From Irritants to Satisfaction:  
A Model of a Theory of Meaning  
Applied to Reading the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ Motif  
In Exodus 16

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## Abbreviations

For the sake of clarity, the abbreviations are divided into three categories. The first includes modern translations of the Bible. The second contains ancient writings and manuscripts. The third group consists of abbreviations for periodicals, reference works, and series.

<table>
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<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bibles</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>CPB</td>
<td>Scrivener, Frederick, Henry Ambrose, <em>The Cambridge Paragraph Bible of the Authorized English Version</em> (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1873)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KJV</td>
<td><em>The Holy Bible: King James Version (Electronic Edition of the 1900 'Pure Cambridge Edition' of the 'Authorized Version')</em> (Bellingham, WA: Logos Research System, 1900)</td>
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### NASB

### NLT
*Holy Bible: New Living Translation* (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House, 2007)

### NRSV

### YLT

### Ancient Greek Sources

<table>
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<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>Codex Vaticanus</td>
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## Ancient Jewish Sources

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ms</td>
<td>(ms) Pentateuchi textus Hebraeo-Samaritanus secundum A. von Gall, Der hebräische Pentateuch der Samaritaner 1914–1918.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.K.</td>
<td>Babylonian Talmud, Seder Nezikin (Order <em>Damages</em>), Tract Bava Kamma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JT Meg.</td>
<td>Jerusalem Talmud, Tract Megillah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Ketib</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meg.</td>
<td>Babylonian Talmud, Seder Moed (Order <em>Festivals</em>), Tract Megillah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mlt Mss</td>
<td>Multi codices manuscripti (i.e. plus quam 20)</td>
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rabbinischen Literatur, Prolegomena (Vondobonae 1906); pars II (1908); pars III (1911).

**pc Mss**
Pauci codices manuscripti (i.e. 3-10)

**Q**
Qere

**T**

**T^J**

**T^Ms**
(T^Ms) codex manuscriptus (codices manuscripti) vel editio (editiones) secundum apparatum criticum Sperberi

---

**Periodicals, Reference Works, and Series**

**AUSS**
*Andrews University Seminary Studies*

**BDB**
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BHS</strong></td>
<td>Schenker, Adrian, <em>Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia</em>, 5 edn (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1997)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BibSac</strong></td>
<td><em>Bibliotheca Sacra</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EvJ</strong></td>
<td><em>Evangelical Journal</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EvQ</strong></td>
<td><em>Evangelical Quarterly</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FAT</strong></td>
<td>Forschungen zum Alten Testament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FRLANT</strong></td>
<td>Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IEJ</strong></td>
<td><em>Israel Exploration Journal</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JATS</strong></td>
<td><em>Journal of the Adventist Theological Society</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JBL</strong></td>
<td><em>Journal of Biblical Literature</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JETS</strong></td>
<td><em>Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JOP</strong></td>
<td><em>Journal of Pragmatics</em></td>
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JPS  Jewish Publication Society

JR  Journal of Religion

JSIJ  Jewish Studies, an Internet Journal

JSJSup  Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism

JSOT  Journal for the Study of the Old Testament

JSOTSup  Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplement Series

JSPSup  Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha Supplement Series

JSS  Journal of Semitic Studies

JTI  Journal of Theological Interpretation


NTT  Norsk Teologisk Tidsskrift

ProEccl  Pro Ecclesia: A Journal of Catholic and Evangelical Theology

RCEAL  Research Centre for English and Applied Linguistics Working Papers

SBL  Society of Biblical Literature
<table>
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<tr>
<td>SCM</td>
<td>Student Christian Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDNVAO</td>
<td>Skrifter Utgitt av Det Norske Videnksaps-Akademi i Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPCK</td>
<td>Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textus</td>
<td><em>Textus: Studies of the Hebrew University Bible Project</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TrinJ</td>
<td><em>Trinity Journal</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VoxEv</td>
<td><em>Vox Evangelica</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT</td>
<td><em>Vetus Testamentum</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZDADL</td>
<td><em>Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZDMG</td>
<td><em>Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zygon</td>
<td><em>Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science</em></td>
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Acknowledgements

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Dedication

To our parents, without whose care, prayers, support and sincere love, this thesis would have not become a reality.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

If my understanding of the world as a whole affects my reading of the Bible, how likely it is for the Bible to change my initial understanding of the world? This is the most fundamental question for the confessional, as well as academic, study of the Bible. The challenge is based on models of communication which propose that one’s reading of the Bible is subject to one’s concept of meaning, which is again subject to one’s interpretative paradigm. Here the paradigm is a unified whole in which all the data gained by observation are organised.\(^1\) Thus, my interpretation of the Bible is deduced from my presuppositions and paradigm, and not induced from the reading of the Bible.

This fundamental problem of the vicious circle in biblical interpretation has led me to reconsider some models of communication and meaning, and consequently to propose a new theory and a model. According to my theory, the force which compels the reader to shift his/her paradigm and thus eventually escape from the vicious circle of reasoning, is the reader’s dissatisfaction with the meaning of the text as it is set forth in the old paradigm.

However, according to my theory of meaning, the shift of the reader’s paradigm is not necessarily the desired effect of reading. Any eventual shift of the paradigm is only a by-product of the process of reading. This process is seen as always driven by the reader’s intention to satisfy his/her expectations set forth for the biblical text within the reader’s focus. Thus, the principal end product of the process of reading is in fact the reader’s satisfaction with the meaning of the text despite all the possible irritants. Irritants are phenomena perceived as any kind of challenge to the current state of affairs in the world and time of the reader.

\(^1\) Appendix B is the glossary containing all the ambiguous terms, definitions of which are given in this thesis. The full definition of a paradigm, as stated in that Appendix, is: a unified whole in which all the data gained by observation are organised into three aspects of the unified whole: metaphysical aspect (the set of ideas and beliefs about reality limited by the paradigm’s master narrative), sociological aspect (the set of sociological factors which influence the way the science is done), and methodological aspect (the set of the available scientific methodology). These three aspects should be understood as the (sub)spheres in which the paradigm functions as an all-encompassing organisational framework. I will develop this definition based on the Kuhnian theory of paradigm as explained in Section 2.1 below.
Accordingly, on the one hand, the eventual shift of the reader’s paradigm is seen as both a possibility and a necessity only in the case when the reader’s expectations set forth for the biblical text could not be satisfied in the reader’s current paradigm. In such a case, all the possible inconsistencies between the apparent meaning of the text and the reader’s expectations for the text, play the role of irritants in the reader’s current paradigm. These irritants are thus phenomena which cause frustration on the basis of them being a mismatch with the reader’s expectations. These frustrating irritants are also called anomalies. In those cases, since the reader cannot find a satisfactory solution to consolidate the apparent inconsistencies, the irritants become the force that drives the reader to shift his/her paradigm.

On the other hand, when the reader can find a satisfactory interpretation of a biblical text within his/her interpretive paradigm, the reader will never shift that paradigm. Any possible challenge in this case is perceived as a match to the interpretative paradigm of the reader. In this sense, the reader perceives the irritant as a challenge and not a threat to his/her paradigm. In those cases of satisfactory interpretations, any small changes in the reader’s paradigm are only adjustments/improvements of that same paradigm. Hence those readings do follow a vicious circle of reasoning within the paradigm. Thus, my argument in this thesis is that my theory of meaning has the potential to explain both what compels the reader to reconsider his/her paradigm and under which circumstances the vicious circle of reasoning is indeed an inevitable part of one’s reading.

Because of this explanatory nature of my theory, it is indeed a foundational theory of meaning. Consequently, its purpose is to explain why certain expressions mean certain things to some persons in a given context. I here concur with Karl Bühler (1879-1963), Dan Sperber (1942-), Deirdre Wilson (1941-) and others who understand and visualise a context as a cognitive sphere2 or

---

2 Bühler’s model, known as ‘Organon model’, defines three main functions of communication: the expressive function, representation, and the conative (appealing) function. The context in the model is conceptualised as a sphere surrounding the text and incorporating (at least partially) the sender, the object, and the recipient envisioned as the entities around the text. A two dimensional graph of the Organon model shows the context as a circle, but Bühler’s theory clearly envisions
Accordingly, I define context as: a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to communication in general and an utterance in particular. If we were to imagine a context as a sphere, what would constitute the borders of the sphere? In particular, how wide would my context be, in the context of a contemporary reader? The narrowest possible context which provides the narrowest possible meaning is the one that appears to the reader who opens the Bible (an edition of the original text, or any given translation), reads an expression found in a verse, and interprets it in its immediate textual context. In this sense, the textual context is a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to only the explicit realm of a specific text. With this narrow focus, an interpretation of a text remains within the domains of linguistics and semantics. Thus, for example, I see the expression ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ in Exodus 16.23,25 in its narrowest context as the day when God does not send the manna to the earth, but rests and preserves the manna from the day before from turning bad. This is the textual, explicit meaning of the expression in those two verses.

In contrast, the pragmatic context is wider, so that it is a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to the author’s intentions, implicatures, and all that is not explicitly present in the text. Thus, an interpretation concerned with intentions and implicatures surpasses domains of pure linguistics and semantics and is part of the field of pragmatics. Accordingly, the same expression from

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3 Sperber and Wilson define context as ‘the set of premises used in interpreting an utterance (apart from the premise that the utterance in question has been produced)’. They define a set of assumptions available to a person ‘an individual cognitive environment’. (The italics are mine.) See Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition, 2nd edn (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1986; repr. 1995), p. 46.

4 I will expand this definition to a more specific one in the Section below. There, and in Appendix B the definition reads: a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to communication in general and a specific utterance in particular. The presuppositions are concerned with relations of relevance between the utterance and one or more centres of meaning of the utterance. (The centres of meaning are one or more sources of information about specific characteristics of the utterance, available to the recipient of the utterance).

5 Models in the field of pragmatics can further be divided on the far-side and near-side pragmatics models. The criterion for the grouping is whether the semantics and pragmatics are clearly delineable (as standing far from each other) or not.
Exodus 16.23,25 can be linked to other biblical and non-biblical literature where God’s providence or lack of it, manna, Sabbath, or any other common motif is explained. In this sense, the author of Exodus 16.23,25 is imagined as being engaged in communication with the authors of other texts, biblical and non-biblical. The author’s intention, as it is thus perceived by the reader, makes the reader see Exodus 16.23,25 in a new light. Here the pragmatic context provides the pragmatic meaning of the text (i.e. an articulation of one’s motivation, intention and aim as presented by a given text).

Furthermore, a context can be expanded to include cultural, political, social or academic circumstances of the writer’s or the recipient’s world and time. Consequently, an interpretation of a text, which is concerned with such circumstances, belongs to the respective discipline. Thus, the reader can consider the meaning of the same expression as being linked to the state of affairs in the world as a whole of which the reader and the Bible are parts. In this sense, the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ expression may be understood as part of conflicts between, for example, theism and atheism, creation and evolution, Judaism and Christianity, humans and nature, etc. A clear delineation between these contexts is not possible. Yet, one can visualise how contexts expand from the field of pure linguistics and semantics towards other fields of study. In this sense, my definition of the sociological context is: a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to the state of affairs (i.e. sociological circumstances) of the author’s world and time in the way the text articulates these circumstances. The sociological context provides the sociological meaning (i.e. an articulation of the state of affairs as they are presented by a given text).

Finally, the widest context a reader can possibly perceive is a paradigm. That is to say that the widest context in which I can interpret the Bible is the context of my personal understanding of the whole of the world of which both I myself and the Bible are parts. This is the paradigmatic context, defined as a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to an utterance as an expression of a particular paradigm. The meaning provided by this context I call the paradigmatic meaning and define it as an articulation of a paradigm by means of an utterance. More
precisely, it is an articulation of a paradigm in a given text conveyed by pragmatic and sociological meanings in the text.

Neither in biblical studies, nor studies of the philosophy of language is there a consensus about how many types of meanings there are. However, I argue that the differentiation I use in this thesis on textual, pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic types of meaning is feasible for communication in general and biblical interpretation in particular.

The cognitive act of reconsidering the same expression as part of a wider context I see as the decentralisation, whilst the opposite is the centralisation in the process of biblical interpretation. This understanding of the process of interpretation as a matter of decentralisation and centralisation, from textual to pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meaning and back, has a unique potential to explain the apparent difference between semantic and foundational theories of meaning.

As mentioned above, the foundational aspect of my theory of meaning is focussed on explaining why certain expressions have particular meanings to some people in a given context. Traditionally, one would tend to see foundational theories of meaning as if they stood in contrast to semantic theories which explain what a particular expression means to certain people in a given context.

In this sense, my theory of meaning also shares some characteristics with semantic theories of meaning. In particular, when a reading is maximally centralised, the meaning of a text is perceived as stable. That is to say that there is little or no ambiguity regarding what the text reads about ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ in Exodus 16.23,25. The reader knows what the explicit meaning of the text is in

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its narrowest possible context. This meaning is stable and within the domains of linguistics and semantics.

However, the foundational aspect of my theory comes to the fore by performing the cognitive acts of decentralisation, towards pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of the text. The reason why the expression means something specific for certain people in a wider context is best understood by having their paradigms in focus. Consequently, the wider meaning is subject to the reader’s paradigm and thus unstable, following the changes within the reader’s paradigm, as well as eventual shifts from it.

In contrast to my understanding, Jeff Speaks, for example, points out that ‘the term “theory of meaning” has, in recent history of philosophy, been used to stand for both semantic theories and foundational theories of meaning… This has obvious potential to mislead.’ I agree with Speaks in that this can be misleading, but I propose that a clear delineation between the two types of theories of meaning can be equally misleading.

Conversely my explanation of the problem of biblical interpretation as an issue of (de)centralisation can be developed in a theory of meaning with both foundational and semantic aspects. In other words, the delineation between semantic and foundational aspects of a theory of meaning is thus shown as trivial, since the process of interpretation always tends to unfold by cognitive leaps from what the text means in its narrow literal context to what the text means in the context of the state of affairs in the world (i.e. pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic contexts). At the level of the reader’s paradigm, the (paradigmatic) meaning of the text is indeed directly connected to the issue of the reader’s paradigm as the main reason why something has the specific meaning to the reader. The ‘what’ and ‘why’ in the process of interpretation are thus never totally delineable. Still, one has to be aware of the dynamics between the

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ontological (what) and epistemological (why) aspects during the decentralisation and centralisation in biblical interpretation.

In order to monitor/analyse these cognitive acts of centralisation and decentralisation, one needs to use certain tools which pure linguistics and semantics cannot provide. In order to acquire these tools, I have incorporated in my theory of meaning the following three theories: a theory of paradigms, a theory of literature, and a theory of relevance.

In what follows, I will approach the problem of the vicious circle in three different ways: by explaining, firstly the vicious circle in non-conduit models of communication, secondly, the vicious circle of the hermeneutic circle, and thirdly, the vicious circle of compiled texts. Each of these approaches will shed new light on the same problem, and show the need for these three types of theories (of paradigms, literature, and relevance) to be utilised in the process of biblical interpretation.

Furthermore, these insights will explain my formulation for the purpose of this thesis, which is to develop a theory of meaning combining credible aspects of a theory of paradigms, a literary theory, and a relevance theory in order to explain the following three issues: firstly, the vicious circle in interpretation as a matter of (de)centralisation, secondly, dissatisfaction as the force that drives the reader to reconsider his/her paradigm and thirdly, satisfaction as the force which keeps the reader satisfied with the vicious circle of reasoning within his/her paradigm.

1.1 THE VICIOUS CIRCLE IN NON-CONDUIT MODELS OF COMMUNICATION

All models of communication in general, and models for reading of, or listening to, a biblical text in particular, can be divided between conduit and non-conduit models. The difference is based on the reader’s presuppositions regarding the potential of transmitting a message from its sender to its receiver. These presuppositions are the most critical characteristics of the reader’s paradigm in general and his/her view on communication in particular.
Thus, on the one hand, conduit models, such as the one proposed by E. C. Shannon (1916-2001) suggest that texts are messages/signs coded by an author/sender. These signs can be correctly decoded by a receiver who uses the sender’s code. The meaning of the text is thus appropriated from the decoded text, without anything else affecting the meaning of the text. Even though the conduit models of communication have an established tradition in the prominent works of for example John Locke (1632-1704), and Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), to my knowledge, there is no evidence of a code which could be applied whereby a contemporary reader would find no ambiguities or multiple options regarding the meaning of a biblical text. Thus, the conduit models of communication are far too simplistic to be able to explain and facilitate the challenges of biblical interpretation, when the communication is presupposed to be according to these models.

On the other hand, non-conduit models of communication take into consideration the contexts of biblical writers as well as of ancient and contemporary interpreters. Any difference between a writer’s context and that of a recipient is seen in these models as a negative factor or obstacle to communication. In addition to differences between contexts, there are factors such as psychological or health conditions of the participants in communication. All these factors can be obstacles in the flow of communication, and they work in synergy. I define synergy as the combined effect of a group of factors working together, where the effect of the group is greater than the sum of the outcome achieved by any one factor working separately. A synergy effect of negative factors in communication is perceived as noise. Differences between contexts of participants in a communication process are parts of the noise. Thus, any difference between the author’s paradigmatic context (i.e. his/her paradigm) and that of the reader is also part of the noise.

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9 Noise can be both aural and visual (like for example in discourse in signed languages). Since I will use a metaphor of a zoom lens, visual noise fits better the purpose of this thesis. However, noise in general is a synergy effect of obstacles in communication.
Since a paradigm, as the widest context possible, is a unified whole, any enquiry about part of the world is subject to an initial understanding of the paradigm. More precisely, different paradigms direct the human enquiry to focus on different types of questions about the world. According to the set of the questions characteristic of a paradigm, all paradigms are generally grouped as belonging to at least these four common types: positivist, interpretive, critical, and poststructural. These paradigms focus the main intention of human enquiry, respectively, towards: predicting, understanding, emancipating, and deconstructing the phenomena observed in the world. The questions raised, respectively, are approximately the following: What will happen? How and why does something happen? What should (have) happen(ed)? What was omitted from previous analyses?

Without discussing in more detail the particulars of each of the paradigms, I am pointing out that each of the four paradigms determines which questions interpreters will raise regarding the Bible. Consequently, if a biblical writer subscribed/belonged to a paradigm different from that of the reader, it is likely that the writer’s expectations for the biblical text he/she wrote differed from the expectations for the same text set forth by a contemporary reader. The reader will thus construe the meaning of the text in accordance to his/her initial questions concerning the text, which might be very different from the questions the author and the ancient first recipients of the text raised in their paradigm. In this sense, the vicious circle in biblical interpretation is based on the paradigmatic context.

Also, since the difference between the author’s paradigm and that of the reader’s is the cause for the vicious circle in biblical interpretation, I wonder what kind of similarities and dissimilarities between the author and the reader may exist on realms which are subject to the paradigm. In other words, does this difference mean that no similarity between the consciousness of the two, is possible? And if so, how do those similarities relate to the realm of paradigms?

11 Ibid.
N.T. Wright’s proposal is helpful here since he clarifies five realms as sub-realities of a paradigm: worldview, mindset, aim, intention and motivation.\(^{12}\) Thus, firstly, he suggests that the worldview is defined as an explicit and public formulation of the metaphysical aspect of a paradigm.\(^{13}\) Secondly, the mindset is a private, individual, personal articulation of the paradigm. In this sense, the mindset is ‘the individual subset of, or the variant on, the worldview held by the society or societies to which the individual belongs’.\(^{14}\) Thirdly, the aim is defined as ‘the fundamental direction of a person’s life, or some fairly stable subset of that fundamental direction’.\(^{15}\) Fourthly, moving towards smaller particles of individually oriented implications of a paradigm, an intention is defined as a specific application of an aim in a particular situation. Finally, a motivation is the particular sense that on a specific occasion, a certain action or set of actions is appropriate and desirable.

According to these sub-realities of a paradigm, one can experience changes in personal motivation, intention, aim, mindset, and even influence changes in the communal explicit public formulation of a paradigm. Still, all of these changes are only changes within the reader’s paradigm and thus answers to the questions the reader raised. These answers are furthermore provided by the logic which fits the initial questions, subject to the reader’s interpretive paradigm. In this sense, all changes within the reader’s paradigm are changes within the vicious circle of reasoning. The reader’s chances to escape from the vicious circle in biblical interpretation are increased when the interpretation becomes concerned with the

\(^{12}\) I recognise a relative compatibility of my approach to the issue of paradigms with Wright’s approach to the same issue, this compatibility suggesting that some of Wright’s definitions can help me clarify these specific types of utterances. In particular, Wright has also started with the theory of paradigms, but subsequently, when applying it to literary and biblical studies, he opted to follow Vladimir Yakovlevich Propp (1895-1970) and Algirdas Julius Greimas (1917-92), instead of Bakhtin as I have done. Nevertheless, some of the definitions he proposes are compatible with the comprehensive theory of meaning I will develop in this thesis. Thus, I suggest that adopting his definitions will contribute to clarity in this thesis. See N. T. Wright, *The New Testament and the People of God*, Christian Origins and the Question of God (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1992), 1, p. 110.

\(^{13}\) Wright, does not clarify the difference between a worldview and paradigm, or even the metaphysical aspect, but, as far as I understand him, this is how he uses the term worldview. See Wright, *The New Testament and the People of God*, p. 110.

\(^{14}\) Ibid.

\(^{15}\) Ibid.
paradigmatic context, by focusing on understanding, comparing and contrasting the writer’s paradigm with that of the reader.

Therefore, I suggest that a theory of meaning has to incorporate a theory of paradigms, where the concept of paradigm is the widest possible context of interpreting the Bible. I also argue that every interpretation that is concerned with contexts narrower than the paradigmatic context are indeed vicious circles of reasoning. Accordingly, as long as the reader cannot recognise another paradigm, like the one to which the writer of the biblical text subscribed as an alternative to the paradigm of the reader, the reading will indeed remain within the vicious circle of reasoning. Furthermore, even if the reader does recognise an alternative paradigm as offered by for example the author of the text, the reader will never accept the offer if the irritants (inconsistencies and oddities) in his/her paradigm are not too difficult/annoying to cope with. In this sense, the issue of the vicious circle in biblical interpretation is in fact an issue of the reader’s satisfaction with his/her paradigm.

Accordingly, the purpose of this thesis is to use the tools provided by a theory of paradigms in order to develop a theory of meaning which explains the following three issues: firstly, the vicious circle in interpretation as a matter of (de)centralisation, secondly, dissatisfaction as the force that motivates the reader to reconsider his/her paradigm and thirdly, satisfaction as the force which keeps the reader satisfied with the vicious circle of reasoning within his/her paradigm. I will now approach the problem of the vicious circle in biblical interpretation from two more angles. By doing that I will provide additional insights to the same problem, and consequently specify the purpose of this thesis in more detail.

1.2 THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF THE HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE

One need not depart from the fields of linguistics and semantics in order to see the same problem of the vicious circle in biblical interpretation, which I explained above in terms of non-conduit models and contexts as spheres of
different size. This second way of explaining the same problem is traditionally known as the problem of the hermeneutic circle.\textsuperscript{16}

The problem resides in the fact that a reader shapes his/her own expectations set forth for the text as a whole, on the basis of his/her initial reading of only a part of the whole text. The rest of the text (for example Exodus 16) is thus read and interpreted according to the reader’s limited knowledge of the initial part (for example, the accusation against Moses in Exodus 16.3). The limited knowledge thus serves as a presupposition about the remainder of the whole (as if the meaning of the remainder of Exod 16 is indeed only about God’s choice of Moses as the leader of the Israelites).

This is clearly a vicious circle of reasoning, since the reader’s understanding of the whole might be coherent with his/her presuppositions regarding it, and yet different from those of the author. I will thus argue in Chapter 4 that there are some clear allusions in Exod 16 that direct the reader to the context of the creation account in Gen 1-3, which also explains the paradigm articulated by Exod 16. A purely linguistic and semantic analysis of a text as a whole and clearly delineated from other texts is thus shown to be a vicious circle of reasoning.

In this sense, this second approach to the problem of the vicious circle evokes the idea that the problem lies in the attempt to restrict biblical interpretation to the linguistic and semantic analysis of a text as if the text were clearly delineated from other texts. Therefore, I suggest that a feasible theory of meaning which explains how the reader can escape the circular reasoning has to incorporate a literary theory suitable for close reading of a biblical text. This literary theory needs to be such, that a close reading of a text will increase the reader’s sensitivity to textual contexts, both smaller and larger than the text in the reader’s

\textsuperscript{16} The term is first utilised by Friedrich Ast and is understood as finding ‘the spirit of the whole through the individual, and through the whole to grasp the individual’. See Friedrich Ast, \textit{Grundlinien der Grammatik, Hermeneutik und Kritik} (Landshut: Jos. Thomann, Buchdrucker und Buchhändler, 1808), p. 178., as quoted in C. Mantzavinos, ‘Hermeneutics’, in \textit{The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy} <http://www.plato.stanford.edu> [accessed 30 May 2017].
focus. Hence a reader needs to be sensitive to intertextual relations between the text in focus and other texts, as well as between the parts of the text in focus. In other words, the literary theory has to closely read the text as a permeable utterance.

The permeability of language in general and a text in particular is the concern of literary theories like, for example, the one proposed by Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975). In line with this literary theory, I define utterance as: a speech unit that is delineated by the rest of the speech by a change of speakers. Written documents are in this sense perceived as speech presented in a written form. In addition, permeability is the effect of diffuse borders which cannot prevent blending of otherwise delineated entities. Accordingly, the permeability of utterances implies diffuse borders between the utterances, otherwise delineated by a change of speakers. Every text is an utterance influenced by other texts and influencing other texts. A literary theory of this kind can be used in order to increase the reader’s sensitivity to relations between all parts of a text in the reader’s focus, as well as to a textual context greater than the text in the focus.

Thus, the more a theory of meaning is sensitive to synergistic relationships between parts of a text with other texts, the more the theory is suitable to interpreting the text as a whole. In light of this insight, the purpose of this thesis is to develop a theory of meaning which employs both a theory of paradigms and a literary theory in order to develop a theory of meaning which explains the following three issues as already emphasised above: firstly, the vicious circle in interpretation as a matter of (de)centralisation, secondly, dissatisfaction as the force that drives the reader to reconsider his/her paradigm and thirdly, satisfaction as the force which keeps the reader satisfied with the vicious circle of reasoning within his/her paradigm. The choice of the two theories should be such that my theory of meaning is sensitive to both the reader’s centralisation and decentralisation in the process of interpretation of a biblical text, and the permeability of the text.
1.3 THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF COMPILED TEXTS

Finally, the third way of explaining the same problem of the vicious circle in biblical interpretation is by focusing on challenges with interpreting a compiled text. The problem is as ancient as the time that people first put two (or more) religious texts (in oral or written form) together and the whole became more than the sum of its parts. The relation between the initial texts and the compiled whole is synergistic and complex. However, the reader’s (or hearer’s) comprehension of this complex relation (between the initial texts and the compilation) affects his or her understanding of the meaning of the compiled whole.

In addition, much of that comprehension (of the relation between the whole text and its parts) is subconscious. This makes the process of understanding the meaning of the text rather a heuristic, intuitionally driven endeavour. Therefore, a meaning of a compiled text is often a product of an automatic subconscious process, rather than an interpretation that corresponds with a logically chosen criteria for it.

But, even if the whole process of interpretation were a fully conscious process, the problem of the meaning of a compiled text would still baffle a reader with many critical questions left unanswered. Should the compiled document be read with or without paying attention to the meanings of the ‘original’ separate documents? After the merging of the documents, the reader is reading a new document, a new utterance, which is (again) more than just a sum of its parts. The new utterance is an outcome of synergy between the previously separated parts.

Thus, on the one hand, if the recipient of the compiled whole is to focus on the separate originals, which one of the original documents is to receive the most

17 ‘Texts in oral form’ is here an allusion to oral traditions which acquire their form even before they become written down. In addition, the same oral traditions, after being written down, still continue their development in a non-textual context. Oral folklore traditions are only one of many examples. Another example is the context of signed languages, where textuality is not an intrinsic part of the language. Thus, a biblical text in deaf communities is still transmitted in a non-textual context, even if a written form of the text exists. Scriptural ‘readings’ used in deaf church liturgies are often compilations of biblical texts. The signed readings reflect the oral form of the texts. Thus, in all these examples, a textual form of a text is only one form of several available.
attention and why? Furthermore, should all the documents be read with equal attention, the recipient still ends up reading each of the original documents in their own right, not the compiled whole.

On the other hand, if the recipient is supposed to read the compiled document as if it was not a compilation, a practical question arises regarding all the traces of the process of compilation (inconsistencies, duplications, etc.), since they are inevitably inherent and often apparent in the compiled document. Should the reader ignore these traces or not? Furthermore, how is one to discern what the traces (literary, semantic, stylistic…) are in the process of compilation and what the intrinsic parts of the compiled text are? In fact, what are the criteria for such discernment?

More importantly, on what basis are these criteria to be established? Where are they to be found? Are they found in the ‘Sitz im Leben’ / situatedness of either the author(s) of the documents, or in some ideas found outside the documents, or in the state of affairs in the world of the initial recipients, as has traditionally been the case in historical criticism in general? Another possibility is to search for the criteria in the text itself, in which case, are the criteria to be found in the final form of the text or in some of its ‘original’ parts? According to where the criteria for the correct reading are to be found, the reading becomes centralised on/in one of several possible centres of meaning. By centre of meaning I mean a source of information available to the recipient of an utterance regarding specific characteristics of the utterance.

In fact, there are at least five possible centres of meaning, especially applicable to biblical writings, regarding which one can delineate ancient first recipients from contemporary recipients. The five centres of meaning are: A - the historical events and ideas in which the religious writings originated; B - the author(s) of the compiled texts; C - the compiled writings; D – the text’s ancient first reader(s); E - its contemporary reader(s). \(^{18}\)

\[^{18}\text{In addition, there is a sixth possible centre of meaning, widely acknowledged in literary criticism today (this will be discussed in more length throughout this thesis), namely the implied}\]
The reader’s paradigm, by definition (being the unified whole in which all the data gained by observation are organised), governs his or her choice of focusing on one or more centres of meaning. This choice of foci which the reader makes in order to discern the meaning of a compiled document, is actually a choice regarding the contexts in which the document is perceived. Here I concur with Sperber and Wilson in that a context for interpretation is chosen, not given, in the sense that it is ‘a psychological construct, a subset of the hearer's assumptions about the world’.

The subjectivity of the choice regarding the context for interpretation within the reader’s paradigm is the basis for the vicious circle in the interpretation. One has no objective criteria for evaluating possible answers to the following questions: Is the main context, according to which the document is to be read, the context of an abstract system of ideas, or the context of circumstances regarding the life and personal choices of the authors? Is it the context of the ancient first recipients of the documents (in which case one should choose between the context of the documents before and the context of the documents after the process of compilation)? Finally, there is always an option to read the compiled document in the context of the present-day audience/ a contemporary reader.

Furthermore, the choice between contexts is indeed a question concerning which circumstances regarding the compiled text appear to be most relevant. Therefore, from here on I define context, more precisely than I did above, as a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to communication in general and a specific utterance in particular, concerning relations of relevance between the utterance and one or more centres of the meaning of the utterance.

author(s), which is, simply explained, the author(s) as seen and understood from the reader’s point of view. At the moment I will leave the discussion regarding the implied author for Section 2.2.9 below.

19 Sperber, p. 15.

20 Here again, these centres of meaning are, by definition, sources of information available to the recipient of an utterance regarding specific characteristics of the utterance. Also by definition of utterance, the compiled text is perceived as an utterance in written form.
By relevance, I mean, a measure of the effectiveness of an utterance to narrow the wider context in which the previous utterance was understood as situated. This concept of relevance implies that along the process of communication, utterances exercise a force by which they situate the conversation closer to a centre of meaning.\textsuperscript{21} I call that force the force of cognitive attraction within the field of cognitive gravity which surrounds an utterance.

I define field of cognitive gravity as the field of attractive force of irritants. Cognitive gravity or attraction is the force which makes the reader focus on the utterance. This attraction is based on apparent promises regarding the improvement of the states of affairs in the reader’s world and time. At the same time, that force of attraction challenges the reader with the promise of changes by raising his/her criteria for satisfaction.

On the one hand, if the satisfaction is achievable with the new criteria, the irritants are perceived as challenging but positive. The irritants lead the reader to satisfaction via challenge. On the other hand, if the satisfaction according with the new criteria is not achievable, the reader is frustrated and in a position to change his/her paradigm. The reader will choose the paradigm that is the most suitable for achieving satisfaction. In this sense, frustrating irritants lead the reader via frustration towards satisfaction in another paradigm. Thus, the gravity of the frustrating irritant (i.e. the anomaly) has exercised the stronger force of attraction than the attraction at the centre of the old paradigm. In other words, the anomaly has proved to have the stronger field of cognitive gravity.

However, the relevance of the explicit context (i.e. the narrowest context) is not changeable for a given text. This is to say that in a given act of interpretation the reader interprets that text which is in the reader’s focus (e.g. Exod 16 in \textit{BHS} as the text I, the reader, have in my hands/in front of me/someone to read it for me). In this sense, the explicit meaning is always stable. However, the pragmatic

\textsuperscript{21} Conceptual closeness to a centre of meaning is indeed the essence of relevance. Thus also in Oxford dictionary for example, relevance is defined as ‘the quality or state of being closely connected or appropriate’. See ‘Relevance’ in \textit{Oxford Dictionary}, \url{http://www.en.oxforddictionaries.com} [accessed 30 May 2017].
context is directed towards a centre of meaning, which is not necessarily the
textual context. Thus, the social context of the ancient first recipients (e.g. wars
national, tribal, etc.), the personal psychological conditions of the writer (e.g.
dreams and similar), or the cognitive capabilities of a contemporary recipient
(e.g. knowledge of ancient Hebrew) are all examples of contexts related to
different centres of meaning.

So which is the centre of meaning towards which the meaning of a biblical text is
to gravitate? Which centre of meaning should be seen as the most relevant centre
in interpreter’s theory of meaning? In the light of these questions, the more a
theory of meaning is sensitive to the relevance of the centres of meaning within
the reader’s paradigm, the more the theory is suitable for explaining the reader’s
circularity in reasoning within that paradigm. There is thus a need for a theory of
relevance, in addition to a theory of paradigms and a theory of literature, as
explained before. These three types of theories need to be utilised in order to
develop a feasible theory of meaning. This leads to the final precise formulation
of the purpose of this thesis.

1.4 THE PURPOSE AND OUTLINE OF THIS THESIS

The final formulation of the purpose of this thesis is to develop a theory of
meaning which combines strong aspects of a theory of paradigms, a literary
theory, and a relevance theory in order to explain the following three issues:
firstly, the vicious circle in interpretation as a matter of (de)centralisation,
secondly, dissatisfaction as the force that drives the reader to reconsider his/her
paradigm and, thirdly, satisfaction as the force which keeps the reader satisfied
with the vicious circle of reasoning within his/her paradigm. The choice of the
three theories should be such that my theory of meaning is sensitive to the
reader’s centralisation and decentralisation in the process of interpretation of a
biblical text, the permeability of the text, and relevance of centres of meaning.

The purpose of this thesis demands the following three working stages: firstly,
outlining the theoretical basis for the solution I propose in this thesis (in Chapter
2), secondly, developing the theoretical model of interpretative relativity (the
The method I will outline at the end of Chapter 3 is in harmony with my theory of meaning. The method is the result of seven steps by which the reader’s understanding of the text changes as the conceptual distance between the interpreter and the text changes. In other words, the seven steps facilitate both the centralisation on the explicit/literal meaning of the text (by the first three steps), and the decentralisation on the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings provided by wider contexts than the text itself (by the last three steps). The seven steps are as follows:

1. Centralisation on aural divisions of the text.
2. Centralisation on visual divisions in the text.
3. Centralisation on dependence markers in the text.
4. Conclusion regarding the type of dependence between the texts.
5. Decentralisation towards the independent text.
6. Decentralisation towards the recipients.
7. Decentralisation towards other centres of meaning.

Accordingly, the first three steps centralise the reader’s focus whereas the last three steps decentralise it. The main outcome of the act of centralisation is apparent discrepancies in the text itself and gaps between the text and other ancient writings. In contrast, the main outcome of the decentralisation is the apparent coherency of the biblical writings as a whole, and clearer relationships between the biblical writings and non-biblical texts. The transitions from centralisation to decentralisation and from apparent discrepancies to apparent
coherence are achieved by following clues regarding relations of relevance and relations of dependence in the text itself. This process of analysing the clues regarding the relations between the centres of meaning is in fact a subjective perception of fields of cognitive gravity.

In order to experience the cognitive gravity, one has to recognise relations of relevance. Even more precisely, one has to recognise the special type of relevance which is the relation of dependence. By dependence, I mean ‘the state of relying on, or being controlled by, someone or something else’. In any process of interpretation of an utterance, relations of dependence contribute to the choice of context. Namely, the author’s choice of words (as well as all verbal and non-verbal elements in communication) is guided by the potential effect the author desires the utterance will have in the communication. This effect is dependent on the author’s and the recipient’s previous experience of other utterances, and in fact, on everything they have ever experienced. Every single functional discourse is functional primarily because of this ‘already known, and already experienced’ usage of language. In this sense, the relations of dependence are the most relevant relations in the process of communication.

The utterance upon which other utterances are dependent serves as a centre of cognitive gravity. Therefore, analysing the field of cognitive gravity which attracts the attention of the author is the ultimate purpose of interpretation. In addition, it is only by following those clues of dependence found in the text that the reader can be challenged to shift his/her paradigm. For example, if the reader concludes that a biblical text is written in order to support a certain worldview (i.e. the public formulation of a paradigm), the reader is thereby offered a choice to firstly accept or reject that worldview, and consequently the whole paradigm.

1.5 MY PRESUPPOSITIONS, INTERPRETATIVE PARADIGM AND METHOD

As explained above, I do not see that the conduit models of communication successfully explain the process of communication in general. Even less are those models capable of explaining biblical interpretation in particular. Thus, I presuppose that non-conduit models of communication are closer to the reality of communication as I experience it. Accordingly, I entertain postpositivist presuppositions with an always present uncertainty regarding any objectivity of my view of reality. The presupposition regarding the non-conduit models is the first one of seven. The following six presuppositions are directly or indirectly a consequence of the first one. First, there is a distinction between ‘faith’ and ‘belief’, second, they can be related to the Scriptures, third, every interpretation is always subject to the reader’s paradigm, fourth, the Scriptures are speech acts in a written form, fifth, they are part of a communicative process, and sixth, the process is aimed at the maximum effectiveness in the communication. I will here explain each of them.

