potential to disrupt the notion of stable and finite meaning. matthews and allen appropriate the accepted academic format of the footnote system (an established system for clarifying meaning) and *play* with that which is *already in existence* to create a mutable and interpretive dialogue that resists the stability of the academic paper. The documents have been produced as digital *iBooks*; the digital submission facilitating the performative premise, where text, image, film and sound interact to disrupt the monologic authorial voice of *singular subjectivity*. Thus the interactivity and reflexivity of the texts invite the reader to participate in dialogue; a dialogue that differs and defers and disrupts the logic of resolute meaning, challenging you to
‘look for a completely different idea, elsewhere, in another area, neither in one no[r] the other’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 10).
Either/Or
double  1. consisting of two usu. equal parts or things. 2. twice as much or many (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 422).

It appears that thought is preoccupied with the ‘double’; double standards, double meaning, double-bind, double cross, double consciousness, double truth, double negative, double talk, double think, double trouble. Superficially the double alludes to the plural: the obverse of the singular or the ‘I’. The double, however, is duplicitous. Fundamentally it contains two, yet through cultural articulation founded on philosophical inheritance, the double alludes to a dichotomous either/or relationship; a choice between two options that allows for no equivocation. The double in its duplicity becomes one.

The expectation of the two, placed in relation to one another, may be seen to establish a culture of comparison; one is different to another, one is the same as the other. ‘As such, difference is not an essence or an attribute of an object but a relationship and position or perspective of signification’ (Barker 2004: 53). It may be suggested that the language of sameness and difference (as a product of comparison and distinction) introduces a preconceived notion of opposition and opposites, thus a binary relationship, ‘the principle of contrast between two mutually exclusive terms’ (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 396).

The double may be said to represent a dichotomy through a tradition of ideological contrariety; body or soul, good or evil, true or false. As Nietzsche poses, ‘What really is it in us that wants “the truth”? ’ ‘We can hardly go out looking for untruth.’ ‘We operate in the most fundamental way, with a series of opposites, of which truth-falsity is the most obvious and fundamental’ (Nietzsche 1973: 11).

The accustomed antinomic relationships of everyday life; on/off, up/down, left/right, good/bad, true/false are transformed through cultural hierarchy into the autonomous; on or off, up or down, left or right, good or bad, true or false. These oppositions, however, are not arbitrary; the doubles allude not only to comparative sameness and difference, but also to a resolution, a reconciliation. The double may be seen to evoke a singular choice. On. Up. Right. Thus an assumptive unity is derived from the presence of the two placed within the associative relationship of the double. Two becomes One.

This logic (of binary opposition leading to a resolution or reconciliation commanding a singular choice) may be seen to underpin Western thought and it could be considered that it is almost impossible to conceive of a rational discourse that is not in some way dependant upon the logocentric philosophical inheritance of binary opposition, hierarchy and the omnipotence that it suggests. Logocentrism is derived from the Greek logos. The word logos can simply be translated as word. In terms of a philosophical stance, however, the term encapsulates and conveys the ultimate principle of a desire for reason and unified truth that is a priori within Western ideology; as Derrida suggests, a fundamental repressive philosophical tradition founded on the notion of a centre. Inherent within this desire for a central truth or surety is the assumptive belief in an articulation of difference and opposition. ‘The logocentric longing par excellence is to distinguish one from the other’ (Derrida 1997: 167). This philosophical stance predicates that ‘truth’ or finite meaning resides in the
centre or the ‘I’ and reinforces that all may be reduced to the unified singular, the one.

*The first precept was never to accept a thing as true until I knew it as such without a single doubt* (Descartes, 1637, *Le Discours de la Methode*).

Pre-Socratic philosophy indicates a varied preoccupation with opposites and has been cited in the thoughts of Hippocrates, Parmenides, the Pythagoreans, Empedocles, Heraclitus, and Anaximander, among others, including the rhetorical use of opposites in the writing of Homer. Oppositions, such as, appearance/reality, logos/mythos, inside/outside, good/evil, nature/culture, mind/body, self/other, absence/presence, speech/writing, are considered to be inured in thought and the production of meaning. The dialectical search for unified truth, according to Derrida, has characterized Western philosophical assumptions since Plato’s *Form and Matter* and Descartes *Mind and Body* dichotomies. Plato supposed that every form has an opposite and proposed that, ‘whatever is done in a certain way is done through the agency of a certain quality, and whatever is done in the opposite way is done through the agency of its opposite?’ (16 Plato, Protagoras, 332 b-c).

The first systematic model of opposites is credited to Aristotle. *Categories* outlined four classes of opposites, that of: correlatives, contraries, privatives to positives (‘affirmatives to negatives’). Aristotelian contraries may be seen as opposites that function as pairs, yet they are not interdependent, ‘the good is not spoken of as the good of the bad, but as the contrary of the bad’ (Aristotle 2002: 35). Contraries, may, therefore, be seen as either, or. Correlatives, however, are described as *double and half*; they are classified in terms of their mutual relationship and their meaning as *double* is reliant upon relational features; the *double* as relational in that it becomes the double of something. Correlatives may, therefore, be seen as either, or maybe neither.

The culture of opposition may be said to manifest itself explicitly in the philosophical heritage of dialectics. It could be argued that it is the dialectic, as a process of ‘argumentation, reasoning and disputation’, that lays the foundation for oppositional thought (Mautner 1996: 140). Generally the dialectic is considered as a mode of thought or a philosophical medium that seeks *truth* through the exchange of conflicting or dichotomous views. The term dialectic appears in various guises throughout Western philosophy and, historically, suggests a form of reasoning that utilizes contradiction as a means of contemplation. For Plato the dialectic was a medium through which *truth* may be attained, whereas for Aristotle the dialectic provided that of a ‘*half truth*’ (Smith 1993: 335-358). Kant associated the dialectic with a false or illusory knowledge, and Hegel, influenced by Kant’s discussion of antinomies in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, considered it to be a means of arriving at an absolute *truth*. Fundamentally, therefore, despite various propositions, the dialectic may be seen to function as a monistic principle. For Plato the search for a unified meaning lay in testing, through contradiction or opposing viewpoints, the ‘truthfulness’ of a hypothesis: reductio ad absurdum. Plato’s Socratic dialogue, as the pursuit of moral improvement, thus utilized the rhetoric of the dichotomous double to seek innate knowledge, truth and virtue.

Aristotle proposed that the dialectic was a process reliant upon inferior logic. From
Aristotle’s perspective the dialectic did not provide the certainty offered by established or scientific notions of proof. Aristotle proposed an alternate theory of logic that sought to utilize oppositional deductive reasoning to arrive at a certain conclusion; a singular axiomatic truth. For Aristotle, deductive reasoning was based upon a method in which a certain conclusion is drawn from two given and existing propositions. Irrespective of the distinctions between dialecticism and that of deductive reasoning, it could be suggested that both play a part in the dominant and assumptive belief in the logic of opposition.

For Kant, dialectic methodology became a systematic approach founded on the use of contradiction to question the existence of pure reason. Kant opposed traditional notions of understanding and focused on the dialectic as an antinomous state of contradiction. Kant proposed that we can never know the ‘infinite’, and as such his model of the dialectic may superficially be perceived as evading the ultimate collapse of the two into a resolute conclusion or singular entity. For Kant, however, a synthesis is a process that ‘gathers the elements for cognition.’ ‘The act of putting different representations together, and grasping what is manifold in them in one cognition and unites them to form a certain content’ (Guyer 1992: 104). Thus, the Kantian dialectic alludes to a process of associative and differentiative relationships; a process that inevitably entreats us to seek sameness and difference when encountering the two as double. Whereas Kant’s dialectic fundamentally resided in a means to expose illusion, Hegel considered the dialectic as a medium of truth. The significance of the Hegelian dialectic ‘with its progressive leaps and interplay of opposites’ denotes a process whereby the thesis, as dominant discourse, is challenged by the antithesis and the conflicting elements are reconciled or synthesised; a process of regeneration and synthesis which ultimately results in an absolute idea; an all embracing whole or totality (Miller 2008: vi). The emphasis for Hegel was that of setting up contradictions and conflicts between the opposing elements, with the intention that the two contrary concepts would be absorbed into that of a new concept, one that would itself be subject to a new antithetic challenge. Through this process Hegel believed that truth would be revealed. Hegel stated, ‘every synthesis will in turn bring forth a new opposite and so on.’ (Maunter 1996: 159). The Hegelian dialectic may give the illusion of fluidity and multiplicity, however, it could be considered that through this dialectical process the two in opposition implode to form a unity, albeit temporary. Hegel states that ‘truth is found neither in the thesis nor the antithesis, but in an emergent synthesis which reconciles the two’ (Hegel). In placing the thesis and the antithesis in an associative relationship the dialectic may be considered as a process that distinguishes one from another. Thus, it is the emphasis on reconciliation between the two that creates a culture of consensus that in turn may perpetuate the desire for resolute singular meaning and truth.

It may be suggested that the legacy of this dominant thought is significant in terms of our understanding and conception of the double as reducible unity and one that operates on the principle of identifying sameness and difference. Dialectic methodology sought to construct a system that utilized the double in opposition as ‘refutation of a relevant proposition, or of a synthesis, or a combination of the opposing assertions’ (Ayer and O'Grady 1992: 484). This philosophical legacy establishes a cultural precedence for not only the identification and existence of a singular truth, or truth residing in the singular, but one that can be only obtained by viewing the
double in opposition; a choice of one or the other, an *either/or* dichotomy resulting in unified thought. The philosophical discourse of the double, however, does not merely reside in dialectical opposition. The Cartesian belief in the existence of two distinct ontological entities, that of mind and body, created a precedent for the belief in an autonomous individual as the site of truth.

Cartesian dualism underpins a host of dichotomies associated with Western thought, and it could be considered that this philosophical stance affirms the belief in the existence of an innate truth residing in the centre or the ‘I’, predicating that all is reducible through reason to the unified singular; the one. The philosophical inheritance of dualist thinking is extensive and may be cited in terms of Aristotle’s oppositions, where opposites may be seen as cures for opposites and virtue may be seen to reside in the *mean* through the tempering of the complimentary elemental extremes: ‘[A] *virtue is a mean between two extremes*’ (Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics*); likewise Hegelian synthesis, or Plato’s belief that humans were once whole and that Zeus split human beings in two: (Slethaug 1993: 9). ‘This desire for unity is, according to Plato, indicative of a human need to move from the world of halves, material forms, and illusions to the realm of wholeness, spirituality, and a perfect reality.’ (Slethaug 1993: 9).

Thus dualist thought may be considered as *instituting* a cultural precedence for classification, division and resolution that will allegedly proffer wholeness or unity; an *either/or*. Nietzsche, however, suggests that, ‘we *operate in the most fundamental way* with a series of opposites, of which truth-falsity is the most obvious and fundamental’ […] ‘between the poles of truth-falsity, good-bad, and so on, there can be no fruitful connections’ (Nietzsche 1973: 15). Thus, the logic of opposition with regard to the double may be seen to fall prey to the identification of sameness and difference, disparity and dissimilarity, a process of the construction of binary polarity founded on comparison and distinction. Binary opposition as a concept relates to a pair of theoretical opposites. These oppositions often masquerade as intrinsic to dominant discourse and Structuralist thought proposed that, ‘binary oppositions *impose order on the experience of the world*’ (Jakobson and Halle 1956: 60). Lévi-Strauss proposed that difference, in the form of oppositions, formed the basis for dealing with the complexities of cultural dilemmas or contradictions and suggested that oppositions are constructed by societies to resolve conflicting situations. It is posed in Derrida’s *Afterword*, however, that, ‘*unless a distinction can be made rigorous and precise it isn’t really a distinction*’. (Derrida: 1991: 115).

