WORKS OF ROBIN ATTFIELD

Since this is a book about the works of Robin Attfield it is appropriate that a full list of his publications is presented here. Robin Attfield provides a brief description of each of the articles and chapters.

Books


**Articles or Chapters in Academic Journals or Books**


5. ‘The Individuality of God’, *Sophia*, X, April 1971, 20-27. Against Michael Durrant it is argued that, ‘God’ being sometimes a proper name and sometimes a common name, God is an individual of some not wholly incomprehensible sort.


7. ‘Collective Responsibility’, in *Analysis*, 32.1, October 1971, 31-32. Statements about the responsibility of Governments are not reducible to statements about the responsibility of Cabinet Ministers alone, even though some statements of the latter sort must be true for any of the former sort to be true.


9. ‘Belief in God’, *Sophia*, July 1972, XI.2, 1-4. The theistic belief that God is good is not as obviously absurd as J.J. McIntosh thinks.


17. ‘The Logical Status of Moral Utterances’ in The Journal of Critical Analysis, IV.2, July 1972 (published 1974), 70-84. It is argued that even basic moral propositions have grounds.

18. ‘On Being Human’ in Inquiry, 17, 1974, 175-92. Argues that the development of certain capacities is necessary for living well as a human.

19. ‘Against Incomparabilism’ in Philosophy, 50, 1975, 230-34. Argues against the view that diverse moralities cannot morally be compared.

20. ‘Towards a Defence of Teleology’ in Ethics, 85.2, January 1975, 123-35. Contends that rule-teleology supplies a criterion of moral rightness adequate to the requirements of social justice and preferable to rival theories.


27. ‘How not to be a Moral Relativist’, *The Monist*, 62.4, 1979, 510-23. Recent defences of moral relativism are found to escape self-contradiction only at the expense of incurring the charge of implausibility, and to explain nothing which could not be better explained without resorting to them.

28. ‘Unto the Third and Fourth Generation’, *Second Order*, VIII.1&2, 1979, 55-70. A theory is developed of reparations due from and to collections of people lasting more than one generation, and is related to a teleological theory of moral rightness.

29. ‘The Value of Value Inquiry’, *Lettera*, 19, 1980, 113-22. Value inquiry is defended against the widespread belief that values are subjective and arbitrary. Inquiries in ethics, aesthetics and politics into what is of value can disclose important truths.

30. ‘Religious Symbols and the Voyage of Analogy’, *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, XI.4, 1980, 225-38. The traditional theory of analogy makes sense of religious language only if one non-analogical proposition about God can be identified. This is supplied by his nature as potential creator.

31. ‘Woolhouse’s Open Future: Not in the Script’, *Studia Leibnitiana* (Journal of the Gottfried-Wilhelm-Leibniz-Gesellschaft, Hanover), 12.2, 1980, 229-35. An interpretation of Leibniz’s Principle of Pre-Determinate History, on which the future of substances is partially an open one, is criticised as lacking support and irreconcilable with the texts concerned, and a more traditional interpretation, on which the careers of substances cannot fail to unfold in accordance with their complete concepts, is preferred.

32. ‘How Not to Undermine Theology’, *New Blackfriars*, 61, 1980, 286-92. Far from the assertion that the divine nature is partially knowable shaking the foundations of the doctrine of creation, that doctrine is subverted rather by the negation of that assertion.

33. ‘Plantinga and Leibniz’, a critical study of Alvin Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity*, in *Studia Leibnitiana*, 12.2, 1980, 215-20. Four related issues where the views of Plantinga have a bearing on those of Leibniz are discussed: essentialism, trans-world identity, the ontological argument and the issue of whether God can create any possible world.

34. ‘The Good of Trees’, *Journal of Value Inquiry*, 15, 1981, 35-54. Trees not only have needs of their own, *pace* Professors Hare and Feinberg, but are also of some slight intrinsic value.


37. ‘Science, Christianity and the Roots of Our Ecological Problems’, in *Lettera*, seconda serie, I, 1982, 35-47, translated by Dr. S. Gamberini as ‘Teoria scientifica, etica cristiana e le origini del problema ecologico’. Christianity is largely responsible for the rise of science and technology, but is not, *pace* Lynn White, a source of ecological disruption, and has advocated an ethic of stewardship for longer than Passmore recognises.