My second basic presupposition is based on a distinction I make between the terms ‘faith’ and ‘belief’. Faith is a matter of choice. In other words, every human being has the freedom to be ‘open’ or ‘closed’ to committing him/herself to a possible tenet of belief. Even though the difference between faith and belief may not be present in every language, it is still useful (if not essential) to make the distinction when attempting to clarify the problem of the vicious circle in biblical interpretation as the focus of this thesis. Accordingly, faith is a cognitive choice of willingness to be open towards a belief. Belief is, in contrast, the tenet to which a person of faith can subscribe. Therefore, faith can be only of one type, whilst every individual can have it to a certain degree, or simply lack it. In contrast to the one type of faith, different beliefs have different tenets, so that

23 Both Oxford and Merriam-Webster dictionaries use ‘faith’ and ‘belief’ interchangeably, since this is how the terms are used in everyday English. Nevertheless, I suggest, there is a difference between the two, which I try to express by the suggested definitions. The slight difference is useful for clarifying the problem this thesis addresses.
there is always a plethora of possible tenets/beliefs to which a person of faith can subscribe.

Furthermore, my third working presupposition is that belief, in this case in Hebrew and Christian spheres, is a matter of information, that is, in some way, related to the phenomenon of the canon of Scriptures (Hebrew and Christian, respectively). From this point on I will use the terms like canon, Scriptures and the Bible generically, so that, for example, ‘the Bible’ covers all the particular Bibles in the two respective traditions. Accordingly, when a particular form of the Bible, Scriptures, or canon is meant, I will denote it with additional attributes (for example, Hebrew or Greek Bible/Scriptures/canon). In these terms a belief (that is the tenet of belief one subscribes to) can be ‘canonical’ or ‘non-canonical’. (Faith, on the other hand, cannot be, since it is a choice to believe, according to the definition above.)

Accordingly, I presuppose that attempts to canonise a set of religious writings in Christian and Jewish communities took place in order to help a community of faith to maintain and nurture its faith (choice to believe) by nurturing the tenets of belief. Consequently, the phenomenon of a developing an eventually closed list of authoritative books forming the canon of Scriptures in the community of believers was meant to serve the purpose of an unchangeable constant in the

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24 In those terms, my understanding is that there are more and less successfully developed tenets of beliefs. In other words, it seems to me that the followings biblical texts suggest that scriptures were meant to be used in order to support and control development of the tenet of the belief: Genesis 9.11-17; Exodus 3.13; 12.25-27; 16.32-34; 34.27; Numbers 17.10; Joshua 4.1-7, etc.

theological universe acknowledged by the community. In this way the Scriptures adopted by a religious community shape the identity of the community. This shaping of the community starts when the community recognises a compilation of writings as authoritative in any possible way. The process of shaping the community takes place during the process of canonisation, as well as after the closure of the canon, and even when the process of canonisation never becomes finalised in the community.

More specifically, in order to define and clarify the tenet of their belief, people have been interpreting the now canonical texts throughout the long history of biblical interpretation in both Judaism and Christianity, the tradition which in fact started even before the respective religious communities attempted to close the canon(s). However, since no systematic exposition of the tenet of canonical belief is found in canonical writings, the interpretation of the writings has been a complex endeavour.

Therefore, I do not see that the field of study in this thesis is an issue of faith, because there is both freedom to believe and a need for belief within each of the

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26 I find it helpful to compare and contrast the relation between a closed list of authoritative books, that is of a canon of Scriptures and ‘other’ writings with the relation between the speed of light and the other base units, like for example measurements of length and mass. Einstein ‘realised’ that the fundamental unit of measure in the universe is the speed of light, whilst measurements of length and mass are relative. Thus, it was only after Einstein’s contribution that the metre was defined in relation to the speed of light and not in relation to another unit of length. The same way, I suggest, for the community of believers who have adopted a certain set of writings as unchangeable, these writings become the constant fundamental unit of measure in their theological universe.

interpretative paradigms. That is to say that even once a choice to believe in relation to the Bible is made, the complex issue of the tenet of the belief still remains to be solved in each of the interpretative paradigms.

As explained above, in accordance with the non-conduit models of communication, my fourth working presupposition is that interpretative paradigms, from within which interpreters perceive the world as a whole (and the canonical texts as a part of that world), influence/determine the method used in interpreting the canonical texts and consequently influence the content ‘read’ out of the texts. In this sense, methods of interpretation which are not concerned with the interpreter’s paradigm indeed follow the vicious circles of reasoning.

My fifth working presupposition is that the biblical text is part of a speech act, whereas every speech act consists of spheres of communication characteristic of specific areas of human activity. Furthermore, these spheres of communication have their specific conditions and goals according to which compositional structure, style and content of the utterances in that sphere are shaped. As Bakhtin has suggested, ‘Each sphere in which the language is used develops its own relatively stable type of the utterances’ (i.e. genres). 28

Furthermore, based on the previous presupposition that the Bible is part of a speech act, my sixth presupposition is that the Bible is part of a communication between writer/author, text/speech, recipients/addressee, and superaddressee (as proposed by Bakhtin). 29 The superaddressee is an implied addressee, personified in the author’s consciousness, since it is presupposed that there can be a difference between the original public/recipient of the biblical text and the recipient imagined by the author of the text.

Finally, my seventh presupposition is that ‘all human beings automatically aim at the most efficient information processing possible’, as claimed by Dan Sperber

28 Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, ed. by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, Slavic Series (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1986), pp. 60, 80.
This means that, on the one hand, the relevance of a thought/concept/assumption is directly proportional to its impact on the context in which the reasoning takes place. On the other hand, the relevance of a thought/concept/assumption is indirectly proportional to the effort required to process it.  

These seven presuppositions of mine are the basis from which I will develop my theory of meaning and apply it to reading the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif in Exod 16. As explained earlier, the initial presupposition regarding communication as non-conduit is indeed the point of departure to all the other presuppositions and this thesis as a whole. I am aware that if I had adopted the presupposition that conduit models of communication do reflect the state of affairs in reality, this thesis would have been developed in another direction, namely towards basic expectations of readers in the positivist paradigm. However, the positivist paradigm does not square with my understanding of the reality.

My interpretative paradigm is variously labelled as postpositivist, constructivist or interpretivist. ‘In this interpretive framework, qualitative researchers seek understanding of the world in which they live and work. They develop subjective meanings of their experiences—meanings directed toward certain objects or things’.  

The research method I will follow in this thesis is usually labelled as logical inductivism blended with deductivism. The process undertaken in this thesis is an inductive (i.e. grounded) theory development since it begins with my basic

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30 Sperber, p. 49.  
31 Ibid., p. 125.  
dissatisfaction with the solutions offered by conduit models of communication. However, it is not a purely inductive process since I work with the three theories I have a priori adopted as the framework within which I develop my theory of meaning. Even so, it is indeed a qualitative enquiry aimed to achieve phenomenological validity, in contrast to statistic results in a quantitative research.34 This phenomenological validity is postpositivist, concerned with the possibility for recognition of same experience by others, and should not be misunderstood as positivist, directly knowable, and empirically testable.35

1.6 MY CHOICE OF THE THEORETICAL TOOLS

As explained above, my three approaches to the issue of the vicious circle in biblical interpretation evokes the idea that a feasible theory of meaning should be developed by utilising tools provided by a theory of paradigms, a theory of literature, and a theory of relevance.

Firstly, I have chosen the theory of paradigms proposed by Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996), since it is indeed a response to the positivist theory of growth of knowledge, as well as to the critical rationalism proposed by Karl Popper (1902-1994). The Popperian theory of paradigms and refined versions of that theory proposed by Imre Lakatos (1922-1974) or Ian Barbour (1923-2013) are thus postpositivist alternatives to Kuhn’s theory. Even though my choice of the Kuhnian theory is a priori, I will compare and contrast Kuhn’s paradigm with Popper’s in Chapter 2. I will thus show that it is only the irritants one sees in one or the alternative explanation of the reality which makes one prefer one theory over the other. In other words, if one would try to show that the conduit model of communication is indeed more coherent with the reality, would it not be just another example of how coherency with one’s understanding of the reality

34 ‘The sign of a good qualitative research study is that the analysis provides a new and compelling interpretation of a text. By new, we mean novel, unique, and engaging. By compelling, we mean logical and supported by rich descriptive examples that persuade the reader to adopt the researcher’s interpretation of the text.’ (Vanderstoep, p. 169-70.) (The italics are the author’s.)

35 For more on the difference between positivist and postpositivist/postmodern phenomenology see: Robert C. Bogdan, and Sari Knopp Biklen, Qualitative Research for Education: An Introduction to Theory and Methods. 5th edn (Boston, MA: Pearson, 2007), p. 33-34.
satisfies one’s expectations related to communication within that reality? In this sense, such an attempt would only support Kuhn’s theory of paradigms (and my fourth basic presupposition above).

The Kuhnian theory has already been shown to be a feasible theory for qualitative enquiry within humanities. One example of such research is Marko Lukic’s thesis on the development of the Seventh-day Adventists’ understanding of their identity. I will add to Lukic’s findings in order to apply the Kuhnian theory to the specific requirements of this thesis.

The second theory I will integrate in my theory of meaning is Bakhtin’s literary criticism. As shown above, for the purpose of this thesis, I do require a theory developed with the presupposed permeability of language. In this sense, Bakhtin’s version of Russian formalism is the best choice to meet the needs of this thesis. In addition, Bakhtinian literary criticism is a reaction to Saussure’s structuralist version of conduit model of communication. Accordingly, Bakhtinian theory is compatible with the purpose of this thesis.

Furthermore, on the one hand, classical Russian formalism (concerned primarily with the form of language as the locus of meaning) would probably provide similar sensitivity to the form of the language and enable me to read the biblical text closely. In contrast, philosophical hermeneutical theories as for example those of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), Wolfgang Iser (1926-2007), and even Martin Buber (1878-1965) would have enabled me to be more sensitive to dialectic (i.e. philosophical aspects) of the text. In my opinion, the Bakhtinian approach to literature combines the best of both alternatives, both a close reading of the text and a philosophical approach to it. The permeability of language is the tool which combines these two alternatives into a holistic approach required for this thesis.

Finally, I will incorporate into my theory of meaning Sperber and Wilson’s theory of relevance. I explained above that my understanding of the topic of vicious circle in interpretation can indeed be seen as a matter of relevance.
Sperber and Wilson’s theory of relevance is the first one to be developed as a theory of meaning/hermeneutics with this concern with relevance.

However, the theory of relevance has faced much criticism. One of the principal criticisms is based on the circular reasoning in one of its premises. Specifically, that the effectiveness of an utterance is directly proportional to the number of contextual effects, and contra proportional to the cost of effort involved in obtaining it. The circularity is perceived in that the contextual effect is measured according to the relevance, which (relevance) is calculated according to the contextual effect. In addition to this circularity, one of the main obstacles to the utilisation of the theory of relevance in biblical interpretation is that it is indeed based on the context in which communication takes place. How can such a context-based theory be applied to reading a biblical text, when so little is known regarding the specific context in which the text originated?

I agree that all these challenges make the theory of relevance insufficient on its own. However, as part of a composite theory of meaning, the theory of relevance will provide some critical tools for focusing on relations of dependence in the biblical text. As with the Kuhnian and Bakhtinian theories, the theory of relevance has also been used earlier in biblical interpretations. In particular, I will follow up David Ryan Klingler’s adaptations of the theory of relevance, in order to fully integrate this theory into my theory of meaning.

In addition to these logical reasons I see for choosing these three theories (of paradigms, literature and relevance) in this thesis, I retain the freedom of postpositivist/constructivist qualitative enquiry. In other words, this enquiry has to maintain the tenet of a heuristic enquiry based on logic initiated by intuition.

1.7 MY CHOICE OF THE ZOOM LENS MODEL

The vastly abstract complexity of the problem of the vicious circle in biblical interpretation makes developing a model vital. A model is, by definition, a visual, descriptive or analogical representation of something otherwise too complex, impossible, or difficult to be directly observed. In this thesis, I will develop a model in order to facilitate an understanding of the problem of the vicious circle and a possible solution to the problem. My choice of this particular model is based on the characteristic of the zoom lens to centralise and decentralise one’s view.

The model is called ‘the hermeneutical zoom lens model’ since it is based on the way an actual zoom lens is capable of zooming in and out and thus changing the way reality is seen through the lens. In this model the changes in the perception of reality are based on two different processes: first, zooming in or out, and second, moving the camera closer to, or further away, from the subject in focus. Thus, firstly, the wider the zoom, the more of the field of reality is seen, whilst, zooming in allows one to see more details of the object in focus, but at the expense of more of the reality being left out of the view.

Secondly, the relative distance between the camera and the object in focus plays a critical role in the perception of the distance between the object and its background, producing the so called ‘telephoto effect’. More precisely, the space/gap between the object in focus and its background is perceived as bigger when the relative distance between the camera and the object is shorter. Here the relative distance is the ratio between the distance between the camera and the object in focus and the distance between the object and its background (achieved by moving the camera closer to the object in focus).

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38 There are, of course, other senses in which the term ‘model’ can be used, but this is how I will use it in this thesis. This is thus my definition, which is in line with definitions found in dictionaries, like for example in: ‘Model’ in Business Dictionary, <http://www.businessdictionary.com/> [accessed 19 February 2018].
In contrast, the bigger the relative distance between the camera and the object in focus (achieved by moving the camera away from the subject), the smaller the gap between the object and its background appears to be. Because of this relative vision of reality, through the zoom lens, the model can also be called the model of interpretative relativity. That is to say that every comprehension of a view/vision of reality is indeed an interpretation of reality. Since the model shows how that interpretation changes, the model is undeniably a model of interpretative relativity.

1.8 THE ZOOM LENS AND THE THEORY OF INTERPRETATIVE RELATIVITY

The difference between textual, pragmatic and paradigmatic meanings, dealt with above, needs to be explained here in the context of interpretative relativity. As I explained above, the textual meaning does not change for a given text. This is how the text reads. In the zoom lens model, this fundamental characteristic of the text is represented by an inert object in focus.

Since this theory is based on this one inevitably inert, invariant object (whilst the camera and its zoom lens may change/move), the theory can be named the theory of invariance. One can monitor changes in the background and the environment around the object in focus, only after one has established/recognised inert objects. The essence of this theory of meaning is thus seen in what does not change in the process of interpretation. Only secondarily is the theory concerned with what changes in that process. The effect of the difference between inertness (of not movable objects) and dynamics (of the objects in motion) is thus, the essence of the zoom lens model.

In addition to the non-changeable textual meaning, I explained above that pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings do change and are subject to the reader’s paradigm and the given context of reading. Those changes of pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings are represented in the zoom lens model by the apparent changes of the distance between the subject in focus and its background. However, this effect takes place only when both the zoom lens and the whole camera (i.e. the photographer) move towards or further away
from the subject in focus. In other words, if both the zoom lens and the camera
are moving, the telephoto effect takes place and the model represents the general
case of the theory of interpretative relativity. In contrast, if only the zoom lens
moves while the camera (i.e. the photographer) is inert, there is no telephoto
effect and the model describes the special case of this general theory. In this
sense, one can make this essential distinction between the special and the general
theory of interpretative relativity.

The only effect taking place according to the model explaining the special theory
is that by changing the zoom (i.e. by movements of the zoom lens) the
photographer’s scope of the view changes. The wider the zoom, the more of the
field of reality is seen, whilst, zooming in allows one to see more details of the
object in focus, but at the expense of more of the reality being left out of the
view.

This special theory rarely represents a typical process of interpretation of a text in
reality. It is possible in theory, only in cases when the reader cannot understand
anything of what he/she reads in the text. That is to say that the reader cannot
cognitively approach the text. The reader knows the literal meaning, but does not
comprehend what pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings could be.
This is the rare, special case.

In contrast, when the reader is focused on reading a given text, but also
understands it and cognitively comes closer to it, this process is represented by
moving the camera closer to the subject in focus. This movement decreases the
distance, for example, from (distance to subject) S1=300 cm to S2=2 cm. If the
distance between the subject in focus and its background (distance to
background) B is 10cm, the ratio between these two (R1=B/S1=10/300) is 0,03.
Whereas when the camera is close to the subject in focus, the ratio
(R2=B/S2=10/2) is 5. This change in relative distance between the camera and
the subject in focus makes the gap between the subject in focus and its
background appear bigger. Hence this is a case of centralisation not only on the
subject in focus, but also on the gaps between the subject and its background.
This is analogous when in biblical interpretation the reader becomes more familiar with the details of a text. The reader at the same time becomes acquainted with the gaps and incoherencies between the text and its background. Conversely, when the camera moves away from the subject, the gap between the subject and the background appears smaller and more coherent. This is paralleled with the reader’s experience of seeing the Bible as more coherent once the biblical text is compared to its wider context.

For example, the laws in Pentateuch look more coherent when they are interpreted in the context of the law of Hammurabi. The same way that, the cosmogony in Genesis 1-2 seems more coherent and meaningful when compared with other ANE cosmogonies. In this sense, the theory of interpretative relativity explains why the textual context and meaning are perceived by the close reading of the text, whereas the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings are perceived essentially by distancing from the text, i.e. by looking at the text in its wider context.

1.9 LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS OF THIS THESIS

Firstly, this thesis is not an exegetical enquiry. In fact, the exegesis/interpretation of the biblical text in Chapter 4 is seen only as an illustration of the theory of meaning developed in the previous chapters. Along the same line of reasoning, the exegesis is not meant to compare and contrast my results of the exegesis with the results of others. Any comparison will be only illustrative. The nature of my research question both demands and justifies this limitation. In other words, looking for a new theory and model that might explain the usually unavoidable vicious reasoning in biblical interpretation limits the need to compare the outcomes of my theory, model and method to the outcomes of other theories, models and methods. I plan to show that the new theory of meaning and the zoom lens model are feasible, and not that the outcomes of my theory are similar or dissimilar from the outcomes of other theories, models and methods (even though I assume that sometimes the outcomes will be indeed similar and other times they will be dissimilar).
Consequently, potential similarities and dissimilarities between particular readings do not provide an answer to my research question. In addition, any attempt to compare outcomes of my reading to outcomes of any other reading will logically impose a question as to which exegesis mine should be compared. The most decentralised reading? A less decentralised reading among the non-conduit models of interpretation? Or should it be compared to the findings of a conduit model? An attempt to answer these questions would demand a totally different concept of research, and the outcome of it would still not provide an answer to the research question of this thesis. Therefore, my valid research question, does not require broader dialogue with other interpretative theories, models, methods and their outcomes.

Accordingly, this thesis is not an enquiry into the history of interpretation. My limited analysis of different approaches to the Bible will be presented in Chapter 3 with a focus on changes which took place from the Age of Enlightenment to the present. Additional reasons for this focus are the following: first, the majority of changes and proliferation of differences among different methods occurred within this timespan; second, the changes that took place in this time span seem to be common to both Jewish and Christian tradition.39

Secondly, in Chapter 4, I will apply the theory, the model and the method I have developed to a reading of the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ in Exodus 16.23,25. There are several reasons for choosing this particular motif as a case study for my research. Primarily, it is a motif that is common to both Jewish and Christian traditions. As a part of the Decalogue, it is often recognised as one of the central motifs in both traditions. Nonetheless, the motif is understood as a source for often very different practices among the believers in the different traditions. This wide spectrum of understanding should provide a good test for the explanatory capabilities of my theory.

39 These changes, common for both Jewish and Christian tradition is the main outcome of a dialogue (between the two traditions) that developed around the common interest in philosophy and sciences at the time. See Ronald L. Eisenberg, JPS Guide to Jewish Traditions (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 2004), p. 496.
Exodus 16 is a text written in a narrative genre. There are however six other instances when the same motif is used in the Pentateuch (Exodus 20.8-11; 31.15-17; 35.2; Leviticus 23.3, 38; 25.2, 4; Deuteronomy 5.14). The scope of this thesis cannot be extended to include these texts in legal genre. However, I suggested that such an enquiry should be done in the near future. Such an enquiry would further demonstrate the flexibility and feasibility of my theory, model and method. My analysis of the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif in Exodus 16 will thus be limited to and suited for fulfilling the purpose of this research, as outlined above.

Thirdly, I will limit my focus to the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif. Accordingly, other dialogic overtones will be analysed only to the extent needed for fulfilling the purpose of this study.

Fourthly, I will limit my use of the three ‘pillar’ theories (Kuhn’s theory of paradigms, Bakhtin’s literary theory, and Sperber and Wilson’s theory of relevance) to what is essential for fulfilling the purpose outlined above.

Finally, I will exercise the freedom to adapt Kuhnian and Bakhtinian theories in order to develop my method of reading the Bible (which is still going to be essentially both Kuhnian and Bakhtinian). As a result, I will continue ‘tuning’ the two theories so that they, together with the theory of relevance, become a more compact whole, feasible for its application in this field of theological enquiry. I believe that building on, for example, Lukic’s application of Kuhnian theory of paradigms does not deviate from Kuhn’s theory, but even enriches it and proves the genius of its depth.

1.10 IMPORTANCE OF THIS THESIS

First, the principal importance of this thesis is its explanatory nature. Our understanding of when, why and how our interpretation follows a vicious circle affects our view of personal and collective knowledge about the Bible.

Second, the pioneering character of the research is important. Namely, while Bakhtin’s literary theory has been applied to biblical studies so far, I have not
come across a work which combines Kuhnian theory, Bakhtinian theory, and Sperber and Wilson’s theory of relevance. There is, however, some research, which has come close to the field of study of this thesis, but that research has utilised only one of the theories, while overlooking the other two.40

Third, the LORD’s Sabbath motif in Exodus is common to both the Christian and the Jewish Bibles. Accordingly, the outcomes of the research should provide advancement in promoting a better dialogue between the two religions.

Fourth, the outcomes of this research limited only to the narrative in Exodus 16 should serve as a basis for future application of my theory of meaning in the legal texts. There is thus, a potential for this research to impact the studies in judicial interpretation in general.

Fifth, my focus in this thesis is on developing my theory of meaning. This theory can later be used for analysing earlier interpretations of a text. Thus, this thesis is important for the potential effect it can have in the realm of history of interpretation.

Sixth, my understanding of context as a cognitive environment or sphere may shed new light on the research in the field of signed languages in general and use of signing space in particular. In other words, my theory of meaning approaches signed and spoken languages as one whole. This thesis can thus contribute to the understanding of these languages.

Seventh, my approach to a given text as an articulation of a paradigm can be applied to scientific texts with quantitative data as well. As a result, both qualitative and quantitative data can be seen as expressions of a paradigm, in line

with the Kuhnian theory of paradigms. In this sense, this thesis contributes to the view where qualitative and quantitative enquiries are parts of one whole.

Finally, since ‘Wittgensteinian fideism’\textsuperscript{41} has been shown to fall short of the ideals, it seems to me that this dialogical aspect of my theory is essential in order to communicate the biblical views in the contemporary age where one or another form of postpositivist interpretative paradigm is often the common platform for communication.

CHAPTER 2: THE THEORETICAL TOOLS

This and the following two Chapters constitute the method part of the thesis. The purpose of this Chapter is, firstly, to introduce the dynamics of Kuhnian paradigm, secondly, to introduce the possible centres of meaning (i.e. a source of information available to the recipient of an utterance regarding specific characteristics of the utterance), thirdly, to introduce the Bakhtinian dialogism and finally, to introduce the theory of relevance. By this, I plan to provide the tools necessary for developing the theory of meaning, the purpose of the subsequent Chapter 3.

2.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE DYNAMICS OF THE KUHNIAN PARADIGM

The choice to utilise the Kuhnian theory of paradigms in this thesis is not arbitrary. I am aware of the contributions made by Barbour in the second half of the twentieth century, who showed that both scientific and religious reasoning takes place within paradigms to which humans subscribe and within which they function.¹ The differences between the two types of reasoning (e.g. the degree of objectivity, tightly or loosely established criteria in sciences and religion, respectively, etc.) do not diminish the essential similarities between the two.²

Accordingly, Barbour’s contribution to our understanding of paradigms was to bridge the gap previously seen as dividing the scientific and religious fields of enquiry. After this bridge was established, revolutions within sciences became comparable with the shifts taking place within religious milieu. Moreover, similar tools of criticism started to be applied in both fields of human endeavour.³

² See Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms, pp. 142-45.
³ See, for example, Küng’s rendering of Christian history as sequence of six paradigms (apocalyptic/primitive Christianity, Hellenistic/patristic, medieval Roman Catholic, Protestant/reformation, modern enlightenment, and emerging ecumenical paradigm). Hans Küng, Paradigm Change in Theology: A Symposium for the Future, trans. by Margaret Kohl (New York,
proposal Barbour made for ‘critical realism’ as an interpretative paradigm for
enquiry in both humanities and sciences is, in fact, an adaptation of, and a follow-
up to, Imre Lakatos’s proposal for a ‘research programme’, which, yet again, is
an adaptation of, and a follow-up to the work of Karl Popper, within the same
field of study. These adaptations applied to the Popperian theory are directed
toward applications of the theory on the gap between the extremes of naive
realism and that of phenomenalism (thus also between positivism and nihilism) in
the process of human reasoning. In contrast, my thesis takes a different route
aimed at understanding the vicious circle in biblical interpretation, which I
explained above as a matter of both the possible centres of meaning and
(de)centralisation in the process of interpretation. In what follows, I will argue
that even though Barbour’s contributions are significant, it is the Kuhnian theory
that provides the essential tools for fulfilling the purpose of this study. Thus,

NY: Crossroad, 1989). Ever since, the ‘paradigm’ became one of the terms undividable from
theological milieu, both Christian and Jewish. See, for example, Gordon J. Spykman,
Reformational Theology: A New Paradigm for Doing Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
1992); Theology as Science in Nineteenth-Century Germany, ed. by Johannes Zachhuber,
Changing Paradigms in Historical and Systematic Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013). The whole of the series is an ample example of utilisation of theories of paradigms to
historical theology. In Jewish milieu, Holocaust/Shoah has been the central theme that clustered
research with implicit and explicit applications of paradigm theories. See for example, Gunnar
Heinsohn, Warum Auschwitz? Hitlers Plan und die Ratiolsigkeit der Nachwelt (Reinbek bei
Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1995); Esther Benbassa, Suffering as Identity: The Jewish Paradigm, trans.
by G. M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2010); Irving Greenberg, ‘Theology after the Shoah: The
4 Imre Lakatos, ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, in
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the
Philosophy of Science, London 1965, Volume 4 ed. by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965; repr. 1970), pp. 91-180 (p. 179). See also the
roots of his research program as aimed at graded truth and not at absolute truth of a theorem,
leading thus to survival of the theorem until a new counterexample is met. This is a much softer
understanding of scientific progress, compared to Kuhn’s revolutions. See Imre Lakatos,
Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1976); Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Vienna: Springer, 1935; repr. London:
Routledge Classics, 2002).
5 See his five models of God (monarch, clock-maker, dialogic, agent/divine organism, and process
model) in Ian Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms: A Comparative Study in Science and
Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), pp. 156-70. Also his four ways of relating science
and religion (conflict, independence, dialogue, integration) leading to his conclusion about critical
realism as the most viable option. Ian Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and
For his criticism of the Kuhnian theory see Chapter six in Barbour, Myths, Models and
Paradigms.
whilst I will enter into a dialogue with Barbour’s work,\(^6\) the choice of the Kuhnian theory for a pillar theory in my research is justified by the tools it provides. Thus, presenting the Kuhnian theory and context of its conflict with Popperian theory is the obvious next step.

Kuhn published his theory in its fully developed form in his book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* in 1962. At the time, his revolutionary philosophical theory of sciences and the way science ‘works’ stood in direct opposition to the alternative philosophy of science, advocated by Popper. The critical question on which the conflict was based was whether an objective understanding of data exists. Popper (as a critical rationalist) stood closer to positivism then Kuhn. Popper argued that scientific data is based on objective measurements, which are an intrinsic part of the studied phenomena, and thus able to lead researchers towards analyses of the data. Popper argued that those analyses are thus independent from the researchers’ presuppositions regarding the phenomena. Conversely, Kuhn argued that any such scientific endeavour, independent from scientists’ presuppositions, is not possible, since every analysis of apparently objective data is a method that is developed according to the presuppositions entertained by the scientists.

Furthermore, Kuhn made a fundamental distinction between normal/regular science (science ‘proper’) and the extraordinary scientific achievements, which serve as the trigger of shifts in science on the level of its basic principles. These changes in understanding and explaining the fundamental principles in sciences are called scientific revolutions. Thus, in contrast to the scientific revolutions stands regular science with its regular scientific research, that is the research that ‘fits’ the presuppositions entertained by the scientific community. In what follows, I will further explain the difference between regular and revolutionary science.

\(^6\) I will discuss Barbour’s influence on N. T. Wright’s method in particular in Section 3.7.1.4 below.
2.1.1 Nature of Regular Science

In order to present Kuhn’s theory of regular science in the clearest possible way, I will contrast Kuhn’s with Popper’s theory of regular science. Thus, each of the characteristics of the Popperian theory will be contrasted with corresponding characteristics of the Kuhnian theory.

2.1.1.1 Testing vs. Puzzle Solving

According to Popper, scientific observation (testing) comes before a theory. In other words, Popper claimed that testing is an activity, which can be done in a kind of a vacuum freed from scientists’ presuppositions or without a philosophical system as a context. The outcome of the testing is thus a set of data that is objective and which can become a basis for a developing a new theory.

In contrast, Kuhn sees testing as an activity, which always happens within a philosophical system/theory. There is no possibility for an observation (testing in its simplest form) to take place in a theoretical vacuum. In other words, every testing is in fact a puzzle solving process, in which the rules of the game have been set in place even before the test starts. Thus, the theory which provides the context (adopted and applied either consciously or unconsciously) makes the problem tangible and approachable and the collection and articulation of the data possible and, finally, an explanation achievable. However, in all the cases, testing is not more than puzzle solving for which the scientists must presuppose a currently accepted theory as the rules of his/her game. Accordingly, Kuhn argued, ‘These trial attempts, whether by the chess player or by the scientist, are trials only of themselves, not of the rules of the game.’

2.1.1.2 Learning from Mistakes vs. Outdating a Paradigm

Furthermore, Popper and Kuhn argued about the nature and role of the failures or mistakes, which a scientific enquiry can come across. On the one hand, Popper

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argued that a scientist is open to learning from his/her mistakes along the process of the scientific enquiry.\textsuperscript{9} Thus, the scientific enquiry is seen as a process in which the theory itself is challenged and seen as the ultimate target of the scientific enquiry.

On the other hand, Kuhn argued, responding to Popper, that a scientist is open to learning from his/her mistakes throughout the process of his/her scientific enquiry only because his/her own skills to solve the puzzle are challenged. In other words, it is never the scientific theory which is challenged in normal science. The scientific theory is always presupposed as correct and something the scientist must use as a way of solving the puzzle he/she is facing, in order to remain scientific. Consequently, if the scientist ventured to question the generally accepted scientific theory, without an objective reason for that (for the acceptable reasons, see 2.1.3. below), he/she would become non-scientific. The nature of normal science is not to question the theory, but only the scientist’s skill to solve the problem within the generally accepted theory.

Accordingly, Kuhn argued that the only time a theory is truly challenged is when there is no other way to explain a phenomenon within the generally accepted scientific theory, so that the scientist is compelled to question the generally accepted fundamental principles. As Kuhn argued, this situation does not occur during the process of normal science, but only when a scientific revolution takes place.

2.1.1.3 Inductivism vs. Deductivism

That a scientific enquiry is a deductive process is the only major common element in the two opposing theories (Popper’s and Kuhn’s).\textsuperscript{10} However, according Kuhn, a truly deductive process is feasible only as the normal science, that is when the starting premises and theories are not under question, but accepted rightly as the starting axioms of the deductive scientific enquiry. Accordingly, normal science can never take the direction of an inductive process.

\textsuperscript{9} See Kuhn, ‘Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?’, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{10} See ibid., pp. 12,14.
The moment science in general takes the inductive direction, it starts challenging the supposedly correct theory, and becomes a scientific revolution, and not normal science, Kuhn argued.

However, since the Popperian theory of normal sciences makes no difference between normal science and scientific revolution, it cannot solve the obvious problem of the way the deductive process can be combined with the supposedly inductive outcomes of the scientific enquiry. Because of this unawareness of the critical difference (i.e. normal science vs scientific revolution) in Popper’s theory, Kuhn suggested that Popper be treated as ‘a naive falsificationist’.11

2.1.1.4 The Logic of Knowledge vs. the Observation Ideology

Since Popper does not differentiate between normal science and scientific revolution, he needs to claim that there is ‘the logic of knowledge’ according to which an observation can and must be ‘logically deduced’ from the knowledge itself.12

Conversely, Kuhn argues that this assertion about the logic of knowledge stands in opposition to the basic scientific rule (with which Popper agrees as well), that ‘to be scientific a theory need be falsifiable only by an observation statement, not by actual observation’.13 Since Popper argues that theories need to be challenged by actual observation, as if a kind of objective knowledge exists which provides the logic according to which observation statements need to be deduced, Popperian logic is called by Kuhn ‘an ideology’, whilst Popperian methodological rules are seen as ‘procedural maxims’.14

2.1.1.5 Scientific Theories vs. Paradigms

All the arguments described above make it clear that Popper’s claim that scientific theories are logically deduced from actual observations does not really hold up. On the other hand, Kuhn’s claim that all the observation statements are

12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p. 15.
deduced not from pure observations, but from the generally accepted theories, seems to me the only feasible theory of the way normal/proper science ‘works’. Accordingly, Kuhn suggested replacing the term ‘scientific theory’ with the term ‘paradigm’. This would, according to Kuhn, make clearer the superiority of the paradigm over the observation process.  

2.1.1.6 Scientific Features of a Theological Enquiry

A scientific theory is thus a paradigm, which needs concrete examples that can bridge gaps between the specific content of knowledge (specifically known phenomena) and the new phenomena to which study the theory is to be applied. Also, the term ‘scientific’ does not mean inductive from a certain objective set of data (as in positivism), nor is it logically deductive, following a presupposed ‘logic of knowledge’ (as in Popperianism). In contrast, it simply means that there are certain criteria which serve as a system for grading methods as correct or incorrect. Accordingly, Marko Lukic’s Illustration 1 below, visualises the relations between three aspects of a paradigm (i.e. metaphysical, sociological and methodological aspects).

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16 Kuhn, ‘Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?’, p. 16. See especially Kuhn’s example with swans in ibid., pp. 16-19.
17 Ibid., p. 2.
Illustration 1: Lukic’s Circular Reasoning Characteristic for the Normal Science Mode

The metaphysical aspect of a paradigm is the set of presuppositions according to which the reality is understood as a whole. The illustration visualises that this aspect of the paradigm is the starting point of the circular reasoning within the normal/proper science. In addition, the illustration also shows that the process of reasoning in the normal science does not challenge the metaphysical aspect of the paradigm, but is even aimed at securing it. In other words, everything that is thought and done according to circular reasoning (within normal science), is done in harmony with the metaphysical aspect of the paradigm. Consequently, circular reasoning cannot challenge or change the paradigm.

Thus, the sociological aspect of the paradigm is subject to the metaphysical. Hence, communities gravitate around sets of presuppositions regarding the
reality. In this sense, any community can be described by the set of presuppositions to which the members of the community subscribe.

Finally, the methodological aspect of the paradigm is the pattern (i.e. matrix) which provides the context for concrete problem solving. In other words, every given community will have its set of methods applicable to concrete problem-solving situations. This set of methods is the methodological aspect of the paradigm. When these methods are used, they provide more and more concrete solutions. All these solutions have the accumulative effect of supporting the initially accepted set of presuppositions regarding the reality. In this way, the metaphysical aspect of the paradigm governs the other two aspects. They in turn produce the sociological and methodological context that supports the initial metaphysical presuppositions.

If one accepts this understanding of the normal science as the closed circle of reasoning, the theological enquiry can be seen as scientific. More precisely, if the Scriptures are seen as a source of theological knowledge, they can serve as criteria for religious reasoning. In other words, the scientific nature of the reasoning is in that case based on the use of the Scriptures as the criterion for the accuracy of the reasoning. Consequently, the reasoning is established within a ‘self-correcting mechanism’ (that is within the regular science), which serves to ‘set things right when they go wrong’. The enquiry thus has the essential characteristic for any scientific enquiry within the range of the normal science.

2.1.2 Nature of the Kuhnian Paradigm

Kuhn himself has not defined the term ‘paradigm’, but instead used the term in some 21 different ways in his seminal work. It was Margaret Masterman who analysed the different contexts in which Kuhn used the term ‘paradigm’ and distinguished three main types of the contexts: the context of metaphysics, the context of sociological factors which influence the way the science is done, and

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19 See Masterman, p. 60.
20 It was Masterman herself who counted the different ways Kuhn used the term paradigm. See Ibid.
finally the context of the available scientific methodology itself. These three contexts define the three different aspects of the Kuhnian paradigm (also seen on Illustration 1 above): metaphysical, sociological and methodological.

In using the term ‘aspect’ of a paradigm, I follow Lukic, who prefers it to other terms, such as for example, ‘elements’ or ‘basic paradigms’. This is because the term ‘aspect’ denotes both the realms in which the paradigm can be expressed and the constituents of which the paradigm is made. Yet again, I find it most helpful to use another illustration created by Lukic (Illustration 2).  

![Illustration 2: Lukic’s Kuhnian Paradigm and its Aspects](image)

I will provide a more detailed explanation of this illustration in the following three subsections.

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21 Lukic, p. 395.
2.1.2.1 The Metaphysical Aspect and The Worldview

The metaphysical aspect of a paradigm is an implicit ‘set of beliefs about reality’. Even though the metaphysical aspect on this illustration above is visualised as the top of the construction, the metaphysical aspect functions as the most basic and most critical aspect of the paradigm. In other words, since every paradigm aims at accommodating a deductive and not inductive process of reasoning, the most basic aspect of the paradigm is experienced as the most extensive umbrella-type aspect that provides the basic epistemic context for the other two aspects.

According to this primary nature of the metaphysical aspect of every paradigm, it could be argued that the metaphysical aspect is also the centre of the paradigm. However, it is impossible to visualise all these attributes of the metaphysical aspect on one single illustration. Nevertheless, Illustration 2 above clearly shows that the other two aspects are subject to the metaphysical aspect. In other words, the metaphysical aspect is in the realm of the understanding of basic relations between all the things, which we may be aware of. Here ‘basic relations’ denote the most fundamental relations, which serve as a basis for understanding any other relation between any part of the universe we may observe.

Furthermore, the ‘switch of gestalt’ seemed to be Kuhn’s favourite way of expressing the fundamental nature of the metaphysical aspect of a paradigm. Gestalt (which can be translated as ‘unified whole’ or ‘shape of an entity’s complete form’) is used to denote theories concerning the ways people comprehend the observed reality. These theories claim that people organise all observed elements into groups by applying these four basic principles: similarity, continuation, closure and proximity.