Difference as distinction may be seen as the non-identical and the dissimilar. Difference or differing, derived from Greek *diapherein*, relates to distinctiveness and division and lies at the root of all conceptual oppositions. Derrida suggests, however, that there can be no inherent 'logic' to this 'either/or' dualism, since both elements in a binary opposition (*all* oppositions) are interdependent and are, therefore, placed in an associative relationship; neither can ‘exist’ without the other. In a determined reliance upon the metaphysics of presence as a site of finite meaning, traditional Western philosophy has focused on this culture of binary oppositions where good opposes evil, truth opposes falsity and absence opposes presence. Binary oppositions, however, are not intrinsic and as Derrida suggests, ‘[i]n a classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-à-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the other
Thus it may be suggested that when the two are placed in relation (the double), a cultural tendency to construct a binary opposition emerges. The double seen as an associative relationship may, therefore, become susceptible to the Derridean violence of hierarchy where a struggle to establish order, surety and finite meaning emerges. It is commonly said of the collaborative double that “they finish each other’s sentences”/“which one does which bit”, either/or through sameness and difference (as distinction) reducing the double to the unified, the one, an assumption of the two artists of the collaborative double as the contrary either/or, the Derridean critique of logocentrism; the ‘logocentric longing’ (Derrida 1997: 167). The associative relation of the two of the double, as double, however, may furthermore be seen as inseparable and interdependent. Thus, the double may proffer that of the correlative or/both. The or/both, however, of the collaborative double may likewise be subsumed into the assumptive logic of opposition; the collaborative double situated in distinctive opposition to that of the single artist, the self sufficient artistic figure, the creative originator as a site of reason, surety and truth. Thus, it may be suggested that the collaborative double itself may predicate uncertainty, divisibility, opposition and dichotomy, becoming the conflicting situation that invokes resolution; ‘so many dichotomies [...] established that there will be enough for everyone to be pinned to the wall, sunk in a hole’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 21). The collaborative double may, therefore, be seen to be doomed to the precondition, the historical canon of the reductionist logic of oppositional thought. So how can the collaborative double, therefore, disrupt the prevailing dominant coherence of the either/or, or/both opposition and site itself ‘beyond the civil world and its Yes and No’? (Nietzsche 1973: 65).

Do ‘we [the collaborative double] have to pay dearly for having assailed men and things with Yes and No.? [?]’

(Nietzsche 1973: 62)
Or/Both
As Gorman quotes Lehman quoting Kenneth Koch:

“One of the most wonderful ways in the world to be with someone’s sweetness and brilliance is to collaborate with that person . . . I like collaborating the way people like drinking — [it] is making a game out of real life.”

(Gorman 2010)

Collaboration within the visual arts is multifarious yet the dominant and persistent assumption is that of an alliance of multiple authors that aspires to disrupt a ‘singular subjectivity’ (Gisbourne 2007: 16). Subjectivity can be described as the ‘condition of being a person [and/or] the process by which we become persons’ (Barker 2004: 194). A cultural preoccupation, however, which appears to reside with that of the Cartesian subject as the unique person with the capacity of reason, consciousness and action; ‘I think therefore I am [placing] the rational, conscious individual subject at the heart of Western philosophy and thought’ (Barker 2004: 195). Thus it may be considered that the dominant discourse of history has established a precedent as to how we perceive the artist as singular, the individuated self-conscious I of subjectivity. ‘The most fundamental assumption of modernity [...] is that the social unit of society is not the group, guild, tribe, or city, but the person. That the contemporary bourgeois artist, as a result of these historical processes, sees his relation to art as an individual, and not as a social relation, is inevitable’ (Gablick 1984: 31).

The advent of Modernism saw a shift in perception, upgrading the figure of the artist to that of a creative and learned genius with a solitary and unique vision to impart to the world. Thus the term ‘artist’ has become encumbered with a prevailing assumption of the ‘self-sufficient genius’ as a site of origination; the artist as the authorial and autonomous figure, the ‘I’: I speak from the heart, I speak a truth, I express my vision, my signature, my style, my eye, my name; an alliance of subjectivity, origination and resolute meaning (Roth Collaboration and Originality, Collaborative Arts: Conversation on Collaborative Arts Practice n.d.: 198).

Poststructuralist thinking sought to negate the ideological figure of the author as the source of finite meaning, suggesting that an acceptance of the author as genius and originator may be seen to result in a compliant belief in autonomy. Despite assertions that the author is dead, and an acknowledgment that the autonomous artist/author is merely a historical construct, the legacy of the individual authorial artist as central to both the production of art and meaning may be seen to persist. Thus it may be suggested that, ‘the act of artistic production doesn’t come from nowhere or start with a blank canvas however, this model of artistic endeavor, where the ‘I’ as central to production and meaning is maintained’ (Berry and Moss 2005: 6).

Novelists or painters are largely solo operators. When it is pure art or self-expression or a deeply original idea that needs to be developed, solitude serves. [I]f you’re trying to think deeply about something, or you are more introverted, as many artists tend to be, having someone yakking in your ear isn’t always productive (Kelly 2012).

It is within this context that collaboration, as a strategy to disrupt or displace the enduring image of the solitary artistic authorial identity, emerges. ‘Artistic collaboration is a special and obvious case of the manipulation of the figure of the
Most arts practice may be seen to involve some form of collaboration; collaboration with an audience, with objects, with culture, with curators, with agencies and with other artists. The term collaboration, however, is commonly defined as ‘the act of working with someone, to produce something’ (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 283). Collaborative practice, as working with someone takes many forms and includes groups of artists, associations, networks, constellations, alliances, coalitions and partnerships. Thus it may be suggested that in contemporary usage the word has become an umbrella term for multiple methods in this act of working together. Despite the ambiguity of the term, a distinction may be made (for the purpose of this discourse) between those that are disparate and transitory and those that deliberately and specifically form an alliance as artistic strategy. The artistic strategy of many collaborations may be seen to seek a new multiple model of artistic practice to ‘question issues of authorship and non-hierarchical working’ (Trio Collective n.d.), the intention being to redefine the notion of a singular artistic identity and as Gilbert & George state, to ‘bring about new understanding’ (Gisbourne 2007:19). This proposition may be seen to proffer collaboration as a recent phenomenon, yet an established historical precedent for collaborative practice exists, a precedent that includes the phenomenon of the collaborative double.

The history of the artistic collaborative double encompasses couples such as Miller & Ray, Tanning & Ernst, hans arp & sophie, yet it was not until the 1970s that artists were documented as adopting a considered strategy of joint authorship with a ‘deliberate intent to relocate the origin of innovation somewhere outside a single discreet consciousness’ (Roth Collaboration and Originality in collaborative Arts Conversations n.d.: 198). Thus the collaborative double may be seen as ‘artists that want to subsume the ‘I’ for the ‘we’; the we as supposedly plural (Gisbourne 2007: 15). Seemingly the double, therefore, may be seen to suggest plurality, ‘twice as much or many’ the contrary to the individual or the ‘I’, and in this most apparent sense the collaborative double may appear to be the obvious case to disrupt the solo artist as a site of origination (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 422). The double, however, is trouble.

The double is defined as evil precisely because of its difference and a possible disturbance to the familiar and the known (Zivkovic 2000).

The double may be considered to personify a cultural preoccupation with uncertainty, an equivocation proffered by duplicity and dichotomy that may be seen to predicate the reductionist logic of oppositional thought; the double, in its ambiguity, instituting opposition and sameness. It may be proffered that we live in a world that seeks certainty and resolution, and thus the double may be seen to present us with an image of irresolution and incompleteness. ‘It [the double] courts and contemplates uncertainty, vacancy, doubt, dizziness, and arrest’ (Miller 1985: 417). The collaborative double may, therefore, be perceived as that which is aberrant and in opposition to the figure of the solitary artist as a site of origination.

The cultural legacy of the double resides in a spiritual, mythological, psychological and philosophical tradition of, for example, twins, doppelgängers, odd-couples and
double acts. For Barth the twin ‘signified whatever dualisms a culture entertained’ (Slethaug 1993: 8). The image of the twin cited in most cultures is often conceived through an identification of sameness, as two halves of the same whole. The reoccurring theme of the doppelgänger similarly plays a significant role in our conception of the double. The doppelgänger is defined as ‘an apparition or double of a living person’ (an apparition founded on sameness as distinction) and characteristically in myth and literature involves a dualistic battle of the two, a battle between the living person and the apparition, resolved in a fight to the death (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 421). Mythologically it is considered that the death of the doppelgänger enacts the successful overcoming of evil impulses, a struggle culminating in the rejuvenated, complete and whole individual.

The double further appears in culture as the odd couple (where two in a relationship have distinct differences), double acts (where the dynamic or humour is derived from an uneven relationship) and the double as lookalike (where two are considered to be the same as, identical to, or copies of the original, and thus ‘cause people to doubt their senses’ (Schwartz 1996: 27). The double, therefore, may be seen within culture as the anomalous other, contrary not only to the singular, the ‘I’, but also contrary as the double itself, a cultural play of difference as relative sameness.

Thus, the double as trouble and the trouble with the double is that it does not simply suggest plurality. The collaborative double, placed within this social and cultural context may be seen as that which is incomplete, the anomalous two that necessitate a resolution. The two of the double may, therefore, be perceived as both different and the same to one and another, to either or, or both aberrant to the cultural norm of the single, the ‘I’. For Deleuze, the conception of difference as sameness ‘assumes that states are comparable’ and as such, ‘difference becomes merely a relative measure of sameness and, being the product of comparison, it concerns external relations between things [...] so that they ‘fit’ within the dominant model of unity’ (Parr 2010: 74/75). Thus the collaborative double placed within the comparative dominant discourse may be seen as that which is divisible to one and/or yet indivisible as a unified third as both.

Within the discourse of the visual arts the collaborative double is, therefore, commonly theorized in terms of the creation of a third; a third as ‘indifferent phantom identity’; a ‘third identity’ (Green 2001: Title), a ‘third force’ (Abromovic and Ulay as cited in Green 2001: 179), a ‘third mind’ (Gysin and Burroughs 1978: Title), that is purported to supplant individual identity and disrupt singular subjectivity (Green 2001: 186). For Green, when artists become a collaborative double, ‘[a]nother entity emerges[...]: a third artistic identity superimposed over and exceeding the individual artists’; the creation of an authorial character exceeding the identity of two collaborating artists’ (Green 2001:179). Green proposes that the third hand is that which offers a dramatic alternative to the dominant ideological figure of the lone artist. The third becomes the ‘modified’ artist, ‘the personae of the collaborative team’ in order to ‘convince an audience of new understandings of artistic identity’ (Green 2000).
For the collaborative double Gilbert & George the production of a third identity manifests itself in matching suits, corresponding gestures and iterative speech, in which ‘they fold [...] themselves into an elusive extra identity’ (Green 2001: 180). The elusive third identity of Gilbert & George conceivably echoes that of the prevailing assumption of the double; the twins, the rejuvenated doppelgänger, the anomalous other of the odd couple, the double act, the lookalike. Whilst the third hand of Gilbert & George, a third that centres on the process of determining sameness, may be seen to challenge the broader assumptions regarding the construction of identity, the double as third persona or identity may not provide us with a new understanding and do little to utilize the potential plurality of the double to disrupt the authorial discrete consciousness of the artistic figure as the dominant model of unity; the indifferent and indivisible two merely replicating the singular authorial presence or subjectivity.