38. ‘Optimific, Right but not Obligatory’, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 12, 1982, 317-20. Utilitarianism can be defended against problems about supererogation raised by McConnell in *Ratio* without incurring the objections attracted by the account of Sikora in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*.

39. ‘Christian Attitudes to Nature’, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 44, 1983, 369-86. Christian attitudes to nature have not been characteristically despotic. Biblical, patristic, medieval and modern Christian attitudes have been much more varied, and overall much more benign, than their traducers contend.

40. ‘Western Traditions and Environmental Ethics’, in Robert Elliot and Arran Gare (eds.), *Environmental Philosophy: A Collection of Readings*, St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1983, 201-30. Historically the tradition of stewardship has been much more prominent than Peter Singer suggests; accordingly the roots of an environmental ethic exist already, and there is no need for a new ethic to be devised, even if this were possible. This work was also published in 1983 at Milton Keynes by The Open University Press, and at University Park, Pennsylvania by Pennsylvania State University Press.

(ed.), *Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence*, London and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1982; and Nicholas Sims (ed.), *Explorations in Ethics and International Relations, Essays in Honour of Sydney D. Bailey*, London: Croom Helm, 1981, in *Review of International Studies*, 9, 1983, 147-52. Though the conditional intention to use nuclear weapons is not wrong in itself, the actual consequences of current postures, compared with those of moderate unilateral disarmament, show the latter to be right.

42. ‘Unilateralism, Morality and Faith’, *Scottish Journal of Religious Studies*, 4, 1983, 3-14. Annette Baier is correct in holding that there are secular reasons for unilateral acts of justice in an unjust world, but they are not confined to the prospect of a Kantian kingdom of ends. They (like Christian ethics) include consequentialist considerations. But there are additional religious reasons for unilateralism.

43. ‘Methods of Ecological Ethics’, *Metaphilosophy*, 14, 3&4, 1983, 195-208. Ecological ethics needs to rely upon a method of argument by analogy, starting from received judgements, rather than appealing to loyalty to the planetary biosphere.


45. ‘Fairness to the Third World’, *Crucible* (journal of the Church of England General Synod’s Board of Social Responsibility), October to December 1983, 171-76. Effort to assist the economic and social development of the Third World is held to be obligatory on grounds not only of reparations but also of international justice.

46. ‘Miller, Kripke, Bach and the Meaning of Proper Names’, *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 21, 1983, 153-58. Theories of proper names which deny their equivalence with non-trivial descriptions (which supposedly would fail to apply to the bearers of the names in some possible worlds) are confronted with counterexamples which are argued either to invalidate the theories, or at least to narrow the scope of their application.

the soundest basis for policies of curtailing population growth which at the same time recognise the value of people.

48. ‘Thomas Traherne and the Location of Intrinsic Value’, *Religious Traditions*, 6, 1983, 66-74. (The original of which 36 above is a summary.)

49. ‘Work and the Human Essence’, *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 1, 1984, 141-50. Meaningful work is argued to be necessarily good for human beings, granted their nature and need for self-respect. As paid work supplies many with their only prospect of meaningful work, the opportunity of employment should be open to everyone.

50. ‘Value in the Wilderness’, Review Article of Donald Scherer and Thomas Attig (eds.), *Ethics and the Environment*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1983, in *Metaphilosophy*, 15, 1984, 289-304. The contributors dealing with applied issues neglect key theoretical considerations raised by those dealing with fundamental issues; the valuable work of the latter is sifted, and suggestions are made about how to fill the gaps which it leaves.


52. ‘Balthasar Bekker and the Decline of the Witch-Craze: The Old Demonology and the New Philosophy’, *Annals of Science*, 42, 1985, 383-395. Balthasar Bekker’s Cartesian and theological criticisms of witch-beliefs were more radical and significant than Hugh Trevor-Roper allows, and help to fill a gap in the explanation of the decline of these beliefs recognised by Keith Thomas.