22 Lukic, p. 395.
23 ‘The primary sense of “paradigm”, clearly, has to be a philosophic one.’ (Masterman, p. 69).
24 If the terms ‘worldview’ and ‘paradigm’ are not used as synonyms, the former is usually defined in harmony with the definition I propose in this thesis. An almost identical definition of a worldview is, for example, suggested in Albert M. Wolters, Creation Regained: Biblical Basics for a Reformational Worldview, 2 edn (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1985; repr. 2005), p. 5.
25 The theory was proposed in the 1920s by Max Wertheimer (1880-1943), Kurt Koffka (1886-1941) and Wolfgang Köhler (1887-1967) as a response to Cartesian atomism (which in its
This process of organisation of elements into a gestalt (a unified whole), Kuhn argued, is the process by which every paradigm works. Whilst the elements are the data gained by observation, the mechanism by which that data is to be organised into a unified whole is the gestalt principle, or the paradigm.

2.1.2.2 The Sociological Aspect – The Sociology

Kuhn wrote that the sociological aspect of a paradigm consists of ‘past scientific achievements that some particular community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice’. Many, for example Masterman, see the originality and revolutionary essence of Kuhn’s theory exactly in this sociologically conditioned feature of the scientific research practiced within a paradigm. Therefore, the sociological aspect of a paradigm is defined as: group of practitioners trained within the context of a particular implicit set of beliefs about reality, which (the group) develops a concrete disciplinary matrix within limitations of the set of beliefs. The practitioner’s explicit public worldviews, or private personal mindsets are parts of the sociological aspect of the paradigm.

This sociological aspect of the paradigm is subject to the basic values found in the metaphysical aspect, as described above. From a scientific point of view, it was revolutionary for Kuhn to claim that every scientific practice is in fact sociologically conditioned. But for the purpose of my research, it is also important to note that the level of influence of this sociological factor is subject to


26 Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 10.
27 Masterman, p. 66.
28 Lukic, p. 395.
the place society has in the hierarchy of basic values in the metaphysical aspect of a person’s paradigm.

As a result, if in one paradigm society and its conventions take the highest place in the metaphysical hierarchy of values, the methodologies applicable in the paradigm will be much more sociologically conditioned than in a case of another paradigm, in which the sociological conventions take the lowest places in the metaphysical hierarchy of values. In the case of my set of presuppositions explained in Chapter 1 above, sociological conventions are not as valued as, for example, in a non-religious, non-biblical paradigm, which has humanity and sociological conventions as the main criteria for grading values and methods.

However, regardless of the particular presuppositions to which a given community will subscribe, it is important to see that both worldview, and mindset are included in the realm of the sociological aspect. More precisely, only paradigm as a whole with its implicit set of presuppositions is part of the metaphysical aspect of the paradigm. In contrast worldview and mindset belong to the overlapping area between the sociological and metaphysical aspects in Illustration 2 above. Likewise, personal motivation, intention, and aim are parts of the overlapping area between methodological aspect and sociological aspect of the paradigm.

2.1.2.3 The Methodological Aspect – The Methodology

The two aspects of the Kuhnian paradigm, visualised by Illustration 2 and described above, logically lead to the aspect of the acceptable methodologies in the paradigm. This aspect is visualised as the lowest and smallest of the three parts of the upside-down pyramid on the illustration. The small size points to the fact that the methodological aspect is indeed subject to the larger sociological and the largest metaphysical aspect. In other words, the values (metaphysics, the worldview) enable the sociological factors to influence the selection of the sociologically acceptable methodologies.

These methodologies finally become sociologically accepted criteria for grading any reasoning/enquiry as scientific or non-scientific in a given time and society.
Thus, the methodological (problem-solving) aspect of a paradigm is defined as: the complete set of concrete problem solutions produced by the group of practitioners who make the sociological aspect of a paradigm, which (the problem solutions) tacitly carry the metaphysical commitments of that group of practitioners.²⁹ One’s personal motivation, intention and aim are parts of this aspect of the paradigm. They are all subject to the metaphysical and the sociological aspects of the paradigm.

Accordingly, new methodologies are accepted and the methodologies are changed in order to make the now sociologically accepted/valid values defendable in the contemporary ‘puzzle solving’ scientific research. Thus, the methodologies will change when needed and as long as they are needed to preserve a sociologically accepted theory. However, none of this will change without a reason. Thus, it is necessary to describe the nature of a need for a change that can instigate a change of methodology and the paradigm as a whole. Better The better the need for these changes is understood, the easier it is to understand the nature of the vicious circle in biblical interpretation. In what follows, I will explain how the Kuhnian theory suggests that every interpretation (in both sciences and humanities) is driven by the tendency to find satisfaction against the oddities observed in a given field of study.

2.1.3 NATURE OF A NEED FOR A CHANGE IN A PARADIGM

Every paradigm has its ‘level of tolerance’. In other words, there is no paradigm which can automatically explain every phenomenon in the world. In practice, this means that every paradigm will have so-called ‘irritants’. The irritants will challenge a scientist’s puzzle-solving skills for a longer or a shorter time until finally, the scientist manages to ‘solve the puzzle’ (i.e. to explain the irritant phenomenon within the metaphysically coherent system of values and according to the sociologically appreciated past scientific achievements and methodologies).

²⁹ Lukic, p. 395.
In addition, every irritant can potentially become the anomaly that will trigger the need for the shift of the paradigms/gestalts. When this happens, a change of the paradigm has to first happen on the level of the methodology. If this change still cannot solve the irritant/anomaly, a change of the core values and the way they are grouped has to take place instead. This extraordinary mode of science, in which scientific research moves into the conditions described above, is clearly explained by Illustration 3 below, developed by Lukic.30

**Illustration 3: Lukic’s Inverted Dynamics of the Normal and Extraordinary Science Modes**

There are two circles of reasoning visualised on the two sides of the illustration. The circle of reasoning (within the normal science) on the left side of the illustration, marked with letters A, B and C, denotes the circle of reasoning visualised on Illustration 1 (where the three aspects of the paradigm were marked with numbers 1, 2 and 3). The arrows denoting the direction of this circle of

30 Lukic, p. 394.
reasoning taking place from A to C and back to A, in Illustration 3, visualises the
deductive nature of the reasoning.

In contrast, the circle of reasoning that takes place between the aspects of the
paradigm marked by letters A’, B’ and C’ in the same illustration is clearly
inductive, being initiated by the methodological/problem-solving aspect of the
paradigm. Accordingly, whilst the circle of reasoning in normal science mode
secures the reign of the paradigm, the circle of reasoning in extraordinary science
supports a shift of the paradigm.

This understanding that there are the two circles of reasoning that science can
accommodate makes science be understood as an extremely personified entity.
Accordingly, science can be understood not just as underdeveloped, young,
premature, mature or old, but also as in periods of a steady/secure reign and in
periods of crisis. Consequently, there are the following three possible situations
in which science can be found:31

1. Non-paradigm science: the stage when there is no paradigm in place
(‘right at the beginning of the process of thinking about any aspect of
the world’).32 The science at this stage is in fact on the level of
philosophical enquiry, whilst collection of data is rather random since
all the data seems to be equally important (there is no pre-scientific
hierarchy of values to govern the scientific enquiry).

2. Multiple-paradigm science: the stage when instead of no paradigms,
there are multiple paradigms. This state occurs if the competing
paradigms are superficial in their approach to the given subject of
enquiry. The solution is to develop a deeper, more precise paradigm,
which would treat the phenomenon in a more effective way and thus
cause the competing theories to be ruled out.

31 Masterman, p. 73.
32 Ibid.
3. Dual-paradigm science: the stage, which takes place directly before a scientific revolution. Two competing paradigms tend to provide the best explanation of a phenomenon in the world.

These three states in which science can be found make queries concerning possible reasons for a change of a paradigm logical. The need for a change of a paradigm is present when there is:

1. Existence of an anomaly (i.e. any unsolvable problem that makes a quest for a new paradigm a necessity).

2. Conflict of two opposing paradigms (i.e. the two paradigms are perceived as incommensurable, e.g. Newtonian and Einsteinian paradigms).

3. One of the conflicting paradigms is shown to solve more puzzles, especially the anomaly (i.e. the most challenging/annoying irritant) in the presently globally accepted paradigm.

How do these three reasons supporting a change of a paradigm, reflect my focus in this thesis (i.e. the theory of meaning based on the issue of the vicious circle in biblical interpretation)? The following examples which represent the three situations described by Kuhn come to mind:

1. In biblical studies an unsolvable problem that makes the pursuit for a new paradigm a necessity, can be the presence of conflicting interpretations of biblical texts within one religious denomination. If all members of the denomination subscribe to the same set of presuppositions and apply the same methodology when interpreting the Bible, one could expect harmonious outcomes of those methods. Accordingly, if there are conflicting results, one will be forced to reconsider changes in the paradigm shared by the members of that denomination.

2. This reconsidering is focused on the choice between two or more incommensurable interpretative paradigms. Like for example the incommensurability between positivist and postpositivist interpretative
paradigms. When this type of conflict is present, one is forced to choose only one among two or more options.

3. The choice is directed by the goal to solve as many challenges in the present paradigm as possible. The choice should take into account how many more problems this new paradigm be able to solve in addition to the one that initiated the shift of paradigms. In this case does the postpositivist paradigm offer better solutions to our present challenges than the positivist paradigm? Potential answers to this question are of both quantitative and qualitative nature. I will explain them in more detail here.

2.1.4 CRITERIA FOR CHOOSING A PARADIGM

Kuhn is clear that, according to his understanding, the sort of criteria for choosing a paradigm are at the level of the psychological and/or the sociological realm. The values Kuhn mentioned are:33

1. Solution to the anomaly.
2. Solution to the biggest number of other ‘marginal’ irritants.
3. The new paradigm is shown to be concrete.
4. The new paradigm is shown to be accurate.
5. The new paradigm is shown to be simple.
6. The new paradigm is shown to be analogical.
7. The new paradigm is shown to be compatible with other specialities/fields.
8. The new paradigm is shown to be sufficiently unprecedented among the particular group of people willing to solve the anomaly.
9. The new paradigm is shown to be sufficiently open-ended, so that there is enough of space for new methods to be developed when needed.

All these reasons, I argue, are indeed applicable in the realm of biblical interpretation as well. In fact, this thesis is a proposal for a theory of meaning

33 Adapted from ibid., (p. 82). See also Kuhn, *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, p. 206.
which is based on this assumption that every interpretation serves these highly subjective evaluations of a paradigm as a whole, as well as methodologies used within it. The subjective nature of this evaluation is seen in terms such as anomaly/irritant, marginal, simple etc. What are the criteria according to which something is described as irritant, marginal or simple, if not my personal position and experience? Since the whole process of changing a paradigm is initiated by the presence of an anomaly (i.e. the irritant one can no longer endure), all these subjective evaluations can indeed be seen as a description of the shift from dissatisfaction to satisfaction.

However, the subjectivity of evaluations in the process of the paradigm shift does not mean that the process is individualistic. In fact, Kuhn claimed that paradigm shifts are driven by strong social factors (i.e. the social aspect of the paradigm). How can this social aspect of the paradigm shift be applied to the paradigm shifts in the field of biblical interpretation? To answer this question, I will focus here on Marko Lukic’s contribution to the Kuhnian Theory.

2.1.5 Marko Lukic’s Contribution to the Kuhnian Theory

The presence of social factors in every shift of paradigms is based on intersection of each of the three aspects of the paradigm (i.e. metaphysical, social, methodological aspect). More the interpreter is aware of these factors, better he/she will be able to monitor his/her own circular reasoning within the paradigm. Lukic, in his Illustration 4 below, visualises this intersection as an overlapping area in which the metaphysical and sociological aspects of the paradigm are manifested in rituals (which are part of the methodological aspect of the paradigm). 34

34 Lukic, p. 395.
Illustration 4: Lukic’s Manifestations of the Metaphysical Aspect of a Paradigm and its Influence on the Sociological Aspect

On the Illustration 4 above, the intersection of the three aspects can be followed from the highly philosophical metaphysical aspect of a paradigm, via its tangible praxis of the methodological aspect (i.e. ‘rituals’), to the paradigm’s sociological aspect with its formation of the society that subscribes to the set of metaphysical presuppositions.

Lukic has also clarified the definitions of a master narrative (i.e. a ‘narrational manifestation of the metaphysical aspect, which states its limitation in a story form’) and of a ritual (i.e. a ‘visible manifestation of a master narrative and a symbol of communal identity’).\(^{35}\) I concur with these definitions, but in order to make them applicable to the research in this thesis, they need slight modification. It is, therefore, worth noting that Lukic’s case study, when contributing to this research, was in the field of systematic theology, consequently having the particulars of a biblical text with its linguistic aspect out of his primary focus.

\(^{35}\) Lukic, p. 395.
Conversely, for this theory to meet the requirements of my thesis, a further development of one single detail on Lukic’s illustration is needed.

2.1.6 Adding on to Lukic’s Contribution

I suggest that the term ‘ritual’ from Lukic’s Illustration 4 above is changed to ‘Faith-life imagery’. There are four reasons for this choice. Firstly, both terms focus on empirical expressions. Secondly, both terms focus on expressions stemming from the master narrative of the metaphysical aspect of a paradigm. Thirdly, only the latter term focuses on what it actually is that links all three aspects of the paradigm and is made tangible in rituals and in symbols of communal identity. Finally, this focus, established through this add-on to Lukic’s contribution to Kuhnian theory, is critical for linking the three pillar theories used in this thesis via textual links in a biblical text. Therefore, according to the purpose of this thesis, I have adapted Lukic’s Illustration 4 above to my Illustration 5 below.

Illustration 5: Adaptation of Lukic’s Manifestations of the Metaphysical Aspect of a Paradigm and its Influence on the Sociological Aspect
By having the faith-life imagery in the centre of the intersection of all the three aspects of the paradigm, I can soon move to incorporating Bakhtinian dialogism into my theory of meaning. Bakhtinian dialogism will provide tools for utilising the faith-life imagery one finds in the Scriptures in general. Furthermore, in Chapter 4 in particular, I will focus on one single motif (i.e. the Sabbath of the LORD motif) as part of the rich imagery in the text in Exodus 16. This understanding of the faith-life imagery as the bridge between the Scriptures and the paradigm articulated by the scriptural text is the core tenet in the rest of this thesis. However, I can now draw some conclusions here.

2.1.7 CONCLUSION: REASONING ABOUT A BIBLICAL MOTIF AND A KUHNIAN PARADIGM

In the Kuhnian paradigm, the distinction between normal science and a scientific revolution applies to the difference between ‘normal’ and ‘revolutionary’ reasoning, which Kuhn often names as a ‘conversion’.36 The latter describes the process which causes changes in the metaphysical aspect of a paradigm, and thus is in fact, a shift of the paradigm itself.

In addition, one can differentiate between the paradigm shift on the communal level as on that of the personal level. The former is influenced by the sociological aspect of the paradigm in the form of irritants on the level of mindset and/or worldview. When they become intolerable, the community looks for solutions on the level of the metaphysical aspect, and the outcome of the process is a paradigm shift i.e. a conversion of the community.

In contrast, the process of a personal conversion begins with irritants on the levels of personal motivation, intention and aim. When irritants on this level become intolerable the person looks for solutions on the level of the social aspect of the paradigm. The process will either include the entire community and consequently turn into a conversion of the community or continue as a process of personal conversion. The person will eventually prefer another paradigm and thus

36 Eighteen times in Kuhn, *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 19, 150, 51, 52, 54, 55, 58, 202, 203, 204.
experience a change of mindset. In these terms, this process is a personal conversion.

Regardless of a communal or an individual process of change, the core distinction between the regular and the revolutionary reasoning is the presence of the vicious circle in the former and the absence of that circle in the latter. In other words, every biblical interpretation described by Kuhnian normal science follows the vicious circle within the reader’s paradigm. Only the biblical interpretation which can be described by Kuhnian extraordinary/revolutionary science escapes the circularity of the regular reasoning in the reader’s paradigm.

This difference between the normal and revolutionary reasoning needs to be further clarified. Both regular and revolutionary reasonings cause the paradigm to change, but only revolutionary readings cause the paradigm shift.

So what kind of changes within the reader’s paradigm are accepted before the changes can be described as a shift? Each of the four Illustrations above (Illustrations 1-4) have the metaphysical aspect of the paradigm (or more precisely the master narrative, as a narrational manifestation of the metaphysical aspect) at the top of the illustration. This hierarchy is not accidental. In fact, Illustration 1 above, serves as a visualisation of the fundamental characteristic of the metaphysical aspect of the paradigm. The metaphysical aspect, i.e. the set of implicit beliefs about the reality, governs the reader’s rendering of the observed reality.

In this sense, the core of the Kuhnian paradigm is the metaphysical aspect. When the metaphysical aspect changes, the whole of the paradigm changes (i.e. the paradigm shift takes place). In contrast, when only the sociological aspect changes (e.g. change of the particular community or of the faith-life imagery which identifies the members of the community) the metaphysical aspect may remain the same. In the case of the unchanged metaphysical aspect, no changes within the paradigm qualify for a paradigm shift.
In these terms changes on the levels of personal motivation, intention, aim, mindset or even on the level of publicly articulated worldview, are not paradigm shifts, if they are not followed, or even more correctly caused by a shift on the level of the metaphysical aspect of the paradigm.

Accordingly, any change on the level of one’s mindset is only an improvement of articulation of the same paradigm, not a true conversion in Kuhnian terms. Thus, the Kuhnian concept of conversion stands in contrast to the understanding of conversion as a change of one’s belief within the same interpretative paradigm. These changes are thus improvements to and not shifts of the paradigm.

Therefore, I distinguish between the spiritual and cognitive conversion. The former is the change of one’s aim, and consequently also his/her intention and motivation. This type of conversion is caused by challenging (but not frustrating) irritants. In such a case, the satisfaction is found within the reader’s current paradigm.

In contrast, cognitive conversion is what the Kuhnian concept of conversion stands for. It is a shift of paradigms caused by a frustrating irritant. The satisfaction, in this case, cannot be found in the current (i.e. old) paradigm. The reader is then forced to look for the satisfaction in another (i.e. new) paradigm.

So what method of reading the Bible can challenge the reader’s basic presuppositions, i.e. the paradigm he/she is in? The answer I will develop in detail in this thesis, is that the reading is at all times focused on experiencing the cognitive gravity (i.e. the field of force of cognitive attraction). The master narrative is an utterance which is in a narrative style and which is surrounded by the strongest field of gravity. Thus, the reader, caught in that field of gravity perceives that other utterances apparently gravitate around the master narrative (i.e. the other utterances are dependent on the master narrative).

However, an utterance to be a master narrative does not necessarily have to be written. Any artefact of human activity, as well as the activity itself, can be perceived as a part of the master narrative. This perception is based on the
apparent force of cognitive gravity which ensures that other utterances depend on
the artefact/activity in order to convey their pragmatic, sociologic and
paradigmatic meanings.

Illustration 4 above visualises the role of the faith-life imagery which articulates
the paradigm as one whole. For this thesis, the role of faith life imagery in the
form of narratives is critical. The most important faith life imagery, by definition,
is the master narrative of one’s paradigm (i.e. the utterance which is in the
narrative style and which positions other utterances by drawing them closer to
itself).

In Chapter 3, I will develop a method which starts with focusing on the smallest
details in the text and then follows the so-called textual markers which lead the
reader to the master narrative articulated by the text. Recognising the master
narrative for any given text is the most critical element of reading. I will
demonstrate this assertion in Chapter 4.

The reason for this assertion is that every reading that allows for reconsidering
the reader’s master narrative is a possibly a revolutionary reading, and thus not a
closed circle of reasoning. Even so, what is the route from the biblical motif in an
actual text to the master narrative, in a wider, or another text? How can that route
be made into a systematic procedure? My argument is that there is a way to
recognise markers in the text which point to the master narrative found in
previous parts of the same text or another text. By following these markers, I as a
reader can understand the paradigm articulated by the text I am reading.
Furthermore, the paradigm promoted by the text can challenge the metaphysical
aspect of the paradigm to which I subscribe. In this sense, my metaphysical
presuppositions can thus be challenged and consequently confirmed or refuted.

For example, in Chapter 4, I will argue that the narrative in which the ‘Sabbath of
the LORD’ motif occurs, derives its pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic
meanings\textsuperscript{37} from the master narrative found in Genesis 1-3. The method I will develop in Chapter 3 will focus on these markers. As I will presently explain, these markers are also called dialogic overtones (preferred term in the field of literary criticism), or allusive or dependence markers (the term preferred in the theory of relevance, and the term I will use in the rest of the thesis).

Thus, the purpose of the following Chapters is to analyse how dependence markers in a biblical text serve as markers of the metaphysical aspect of the paradigm which the writer had intended to communicate when writing the biblical text. To achieve this purpose, I need to introduce the tools provided by the Bakhtinian theory of literature.

2.2 \textsc{Introduction to Key-Terms for Bakhtinian Dialogism}

As asserted in Section 1.4 above, the purpose of this thesis is to develop a theory of meaning which combines solid aspects of a theory of paradigms, a literary theory, and a relevance theory in order to explain the following three issues: firstly, the vicious circle in interpretation as a matter of (de)centralisation, secondly, dissatisfaction as the force that drives the reader to reconsider his/her paradigm and, thirdly, satisfaction as the force which keeps the reader satisfied with the vicious circle of reasoning within his/her paradigm. In this section of Chapter 2, my focus is on the literary theory. Also, I concluded in the introduction above, that the literary theory should be such as to make the reader more sensitive to the permeability of any given text. As I will show in what follows, Bakhtinian theory of literature meets these requirements.

I will introduce the following eight key terms: utterance, chronotope, superaddressee, act of authoring, dialogism, polyphony, heteroglossia, and grotesque realism. Presentation of these key words will help me explain that the essence of Bakhtinian dialogism is understanding of the reality as if it had diffuse, undeveloped and ambiguous borders. The eight key terms do not equally explicitly express this view on the reality. More precisely, it will be shown that

\textsuperscript{37} The pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings are changeable, in contrast to the unchangeable literal meaning, as explained in Section 1.8 above.
the peak of the presentation of the reality (with its undeveloped borders) is reached in grotesque realism and its carnival genre. This presentation of the reality will be explained as having a critical impact on my understanding of the borders between the five centres of meaning of an utterance (i.e. A - the historical events and ideas in which the religious writings originated; B - the author(s) of the compiled texts; C - the compiled writings; D – the text’s ancient first reader(s); E - its contemporary readers). To present those eight key terms, I will utilise a comparative, juxtaposing style, similar to the style I used when I introduced the key terms concerning the Kuhnian theory of paradigms, in 2.1 above.

2.2.1 **Utterance vs. Linguistic Elements Which Convey Meaning**

Bakhtin argued that the ambiguity in linguistics (stylistics and phonetics in particular) on the one hand, and in literary studies on the other arose exactly because the idea of utterance had not been developed sufficiently. In other words, it is ambiguity in the definition of the utterance that causes ambiguity in other fields of linguistic and literary studies to spread. More specifically, Bakhtin argued that previous attempts to define the utterance as part of linguistic elements was incorrect. Consequently, he was the first literary critic to propose a definition of the utterance that was based on the relation between the author and ‘the others’.  

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38 The main stream of the late nineteenth- and early-twentieth century linguistics was influenced by works of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) and Karl Vossler (1872-1949). Bakhtin departs from their linguistic theories on two grounds: the first is the influence of ‘the other’ (the partner/s engaged in dialogue) in the process of authoring a speech (the main nineteenth- and early twentieth-century theories were polarised around the idea of individual creativity in the speech act with focus on the author himself/herself, as self-sufficient for the speech to take place). The second, which is an outcome of the first, is the artificially exaggerated freedom of creativity attributed to the author in these classic literary theories. Bakhtin, on the other hand, argues that the absolute freedom is unreal, since in order for communication to function the freedom must be limited and conventionally shaped at the level of genres. This is where the theory of genres, comes to the fore, as one of the essential pillars in Bakhtin’s literary theory. Bakhtin’s theory is thus one of the first modern literary theories (along with Martin Buber’s rather philosophical theory) that are essentially based on the relation between the author and ‘the others’ in the phenomenon of a speech act, as well as the first one to approach the issue of utterance as speech units defined in the context of the relation between the author and ‘the others’. See Mikhail Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, ed. by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, Slavic Series (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1986), pp. 67-74. For more on the link between Bakhtinian criticism and phenomenology (advocated by de Saussure,
2.2.1.1 Definitions of Utterance and of Sentence and Word.

As stated in Section 1.2 above, according to Bakhtin, an utterance is every speech unit that is delineated by the rest of the speech communication by a ‘change of speaking subjects, that is, a change of speakers’.\(^{39}\) However, it is not the sentence nor the words, within the scope of a speech of the same speaker, that constitute in themselves a speech unit (that is an utterance) but only a linguistic unit. Furthermore, according to Bakhtin, a sentence is defined as ‘a relatively complete thought, directly correlated with the other thoughts of a single speaker within his utterance as a whole’.\(^{40}\) Accordingly, a word (and phrases as made up from words) as a linguistic unit, can be defined as a building block of a sentence. Therefore, none of these three linguistic elements (sentence, phrase and word) is dependent on the context of relations between the author and ‘the other’, since the existence of ‘the other’ is not needed for sentences, words and phrases to exist. In contrast, for the existence of an utterance, the existence of ‘the other’ is an essential prerequisite. Already here the permeability of language is introduced by making the utterance the main building block in this literary theory.

However, if a word or a sentence is delineated from the rest of the speech-flow by a change of the speakers engaged in the conversation, then the word or the sentence becomes a speech unit acquiring all the features of an utterance. Thus, the change of the speakers is the crucial difference between speech and language units, which I am going to clarify further by analysing some features of utterance, sentence and word.

2.2.1.2 Features of Utterance

Once the features of an utterance as a speech unit have been clarified, the features of a sentence and words as linguistic elements become almost self-explanatory. Therefore, I will devote considerable space to clarifying the features of an

\(^{39}\) Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 71.

\(^{40}\) Ibid., p. 73.
utterance as a speech unit. According to Bakhtin, there are five features of every utterance:

1. Change of speaking subjects.
2. Finalisation of the utterance.
3. Expressive aspect of the utterance.
4. Addressivity of every utterance.
5. Personal proximity of the addressee to the speaker/author.

Each of these features needs clarification. The change of speaking subjects is the first limiter and delimiter of every utterance. This, in practice, means that there are primary and secondary utterances, as well as that there are primary and secondary conversations. To exemplify this, within Exodus, I can spot many primary conversations by analysing the change of speakers in each of the conversations. Each of the conversations is made up of a certain number of speech units, that is, of utterances, where each of the utterances is delineated by the change of the speakers. Furthermore, the book of Exodus itself is part of the wider dialogue (‘secondary dialogue’) that takes place on the level of the Pentateuch. On this level of dialogue, Exodus is seen as part of the ‘speech flow’ among the books of the Pentateuch. Furthermore, the Pentateuch can be considered in the context of the relation between the Pentateuch and other Biblical and non-biblical literature. Thus, an utterance can take literally any size, from the smallest rejoinder in a dialogue to a multivolume opus of a writer, and wider.

However, it has to be clarified that voice is always a speaking personality and a speaking consciousness. This speaking consciousness in every utterance sets the stage for making the essential difference between poetry and prose, as the former always resembles a double-voiced reality, whilst the latter always resembles a single-voiced reality. Nevertheless, in both cases, every utterance is delineated by a shift of voices, leaving poetic utterance as one utterance that cannot be
dismantled into smaller utterances, whilst every prose utterance contains more than one smaller utterance in itself.\textsuperscript{41}

An outcome of this first feature of utterances is the finalisation, which is the next characteristic of every utterance. The finalisation of every utterance is based on the main criterion that measures the possibility of responding to the utterance. In other words, every utterance in its essence is directed to call for an active response from ‘the other’ in the speech flow. This expected and acquired response can be of higher degree and proximity, characteristic of military commands, for example. Or, on the contrary, the expected response can be of the lowest degree, typical of lyric poetry, for instance. The expected response in the latter example is delayed, introverted, but nevertheless, it is specific, particular. It is specific because it is determined by the following three factors: firstly, the speaker’s choice to finalise his/her utterance at that particular point of the speech, secondly, the speaker’s distinct plan for the speech and thirdly, precise conventions of ways the specific speech can be finalised in order to be understood in the specific way.\textsuperscript{42} Each of the three factors is needed to make the ‘organic whole of the utterance’, which are the semantic exhaustiveness of the theme, the speaker’s plan, and generic forms of finalisation, respectively.\textsuperscript{43}

Furthermore, there is no neutral utterance. Accordingly, each utterance expresses the speaker’s evaluative opinion regarding the topic discussed. In this way, the expressivity of utterance is directly related to stylistics in linguistic studies, focusing on emotional evaluations expressed by the speaker.\textsuperscript{44}

In addition, every utterance is in a specific relation to the speaker himself/herself, and the other participants engaged in the dialogue. As Bakhtin explains, ‘both the composition and, particularly, the style of the utterance depend on those to whom the utterance is addressed, how the speaker (writer) senses and imagines his

\textsuperscript{42} See Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, pp. 76-77.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} See ibid., p. 84.
addressees, and the force of their effect on the utterance’.\textsuperscript{45} This relation of the utterance to the speaker and addressees is specific for each genre. In other words, the very relation determines the genre the writer is going to choose to direct the speech to the specific addressee(s).\textsuperscript{46} Thus, addressivity of every utterance is a measure of the effect the relation between the addressee and the author will have on the choice of genre of the author's utterance. A typical example, used by Bakhtin, is the difference between a speech delivered before the prime court, and a speech whispered into the ears of a person with whom the speaker is in love.

Finally, this directs the focus to the fifth feature of an utterance, which is the personal proximity of the addressee to the speaker. Thus, personal proximity of every utterance is a measure of the capability of the utterance to convey emotional relation between the addressee and the author. The same example of the difference between the entities to whom/which the speech is addressed explains the distinction. Also, Bakhtin argued that the close proximity of the familial styles in literature played a significant role in periods of political change having the purpose of presenting old, official and traditional political conventions as being far from the author’s and audience’s ‘hearts’.\textsuperscript{47}

Each of these five features of every utterance directs the author to choose the particular form of utterance that will transmit his/her message in a specific way so that the audience understands and reacts to it as it (the audience) is seen from the author’s perspective.

2.2.1.3 Features of Sentence

A sentence, which is not delineated by the change of speakers, has none of the five features above. When there is no change of speaking subjects, there is, therefore, no relation between the speaker, ‘the other’ and the sentence. Finalisation of a sentence is then always only grammatical, not ‘ideological’, concerning the idea or message that is intended to be conveyed by the given

\textsuperscript{45} Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{46} See ibid.
\textsuperscript{47} See ibid., p. 97.
sentence. However, the idea (i.e. the ‘meaning’) that the sentence may express is determined not by grammatical finalisation of the very sentence (i.e. when it is finalised by a pause or a full stop), but by the finalisation of the whole utterance, of which the sentence is only a part.

I will illustrate the finalisation of an utterance by the following sentence in Exodus 16.28: ‘The Lord said to Moses, “How long will you refuse to keep my commandments and instructions?”’ This sentence conveys meaning not according to the way the sentence is grammatically finalised (i.e. with a question mark), but by the structure of the whole utterance in which the sentence may be positioned. On the one hand, the sentence may convey the meaning of true inquiry regarding the object of speech. At the same time, there is the same degree of possibility for the sentence to be part of an ironical utterance, a rhetorical question in which the meaning of the sentence will be the very opposite of the meaning in the previous example. The rest of the features (expressiveness, addressivity, and proximity of the author and audience) follow the same pattern; it is the whole utterance that determines these features, while sentences within the utterance only acquire the features. No sentence by itself, simply because of the grammatical features it has, can determine any of the features of utterance as a speech unit.

2.2.1.4 Features of Word.

The most often misunderstood feature of a word, according to Bakhtin, is its expressiveness. Bakhtin argued that a word, as a linguistic element, does not have expressiveness as something that is intrinsically embedded in the word itself, but rather it is attributed to the word by the context of utterances in which the word is used or has been used up to the present. This practically means that there are three aspects of the existence of any word in relation to possible expressiveness a word can acquire:

1. Nobody’s word
2. Other’s word

48 See Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, pp. 88, 89.
49 See ibid., p. 88.
3. My word

Nobody’s word is the aspect of the existence of the word from which the possible ‘expressiveness’ of the word is considered from the perspective of the word’s definition in a dictionary. It is nobody’s word because the way it is used in utterances of ‘others’ is not taken into account at this time. By this juncture of the existence of a word, only the essential minimum for the word to be used in a meaningful communication is met.

On the other hand, the word as the word of ‘others’ is the aspect of which the word is considered as ‘carrying’ meanings (related to the author’s evaluative positions) attributed to the word on the basis of how the word has been used in previous utterances of others.

Furthermore, when I use the same word, which is, in this case, my word, I use the artistic freedom to expand the ‘meaning’ of the word by using it to serve the expressiveness of my evaluative positions in my own utterance. By this, I am expanding the expressiveness of the word inherited from all the previous utterances in which the word has been used. In this way, the word in the latter two cases exists as an ‘abbreviation’ of utterance(s).

There are many examples which illustrate this expressiveness of utterance in biblical texts. The most common are names of persons and places. The most relevant to the narrative in Exodus 16 is the name of the land of Egypt. Thus, the land of Egypt in Exodus 16.1 refers to the actual area on the African continent. However, the Israelites’ collective experience of the life in slavery related to the land of Egypt has charged this name of the land with additional meanings. Thus, already in Exodus 16.1, the land of Egypt is arguably much more than a geographical designation. It is rather the place of slavery. Thus, the narrator makes the point that the event in Exodus 16 occurred only two and a half months after the people of Israel became free. In this context, the people’s claim that the land of Egypt was the land of abundance is so striking (in Exodus 16.3).

In this sense, the previous speech acts in which the word or phrase has been experienced enables the phrase to ‘inherit’ the expressive potential. This
expressiveness is inherited as the feature of an utterance and is not related to the word existing as a linguistic unit.

2.2.1.5 *Dialogic Overtones in Every Utterance.*

This inherited expressiveness that every word ‘carries’ with itself is directly linked to the idea of dialogic overtones (i.e. markers of relation towards utterances of others) in every utterance.\(^5^0\) Hence, no utterance deals with an issue for the first time in the history of human thinking. Every ‘new’ idea, ‘new’ topic is always in correlation with previous thoughts and utterances of others. In this sense, every utterance is, in a way, a response to utterances of ‘others’. An analysis of utterances that fails to be sensitive to the phenomenon of dialogic overtones falls short of any comprehensive understanding of the ways a language and its units are used in real-life practice. It fails to ‘hear’ the meaning that is ‘irrational’ when the analysis is based on rules of syntax or any grammar as a system.\(^5^1\)

The theory of meaning I will propose in Chapter 3 will be based on this very feature of every utterance. Namely, I argue that dialogic overtones of an utterance can be used as markers of relations between the utterance and previous utterances with which the analysed utterance is in dialogue.

2.2.1.6 *Dialogism vs. Classical Stylistics.*

All the above-presented features of utterance, as opposed to a sentence and a word as linguistic elements, demand a change in the methods used to approaching any literary work. In particular, it is the very understanding of stylistics that Bakhtin proposed be changed.

Classical stylistics, according to Bakhtin,\(^5^2\) is based solely on two sets of factors: the first one of the two sets is related to the speaker/author and his/her worldview, evaluations and emotions. The other set of factors is related to language as a

\(^{50}\) Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, pp. 92,93.

\(^{51}\) Ibid., p. 92.

\(^{52}\) Ibid., pp. 90,91.
system and the theme of the author’s speech. Because these two (the language and the theme) can be delineated in classical stylistics, the speech can be analysed almost as a self-sufficient whole. In other words, it appears as if these two sets of factors are the only available to determine the style of the speech.\footnote{Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 90.}

In contrast, Bakhtin argues that no utterance is a self-sufficient whole.\footnote{Ibid., p. 91.} Accordingly, every utterance is a link in a chain of conversations. Dialogic(al) features are those which resemble dialogism, that is, the context in which no part of the reality can be completely delineated and independent from the rest of the reality. Therefore, any attempt to analyse the style of the utterance without considering this dialogical factor, which affects the style of the utterance in the most critical way, is far from being realistic and natural. In this sense, classical stylistics, being insensitive to the dialogical factors determining the style of the utterance, is unable to analyse the nature of styles of utterances as they operate in real-life practice. In contrast, dialogism, being focused on dialogic overtones (in addition to factors also recognised by classical stylistics) is the only way to recognise the style of an utterance as it functions in practice.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 91,92.}

2.2.1.7 *Generic Forms vs. Linguistic Forms of Utterance.*

The difference between the features of an utterance (as a speech unit), and the features of sentences and words (as linguistic units), reaches its peak in generic forms (i.e. genre) of the utterance. Thus, Bakhtin argues, ‘the speaker’s speech will be manifested primarily in the choice of a particular speech genre’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 78.} In other words, the linguistic structure of a particular speech shows only the linguistic elements that are used in the speech. In contrast, the way the speech will function in conveying a specific meaning of the discourse is in practice determined by its generic form (genre), and not by its linguistic structure.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 78-81; Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, pp. 84-85. See also Walter L. Reed, *Dialogues of the Word: The Bible as Literature According to Bakhtin* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 46.} Thus, generic form can
be determined as a ‘relatively stable’ form of utterances, which features a specific horizon of expectations that is brought on an utterance by the specific sphere of communication the utterance is used in, and by the chronotope (i.e. a specific construction of time and space) presented in the utterance.\footnote{Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, pp. 60, 80.}

However, the sphere of communication denotes a group of specific occasions in life in which language is used in a specific way, characteristic for that and similar occasions (forming, thus, spheres such as ‘at work’, ‘at a court’, ‘at home’, ‘with the loved ones’ etc.). However, any specific sphere of communication features a specific presentation of time and space in the utterance. This specific presentation of time and space is called chronotope. This term deserves further explanation.