*Gilbert: Two people make one artist.*
*George: We think that we are an artist.*
*Gilbert: Two visions make one vision.*
(Gisbourne 2007: 19)

The double, Ulay and Abramović, defined their collaboration as a third force. For Ulay and Abramović the third is not a deliberately constructed and performed identity but that which emerged as a result of the process of collaboration. As Ulay and Abramović stated ‘we work from the point of view of the higher self’ which they named as a ‘super-self’ (Green 2001: 180). This higher or super-self was defined by the collaborative double as, ‘a third hermaphroditic force’ a ‘two headed body’ conceivably reiterating the double as two halves of the same whole (Green 2000).
The collaborative practice of the *third force* of Ulay and Abramović focuses on the associative relation between the two in the collaboration. Ulay and Abramović’s performances commonly conveyed the ambiguity of the double, yet ultimately resulted in the indivisibility of the two, ‘we become a kind of polarity’, a polarity, however, that sought a unified resolution (Ulay and Abramović li-ma.nl n.d.). ‘He presented the male energy and I presented the female energy and we tried to combine them’ (Ulay and Abramović li-ma.nl n.d.). The collaborative performances of Ulay and Abramović may be seen to have created a tension between the double; a tension, however, that ultimately sought resolution and unity. For Ulay and Abramović resolution resided in creating a state of harmony between the two, a process of performance that homogenized and unified the double.

Conceivably, therefore, the collaborative third becomes not *either/or* or double, but a *third* that consolidates the associative two into the harmonious figure of the one as a resolved whole, a dominant model of unity. Ulay and Abramović proposed that the creation of this *third figure* absented the collaborators from their individual identities, ‘shedding traditional signs of unwanted artistic personality – the conventional artistic identities’ (Green Collaboration as a Symptom: Conversations on Collaborative Arts Practice n.d.: 4). As Green suggests, the ‘phantom identity’ [was] intended to obscure the identities of the individual artists, presenting the artists as depersonalized objects’; a perspective that he proposes closes the gap between artist and artwork, artist and viewer, artist and artist (Green 2000). It may be suggested, however, that the naming of the third figure of collaboration may merely result in the replication of a conventional artistic identity; a discrete identity of the solo artist as central to production and resolute meaning; a representative identity that eradicates the potential interplay between the double as a means to disrupt the dominant ideological assumption of the artistic figure as a site of origination and unified meaning.
In 1978 Gysin and Burroughs’s text the *Third Mind* was produced in English. The collaborative text explored the possibility of a ‘third author’, created by the encounter of the two minds in the double.

*The third mind* [...] is not the history of a literary collaboration but rather a complete fusion in a praxis of two subjectivities, two subjectivities that metamorphose into a third; it is from this collusion that a new author emerges, an absent third person, invisible and beyond grasp, [...]. The book [*The Third Mind*] is therefore the negation of the omnipresent and all powerful author – the geometrist who clings to his inspiration as coming from divine inspiration, a mission, or the dictates of language.

(Gerard Georges Lemaire as cited in Gysin & Burroughs 1978)

For Gysin and Burroughs the production of a *third author* invalidated the two of the collaborative double and negated the omnipresent ideological figure of the author as a ‘site of origination’, ‘the voice of a single, person, the author “confiding” in us’ (Roth *Collaboration and Originality in Collaborative Arts: Conversations in Collaborative Arts Practice*: 198). They proposed that by eradicating their authorial identity a multiplicity of voices and meanings would emerge from that of the fourth author, the reader. Gysin and Burroughs suggested that it was with the fourth, fifth, sixth...authors that plurality of meaning would emerge; meaning that resided outside authorial singularity - a third mind, a fourth mind, a fifth mind of the readers encountering the text; the death of the author, ‘facilitating the birth of the reader’ (Rogoff, *Production Lines in Collaborative Arts: Conversations in Collaborative Art Practice*: 69). As Barthes suggested, by excluding or negating the author, a text may be seen as ‘irreducibly plural, a weave of voices or codes which cannot be tied to a single point of expressive origin.’ (Childs and Fowler 2005: 13).

Gysin and Burroughs’s emphasis on the text (the product of collaboration) as a site of multiplicity, however, may be seen to negate the significance and potential of the collaborative double to disrupt dominant assumptions regarding authorial identity as a *singular subjectivity*. Thus, it may be suggested that Gysin and Burroughs’s emphasis on negation, invisibility and indifference to both the two (the collaborators), and/or the third author/s (the third mind), may not necessarily address the potential of the collaborative double itself to resist sameness and generate
multiplicity.

Whilst the historical formation of the ‘I’ and/or a singular subjectivity is, to a degree, highlighted through these existing models of multiple authorship, it could be suggested that this *third identity* may not disrupt or bring about a *new understanding*, but ultimately duplicate and perpetuate the established and traditional model of singular artistic authorship, ‘a lone artistic originator and creator [...] one that originates or gives existence’ (Stillinger 1991:4). The collaboration double, whilst superficially alluding to the plural or multiple, when considered in terms of sameness as *third*, may not necessarily address the broader and more fundamental issues associated with plurality, fluidity and instability of the artist, authorship and origination. Through the construction of the *third* the double may be seen to reaffirm the compliant belief in the myth of the unified singular artist as a site of definitive and resolute meaning.

So how can the collaborative double resist this persistent cultural preoccupation with resolving the problem of the double; the homogenization of the two into the elusive extra artistic identity, a unified third that may be seen to replicate the discourse of the solo artist? As Cull poses, ‘what [...] if we acknowledge that the solo artist or author was never self-present or self-identical in the first place?’ (Cull 2012). If we acknowledge the authorial figure of the artist, (the individual, the ‘I’, the singular) as merely a cultural and ideological construction of a dominant regime, and subjectivity as a process that resides outside the individuated self conscious I, then the collaborative double need not preoccupy itself with the oppositional premise of sameness; sameness as distinction either between that of the supposed singular subjectivity of the artist and the collaborative double and/or the sameness of the two within the collaboration as the *third* that mimics the assumptive unity of the singular artist (Cull 2012). Thus the collaborative double need not ‘fit within the dominant model of unity’ (Parr 2010: 72).

For Deleuze sameness equates to difference as distinction. Deleuze suggests that difference need not merely be seen in terms of distinction and opposition, but also as *difference-in-itself*, difference as that of singularity and the process of individuation derived from ‘*multitudinous influences*’ (Parr 2010: 73). As Deleuze and Guattari in collaboration suggested, ‘*since each of us is several we are already quite a crowd*’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 3). Thus it may be suggested that it is the very interplay of singularities that holds the potential to reconfigure the collaborative double, from the double as *third*, (the indivisible and indifferent third) to the collaborative double as the production of multitudinous and proliferating possibilities of *difference*.

*Less a question of pooling our knowledge than piling up our uncertainties* (Guattari 2006: 12).

Hence, reconfiguring thought may allow the collaborative double to become an inclusive and differential mode of production, a mode of production that is not opposed as such to the individual artist, but one that ‘rupture[s] the authority previously held by the aura [the myth] of the unique individual known as ‘the artist’ without any attempt to reinscribe it in an alternative, expanded group identity, [the third]’ (Rogoff, *Production Lines in Collaborative Arts: Conversations in Collaborative Art Practice*: 69). The collaborative double as a model of proliferative production may,
therefore, resist the cultural preoccupation with resolving and unifying the supposed anomaly of the double. As Foucault suggests, the double may be seen to *‘evoke multiplicity, plurality, and absence; it neither refers to a precise parallel between two things nor means ‘two-of’* ([Foucault 1998: 198]). Thus the potential of the collaborative double may lie in utilizing *all* of the differences of the double. As Derrida suggests, *‘differences, looked at from a certain [different] perspective, may instead communicate ideas of fragmentation and plurality’*: the interplay of the double as *‘less than one and more than two’* conceivably not either/or, nor the one and other, but perhaps that of *neither* and *both* and *many* ([Slethaug 1993: 23]). Thus it is possibly the very condition of being double that permits all the voices of the crowd. The double as that which *‘consist[s] of two usu. equal parts or things’* as well as that of *‘twice as much or [and potentially] many’* ([Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 422]).
Either/Neither
How, then, in history’s quest for the integrity of the “self”, can such awkward remainders, the double among them, be handled? One way is to remove or subjugate them in some manner, to “kill” them, as it were. The double thus becomes a kind of scapegoat that must be suppressed-eliminated or marginalized, either entirely or in part - if the purity and authenticity of the self is to be won’
(Henning 1988: 125).

Despite an established historical precedence within the visual arts, the artistic collaborative double placed within the dominant cultural discourse (as a model of unity) may be perceived as disquieting and aberrant to that of ‘the unique individual known as the artist’ (Rogoff, Production Lines in Collaborative Arts: Conversations in Collaborative Art Practice: 69). In encountering the collaborative double the ghost of the ‘lone artistic [...] creator’, as ‘one that originates or gives existence to’ may be seen to endure, imploring us to compliantly seek the authorial voice and unified meaning (Stillinger 1991: 4). As Charles Green suggests, ‘we routinely refer to the single authorial mind, or personality, or consciousness to validate “meaning” or “authority”’ (Green Collaboration as a Symptom: Conversations on Collaborative Arts Practice n.d.:4).

In response to Barthes’s Death of the Author, Foucault poses the question “What is an author?”. Barthes defined the author as an ideological construct, ‘the voice of a single, person, the author “confiding” in us’ and proposed that by excluding the author a text may be seen as ‘irreducibly plural, a weave of voices or codes which cannot be tied to a single point of expressive origin’ (Roth Collaboration and Originality in Collaborative Arts: Conversations in Collaborative Arts Practice n.d.: 198), (Childs and Fowler 2005: 12). In response to this proposition Foucault reflected that ‘the function of the author is to characterize the existence, circulation, and operation of certain discourse within society’ (Foucault 1977: 124). Foucault’s intertextual reference to Barthes’s Death of the Author and more specifically Beckett’s Endgame asks ‘What does it matter who is speaking, someone said, what does it matter who is speaking?’ (Foucault 1977: 124). Foucault may be seen to play with the emphasis on the word ‘matter’ in ‘what does it matter’ and draws upon Beckett’s use of ‘someone’ as that which is unnamed and lacks classification, questioning the significance of the identity of the author and ‘tease[ing] us with the possibility of an authorial vanishing point’ (Begam 1996: 121). Foucault proposes, therefore, that the emphasis need not be placed on the exclusion of the author, per se, but on the discursive author-function, where the dominant assumptions and beliefs with regard to the author and authorship are acknowledged in terms of their constructed social roles and positions, the ‘transhistorical constants that govern the construction of an author’ (Foucault 1977:124). For Foucault the author does not vanish, but is acknowledged as a participant in a process and mode of production that ultimately reveals the complexity of its own discursive practices, ‘who speaks, what is said, how it is said and how it is interpreted’ (Costello and Vickery 2007: 172).

The authors name is not a function of a mans civil status, nor is it fictional; it is situated in the breach among the discontinuities, which gives rise to new groups of discourse and their singular mode of existence (Foucault 1977: 124-127).
Barthes proclaimed the death of the author; the collaborative double, however, need not play dead: they do not have to play at being Barthes’s dead authors. The collaborative double may alternatively seek to utilize the potential inherent in the dominant beliefs imbedded in the social construction of the author; for example, the discursive role of the artist name. As Foucault suggests, ‘the author's name does not refer to a ‘real’, singular individual. It can give rise simultaneously to several selves and to several subject positions that can be occupied by others and is often trans-discursive’ (Foucault 1977: 127).