54. ‘Development: Some Areas of Consensus’, *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 17.2, Summer 1986, 36-44. Common ground can be found among development theorists both about the concept of development, and about the causes and remedies of underdevelopment.


56. ‘The Good of Trees’ (34 above), republished in Donald VanDeVeer and Christine Pierce (eds.), *People, Penguins and Plastic Trees*, Basic

57. ‘Teaching Environmental Philosophy at a British University’, Journal of Environmental Education (New York), 18.4, Summer 1987, 15-18. The introduction of environmental philosophy into four philosophical courses at University College Cardiff is discussed, Philosophical Aspects of Social and World Problems, Philosophical Theology, Moral Philosophy and Modern European Ideas.


59. ‘The Ethics of Power’, African Philosophical Inquiry, 1.2, July 1987, 141-156. A theory is expounded and defended of the justification, scope and limits of the activities of collective bodies such as the state, and of the individual’s obligation to obey.


63. ‘Intercultural Values and Human Needs’, Proceedings of the Seventeenth World Congress of Philosophy (Montreal, 1983), Editions Montmorency, 1988, Vol. II, 491-497. Even those who deny that rational comparisons are possible between different societies or different ideological discourses are argued to presuppose concepts of human beings and human needs which supply a basis for such comparisons.

64. ‘Methods of Ecological Ethics’ (43 above), republished with an updating postscript in Terrell Ward Bynum and William Vitek (eds.) Applying Philosophy (Metaphilosophy Monographs Series), Oxford
and New York: The Metaphilosophy Foundation in association with

65. ‘Some Current Values and Assumptions’, jointly composed with two
other members (Dr. Arthur Peacocke and Dr. Katharine Dell) of the
Ian Ramsey Centre, St. Cross College, Oxford Working Party, and
comprising Chapter 2 (pp. 19-24) of the Report of the Ian Ramsey
Centre on environmental ethics, *Values, Conflict and the Environment*,
edited by Robin Attfield and Katharine Dell, Oxford: Ian Ramsey
Centre and Centre for Applied Ethics, Cardiff, 1989. A survey of the
range of principles of value currently adhered to in environmental
matters.

66. ‘Reasoning About the Environment’, jointly composed with three
members (Professor R.M. Hare, Dr. J.P. Griffin and Mr. A. Darby) of
the Ian Ramsey Centre, St. Cross College, Oxford Working Party, and
substantially revised by myself to meet criticisms from the other
members; the main philosophical section (Chapter 3; pp. 25-46) of the
Conflict and the Environment*, edited by Robin Attfield and Katharine
Dell, Oxford: Ian Ramsey Centre and Centre for Applied Ethics, Cardiff, 1989. In the light of the value-theory here defended, and of
our contention that environmental values are commensurable, an
enlarged and modified method of cost-benefit analysis is developed
and defended with a view to implementation by planners and policy-
makers.

67. ‘An Editorial Response’, Chapter 6 (pp. 83-86) of the Report of the
view of the criticisms expressed by two members of the Working Party
of the main report in Chapter 5, the meaning and implications of
erlier chapters are further clarified and defended.

68. ‘Secular Humanism’, paper commissioned for the Ian Ramsey Centre,
St. Cross College, Oxford Working Party Report on environmental
ethics, *Values, Conflict and the Environment*, edited by Robin Attfield
and Katharine Dell, Oxford: Ian Ramsey Centre and Centre for
Applied Ethics, Cardiff, 1989, of which it forms Chapter 8, pp. 91-96.
The various distinctive historical stances and values of Enlightenment
and post-Enlightenment humanism relating to future generations and to
nonhuman nature are reviewed so as to exhibit both continuities and
discontinuities with Judaic and Christian values.

70. ‘Derek Parfit and the History of Ethics’, in History of the Human Sciences, 2.4, October 1989, 357-371. Parfit’s exposition of Christian ethics as founded on the principle of self-interest and his claims that till recently normative and applied ethics have been entrammelled by religion are contested, and alternative accounts both of Christian ethics and of recent developments in normative and applied ethics are offered and defended.