2.2.2 **Chronotope vs. Temporal and Spatial Gaps**

The etymology of the term chronotope is found in the Greek ‘chronos’ (time) and ‘topos’ (place) giving the literal meaning ‘time-space’. The main idea regarding the chronotope entertained by Bakhtin was to propose a new approach to the time and space issues found in any utterance. Namely, similarly to the new approach to energy and mass issues in the sciences introduced by Einstein’s theory of relativity, it was Bakhtin’s literary theory that introduced the idea of the inseparability of time and space in any utterance. After Einstein, the issues relating to mass are inseparable from the issues relating to energy (in physics of relativity).\footnote{See Holquist, ‘Glossary’, p. 428; Martin J. Buss, ‘Dialogue in and among Genres’, in *Semeia 63: Bakhtin and Genre Theory in Biblical Studies*, ed. by Roland Boer, (Atlanta, GA: SBL, 2007), pp. 9-18 (p. 10).} In a similar way, Bakhtin argued, time and space are inseparable in any artistic work forming a unique construction, specific to each artistic work.\footnote{I find the following extremely simplified explanation of the theory of relativity very useful as it was explained by Einstein himself: ‘If we imagine all physical things, all stars, all light taken out of the universe, what then remains is something like a giant vessel without walls called “space.” With respect to what is happening in the world, it plays the same role as the stage in a theatre performance. In this space, in this vessel without walls, there is an eternally uniformly occurring tick-tock that, however, only ghosts, but those everywhere can hear; that is “time.”’ (Albert Einstein, ‘Doc. 44.a: The Principal Ideas of the Theory of Relativity’, in *The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein: Volume 7: The Berlin Years Writings 1918-1921*, ed. by Michel Janssen, and others (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 3-6 (p. 3)). Since the speed of light is the fundamental unit of measure (the absolute constant), the measurements of space and time are relative. Space and time are therefore interwoven in a ‘fabric’ of “time-space”, whereas everything...}
 Similar to the classification of genres as ‘fairly stable forms of utterances,’ Bakhtin provided a classification of chronotopes as fairly stable forms of specific time-space compositions. In other words, Bakhtin wanted to show how certain genres prefer certain types of chronotopes. Accordingly, he concluded that in travel style genres, which have the travel style chronotope, time takes precedence over space. In contrast, in idyllic, lyrical genres, chronotope is composed of space that takes precedence over time. Accordingly, every artistic work has a unique composition of time and space factors that are blended in one ‘carefully thought-out, concrete whole’. Thus, the choice of chronotope resembles the author’s choice of worldview, which he/she intended to convey. The following examples will clarify this point.

As regarding the travel style genres, in which chronotope is composed by time taking precedence over space, the wanderings of Israel from Egypt to the travels through the ‘time-space’ at the velocity of light. The slower one moves through space, the faster one moves through time. Oppositely, the faster one moves through space, the slower one moves through time. For more on the general theory of relativity itself see Albert Einstein, ‘Doc. 30: The Foundation of the General Theory of Relativity’, trans. by Alfred Engel, in The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein: Volume 6: The Berlin Years: Writings, 1914-1917, ed. by A. J. Kox, Martin J. Klein and Robert Schulmann, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 146-200.


62 This understanding that the main feature of every literary work is its presentation of a specific construction of time and space was the core difference between Georg (György) Lukács (1885-1971) and Bakhtin. Furthermore, the same issue of chronotope in the novel made the difference between Bakhtin’s and Maxim (Alexei Maximovich Peshkov) Gorky’s (1868-1936) understanding of ‘the folk’ as the concept of specific ‘historical space’ of the collective. For more on these differences see Graham Pechey, Mikhail Bakhtin: The Word in the World (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 82-104.

63 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 80.
64 Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, p. 84.
65 I am not the first to argue for this link between the writer’s ideology and his/her choice of chronotope. Thus, “[s]pecific chronotopes correspond to particular genres … which themselves represent particular world-views. To this extent, chronotope is a cognitive concept as much as a narrative feature of texts.” (Graham Roberts, ‘Glossary’, in The Bakhtin Reader: Selected Writings of Bakhtin, Medvedev, Voloshinov, ed. by Pam Morris, (London: Arnold, 1994), pp. 245-52 (p. 246).)
Promised Land in the book of Exodus is a typical example of this genre in the Bible. It is a case in point because in this chronotope ‘the time spent means the ground covered, and pages turned’, as Vice puts it.\(^6^6\)

The above-mentioned type of travel-style chronotope is focused on the exactness of the ‘unity of time and space markers’.\(^6^7\) However, no chronotope has to remain a ‘purely distilled’ type of chronotope. In fact, the chronotopes of the pure type are rare. Very often chronotopes are ‘charged up’ with additional meaning by introducing new topics with new types of polyphonic characters. In Chapter 4, I will argue that for example, the account of God providing manna in the desert utilises a chronotope which has as its basis the travel chronotope, but with this motif of manna and, more so, the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif, the chronotope develops a new horizon of expectations.

Even though it is barely possible to find a purely road-style or purely lyrical-style chronotope, the focus on the composition of time and space and the way it ‘works’ in a given artistic work remains essential, critical. The focus on the time–space composition enables the spectator to ‘hear’ the additional dialogic overtones present in the artistic work. These dialogic overtones would otherwise remain unseen and unheard.

Regarding the idyllic, lyrical genres, in which chronotope is composed by space taking precedence over time, a case in point is ‘the song of Moses’ in Exodus 15. There are almost no temporal designations while the text is charged with descriptions of space. This is achieved by prevailing motifs related to the border between the sea and the dry land. Thus the place of the enemies is described by expressions like ‘into the sea’, ‘in the Red Sea’, ‘floods covered... down into the depths’, ‘the waters piled up...the deeps congealed’, ‘the sea covered’, ‘the earth swallowed’ in verses Exodus 15.1,4,5,8,10,12 respectively. In contrast, the place of the Israelites is described as ‘on the mountain... the sanctuary’ in verse 17.


\(^{67}\) See ibid., p. 98.
Also, the naming of other nations in Exodus 15.14,15 charges the chronotope with topics of publicity versus intimacy, nationality versus individuality, even tradition versus freedom of personal choice. Thus, the exodus from Egypt becomes part of the common experience characteristic of every redemption, emancipation, liberation, or salvation regardless of one’s relation to the actual historical exodus from Egypt.

Furthermore, this notion of chronotopic motifs introduces the question concerned with the relation between the artistic work and history. That is, the relation between an artistic work and history is far more complicated and multileveled than any non-dialogical theory of meaning can ever comprehend. In particular, there are three layers of chronotope present in every utterance. They can be highlighted by asking the following three questions:

a) What are the means by which the text represents (external) history?

b) What are the ways of presenting (formal) properties of the text itself (its plot, narrator, and relation to other texts)?

c) What are the (internal) images of time and space in the text, out of which a representation of history is to be constructed?

In line with this aspect of dialogical concept of reality, I define ‘image’ here, as a subjective comprehension and depiction of reality. Answers to the three questions above practically determine the way time and space mutually shape themselves in the artistic work analysed. In addition, the same questions provide insights into relations between the artistic work and history (which is here seen as multileveled). More precisely, there is external history, internal history, and the plot or the artistic work’s formal construction.

Even more, in the light of the Kuhnian theory of paradigms introduced in Section 2.1 above, one can make a distinction between the external, formal and internal chronotope by their function in designating chronotopes on the following three

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68 Based on Sue Vice’s analysis of ways Bakhtin’s chronotope works, in Vice, pp. 201, 202.
levels respectively: metaphysical aspect of a paradigm, an utterance, and an image of the world (in an utterance). Thus, firstly, the external chronotope can be defined as a specific construct of time and space on the level of the metaphysical aspect of the author’s paradigm. Secondly, a formal chronotope is an artistic construct of time and space in an utterance with the focus adapted to the purpose of conveying an image of the world in the utterance. Thirdly and finally, an internal chronotope is an artistic construct of time and space in an image of the world, with a focus adapted to the purpose of conveying the message of the author.

Accordingly, it is important to note that the external chronotope is something the writer does not perceive as if he/she has any control over it. In other words, the external chronotope is independent of his/her choice, since it is determined by the whole of the paradigm the author subscribes to as the only logical answer to the most fundamental questions in life. In contrast, the formal chronotope and internal chronotope are constructs created by the author through specific accentuation on time or space in his/her utterance. Thus, as an illustration, the relation could be presented as the role of the Creator of the universe, compared to a photographer in the universe. The former adjusts the external chronotope, the latter adjusts the formal and internal.

Furthermore, this multi-layered representation of time and space creates a possibility for the intermingling of the layers. The literary device which utilises this intermingling of layers is called ‘mise en abyme’, meaning, idiomatically, ‘play-within-the-play’ or ‘story within the story’.\footnote{Literally ‘in the middle of the shield’. The expression comes from the tradition of having a miniaturised form of the shield in the centre of some shields. Thus, the effect is that there is a shield with a picture of itself in the middle, in the centre of which there is a miniaturised form/picture of the same shield, with a miniaturised picture of the shield in its centre. The effect is the same as the outcome of two mirrors mutually reflecting each other. The reflection of each of the mirrors in its own mirror is endless. The same effect is gained when there is a play within a play or a story within a story. See Barbara Green, \textit{Mikhail Bakhtin and Biblical Scholarship: An Introduction}, SBL Semeia Series (Atlanta, GA: SBL, 2000), pp. 75, 181. See also Lucien Dällenbach, \textit{The Mirror in the Text} (Cambridge: Polity, 1989); and Robert Polzin, \textit{David and the Deuteronomist: A Literary Study of the Deuteronomic History. Part Three: 2 Samuel} (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 37-47.} For example, I see this in Deuteronomy 31.30-32.10 where Moses recounts how he was narrating to the
Israelites what God had done for them. In this given example, there are at least three layers of time, each having its own space presented, even though with a different level of clarity. In verses 31.30-32.3, the first (1.) layer of time corresponds to space clearly introduced in the preceding verses. Verse 32.4 then suddenly interrupts that chronotope with a statement about a fact which is not limited to time or space, functioning as (2.) chronotope and a bridge towards the following verse 32.5a, where a totally new (3.) chronotope emerges. The second half of the verse, 32.5b is a leap back towards the previous (1.) chronotope of 21.30-32.3, this time utilised in 32.6,7. Nevertheless, 32.8 is a leap back to the (3.) chronotope from 32.5a, leading to 32.9, which utilises the (1.) chronotope from 32.5a. Finally, 32.10 is a leap back to the (3.) chronotope layer from verses 32.5a and 32.8.

Utilisation of this literary device brings a special meaning to the whole text, since time and space are represented as merging into one big whole, where every single detail interferes with others. Taking into consideration that it is Moses’ recounting of the history of salvation from the bondage of Egypt, knowing that, from his own perspective, time and space are about to cease to function (since his death has already been announced, see 31.29), this intermingling of all the layers of time and space is more than just accidental. Nevertheless, the intermingling becomes even more complicated when a future perspective is introduced, as is the case, for example in Deuteronomy 32.35-36. Past, present, and future climax to a peak where everything is subordinated to the representation of the time and space of the death of Moses, who kept the faith in God. This same death-motif which transcends and subordinates other chronotopes is further developed with a narration of Moses’ own 70 death (Deuteronomy 34.1-5), as well as with the comment on the fact that his tomb has never been found (Deuteronomy 34.6). Furthermore, this intermingling of time and space leads to the question of the addressee(s) represented by a text. Thus, the roles of superaddressee and ultimately known addressee must be introduced.

70 The fact that someone else other than Moses may have written his obituary does not invalidate the motif, quite the opposite. Namely, a very new chronotope of another time and space is thus introduced in the whole of the book, with an already turbulent mixture of chronotopes in the text.
2.2.3 SUPERADDRESSEE VS. ULTIMATELY KNOWN ADDRESSEE

Just as the layers of time and space are discernible in an utterance, so at least two layers can be found in the addressees. Thus, Bakhtin wrote:71

Any utterance always has an addressee ... whose responsive understanding the author of the speech work seeks and surpasses. This is the second party. ... But in addition to this addressee (the second party), the author of the utterance, with greater or lesser awareness, presupposes a higher superaddressee (third), whose absolutely just responsive understanding is presumed, either in some metaphysical distance or in distant historical time (the loophole addressee). In various ages and with various understandings of the world, this superaddressee and his ideally true responsive understanding assume various ideological expressions (God, absolute truth, the court of dispassionate human consciousness, the people, the court of history, science, and so forth).

The introduction of the third person’s role into the dialogue is not initiated by the third person’s (superaddressee’s) ability, but rather by the inability of the first two persons’ roles’. This is to say that there is no human being with ultimate knowledge and it is unlikely that anyone has ever seriously claimed to have that kind of knowledge. Nevertheless, the implications of the non-dialogic theories of meaning tend to suggest this kind of knowledge. In other words, it is a utopia of those theories of meaning that the only way the gap between the author and audience can be bridged is by presupposing an ultimate mutual understanding between the author and the audience.

On the other hand, according to Bakhtin and his literary theory, the author as a human has limited knowledge, not only of the subsequent recipients of his writings (loophole recipients), but even of the author’s closest, first recipients. It is only by the idea of superaddressee that a perfectly just and correct understanding of the writer’s utterance can be assumed.72 Without that

71 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 126.
72 This assumption has been the basis for some critics of Bakhtin to understand him as introducing the religious motive of God in his literary theory. However, the ground for such a claim is vague, since most of Bakhtin’s private life was lost in the time of the ‘communist iron curtain’. Nevertheless, see Ruth Coates, Christianity in Bakhtin: God and the Exiled Author, Cambridge Studies in Russian Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; repr. 2004).
presupposed superaddressee, no author would begin writing, since what would be
the point of writing if not in order to be understood by the intended reader?

Therefore, the problem of reading any text is in that we can only gather clues to
help us vaguely guess how big or small the difference between the super-
addressee and the actual addressee(s) is. The assumption, most likely correct, is
that the difference between the superaddressee and the actual addressee increases
gradually and proportionally with the increase of the time gap between the two
contexts.

However, the main problem in communication is not the existence of the gap
between the writer’s context and the recipient’s context, (since the gap is always
there, no matter how big or small it is) but the author’s and the reader’s
unawareness of the gap. In other words, the main problem is the assumed
capabilities of both the author and the reader to ultimately know and understand
the other partner in the dialogue. This problem is avoidable, or at least the effect
of it is absorbed with the implementation of the role of the superaddressee present
in every dialogue, affecting the discourse and enabling it to function as feasible,
even though always imperfect and limited. However, since the discourse is
enabled by bridging those gaps between contexts of the reader and that of the
author, the discourse can facilitate authoring by both the author and the
recipients. The latter needs to be explained.

2.2.4 ACT OF AUTHORING VS. SPEAKING AND HEARING

According to Bakhtin, every human is an author,73 and every text has an author.74
Furthermore, according to the dialogical features of every utterance, as presented
above, every authoring is dialogical. This dialogical aspect of authoring is
probably best explained if the focus of this explanation is on the two modes or
ways by which human consciousness operates. Bakhtin called these modes for ‘I
for myself’ and ‘I for others’.75 The first one presents the real person, as seen

73 See Green, p. 33.
74 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 104.
75 See Green, p. 34.
from the subjective angle of the person himself/herself. On the other hand, the ‘I for others’ is the person that is conveyed (authorised) in the image of the author of an utterance.\textsuperscript{76} It is not the real person (presenting the ‘I for myself’ consciousness), but the ‘I’ as already authorised by the actual author. In this sense, the authorised image of the voice of the author functions in the utterance (as a whole), as a separate, authorised voice (as a distinct consciousness).

Accordingly, the author that is comprehensible by the analysis of an utterance is not the real author but the authorised one, authorised by the real author. That is to say that via an analysis of a written utterance, we can visualise only the image of the author, which is not the values and opinions of the consciousness of the author in person, but of the author as he/she projected, shared, and whose consciousness he/she authorised (the ‘I for others’ consciousness).\textsuperscript{77} Therefore, Bakhtin differentiates between ‘the author in person’ and ‘the image of the author’: ‘The author cannot be separated from the images and characters, since he enters into these images as an indispensable part of them (images are dual and sometimes double-voiced). But the image of the author can be separated from the images of the characters. This image itself, however, is created by the author and is therefore also dual.’\textsuperscript{78}

Furthermore, apart from authoring the image of the author present in the utterance, the author in person authors every other consciousness/voice present in the utterance. The act of authoring the so-called ‘heroes’ of the utterance is a

\textsuperscript{76} See Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, pp. 106-16.
\textsuperscript{77} See ibid., pp. 148-49. Bakhtin uses a few more terms in order to describe the difference between the ‘person of the writer’ and the ‘image of the writer’. These are ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ author, where the primary author is the author in person, whilst the image of the author is the secondary author. Furthermore, the primary author is also ‘natura non creata quae creat’, whilst the secondary is ‘natura creat quae non creat’. The latter two Latin terms are actually adopted and adapted from the philosopher Duns Scotus’ scheme of four modes of being (nature created and not creating, nature created and creating, nature not created and creating, and finally nature not created and not creating). The dichotomy adapted by Bakhtin makes the difference between the primary author who is in terms of literary act of authoring ‘not created, but creating’ and the secondary author (the image and not the person) who is ‘created (by the primary author) but is not creating’. The image of the hero authorised in a novel is also ‘created and not creating’, since it is created by the primary author, the same way as is the image of the primary author. See also Michael Holquist’s note 23 in Bakhtin, \textit{Speech Genres and Other Late Essays}, p. 157.
\textsuperscript{78} Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 116.
process in which yet again the borders between the consciousness of the author and the persons he/she authorises are, if not vague, then perforated/porous.\textsuperscript{79} This in practice means that the image of the author that is present in a given utterance is created not only from the voice of the author as can be heard by analysis of the utterance as a whole but also by listening to every voice present in the utterance itself. This is so because every voice is authorised by the author of the utterance in a way by which the author projects and shares his/her understanding of the world in more or less an artistic way.

Finally, there is also the third consciousness essential for understanding the way authoring works according to the dialogical theory of meaning, the so-called ‘The-other-for-me’.\textsuperscript{80} This third consciousness is again not something that is absolute, but the one that I (as a recipient of the utterance) see, meet, and engage with. This idea of the third consciousness is the point where the act of authoring is introduced to the audience/readership. In other words, hearing and listening imply a far too simplistic and passive a representation of the process of understanding. In other words, ‘hearing’ and ‘listening’ were satisfactory and suitable only to the non-dialogical theories of meaning in which the artificial passive and objective understanding could be presumed.

In contrast, the dialogical theory of meaning does not conceptualise any utterance as passive. Moreover, every understanding is an act of authoring. This authoring is of a lesser intensity when compared to the act of authoring on the side of the author of the utterance. Nevertheless, it is still an act of authoring with all the features of formation of evaluative consciousness on the side of the recipient of the utterance.

The main and in a way paradoxal outcome of the act of authoring is that there are the following three voices to be heard in every utterance: the voice of the image of the author, the authorised heroes in the utterance, the superaddressee/image of the recipient of the utterance. However, the paradox is that the only voice that can

\textsuperscript{79} See Green, p. 35.  
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., p. 34.
never be heard is the voice of the real, primary author. The primary author always ‘cloths himself in silence’, Bakhtin wrote.81

Furthermore, because of dialogic overtones in the process of both speaking and hearing, every voice is in a way doubled.82 The double-voicedness is a literary phenomenon which dictates that a clear delineation between the voices of the author and the voice of the heroes he/she has authorised is not possible. The reason for this is that each of the voices in an utterance is, in a more or less direct way, influenced by, and part of, the presentation of the author’s voice.83 In the same way, every understanding or exposition of an utterance of ‘others’ is also a presentation of the voice of the person who presents the utterance of ‘others’.84

This problem of literary representation is most obvious in any ‘history of an artist’ style in which an author authorises an image of himself/herself in an artistic work about himself/herself. A typical biblical example of this literary phenomenon is the image of Moses in the Pentateuch/Torah. Namely, the image of Moses is presented as composing the account of Israel’s wandering on their way out of Egypt to the Promised Land. Thus, no matter how accurate the historical account of Moses is in his writings, it is still a (selective/censored) image of him, authorised by himself.

Nevertheless, double-voicedness has the result that the same speech/writing, in the same context, bears a different meaning for different audiences. In other words, a different audience (may be present at the same time and place) will hear/comprehend a different voice, conveying a different message, while listening to the same speech, of the same person, under same circumstances of the speech act (or writing).

81 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 149.
82 See Green, p. 35.
83 This double voicedness of every representation is especially obvious in the carnival genre, where the author is a spectator and each spectator is an author as well (see carnival features in Section 2.2.8 below).
84 See Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, pp. 110-16.
A typical biblical example of this phenomenon, I suggest, is the question posed by the Pharaoh’s servants in Exodus 10.7 ‘How long shall this fellow be a snare to us?’ A logical question to be asked, by a contemporary (today’s) reader, is who that ‘fellow’ was. Namely, in verse 3, it is stated that both Aaron and Moses went to Pharaoh, ‘and said …’. Furthermore, from Exodus 4.15,16 and 7.1,2 the today’s reader/listener can understand that it was not Moses who uttered the words, but Aaron, according to the agreement between God, Moses and Aaron. Nevertheless, the utterance itself was in the first person singular, that is, as if God himself had uttered it (10.3-6).

Clearly, the Pharaoh and his servants had several possibilities in regards to the author of the utterance heard: Moses, Aaron or God. Nevertheless, the explicitness of this ambiguity is brought to the fore with an inconsistency in terms of the number of persons speaking. As mentioned, in the beginning of verse 3, both Moses and Aaron are described as those who ‘went in and said …’ However, after finishing the utterance (verse 6), only one unspecified person was described as the one who ‘turned and went out’. Nevertheless, both Moses and Aaron were brought back to Pharaoh, according to verse 8. Who was thus the ‘fellow’ in verse 7?

While higher criticism looks for solutions on the basis of the text being a composite of many pieces (as will be explained in Chapter 3), Bakhtinian criticism sees double-voicedness as a feasible solution to these apparent inconsistencies in the text since double-voicedness is anyway present in every single discourse. Fighting against double-voicedness to clear the biblical text from it is no less of a utopia than Don Quixote’s attempt to make this world windmill free. More precisely, the difference between utterances regarding double-voicedness is only in the degree of explicitness in the double-voicedness. Thus, contrary to this extremely explicit double-voicedness in the biblical example above, double-voicedness is implicit, for example, in every claim that

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85 NRSV translation.
the Scriptures convey the ‘word’ or ‘voice’ of God.\textsuperscript{86} Nevertheless, this double-voicedness of every utterance makes the introduction of the term dialogism a necessity. While double-voicedness assumes the underdeveloped borders between the author and the voices in the utterance (as explained above), the dialogism assumes the underdeveloped borders between the image of the author and the image of the recipient in the utterance. The latter assumption is best explained when dialogism is contrasted to monologue and dialogue.

2.2.5 Dialogism vs. Monologue and Dialogue

Dialogism is the term used by Bakhtin, with the intention of rejecting the much more common term ‘dialogue’. The intention was, of course, to make the clearest possible distinction between the presuppositions entertained by non-dialogical literary theories and the presuppositions entertained by Bakhtin.

According to Bakhtin, dialogue is often used as an antonym to the word monologue. Accordingly, dialogue is a term that designates exchange of thoughts/utterances between two partners. By this definition, it could be assumed that the engagement of the parties in dialogue may be partial, especially on the side of the recipient of the utterance of the ‘other’ voice in the dialogue. In fact, if dialogue can be seen as an extended version of monologue, it can be assumed that dialogue can also be dismantled into a number of monologues. Thus, an utterance in a dialogue (comprehended as a two-part monologue) could be perceived as self-sufficient, i.e. without a need for the other party in the dialogue.

In contrast, in dialogical methodology, no utterance is monological. ‘The expression of an utterance always responds to a greater or lesser degree, that is, it expresses the speaker’s attitude toward other’s utterances and not just his attitude toward the object of his utterance’, Bakhtin wrote.\textsuperscript{87} In other words, the usage of the newly coined term ‘dialogism’ draws attention to more than just a mere exchange of thoughts/utterances between two parties. Dialogism includes not only participation of the two parties, but also full engagement of the parties. The

\textsuperscript{86} Accordingly, for example, the claim in 2 Chronicles 36.15,16 follows this logic.

\textsuperscript{87} Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 92.
focus is on not only what has been said, but also on the whole being of the person who said it. Dialogism is not only about exchange of thoughts, but also to a greater extent about engagement of persons.

Finally, this holistic view on mutual influence of the both parties in the dialogism enables Bakhtin’s literary theory to become a holistic methodology for socio-psychological analysis of structures of any society.\textsuperscript{88} In other words, whilst the term dialogue puts the focus on the mutual influence between two parties only, dialogism sets a basis for an analysis of mutual influence of an unlimited number of parties within a society as a whole. This engagement of multiple parties present in every dialogism is most comprehensively conveyed by the phenomenon called polyphony.

2.2.6 Polyphony vs. Monophonic Autocracy

Polyphony is a literary phenomenon in which mutual engagement of more than two voices takes place at the same time. Thus, a polyphonic analysis of an utterance presents an analysis of the utterance based on listening to all the voices that can be heard when analysing the utterance (i.e. voices of all the characters in the utterance, the voice of the image of the author, the voice of the audience to whom the utterance is addressed in the first place, the voice of the contemporary addressee/s, etc.). Consequently, polyphony and dialogism can be used as synonyms,\textsuperscript{89} even though there is a slight difference between them. Namely, the difference is in the level of engagement conveyed by the two terms. More precisely, polyphony is concerned with the engagement of voices in the utterance as a whole (that is with the ‘macrocosmic structure of the text’). In contrast, dialogism is a broader term, being able to denote also the engagement that takes place on the level of the actual parts of the utterance (i.e. with ‘reciprocating

\textsuperscript{88} See for example Bakhtin’s argument that familial and intimate style and genres were used in the Renaissance in order to ‘destroy the official medieval picture of the world’. See Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 97.

mechanisms within the smaller units of exchange, down to the individual word’).\textsuperscript{90}

Nevertheless, every utterance can be analysed in the polyphonic fashion. More precisely, dialogic overtones in every utterance facilitate multiple voices to contribute to developing the meaning of the utterance. Thus, every utterance has a certain potential for more than one voice to be heard in it. In practice, this means that no voice has any autocracy over other voices in the utterance. In other words, since the voice of the author’s image is present not only in the author’s voice but also in the voices of every character that the author has authorised, there is no basis upon which any of the authorised voices should lay claim to the position of the ‘main’ voice. Very often the ‘main’ character is not the one through which the ‘leading’ (in the sense of the closest to the moral ideal) voice is to be heard. For example, King David’s voice in the Bible is the ‘leading’ and ‘truthful’ one when commanding and initiating the building of the Temple for God. However, it is Nathan the prophet’s voice that takes over the ‘leading’ position from David’s voice, when Nathan makes David realise and admit his sins regarding Uriah and his wife (see 2 Samuel 11).

Thus, the inevitable question is: Upon what basis should which we should decide which voice is to be followed among the many voices ‘heard’ whilst reading/listening to a specific biblical passage? No monological treatment of the text as an utterance can provide the answer since no voice is ultimately correct. Every voice has a certain degree of truthfulness and correctness from case to case, from specific situation to specific situation. Every voice is to be analysed only as a part of the whole, with its specific role in the polyphony of voices.

In addition, in Chapter 3 I will argue that every utterance should be seen as a part of a paradigm in which the utterance is uttered. Accordingly, when it comes to the validity of every single voice, my understanding is that all voices in an

utterance borrow their validity from the metaphysical aspect of the paradigm (i.e. they share in conveying the image of the paradigm which is authorised by the author of the utterance, in which these voices are found).

Furthermore, in addition to the polyphony present in every utterance as a whole, there is also the phenomenon of polyphonic features of a character (hero) in an utterance. A polyphonic character is a complex character in which more than one voice can be heard. Indeed, the polyphonic character is the result of an act of authoring in which the author has authorised a new being by modes of dialogic overtones that are intermingled into one new whole, the new authorised character/hero. A typical example is King Saul’s personality within the biblical opus.91

In addition to the polyphonic characters, complex meaning (incorporating the unchangeable literal and changeable pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings) of an utterance is developed by the presence of all the voices in the utterance, and by the possibility for every voice to adapt itself to the specific situation in which the utterance is supposed to convey meaning.

2.2.7 HETEROGLOSSIA VS. CANONICAL UNIFORMITY OF LANGUAGE

While polyphony assumes vague borders in the hierarchy between the voices in the utterance (as explained above), heteroglossia assumes vague borders between styles of speeches within the utterance. This socio-psychological aspect of Bakhtin’s literary theory makes the theory sensitive to non-grammatical and purely referentially semantic dialogic overtones of genres used by each person in different spheres of communication.92 Meaning that, every person uses different styles in different spheres in everyday dynamics of speech communication. For example, the same person will speak differently when in court, compared to the style used when proclaiming his/her love for a beloved person. Thus, heteroglossia is the literary phenomenon that utilises the ability of voices to use

91 See for example Barbara Green’s analysis of the complex polyphonic personality of King Saul, in Green, pp. 67-134.
92 See Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 93.
(adapt to) different styles of speeches according to the context of discourse. A practical outcome of heteroglossia is that it is only the analysis done in this kind of dialogical fashion that is able to provide insights to the different meanings one voice can convey with different styles in different contexts of conversation.

Heteroglossia is not to be equated with double-voicedness (see Section 2.2.4 above), nor polyphony, as explained above (in Section 2.2.6). More precisely, polyphony is concerned with the presence of many voices, double-voicedness with layers of one voice, and heteroglossia with the adaptability/pluriformity of a voice. However, both heteroglossia and double-voicedness stand in opposition to any presupposition that either language as a dialogical system or its usage in practice can be uniformed in any way. Accordingly, any uniformity of a language can be achieved only on the level of a grammatical system. In contrast, meaning is conveyed and determined by the clues that are non-grammatical, but dialogical and thus unable to be made uniform.

Accordingly, heteroglossia is the force that drives a language to develop as a living entity, living its life in all the contexts, together with the voices that use the language. The force opposite to heteroglossia is social uniformity of language that forces the language to become standardised to a specific frame, acceptable in certain, stereotypic social contexts. However, both heteroglossia and uniformity are essential for language to function as a tool for discourse. Namely, without certain stereotypes, specific to certain social contexts, the language is deprived of referential points, which are necessary for meaning to be conveyed. In other words, without these kinds of stereotypes, one can never comprehend the stylistic figures based on the language ‘crossing the borders’ of what is expectable and acceptable in a certain social context. More precisely, comic, satirical or ironic utterances are not comprehensible unless on the basis of what is known as socially expectable in a given context.

Still, too much rigidity would equally deprive the language of its feasibility in conveying comic, satirical, or ironic meaning, since without the flexibility of language to cross the borders of what has become a stereotype, no contrast to the
stereotype can be conveyed. In this sense, one can recognise centrifugal and
centripetal forces at work in the formation of every utterance. Thus, canonisation
(of an utterance) is the final stage of the process of interaction of centrifugal and
centripetal forces in formation of an utterance, resulting in blurring the
heteroglossity of its voices and making its form rigid. Accordingly, newly
canonised stereotypes are perpetually established, whilst language constantly
seeks for new breaches of the stereotypes.

More precisely, the centrifugal forces at work in the process of the formation of
an utterance are heteroglossia and re-accentuation. Here, re-accentuation is a
literary technic by which the changing of accents in an utterance, and accordingly
of meaning, is achieved. In contrast, accentuation is the literary technic which
utilises dialogical overtones as accents in an utterance, and which thus narrows
the scope of possible meanings the utterance can convey. The dialogical
overtones, as the accents in an utterance, highlight the direction of the utterance
towards another utterance, to which the directed utterance corresponds.

In Chapter 3 (particularly in Section 3.5.2.4 below), I will argue that the same
centripetal and centrifugal forces which interact in the formation of every
utterance (i.e. accentuation and re-accentuation) are evident in the case of the
Scriptures as an utterance. More precisely, I will utilise the concepts of
canonisation, accentuation and direction of an utterance in relation to the
phenomenon of Scriptures.

Here, it is important to understand that canonisation is the outcome of a dynamic
process of accentuation of an utterance by establishing dialogical overtones in the
utterance. However, genres (i.e. fairly stable forms of utterances) affect the
tendency of utterances to be accentuated and canonised. In other words, not all
genres are equally suitable for accentuation and canonisation of utterances. The
genre for which canonisation is the most difficult to attain is carnival with its
grotesque realism. The carnival genre is also the genre by which the presentation

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of Bakhtinian understanding of the world reaches its peak, by having all borders in the world vague and undeveloped.

2.2.8 **Carnival and Grotesque vs. Idealised Boundaries**

Probably the most complex genre to analyse with the non-dialogical theories of meaning is carnival with its relation to the grotesque realism. Conversely, it is the genre in which the functionality and dynamics of the dialogical theory of meaning can be applied at its best. The dialogical theory of meaning, with its focus on the dialogic overtones, enables critics to understand the cultural, ideological and historical backgrounds of ideas entertained by each specific carnival.

Only in a dialogical representation of the world (that is where the world has vague borders) can a street performance be utilised as a literary tool. In other words, only in the Bakhtinian dialogism can the link between the grotesque realism on the street and the grotesque realism in the text be comprehended. Owing to this strong link between the (grotesque) literature and the (grotesque) event, Bakhtin was able to apply his socio-political analysis of the sixteenth-century literary work of Rabelais\(^4\) to an analysis of the twentieth-century political situation in the Stalinist Soviet Union.

Accordingly, within the dialogical methodology, no political phenomenon is to be treated as if performed in isolation. Therefore, no political situation is totally new, but is always, in a way, a form of previous political changes. Thus, what was taking place on the political stage in the Stalinist Soviet Union in the twentieth century could be easily expressed by the same literary style that was used to criticise the political stage of fifteenth-century feudalism, as presented in Rabelais' literary work.\(^5\)

\(^4\) See for example, an 1894 edition of the English translation of all the five novels of Rabelais (originally written between 1532 CE and 1552 CE in French) in Francis Rabelais, *The Works of Rabelais* (Derby: Moray Press, 1894).

\(^5\) Nevertheless, recent studies in mediaeval history have shown that Bakhtin’s analysis of the medieval social context and its usage of carnival was too simplified. However, I agree with Brandist’s argument that Bakhtin approached carnival with a focus on a literary form (even as a ‘proto-genre’) and not focussing on it as a historical socio-political phenomenon. For Bakhtin, the
In the case of other literary genres, this cross-cultural and inter-political bridging may also have been done more or less successfully within also a non-dialogical theory of meaning. However, in the case of carnival and its grotesque realism, it is the dialogical theory only, which provides the insights in the dialogical links between different cultures, politics and literature. More precisely, carnival is the genre that has a number of such characteristics that it is not possible for the genre to function within the non-dialogical theory. I am thus concurring with Bakhtin that analysis of the phenomenon of carnival leads to a better understanding of the most dialogical presentation of the world.

What are the main characteristics of the carnival spectacle? Firstly, the carnival always contains an element of ritual. The element of ritual in carnivals is exploited in the context of profanation. In the case of profanation of religious ideas, the objects of the ideas are profaned to the level of the body, in terms that objects and persons that are under any other circumstances untouchable, separated and sacred, become touchable, common and profane in a carnival. Therefore, there is a blurring of borders between the sacred and the profane within carnival. In addition, an annihilation of the borders between the performers/authors and spectators/audience takes place at a carnival. In the context of speech, the audience and the authors are the same voices (the same consciousness). Consequently, there is no hierarchy among voices at a carnival; instead, everything is led by ‘mass action’. This absence of any hierarchical structure leads to a diminishing of all socio-political borders at the spectacle. In

latter was only an outcome of anthropolo gy expressed by the carnival genre. Thus, Bakhtin’s contribution to the literary analysis of carnival as genre is undisputable. See Brandist, *The Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture and Politics*, pp. 137-40, 48-49. However, for more on refinements of Bakhtinian analysis of carnival as a philosophical and socio-political phenomenon, see Chris Humphrey, ‘Bakhtin and the Study of Popular Culture: Re-thinking Carnival as a Historical and Analytical Concept’, in *Materializing Bakhtin: The Bakhtin Circle and Social Theory*, ed. by Craig Brandist and Galin Tihanov (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 164-72; Brandist, *The Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture and Politics*, pp. 176-91.


7 On carnival in the pre-Reformation liturgical calendar as the historical background for both Rabelais and subsequent literary usage of carnival, see Carol Clark, ‘Carnival’, in *The Rabelais Encyclopedia*, ed. by Elizabeth Chesney Zegura, (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2004), pp. 28-29.


9 See Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics*, p. 123.
the mass of voices taking part in the event, all borders between social and political strata in the society become totally ineffective.\footnote{Vice, Introducing Bakhtin, p. 152.}

Accordingly, there is always a motif of throning and dethroning (as well as of crowning and decrowning) of the carnival king.\footnote{Bakhtin, \textit{Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics}, pp. 124–27. On the relation between imitation (of a hierarchical role model) and parody, see JoAnn DellaNeva, ‘Imitation and Parody’, in \textit{The Rabelais Encyclopedia}, ed. by Elizabeth Chesney Zegura, (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2004), pp. 126-27.}

Finally, the culmination of the process of making all the borders ineffective exploits the idea of death and new life. This degradation of all the possible borders at the carnival also demolishes the border between the death and rebirth, that is, the border between this life and the future life.\footnote{Bakhtin, \textit{Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics}, p. 8.}

The main outcome of this eradication of all the borders is the motif of happiness and freedom for everyone. This motif of happiness is at a carnival always expressed as undividable from irony/satire. This aspect of carnival reaches its climax in carnival parody and comic shows.\footnote{Nevertheless, the laughter aspect is only partially preserved in modern parodies. See ibid., p. 128. On inseparability of humour and satire in the carnival genre, see John Parkin, ‘Humor’, in \textit{The Rabelais Encyclopedia}, ed. by Elizabeth Chesney Zegura, (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2004), pp. 122-24; Bernd Renner, ‘Satire (Satyre)’, in \textit{The Rabelais Encyclopedia}, ed. by Elizabeth Chesney Zegura, (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2004), pp. 223-24. On the function of laughter in desecration of both the official language and rigid official norms, see Brandist, \textit{The Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture and Politics}, pp. 126-28.}

During the comic shows, the last border to be annihilated is the border between an event and a literary work.\footnote{See Bakhtin, \textit{Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics}, pp. 132, 159, 165.}

Thus, the curses, jargon and ironic language penetrate literature with the purpose of destroying all conventions concerning the boundaries expected of standardised language and an artistic work. Consequently, the grotesque realism as the outcome of the carnival spectacle is a presentation of the world in which none of its boundaries are developed, constant or firm.