Identity may be seen to pertain to cultural description, to categorization and classification, to sameness and difference. This duplicitous term (duplicitous in the sense that it implies that which may be both fixed and fluid) is, however, best described as a ‘discursive practice that enacts or produces that which it names through citation and reiteration of norms or conventions’ (Barker 2004: 93-94). We exist as a multitude of fragmented identities, one identity never more real, or fictive than another: as Foucault suggests, ‘identity is a discourse like any other. There can be no ‘real’ identity, just a way of talking about the self’ (Harrison and Wood 1992). The prevailing assumption of identity, however, as that of classification and distinction, may be seen as implicitly linked to the conventional and romanticized discourse of the author, and names commonly play a significant role in the construction of an authorial identity.

What’s in a name?

Frequently we visit a gallery in order to view a particular artist’s work. We are often drawn towards the artist’s name as opposed to the artwork. How does the artist’s name perpetuate a romanticised and ideological notion of the identity of the autonomous artist as originator? Picasso, da Vinci, van Gogh, Michelangelo, Monet, Cezanne, Raphael, Rembrandt, Warhol, Dali, Matisse? ‘What a heavy burden is a name that has become too famous’ (Voltaire).

A name, a collaborative name, Harrison and Wood, Gilbert and George, matthews and allen, may be seen to allude to classification and distinction. A name, however, may alternatively be used as a device to de-emphasize the individual author/s. The collaborative name matthews and allen is composed or made-up of two common surnames. It is proposed that first names are considered to be specific (Gilbert and George), middle names superfluous (Anthony David McPartlin and Declan Joseph Oliver Donnelly), and surnames ‘are generally perceived as arbitrary’ in that they do not refer to any specific characteristics (Harrison and Wood). (Lodge 2011:36 The Art of Fiction). The name matthews and allen does not
pertain to, for example, a particular age or gender, it is to an extent ambiguous. ‘We have not assigned clever pseudonyms to prevent recognition’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 3). \[back\]

Many collaborations employ pseudonyms in an attempt to free themselves from authorial preconceptions, ‘the pleasure of making up names. At times I had to curb my impulse towards the outlandish – the fiercely comical, the pun, the dirty word – but for the most part I was content to play within the bounds of realism’ (Auster 1999: 251). The name matthews and allen was chosen from within Auster’s ‘bounds of realism’ as a deliberate device that would enable the double to play with the dominant assumptions of identity (‘the characteristics determining who or what a person or thing is’) and ‘the culture in which [the dominant assumptions] circulates’ (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 702), (Foucault 1977:123). The name matthews and allen may allude to individuals, to (an odd) couple, a double act, a company/to companions. The use of two indeterminate names (with the conjunction and) may be seen to provoke interplay between fact and fiction and as such, through indeterminacy, matthews and allen attempt to resist a fixed unified authorial (classifiable and distinctive) identity and thus gains the potential to become many.

\[hyperlink\] Its not easy with you two...How am I going to tell you apart? The only difference between you is your names, otherwise you’re like ‘...you’re as like each other as two snakes.’ [...] I can’t see any difference between you. So I shall treat you as one single person and call you both Arthur, that’s what one of you is called, after all. Is it you perhaps? (Kafka 2009: 19) \[back\]

The artistic identity of the collaborative double as aberrant to the individual artist as the site of unity and origination, can invoke disquietude. matthews and allen, unlike many collaborative doubles, are not family members, are not the same age, did not attend art school together, do not live together and are not a couple. They are very different; they are difficult to classify or designate. They do not look alike but, peculiarly, when placed in association, as double, it appears that it is not easy to tell them apart. It could be considered that we live in a world that seeks certainty, unity and resolution and in encountering the anomalous double we seek to collapse the two into a homogenous and unified whole, a third, the collaboration, and/or attempt to place the two in opposition; as Caesar’s maxim entertreats divide et impera; divide and rule. Thus, it may be suggested, at least in part, that there appears to be a desire to distinguish between the two; a game of seek the author. “Which one is which?” “Who does which bit?” “Which one is good, which one is (therefore) evil?”; the logic of opposition echoing philosophical and ideological contrariety.

I really enjoyed the informative article about Ant and Dec (YOU Again? 23 February), but I am still no closer to knowing which one is which. Gary Smith, Langport, Somerset.’ (Aitkenhead 2013)

Parallels are often drawn between matthews and allen and other doubles, Gilbert & George, The Odd Couple, Ant & Dec. As a collaborative double it appears that you are of ‘indeterminate status among the various forms of social relations’,
the anomalous double, as outsider, grouped with other cultural anomalies; the odd couple(s) (Livett 2000). ‘These are [...] odd couples, where ‘odd’ indicates not primarily that each individual in the pair is odd (although that’s also implied), but that the pairs are odd as pairs. Each twosome has a kind of unity, yet the nature of that unity is ambiguous’ (Livett 2000).

Despite a long history of the collaborative double it could be considered that they are still seen as the odd couple of the art world, and that which is odd, anomalous or aberrant is frequently relegated to the humorous or the absurd. Comedy is often born out of the disparity between ‘what a person is and what he affects to be’ (Bevis 2013: 39) and the double as two characters may be seen as a literal and exaggerated manifestation of this inherent thought. The comedy double act is noted as one of the most durable comic formats where humour and meaning is derived from the interplay of two identities, personalities or characters. The tradition of the double act is cited in classical dialogues and Shakespearean comedy, where ‘the patter of a serious or ‘straight’ man trying to cope with the vagaries of a comic servant set the pattern of the principal type of double-act’ (Neale and Krutnik 1990: 187). The double act as we know it today is a comic pairing where humour is derived from the tension that is created betwixt an uneven and incompatible relationship between the two. Generally these pairings are considered to consist of a straight man (the conventional and reasonable character who often plays the serious stooge) and the funny man (the unconventional and less conformist character who often appears as the comic). A comparison is often drawn between the collaborative double and the comedy double act, where a straight man and funny man are sought. However, the roles enacted within the double act are not necessarily fixed and in many instances are interchangeable. As Peter Cook proffers with regard to his collaboration with Dudley Moore (a double act with no straight man) ‘for some reason it works, he’s short and working class I’m tall and middle class, he’s from Dagenham I’m from Torquay, one of us is Jewish I don’t know which one.’ the joke residing in the final line, ‘I don’t know which one’ (Fry 2006).

Matthews and Allen do not intentionally assume specific roles within the collaboration, (the straight man, the funny man, the author, the actor, the producer, the director, the character); enacting fixed roles may be seen to perpetuate dichotomous and unified thought. It appears, however, that there is a prevailing assumption that the two of the double will perform specific roles and bring individual skills to the collaboration. As Rogoff suggests, however, ‘this concept of collaboration is extremely limited. It assumes a coming together of talents and skills which cross-fertilize one another through simple processes, neither challenged by issues of difference [...]’ (Rogoff, Production Lines in Collaborative Arts: Conversations in Collaborative Art Practice: 69). Thus, Matthews and Allen attempt to play (play as in the Derridean disruption of presence) with the discontinuities of the dominant assumptions, the ideological positions, the paradigmatic territory, the cultural expectations inherent in the identities of author, character, and.

The word character is complex, it may be defined as ‘1. the mental and moral qualities distinctive to an individual [and] 2. a person in a novel, play, or film’ (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 245). Thus the word character is contrary, it suggests that which may classify and designate through sameness and difference a definite and constant identity, yet simultaneously proffering that which is indefinite and transient.
With regard to literature, David Lodge suggests, ‘character is probably the most difficult aspect of the art of fiction to discuss in technical terms. This is partly because there are so many different types of character and so many different ways of representing them: major characters and minor characters, flat characters [those which are considered to be two-dimensional and uncomplicated] and round characters [those which are considered to be complex and encompass elements of ambiguity], characters rendered from inside their minds [...] and characters viewed from outside by others [...]’ (Lodge 2011: 67). However, the general assumption with regard to characters is that they are ‘the people who inhabit and take part in a story’ (Baldick 1990: 33). Despite an acknowledgement of these people as authorial constructions, characters persist in conveying an expectation of the real. As the caveats frequently found in films and books declare, ‘[t]he events and characters depicted in this photoplay are fictitious. Any similarity to actual persons, living or dead, or to actual events is purely accidental.’ (Breaking Away, 20th Century Fox Film Corporation, 1979). Nevertheless as Henry James suggests, ‘characters are based on life but are not to be confused with it’ (Lodge 2011: 67). Despite our transitory flirtation with the character as real, ultimately we close the book or leave the theatre accepting them as indefinite fictional personae constructed in part by the authorial mind, in part by the reader, in part by the viewer. Characters are constructed within the discourse of the transitory and illusory, they do not appear to offer a resolved point of reference; they belong to a discursive process where meaning and identity become subject to a continual process of negotiation and renegotiation. Thus characters may be seen to reside in an aporetic space between author and reader, the distinct and the indistinct, the real and the imagined, fact and fiction, illusion and reality, between presence and absence; thus it is within this space that characters present the potential for play (the latitude of participation, performance; the game).

‘[T]he people of fiction, the fictitious beings, will [...] no longer be well-made characters who carry with them a fixed identity, a stable set of social and psychological attributes - a name, a situation, a profession, a condition etc. The creatures of the new fiction will be as changeable, as illusory, as nameless, as unnamable, as fraudulent, as unpredictable as the discourse that makes them’ (Federman 1981: 12). If an encounter with a single character presents us with an image of undecidability, then conceivably the double character may further offer the potential to disrupt the notion of a fixed, stable and unified identity. Despite a cultural legacy of the double as the divisible two (the dichotomous either/or as one) and the indivisible two (the third as one), the identity of the double-figure character in literature may be seen as a metaphor for the ‘the sum of all the contradictions and ambiguities [...] of an entire situation’ (Collins 1963).

as alike as snakes. And yet they are attentive observers, “quick” and “supple”; they have sparkling eyes and, in contrast to their childish ways, and adult faces, “of students almost” with long, thick beards. Someone, it’s not clear who, has assigned them to us, and it isn’t easy to get them off our backs. In sum, “we don’t know who they are” – perhaps they are “emissaries” from the enemy. But they look like angels, messengers who do not know the content of the letters they must deliver, but whose smile, whose look, whose posture “seems like a message”. We learn nothing about them, this unclassifiable “crew” to whom, at bottom, the main characters owe everything (Kafka 2009).
The characters of Jeremias and Artur, The Assistants in Kafka’s novel *The Castle*, highlight the potential of the double to disrupt an expectation of a stable and unified identity. [hyperlink] The Assistants, at times named as one, appear as two; a two, however, that cannot be identified or classified in terms of *sameness and difference*; a double that may be seen to unsettle the categorical classifiable distinctions and offer a proliferation of ‘*pluridimensional possibilities and meanings*’ (Slethaug 1993:197). [back] The two characters through their interplay appear unclassifiable, indistinguishable, ambiguous doubles; their *twoness* presents neither, either/or consensus or dissensus of meaning. ‘*The contradiction that they act out in frantic pantomime is the contradiction of existence, the eternal ambiguity of meaning in the universe.*’ (Collins 1963)

Two men made their appearance.  
*One came from the direction of the Bastille; the other from that of the Jardin des Plantes. As soon as they reached the middle of the boulevard, they sat down, at the same moment, on the same seat.*

(Flaubert 2013)