71. ‘Deep Ecology and Intrinsic Value’, Cogito, 4/1, 1990, 61-66; a response to a critic, which also explains the indispensability of the notion of intrinsic value.

72. ‘The Global Distribution of Health Care Resources’ Journal of Medical Ethics, 16/2, September 1990, 153-156; also in Harry Lesser (ed.), Ageing, Autonomy and Ethics, Routledge, 1999 (see 118, below). The international aspects of health care and developmental problems are investigated in the light of rival ethical paradigms, which are shown to produce convergent policy directives.


75. ‘Has the History of Philosophy Ruined the Environment?’, Environmental Ethics, 13.2, 1991, 127-137. Eugene Hargrove’s critique of the impact of the history of ideas and the history of philosophy on attitudes to the environment is shown to be partially valid but partially in need of revision.


81. ‘Clarke, Independence and Necessity’ *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 1.2, 1993, 67-82. While the version of the cosmological argument advanced in Clarke’s Boyle Lectures is vulnerable to criticisms such as Hume’s, the version of Clarke’s critic Daniel Waterland remains defensible.


84. ‘Rehabilitating Nature and Making Nature Habitable’, in Robin Attfield and Andrew Belsey (eds.), *Philosophy and the Natural Environment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 45-57; ISBN 0-521-46903-1; ISSN (as special number of the journal Philosophy) 0031-8191(1994)69+1;1-P. While it is not impossible to restore nature, and both preservation and restoration are proper roles for humanity, they are subordinate to making nature sustainably habitable.
85. (Jointly with Barry Wilkins) ‘Sustainability’, *Environmental Values*, 3, 1994, 155-158. Arguments are adduced against understanding ‘sustainability’ as implying ‘fit to be sustained’.
91. ‘Preferences, Health, Interests and Value’, *Justifying Value in Nature, Special Topic Issue of The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy*, 3:2, May 1995, 7-15 (of hard copy); ISSN 1071-5800. The capacity for health is argued to be sufficient for having interests and moral
standing; thus the capacity for preferences is sufficient but unnecessary in these regards.


95. ‘Genetic Engineering: Can Unnatural Kinds Be Wronged?’, in Wheale, P.R. and McNally, R.M. (eds.) Animal Genetic Engineering: Of Pigs, Oncomice and Men, London: Pluto Press, 1995, 201-208. ISBN 074530754X (hb) and 0745307558 (pb). It is argued that transgenic animals can be harmed, and that also the ethics of generating them is partially independent of this possibility.


98. ‘Too High a Theme? Of Finitude, Predication and Analogy’, Scottish Journal of Religious Studies, 17.1, 1996, 5-19. Language about God, like language used of nonhuman animals, can bear a sense analogous to that of the same language when used of human beings, despite the fears of the seventeenth-century poet Richard Baxter that, without supernatural help, the divine nature may be “too high a theme”.


Coherent objections to transgenic engineering in terms of intrinsic value are consequentialist rather than Kantian.


108. ‘Existence Value and Intrinsic Value’, Ecological Economics, 24 (special number, edited by Bo Gustafsson of the Swedish Colloquium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, University of Uppsala), 1998, 163-8; ISSN: 0921-8009. Despite Jonathan Aldred’s defence of existence value, such value fails to cover much of the extension of intrinsic value, and should be replaced in decision-making by direct consideration of items of intrinsic value, as represented by proxies.


111. ‘Environmental Ethics and Intergenerational Equity’, Inquiry, 41, 1998, 207-22; ISSN: 0020-174X. Principles, policies and a model for relations between generations are discussed and sifted.

112. ‘Responsibility for the Global Environment’ (presented at Development Conference, Aberdeen, 1996), International Journal of Applied Philosophy (Florida) 12, 1998, 181-6; ISSN: 0739-098X. Argues that states have obligations to participate in treaties necessary to protect the global environment.


114. ‘Aldo Leopold: A Brief Appraisal’, Reflections, Newsletter of the Program for Ethics, Science and the Environment (Department of
Philosophy, Oregon State University), 3, 1998, 7. Leopold is rightfully influential as an ecologist, but philosophically naive.