Accordingly, I suggest that the carnival genre is defined as the form of utterances which features a horizon of expectations (i.e. an expectable style), brought to an utterance that is used with the purpose of developing a grotesque representation
of the world, in which the world is in its unfinished form, with all its boundaries under development and movable. Thus, the main difference between the grotesque in comparison with classical realism is in the presentation of boundaries between societies, social strata, individuals and the representation of human body.\textsuperscript{105}

Classical realism presents boundaries between social strata, as if no change between them is possible. The boundaries are not fluid or porous.\textsuperscript{106} The same is true of boundaries between bodies. The focus is on the body as single, delineated from the rest of society and the world. The body is always in its finished form, as an ideal body.\textsuperscript{107}

In contrast, in grotesque realism the focus is on either the body as a part of the society – ‘body of the people as a whole’\textsuperscript{108} – or the individual body, but always in its unfinished form, with boundaries ‘in development’. The focus is on all that the development includes: ‘Eating, drinking, defection and other elimination (sweating, blowing of the nose, sneezing), as well as copulation, pregnancy, dismemberment, swallowing up by another body…’\textsuperscript{109}

Consequently, in grotesque realism, moving the boundaries, described above, is seen as positive, even essential, whilst in classical realism changing the

\textsuperscript{105} For further research, it would be beneficial to investigate different accents of grotesque realism developed by Bakhtin and Julia Kristeva, for example. See Julia Kristeva, ‘Word, Dialogue and Novel’, in Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, ed. by Leon Roudiez, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), pp. 64-91 (pp. 65,78); Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. by Leon Roudiez (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1980; repr. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 2-5, 85, 105, 38-205. Since the theories of grotesque are not the main focus of my presentation here, I will not present in detail the differences between the Bakhtin’s and Kristeva’s theories. For a detailed study of the two see Vice, Introducing Bakhtin, pp. 162-76. For G.W. Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) and Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) as the two philosophers who provided the philosophical background for Bakhtinian analysis of grotesque, see Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture and Politics, pp. 140-43.


\textsuperscript{107} See Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, p. 25; Vice, Introducing Bakhtin, pp. 155-57.

\textsuperscript{108} See ibid., p. 153

boundaries is always seen as negative, as profaning and defiling the already
developed ideal (of a society, an individual or a body). Hence, classical realism
and grotesque realism comprehend maternal motifs (with the womb as the main
motif) and death motifs in ironic texts differently. According to the classical view
on boundaries, the womb and death are seen as the beginnings and ends filled
with emotions of fright.

In opposition, according to the medieval form of grotesque, there is no
delineation between beginnings and ends, nor is there any place for frightening
emotions. In the grotesque, life contains death. Every death or end is in essence a
form of giving place for new life and new beginning.

These are these features of the grotesque realism that made it so suitable for
expressing views of those social-strata classes that desired change in society.
People from the oppressed social echelons longed for the carnival situation where
there is no difference made between the poor and the rich, between the upper
stratum and the lower stratum in the society. Grotesque realism is a desire for
change that will bring life out of death.

Finally, a link between the carnival genre and some ‘carnival type’ episodes in
biblical narratives has already been recognised by OT scholars. However, I
believe, it is important not to limit grotesque realism to its form only, but to
imply the realism on the level of ideas as well. Accordingly, Bakhtin himself
missed the opportunity to apply his theory to its full extent exactly because he
focused on the analysis of literary texts on the level of grotesque forms, instead of
applying the theory on the level of grotesque ideas, as well. Hence, the lack of,
for example, gender sensitivity in Bakhtin’s literary analysis. Nevertheless, as
will be shown in Chapter 3, the feminist interpretations utilising Bakhtinian

See for example, Charles M. Rix, ‘Carnivalizing Sinai: A Bakhtinian Reading of Exodus 32.’
Tears: Carnivalistic Overtones in the Stories of Sarah and Hagar’, Perspectives in Religious
Studies, 32 (Fall 2005), 295-308;

165.
criticism are now numerous, only some thirty years since the publication of Phyllis Trible’s God and Rhetoric of Sexuality in 1978.

Nevertheless, it seems to me that the conflict between the two views on boundaries (classical realism versus grotesque realism) is also important when the delineation between the sanctified and the profane, between the edible and the non-edible, between life and death, is in focus in ‘carnival scenes’ in the Pentateuch/Torah, such as the example of the Golden Calf scene in Exodus 32.

Besides this obvious example of carnival in the Pentateuch/Torah, it would seem that in the context in which the Pentateuch/Torah was written, the ‘lower bodily stratum’ together with the ‘lower bodily acts’ (with all the images of birth, fertility, copulative bonding, genital organs …) have not been regarded as an inappropriate part of a religious discourse. Hence the presence of all the ‘lower bodily images’ scattered throughout the Pentateuch/Torah, without the disgust that the same grotesque images would necessarily prompt in contemporary literary and religious context. This is to say that in biblical writings, along with the general use of euphemism, lower bodily images had not ceased to convey positive meaning, as well as the potentially negative, whilst in contemporary grotesque fashion, only the latter meaning survives. Hence, biblical images of lower bodily stratum were still applicable for representation of divine visions and laws. Thus, it seems to me that carnival and grotesque motifs, present in the Bible, provide insights into ideas that are otherwise out of reach for a ‘non-dialogical’ reader.

After introducing all the essential elements for understanding the dynamics of Bakhtinian dialogism, I can draw some profound conclusions here regarding the

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113 See Ezekiel 16 as a typical example.
114 Regarding the degradation of potentially positive meaning of these images in contemporary literary culture see Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, pp. 147-50; Vice, Introducing Bakhtin, p. 181.
115 However, this is only a digression, concerned with the potential for further research. Accordingly, see the provocative analysis of the biblical images of sexuality in Howard Eilberg-Schwartz, God’s Phallus and Other Problems for Men and Monotheism (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1994; repr. 1995).
effect this dialogism has on my concept of communication in general, and biblical interpretation in particular. More precisely, since my plan is to integrate Bakhtinian dialogism into my theory of meaning, I will here explain the effect of this dialogism on a non-conduit model of communication.

2.2.9 CONCLUSION: CENTRES OF MEANING AND CANONISED IMAGES

Bakhtinian dialogism is shown to provide tools for seeing borders in reality as underdeveloped and gaps as bridgeable. This dialogical concept of reality affects one’s concept of meaning. A centre of meaning is by definition a source of information available to the recipient of an utterance regarding specific characteristics of the utterance. (See Section 1.3 above.) I have already introduced the five centres of meaning as A - the historical events and ideas in which the religious writings originated; B - the author(s) of the compiled texts; C - the compiled writings; D – the text’s ancient first reader(s); E - its contemporary reader(s). I have also concluded that according to the non-conduit models of communication, every interpretation is a cognitive process related to these five centres of meaning. To incorporate Bakhtinian dialogism to my theory of meaning, I need to analyse how this dialogism affects my concept of the centres of meaning. I will begin the analysis with Barton’s suggestion on how to visualise the centres of meaning.

Barton has suggested the following Illustration 6 below in order to present his four centres of meaning: Historical Events or Theological Ideas, Author, Text, and Recipient of the text.¹¹⁶

Illustration 6: Barton’s Centres of Meaning

The roles of the ‘Author’, ‘Text’ and ‘Reader’ on the Illustration 6 above are essential in any model of communication. However, Barton adds ‘Historical Events or Theological Ideas’ as a separate centre. According to Barton, this centre represents the ideas present in the author’s world and time and thus available for the reader and his contemporaries. I concur with Barton in that this centre is indeed distinguishable from the other centres of meaning.

I will however, take a step further and modify Barton’s centres of meaning by dividing his ‘Reader’ on ‘Ancient First Recipient(s)’ and Contemporary Recipient(s). I will also assign a letter to each of the centres. Thus, I have the five centres of meaning, as presented in the following Illustration 7 below.

Illustration 7: Five Centres of Meaning

A. Historical Events or Theological Ideas

B. Author(s)  D. Ancient First Recipient  E. Contemporary Recipient

C. Text
By these adjustments of Barton’s illustration, I am able to illustrate my five centres of meaning, i.e. A - the historical events and ideas in which the religious writings originated; B - the author(s) of the compiled texts; C - the compiled writings; D – the text’s ancient first recipient(s); E - its contemporary recipient(s).

As presented in Section 2.2.4 above, the act of authoring in Bakhtinian dialogism demands that the more accurate presentation of the relations between the centres of meaning incorporates the idea of images of these five centres. Thus, instead of seeing the author of the text, the reader appropriates only an image of the author, as the image is authored in the text. The same kind of authored image of other centres of meaning is found in the text. Thus, according to my interpretation of Bakhtinian dialogism, the centres of meaning should be more appropriately visualised as in the Illustration 8 below.
Illustration 8: Centres of Meaning after Application of Bakhtinian Theory

There are five details in this illustration that need to be explained (where A’ to E’ are five centres of meaning and five images of the centres of meaning). Thus, firstly, centres of meaning/voice (marked as A’ to E’) are understood as acquiring an image (images here represented by letters A to E). Secondly, an image of a voice is closer to the text than the actual/real voice. Thus, the real voice is marked as X’ counterpart of X (the image of x voice). Thirdly, both the images of voices and voices themselves are represented with letters of equal size, making the point that they are all equally represented in the polyphony featured in a text.

However, in addition to the centres of meaning visualised in this illustration, it is also true that Bakhtinian dialogism recognises one important difference between
the voices, a difference that is not visualised on this illustration. Namely, the
image of the voice of the author is, according to Bakhtin, directly accessible only
in the poetic genre, where monophony of the author’s voice is featured. (Even
when the poetic utterance makes use of other voices, it still features specific
hegemony of the author’s voice/consciousness.) Accordingly, in other genres,
representation of the author’s consciousness is distributed across the voices
he/she has authorised and, thus, is never fully accessible in a direct way.\footnote{As quoted earlier, the author always ‘clothes himself in silence’. (Bakhtin, \textit{Speech Genres and Other Late Essays}, p. 149.)} However, I was not able to visualise this distinction on the illustration above.
Since the scope of my research in this thesis is limited to reading the narrative
text in Exodus 16 (in Chapter 4), this lack of accuracy in the illustration will in
any case not affect my application of the theory I am illustrating here.

Fourthly, the illustration above visualises some important aspects of the C and C’
centres of meaning. Namely, every written canon of Scriptures is the outcome of
a process of selecting some written utterances from amongst scriptural variants.
Accordingly, the ‘authentic’ voice is not the C centre (that is the canonical
image), but the variants in C’, which were the historical basis/background for the
development of the canonical image, which eventually got to be (recognised as)
authorised by a community of faith.

In this sense, any given Bible is only an image of many voices represented by the
scriptural variants. However, regardless of the authenticity of the previous
variants, the author’s intention is to make a new image of the variants, the new
compilation. In these terms, the act of authoring is seen as the act of recompiling
the words and thoughts of ‘others’. In other words, the act of authoring the Bible
is based on making old utterances new by re-accentuating them so that the
scriptural variants become a new compilation, a new utterance. This re-
accentuation is, more precisely, rearrangement of dialogical overtones in the
utterance. The new utterance (i.e. the newly compiled text) is re-accentuated in
the way that it fits the author’s intention to convey his/her image of the world and
time in the utterance.
This image of the world and time, as it is established in the compiled utterance, introduces the last detail in the Illustration 8 above. Thus finally, the C - the compiled writings centre is conceptualised as an utterance which manifests an image of the paradigm the author intended to convey. In this sense, the C – centre is part of ‘Faith-life imagery’ detail on Illustration 5 above. The Bible becomes part of rituals in one tradition. More precisely, the Bible is part of visible manifestations of a master narrative and a symbol of communal identity.

As a symbol of communal identity, the Bible utilises the field of cognitive gravity surrounding the Bible (i.e. the field in which other utterances are cognitively drawn closer to the Bible to stabilise their pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings). The stabilisation is achieved by experiencing either challenging or frustrating irritants perceived in those other utterances. To analyse a community’s master narrative, one has to analyse the explicit manifestations of the narrative and its cognitive attraction in contrast to its potential dependence on other utterances. If the Bible is perceived as an utterance with a master narrative (or as the master narrative itself), it means that the reader experiences cognitive attraction, and perceives other sources of meaning with other utterances as dependent from the master narrative. Moreover, the Bible is part of the symbols of communal identity.

This comparison and merging of Illustrations 5 and 8 above, represents a conceptual merging of the Kuhnian theory of paradigms and the Bakhtinian theory of literature. This conclusion leads us further towards understanding the act of authoring as an act of canonisation. Namely, the author’s plan with authoring an utterance is to eventually convey faith-life images which will reach the recipient of the utterance (e.g. images of the voice of the author, images of other voices in the utterance, image of community, world, time, and of the whole paradigm). The author’s plan with authoring is the basis for the Bakhtinian concept of canonisation.

Every given Bible is, in Bakhtinian terms, a canonised utterance, i.e. an utterance of ‘others’ which was accentuated by the effect of centrifugal and centripetal
forces. (See Section 2.2.7 above.) According to Bakhtin, these centripetal and centrifugal forces make their impact through processes of accentuation and re-accentuation of the utterance, respectively.

The new utterance is thus canonised, in the sense that the author’s intention is preserved as long as the accents in the utterance are intact. A re-accentuation of the utterance will possibly change the previous accents, and perhaps indirectly the master narrative promoted by the text, and consequently, the paradigm conveyed by the text. Because of this effect of re-accentuation, the focus on the dialogical overtones is so critical in the dialogical theory of meaning.

However, the matter of canonisation in biblical studies, as an issue of authority is not of consequence for this thesis in general, nor of my analysis of the Bakhtinian concept of canonisation in particular. My third presupposition in Section 1.5 above is related to the issue of biblical canon though, but that presupposition is here understood as a unique case of the general concept of canonisation in the Bakhtinian theory of literature. In other words, my presupposition regarding who or what has led the centrifugal and the centripetal forces to make an impact on the biblical compilations to finally be accentuated the way they are, is a matter of my personal belief.

The Bakhtinian concept of accentuation is concerned with the effect of the process regardless of what the reason for the process was. In this sense, the question of canonisation as a matter of authority is not an issue in the realm of Bakhtinian dialogism. Every single utterance is accentuated in a certain way. If this accentuation is preserved, in one way or another, the canonisation is effective. In contrast, if an act of re-accentuation is allowed to take place, the process of canonisation has failed.

Accordingly, when I, as a reader, read a given version of the Bible, I am indeed reading an accentuated utterance. In this sense, the process of re-accentuation is completed, since I am reading an actual text which does not change during the process of reading, regardless of the fact about whether another example of the same book exists in the world, or whether someone else has read it. With regard
to the ideas and words, they are always ideas and words of the ‘others’ as in other than the author. In contrast, the choice of canonisation of new accents in a new utterance is that of the author.

Thus, my belief that there is a Being that has affected the process of re-accentuating the finally canonised Bible, with regard to the given version I am reading, is seen as one of many choices for belief, the choices which are all in harmony with the Bakhtinian concept of canonisation.

According to Bakhtin, this concept of canonisation is not limited to the canonisation of only a textual utterance. Any other artefact of human activity is seen as an accentuated utterance. In fact, the whole speech act is an utterance, according to the non-conduit models of communication. Since every unchanged utterance is a canonised utterance, the canonisation is a matter of rituals regardless of their type or form. As long as they are not changed, they are in fact canonised rituals. Every not re-accentuated text is thus a form of a ritual.

Thus, the Bakhtinian concept of canonisation represents all forms of human activity as a conflict between accentuation and re-accentuation, between old canons and new canons, rigidity and change. This concept affects one’s understanding of the process of interpretation. Namely, interpretation is thus understood as an enquiry regarding competitive and conflicting canons.

The reader’s plan is to recognise the traces of the author’s act of canonisation. The problem, however, is that the reader sees an unlimited number of canons, all competing for the reader’s attention. As introduced in Section 1.3 above, the competition is based on the vicious circle in compiled utterances. Here, in the context of the Bakhtinian concept of canonisation, every utterance is a compilation. Even more, every utterance is a representation of three chronotopes, internal, formal and external. Each of them is accentuated and perceived as canonised.

Which representation of reality of time and space should the reader prioritise? By using the example from chronotopes in Deuteronomy 32 analysed in Section
2.2.2 above, I can see the contest between the chronotope as seen from Moses’ point of view and the chronotope as seen from the narrator’s point of view. I as the reader have to make a choice how I will relate my understanding of my world and time (i.e. the contemporary reader’s chronotope) to the chronotopes represented in and by the text I am reading. This choice is subject to what I as a reader find the most relevant to my world and time. In this sense, the act of interpretation is an act of evaluating the relevance of competing canonised representations of reality. Therefore, I need to integrate a relevance theory into my theory of meaning. This is the purpose of the following Section.

2.3 INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF RELEVANCE

I will argue that the theory of relevance, as presented by Sperber and Wilson and consequently applied to the issue of centres of meaning and the issue of contexts, will provide the tools needed to recognise the dialogical overtones as they are canonised in a given text. (Note that here and in the rest of the thesis, I use the terms canonisation and canon as it was presented in Sections 2.2.7 and 2.2.9 above.) Furthermore, in Chapter 3 below, I will develop my theory of meaning by utilising those tools in combination with the tools provided by my previous two pillar theories (of paradigms, and of literature).

I am aware of the critique and competitive theories of relevance. Accordingly, as introduced in Section 1.6 above, I do agree that the relevance theory is far

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118 As explained above, every given Bible is, in Bakhtinian terms, a canonised utterance, i.e. an utterance of ‘others’ which was accentuated by the effect of centrifugal and centripetal forces. In this sense, the process of re-accentuation is completed in the case of reading an actual text which does not change during the process of reading. The Bakhtinian concept of canonisation is applicable to any text, regardless of the fact about whether another example of the same text exists in the world, or whether someone else has read it.

119 Sperber and Wilson’s theory of relevance has been contrasted with the theory of relevance proposed by Barbara Gorayska and Roger Lindsay. The main difference between the two theories is their dissimilar focus. Namely, Gorayska and Lindsay’s theory puts its focus on pragmatic, physical problem solving. In contrast, Sperber and Wilson’s theory puts the focus on solving the problem of relationship between utterances and interpretation. As such, the latter theory is more applicable to the field of study of my research. There have also been some improvements, clarifications in the theory, made, for example, by Andreas H. Jucker and Sharmaine Seneviratne. However, those details do not affect my application of basic principles of relevance theory developed by Sperber and Wilson. See Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*, 2nd edn (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1986; repr. 1995); Roger Lindsay and Barbara Gorayska, ‘Relevance, Goal Management and Cognitive Technology’, in
from the ideal for explaining the problem of hermeneutic circle in biblical interpretation. However, combining the theory with the other two pillar theories in this thesis (theory of paradigms and literature) will prove suitable for the purpose of this thesis.

2.3.1 Sperber and Wilson’s Theory of Relevance and Klingler’s Contribution

Just as Kuhnian and Bakhtinian theories have provided the ground for decentralisation of meaning (by their sensitivity to the widest possible view on the world, and to the undeveloped borders within the world, respectively), so will the theory of relevance provide the ground for centralisation of meaning (by making the reader sensitive to apparent constants in his/her world). In particular, it will be shown that my theory of meaning (which incorporates the theory of relevance) is, in its essence, a theory about constants (since relativity cannot be comprehended without the existence of constants). When this issue of constants is seen from the perspective of the relativity of meaning, some profound conclusions will be drawn -regarding the role of a given text (canonised according to the Bakhtinian theory)\(^{120}\) in the process of formulation and transmission of a religious paradigm.

There are two main applications of the theory of relevance that I will be using in this thesis. Firstly, I will utilise the theory of relevance myself in order to develop criteria for analysis of a relevant source of information. Secondly, I will rework Klingler’s definitions of allusion and echo, and the criteria for analysing an

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\(^{120}\) Regarding the Bakhtinian concept of canonisation utilised in this thesis see Sections 2.2.7 and 2.2.9 above.
allusion, as they were developed by utilising the theory of relevance. However, firstly the basics of the theory of relevance needs to be explained.

2.3.1.1 The Basics of the Theory of Relevance

The backbone of the theory of relevance is my seventh working presupposition in this thesis, as asserted in Section 1.5 above. Namely, every person ‘automatically aims at the most efficient information processing possible.’ Arising from this main principle, three others have been formulated by Sperber and Wilson:

1. ‘[A]n assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that its contextual effects in this context are large’. Thus, the relevance of an assumption is directly proportional to its impact on the context in which the reasoning takes place.

2. ‘[A]n assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that the effort required to process it in this context is small’. In other words, the relevance of a thought/concept/assumption is indirectly proportional to the effort required to process it. Thus, the most relevant statement will be the one that impacts the context in the most powerful way, whilst using the minimum of effort available for processing the information.

3. The third principle arises when the previous two are used to define the phenomenon of the context, which, according to Sperber and Wilson’s definition, is ‘the set of premises used in interpreting an utterance’. The third principle is: In order for an utterance to be relevant to the previous utterance, it has to aim at narrowing the wider context in which the previous utterance was situated.

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121 I will approach the same issue but with a different methodology from Klingler’s. See Klingler, ‘Validity in the Identification and Interpretation of a Literary Allusion in the Hebrew Bible’ (unpublished PhD Thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary, 2010), pp. 25-77. However, his conclusions are very helpful in order to bring clarity to the otherwise ambiguous terms. (See Ibid., p. 92.) I will also aim to show where our approaches differ and what the outcomes of the differences are.
122 Sperber, p. 49.
123 See ibid., p. 125. See also Klingler, p. 149.
124 Sperber, p. 125.
125 Ibid., p. 15.
The main effect of these three principles is the ‘ostensive-inferential communication’ which is the communication model consisting of the following three elements: ‘the informative intention’, ‘the communicative intention’ and ‘the ostensive stimulus’. These elements are respectively: the author’s intention to inform the audience of something, the author’s intention to inform the audience of his/her informative intention and finally, the act of the author designed to attract the recipient’s attention and focus it on the author’s assumptions.126

More precisely, the ostensive stimulus is defined as an act which does: firstly, attract the audience’s attention, and secondly, focus the attention on the communicator's intentions.127 Furthermore, the ostensive-inferential communication is defined as the process in which the communicator (i.e. author, utterer) produces a stimulus which makes it mutually manifest to communicator and audience that the communicator intends, by means of this stimulus, to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions.128

How can this model of communication contribute to the Kuhnian theory of paradigms and the Bakhtinian theory of literature? On the one hand, from the representation of Kuhnian and Bakhtinian theories, in this Chapter, we have seen that our understanding of a text is always subject to the paradigm from within which we read the text, and therefore, the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings are always perceived as unstable. On the other hand, the principles of relevance, highlighted here, present the process of reading/rendering the utterance as the process of narrowing the context in which the unstable meanings of the utterance are to be developed and stabilised in a given act of reading.

In this sense whilst the first two theories increase the reader’s sensitivity to centrifugal forces in the process of communication (expanding the context of an

126 Sperber, p. 63.
127 Ibid., p. 153.
128 Ibid., p. 63.
utterance) the theory of relevance will increase the reader’s sensitivity to centripetal forces in the same process.

2.3.1.2 Klingler’s Application of the Theory of Relevance

Sperber and Wilson originally formulated their theory working on the matter of metaphors. It was Klingler who applied their theory to his study of the allusion as a literary technique.\(^{129}\) However, Klingler has approached the issue of intertextuality in general and the allusions in particular through the analysis of historical development of hermeneutical ideas.\(^ {130}\) This approach had the purpose of exposing the limitations of the vicious circle in dialogical hermeneutics.\(^ {131}\) Even though he is not the first to utilise that approach,\(^ {132}\) his conclusions relating to the distinction between intertextual dependence and intertextual relation are profound. Namely, Klingler (following up Jan Pauline’s arguments,\(^ {133}\) who draws on Merrill C. Tenney\(^ {134}\) and John Hollander)\(^ {135}\) argues that the difference between an echo and an allusion mirror the difference between two types of intertextuality: intertextual relation and intertextual dependence. For the purpose of this thesis, this difference between the two types of intertextuality is critical since the former type represents the dominant relations in the dialogical representation of the world, whilst the latter type of intertextuality represents the dominant relations in the non-dialogical representation of the world. Illustration 9 below, created by Klingler,\(^ {136}\) shows the relation between an echo and an allusion as the elements of two different types of intertextuality.

\(^{129}\) See Klingler, pp. 149-58.
\(^{130}\) See Chapter 2 of his PhD thesis, ibid., pp. 25-77.
\(^{131}\) Ibid., pp. 11-15.
\(^{132}\) Klingler himself follows-up extensively the work done by David West. (David West, An Introduction to Continental Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity, 1996).) See Klingler, pp. 93-94.
\(^{136}\) As taken from Klingler, p. 91.
Illustration 9: Klingler’s Intertextual Relation

The illustration above juxtaposes two types of relations that are developed according to two types of reality, namely non-dialogical (on the left hand side), and dialogical (on the right hand side). On the right hand side of the illustration above, there is only one type of intertextual relations visualised, namely echo. The key point in Klingler’s thesis is that the intertextuality represented by an
echo is an intertextual relation and that it is the type studied in most of the research done in the field of intertextuality since the shift of the paradigms.\cite{Klingler}

That research follows the basic presuppositions of the dialogic, decentralised, postpositivist paradigm and thus ends up being detached from ideas of objectiveness, author and authorial intention.

This lack of objectiveness, especially in relation to the notion of the author is the principal aspect of the intertextual relation based on the twofold (both directions) orientation of the presupposed communication in which the echo is used, i.e. the communication developed along the type of relations that we have seen as being assumed by Bakhtinian understanding of the world. Thus, according to the dialogical presuppositions, the contemporary recipient is an active participant in the process of creating the meaning of echoes in the (biblical) text, (whilst this is never the case with allusions, as they are defined by Klingler).

In contrast, the intertextuality visualised on the left hand side in the illustration above, is intertextual dependence. Klingler argued that the research pointing to this type of intertextuality is very scarce, done only by the few who have recognised that our understanding of allusions (as a literary device) is a kind of a remedy to the biblical studies that are brought to a crisis by the trends of the reader-response methods. In order for the biblical studies to recover from the crisis, Klingler argued, more research is needed to be done in order to explore relations between the author, text and recipients, as the relations develop along the clear borders in the non-dialogical representation of the world.

In accordance with this clear purpose of exploring the relations in the non-dialogical world, Klingler argued that the common characteristic of reference, citation, quotation, paraphrase and allusion is that they are all only one direction oriented. This is to say all of them are used in a communication where a communicator points back to a text of an earlier time or to an earlier part of the same text.

\cite{Klingler} Klingler, pp. 92-94.
The difference between them is explained by Klingler’s definitions, as follows.\(^{138}\) Literary reference is when an author makes a straightforward identifying mention of a person, place, or thing existing in another text with no intention for further connections to be drawn between the text doing the referring and the thing being referred to. Literary citation is a direct literary marker by which the author directly points the reader to the referenced text. Literary quotation is when an author of one text intentionally reproduces the exact words of another text. Literary paraphrase is when an author of one text intentionally reproduces the same meaning of the words of another text. Finally, literary allusion is a literary device utilised by an author whereby allusive textual markers are placed into the alluding text (i.e., developing literary context) in order to trigger meaning in a text previously alluded to (i.e., the stable meaning of a previous text) for the rhetorical function of importing that meaning into the alluding text in order to assist in determining the author’s intended meaning of the alluding text.\(^{139}\)

After clarifying these terms, Klingler applied the theory of relevance to the method of reading the Bible in general, and identifying and analysing an allusion, in particular. The method consists of the following steps:\(^{140}\)

a) Explanation of the developing textual meaning of the alluding text.

b) Identification of markers (of literary allusion).

c) Validation of the known (stable) contextual meaning of the alluded text.

d) Explanation of the rhetorical function of the allusion.

e) Explanation of meaning to be imported into the developing context of alluding text.

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\(^{138}\) Klingler, pp. 117-18.

\(^{139}\) Ibid., p. 118.

\(^{140}\) Ibid., p. 185.
It is important to note that, in order to apply these steps whilst reading a biblical text, the reader has to presuppose existence of the one-way dependence of the ‘younger’ text on the ‘older text’. In addition, the reader has to assume clear borders between the texts, as well as, between the author, the voices in the text, and the recipient(s) of the text. Also, the reader has to focus on the realm of the given text only, as if the text existed in a cognitive vacuum, independent of the rest of the reader’s reality. Therefore, the reader has to adopt a very non-dialogical and centralised understanding of the world.

The classical problem with this method (used in isolation) is not in what it focuses on, but in what the method overlooks. Explained as the vicious circle of complied texts (in Section 1.3 above) the problem of narrowing the focus on only one centre of meaning in a non-dialogical concept of reality is that such an interpretation makes the other (four) centres recede from the reader’s view. More precisely, when the reader’s focus is narrowed to C – the compiled writings centre, all the other four fade out of his/her view. The other four are (as visualised in Illustration 7 above) A – the historical events and ideas in which the religious writings originated; B – the author(s) of the compiled texts; D – the text’s ancient first reader(s); E – its contemporary reader(s).

Apart from this weakness of Klingler’s method used as part of the non-dialogical paradigm, I argue that the method is still useful in regards, at least, the following two matters. Firstly, regarding the issue of rhetoric, Klingler argues, that the possible rhetorical functions of an allusion are:\textsuperscript{141}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Metaphoric (B=A in terms of class or type). ‘This is like that.’
\item Validation (B=A in terms of fulfilment or implementation). ‘This is that.’
\item Ironic (B\neq A in terms of failure). ‘This is NOT like that!’
\item Climactic (B>A). ‘This is better than that.’
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{141} Klingler.
e) Emblematic (B<A). ‘This is not as good as that.’

By this differentiation, Klingler asserts that even in such a centralised, non-dialogical understanding of the world and the relations in it, one can be sensitive (at least to a certain degree) to rhetorical features of a text.

Secondly, regarding the issue of the literary studies, Klingler’s method contributes to our understanding of how a rather philosophical/psychological theory of relevance can be applied to a literary theory. In particular, Klingler had to adapt the basic principles of relevance so that they can be utilised in his research focused on the ‘distant text’, that is, on the text the author is alluding to, by utilising the analysed allusion.\textsuperscript{142} Thus, Klingler has restated the first principle of relevance as: the ‘[e]xtent condition 1: A distant text is relevant in an author’s context to the extent that the distant text’s contextual effects are large.’ Accordingly, ‘the extent condition 2 is restated as follows: A distant text is relevant in an author’s context to the extent that the effort required to process the distant text is small.’\textsuperscript{143}

In Klingler’s thesis, the purpose of adaptations of the original theory was to apply the relevance theory in biblical studies within a non-dialogical concept of the world. In contrast, the purpose of my thesis is to develop a theory of meaning in accordance with a dialogical concept of the world. Because of this difference, I need to address some points to Klingler’s approach, before I rework some of Klingler’s definitions.

\textit{2.3.1.3 A Response to Klingler’s Approach}

It is important to note that Klingler does not devote much attention to the difference between reader-response methods (like the one promoted by Stanley Fish, for example)\textsuperscript{144} and dialogical methods (like the one promoted by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{142} Klingler, p. 149.
\item \textsuperscript{143} The italics are the author’s.
\item \textsuperscript{144} Stanley Fish, \textit{Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980). See Klingler, pp. 35, 72, 73.
\end{itemize}
Bakhtinian scholars in biblical studies, Carol Newsom, for example). \(^{145}\)

Conversely, scholars aiming to utilise a dialogical, decentralised approach (or a variation on it) tend to clarify that difference, as, for example, Hulisani Ramantswana has done. \(^{146}\)

My understanding of this lack of the attention to the difference between reader-response methods and dialogical methods, is caused by the specific approach Klingler had when addressing the issue of the shift of paradigms. Tracing the development of hermeneutical ideas (tracking the way in which Georg Hans Gadamer, Stanley Fish, Umberto Eco, Richard Rorty and Paul Ricoeur in recent history have followed in the footsteps of René Descartes (1596-1650), David Hume (1711-76), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803), G.W. Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), and Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher (1768-1834), etc.) throughout the history of philosophy is a very interesting exercise. However, tracing the choice previous scholars/philosophers have made does not necessarily clarify the reasons for the choice. The outcomes of the choice are not a revelation considering that the shift took place half a century ago. But claiming that the philosophers in the trenches on the other side of the frontline are irresponsible and lacking honourable intentions \(^{147}\) is an even older undertaking.

Therefore, my understanding is that Klingler’s attempt to address the ‘honourability’ of Fish’s method of approach is, out of the sphere of biblical studies, then at least not a solution to the problem. This falling short of the ideal solution (and approach, I would argue) is also pointed out by Klingler himself. \(^{148}\)

\(^{145}\) Carol Newsom, ‘Bakhtin, the Bible and Dialogic Truth’, *JR*, 76 (1996), 290-306.


\(^{147}\) See, for example, the following statement: ‘If Stanley Fish would only come clean about the possibility of literary knowledge, he would see that the only honourable course would be to admit that the truth of the meaning is right there in the text, to be discovered by reading the author’s words … This is to say, words mean things. Therefore, textual meaning is both determinable and able to be validated!’ (Klingler, p. 73.)

\(^{148}\) In his own words: ‘What this approach will not do is eliminate all the existing disagreements. In fact, it may not eliminate any existing disagreements. What it will do, however, is reveal the
To avoid such a narrow view when analysing the trends in biblical studies, one has to take into consideration the concept of paradigms, as I have done in this thesis. Additionally, I am following up Kuhn’s presentation of the reasons for misunderstandings between people ‘operating’ in conflicting paradigms, as well as Abram’s, Barton’s and finally Klingler’s arguments in their respective fields of research, as presented above. In particular, Kuhn has clarified the incommensurability of paradigms from within which the two groups of scholars approach the biblical text (the group that assumes the world as being non-dialogical, in contrast to the group that assumes this world as being dialogical). Furthermore, Barton (following up Abrams’ suggestions) has clarified how our presuppositions regarding the relation between the text and the world, affect our reading of the text. Finally, here I will follow up Klingler’s point that the relevance theory can be applied to the analysis of rhetorical functions of a text.

2.3.2 APPLICATION OF THE RELEVANCE THEORY TO THE CENTRES OF MEANING

In order to follow-up the previously analysed theories, I need to reformulate the relevance principles so that they become suitable for focusing on the possible centres of meaning in a theological enquiry. This I will do this by starting from the previously introduced five centres of meaning and their images in a given text (as in Illustration 8 above). Thus, the vicious circle in biblical interpretation (as it is perceived in the dialogical concept of the world) is summarised as a competition of canonised images in a given text, in which the images compete for the reader’s attention.

To illustrate, I choose to use the same example of the intermingling chronotopes in Deuteronomy 31-34 (as I did in Section 2.2.2 above). Which representation of time and space should I as the reader find the most relevant when reading Deuteronomy 32? Is the Moses’ (‘internal’) image of world and time (related to

true source of disagreement between interpreters that lead to their disagreement over the interpretation of a literary allusion.’ Klingler, p. 185. This plan of Klingler’s seems to be much more viable, compared to the one from the previous quotation, seemingly aimed at Fisher personally.

149 Klingler has also pointed to the probability of the solution being found in focusing on the issues of centres of meaning or context (Ibid., pp. 189-91.)
his soon death) more relevant than the (internal) image of the Israelite who comments on the fact that Moses’ tomb has never been found (Deuteronomy 34.6)? Also, the reader has to choose between those internal chronotopes and the formal chronotope represented by the combination of all those internal chronotopes in the given form of the Pentateuch. I as the reader have no access to the author’s external chronotope, that is the reality as he/she experienced, but only to the images the author has authorised (and canonised) by the given text. Therefore, the interpretation is a matter of evaluating the relevance of competing canonised representations of reality.

This reality of competitive images is even more complicated than the intermingling chronotopes within a given text. Namely, in Bakhtinian representation of reality non-textual centres of meaning are able to provide their images of reality. Thus, all five centres of meaning offer their competitive images. Moreover, in line with the Kuhnian representation of reality, every ritualised artefact is a visible manifestation of a master narrative and indirectly of a paradigm. So which narrative, from which centre of meaning am I as the reader supposed to identify as the master narrative? Which paradigm should I perceive as the one conveyed by the given text that I as the reader have in front of me?

To answer these questions, I need to reformulate Klingler’s principles of relevance to fit my definition of context. As stated in Section 1.1 above, the context is a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to communication in general and a specific utterance in particular. The presuppositions are concerned with relations of relevance between the utterance and one or more centres of meaning of the utterance.

Stemming from the axiom that all persons ‘automatically aim at the most efficient information processing possible’, the three principles of relevance should thus read:

A centre of meaning/source of information is relevant in a reader’s context to the extent that contextual effects of the centre of meaning are large.
A centre of meaning is relevant in a reader’s context to the extent that the effort required to access/process the centre of meaning is small.

In order for an utterance stemming from a centre of meaning to be relevant to the previous utterance, it has to aim at narrowing the wider context in which the previous utterance was processed to be situated.

Thus, I conclude that a definition of relevance, for the purpose of this research is: a measure of effectiveness of an utterance to narrow the wider context in which the previous utterance was processed to be situated.

Furthermore, Wilson and Sperber have argued that there are only three conditions under which an assumption is valued as irrelevant:

1. The assumption may contribute new information, but this information does not connect up with any information present in the context.
2. The assumption is already present in the context and its strength is unaffected by the newly present information; this newly presented information is therefore entirely uninformative and, a fortiori, irrelevant.
3. The assumption is inconsistent with the context and is too weak to upset it; processing the information thus leaves the context unchanged.  

According to the purpose of this thesis, these conditions can be reformulated in the context of the relevance of centres of meaning, so that they read as follows; a centre of meaning is valued as irrelevant if:

1. The centre of meaning may contribute new information, but this information does not connect up with any information gathered from a(nother) centre of meaning that has already been evaluated as relevant.
2. The centre of meaning could be a priori evaluated as relevant according to the reader’s basic presuppositions, but the information collected from the centre of meaning is already present in another

Sperber, p. 121.
centre of meaning already valued as relevant. This newly presented centre of meaning is therefore entirely uninformative and, a fortiori, irrelevant.

3. The centre of meaning could not be a priori evaluated as relevant according to the reader’s basic presuppositions, and the information collected from the centre of meaning is too weak to upset the reader’s basic presuppositions; processing the information from this centre of meaning thus leaves the presuppositions unchanged.

Note how the style of the language used in Wilson and Sperber’s description of this third condition of irrelevance is very similar to the language Kuhn has used in order to describe irritants of a paradigm that (the irritants) tend to grow into anomalies of the paradigm that (the irritants) would, ultimately, so upset the person/community within that paradigm that the person/community will pursue change of basic presuppositions entertained in the paradigm resulting in a shift of paradigms in order to avoid the irritating distress. (Conversely, if an irritant is too weak to grow into an upsetting anomaly, a shift of paradigms will not take place, with the person/community remaining in the current paradigm with the existing set of basic presuppositions, and their always present, but weak, distressing irritants.)

I argue that this similarity in language style, points to the compatibility of the two theories (i.e. the theory of paradigms, and the theory of relevance) and accordingly makes it possible to combine the two theories. However, before using the theory of relevance in order to develop a comprehensive method for reading the biblical text, a further reworking of the definitions in the relevance theory needs to be done.