The characters Bouvard and Pecuchet in Flaubert’s novel, (originally titled *The Tale of Two Nobodies*), similarly propose the potential of the double to disrupt the notion of fixed identity and meaning. The *sameness and difference* between the characters are discussed as [hyperlink] ‘*the taller of the pair, arrayed in linen cloth, walked with his hat back, his waistcoat unbuttoned, and his cravat in his hand. The smaller, whose form was covered with a maroon frock-coat, wore a cap with a pointed peak*’ (Flaubert 2013). [back] The characters are *different*, but it is difficult to tell them apart. They are not the same and their associative relationship is acknowledged. The double, the *odd couple*, in their indeterminate state, presents us with an image of incompleteness. The double, as two, in its cultural duplicity and ambiguity, stands for opposition and difference, affinity and similarity; it is the *play* of the double that offers the potential and possibilities of not either/or but maybe neither, and. As Slethaug suggests, ‘*doubleness and doubling are linguistic and literary devices to break down assumptions about logical possibility, reason, powers of discrimination, and consistency.*’ (Slethaug 1993: 29). The double, Bouvard and Pecuchet, in an unremitting search and relentless failure to find answers, solutions, knowledge, parodies a cultural preoccupation with a relentless pursuit of meaning as the knowable, the unified, the resolved; our cultural preoccupation with unifying the double. ‘*What is the point of it all? Perhaps there isn’t a point. Yet… and Pecuchet repeated the word two or three times, without finding anything more to say*’ (Flaubert 2013). Thus it may be suggested that it is the very interplay of difference between the two of the double character that holds the potential to disrupt ‘*the logocentric longing par excellence […] to distinguish one from the other*’; a cultural preoccupation with the singular authorial presence as a site of origination and finite meaning (Derrida 1997: 167). As Derrida suggests, ‘*Differences, looked at from a certain perspective, may instead communicate ideas of fragmentation and plurality*’ (Slethaug 1993: 23). Deconstruction, proposed by Derrida as a means to deny a logocentric cultural tradition, considers how the binary two may be seen to contradict their own logic (the logic of the double as the reducible, the either/or or third) by denying the possibility of *pure presence* and thus finite meaning: ‘*Not to synthesize the terms in opposition, but to mark their difference and eternal interplay*’ (Derrida
Deconstruction may, therefore, be seen as doubleness and doubling, a double movement of affirmation and negation, where differences and similarities are revealed through the process and conditions of their production. In this image of incompleteness no oppositions are revealed, no singular resolutions found, no privileged finite meanings or absolute truths established. For Derrida, the potential of the double lies in playing the double game; a game that seeks to expose incompleteness operating within the bounds of realism as determinate possibilities (possibilities that are ‘pragmatically determined’) to expose ambiguity and uncertainty (Derrida 1988: 148). Thus the ambiguous and undecidable double may be seen as the Derridean Pharmakon, resisting resolution, and exposing through its interplay the inconsistencies of meaning. The double may, therefore, be seen to perform as a subversive device that holds the potential to disrupt the assumption of difference (between the two) as distinction; a play of the production of difference that assumes all identities and resists stasis and unity. Not one nor other, but both and maybe neither. Derrida speaks of the double hymen, double invagination, double vow, double token, and double affirmation. He playfully repeats himself, doubles the rhetoric, and duplicates the typography, conveying that sameness need not necessarily be a means of producing uniformity, nor difference necessarily a means of producing opposition (Slethaug 1993: 22). As Derrida, through differance suggests, meaning is that which differs and defers; the difference between difference (e) and differance (a) . Differance may be seen to suggest both similarity (as opposed to Deleuzian sameness) and difference, identity and non-identity; a ‘systematic play of differences, of traces of differences, of the spacing by means of which elements are related to each other’ (Derrida 1981: 1-28). Thus differance may be seen as ‘not just the space between ‘a’ and ‘e’ [m and a], but the spacing that makes possible the difference between them’ (Niall 2008: 25). Thus it may be the middle voice, a non-consensual undecidability between, that articulates in interplay the ‘contradictions and ambiguities of an entire situation’ (Collins 1963). It may be suggested, therefore, that it is not merely the interplay and relationship between the collaborative double as anomalous (the double as metaphorical differance) to the logic of the single artistic originator (as the Derridean foregone conclusion), but also the interplay of and between the double itself that may incite the play of difference. It is the play of emergent difference between the double that may be seen to hold the potential to disrupt the logic of opposition, reason, resolution and unity and thus offer the possibility of multiplicity. They are Helen, Marilyn, matthews and allen, characters and authors and editors, real and fictive, visible and invisible and good and evil, thought and unthought, friends and antagonists; they are differance and schizophrenic singularities. They are an assemblage of differences. They are all and they are neither. They are double. ‘Neither of us was the madman, and neither the doctor: there had to be two of us if we were to uncover a process that would not be reducible [...]’ (Guattari, 2006: 19).

Through difference and undecidability the collaborative double may be seen to resist the logic of the divisible oppositional dichotomy or/and an indivisible imploded third and resist replication and perpetuation of the dominant and enduring image of the single authorial artistic figure as a site of origination and finite meaning. Thus it may be the very condition of being double that holds the potential for multiplicity and proliferation; the double that is neither defined by collaboration (as indivisible unity), nor the parts that may distinguish the two collaborators (as divisible unity), but a Bakhtinian unfinalized double (as an equivocal and indefinite identity) that
through ambiguity and inconsistency disrupts categorization and classification (Bakhtin 1982: 59). The collaborative double as potential multiplicity. As Deleuze and Guattari proffer;

\[
a \text{multiplicity is defined not by the elements that compose it in extension, not by the characteristics that compose it in comprehension, but by the lines and dimensions that it encom-passes in ‘intension’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 270).}
\]

It is the collaborative double as multiplicity, therefore, that can be defined neither by the unified summation of the parts nor the one or other, but by the variable intensities, the spacing and interplay between (the multitude of differences) as a mode of production. Thus, it is the play of the double that matthews and allen enact that offers a ‘determinate oscillation between possibilities’ (Slethaug 1993: 28); an oscillation of difference where the collaborative double may become the unnameable of difference, and as such neither; ‘neither absolutely separate nor simply inseparable’ (Derrida 2004: 192).

**NEITHER**

to and fro in shadow from inner to outer shadow

from impenetrable self to impenetrable unself by way of neither

[hyperlink] as between two lit refuges whose doors once neared gently close, once away turned from gently part again

beckoned back and forth and turned away [back]

heedless of the way, intent on the one gleam or the other

unheard footfalls only sound

till at last halt for good, absent for good from self and other

then no sound

then gently light unfading on that unheeded neither

unspeakable home

[...] striving for a state of betweeness for a kind of no man’s land between opposites of light and darkness, self and unself, starting and stopping, life and death, language and silence.

(Gontarski as cited in Beckett 1997: 60)
Neither/And
the philosopher Gilles Deleuze is amongst those who are keen that we substitute AND for IS. The sky and some blue and roses and red. ‘Thinking with AND, instead of IS...’ This is what Gilles Deleuze is asking me to do. Indeed, this is what the theory and practice of relations is asking me to do. Include the AND. The AND is not a specific relation or conjunction, it is that which subtends all relations, the path of all relations, which make relations shoot outside their terms and outside the set of their terms, and outside every-thing which could be determined as Being, One or Whole (Lomax 2000: 152).

And is frequently used in the names of collaborative doubles and as Juliet proffers, What’s in a name? And is defined as that which ‘connect[s] words [...] that are to be taken jointly’ (Pearsall and Trumble 2000: 48). Thus, and is predominantly considered as a conjunction and is typically seen to function as a connective, as opposed to a disjunctive that is seen to separate and divide. Despite the apparent dichotomous function of the two terms, (that of connecting and separating), the introduction of either a disjunctive, such as or and/or the conjunctive and into the paired double, may be seen to perpetuate the dominant assumption of the collaborative double as a divisible or indivisible unity. The inclusion of or, as in Nat or Bobbie, Gilbert or George, Ant or Dec, suggests a contrary relationship between the associative pair, that of one not the other. The inclusion of this disjunction may be seen to present us with a proposition that requires us to not only select one of the two, but to select the right one, the one that is true. This premise threatens to classify the double as merely two discrete entities bound only by opposition and hierarchy; which one is the right one? Which one is true? You cannot have both; it has to be a dichotomous either/or.

The inclusion of the conjunctive and placed between the paired collaborative double may superficially be seen to dissipate or eradicate such binary oppositional hierarchy. In its most literal translation the and (as opposed to the or), may be seen to connect and bind the two. Thus, the and may predominantly be used by collaborative doubles in an attempt to communicate a sense of inclusion. The and, however, perceived of as a conjunction may be seen to merely join the two into one inclusive, third or unified whole; Nat and Bobbie, as one unified double act. The and, however, placed between the collaborative double need not function simply as a conjunction, but may further offer the potential to create a betwixt and between gap for possibility, proliferation and multiplicity. The and is not merely defined as that which connects, but also as that which may be ‘used to introduce an additional comment or interjection’ (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 48). What may be significant in the use of the and in the collaborative name, is not the joining or connecting of the two, but the space and spacing that the and may create betwixt and between the two.

betwixt and between 1. neither one thing nor the other (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 138).
Between commonly suggests a space of consensus and resolution ‘by joint or reciprocal action’, a site that is created to unify the dichotomous two that reside on either side of the between; the uniting of the divisible two into the imploded third (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 138).

and

betwixt, defined as ‘informal’ and as ‘not fully or properly either of two things’ offers an opportunity to explore the potential of the space between the two as a site of oscillation, uncertainty and multiplicity (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 138).

The prevailing assumption is that the word between relates to the middle or centre; the middle ground, middle-of-the road, caught in the middle, smack in the middle, playing both ends against the middle, all evoking notions of mediocrity, moderation, cultural consensus; the mean. Similarly, centre ground, centre on someone or something, take centre stage, all allude to a site of individuality and unity. Despite such resolute assumptions the and as the space between, seen from a different perspective need not perform as a site of concordance, ‘[a]s what [...] happens in the middle, [may] disrupt [...] the security of borders and regulations and unset[le] the solace of ideal forms.’ (Derrida as cited in Niall 2008) Derrida suggests ‘the word [’]between[’] has no full meaning of its own.’ (Derrida 2004: 222). Between, (and similarly and) as a syncategoreme, can only exist when ‘something’ is placed either side of the between. Thus, it is the double (albeit the double as the undecidable neither) that may allow the and between to be conceived of as a Beckettian no mans land and as such the and betwixt and between may be allied to Khoric neither.

Khora is neither present nor absent, active nor passive, the Good nor the evil, living nor nonliving (Timaeus, 50c). Neither theomorphic nor anthromorphic—but rather atheological and nonhuman—Khora is not even a receptacle
(Caputo 1997: 36).

The unnamable Khora (Chora), the unknowable space and interval and gap (with the inherent contradiction of discussing the unknowable and naming the unnamable), that is neither being, or non being, neither, nor, and, an interval between. ‘The thought of khora would trouble the very order of polarity, of polarity in general, whether dialectical or not’ ‘both this and that’ ‘neither this not that’ (Wolfreys 1998: 39).

The Khora may be seen as aporetic. ‘khora is that which troubles interpretation while performing a certain opening of the text at its heart’ (Wolfreys 1998: 39). Thus it does not function as the conventionally perceived middle or centre, (not a consensual middle, or centre as site of power or unity), but as an aporetic centre, a central disrupter, a space for uncertainty and possibility and multiplicity. ‘Chora doesn’t look like anything, it doesn’t resemble anything, but if it did it would look a lot like stupidity’ (Morgan 2006).