122. ‘Evolution, Theodicy and Value’ (presented at the Science and Religion Forum Conference, Hoddesdon, 1996), The Heythrop Journal, 41.3, July 2000, 281-296; ISSN 0018-1196. Neither nature nor natural creatures can be regarded as immoral; nature, including predation and parasitism, is argued to be compatible with creation by a benign creator.


125. ‘Are Promises to Repay International Debt Binding?’ (presented to International Society for Value Inquiry at World Congress of Philosophy, Boston, 1998), *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 32.4, Winter 2001, 505-511; ISSN 0047-2786. John Searle’s findings about debt obligations do not imply that Third World countries have overriding obligations to service or repay debts.

126. ‘Meaningful Work and Full Employment’, *Reason in Practice*, 1.1, 2001, 41-48; ISSN, 1473-589X. Arguments from essential capacities and from self-respect continue to support the value of meaningful work, for which full employment is indispensable.


130. ‘To Do No Harm: The Precautionary Principle and Moral Values’ (a revision of 86 above), *Reason and Practice*, 1.3, 2001, 11-20; ISSN, 1473-589X.


citizens recognise universal obligations, not least with regard to the shared, objective global environment.


136. ‘Ecological Sustainability in a Developing Country such as South Africa? A Philosophical and Ethical Inquiry’ (jointly authored with Johan Hattingh), The International Journal of Human Rights, 6.2 (Summer 2002), pp. 65-92; ISSN 1364-2987. Conceptual and ethical problems for ecologically sustainable development are shown not to prevent such development being reconcilable with social justice, even in a developing country such as South Africa.


139. ‘Biocentric Consequentialism, Pluralism and ‘the Minimax Implication’: A Reply to Alan Carter’, Utilitas, 15.1 (March 2003), 76-91; ISSN 0953-8208. Biocentric consequentialism is defended against criticisms from Alan Carter relating to population, quality of life and environmental sensitivity.

140. ‘Global Warming, Justice and Future Generations’, in Harto Hakovirta (ed.), Six Essays on Global Order and Governance, Turku: Academy of Finland Figare/Safir Project, Department of Political


143. ‘Sustainable Development, Sustainable Livelihoods and Land Reform in South Africa: A Conceptual and Ethical Inquiry’ (jointly authored with Johan Hattingh and Manamela Matshabaphala), in *Third World Quarterly*, 25.2, 2004, 405-21; ISSN 0143-6597. The relations between sustainable development, sustainable livelihoods and land reform are explored, and the case against and that in favour of land reform in South Africa are presented and appraised. A 'research highlight' in which Rabi Thapa re-presents and highlights this article has been published (18/5/05) on id21, the DfID website, at http://www.id21.org/society/s1ara1.html; a further abstract has also appeared in the Sociological Abstracts database of CSA Illumina (June 2005).

144. ‘The Concept of Sustainable Development Revisited’, in *Yeditepe ’de Felsefe* (Philosophy at Yeditepe University, Istanbul), 1.3, 2004, 300-309; ISSN 1304-0197. The radical core of this concept is defended against both economistic interpretations and charges of irremediable vagueness.

145. ‘Rousseau, Clarke, Butler and Deism’, *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 12.3, 2004, 429-443; ISSN 0960-8788. Rousseau is argued to have produced a defence of deism sufficient to uphold it against eighteenth-century criticism and make it still a potential option amongst metaphysical positions.


151. ‘Future Generations: Considering All the Affected Parties’, translated into Spanish by Adrián Pradier, under the supervision of Carmen Velayos, as ‘Generaciones futuras: considerando todes das partes afectadas’, in *Isegoria* (Spain), 32, junio 2005 (published December 2005), 35-46; ISSN, 1130-2097. Current agents have responsibility for differences that can be made to the quality of life of future people and other future creatures, insofar as these are foreseeable.

152. ‘Sustainable Forests, Global Responsibility and the Earth Charter’, *Silva Carelica* (Finland), 49, 2005, 11-25; ISSN 0780-8232. Sustainable development must be global, and based on an ethic such as that of the Earth Charter, recommended here to foresters.