2.3.3 REWORKING KLINGLER’S DEFINITIONS

First of all, in my opinion, Klingler was not interested in non-literary allusions (since he did not approach the issue from the point of view of multiple centres of meaning). Consequently, Klingler’s limited approach to the issue of meaning, makes reworking of Klingler’s definitions an essential prerequisite for using the
definitions in combination with the theory of paradigms and the Bakhtinian criticism (i.e. in accordance with the purpose of this thesis).

The first of the definitions affected is intertextuality itself. Whilst it is helpful to know what the pitfalls of an extremely decentralised approach are, Klingler’s definition does not provide an explanation for those phenomena which intertextuality in general aims to explain. Namely, as seen from Bakhtinian theory, intertextuality (in its broader sense) tends to be sensitive to the multiple relations between an utterance and the rest of the world. Klingler’s definition of intertextuality (and its subcategories) is just not capable of appropriating that kind of sensitivity to different contexts, from and between my five centres of meaning, i.e. A - the historical events and ideas in which the religious writings originated; B - the author(s) of the compiled texts; C - the compiled writings; D – the text’s ancient first recipient(s); E - its contemporary recipient(s). For the sake of clarity in this field of study, I suggest the relations between an utterance and other contexts to be called intercontextuality (instead of intertextuality), simply because the essence of the problem is not the meaning between texts, but in/stability of a meaning between multiple contexts.

However, if the relation of a (monophonic) dependence is in a written context, it is called intertextuality. Thus, intertextuality still takes place in the context of two parts of the same text, or between two texts, with dependence markers pointing to a previous part of the same text or to a text from an earlier time.

Concerning the next two terms, two types of inter(con)textuality, which Klinger suggests be called intertextual dependence and intertextual relation, are not precise enough, since both of the names signify relation (dependence being a kind of relation as well). Even though the broader view on intertextuality presupposes a bi-directional relationship (interrelations), I argue that this lack of clarity in terminology is not the main problem, but just the outcome thereof, whereas the main problem is the multiplicity of centres of meaning. The phenomenon of multiple centres of meaning makes many contexts available as potential contexts.
for a developing meaning to be stabilised or destabilised, leaving the reader (recipient of the utterance) with ambiguity regarding the developing meaning.

As explained in Chapter 1 above, I recognise textual, pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic context, and the difference between them as a cognitive path of decentralisation (from the narrowest textual to the widest paradigmatic context) and centralisation in the opposite direction. At the same time, I recognise that only the textual meaning is stable. In contrast, pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings are not stable. Because of this instability, these meanings are always developing from one context to another.

The vicious problem is, thus, not that the direction of relationship utilised by an allusion and an echo is different, but that the relationships an echo utilises leave the allusive context broad enough for the contextual meaning to remain vague and unstable (since, by definition, they do not have allusive markers). Conversely, as was successfully argued and clarified by Klingler, an allusion’s allusive markers narrow the context of possible meanings so much that there is only one (most relevant) context with its contextual meaning which the allusion demands be imported from the alluded context.

This narrowing of the context is achieved by the author’s ostensive stimulus, i.e. the act of the author designed to attract the recipient’s attention and focus it on the author’s assumptions. In the terms of the Bakhtinian dialogism, this act of making the ostensive stimulus is in fact, the author’s act of canonisation of the utterance. The act consists of developing specific accents in the utterance so that the utterance becomes directed towards another utterance, as it fits the author’s intention.

In these terms, both the dialogical theory of literature and the theory of relevance perceive the nature of the relevance of utterance as based upon the markers of the direction of the utterance. These markers of the direction, although differently named, are the same. For the sake of clarity, from here on, I will use the term dependence markers.
Accordingly, I suggest that the term intertextual dependence is changed to relation of monophonic dependence, since there is only one dominant relation of dependence emphasised by the dependence markers and thus also only one delineated stable meaning that is resembled in the developing meaning of the alluding text. Accordingly, I suggest, the term ‘intertextual relation’ should be changed to ‘relation of polyphonic dependence’ since the essence of the problem is that the echo continues to resemble many stable meanings, and not just one, as is the case with an allusion.

Finally, since both an allusion and an echo contain allusive markers to the utterances in the rest of the world (so well argued by Bakhtin), it is not the presence of them that cause an allusion to be an allusion, but the quantity and quality of them, whereas allusive markers in allusions narrow the possible contexts much more effectively. Thus, I suggest the markers be called ‘dependence markers’ (and not ‘allusive markers’ since all of them are allusive and directed to something already contained in the utterances already having been used in the world). Accordingly, dependence markers are defined as markers in a text which point to previous parts of the same text or in some other text(s) so that the metaphysical aspect of the paradigm can be further utilised. In this sense, the dependence markers are indeed the markers of cognitive gravity.

Since the rest of Klingler’s definitions concern the literary elements and techniques utilising a stable meaning, this change of approach to the issue has not affected the definitions suggested by Klingler. Therefore, I suggest an adaptation of Klingler’s illustration, as shown in Illustration 10, below.
Illustration 10: Adaptation of Klingler’s Intertextual Relation: Intercontextuality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relation of monophonic dependence, resembling only one stable meaning and having (sufficient) dependence markers.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thus, the context is narrowed into one relation of dependence, taking place within a centre of meaning (e.g., biblical canon, sociological context of the first recipients, sociological context of a contemporary recipient…) or with the relation of dependence taking place over borders of a single centre of meaning in the context between two single centres of meaning so that the context is still stable, being fixed between those two centres of meaning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the relation of monophonic dependence is in a written context, it is called intertextuality. Thus, intertextuality always takes place with dependence markers pointing to a previous part of the same text or to a text from an earlier time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literary allusion is a literary device utilized by an author whereby allusive textual markers are placed into the alluding text (i.e., developing literary context) in order to activate meaning in a text previously alluded to (i.e., the stable meaning of a previous text) for the rhetorical function of importing that meaning into the alluding text in order to assist in the development of the author of the alluding text's intended meaning.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relation of polyphonic dependence, resembling many stable meanings and being without (sufficient) dependence markers.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thus, the context remains broad enough to accommodate more than one relation of dependence taking place across any number of centres of meaning and lacking (sufficient) dependence markers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echo with only few dependence markers, leaving the meaning vague and unstable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The right column in the illustration above represents every possible utterance, whilst only some utterances qualify to be represented by the left column in the illustration. In other words, every utterance echoes many other utterances (in line with Bakhtinian dialogism). Thus, an utterance containing an allusion will also always echo many other utterances. But, in the case of an allusion, the alluding utterance will, simultaneously, allude to only one utterance (validated as the most
relevant utterance), and thus demand importation of meaning from the alluded utterance to the alluding one (in line with the theory of relevance).

Thus, every analysis of intercontextuality must include:

1. Analysis of the developing meaning of an utterance by every part of the utterance being accounted for as of the highest relevance (by validating that every part of the utterance is the most relevant for the narrowing context).

2. Cognition of the narrowing plethora of stable contexts which could accommodate the developing meaning of the analysed utterance (based on the meanings from the stable contexts which resemble the developing meaning)

3. Cognition of a presence of – or lack of dependence markers in the analysed utterance and thus concluding if there is a single most relevant utterance on which the developing meaning would be exclusively dependent and stabilised accordingly, or that the resemblance between the developing meaning and the plethora of stable meanings (narrowed but still being a set of more than one stable meaning) is based on the polyphonic dependence where the developing meaning echoes two or more stable meanings and yet remains unstable.

4. In the case of the presence of dependence markers in the analysed utterance, cognition of the dependent relation takes place.

5. Stabilising the developing meaning according to the recognised relation of (monophonic) dependence.

2.3.4 **Conclusion: Implications of My Application of the Relevance Theory**

The potential of the theory of relevance, as applied to the method of analysis of an allusion, has already been well argued in Klingler’s research presented above. But, when the same theory is applied to the issue of competing centres of meaning (especially in literary and/or biblical studies) there are profound implications which are not apparent. I present them as follows:
1. Different paradigms require the reader to raise a different set of questions regarding the given text. In the context of these questions, the three principles of relevance, when applied to the issue of the relevance of five centres of meaning, require the reader to prioritise the text as the most relevant centre of meaning.

2. At the same time, valuing one centre of meaning (i.e. any one of the five centres available) as the most relevant does not necessarily make all the other centres of meaning irrelevant. Quite the opposite, the three principles of the theory of relevance, being applied to the issue of the centres of meaning, as presented above, point to graded relevancy. According to the first two principles of relevancy, the reader will evaluate and select his/her choice of the next most relevant information available. In addition, according to especially the third principle of relevancy, the reader will evaluate and select the next most relevant centre of meaning available.

Before moving on to the next, fourth point, I need to further adapt Illustration 8 above. The conclusions drawn at this stage affect our understanding of the centres of meaning, as envisioned on that illustration. Accordingly, Illustration 11 below, visually clarifies the graded relevancy of the five centres of meaning.
Illustration 11: Centres of Meaning after Application of Bakhtinian- and Relevance Theory Combined

On the illustration above, the difference between the capital and small letters of the centres of meaning is meant to represent the graded relevancy of the respective centres. Accordingly, it is images (of the world, the ancient author, first recipients and of the contemporary recipients) that the Scriptures are meant to develop and transmit to its recipients.

Accordingly, the difference between the real world, author, recipients and the biblical images of the world, author, and recipients, is a matter of a personal
choice of faith within the given interpretative paradigm. In other words, there will always be a gap between the images and the real world, author, and recipients. Those gaps are rarely within the limits of a scientific enquiry. In those cases, the gaps are a matter of faith and belief.

For example, if I, as the reader, presuppose that the image of the world (developed by the Scriptures) is relevant to me, in terms that it is prescriptive for my own image/vision of the world, my faith will lead me to prefer the belief wherein the difference between the image and the world is very small or non-existent (such as, for example, the fundamental belief in the orthodox movement in Judaism, which holds that not just the written Torah was given at Sinai, but also the whole of the oral Torah. Consequently, everything in the Torah is a mirror of reality, since it was handed down directly from God). Conversely, if I, as the reader, presuppose that the biblical image of the world is irrelevant to me, because it is not descriptive of my own image/vision of the world, my faith (or lack of it?) will lead me prefer the belief which supports the difference between the image and the world is great or huge (such as any of the set of beliefs characteristic for any more liberal movement in Judaism, or branch of Christianity).\footnote{For example, Cyril Rodd entertains presuppositions about extreme distance between the world of the Bible and ours (See Rodd, \textit{Glimpses of a Strange Land}). Consequently, the otherness and even more the oddity of the world of the Bible leaves no room for prescriptive features of the glimpses of images of the world we might find in the Bible. There are, however, other ways to entertain presuppositions regarding a huge gap between the real world and the biblical image of the world. I will analyse them in Section 3.7.2 below.}

3. Different paradigms direct the reader towards different questions regarding the given text. In those terms, only the textual meaning is stable, whilst the other three meanings are subject to the reader’s perception of the context with which the utterance is associated. In those terms the process of comprehending the unstable meanings is a subjective process within the vicious circle of reasoning, based on the principles of relevance.

4. However, the principles of relevance explain the potential for the process to become non-circular. The potential is based on the intensity of the
ostensive stimulus of the utterance. In Bakhtinian terms, the same effect is the effect of the direction of the utterance developed by the accents canonised in the utterance. In Kuhnian terms, the effect is in fact the irritant (either challenging or frustrating) which forces the reader to reconsider his/her paradigm in accordance with the cognitive gravity in which the reader is caught. In the terms of my rendering of the Klingler’s definition, this potential is based on the dependence markers in the text, which direct the reader towards other texts according to which the reader should appropriate the changeable meanings of the text. This is why dependence markers are indeed markers of cognitive gravity.

5. Furthermore, if an utterance alludes to another utterance, it means that, for the speaker/writer of the alluding utterance, the alluded utterance is has stable meaning. In that case, if the reader/recipient has not yet recognised the alluded reference as one with the stable meaning, he/she should return to the alluded utterance and investigate the dependence markers in the alluded utterance so that the utterance becomes an utterance with a stable meaning for the reader/recipient, as well. Thus, for example, if an utterance in the Bible alludes to Genesis 1-3 (as I will argue in case of the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif) it is a clear sign that, for the author of the alluding text, the alluded utterance (in this case Genesis 1-3) was perceived as having the most stable meaning and of the highest relevance for developing the meaning of his/her (alluding) utterance.

6. Finally, I can illustrate the relations between the utterance and the paradigm to which the reader is directed by the dependence markers in the given text. Illustration 12 below, provides a visual representation of the relation between different forms of utterances and the image of a paradigm in which the utterances operate and carry their meanings.
Illustration 12: The Master Narrative as the Centre of Cognitive Gravity

The illustration above visualises the process of reading in which, the reader is drawn by assurance of the master narrative regarding improvements of the current state of affairs in the world and time of the reader. This attraction
draws the reader’s mindset towards the master narrative as the centre of cognitive gravity (represented in the illustration above by the arrows). In this process, the reader perceives other utterances as being closer or wider from the master narrative. This apparent distance is based on the reader’s perception of markers of dependence of those other utterances on the master narrative. The image of the paradigm with its impression of metaphysical presuppositions, community, and concrete problem solutions all make up the reader’s cognitive universe. Every utterance is expected to be part of the universe and gravitate around the master narrative.

7. Any failure to meet this expectation is perceived as an irritant. The irritant likewise has its field of gravity. However, that field of gravity is perceived as weaker than the field of gravity of the master narrative in case the irritant’s challenge is perceived as challenging and not frustrating. (I.e. only the reader’s motivation, intention and aim are challenged, in contrast to his/her intact mindset, worldview or paradigm). In other words, the reader believes that with more improvements of his/her motivation, intention and aim, the field of gravity of the irritant will become weaker. In this sense, improvements of the aim (within the reader’s paradigm) will confirm the magnetism of the reader’s master narrative.

8. In contrast, there are situations when improvements to the reader’s goal do not weaken the irritant’s field of gravity. In other words, the phenomenon of the irritant still promises improvements of the state of affairs in the reader’s world and time, even when all the possible improvements in the reader’s paradigm seem already to have been made. More precisely, the irritant becomes intolerably frustrating by the lure of its promises, even after the current paradigm of the reader seems to be totally exploited. In this case, the reader is drawn to the irritant as the new master narrative. Then, a reorganisation of the cognitive universe of the reader takes place, this time with the new master narrative at its centre. This process is in fact a merging of the theory of relevance and theory of dialogism according to the Kuhnian theory of paradigms. In Kuhnian terms, as explained in Sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 above, this process is as it
were a sequence of the three possible relations between paradigms: tolerance, clash and finally a ban of the losing paradigm. Eventually, one of the paradigms is ruled out for the sake of the ‘winning’ (most convincing) paradigm, where the latter is validated as explaining the world in a simpler, more coherent, more detailed and, thus, a better way.

For the sake of feasibility in presentation, Illustration 12 above visualises only the simplified form of the ongoing process of weighing various paradigms. Thus, only the outcome of the process is presented, according to which the master narrative is a formulation of the winning (most convincing) paradigm.

9. In addition, if the utterance does not have a discernible master narrative and its paradigm, the utterance loses all of the intrinsic attributes of an utterance (change of speaking subjects, finalisation of the utterance, expressive aspect of the utterance, addressivity of every utterance and personal proximity of the addressee to the author, as well as direction of the utterance) as explained in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.7 above. Without these features the utterance ceases to be an utterance. Simply put, a literary utterance without a relation to a master narrative (and the paradigm of which the master narrative is the most critical formulation) is an oxymoron.

10. Furthermore, according to Bakhtinian dialogism, the master narrative is the utterance which is a constituent part of a larger utterance (thus a sub-utterance) and which presents a worldview in the most feasible way in the utterance, so that other constituent sub-utterances within the utterance borrow their meaning from the master narrative. In this sense, recognising an utterance as the master narrative is a process based on centralisation to smallest sub-utterances and decentralisation to the largest utterances and their images of paradigms.
11. Along the process of centralisation and decentralisation, the reader’s mindset, aim, intention and motivation is caught in the strongest field of gravity of the utterances he/she perceives.

12. This concept of developing meanings within the cognitive universe of the reader is the basis for my theory of meaning. In what follows, I will use the tools presented in this Chapter and develop my theory of meaning and a model of the theory. After, I will apply the theory of meaning to reading the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif in Exodus 16.
CHAPTER 3: INTERPRETATIVE RELATIVITY – A THEORY AND A MODEL

This Chapter is the second section of the method part of this thesis. The purpose of this Chapter is to develop my theory of meaning, model of the theory, and a method based on the theory and the model. I plan to do it by means of the five steps: firstly, I will reconsider my concept of relations between the five centres of meaning, secondly, I will reconsider some of the models for theories of meaning, thirdly, I will develop my model for the theory of meaning and finalise my theory of interpretative relativity, fourthly, I will reconsider different approaches to the Bible with focus on changes which took place from the Age of Enlightenment to the present. Fifthly, I will present my method based on the zoom lens model for my theory of meaning.

3.1 RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRES OF MEANING

Earlier in this thesis (See Illustration 7 above), I developed a modified Barton’s centres of meaning with the following five centres: A - the historical events and ideas in which the religious writings originated; B - the author(s) of the compiled texts; C - the compiled writings; D – the text’s ancient first recipient(s); E - its contemporary recipient(s).

To visualise all the possible relations between the C centre and the other four centres of meaning (A, B, D, E), I will add five more details to illustration 7 above. The additional details are: firstly, I have visualised the position of the camera, secondly, I have assigned different colours to each of the five centres of meaning, and thirdly, I have assigned corresponding colours to the links which present relations between them. By introducing the colour-coded system in Illustration 13 below, I can visualise the difference between relations of relevance in the field of cognitive gravity and relations of dependence. In the illustration below, black lines represent potential relevance, which denotes the reader’s openness to experience the field of cognitive gravity surrounding a given centre of meaning. In contrast, colour-coded lines represent potential dependence, which denotes the reader’s experience of the gravity. Consequently, all relations among
the centres of meaning are relations of relevance. In contrast, only those relations
which the reader perceives as attractive are labelled as the relations of
dependence.

Illustration 13: Angle of View, Centres of Meaning, and Relations within the
Field of Cognitive Gravity

Legend:
- Position of the Camera
- A) Centre of Meaning: Image of Historical Events/Theological Ideas
- B) Centre of Meaning: Image of Ancient Author(s)/Editor(s) and Their Worldviews
- C) Centre of Meaning: Scriptures with Meta Narrative and Its Image of Paradigm
- D) Centre of Meaning: Image of Ancient First Recipients and Their Worldviews
- E) Centre of Meaning: Image of Contemporary Recipients and Their Worldviews

- Line of Potential Dependence on A)
- Line of Potential Dependence on B)
- Line of Potential Dependence on C)
- Line of Potential Dependence on D)
- Line of Potential Dependence on E)
--- Line of Potential Relevance
There are two more details (in addition to the previous three) in the illustration above that need clarification. Thus, fourthly, all but one of the centres of meaning are labelled as an ‘image’ of a given centre of meaning. I did this in line with my conclusions from Section 2.3.4 above and Illustration 11, when I analysed the effect which the theory of relevance and the theory of literature have on my concept of the centres of meaning. According to those conclusions, the Illustration 13 above represents a vision of reality as it is perceived by the reader (e.g. a ‘vision’ or an ‘image’ of reality, rather than the reality itself).

In contrast, the only centre whose name does not follow the pattern is the C – centre, the Text, which is the only one the contemporary reader does not perceive as an image. An ‘image’ here is, as asserted before, a subjective comprehension and depiction of reality. The reason for not labelling the C centre in the illustration above as an image is because the text, seen from the recipient’s angle of view is not an image, but an artefact. In other words, when the text is looked at or heard it is perceived as a real, concrete utterance (not an image).

Fifthly, the final adjustment to the Barton’s centres of meaning I have made in the illustration above is that I adjusted the positions of the centres, so that each of them is at least partially visible from every other centre of meaning. The next step in the development of my theory of meaning and the corresponding model, is to visualise the concept of context as a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to communication in general and a specific utterance in particular. How does that concept of context relate to the relations between the five centres of meaning?

In Illustration 14 below, I am adding context spheres (i.e. spheres of relevance). These spheres are illustrated by circles of different radius, with their common centre in C centre of meaning. For the sake of clarity, I have omitted the lines representing potential relevance presented on the previous illustration.
Illustration 14: Angle of View with Different Contexts

The reason for centralising the context spheres in the C centre of meaning is the same as in Illustrations 8 and 11 above. Namely, the text centre has the only stable meaning, i.e. the textual meaning. From the textual meaning, which is
perceived as a fact, the reader expands the context from the smallest utterances to the biggest in order to comprehend the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of the text. In the process of decentralisation, the reader’s intention is to find irritants which will attract his/her attention by their promise of improving the state of affairs in the reader’s world and time. In that sense, the irritants have a field of cognitive gravity around them. The same field of gravity is perceived as attracting utterances from other centres of meaning to develop their pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings by importing the context from the irritants. In this sense, the other utterances are perceived as dependent on the irritant with the strongest field of cognitive gravity.

If the irritant is found by reading the C – text centre of meaning, the reader will continue reading, since the text is perceived as having sufficient appeal to invest the effort of reading. In contrast, if no irritant is found in the text which challenges the status quo in the reader’s world and time, the reader will simply dismiss the text, since the text is not worth the effort of reading it.

Accordingly, if there were any utterances which the reader has found challenging, the reader will continue investing in the reading process by following the clues of dependence, as suggested by Klingler’s adaptation of the theory of relevance (see Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 above).

By following the clues of dependence (i.e. clues of the force of gravity), the reader is directed towards other irritants and their fields of cognitive gravity. These other irritants, in this case, set the context in which the initial text is perceived (i.e. the other irritants ‘situate’ the initial text). This new context (sphere of relevance) has possibly then shifted its centre from C centre of meaning to any of the other four, according to the attraction the reader has experienced when trying to comprehend the reading of the text.

This is my theory of meaning developed thus far. To develop it further, I will now compare and contrast some of the recently proposed models for theories of meaning, in relation to the paradigms in which they were used. By this comparison (in the following two Sections of this Chapter), I plan to take the
second step towards fulfilling the purpose of this Chapter. This comparison will show the direction which the development of my model of theory of meaning needs to take.

3.2 PARADIGM ENQUIRIES AND HERMENEUTICAL MODELS

The purpose of this Section is to show a new hermeneutical model which could explain hermeneutical issues as issues of centralisation and decentralisation of meaning. First, I will present four major paradigms and compare them on the basis of their presuppositions regarding centralisation of meaning.

3.2.1 DIFFERENT PARADIGM ENQUIRIES

There have been four major interpretative paradigms since the nineteenth century, each having a turn to be the dominant wave in the world in general, and in the western world in particular: positivist, constructivist, critical, and post/structural paradigms. Even though they do coexist, one can still recognise the dominant paradigm at a given time and historical location.¹

The main difference between all the paradigms however, are the expectations and claims they place on the human enquiry. In the positivistic paradigm the main expectation can be described as prediction. This is because there is an assumption of the existence of that reality which can be quantified, measured, and categorised. Consequently, the main agenda of the human enquiry in the positivistic paradigm is to quantify, measure, and categorise its subject, and, accordingly, predict results of future measurements. In comparison, the interpretative paradigm (often named as constructivist paradigm) claims an understanding of the construction of reality as its main agenda (i.e. investigating what factors affect our limited and subjective perception of reality). Furthermore,

¹ Thus, Patti Lather and Elizabeth A. Pierre distinguished positivism with August Conte (1778-1857); social constructivism with Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966); emancipatory paradigms with Frankfurt school and the social movements in 1960’s and 1970’s; and the post paradigms mainly with critiques proposed by Michael Foucault (1926-1984), Jacques Derida (1930-2004), and Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995). One can, of course, argue for different representatives of the initial propagators of the paradigm shifts, but there is a general consensus about the shifts that have taken place. See Patti Lather, Getting Lost: Feminist Efforts toward a Double(D) Science, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2007), p. 164.
the critical paradigm prioritises the ideological critique of inequities of all types. Finally, the poststructural (often called postmodern) paradigm claims that interrupting and restructuring established ‘binaries’ is the purpose of human enquiry.

By binaries here, I mean the philosophical opposition of two related terms or concepts that are opposite in meaning. Whilst these binaries served as the basic elements in, for instance, structuralist linguistics (by claiming that meaning of a phenomenon can only be understood in terms of its opposite, i.e. what the term is not), poststructuralism rejects them, and even more, deconstructs them. The following Illustration 15 below, visualises the paradigm shifts that took place.²

### Illustration 15: Different Paradigm Enquiries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predict</th>
<th>Understand</th>
<th>Emancipate</th>
<th>Break</th>
<th>Deconstruct</th>
<th>Next??????</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Positivist</td>
<td>*Interpretive</td>
<td>*Critical</td>
<td>*Poststructural Postmodern</td>
<td>*Neopositivist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Methods</td>
<td>Naturalistic</td>
<td>Neomaxist</td>
<td>Postcolonial</td>
<td>Neopragmatist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructivist</td>
<td>&lt;Feminist&gt;</td>
<td>Postcritical</td>
<td>Posthumanist</td>
<td>Participatory Dialogic Policy Analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phenomenological</td>
<td>Critical Race Theory</td>
<td>Post-ordalist</td>
<td>Posthumanist</td>
<td>Participatory Dialogic Policy Analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnographic</td>
<td>Praxis-oriented</td>
<td>PostFordist</td>
<td>Postfeminist</td>
<td>Poststructuralism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic Interactionist</td>
<td>&lt;Freirean Participatory Action Research</td>
<td>Query Theory</td>
<td>Post-post</td>
<td>Race-feminist Poststructuralism (Watts &amp; Wetherell)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretive Mixed Methods</td>
<td>Gay &amp; Lesbian Theories</td>
<td>Disability Studies</td>
<td>Critical Ethnography</td>
<td>Dis-cursus Analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Postparadigmatic Diaspora (John Caputo)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Post-everything (Fred Erickson)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates the term most commonly used  < Indicates cross paradigm movement

In the illustration above, I have drawn attention to the first two lines in the illustration, i.e. the explanation of the focus of enquiry within the paradigm, and the most usual name for the paradigm. However, the most crucial detail in the illustration is the break between the critical and postmodern/poststructural paradigm. The outcome of the agenda of the poststructural paradigm is an essential difference in the type, and not just the focus of human enquiry, as used to be the case in the previous shifts. In other words, whereas the previous

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² The chart is developed by Lather and Pierre. See Lather, p. 164.
paradigm shifts moved from a focus on the quantification of reality, to the construction of reality, and then to the inequities of the reality, respectively, the final shift of the paradigms proposed a new reality altogether.

In the new reality ‘all major epistemological concepts (e.g. language, discourse, knowledge, truth, reason, power, freedom, the subject, objectivity, being, reality, method, science) are deconstructed.\(^3\) In this sense, the prior choice of focus, is no longer possible. Human enquiry has now become characterised as intrinsically decentralised. Thus, the break in the table above visualises the shift from intrinsically centralised to intrinsically decentralised paradigms.

To illustrate the effect of that shift, for example, in the positivist paradigm, different readings are appropriated as opposite and incompatible and harmony between them is not a viable solution (the binaries are stable, not interchangeable, and not deconstructible). In the poststructural paradigm, compatibility is always possible, exactly because the binaries are not stable. The opposites in one reading can be perceived as synonyms in another reading. A deconstructed reading can always provide a possibility for harmony within chaos.

The effect of this extremely decentralised approach to reality is also seen in the way deconstruction operates within the postmodern interpretive paradigm. Namely, Derrida is explicit in that ‘…deconstruction doesn’t consist in a set of theorems, axioms, tools, rules, techniques, methods… There is no deconstruction, deconstruction has no specific object…’\(^4\) Thus also: ‘Deconstruction is neither an analysis nor a critique…. I would say the same about method. Deconstruction is not a method and cannot be transformed into one…. It must also be made clear that deconstruction is not even an act or an operation….’\(^5\)

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\(^3\) Lather, p. 164.
Thus I concur with Gary Rolfe’s analysis of the statements of Derida that method, classically defined as ‘a systematic procedure, technique, or mode of enquiry’ does not exist in poststructural readings. Still, Rolfe concludes that one can recognise a strategy of deconstruction, which incorporates: 1) locating a promising marginal text (that what is omitted by the classical methods), 2) the use of antithesis of that what has served as the standard, 3) the reversal of the established hierarchy, in order to also displace and dismantle this hierarchy.

Apart from this essential difference in centralisation of the focus in previous paradigms and the extremely decentralised focus in the postmodern paradigm, there is however, a common element in all of these four major interpretative paradigms, the postmodern one included. The common element is the reliance of each of the paradigms on a particular model of hermeneutical enquiry. In other words, hermeneutical method, or absence of it, arises from an underlying hermeneutical / interpretative model. Hence, I define a hermeneutical model as a metaphorical presentation of a hermeneutical agenda.

In the study of hermeneutics, several ways of visualising hermeneutical models have been proposed: hermeneutical spirals, hermeneutical labyrinths, triangles, circles, and a special modification of circles, the Möbius strip. All of these can be grouped in families of, for example, spirals, circles, triangles, etc. Here the type of hermeneutical models, is a group of hermeneutical models that share a common visual metaphor, which explains their similarities and differences, by each particular model adjusting the visual metaphor in a specific way.

However, I argue that while this classification based on the common visual metaphor, shared by a specific type of models, is logical, it fails to reflect the essential difference between the models based on what is their sensitivity to centripetal and centrifugal forces in process of interpretation. In other words, it is possible to have two hermeneutical models that share the same visual metaphor,

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but which still are intrinsically different, in the sense that one of them can be intrinsically centralised and the other decentralised.

In order to show why centralisation and decentralisation as features of a model are more relevant, then the metaphor the model is based on I will here briefly compare four models,\(^8\) two different spirals, one proposed by Grant Osborne,\(^9\) the other by Paul Ricoeur,\(^10\) a labyrinth, proposed by John Dominic Crossan,\(^11\) and a Möbius strip (a special version of a circle), proposed by Anne Beate Reinertsen.\(^12\) By doing this I will demonstrate a need for a new model, which is intrinsically neither centralised nor decentralised, but developed in such a way as to facilitate control of centralisation and decentralisation in interpretation. I will call my model ‘the model of interpretative relativity’ i.e. ‘the zoom lens model’. This comparison of the four models is also intended to show the need for hermeneutical metamodels. I define ‘metamodel’ as the initial set of presuppositions, expressed in a metaphor, which serve as criteria for choosing a particular model.

3.2.2 HERMENEUTICAL MODELS

A typical example of a centralised hermeneutical model is the so called ‘hermeneutical spiral’, proposed by Grant Osborne.\(^13\) The model actually consists of two spirals, one narrow, the other broad. Both of them are conical, with a wide bottom and narrow top. The only difference between them is the conceptual width/breadth they describe.

Thus, on the one hand, the narrow spiral has the following four centres in the bottom circle of the spiral: the reader as the interpreter, an initial set of questions

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8 There are other models as well. Susan Wittig, for example, has worked with a triangle as a model. See Susan Wittig, ‘A Theory of Multiple Meanings’, *Semeia*, 9 (1977), 74-103.
13 See Osborne, p. 418.
regarding the text, the text itself, and the agenda which the text itself sets out for
the reader. It is important here not to confuse the agenda in this hermeneutical
spiral with the hermeneutical agenda as the main characteristic of four different
interpretative paradigms, in Section 3.2 above. In fact, the two agendas are
opposite. The agenda in Osborne’s model is set out by the text itself. Oppositely,
the hermeneutical agenda is, by definition, set out by the interpreter, before even
approaching the text. Thus, hermeneutical agenda corresponds to Osborn’s
questions which the reader asks regarding the text (before analysing it).

On the other hand, the broader hermeneutical spiral is broader in the sense that
the reality it encompasses is wider than the text. This spiral has the following four
foci: receptor, meaning, source, and significance. Every circle of the conic spiral
has four elements positioned so that the reader faces the text, and the (authorial)
meaning faces (contemporary) significance.

The metaphor of the spiral is supposed to describe different centres the reader is
assumed to focus on when proceeding in the enquiry regarding a text. The reader
is visualised as following the spiral from the bottom to the top, moving from one
centre to the next, from the bottom circle to the same centres on the next circle
above, the interpreter is supposed to move upwards, narrowing the possible
meaning of the text.

According to my understanding of Osborne’s proposal, the narrower spiral is a
model for comprehending the meaning of the text, whereas consequent
contextualisation, which encompasses the interpreter’s life and situation, is
represented by the broader spiral.\textsuperscript{14}

The actual shifting of the foci is accomplished in two steps: grammatical-
syntactical exegesis and investigation of historical-cultural background. Along
the process (visualised as moving from the bottom to the top of the spiral) the
reader becomes more and more informed, and accordingly, his or her
understanding of the possible meanings of the text becomes narrower and

\textsuperscript{14} See Osborne, p. 418.
narrower (i.e. more focused). At the end of the process the reader understands the text as having only one possible, original meaning, intended by the author of the text.

The spiral is thus a model. However, there is an endless number of different types of spirals, which might be used for explaining different hermeneutical agendas. For instance, what if the spiral was turned up-side-down? What if the spiral only had circles of the same size, like spiral stairs, presenting a never-ending, always escalating process of hermeneutical enquiry? The latter is indeed Paul Ricoeur’s choice for his model. Riceour asserts that his model is a spiral and not a simple circle:

That the analysis is circular is indisputable. But that the circle is a vicious one can be refuted. In this regard, I would rather speak of an endless spiral that would carry the meditation past the same point a number of times, but at different altitudes.\(^1\)

Ricoeur’s spiral is thus conceptually the exact opposite of Osborne’s spiral(s). Osborne’s model is intrinsically centralised (focused always on one single centre at a time, and then, moving from one centre to the next along the process of interpretation, aimed at reaching author’s single intended meaning) whereas Ricoeur’s is intrinsically decentralised, with an endless meditation, without a presupposed author’s intended meaning in a text.\(^2\) Even so, they share the same visual metaphor, the metaphor of a spiral.

In contrast, in Crossan’s model there is no centre. Namely, Crossan builds his model on the metaphor of a labyrinth. As for the specific shape of the labyrinth, Crossan suggests that the reader is free to create it as the reading process unfolds.

\(^1\) Ricoeur, p. 72.

\(^2\) Thus, Craig Bartholomew concludes that ‘… Ricour finds a significant role for the reader in interpretation; as a result, a world is opened up in front of the text.’ See Craig G. Bartholomew, *Introducing Biblical Hermeneutics: A Comprehensive Framework for Hearing God in Scripture*, (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2015), p. 67.
Structuralism says that we create the labyrinth ourselves, that it has no centre, that it is infinitely expansible, that we create it as play and for play, and that one can no more consider leaving it than one can envisage shedding one’s skin.\textsuperscript{17}

It is important to note that, the way I understand it, that Crossan’s ‘structuralism’ in the quotation, belongs, by its nature, to what Lather and Pierre would classify as ‘poststructural’ enquiry in the Illustration 15 above. Crossan’s labyrinth is one possible example of labyrinth-based models for theories of meaning. But, although it is possible to have several theories which visualise their models as labyrinth, the main characteristic of the theories and models is not the visual metaphor, but the intrinsic decentralisation of meaning as their hermeneutical agenda. In this sense, the visual metaphor is indeed a deceptive feature, whereas the centralisation/decentralisation feature is what characterises them best.

This raises the question concerning the criteria which the reader follows when choosing between different hermeneutical models. Crossan argues that the criteria for the choice are provided by metamodels. He suggests ‘play’ (ludic play) to be the metamodel. Crossan (concurring with Johan Huizinga) defines ludic game as ‘a free activity standing quite consciously outside “ordinary” life as being “not serious”, but at the same time absorbing the player intensely and utterly.’\textsuperscript{18}

Crossan’s argument that ‘reality is play’ appears to be strong, since, if human enquiry is not ludic play, one should be able to identify some criteria for finding the rules of the game. Crossan’s point is clear: ‘If one can think up any other metamodel, would not the act of such thought be easily construed as an act of play?’\textsuperscript{19} Crossan’s answer to the question of metamodels makes Reinertsen’s model exceptionally interesting.

\textsuperscript{17} Crossan, p. 112.
\textsuperscript{18} Crossan, p. 113.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid. p. 116.
Moreover, Reinertsen developed her model by adapting the circular model for living research designs proposed by Karl H. Müller. Namely, Reinertsen used Möbius strip as her model of enquiry. Möbius strip is a strip/band with only one side, and only one boundary/edge. It is made by twisting a strip half way (twisting only one end by 180 degrees) and then joining the ends of the strip to form a loop.

The key mathematical property of Möbius strip is that it is non-orientable. Therefore, this model has some profound implications on one’s theory of meaning. The first one is the most obvious: the possibility to endlessly follow the strip’s surface without crossing edges illustrates constant nonbinary decision-making. Furthermore, according to Reinertsen, Möbius strip is not only a model for decision-making, but also for the researcher’s brain, will, and for the researcher him- or herself. This is clearly a decentralised approach to interpretation and meaning, classified as ‘poststructural’ in the Illustration 15 above.

In addition, Reinertsen’s model is a very good example of how extremely decentralised approaches to hermeneutical questions lead hermeneutical methods to a dead-end. When a hermeneutical method becomes equal with the researcher/interpreter, the hermeneutical method ceases to exist. It leads the interpreter/researcher out of hermeneutics with a hermeneutical method, and into the poststructural paradigm, with deconstruction and without a method.

However, Reinertsen’s model is also an excellent example of how a model can be self-sufficient, that is, to serve as a metamodel, meta-metamodel, etc. Specifically, Reinertsen’s model, compared to Crossan’s, does not need an extra metamodel. Reinertsen’s model explains the researcher’s reality as a whole. This intrinsic difference between the methods in regard to their concept of reality is sufficient to draw some important conclusions for the purpose of this thesis.

21 Reinertsen, p. 259.
22 Ibid.
3.2.3 CONCLUSIONS REGARDING MODELS

Osborne believes that his model is suitable for keeping balance in the process of hermeneutical enquiry. He calls for keeping the balance between ‘abstract proposition’ and ‘dynamic communication’. He points out that ‘it is true that twentieth-century evangelical hermeneutics has emphasized only the propositional dimension; but we do not solve that by going to the opposite extreme. A biblical balance is required.’

However, I do not see Osborne’s contribution as satisfactory, since his model is a priori directed towards one single intended meaning of a text. This is not surprising since his model is developed within centralised pre-postmodern paradigm, with the only dynamics in the model being achieved by moving the focus from one centre to the following one, along the hermeneutical spiral. In this sense, Osborne operates within the presuppositions (of interpretative paradigm) which he (and for example N. T. Wright) calls for ‘critical realism’. Critical, in contrast to ‘naïve realism’ and in the sense that it never assumes that theological constructions are exact depictions of revealed truth.