Where now? Who now? When now? Unquestioning. I, say I. Unbelieving. Questions, hypotheses, call them that. Keep going, going on, call that going, call that on. Can it be that one day, off it goes on, that one day I simply stayed in, in where, instead of going out, in the old way, out to spend the day
and night as far away as possible, it wasn’t far. Perhaps that is how it began. You think you are simply resting, the better to act when the time comes, or for not reason, and you soon find yourself powerless ever to do anything again. No matter how it happened. It, say it, not knowing what. Perhaps I simply assented at last to an old thing, But I did nothing. I seem to speak, it is not I, about me, it is not about me. These few general remarks to begin with. What am I to do, what shall I do, what should I do, in my situation, how proceed? By aporia pure and simple? Or by affirmations and negations invalidated as uttered, or sooner or later? Generally speaking. There must be other shifts. Otherwise it would be quite hopeless. But it is quite hopeless. [hyperlink] I should mention before going any further, any further on, that I say aporia without knowing what it means. (Beckett The Unnamable 1959) [back]

The use of and in the collaborative double name may be seen to act as an aporetic pause, a gap. The literal meaning of the word aporia is unpassable path and is cited in Ancient Greek philosophy as the logic of contradiction. Aporia or the aporetic method is considered to be the foundation for Socratic dialogue and was seen as the problem to be solved or the truth to be sought. Aristotle utilized aporia to highlight the incompatibilities between opposing logical stances, thus reconciling opposing elements. Rhetorically, however, aporia is thought of as a point of uncertainty and a pause. For Derrida, the aporetic pause is an encounter with that which confounds the rules of logic, and where undecidability of meaning is performed; ‘a moment of self contradiction where the text [the text of the collaborative double] betrays the tension between rhetoric and logic, between what it manifestly means to say and what it is nonetheless constrained to mean’ (Cuddon 1992: 50). Thus, when encountering the collaborative double, logic may be seen to reside in the figure of the singular artist; the logic of the collaborative double as an oppositional dichotomy or indivisible consolidated third and the rhetoric of the collaborative two as a discursive multiplicity. The and of the collaborative double may, therefore, be seen to confound the rules of logic, and enact the tension between the dominant assumption of the self sufficient artist as the site of unified meaning and the rhetoric of the double as multiple and multiplicity. The and between the collaborative double may be seen to hold the potential to become the aporetic pause or gap, not, however, as an ‘impasse’, a (full)

stop

but a stopping point, a pause for thought, a pause for doubt, a pause for the proliferation of possibilities.

The potential of the aporetic and, betwixt and between, may further be seen to function as a polysyndeton. The word polysyndeton derives from the Greek poly for many and syndeton as that which is bound together and typically refers to the repetition of words such as and. The use of multiple or repetitious words are cited as performing many functions. ‘a. Polysyndeton may be used to create rhythm A and B and C and D [...] b. Polysyndeton also regulates the pace of an utterance. Inserting extra conjunctions can slow a statement down by drawing out the process of saying it. But it can also speed an utterance up, as when all the conjunctions suggest excitability and urgency. The result depends on the context. c.
Polysyndeton can create the impression that the speaker is making up the meaning as the utterance goes along. A normal list of items with commas between most of them and an and only before the last one requires the speaker to know when the list is coming to an end, since just before the end is the one and only place where the and goes. Putting an and after every item suggests that the speaker doesn’t have a plan of this kind; each item on the list might be the last or might not, depending on how many more things occur to the speaker. The resulting sound of artlessness may enhance the speaker’s credibility. d. In the most common case of the polysyndeton the speaker uses “and” to connect items in a series, rather than separating them with commas. The result is to emphasize every one of the items [...]. e. Sometimes the repeated use of conjunctions also serves to emphasize the large number of items the speaker names. f. polysyndeton is an important device for building loose sentences, an extra conjunction may attach a thought to the end of the sentence where it is not expected, thus creating possibilities for surprise and interest’ (Farnsworth 2011: 128).

Literally and syntactically the collaborative double ordinarily contains one and (Nat and Bobbie, Gilbert and George, Ant and Dec). However, it may be suggested that conceptually the and (even in the singular) communicates a form of polysyndetic proliferation. And by its very definition conveys progression, continuance and number (Nat and Bobbie and Gilbert and George and and and). Thus the and hints at the possibility of repetition, of the multiple and of the speaker’s artlessness associated with stuttering and stammering; a stuttering and stammering as pause for doubt and a stuttering and stammering that allows for a site of proliferation to emerge betwixt and between the two.

The and as a stuttering and stammering and may be seen to perform within the pause or gap as the proliferating and that offers the potential to become the agent provocateur; an interlocutor, the ‘[‘someone’] who takes part in a conversation; the performer in a show [...] placed midway between [and] engages in banter’ (freedictionary.com). The and as interlocutor however, does not perform as a unified monologic voice; the and performs as the chatter of possibilities, as the polyphonous Shakespearean fool who ‘utilises the stuff of the world’ to unravel the ‘dominant regime’ (O Sullivan 2005). Thus, it is the and that may hold the potential to perform generative dialogue, dialogue that allows for multiplicity to emerge. [hyperlink] ‘The tree imposes the verb "to be," but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, "and. . . and... and. . ." This conjunction carries enough force to shake and uproot the verb "to be" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). [back] The and, therefore, may perform as an agent for proliferation, undoing binaries and extricating the collaborative double from the preconceptions of a third as a singular, unified consensual whole; as Deleuze states, ‘the conjunction AND is, neither a union, nor a juxtaposition, but the birth of a stammering [...]’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007:10).

For Deleuze, stuttering and stammering has the potential to disrupt the logic of a language in equilibrium, a language of a dominant regime, a language of logocentrism. ‘Stuttering as a [performative] art that no longer selects and affirms established sequences but affirms the disjointed terms through their distance, without limiting one by the other or excluding one from the other, laying out and passing through the entire set of possibilities.’ Deleuze suggests that it ‘is only a particular type of speech [and language], a poetic speech, [...] that actualizes these powers of
bifurcation and variation.’ ‘Creative stuttering is what makes language grow from the middle, like grass; it is what makes language a rhizome instead of a tree’. [They] (Kafka, Beckett, Dostoevsky) ‘invent a minor use of a major language. [They] minorize this language. [hyperlink] [They] draw [...] out a nonexistent foreign language within [their] own language’, ‘grimaces, slips of the tongue, screechings, inarticulate sounds, extended liaisons, and brutal accelerations and decelerations’, a ‘language in perpetual disequilibrium’ (Deleuze 2004: 111). 

Thus, stuttering and stammering between the collaborative double has the potential to become the performative ‘hum, the murmurings, the vibrations and reverberations within and between speech, [language, thought and meaning]’ (Deleuze 2004: 108). As Bogue states, ‘not so much a stuttering of one’s speech as [...] a conceptual stuttering, a stuttering of thought itself’ (Bogue 2004: 24).

and

the conceptual stuttering and stammering and between of the unnameable collaborative double may be seen to interrupt the equilibrium of the singular artist.

and and

the stuttering and stammering and between of the aporetic encounter may be conceptualized as a pause for thought.

and and and

as a pause between, the stuttering and stammering vibrations and reverberations of possibilities and multiplicities may unfold.

and and and and

the stuttering and stammering of the performative dialogue at play.
and
And/Between
we do not work together we work between the two
(Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 17).

How one communicates is fundamental to collaboration and dialogue ‘lives a tense
life on the border of someone else’s thought, someone else’s consciousness’ (Emerson
1984: 32). Collaboration, as to work together to produce something requires an
articulation between; an exchange of thoughts and concepts passed in dialogue
between one and another. Typically however, the theoretical and discursive emphasis
for collaborative communication is placed upon either the dichotomous participants
engaged in dialogue or the outcome arising from the process of dialogue as a means
to achieve a consensual and conflated resolution; both or either/or monologic, not
neither dialogic.

Dialogue is commonly defined as to ‘take part in a conversation or discussion to
resolve a problem’ but what might that resolution entail? (Pearsall and Trumble 1995:
393).

To consider collaborative dialogue between the two as a means to resolution suggests
the existence of a contentious situation, one that may require a determined and
definite conclusion, a unified decidable truth to be sought. Collaborative dialogue as
a mode of communication is generally conceived of as the act of coming together
with a specific aim that focuses on the outcome of that dialogue. Thus dialogue
between the two in a collaborative double is perceived to be that of a discussion
which will ultimately result in consensus, a conclusion. A consideration of the
collaborative double in these terms may, therefore, be seen to perpetuate notions of
the dialectical two, the binary pair, the contrary, that are engaged in adversarial
confrontation, a battle of wits, a power struggle. As Freire suggests, however,
dialogue cannot occur between those who want to name the world, and those who
do not want this naming; or between those who have been denied the right to speak,
and those who deny the right’ (Freire 1972: 61).

The etymology of the word dialogue suggests that it is formed from the two words
dia (through or across) and logos (word, speech, discourse), and despite associations
with reason and truth, may literally be interpreted as to speak between. In
contemporary cultural usage dialogue has become a byword for a process of shared
thought that may arise from ‘a non coercive relationship of mutual respect’ (Flusser
2002: xiv). As Bohm suggests, ‘the key components of dialogue: shared meaning; the
nature of collective thought; the pervasiveness of fragmentation; the function of
awareness; the microcultural context; undirected inquiry; impersonal fellowship;
and the paradox of the observer and the observed’ (Bohm 2004: 20). Thus, an
expectation of dialogue need not centre on resolution, winning the argument, the
dialectical one or the other that may implode, unifying thought and meaning,
dialogue considered from a different perspective may be seen to offer the potential to
‘advance understanding’ (Habermas 1984: 285-287).

For Habermas, effective dialogue is dependent upon rules of the game, and it is these
rules that create an ideal speech situation; a situation with no imbalance of power.
Habermas’s rules of dialogue involve all participants being granted an equal
opportunity and right to assert, defend or question any statements. They must not be
constrained or informed by status or difference, (one-sidedly binding norms), and yet
‘be motivated solely by the desire to reach a consensus about the truth of statements and the validity of norms’ (Warf 2013). But how do we leave our power at the door? Thoughts and language are ideological, imbued with intentions, assumptions, meanings and rhetoric. Language and dialogue are littered with interpretations and preconceptions. Dialogue, as such, viewed from the perspective of resolution, may be seen to be about distortion; about power and overpowering; about the hierarchical; about dominant regimes; about establishing and fixing meaning. Habermas suggests, however, that ‘social and cultural interactions presuppose language and that in the very structure of speech we may find the essential grounding conditions for interaction’, a communicative interaction where dialogue does not privilege the powerful (Barker 2004: 92). Thus communicative action involves a process whereby participants seek a common understanding and coordinate dialogue as reasoned argument, consensus, and cooperation as opposed to pursuing their own agendas (Habermas 1984: 86).

Whilst for Habermas the process of dialogue purports equality, this model based upon a search for universal consensual truth, (albeit one where ‘agreement cannot be imposed, but rests on common conviction’) may ultimately merely replicate the philosophical culture of dialectics. Habermas’s model may be seen to highlight the democratic process involved in the conception of dialogue, yet this method may not necessarily address the efficacy of a process that aims to free fixed language and meaning from the dominant regime through the stasis of consensual truth. Thus, this perspective on dialogue may essentially be seen to idealistically disregard the philosophical inheritance of communication. Dialogue is most often entered into with a particular and relatively fixed hierarchical stance and views are exchanged in order to coerce others to modify their opinion; a game of discursive arm wrestling; ‘it boils down to a way of appeasing others in order to hold on to one’s own point of view. Such an attitude does not bring the partners closer to a supposed “truth” but serves a political purpose, namely to protect and reinforce their original positions’ (Schwartz and Cilliers 2003: 4). As Bohm states, ‘at best this may produce agreement or compromise, but it does not give rise to anything creative’ (Bohm and Peat 1987: 241).