154. ‘Unprojected Value, Unfathomed Caves and Unspent Nature’, *Environmental Values*, 14.4, 2005, 513-18; ISSN, 0963-2719. Passages of poetry are used to illustrate that not all value is to be regarded as a projection of human sentiments.

155. ‘Altruism and Environmental Concern’ (joint paper with Stephen Moller), *Copula, Journal of the Department of Philosophy*,
Jahangirnagar University (Bangladesh), 22, June 2005, 51-59; ISSN, 1563-0692. Diverse theories of environmental ethics are tested for their coherence with the phenomenon of altruism.


159. ‘The Shape of a Global Ethic’, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 32.1, 2006, 5-19; ISSN: 0191-4537; DOI (Digital Object Identifier): http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453706059843. Problems including future-related responsibilities preclude most kinds of ethical theory from suitability as a global ethic, but practice-consequentialism is argued to overcome such problems, provided it adopts a biocentric form.

160. ‘Is the Concept of Nature Dispensable’, Ludus Vitalis: Journal of Philosophy of Life Sciences (Spain), vol. xiv, no. 25, June 2006, 105-1167; ISSN: 1133-5165. Also to be translated into Spanish, for a collection to be edited by Teresa Kwiatkowska. The concept of nature is argued to be indispensable, not least for ethics, despite the claims of strong constructivists.

162. ‘Leibniz, the Cause of Gravity, and ‘Physical Theology’’, in *Studia Leibnitiana* 36.2, 2005 (published 2007), 238-244; ISSN, 0039-3185. Farrer’s category of physical theology is applied to Leibniz’s Newtonian opponents.


169. ‘Beyond the Earth Charter: Taking Possible People Seriously’, *Environmental Ethics*, 29.4, Winter 2007 (published February 2008), 359-367; ISSN, 0163-4275. The Earth Charter needs to be
stretched to cope with the problem that future obligations are not owed to identifiable individuals, but to whoever lives in future times.

170. ‘Mediated Responsibilities, Global Warming and the Scope of Ethics’, *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 40.2, 2009, 225-236; ISSN 0047-2786. Both individuals and governments are responsible even when the impacts of their action or inaction are mediated.

171. ‘Non-Reciprocal Responsibilities and the Banquet of the Kingdom’, *Journal of Global Ethics*, 5.1, 2009, 33-41; ISSN (print) 1744-9626; (online) 1744-9634. In reply to Chris Groves, the ethics-of-care model is argued to stand in need of supplementation with regard to non-reciprocal responsibilities from other models, including that of hospitality.

172. ‘Social History, Religion and Technology: An Interdisciplinary Investigation into White’s ‘Roots’’, *Environmental Ethics*, 31.1, 2009, 31-50; ISSN, 0163-4275. White’s controversial ‘Roots’ paper involves, pace Harrison, a critique of Christianity that misses the mark, while, as Whitney argues, disregarding economic and institutional causes of ecological problems, yet relevantly focusing on the influence of values and beliefs.


177. ‘The Precautionary Principle’, Guest Editorial, *UK Centre for Bioscience Bulletin*, 29, Spring 2010, 1, ISSN 1740-6692 (print); 1740-6706 (online). All science students should be taught about the Precautionary Principle.


183. ‘The Global Distribution of Health Care Resources in the Twenty-First Century’, to be published in a Rodopi collection to be edited by Harry Lesser.


185. ‘Climate Change, Environmental Ethics, and Biocentrism’ forthcoming in Ved Nanda and Olivier Urbain (eds), *Facing Climate Change with a New Environmental Ethic*, Piscataway, NY: Transaction. A biocentric approach is defended and shown to justify significant action on climate change.

186. ‘Social History, Religion and Technology: An Interdisciplinary Investigation into White’s ‘Roots’’ (172 above), to be republished in a collection on anthropocentrism to be edited by Rob Boddice.
188. ‘Has the History of Philosophy Ruined the Environment?’ (75 above), to be republished online by Thomas Seiler at www.umweltethik.at

Reviews