In contrast, I plan to move from poststructuralist towards critical theories, and end by subscribing to a form of critical realism. However, this form is different from Osborne’s in the sense that he aimed at making an intrinsically centralised concept of reality more dynamic. In contrast, my concept of reality is intrinsically decentralised, dialogical. My plan is to understand how the intrinsically decentralised (i.e. dialogical) concept of interpretation functions.

Thus, if dialogism (in contrast to dialogue) is understood as a decentralised concept of communication, with voices involved never clearly delineated, then my set of presuppositions can be grouped under a term ‘critical dialogism’. In this sense, the model I propose is developed in the opposing direction of Osborne’s, insofar that I am starting with the three theories developed within a genuinely

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23 Osborne, p. 418.
decentralised paradigm, and then using the tools the theories provide, in order to derive pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of a text.

Thus, should Osborne’s model be able to control (de)centralisation of meaning in a process of interpretation, my model will contribute differently from Osborne’s, by providing tools for the same work on a genuinely different path of hermeneutical enquiry.

I nevertheless concur with Osborne’s understanding of the need for balancing, and conclude that developing a model which (does not need a metamodel, and yet) facilitates control of centralisation and decentralisation in the process of interpretation, can be compared to what Einstein’s contribution to bridging the reality of energy and the reality of matter, meant to scientific research of his time. Newtonian physics has no tools for bridging the two realities (of energy, and of matter). Einstein’s theory of relativity has provided the tools.

Similarly, my model of interpretative relativity can contribute to bridging the reality of a centralised interpretation and of a decentralised interpretation by providing a theory of meaning which utilises intrinsically decentralised concept of meaning to explain how the concept facilitates communication in general and biblical interpretation in particular. By presenting my model and theory of meaning in the following Sections, I will take the fourth step in accordance with the purpose of this Chapter.

3.3 THE ZOOM LENS MODEL

The metaphor on which my model of my theory of meaning is developed is a zoom lens, capable of changing the zoom from under 50 mm (known as wide-angle lens) to above 135 mm (known as telephoto lens). The model is based on two different movements: firstly, move of the zoom lens, and secondly, move of the entire camera. Below is a detailed explanation of these movements.

3.3.1 MOVE OF THE ZOOM LENS

Every move of the zoom lens (so called ‘zooming in, and out’) narrows or broadens the view, so that at longer zooms (by zooming in) the view becomes
narrower. Consequently, as it was visualised in Illustration 14 above, the centres of meaning gradually fall out of the view, as the zoom increases. The widest/shortest zoom (SR3 in Illustration 14 above) is able to capture all four centres of meaning. In contrast, the narrower, longer zoom (visualised as SR2 in Illustration 14 above) could not capture the E centre of meaning. Finally, the narrowest/longest zoom (visualised as SR1) had only C centre within its view. This was the centralisation i.e. movements directed towards narrowing of the view of the zoom lens. The movements of the zoom lens in the opposite direction (i.e. decentralisation) have the opposite effect.

It is vital to understand that during these movements of the zoom lens, the position of the camera as a whole is not changed. In other words, the photographer does not change his/her position. Additionally, in these examples, the position of the camera was as if the viewer stands independent from the centres of meaning. Specifically, since I here too, follow the presentation of these centres of meaning on previous illustrations in the thesis, and because it serves the purpose of showing how centres of meaning will fall out of view, as the zoom gradually increases. In contrast, when describing the telephoto effect as a metaphor for my theory of meaning, the initial position of the camera is going to assume the angle of view of the contemporary recipient (i.e. E centre of meaning). Below is a detailed explanation of this movement.

3.3.2 MOVE OF THE CAMERA (RELATIVE DISTANCE)

Moving the camera closer and further away from the subject in focus changes the relative distance, as it is compared with the distance between the subject in focus and its background. The effect is called the ‘telephoto effect’ (also known as ‘distortion of space effect’, ‘telephoto compression phenomenon’, ‘lens compression effect’…). On the four illustrations below (Illustrations 16, 17, 18 and 19), we will see how the distance between the subject in focus and its background decreases, as the distance between the camera and the subject in focus increases. In this sense, this is a movement that supports centralisation. In practice, as the four illustrations below will show, this movement of the camera is normally accompanied by enlarging the zoom (that is the corresponding
movement of zoom lens). This enlarging of the zoom, as it was seen on the previous four illustrations, causes narrowing of the view, and thus again supports centralisation of the view.

Furthermore, on the four illustrations below, the camera is positioned differently than on the four illustrations above. The reason for that is that this time movement of the whole camera represents conceptual distance between the interpreter and the text. Accordingly, the movement of the camera in the four illustrations below metaphorically presents conceptual, as well as temporal, cultural, geographical, etc., distancing of the recipient of the text from the text. This representation of the relations between the contemporary recipient and the other centres of meaning is in keeping with the theory of meaning according to which the reader changes his/her cognitive distance from a given centre of meaning. As explained earlier, the process of reading is conceptualised as experiencing gravity effect of utterances from different centres of meaning. In this case, for the sake of illustration, the reader is supposedly increasing the distance from the centres of meaning in the illustrations below. Thus, in Illustration 16 below, I present three photographs taken with the purpose of achieving the telephoto effect.
Illustration 16: Apparent Change of Distance Representing Cognitive Gravity

Ratio R1 with the camera at the minimum distance and zoom at 25 mm

Ratio R2 with the camera at the medium distance and zoom at 472 mm

Ratio R3 with the camera at the maximum distance and zoom at 600 mm
Each of the photographs has the green E centre of meaning (i.e. the contemporary recipient) within the view of the camera. When compared, the photographs show apparent change of the gaps between the green E centre and the other centres in the photographs (in the Illustration 16 below above). Thus, gaps (i.e. the space between the centres) appear to be the largest on the first photograph, and smallest on the third photograph. This effect is achieved by movements of the camera while zooming out from the shortest zoom, to the longest.

Illustrations 17, 18 and 19 below provide a graphical explanation of the effect on the photographs above. Thus, Illustration 17 below explains the situation with the camera narrowest to the centre of meaning.
In the illustration above, S1 is the distance between the camera and the subject in focus, while B1 is the distance between the camera and the background of the subject in focus. For the sake of illustration, S1 is 5 cm. In contrast B1 is 105 cm. The relative distance is the ratio between the distance between the camera and the
object in focus and the distance between the camera and the background of the object in focus. In the illustration above ratio R1 is calculated at 21.

It will be clear after the comparison with ratios R2 and R3 in the Illustrations 18 and 19 below, that the ratio increases, i.e. the ratio is directly proportional to the apparent gap between the subject in focus and its background. In other words, closer the camera is to the subject in focus, the bigger the gaps appear to be. In terms of reading an utterance as testing the field of cognitive gravity surrounding the utterance, the same effect is described as the utterance is more attractive when apparent inconsistencies between the utterance and its background are bigger. In contrast, the more an utterance seems to be part of the cognitive universe of the reader, the less attractive it is to the reader.
Illustration 18: Cognitive Gravity at Relative Distance, Ratio 2, Zoom of 379 mm

Legend:
- Position of the Camera
- S2: Distance between the Camera and the Subject
- B2: Distance between the Camera and the Background
- A: Centre of Meaning: Image of Historical Events/Theological Ideas
- B: Centre of Meaning: Image of Ancient Author(s)/Editor(s)
- C: Centre of Meaning: Scriptures with Meta Narrative and Its Image of Paradigm
- E: Centre of Meaning: Image of Contemporary Recipients

Ratio Background to Subject:
R2 = B2/S2

In Illustration 18 above, the zoom increases in order to keep the same centre of meaning in focus whilst moving the camera away from the centre of meaning in focus. Accordingly, the distance between the centres (all of them) and the camera increases as well. The effect, calculated by Ratio 2 is that the gaps between the centres of meaning appear smaller.
This effect is most obvious in Illustration 19 below, with the focus on the same subject, but at the narrowest/longest zoom and the camera furthest away from the centres of meaning.

**Illustration 19: Cognitive Gravity at Relative Distance, Ratio 3, Zoom of 600 mm**

Legend:
- Position of the Camera
- Distance between the Camera and the Subject (**300 cm**)
- Distance between the Camera and the Background (**400 cm**)
- B) Centre of Meaning: Image of Ancient Author(s)/Editor(s)
- C) Centre of Meaning: Scriptures with Meta Narrative and Its Image of Paradigm
- E) Centre of Meaning: Image of Contemporary Recipients

Ratio Background to Subject:

\[ R3 = \frac{B3}{S3} = \frac{400}{300} = 1.3 \]
The depth of the space as seen through a zoom of 600 mm, with the camera being even more distant from the subject photographed, provides an illustrative Ratio at 1.3. The ratio is the smallest, and so are the apparent gaps. In terms of the process of reading conceptualised as the movement of the reader in the field of cognitive gravity, the situation envisioned with this illustration is when the reader is cognitively distant from the text. He/she is not acquainted with all the details of the text. In this situation, the text seems to fit in the cognitive universe of the reader. There are apparently no big gaps between different centres of meanings in the cognitive universe. Also, there are no challenges for the reader’s aim or mindset. Everything tends to remain status quo. Let us now conceptualise the cognitive movement of the reader in the opposite direction, i.e. towards a centre of meaning. This conceptualisation essentially presents my theory of meaning.

3.4 THE THEORY OF INTERPRETATIVE RELATIVITY

The reader starts his/her cognitive journey distanced from a given text. In other words, the reader does not know what the text is about. I will illustrate my theory of meaning by using two extreme examples, firstly, the situation of extreme incomprehension and secondly, the situation of extreme cognitive closeness to the given text.

Thus, firstly, let us imagine a child from a distant land, grown up with the knowledge of only one local dialect. At the age of seven, he/she becomes adopted and relocated to Jerusalem uniting with an Orthodox Jewish family. It is Pesach, and the family is gathered around the dining table. The candles, festive meal, music, songs and meeting with the extended new family all leaves an extraordinary impression on our young person. When the evening comes to a close, and the family is about to retire at the end of the long festive day, the young person, with the very limited knowledge of Hebrew, points to the book the adoptive father read earlier that evening. The young reader opens the first page. The old book leaves some impression that fits the feelings related to the traditional symbols used that evening. However, the young reader is disappointed. The text is inaccessible. The reader stays at the initial cognitive distance from the text. Any relation to the text comes from other experiences the
reader has had. The only experience directly related to the text is that it is inaccessible.

Secondly, let us imagine the extreme contrast of the experience of the young reader from the previous example. Here we have an experienced scholar from the humanities department at Hebrew University Jerusalem. He/she is at the university library. The person reaches towards the same text used in the previous example above. However, here the text is on a library shelf. In this example, the text is part of an anthology of traditional Hebrew prayers. Many quotations from the text of the Torah are explained and analysed with long notes about the different traditions in which multiple forms of the tradition developed. The scholar is about to write an article on different streams of the development of the text in the anthology. I will now use both these examples to clarify the difference between the special and general theory of interpretative relativity.

3.4.1 The Special Theory of Interpretative Relativity

The first example above is the closest I can envision the phenomenon represented with Illustration 14 above. There is no cognitive movement of the reader towards the text. The minimum of reading is invested in the process of zooming into the text, but there is no cognitive relation to the text. The reader tries to connect the text with the other centres in his/her cognitive universe, but no approach to the text is possible. Thus, the text remains only what other centres of meaning (in the reader’s already established cognitive universe) could explain about the text. Therefore, the young reader only understood about the text what other centres of meaning could offer him/her (i.e. the effect of the rich faith-life imagery used that festive evening). This is an extreme example and rare in reality. This situation is a unique case in the general experience of reading as the process in which the cognitive distance between the text and the reader changes. Therefore, I call the first example an example of the special theory of interpretative relativity. The theory is based on the inertness of both the text and the reader. According to this unique case of the theory, the reading is limited to (at best) appropriating only the literal meaning of the text. In our example above, the child could see the letters, but he/she could only appropriate, at best, what the
text reads. The child could not move forwards towards the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of the text.

3.4.2 **The General Theory of Interpretative Relativity**

In contrast to the case of special theory of interpretative relativity, in the second example above, the reader is both willing and capable of investing in reading as the process in which the cognitive distance between the text and the reader decreases. The textual utterance the reader reads is part of a bigger utterance (i.e. the anthology). Also, the utterance the reader is reading incorporates recognisable smaller utterances. The cognitive journey of reading begins with opening the cover, focusing on the form of the text. At this stage, everything in the text appears as a whole. Texts written in different times in history all appear to belong to one world and time. In this sense, every reading begins with utilisation of apparent synchronicity of the text as a whole. It is the only way to cognitively come closer to the text. Subsequently, the reader cognitively zooms into the smaller sections of the utterance. The reader is reading rational portions of the given text.

As the reader cognitively approaches the text, various images of world and time become discernible in the reader’s cognitive universe. The reader begins to notice dependence markers apparent in the text. The dependence markers have a twofold effect: firstly, the reader is guided to become better acquainted with the given text, and secondly, the reader is guided to recognise gaps between the text, images the text produces (i.e. of voices, communities, worlds, and times) and other centres of meaning. By being guided/directed to see these gaps, the reader experiences the text, images the text produces and other centres of meaning as all becoming more distanced from each other.

The reader comes as close to the text as possible. The apparent relations of dependence play the role of irritants that challenge the reader to situate the given text in the cognitive universe, which, at this step, is apparently disharmonious. How to make sense of the text which is here set apart? How frustrating is this situation for the reader? Depending on the reader’s paradigm, i.e. the initial set of
questions which govern the development of the inquiry, the reader has two possible solutions to the apparent and challenging discrepancies between the text and the rest of his/her cognitive universe.

Firstly, the challenge might be solved if the reader zooms out and moves back, away from the text. As a consequence, the gaps will become smaller and the text might again seem to be part of a coherent cognitive universe.

Thus, if the challenges of the irritants become weakened by the act of decentralisation, the reader has experienced a challenge which he/she was capable of overcoming within his/her paradigm. In this sense, this confirms the capabilities of the paradigm, which in this case appears to be even more stable. Thus, the reader was in this case challenged only at the level of his motivation, intention and aim, not the level of his/her mindset. Consequently, any changes of the aim, i.e. the fundamental direction of a person’s life, or some fairly stable subset of that fundamental direction, may be big changes but are in essence not of paradigmatic nature. I suggest these changes be called spiritual conversion.

However, there is another possible scenario as well. Thus, secondly, what could happen is that, when zooming out, the text or parts of it seem to make more sense as parts of another field of gravity, associated with another utterance. The reader experiences a conflict of centres of gravity and zooms out and moves back, away from the text. However, it is possible that the fields of the cognitive gravity experienced when approaching the text make the text seem to make more sense as situated in another field of gravity. In other words, the pieces of the text seem to make more sense as parts of another field of gravity, associated with another utterance. The reader has two options, and the choice depends on the set of initial questions the reader accepted before approaching the text. Namely, if the initial set of questions regarding the text (i.e. initial expectation set forth for the text) is such that, that kind of discrepancy in the text can be accommodated, the reader will reassemble the text, i.e. situate it in the field of cognitive gravity around another utterance.
In contrast, if the initial set of questions, i.e. expectations regarding the text, cannot accommodate such discrepancies, the reader is challenged on the level of those initial questions. The irritants are challenging the fundamental presuppositions regarding the cognitive universe of the reader. The reader becomes open to a paradigm shift, i.e. to change the initial presuppositions. This shift is called the cognitive conversion.

As was proposed in this thesis, the irritants which affect the reader on the level of his/her motivation, intention and aim, I call the ‘challenging irritants’. In contrast, the irritants which affect the reader on the level of his mindset, worldview or master narrative, I call the ‘frustrating irritants’. They are described as anomalies, in terms of the Kuhnian theory of paradigms.

As explained above, in contrast to the unique case of the theory of interpretative relativity, the challenge with reading a text which is accessible, i.e. when experiencing the general case of interpretative relativity, the reader is challenged by pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of the text. The textual meaning does not cause challenges. The effect of challenges is caused by change of the reader’s cognitive proximity to the text and his/her experience of the field of cognitive gravity of utterances from textual and non-textual centres of meaning.

This presentation of my theory of meaning still does not answer the question of the method of approaching the Bible. By method I mean a fairly organised, logical sequence of actions or procedures for accomplishing something. In the remaining Sections of this Chapter, I plan to reconsider different methods/approaches to the Bible with the focus on changes which took place from the Age of Enlightenment to the present. Based on this comparison, I plan to draw a conclusion regarding the method which is in harmony with my theory of meaning.

3.5 METHOD AS MEASURING COGNITIVE GRAVITY

Presently I will compare different experiences of this field of cognitive gravity, as it was experienced in biblical studies since the 19th century positivism. This
comparison will help me explain in more detail how the same irritants have been experienced differently in different paradigms. The shift from understanding the Bible, as mirroring the reality in the positivist paradigm, to the Bible illuminating the reality was a complex socio-ideological process, as already argued earlier in this thesis. However, I find it essential at this stage in the thesis, to focus more closely on the effect these changes had on the actual methods in biblical studies.

The first dramatic changes in the methods used to study the Bible that anticipated modern biblical criticism started to take place around the time of the Reformation. Accordingly, I agree that ‘it is not unjust to trace the origins of biblical criticism in the modern sense back to the Renaissance’; most notably in writings of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Isaac La Peyrère (1596-1676), Baruch Spinoza (1632-77), Richard Simon (1638-1712), John Locke (1632-1704) and Pierre Bayle (1647-1707), where the traditional view on Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch was put under question and the Bible as a whole put under the scrutiny of human reason. However, these roots only started to take hold in biblical studies, as Biblical or ‘Higher Criticism’ at the time of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century.

In particular, it was with Jean Astruc (1684-1766) that the first idea of multiple sources of Pentateuch text was published (1753). Astruc focused his research on the book of Genesis. His logic reflected two presuppositions that in later scholarship became explicit; that a single writer would not repeat a story and not...

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use different names of God as synonymously. Following this logic, he ended up with the conclusion that Genesis was a product of a process of editing of four separate documents, merging them into one book. This process, according to Astruc, started with Moses, but was continued by subsequent editors. Followed by J. G. Eichhorn (1753-1827) and his *Einleitung in das Alte Testament* (1780-83), and Julius Wellhausen (1844-1918) and his *Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels* (1878), the ‘German scissors’ sharpened Astruc’s presuppositions even further and cut the biblical text into even smaller pieces.

It is of critical importance to note that Charles Darwin’s *Origin of the Species* (1859) played an essential role in the process of establishing and developing biblical criticism, Darwin’s hypothesis becoming the master narrative for the metaphysical aspect of the paradigm embraced (even though not explicitly) by the critics of the Bible. It seemed that if faith of any kind was to be maintained, the shift from the text as a mirror (of reality) to the text as a lamp (illuminating reality) was inevitable. However, it also appeared that ‘the lamp’ could be switched on either side (pre-historical, i.e. ‘behind the text’ and historical, i.e. ‘in front of the text’) of the biblical text, as will be shown in the Sections that follow. Historically, however, the lamp was first switched on ‘behind’ the text, namely

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by focusing on the traditions and their development ‘behind’ the ultimately canonised text within a community of faith.\(^{34}\)

### 3.5.1 Cognitive Gravity Behind the Text

The so-called ‘Higher Criticism’ of the Bible is built on the presupposition that there was a long and complicated history of intermingled traditions (for instance, the so-called J, E, D and P) so that the final product is the text we find in the Bible as an ‘amalgam’\(^{35}\) of the traditions. Illustration 20 below, from Gordon J. Wenham, presents the relation between sources in a very simplified and, for this purpose, helpful manner.\(^{36}\)

**Illustration 20: Wenham’s Conglomeration of Sources According to Documentary Hypothesis**

\[ J \rightarrow JE \rightarrow JED \rightarrow JEDP (Pentateuch) \]

It was thus by the time of Wellhausen that the outcome of the documentary hypothesis, applied to the Pentateuch/Torah, was the delineation of four major editions of the text (J, E, D and P), Priestly (P) being the youngest edition, dated from the time after the Babylonian exile. Illustration 21 below, shows the dating

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\(^{34}\) Note that here and in the rest of the thesis, I use the terms canonisation and canon as it was presented in Sections 2.2.7 and 2.2.9 above. Every given Bible or part of it is, in Bakhtinian terms, a canonised utterance, i.e. an utterance of ‘others’ which was accentuated by the effect of centrifugal and centripetal forces.


of the alleged sources of the Pentateuch/Torah, as suggested by Wellhausen (but endlessly revised since his time).\textsuperscript{37}

Illustration 21: Dating of the Sources to Pentateuch/Torah

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Date BCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JE</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JED</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEDP</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It has to be noted however that none of these suggested dates have acquired a consensus in biblical studies. This lack of any single agreement on the part of the very proponents of the hypothesis, especially as the hypothesis developed in the twentieth century, is also the most obvious sign of the speculative nature of the reasoning involved. In an attempt to reach a consensus, an adjustment of the hypothesis, achieved by Albrecht Alt (1883-1956),\textsuperscript{38} Martin Noth (1902-68)\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{37} Wenham, Exploring the Old Testament: The Pentateuch, p. 196.
\textsuperscript{38} Albrecht Alt, Israel und Aegypten; die politischen Beziehungen der Könige von Israel und Juda zu den Pharaonen (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1909).
and Gerhard von Rad (1901-71)\textsuperscript{40} helped, albeit very little. More precisely, their adjustment to the hypothesis, claiming that the process of the evolution of the biblical text was of a more homogenous (and thus a more coherent) nature than previously believed, did produce some common ground, maintained until the 1970’s.\textsuperscript{41} However, the ever-growing plethora of new dating for the documentary sources arising from constant reconstructions of the pre-history of biblical text showed that any consensus fell short of the ideal. In fact, as Barton pointed out, Wellhausen’s dating of pentateuchal sources was only meant to be a prolegomena to the actual reconstructed history of Israel, the history, which is yet to be written.\textsuperscript{42}

However, in 1901 Hermann Gunkel (1862-1932) established a new milestone in the criticism of the Pentateuch/Torah with his commentary on Genesis.\textsuperscript{43} The critical thought in his work was to focus on oral traditions and their context, instead of the textual (written) tradition in the pre-history of transmission of the biblical text. This change of focus puts, according to Gunkel, the biblical text (or pieces of it) in its more historical/more natural context, that is, in an oral/aural setting. In my opinion the importance of this change of focus, initiated by Gunkel, can hardly be overstated in overviews of the history of the interpretation of the Pentateuch/Torah.\textsuperscript{44} More precisely, this very shift initiated not only Gunkel’s version of ‘literary’ criticism (better known under the label ‘form criticism’), but also the ‘new’ literary criticism in the latter part of the twentieth century. I will return later to this important point.\textsuperscript{45} However, even though Gunkel himself believed that his focus on oral tradition was compatible with

\textsuperscript{42} Barton, ‘Historical-Critical Approaches’, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{45} See Section 3.6.2 below.
Wellhausen’s focus on literary traditions, so that the two complemented each other, Rolf Rendtorff pointed out the logical incompatibility of the two, and finally concluded that ‘each dating of the pentateuchal “sources” relies on purely hypothetical assumptions which in the long run have their continued existence because of the consensus of scholars’.\textsuperscript{46}

Moreover, the so-called ‘Scandinavian School’ of interpretation was indeed an offspring of Gunkel’s focus on oral tradition, which preceded (and co-existed with) the written history of biblical text, even though not all Scandinavian scholars claimed, as Gunkel did, that it is possible to reconstruct the oral prehistory of the text. The most notable scholars of the Scandinavian group are Ivan Engnell\textsuperscript{47} and Alfred Haldar\textsuperscript{48} from the Uppsala School, and Sigmund Mowinckel\textsuperscript{49} from Norway.\textsuperscript{50} In spite of the many differences between them,\textsuperscript{51}


\textsuperscript{50} However, even at the Faculty of Theology in Oslo, where Mowinckel’s influence is expectably the strongest, works such as Martin Ravndal Hauge’s \textit{Between Sheol and Temple}, still with strong roots on voices ‘behind’ the text, show interest in the literary (even ‘new-literary’) features of the text. See Martin Ravndal Hauge, \textit{Between Sheol and Temple: Motif Structure and Function in the I-Psalms}, ed. by David Clines and Philip Davies, JSOTSup (Sheffield: JSOT, 1995), 178. On the shift from Mowinckel to Hauge see Rannfrid I. Thelle, ‘Historiens Utfordringer: Gammeltestamentlig Forskning ved Det Teologiske Fakultet i det 20. Århundre’, \textit{NTT}, 101 (2000), 17-32, (p. 27).

the common element in their approaches was to presuppose that the centre of meaning is still well-rooted in the voices behind the text (that is in *Sitz im Leben* in the pre-history of the evolution of the text). However, this focus has appeared to conceal many methodological irritants. Applicability of the findings of the nineteenth-century folklorists, potential incomparability between European and ancient Near-Eastern cultures, and the evolutionistic paradigm are the principal concerns for this thesis and thus need to be explained.

Firstly, regarding the applicability of the findings of the nineteenth-century folklorists, Aulikki Nahkola has clarified that Gunkel’s hypothesis was very much a product of the European nineteenth century’s interest in national identity in general and national oral traditions in particular. Accordingly, Gunkel’s division of genre types in the Pentateuch, for instance legends (*Sagen*) and folktales (*Märchen*), was largely adopted from the Grimm brothers’ division of genres. In addition, as Nahkola pointed out, Gunkel’s hypothesis was in line with the research of Danish philologist and folklorist, Axel Olrik (1864-1917). The parallel research, done by Gunkel and by Olrik separately, led to a culmination of their respective hypotheses, entertaining three crucial presuppositions: namely, that there is a long oral tradition behind the biblical text (a presupposition already mooted by some documentary critics) and that the oral

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*Canon: Creative Tradition History in the Old Testament*, JSOTSup (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1998), JSOTSup 191, pp. 24-32.

52 Rendtorff seems to agree with this conclusion: ‘My point is that, in spite of the obvious fundamental divergences and even contradictions among the schools, they had in common a certain approach to the biblical texts, taking them, within the respective paradigms, mainly as a means, sometimes even as tools, for discovering something assumed to lie behind the texts.’ (Rolf Rendtorff, *Canon and Theology: Overtures to an Old Testament Theology* (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1993), p. 26.)


54 ‘Gunkel’s concept of certain Old Testament narratives as *Sage*, even *Märchen* and *Mythen*, not *Geschichte* – thence oral, not literary creations that developed according to certain universal principles, not haphazardly – was consistent with, and rooted in, the oral narrative scholarship of his time and therefore enabled as well by its orientation and modes of expression.’ (The italics are the author’s.) (Nahkola, p. 118.) See also Kirkpatrick, p. 18.

tradition is discernible from and via the biblical text (a genuinely new presupposition) and that it could be reconstructed according to universal/epic laws.\textsuperscript{56} Thus, according to Gunkel: ‘investigators have instead treated the legendary books too much as “books”. If we desire to understand the legends better, we must call to mind the situations in which the legends were recited’.\textsuperscript{57}

Secondly, regarding the incomparability between European and ancient Near-Eastern cultures, Patricia G. Kirkpatrick’s findings are critical. She has shown that folklore studies have developed drastically since Gunkel’s work, so that early presuppositions regarding the comparability of oral transmissions among different cultures must be treated with discretion today. For instance, Gunkel has followed only the German and Finnish/Scandinavian schools of folklore studies, so his (and Olrik’s) research/‘laws’ were based on a study of a limited sample of oral traditions. When learning has increased and more models have become available.

More precisely, prior to Gunkel and Olrik, by the collection of the Finnish oral tradition that lead to the formation of the Kalevala national epic, it was made clear that there is no single prototype/universal way for the development of oral traditions. Moreover, Kalevala did not develop in an entirely typical way, Elias Lönnrot (1802-84) was working not just as a collector but also as editor.\textsuperscript{58} In addition, shortly after Gunkel’s Genesis, there emerged a new school of folklore studies, led by Milman Parry (1902-35) and Albert Lord (1912-91); the school focused on studying Homeric epics and epics of the South Slavs. Both of the oral traditions (Balkan and Homeric) were shown to have developed through the use of conventions or formulae,\textsuperscript{59} showing yet another way for specific oral traditions

\textsuperscript{56} In words of Kirkpatrick: ‘Unlike Wellhausen who had maintained that the oral stage could not be uncovered, Gunkel sought to establish criteria by which the earliest form of the tradition could be detected.’ (Kirkpatrick, p. 32.)
\textsuperscript{57} Gunkel, The Legends of Genesis, p. 40.
\textsuperscript{59} For examples of complex chiastic structures as well as of anaphora, alliteration, and parataxis in South Slavic oral literature, see ibid., pp. 31-34; Albert Bates Lord and Béla Bartók, Serbo-Croatian Folk Songs: Texts and Transcriptions of Seventy-Five Folk Songs from the Milman
to develop. Developments in folkloristics have shown that oral traditions never stay the same but develop as they are transmitted. Nevertheless, it has not been established that the traditions develop according to any universal pattern.

The following comparison of the three traditions will hopefully clarify the point. Kalevala is created into one poem by a single editor, thus becoming a long 22,795-line epic. The epics of the South-Slavs are individual songs, ranging from several hundreds to sometimes even 10,000 lines. The Iliad and Odyssey, range from more than 10,000 lines each whilst still being independent songs. What makes Kalevala the best contender for a comparison with the development of the pentateuchal text? The poems from which Kalevala was created were not even close to the length of the Iliad, Odyssey or some of South-Slavic epics. Still, Kalevala is indeed the best prototype, not of any universal oral tradition, but of the collection of traditions by an editor, matching in this respect the documentary hypothesis, where after a long oral tradition presumed redactors textualised and finally merged separate single traditions into one whole (compare Lönnrot’s creation of Kalevala with Wellhausen’s Deuteronomistic editor).

It is thus clear that Gunkel’s hypothesis was an outcome not only of the achievements of the folkloristics of his time, but also of its drawbacks. In addition, the research of other national traditions in Africa, or among the North American Indians, shows clearly that Gunkel’s presuppositions of universality of any oral tradition cannot be sustained today.  

Thirdly and finally, it is important to recognise that the drawbacks of Gunkel’s hypothesis are rooted in its evolutionistic presuppositions. Namely, the crucial principles in the hypothesis are that the tradition has developed in a linear, uniform manner, so that the laws we can observe today are the same laws at work

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60 Since Parry/Lord research among Yugoslavian bards, many other studies have been done, bringing the various oral traditions of folklore studies to emerge. See for example D. Tedlock’s research among North American Indians (Cited in Kirkpatrick, p. 70.) See also Ruth Finnegan’s research among the African oral traditions in Ruth Finnegan, Oral Literature in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970; repr. Oxford: Open Book, 2012).
throughout pre-history times. Moreover, the traditions have evolved from 
primitive forms of oral literature, to meeting the needs of primitive man. In the 
words of Gunkel: ‘it is to be expected from the nature of the case; legends come 
from ages and stages which have not yet acquired the intellectual power to 
distinguish between poetry and reality’.\(^{61}\) The transformation of the oral tradition 
is thus an unconscious process in the society of a primitive man.\(^{62}\) I believe, the 
personal choice of these presuppositions should be respected, but claiming the 
status of a theory for a personal hypothesis like this is not attainable today.

Gunkel’s centralisation on the image of the author/s, fuelled with his 
presupposition of a huge gap between the image of the author and the actual 
author/s, prevented him from having any sensitivity to the Bible as an utterance. 
Moreover, this insensitivity to the Bible as an utterance (that conveys a paradigm) 
prevented him from even glimpsing the possibility that his rendering of the 
biblical text might be the offshoot of the evolutionistic paradigm of his time and 
his place.

However, I have pointed out some irritants in the hermeneutical paradigm of the 
Scandinavian school, some of them being outcomes of their own interpretation, 
whilst some of them were simply inherited from Gunkel and Wellhausen. 
Nevertheless, it is vital to understand that the focus on the oral tradition behind 
the text, whilst claiming that it is not reconstructable, was indeed a catalyst for 
shifting the focus from the fragments/documents of the biblical text to the text 
itself. The pendulum thus swung back to the text, but the text was no longer 
perceived as a mirror, not after the experience of the higher criticism. This time it 
was indeed a lamp, switched on in the text itself.

3.5.2 COGNITIVE GRAVITY OF THE TEXT

The collection of methods of interpretation where the focus is on the biblical text, 
and where the text is seen as illuminating reality, is recognisable in the works of

\(^{62}\) Ibid., p. 39.
Robert Gordis, Isaac Leo Seeligmann, Brevard Springs Childs, James A. Sanders, Michael Fishbane, Geza Vermes, to mention just a few. Common in their work is also a follow-up to the notion of a more homogenous transition from the history of tradition to formation of the Bible. This notion, furthermore, allows them to move the focus closer to the phenomenon of the Bible as an utterance. More precisely, the formation of the text in the Bible is perceived as a long, and more unified process, resulting in a presumably homogenous whole of the Bible as an utterance.

There are, as always, differences in the methods within this group. The main difference is, in my opinion, the various understandings of inner-biblical exegesis: whether it stems from an intrinsic feature of the Scriptures itself (leading thus to, for example, Childs’ understanding of the canon) or from the ideological/political agenda of the interpreter (leading thus to, for example, Fishbane’s understanding of the canon). This difference results in two conflicting views on the authority of the Scriptures and the canon: authority stemming from

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63 Robert Gordis, *The Biblical Text in the Making: A Study of the Kethib-Qere* (Philadelphia, PA: JPS, 1937); where he pointed to homiletically and used Kethib-Qere distinction, as it was preserved in the text of the Hebrew Scriptures. The idea of a type of interpretation (midrash), already preserved in the very text of the Bible is further expanded in Robert Gordis, ‘Midrash in the Prophets’, *JBL*, 49 (1930), 417-22.


the Scriptures themselves, being distinct revelation from God, or from the interpretative tradition, being instead a religious community/tradition-based phenomenon. However, note that the Bakhtinian concept of canonisation, utilised in this thesis, is broad enough to accommodate views of both Child and Fishbane.\(^69\)

In addition, the methods in this group can be also divided according to the twofold view on the comparison between canon and Scriptures. Namely, the difference between canon and Scriptures is either between the canonical process and the final form interpretation (as predominant among scholars from the English speaking world) or between the nature of the process of canonisation and the nature of the final form (as predominant among scholars of a German-speaking background).\(^70\)

Nevertheless, what all the representatives in the group have in common is that they have recognised two types of forces that lead to the formation of the canon; the centrifugal and centripetal forces. In particular, terms such as ‘literary redactions’, ‘literary variants’, ‘various traditions’, ‘forward-looking interpretation’, and even ‘dynamic exegesis’\(^71\) all denote the centrifugal force(s) aimed at broadening the canonical opus of books. Conversely, ‘Nachgeschichte’,\(^72\) ‘unifying reflections’ (Zusammen-Denken), ‘inner-biblical comments, revisions, interpretation, exegesis, midrash’, ‘post-biblical midrash’, ‘protective exegesis’,\(^73\) and ‘backward looking interpretation’\(^74\) all denote the centripetal forces,\(^75\) aimed at narrowing the canonical opus. I contend that this common understanding of the forces at work during the process of canonisation is one of the core contributions of these approaches. The compatibility between this

\(^{69}\) See Sections 2.2.7 and 2.2.9 above.
\(^{70}\) Childs, ‘The Canon in Recent Biblical Studies: Reflections on an Era’, (p. 44).
\(^{73}\) Fishbane, ‘Torah and Tradition’.
\(^{74}\) Sæbø, p. 291.
\(^{75}\) Ibid., pp. 291-307.
understanding and Bakhtinian understanding of the phenomenon of the
canonisation of language and/or utterance is striking.\textsuperscript{76}

This experience of the field of cognitive gravity surrounding the text of the Bible,
perceived as a whole, provided certain solutions, but some new questions as well.
Regarding the former, Aulikki Nahkola’s findings are most relevant to my
research; regarding the latter, a difference between Scriptures and canons as
competitive centres of meaning is pivotal. In what follows, both the solution and
the new question are to be better explained.

3.5.2.1 \textit{Variants in Scriptures as the Common Denominator for Traditions}

Biblical text contains so-called doublets, sometimes called double narratives or
simply variants of the same account. This feature of the biblical text has been an
essential element in all the methodologies ever since Astruc. According to
different approaches to the doublets, the methodologies can be classified in two
camps. The difference between the methodologies is simply that, on the one
hand, Astruc and all the critics in the camp of Higher Criticism presuppose that
one author should not, would not and could not use the doublets synonymously in
process of writing the scriptural books. On the other hand, as it will be presented
below, the commentators (utilising the so-called new literary criticism) in the
opposite camp presuppose the reverse: one author should, would and definitely
could use the doublets synonymously in process of writing the Scriptures.
Moreover, they argue, these doublets are in fact the very tool used by biblical
writers/editors to link the different texts in the scriptural opus with each other.

Nahkola has highlighted and explored this common focus on the double
narratives. Her argument is compatible with what I argue, so that outcome of any
reading of the Scriptures is, thus, subject to the reader’s centralisation of the
phenomenon of doublets into any one of at least five possible contexts (between

\textsuperscript{76} Note the definition of canonisation as ‘the final stage of the process of interaction of centrifugal
and centripetal forces in formation of an utterance, resulting in blurring of heteroglossity of its
voices and making its form rigid’. (See Sections 2.2.7 and 2.29 above.)
other centres of meaning and the canonised text as a centre of meaning).77

‘Translating’ this into Nahkola’s terminology,78 one could recognise the ‘nature model’ in methodologies like Spinoza’s, the ‘archivist-historian model’ in methodologies like Astruc’s, the ‘historian model’ in methodologies like Wellhausen’s and finally the ‘literary artist model’ in methodologies like Robert Alter’s.

Accordingly, Spinoza approached the doublets in the context between the Bible (C centre of meaning on Illustration 11 above) and the real world/historical events (a’ centre of meaning) which, in fact, he used in order to prove that the Bible does not mirror reality. Furthermore, the context between the Bible (C centre) and the textual tradition behind the canonised text (b’ centre of meaning) is the context in which the doublets from the Bible are read by Astruc and Wellhausen. Finally, according to Robert Alter’s method, the doublets are read in the context of the canonised list of books as a literary whole (i.e. context between C and c’ centres of meaning on Illustration 11 above).

In addition, apart from the compatibility of the conclusions above, I find the following contribution of Nahkola’s as of even greater importance; she has drawn attention to the findings of the late Shemaryahu Talmon of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem79 with regard to the literary–textual variants dichotomy. Talmon’s contribution deserves our attention, since, as I will argue, it is directed towards the C–c’ context of meaning as having some unique features (see Illustration 11 above).