Dialogue for Bohm, like Habermas, involves a form of communication that is free of the opinions and assumptions of the one and the other and the both. For Bohm creative dialogue, ‘that reveals the incoherence of our thought’ is generated in a space, the centre of the circle, a site that offers the potential to discover a common or shared meaning, where thought moves from social fragmentation to social commonality (Bohm 2004: 7-56). This proposed model of dialogue alludes to the centre of the circle as the space between as a site of multiplicity, inclusion and the dialogic. For Bohm dialogue is not necessarily about resolving a specific problem, yet in an attempt to locate ‘a shared coherent common outcome’, difference and fragmentation may become excluded (Bohm 2004: 7-56). Thus Bohm’s between may be seen to perform not as an unnamable space of creativity and possibility, but as a coherent monologic centre of consensus and unity.

For dialogue to pertain to incoherence, possibility and potential, a shift in emphasis is required; dialogue as not one or the other, or both as a unified voice, but the space between as an inclusive site; a site that includes difference and multiplicity, and and and dialogue that disrupts the monologic singular subjectivity of the authorial voice as a source of finite truth and meaning; [hyperlink] ‘dialogue [that] purports to free itself of the unified authorial voice – or at least, to pluralize it into multiple voices
Beyond the two – and to do so precisely by creating a discourse entre-deux, between and among several interlocutors [...] expanding this exercise toward enunciative plurality’ (Stivale 2008:95).

Thus, dialogue between may be considered as dialogic, that which is ‘two dimensional or multi accential’. As Bakhtin suggests ‘all meaning is essentially dialogic; it has been passed from mouth to mouth, as well as been used in different contexts and with different intentions’ (Barker 2004: 50). Bakhtin’s theory of communication proposes dialogue as interplay between social forces and meanings. For Bakhtin all communication is historically, socially and culturally responsive, thus all utterances are multi-voiced and in flux; they encapsulate the difference and multiplicity of voices both past and present. The dialogic may, therefore, be seen as a process of negotiation and and renegotiation of language that occurs betwixt and between as a ‘polyphony of fully valid voices’ (Bakhtin 1984: 6-7). It is the process of dialogue between, and not a dialogue with one and then another, that creates a ‘dialogically agitated environment of alien words’, a foreign language, a stuttering, where ‘value judgements and accents, weave in and out of complex interrelationships, merg[ing] with some, reco[ll]ing from others, intersect[ing] with yet a third group: and all its semantic layers, may complicate its expression [...]’ (Bakhtin 1981: 276).

For Bakhtin the dialogic becomes a dynamic process of multiple voiced positions where dialogical relations and associations occur; both with and between. Thus dialogue for Bakhtin is a process where speech, word, language, culture and meaning encounter the oscillation of dialogization; dialogue as a process of tension, ‘moving in spheres that are liminal [...] at their junctures and points of intersection’ (Bakhtin 1981: 281). For Bakhtin, therefore, the dialogic involves an acceptance of contradictions, uncertainties, similarities and differences, ‘it represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between [...] and so forth’ (Bakhtin 1981: 291). Thus, dialogue may have the potential to deviate from an expectation of a unified single utterance, the monologicality of certainty and resolute meaning. For Bakhtin dialogic multiplicity disrupts the notion of static meaning. Bakhtin suggests that meaning is always a battle between the attempt by dominant regimes to fix monoglossic meaning and the interplay, intersection and fluidity of polyglossic multiple voices, meanings and contexts, ‘a plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousness, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices’ (Bakhtin 1981: 281).

The interdependent dialogue of the dialogic between may, therefore, be seen as a form of zig zag. [hyperlink] A zig zag that veers, deviates, diverges, and swerves. Thus the dialogic zig zag does not perform a dialectical game of ping pong or become reduced to the consensual third. [back] Dialogue as an aporetic between may be seen to perform as a stuttering and stammering of possibilities and perspectives, of assumptions, thoughts, preconceptions, distractions, opinions and preoccupations; a dialogue that allows a polyphony of voices to be heard and permits all social and cultural interaction and fragmentation. Thus stuttering and stammering may be seen as a generative dialogue that encompasses all the stuff of the world with all its interruptions and inconsequentialities; the indeterminate, the stuff commonly relegated to the unnecessary, the inconsequential. Dialogue performed through ‘stutterings and stammerings, moments of indeterminacy operating as a new
effectual syntax. In each case it is a question of practices that are capable of interrupting’ (O Sullivan 2009).

The practice of dialogue between the collaborative double offers the potential to become the polyphonic stuttering and stammering that oscillates in performance between the two ‘we were only two, [Deleuze and Guattari] but what was important for us was less our working together than this strange fact of working between the two of us’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 17). The stuttering betwixt and between the double in dialogue that permits all voices in ‘enunicative plurality’ (Stivale 2008: 95).

dialogue is never solely between two, but admits other voices necessarily […]’ (Stivale 2008: 90).

Thus dialogue that does not attempt to leave at the door ideology, hierarchy, intention, meaning or rhetoric, permits all voices that zig and zag and diverge. Dialogue performed between, does not seek a definitive truth or common conviction, it differs and defers. [hyperlink] The ‘discursive zig zag’ betwixt and between offers the potential to become a multiplicity of cross-sectioned and fragmented thoughts and perspectives, ‘as if the stylus or cursor could jump through, crosscutting from one conceptual flow to another.’ [back] ‘The zig zag constitutes the fundamental encounter of the “in-between” of the fold that is the juxtaposition of thought and unthought, art and life, affect and the brain, and the friendship conjoined to creativity […] the spark and leap of creation’ (Stivale 2008: 95).

Deleuze and Parnet’s collaboration Dialogues 1977 was conceived as ‘practice-in-dialogue’ (Stivale 2008: 86). In the preface they state that ‘this book aims to highlight the existence and action of multiplicities.’ ‘What mattered most was not the points – Felix, Claire Parnet, me and many others, who functioned simply as temporary, transitory and evanescent points of subjectivation – but the collection of bifurcating, divergent and muddles lines which constituted this book as a multiplicity and which passed between the points, carrying them along without ever going from one to the other. Hence, the first plan for a conversation between two people, in which one asked the questions and the other replied, no longer had any value.’ […] As we became less sure what came from one, what came from the other, or even from someone else, we would become clearer about “What is it to write?” This really is a book without subject, without beginning or end, but not without a middle’ (Deleuze and Parnett 2007: ix).

For Deleuze and Parnet in dialogue, the authorial voice of the one or the other or both becomes irrelevant. The dialogue becomes a process, a generative act between that permits all voices; ‘dialogue that is populated by ‘encounters’, not necessarily with people but with ‘movements, ideas, events, entities’’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 6). Thus dialogue between for Deleuze and Parnet may be seen as an enunciative dialogic encounter of multiplicity. Deleuze describes the process of dialogue as, ‘a process that occurs “behind the thinker’s back or in the moment when he blinks” ’ a ‘set of sounds hammered out, of discursive gestures, of ideas all made of tinder and fire, of deep attention and sudden closure, of laughter and smiles […]’, ‘a sort of wild rodeo’, ‘a process of ‘a pick-me-up or pick-up’ (Stivale 2008: 86-97). Thus it may be suggested that it is the collaborative dialogue performed between the two that allows for this very equivocation, reverberation and oscillation. As Deleuze suggests of the
encounter between the two, ‘it was less a question of pooling our knowledge than piling up our uncertainties’ (Guattari 2006: 6).

For Deleuze and Parnet, uncertainty lies in the multitude of difference; difference, however, that is not difference as distinction and negation (that of the conventional assumption of a collaborative double with different skills united as third) but difference as differentiation and affirmation (the proliferation of different and differing perspectives within the collaborative double). ‘So this whole way of being two, of living their duality, was to conceive production as an assemblage of differences. Far from destroying each other, and catching each difference in a centrifugal motion that would have taken them apart, they managed to work together [...] enabling the conditions for a truly collective enunciation to emerge’ (Guattari 2006: 20). The collaborative double in dialogue take flight, through difference, from dialectical opposition, ‘what we are engaged in is not about debate or conflict resolution. In a certain sense there never is any opposition’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 21).

Deleuze writes of the collaboration as ‘a rhizome, as opposed to the unity of the tree and its binary logic’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: x). ‘The rhizome has no beginning, end, or unified center.’ ‘The rhizome is reducible neither to the One nor the multiple [...] it is comprised not of units but of dimensions, or rather directions in motion’; ‘the inter- and trans-dimensionality of rhizomatic inviting lines of flight’; a line of flight that holds the potential to put a system in flight, to leave, to escape, yet not flee a static dominant regime (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 21). Thus, a rhizomatic collaborative performance between the two may be seen as both heterogeneous and proliferating. A dialogue between that does not exclude perceived consequentialites and inconsequentialities, incoherence and coherence, the major or the minor, ‘a collective assemblage of enunciation’, ‘an out of step duet’, one that deterritorializes and reterritorializes with ‘thought [...] flying off in every direction’ (Stivale 2008: 13-22 154). For Deleuze and Guattari territory is a conceptual regime, a dynamic configuration of intersected assemblages that are in constant flux; and thus a line of flight is produced when glitches or interruptions occur in the equilibrium, the expected flow, the familiar, the accepted, the perception of the known, truth. The stuttering and stammering dialogue between includes the interruptions, the glitches and and of understanding and misunderstanding. The dialogue differs and defers and disrupts the resolute meaning, challenging you to ‘look for a completely different idea, elsewhere, in another area, [that is] neither in one no[r] the other’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 10).

Thus the process of dialogue between the collaborative double may permit all voices and perform the oscillating undecidability of language and communication. As Derrida suggests, ‘It follows from this “undecidability” that one’s understanding of what the other is saying is never complete. This lack of pure understanding subverts any attempts at unravelling the truth [...]’ (Swartz, C. & Cilliers 2003). It is, therefore, within this continual dialogue of undecidability, of understanding and misunderstanding, of stasis and flux, of the expected and the unexpected, of the resolute and the irresolute, the interrupted and the uninterrupted that proliferating lines of flight may emerge. Thus dialogue between the two may be seen to resist the unity of divisible opposition and the indivisible third. Dialogue performed between the two in the collaborative double may, therefore, be reconsidered as, ‘not something which would be in the one, or something which would be in the other,
even if it had to be exchanged, be mingled, but something which is between the two outside the two and which flows in another direction’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 7).

Dialogue
I can’t go on.
Go on.
Is there anyone to hear here?
Who are you?
You.
I?
Aye.
Then let me see me!
See?
A lass! Alas

(Barth 1969 Lost in the Funhouse: 101)
And/Also
Collaboration between the two within the visual arts takes many forms, however, the dominant assumption is that of multiple authors who seek to disrupt a ‘singular subjectivity’ (Gisbourne 2007: 16). It is suggested that the precondition of history has established a compliant belief in the artist as singular, the individuated self-conscious I of subjectivity, the autonomous and authorial artist as the self sufficient genius with unique experience and a resolute vision to impart to the world. As Charles Green suggests, ‘we routinely refer to the single authorial mind, or personality, or consciousness to validate ”meaning” or “authority”’ (Green collabarts.org).

It is within this context that collaboration may be seen to seek multiple models of arts practice as a strategy to disrupt or displace the dominant figure of the solo artist. Thus the collaborative double, as seemingly plural, may appear to be the obvious case to disrupt the solo artist as a site of origination. However, whilst the construction of the self-sufficient artistic figure is ostensibly highlighted through the presence of the two, the collaborative double may commonly be confounded by the assumptive and persistent belief in the singular artist, thereby proffering the double artist as a problem that requires resolution. The problematic collaborative double may, therefore, be perceived as that of a divisible oppositional dichotomy and/or the indivisible unified third that may be seen to merely replicate and perpetuate an established model of singular artistic authorship. The aim of this research, therefore, was to explore how the collaborative double may be utilized to disrupt the hegemonic regime of the either/or or/both, of the unified authorial figure and finite meaning.

[hyperlink] We are Helen, Marilyn, matthews and allen, characters and authors and editors, we are converse and we converse, we are deliberate and we deliberate, we are appropriate and we appropriate, we are alternate and we alternate, we are contrary and contrary, we are content and content; we are undecidable differential selves; schizophrenic singularities. We are an assemblage of differences. [back] We are all and we are both, we are many, we are either/neither. We are double. This research proposed that it is not, therefore, merely the interplay between the collaborative double (the between as a site of conflation), as anomalous to the logic of the single artistic authorial figure, but the ‘eternal interplay’, between the two of the double, (as a site of proliferation), that holds the potential to generate a stuttering and stammering oscillation of dialogic possibilities and perspectives (Derrida 1981: 38). As Bakhtin proposes, dialogue is a proliferating and divergent interplay between social forces and meanings. Thus it is this process of dialogue between, and not a dialogue with one and then the other, that creates a ‘dialogically agitated environment of alien words’; a dialogue between the inclusive polyphony of voices; an ongoing dialogue of ‘enunciative plurality’ that resists stasis (Stivale 2008: 95).

The research for this document explored how a dialogic premise may be performed by all emergent participants in the site between the collaborative double; not only, but also, Helen and Marilyn and matthews and allen and academic text and academic footnotes, between, truth and fiction, subject and subject, understanding and misunderstanding, sense and nonsense and; a dialogic interplay of praxis that aimed to produce polyphonic, divergent and reflexive possibilities, rather than
formulate monologic and assumptive conclusions; ‘a plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses’ (Bakhtin 1981: 281).

Within the document Helen and Marilyn participate as the academic voices, narrating the theoretical premise of the research through the production of two independently written texts. Helen and Marilyn superficially assume the position of traditional authors and construct the assumptive conception of an academic authorial presence, the author as an ideological construct, ‘the voice of a single person, the author “confiding” in us’ a logocentric truth (Roth Collaboration and Originality in Collaborative Arts: Conversations in Collaborative Arts Practice n.d.: 198). Thus, the academic voices of Helen and Marilyn include the ‘transhistorical constants that govern the construction of an author’, the paradigmatic territory of the academic, the methodology, the language, the style, the coherence, the scholarly pursuit of knowledge, the academic rules of the game (Roth Collaboration and Originality in Collaborative Arts: Conversations in Collaborative Arts Practice n.d.: 198). Helen and Marilyn, however, do not merely assume a definitive and stable monologic authorial presence, but perform the academic author-function as participants in a process and mode of production that ultimately reveals the complexity of its own discursive practices. Thus, the authors enact the orchestration and dissemination of knowledge and meaning; they become the author in the Bakhtinian polyphonic novel enabling ‘objective complexity, contradictoriness and multi-voicedness [...] the position of the déclassé intellectual and the social wanderer’; ‘seeing the world in terms of interaction and coexistence’; ‘the author [...] as an organizer and participant in the dialogue without retaining for himself the final word.’ (Bakhtin 1984: 30-72). Helen and Marilyn, therefore, resist dichotomy and conflation, (the dichotomous either/or of author/author, author/reader, author/character, author/anti-author) alternatively appropriating the discontinuities of the dominant assumptions inherent in such roles, to speak with and amongst, not about, the on-going dialogue.

Thus, the authors of these documents become simply participants, in a stuttering and stammering dialogue between, where a ‘variety of conflicting ideological positions are given a voice and set in play both between and within individual speaking subjects, without being placed and judged by an authoritative authorial voice’ (Lodge 1990: 86).

Within the document Matthews and Allen participate as the collaborative unclassifiable crew, the undecidable all and neither and double and, that resist definition by author and reader, positioned with and amongst, through their interplay of difference. The double characters of matsc and Allen engage in a process of ongoing dialogue; a practice of polyphonic dialogue between the collaborative double that offers the potential to become a dialogic stuttering and stammering that oscillates in the performative interplay of the two. The stuttering betwixt and between the double in dialogue permits all voices in enunicative plurality, a plurality
that includes the *stuff of the world*, with all its interruptions and supposed inconsequentialities, to unravel dominant assumptions and resolute meaning; ‘dialogue [that] is never solely between two, but admits other voices necessarily [...]’ (Stivale 2008: 90).

Dialogue is commonly defined as to ‘take part in a conversation or discussion to resolve a problem’ (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 393). To consider collaborative dialogue *between* the two as a means to resolution, however, suggests the existence of a definite conclusion, a unified decidable *truth* to be sought. Matthews and Allen, however, do not seek truth or certainty, but engage in a dialogue *between* that furthers the production of multitudinous and proliferating possibilities and meanings.

Matthews and Allen’s dialogue may be seen to resemble the cross talk of the music-hall double act. Cross talk is defined as both ‘*unwanted signals in communication* and ‘*witty repartee*’ (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 341); witty in that the comedy or ludicy is derived from the unwanted, the *mis*-communication, the not necessarily welcomed, the unexpected, the interruption, the swerve, ‘*comedy [that] comes from the deviations from what we would conventionally expect*’ (Neale and Krutnik 1990: 193). Matthews and Allen’s dialogic cross talk, however, is not scripted or rehearsed, it is performed as an improvised zig zag dialogue betwixt and between the collaborative double; ‘*an out of step duet*’ with ‘thought [...] flying off in every direction’, (Stivale 2008: 13-21 154); a game of both word association and disassociation, a game with ‘*no [certain] rules, [and] no general formula*’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 16).

Matthews and Allen’s *rules of the game* may be seen as that of the Foucauldian game, where *play* emerges from the ‘*game exceed[ing] its own rules*’: ‘*a game that invariably goes beyond [...] and transgresses its limits*’ (Foucault 1977). For Matthews and Allen, transgressive *mis*-behaviour becomes that of a dynamic and proliferating dialogue that serves to disrupt equilibrium and stasis; a *stuttering and stammering dialogue between* that includes the and and and of behaviour and *mis*-behaviour and understanding and *mis*-understanding and direction and *mis*-direction. An aporetic dialogue between the two of the collaborative double that different and defers *and* disrupts *and* unravels homogeneity, a dialogue that is performed within the document by the Matthews and Allen footnotes that invite you to ‘*look for a completely different idea, elsewhere, in another area, [that is] neither in one no[r] the other*’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 10).

and

*the academic text and the academic footnotes*

Matthews and Allen’s dialogic methodology takes as its entry point the assumption that *critically acclaimed knowledge* is a product of hegemonic authorialism; the ideological figure of the academic author, as the individuated self-conscious *I* and originator, engaged in the production of unified *meaning, knowledge* and *truth*. The *academic texts* with the document, *authored* by Helen and Marilyn, enact the dominant discourse of academia, the monologic voice of decidable truth and originality; a text that attempts to conform to the *academic rules of the game*.

Within the text Matthews and Allen *appropriate* the accepted academic format (the rules) of footnoting. Footnotes are commonly seen as a means to support or resolve
the content of the major text; ‘(a) to cite sources of information, (b) to give additional information concerning matters treated in the text, (c) to direct attention to supporting, divergent, or conflicting opinions, and (d) to refer to other pages or passages in the text’ (Hurt, P., 1992, Bibliography and Footnotes: A Style Manual for Students and Writers, University of California Press). Matthews and Allen’s footnotes, however, do not seek to support or substantiate nor oppose or invalidate the academic text, but through performative citationality offer a stuttering and stammering oscillation of proliferating possibilities; the possibility of a ‘stories [that] slips into, or tends to slip into, the space between the two’ (O’Sullivan 2009). The multiplicitious dialogue that emerges between the text and the footnotes may be seen to resist the either/or dichotomous thought in a ‘continual supplementarity of meaning, that is the continual substitution and adding of meaning’, ‘a plenitude enriching another plenitude’, which serves to disrupt unified, resolute, fixed meaning (Derrida 1997: 144).

[We] live in a world of others’ words
(Bakhtin 1984: 143)

Matthews and Allen do not use their own words, but draw on the world of plentiful words. As Paul Auster suggests, ‘I tried to use certain generic conventions to get to another place, another place altogether’ (Auster 1999). The rules of the footnote game include all the generic and paradigmatic conventions, the dominant assumptions, the rules of society, the great game of life and world play (Heidegger as cited in Rattoul and Pettigrew 2002: 108). Citing, reiterating, repeating, performing and reperforming, the footnote game between may be seen as a process of difference and deferral, of decidability and undecidability, of contextualization and recontextualization, a determinate and continual oscillation of possibilities at play.

and
between
text and reader

Within this document the reader is invited to join the game, indeed the reader must participate since the dialogic interplay ‘provides no support for the [reader] who would objectify an entire event according to some ordinary monologic category (thematically, lyrically or cognitively)— and this consequently makes the [reader] also a participant’ (Bakhtin 1984: 18).

For the reader of this polyphonic text, the footnotes may be seen to perform as the aporetic and, an interruption to their search for knowledge and the construction of resolute meaning. The footnote interrupts the reader’s journey throughout the academic text, from the beginning to the end; the aporetic ‘drive over the road with innumerable potholes’ (Zerby 2003: 12). ‘The footnote [...] interrupt[s]. Simply interrupt[s]’ (Zerby 2003: 3), the interruption as a pause for thought; a pause for thought, where, for the reader, the footnote may be seen to perform as the stuttering stammering and, the proliferating and inclusive and that holds the potential to unravel the logic of a language in equilibrium, a language of a dominant regime, a language of logocentrism and truth, because as Nietzsche suggests, ‘there are [maybe] no facts, only interpretations’ (Nietzsche Unpublished Notebooks). Thus the interplay between the text and the footnote may be experienced as a site of undecidability, a site of differance, that invites the reader to participate in a determinate (pragmatically determined) oscillation between possibilities, a site in
which the text ‘undermines its own rhetorical structure, dismantles, or deconstructs itself.’ It is the dialogue, not of truth or fiction, but one of divergence, a dialogue between text and reader where ‘difference never comes to a full stop anywhere, absolutely’ (Derrida 1988: 149).
‘Indeed, what compels us to assume there exists any essential antithesis between ‘true’ and ‘false’? Is it not enough to suppose grades of apparentness and as it were lighter and darker shades and tones of appearance – different valeurs, to speak in the language of painters? Why could the world WHICH IS OF ANY CONCERN TO US – not be a fiction? And he who then objects: ‘but to the fiction there belongs an author [an originator]?’ - could he not be met with the round retort: WHY? Does this ‘belongs’ perhaps not also belong to the fiction? Are we not permitted to be a little ironical about the subject [..?]’

(Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 1973: 65)
and
*between*
s between subject and subject

‘Who are you, then? [...] Don’t you recognize me? [...] But you look quite different. That’s because I’m on my own...When I’m alone, I lose my youthful high spirits.’

(The Assistants: Kafka *The Castle* 2009)
between understanding and misunderstanding

‘I don’t want any more of it: the famous cogito is a bore. The ideas of things are taken for the things themselves. What we barely understand is explained by means of words that we do not understand at all!’

(Flaubert Bouvard and Pecuchet 2013)
and

between

sense and nonsense

‘all is well that endes well’

(Heywood, J., 1546, A Dialogue Conteyning the Nomber in Effect of All the Prouerbes in the Englishe Tongue)
and

between

‘Oh, let’s-get-on-with-it’
(Nat and Bobbie)
and

between

[hyperlink] ‘But I digress’ [back]

(Ronnie Corbett)
and
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