3.5.2.2 The Common Field for Textual Criticism and Source Criticism

Nahkola drew attention to Talmon’s argument that there are three types of textual variants in the Masoretic text.80 The first type, (literary) variant reading, is the variant studied by traditional textual criticism. Included in this category are:

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77 As envisioned on Illustration 11 above.
78 See Sabø, pp. 73-114.
79 Talmon’s articles were recently republished in Shemaryahu Talmon, Text and Canon of the Hebrew Bible (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2010).
80 Shemaryahu Talmon, ‘Double Readings in the Masoretic Text’, Textus, 1 (1960), 144-84.
a) Deliberate corrections of the text.

b) Variants arising from the scribal routine.

c) Textual corruptions resulting from visual and aural mistakes, or from flawed memories of scribes and copyists.\(^{81}\)

The second type is synonymous readings. Contrary to the variant readings in the group above, synonymous readings ‘have no direct bearing on the criticism and emendation of the text since by definition it is impossible to decide that any one of them is intrinsically preferable to the others’.\(^{82}\) Variants are synonymous if:

a) They result from the substitution of words and phrases by others which are used interchangeably and synonymously with them in the literature of the OT.

b) They do not adversely affect the structure of the verse, nor do they disturb either its meaning or rhythm. Hence, they cannot be explained as scribal errors.

c) No sign of systematic or tendentious emendation can be found in them. They are to be taken at face value. Synonymous readings cannot be explained as variants with a clearly defined ideological purpose. They are characterised by the absence of any difference between them in content or meaning.

d) ... [T]hey are not, as far as we can tell, the product of different chronologically or geographically distinct literary strata.\(^{83}\)

Finally, the third type of variant is called (literary) double readings. In contrast to (d) above, double readings are the product of different chronologically or geographically distinct literary strata, which, in particular, originate during the process of translating the biblical text and then transmitting the translation, or are simply a translation of an already existing double reading from the earlier manuscript. The variants in this group are:

a) Alternative renderings of a single Hebrew word or a single Hebrew expression found in the different MSS of the version in question …

\(^{81}\) Talmon, ‘Double Readings in the Masoretic Text’, p. 144.
\(^{82}\) Ibid., p. 146.
\(^{83}\) Ibid.
b) Conflate translations of synonymous readings. In these cases, the translator had recourse to a doublet to preserve two alternative Hebrew traditions which he found in different MSS of the original, because he would not presume to prefer one to the other.

c) Translations of double readings which had already been incorporated as such in the Hebrew MS used by the translator and whose conflated character escaped his notice; or if he noticed them, he did not presume to correct them. ⁸⁴

Furthermore, Nahkola points out that synonymous and double readings, as categorised by Talmon, could include the double narratives used by the source critics. Specifically, as an example, she points out that both W. Nowack and Talmon have used the same verse, Judges 19.9, in order to argue for two different sources behind the MT text. ⁸⁵ Nevertheless, whilst Talmon argues that it is an example of a textual double reading variant, Nowack argues that it is a literary double reading variant. The logical question is thus: how can one delineate the two ⁸⁶ – especially since the criteria for determining the two correspond, since both of them are, according to Talmon, a ‘synoptical’ or ‘horizontal’ rendering of variants, aimed at determining the sources, origins and development of the textual variants? ⁸⁷

Talmon, thus, follows the hypothesis of Paul E. Kahle (1875-1964) (and opposes the hypothesis of Paul de Lagarde (1827-91)), ⁸⁸ according to which the direct predecessors of MT were vulgar texts (Vulgärtexte), which furthermore have a common source, called the Urtext. Furthermore, Talmon’s optimism regarding the possibilities of reconstructing the Urtext seems to compete with the optimism exercised by the forerunners of documentary hypothesis. ⁸⁹

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⁸⁶ Nahkola, p. 185.
⁸⁸ De Lagarde did not agree with the hypothesis about the existence of vulgar texts in the pre-history of Masoretic texts. See Tov, ‘The History and Significance of a Standard Text of the Hebrew Bible’, p. 52.
However, for this thesis, the similarities between source criticism and Talmon’s textual criticism are just as important as the differences. The similarities are thus the presuppositions regarding the pre-history of the text, criteria used in the method, and the phenomena analysed. In addition, similarities are also the two irritants, claimed to be present when the presuppositions, in common with source critics, are entertained. The first irritant is the speculative optimism regarding the deconstruction of the Urtext, when there is no textual witness which could lift the hypothesis to the level of thesis. The second irritant is that some of the basic principles presupposed to lead to the formation of variants are contradictory; the immense reverence for the preceding tradition (which ensures preservation and transmission of the text) seems to be contradictory to the freedom attributed to the scribes to amend the text on the level of synonymous readings and especially on the level of double readings.\[90\]

Nevertheless, the differences between the source critics and Talmon are that Talmon claimed that his criticism is still textual criticism, and thus centred on the C (Text) centre on Illustration 11 above, and even more precisely at the c’ (Scriptural variants) centre on the same illustration. This recognition has a particular implication for my research. I will explicate the implication in what follows.

3.5.2.3 Adding on to Nahkola’s Contribution

As I understand it, a specific feature of Talmon’s criticism is the combination of the locus of his method (resulting in the criticism being termed textual), and the presuppositions and criteria which he shares with source critics. Thus, interpreted into the terms of this thesis, he sees the text as a lamp switched on in the text itself, and not behind the text. Thus, contrary to source critics’ centralisation on the pre-history of the text, Talmon showed that source critical presuppositions could be entertained even from the biblical text as the very centre of the critic’s method. Talmon’s arguments and Nahkola’s contribution should thus be seen as

\[90\] The argument already used by Whybray and mentioned earlier in this thesis. See Whybray, The Making of the Pentateuch: A Methodological Study, p. 49; Nahkola, p. 182.
supporting the idea that C and c’ are the centres of meaning with a unique relation between them, compared to other centres of meaning (the relation I have already tried to express visually on Illustration 11 above). That is to say, it is only at the accessible C centre (canonised image of the biblical text) that the remote centre (c’) is incorporated in the C centre of meaning. On the contrary, all the other remote centres of meaning (namely a’, b’, d’ and e’) are indeed distant and not incorporated in the accessible centres of A, B, D and E (see Illustration 11 above).

Furthermore, my understanding is that, this conclusion should raise questions regarding a possible common field between textual criticism and form criticism. In other words, according to the common ground between textual criticism and source criticism (observed by Nahkola), the possibility of common ground between textual criticism (analysing the textual tradition of the Scriptures in the context between C and c’ centres of meaning), and form criticism (analysing oral transmission of the Scriptures by focusing on their pre-textual forms) should be investigated. Thus, what is the relation between the two types of criticism and is there a common field of study for the two?

In order to answer these questions, one has to take into consideration two critical factors. First, the study of orality and oral transmission has shown that oral transmission does not cease after a text is written. On the contrary, oral tradition and textual tradition coexist and interfere. Moreover, the particular circumstances of usage of the Scriptures in familial and public liturgy make this point even clearer. In other words, if not the majority, then still a considerable number of followers of the Scriptures have not read them but listened to them. Thus, it is fair

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91 ‘Oral literature did not need writing to become literature, and it continued long after writing was invented.’ Even more: ‘Literacy has little or no effect on oral history, except that eventually, when literacy becomes widespread and begins to be used for recording, and finally for writing, literature, the writing of history is an important part of that larger development’. (The italics are the author’s.) (Lord, Epic Singers and Oral Tradition, pp. 21, 22.) See also Albert B. Lord, The Singer of Tales, ed. by Stephen Mitchell and Gregory Nagy, 2 edn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960; repr. 2000).

92 Deuteronomy 6.6-7; 17.18-19; 31.9-13; 2 Kings 23.2; and especially Nehemiah 8.8.
to say that interest in the orality of the Scriptures in biblical studies has its niche, even in cases where the text of the Scriptures is already present.

Secondly, the form of the text contributes to answering the questions above. Namely, the form of the text (that is, its actual physical appearance on the page or the rhythm of its delivery) has changed throughout the process of both its oral and written transmission, so that it has eventually been divided by means of (the smallest) stichs and verses, \(^93\) aliyot\(^94\) (readings by a single reader in the synagogue), petuchot\(^95\) and setumot\(^96\) (closed sub-paragraph and open paragraph markers), chapters,\(^97\) and sedarim\(^98\) and parashot\(^100\) (weekly reading portions in

\(^{93}\) The division of verses is work of the Masoretes. However, there are evidences that even the division of verses followed several streams of textual witnesses. ‘Sometimes one-and-a-half verses in one book form one verse in another one.’ Emanuel Tov, *Textual Criticism of the Hebrew Bible*, 2 edn (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1992; repr. 2001), p. 52. In addition to verses, there are Masoretic section divisions in the middle of a verse, called stichs. These smallest divisions are made using the same signs otherwise indicating the end of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ sections at the end of verses. The breaks in the middle of verses normally follow a natural break in content of the text. See Tov, *Textual Criticism of the Hebrew Bible*, p. 53; Emanuel Tov, *Scribal Practices and Approaches Reflected in the Texts Found in the Judean Desert* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 127-28.

\(^{94}\) The plural ofםני meaning ‘ascend’ or ‘go up’ and also ‘to be counted’. The latter meaning is to be applied to this public reading, since it denotes that everyone (including women) can ‘be counted’ for reading the Torah in the synagogue. See Meg. 23a; Judith Hauptman, ‘Blessings over Torah: Talmud’, in My People’s Prayer Book: Seder K’riat Hatorah v. 4, Traditional Prayers, Modern Commentaries, ed. by Lawrence A. Hoffman, (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights, 2000), pp. 104-10 (p. 110). It was not before Maimonides of the twelfth century CE that a uniformity in textual divisions is attempted on a halakhic level. Aliyot, as the most recent development of the divisions in the text was, most likely, implemented at his time. However, no uniformity in aliyot was reached until approximately the eighteenth century. See Ephraim Stulberg, ‘The Last Oral Torah? The Division of the Torah into “Aliyot”’, *JSIJ*, 8 (2009), 183-202, pp. 183, 86, n.8).

\(^{95}\) The plural ofסאכ meaning ‘closed’.

\(^{96}\) The plural ofסאכ meaning ‘open’.


\(^{98}\) ‘The division into chapters was established in the thirteenth century by Archbishop Stephen Langton from Canterbury, England …’. (The italics are the author’s.) (Tov, *Textual Criticism of the Hebrew Bible*, p. 52.)

a triennial and annual cycles, respectively). Stichs, verses, petuchot and setumot, and chapters became part of the body text, whilst parashot and sedarim were added in form of Masoretic notes in the margins of the text. Even though aliyot are of the most recent dating, their origins are in stichs, the smallest sense divisions, which were never fully standardised. Conversely, fairly standardised aliyot are incorporated in the text of some editions of the Hebrew Bible. Thus, one can indeed claim common ground for both textual criticism (as suggested by Talmon) and (a de-centralised understanding of) form criticism. Consequently, for sensitivity to orality of the Scriptures to be employed, I believe one does not necessarily need to engage in ‘Gunkel-style’ speculations regarding the pre-history of the Scriptures. Accordingly, differences between these divisions (as traced in the history of the Scriptures) directly illuminate the issue of how the Scriptures were used in an oral/aural context, in addition to its usage in a context of reading.

Thus, on the one hand, petuchot and setumot as ‘large sense divisions’ seem to be part of the earliest tradition of transmission. It is, in fact, almost certain that the autographs contained them. Indubitably, these divisions are a product of content divisioning, not quantitative divisioning. Furthermore, petucha has a form of a paragraph division, starting at the beginning of a new line, after the previous section ended. In contrast, setumah is a sub-paragraph, beginning

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101 For example, CJB.
103 ‘The system of subdividing a text into larger sense units by means of spacing was used for the transmission of many texts in antiquity, sacred and nonsacred, in Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek.’ (Ibid.) Thus, this conclusion is not derived only from the Judean Desert Scrolls, since there are indeed various opinions about how optimistic one should be about the existence of a specific school of writing at Qumran. For opposing views see Eibert J. C. Tigchelaar, ‘Assessing Emanuel Tov’s “Qumran Scribal Practice”’, in *The Dead Sea Scrolls: Transmission of Traditions and Production of Texts*, ed. by Sarianna Metso, Hindy Najman and Eileen Schuller, (Leiden: Brill, 2010), pp. 173-208. However, for more on the practice of sense units’ dividers, see Tov, ‘The Background of the Sense Divisions in the Biblical Texts’; Tov, *Textual Criticism of the Hebrew Bible*, pp. 50-51.
merely nine letter-spaces after the previous section ended, within the same line.
These divisions, by definition, testify to the visual sense divisions in the context of reading.  

On the other hand, stichs and verses, aliyot, parashot and sedarim are all sense divisions that originated in the oral/aural context, which left written traces only at later stages of development. However, what is specific for stichs and verses (as the earliest developed in this group) is that they exist only as related to the Scriptures (also among the Judean Desert Scrolls) and have not been found in other types of ancient literature.

Nevertheless, among the evidence for this type of divisioning as part of the earliest oral tradition, we have the inner biblical testimony of the tradition of public reading of the Scriptures (see Deuteronomy 17.18-19; 31.9-13; 2 Kings 23.2; and especially Nehemiah 8.8). In addition, there is Talmudic witness, that Moses himself divided the text into verses, as well as Talmudic prohibition against writing that division into a Torah scroll. There is also a Talmudic argument that ‘already Moses instituted the custom of publicly reading portions of the Torah on Sabbaths, festivals, and Rosh Hodesh (a semi-festival in ancient times) (JT Meg. 4:1). It is thus justifiable to assert that the above-mentioned

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105 There are also so-called paragraphos which denote types of a not widely standardised visual divisions. For more on paragraphos, see Tov, Scribal Practices and Approaches Reflected in the Texts Found in the Judean Desert, p. 139.
106 Ibid., pp. 127-34.
107 Sedarim are understood as more technical divisions of the text, whilst parashot are much more ‘sense-oriented’ divisions. This is one of the reasons that sedarim divisions became unnecessary and extinct, after the technical divisions in terms of chapters was introduced in the thirteenth century CE. Thus, sedarim divisions are not adhered to during the reading of the Torah in synagogues today. See Aron Dotan, ‘Masora’, in Encyclopedia Judaica, Lif–Mek, ed. by Fred Skolnik and Michael Berenbaum, 22 vols (Jerusalem: Keter, 1971; repr. 2007), XIII, pp. 603-56 (p. 607).
108 ‘Among all the Hebrew and Aramaic texts from antiquity and more particularly from the Judean Desert, the division into smaller units than the larger section divisions (open and closed sections), though not the smallest units possible, is evidenced only in Hebrew Scripture.’ Tov, Scribal Practices and Approaches Reflected in the Texts Found in the Judean Desert, p. 127.
109 ‘… any verse which Moses had not divided, we may not divide.’ Meg. 22a
110 ‘If a Torah scroll has spaces <to mark> the beginning of verses, it may not be used for the lections.’ (Tov, Scribal Practices and Approaches Reflected in the Texts Found in the Judean Desert, p. 128.)
aural sense divisions originated as part of the practice of oral
transmission/proclamation of the Scriptures. Therefore, the two traditions, oral
and written, had their separate histories, and only at later stages merged into a
form of written tradition. However, as confirmed by folklore studies, oral
traditions do not cease to exist after they leave traces in a written tradition.

Accordingly, I concur with Tov that, if not earlier, the public reading of the Torah
is certainly evident from the middle of the second century BCE.\(^{112}\) For the
communities of faith which practiced the public reading of the Torah, the
canonisation process led to stabilisation of the closed list of Scriptures, that is, the
canon. (See Sections 2.2.7 and 2.2.9 above for the Bakhtinian concept of
canonisation utilised in this thesis.)

Consequently, if one is to formulate a method of approaching the Scriptures with
the view of understanding the meaning of the Scriptures as an utterance, one
should consider the circumstances under which the Scriptures were used at the
time they became the canon for a particular community of faith. In other words, if
validation of the method follows the logic that ‘the proof of the pudding is in the
eating’, one should consider how (even more precisely, in what portions) the
pudding was ‘prescribed’ to be eaten by those who ‘discovered’ it.

Regarding the exact portions, it is true that little is known about the actual
practice of public reading of the Torah, prior to the time when divisioning weekly
reading portions (aliyot) was indicated on manuscripts. However, after aliyot
came into use, most likely at the time of Maimonides in the twelfth century CE,
the whole practice of public reading became illuminated.

Accordingly, it is known that parashot (weekly reading portions) had reached
significant (although not perfect) uniformity. Thus, a single mistake regarding the
parashot (a mistake regarding the place, type or a missing parasha) in the text of a

\(^{112}\) See Tov, Scribal Practices and Approaches Reflected in the Texts Found in the Judean
Desert.127, n.173
scroll rendered the scroll completely invalid.\textsuperscript{113} Talmud testifies that regular readings of the Torah were instituted on Monday, Thursday, and twice on the Sabbath (morning and evening services).\textsuperscript{114} However, ‘there was no systematic order for the substance and length of the public Torah readings until the Rabbis established the practice of consecutive readings’.\textsuperscript{115} Nevertheless, the latter tradition of reading parashot as consisting of consecutive aliyot bears additional witness to the approximate size of the text that was listened to.

Namely, the Palestinian tradition had the Torah/Pentateuch divided into 155 portions, so that the whole is read in a triennial cycle.\textsuperscript{116} In contrast, the Babylonian tradition had the Torah/Pentateuch divided into 54 sections, so that the whole is read in an annual cycle.\textsuperscript{117} Eventually, the Babylonian annual cycle became accepted as the norm in the Palestinian Jewish community as well.\textsuperscript{118} In addition, there are also haphtaroth, the 54 sections of the text of the Prophets. The divisions of the text of the Prophets are introduced during the Maccabean period, at about 165 BCE.\textsuperscript{119}

Finally, for this thesis the following rules for choosing and subdividing the weekly readings of the Torah and Prophets into aliyot (the readings done by one reader in the synagogue) are critical. Firstly, the readings of the Torah and of the Prophets had to match thematically, both with each other and with the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item ‘The [following] ten enactments were ordained by Ezra: That the law be read [publicly] in the Minhah service on Sabbath; that the law be read [publicly] on Mondays and Thursdays …’ B.K. 82a; See also Eisenberg, p. 438.
\item Ibid., p. 439.
\item ‘for the people of Palestine, who complete the reading of the Pentateuch in three years’. Meg. 29b.
\item See Eisenberg, pp. 439, 440.
\item Palestinian triennial cycle is no longer in use anywhere. However, various versions of a newly arranged triennial cycle of reading the Scriptures are used in some synagogues in Reform, Conservative, Reconstructionist and Renewal Jewish movements. See Ginsburg, \textit{Introduction to the Massoretico-Critical Edition of the Hebrew Bible}, p. 32; Geisler, \textit{A General Introduction to the Bible}, p. 339.
\item See Geisler, \textit{A General Introduction to the Bible}, p. 339.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}

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season/festival, in case it was not an ordinary Monday, Thursday or Sabbath.  
Secondly, an aliyah should not be shorter than three verses. Thirdly, the last 
aliyah must not finish so that fewer than three verses are left of a large sense 
section (petucha or setumah). Fourthly, the last aliyah must not finish so that 
fewer than three verses are read from the beginning of a large sense section. 
Fifthly, the last aliyah read on all occasions, should finish on an optimistic note, 
so that often an additional three verses are read from the next consecutive sense 
section, or another which fits thematically to the one just read. Sixthly, there 
were from three to seven and more aliyot at each public reading, subject to which 
occaision it was (minimum seven aliyot on each Sabbath). Seventhly, 
haphtarah, the reading from the Prophets was a minimum of three verses long for 
congregations where a translation was needed, and a minimum of twenty-one 
verses long for congregations where no translation took place. All the same, even 
in the latter case, if an entirely new theme was discussed within the scope of the 
twenty-one verses, the haphtarah is shortened to for example only ten verses (for 
example, in case of Isa. 54.1-10). However, haphtarah is read only on 
Sabbaths, major festivals and fast days.

In addition, since the public reading after the Babylonian exile was performed to 
the audience whose vernacular language was Aramaic, a translator was 
translating verse by verse ad hoc having no script in front of him, but only by 
listening, understanding and translating the heard verse. Nevertheless, the 
translation had to meet the following standard: the translator ‘was not permitted 
to translate word by word, lest he distort the sense of the text, nor was he

120 For example, Exodus 20.1-14 on Shavuot, Leviticus 16 on Yom Kippur… See Meg. 31a-b. 
121 ‘He who reads in the Torah should not read less than three verses.’ Meg. 22a. 
122 ‘… at the end of a section not less than three verses should be left.’ Meg. 22a; 21b. 
123 ‘… we do not read less than three verses together at the beginning of a paragraph’. Meg. 22a; 23b. 
124 Eisenberg, pp. 458-59. 
125 Minimum three on Mondays and Thursdays, and minimum seven on Sabbaths. See ibid., p. 444. 
126 Ibid., p. 457. 
127 Meg. 23b. The reading of haphtarah originated, most likely at the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, and his decree by which all public reading of the Torah was banned. Thus, haphtarah is read instead. Nevertheless, after the circumstances changed, the reading of both the Torah and haphtarah remained. Jesus in Luke 4.16-21 followed the custom to read from the Prophets, the sense section he chose, and then elaborate on it.
permitted to elaborate on the text. His was to be a free, though exact translation.\footnote{128 Eisenberg, p. 453.}

It is thus evident that every public reading followed a logic of sense divisions. Even more, every detail of the practice of public reading was subject to this logic of sense divisions. The fact that the whole Bible became divided into verses even though only the Torah and part of the Prophets were used in oral liturgy, testifies to the strength of the oral tradition and its logic (since verses are divisions originated under oral tradition, not written).

The logic to which this oral practice attests has considerable implications on the issue of centralisation and decentralisation of meaning. In what follows, I will argue that methods of approaching biblical text, which are good at sensing the overarching narrative in the Bible, tend to loose sensitivity to the small details of the text. The opposite is true for the dialogical ‘close reading’ approaches, which rarely reach a level of sensitivity to the overarching scope to which the whole opus of the Scriptures witness. Thus, the practical question is where should one start from: the details, or the overarching structure? The logic of the oral tradition of Torah readings seems to me to provide the solution, since neither of the extremes (in decentralisation or centralisation) seems to be justified by the context of practice in which the Scriptures became the canon for the particular community of faith.

Therefore, I believe, one has to approach the Scriptures by being open to hearing sense divisions in it. Consequently, outcomes of higher criticism, according to which the Bible cannot be read in sequence of sense divisions, seem simply not in accordance with the nature of the Scriptures.\footnote{129 Thus, even if one could argue that there were times when the Scriptures were used in a predominantly written context, it seems to me against common sense to claim that the Scriptures cannot be used in an oral/aural context, so that one makes use of sequences of sense divisions. Nevertheless, the opposite of this logic is the outcome of the nineteenth-century’s higher criticism, after which reading the Bible as a whole became an endemic phenomenon preserved only in most conservative scholarly circles. See Walter C. Kaiser Jr, ‘Biblical Theology and the Interpretation of Messianic Texts’, \textit{AUSS}, 34 (Autumn 1996), 195-209, (p. 196).} Furthermore, the sequences of sense division heard cannot be abnormally long, like for example a biblical book

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\end{table}
in its entirety. Therefore, the presupposition that one can intuitively get a hint of what the overarching narrative is like, does not seem to be supported by the portion of the Scripture traditionally heard on a single occasion.

Thus, a controlled understanding of the overarching narrative can only be developed after centralising meaning on small details within a sense division of the biblical text, read and heard. Thus, the time needed for listening to the entire book is not the main reason for the lack of practice of reading the whole Bible in its entirety (not even in large sections). Instead, the main reason for dividing the text into small sensible portions lies in the practice of centralisation, which I argue should always precede decentralisation, as seemed to be the case each time the Torah was read. Simply put, one cannot centralise on small details when aiming at reading a whole book in one reading/listening. However, splitting the text into small quantitative, instead of content units, is not natural either. Conversely, if the text is divided into smaller sense divisions, a centralisation on small details is both possible and natural. Thus, a decentralisation is the consecutive step, which is to be taken via the small details already recognised during centralisation. In those terms, the decentralisation after centralisation is not without control, but is controlled by the small details, which Bakhtin called ‘dialogic overtones’, whilst Klingler called them ‘allusive markers’; I have suggested that they should be called ‘dependence markers’.

The next step, then, towards the final conclusion of what a genuine biblical approach to biblical text should contain is to clarify the differences between the Scriptures and the canon. In other words, I claimed that sensitivity to orality of the Bible can already be applied at the C–c’ context between centres of meaning, without necessarily changing the context to the b’ centre of pre-history (as Gunkel, for example, did). Furthermore, I claimed that centralisation on the

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130 On a critique of some modern triennial Torah-reading cycle where logical consecutive texts are abrupt, as well as limitations of the present lectionary in Lutheran tradition see, for example, Walter Sundberg, ‘Limitations of the Lectionary’, *Word & World*, 10 (1990), 14–20; Eisenberg, p. 440.
131 See again my reworking Klingler’s Definitions in Section 2.3.3 above.
132 By this, I do not claim that Gunkel did not start by focusing on small details in the text, as it was, that is the form of the text he was reading. However, I argue that the drift towards the pre-
small details in a portion of the text read/heard should be employed at the
beginning of the process of rendering the text. Both claims give rise to the
following question: Is the method then to be located at the level of the canonised
text (i.e. an edition of the Bible), or its underlying scriptural variants?

3.5.2.4 Scriptures vs Canon as the Locus of Method

As explained above, every given Bible or part of it is, in Bakhtinian terms, a
canonised utterance, i.e. an utterance of ‘others’ which was accentuated by the
effect of centrifugal and centripetal forces. (Note that here and in the rest of the
thesis, I use the terms canonisation and canon as it was presented in Sections
2.2.7 and 2.2.9 above.) The canon is the most accessible centre of meaning for
the contemporary reader in any biblical tradition with his/her Bible being ‘at
hand’. Therefore, according to the principles of relevance explained in Chapter 2
above, the respective canon of writings in the particular Bible would typically
deserve the status of the most relevant centre of meaning. However, the irritants
associated with this centre of meaning are multiple.

Firstly, there are at least four biblical canons available to me as the contemporary
reader: the Greek LXX, the Latin vulgate, the Hebrew MT, and for example the
English KJV (with a version of MT text but with different order of books).

Historically speaking, all four have had a community of believers who saw their
Bible as the biblical canon and preferred it to the others.

history of the text was not necessary for his sensitivity to orality of the text to be employed. For
more on Gunkel’s choice to move the centre to pre-history of the text, as part of the sociological
momentum of his time, see John Barton, The Old Testament: Canon, Literature and Theology:

133 Even the focus on MS, as the edition of the final form preserved by the Masoretes, through
whose efforts the canonisation reached its peak for their particular community of faith, does not
eliminate the initial questions at stake. More precisely, the question ‘which final form of the text?’
is simply rephrased into the question ‘which Masoretic text?’, since even the MS has developed
via recognisable streams and branches of transmission. Thus, ‘even were we to surmise that [MS]
reflects the “original” form of the Bible, we would still have to decide which Masoretic Text
reflects this “original text,” since the Masoretic Text is not a uniform textual unit, but is itself
represented by many witnesses’. (The italics are the author’s.) (Tov, Textual Criticism of the
Hebrew Bible, p. 11.) See also Barton, The Old Testament: Canon, Literature and Theology, pp.
185-89.
Secondly, choice of the canon that is historically and geographically the nearest to the context of the reader justifies usage of the term the final form of the text of the Bible but does not solve any problem – quite the opposite. In other words, the so-called final form approaches are in fact particular tradition approaches, leading to the inevitable question of the criteria by which the particular tradition was perceived as most favourable and relevant. I find this choice of locus hardly attainable within a view wider than a particular tradition is. Along this line of argument, Barton affirms that KJV is an equally legitimate final form of the text, according to the criteria limited to one particular tradition. Namely, from the year 1611, and within the Protestant tradition(s) of the English-speaking world, KJV has indeed been the final form of the text, being the latest version of the authorised translation of the inherited Scriptures.\(^{134}\)

However, it is clear that historical and geographical proximity cannot justify any canon be awarded the status of the centre of hermeneutical theory and meaning. Based on the historical and geographical criteria, anchoring the theory to one particular canon with (at best, graded) ignorance of other canons, is nothing less than locating the method at one particular religious tradition (of faith and interpretation) within which the canonisation took place or the canon became part of the religious heritage. There seems to be no objective answer to the question of which tradition deserves to be regarded as genuinely biblical: Hebrew, Greek, Latin or English.

In spite of these irritants, the majority of hypotheses\(^ {135}\) regarding the formation of the canon of the Scriptures follow precisely historical and geographical criteria that are presumed to have governed the process of canonisation. Accordingly, the emphasis the critics put on the tradition with its socio-political circumstances

\(^{134}\) See Barton, *The Old Testament: Canon, Literature and Theology*, p. 189.

\(^{135}\) I do not believe that any of those should deserve the status of a theory, since the historical witnesses for both of them are either weak, or non-existent. I find Wright’s definition of hypothesis here as having no need for further explanation: a hypothesis is ‘essentially a construct, thought up by a human mind, which offers itself as a story about a particular set of phenomena, in which the story, which is bound to be an interpretation of those phenomena, also offers an explanation of them’. (The italics are the author’s.) (Wright, *The New Testament and the People of God*, p. 99.)
under which the process of canonisation took place, is explicit in the case of James Barr, Sanders, Seeligmann and Fishbane, to mention just a few.

In contrast, Childs was the first to locate the method in the Scriptures, instead of in the canon, avoiding thus the dead-ends of the ‘final form’ issue, whilst still searching for the criteria for canonisation in the intrinsic qualities of the writings themselves, rather than any socio-political factors in the society in which the writings happened to be canonised. This difference urged him to claim his method not to be canonical in comparison to Sanders’ method, for example.

It is important, then, to recognise the fact that the locus of Childs’ method is at the c’ centre (the Scriptures with scriptural variants), as opposed to the C centre (the Canon of Scriptures), on Illustration 11 above. This does not mean that Childs’ method is not sensitive to the canon as a list of authoritative writings, which closed under a particular tradition of interpretation. In fact, quite the opposite: Childs played a pioneering role in introducing the history of interpretation (Wirkungsgeschichte) as a discipline in the field of hermeneutics.

Furthermore, Barton’s contribution with the proposal to distinguish between the canon (as the list of books) and Scriptures (as the authoritative books) seems to

140 Childs, ‘The Canon in Recent Biblical Studies: Reflections on an Era’, pp. 33-35; As a matter of fact, his main monograph, introductory to his method, was meant to lead to the Scriptures, not canon. (Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture.) See also Barton, The Old Testament: Canon, Literature and Theology, pp. 44-47.
141 ‘The history of exegesis is of special interest in illuminating the text by showing how the questions which are brought to bear by subsequent generations of interpreters influenced the answers which they received. No one comes to the text de novo ...’ (Brevard S. Childs, The Book of Exodus: A Critical, Theological Commentary (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1974), p. xv)
be helpful, since it delineates the notion of tradition (that finalises the canonisation) from theology/ideology that drives it.\textsuperscript{142} In the praxis of hermeneutics, a focus on the former, as explained above, leads to circulus vitiosus of justifying one interpretative tradition based on criteria established by the same tradition. Focus on the latter, thus, strikes me as a logical and viable solution for avoiding the irritants of ‘the final form’ proposals. In other words, it is not the focus on the tradition that leads to a satisfying explanation of the phenomenon of the canon, but, as I will suggest below, the focus on a balance between centralisation and decentralisation of meaning.

Furthermore, this notion of the intrinsic quality of the canonical books is indeed common to, among others, Childs, Walter C. Kaiser Jr and Wright. There is good reason to include Wright in this list,\textsuperscript{143} even though he is a New Testament scholar. Specifically, the way he developed his method has much in common with the route I took in this thesis. In particular, both of us started with a theory of paradigms (Wright followed Barbour,\textsuperscript{144} I followed Kuhn). Both of us linked the paradigm theories to literary analysis of the biblical text (Wright followed Propp\textsuperscript{145} and Greimas,\textsuperscript{146} I followed Bakhtin). Finally, he saw a need to combine the two theories with the theory of history proposed by Edward Hallett Carr (1892-1982).\textsuperscript{147} In contrast, my understanding was that a combination of the Kuhnian and Bakhtinian theories would be most productive if linked with theory of relevance in general and theory of literary allusions in particular. The outcome of Wright’s comprehensive theory is the so-called critical realism, which, in his case is a follow-up to critical realism proposed by Ben F. Meyer (1927-95). Thus,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{142} Barton, \textit{The Old Testament: Canon, Literature and Theology}, pp. 44-47.
\item \textsuperscript{143} In addition to what I have used of his proposals already in the thesis. See Section 2.3.4 above.
\item \textsuperscript{147} Wright, \textit{The New Testament and the People of God}, p. 82. See also David M. Carr, \textit{What is History?}, 2 edn (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1987).
\end{itemize}
comparing Wright’s method (the so-called five-acts method) with mine (I will suggest the name zoom lens method), appears to be logical and promising, at least to the level required to evaluate my choice of tools in my rendering of the biblical text.

In particular, Childs, Kaiser, and Wright claim that there is an overarching, homogenous ‘controlling story’, or a master narrative, which justifies the view on the Scriptures as a unified whole. Nevertheless, it is the differences between their methods that will prove to be helpful in solving the problem of my research.

It should be noted, however, that the differences between these methods, discussed in what follows, are very subtle. Thus, at many points, as will be shown, the difference is between a good and a better tool used, an appropriate and a more appropriate one. None the less, my application of the method in the following Chapter will show that even the fine-tuning of the methods yields considerable differences in the outcomes.

The first difference among the methods concerns the level of sense of homogeneity of the Scriptures. Namely, as explained above, Childs locates his method at the c’ centre (Scriptures, with its variants), whilst Kaiser’s method seems to be almost insensitive to the variants. Moreover, this insensitivity seems to be caused by Kaiser’s much stronger focus on the unifying theme that is spread throughout the Bible; the theme he finds to be ‘God’s promise’. Accordingly,

Kaiser’s method could be labelled as genuinely canonical, since his method is indeed located and practised within the borders of the canonical opus. But, the cost for such a strong emphasis on the central theme is drifting away from the centre (with all the variants of the biblical text), and indeed becoming less, if at all, sensitive to it.

In addition, Wright’s method, according to my understanding, is developed by taking another step towards the image of the historical events/theological ideas, that is to a centre on Illustration 11 above. (However, I am stressing again that these differences are indeed on the level of fine-tuning.) More precisely, the Bible is seen as a narrative of an unfinished drama, so that the biblical story provides five acts (Creation, Fall, Israel, Jesus, Church) whilst the last stage of the fifth act (Church) is left for the contemporary reader to play out, being governed by the theme, plot, impression, and style of the previous parts. The outcome, it would seem, is the maximum sensitivity to the all-embracing story, but at the cost of lack of sensitivity to smaller details in the story itself, something that a sharper focus on the text could provide. This has already been noted by Wright’s predecessors, collectively belonging to the school of ‘structuralism’, and even more so by their critics.

It would seem that Wright has also seen these criteria for the control of the story, to be the most critical part of his method; thus, in his own words: ‘There is urgent need for better control within the practice of this method, for finding some ways to assessing the respective assertions of critics who have used it.’

In other words, Wright has achieved substantial control over the plot of a story, following Greimas, and acquired a tool that seems compatible with my method.

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152 Ibid., pp. 70-77. See Greimas, Structural Semantics: An Attempt at a Method; Greimas, On Meaning: Selected Writings in Semiotic Theory.
as well. (I believe, Bakhtinian dialogism leaves room for similar elements for controlling the plot of the story.) Nevertheless, Bakhtinian sensitivity to dialogic overtones, I suggest, would provide control of the story over even smaller elements than the plot. Accordingly, if the previous acts of the drama are to lead me to an understanding of what the end of the drama should look like, the critical question is about what the criteria are for the correct understanding of the previous acts. What are the criteria for the correct reading of the plot? I am convinced that the criteria cannot be found on the level of the plot, since it would clearly produce a circulus vitiosus.

Furthermore, the criteria cannot be found on the level of the paradigm either, since the mainstay of the method is that the plot is the chief criteria for determining the paradigm/worldview, not vice versa. The only viable solution I thus see is tools sensitive to elements smaller than plot. Nevertheless, Wright does not seem to provide them, at least not explicitly. It seems that he has rather taken the route of searching for that tool by resorting to historical scholarship.\(^\text{153}\) I have to admit that I do not understand how historical scholarship could provide criteria for correctly understanding Genesis 1-3, for example. However, Genesis 1-3 is seen as incorporating the first and second part of the drama we are supposed to take part in, according to Wright.

Thus, in the light of the strengths and weaknesses of Wright’s method, explained above, I think that in comparison with Childs’ method and Kaiser’s method, Wright’s is the nearest to the A centre on Illustration 11 above, that is to the image of the historical events/theological ideas of the biblical paradigm. In

\(^{153}\) It is, of course, legitimate to conclude that the only possible solution for lack of criteria in his method was to resort to the history of interpretation, following the solution proposed by Childs. However, in what follows, I will argue that there is a close link in hermeneutical methods sharing presuppositions with structuralists and hermeneutical methods sharing presuppositions with poststructuralists. Moreover, poststructuralists’ claim that there is a strong connection between ‘genesis’ and structure, between history and semantics, and seem also to provide grounds for Wright’s solution. Thus, Wright concludes: ‘Genuine historical scholarship is still the appropriate tool with which to work at discovering more fully what precisely the biblical authors intended to say.’ (Wright, \textit{Scripture and the Authority of God}, p. 81.) See also Jobling, ‘Methods of Modern Literary Criticism’, (p. 24); On the link between ‘Genesis and Structure’ and Phenomenology see Jacques Derrida, \textit{Writing and Difference}, trans. by Alan Bass (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1967; repr. London: Routledge Classics, 2001), pp. 193-211.
contrast to Wright’s method, Kaiser’s focus on details in the canonical text of the Old Testament that provide factual minutiae about the Messiah, his life, teaching, and so on, in the New Testament shows how important to him the small details of the narratives in the Bible are.\footnote{154}

This comparison invites us in numerous ways to reconsider the chicken-and-egg question, what comes first and what follows, that is, the chicken or the egg, sensitivity to centrifugal forces in the Bible or on the centripetal, focus on variants or on the overarching theme, on the small details or the structure … This is where, I suggest, functionality against theory comes to fore.\footnote{155} On the one hand, centralising the meaning having started from a centre already sensitive to centripetal forces at work, would handicap the meaning, leading to a ‘canon within the canon’\footnote{156} hermeneutical handicap, or at best to a method being criticised as far too ‘flat’.\footnote{157} On the other hand, decentralising the meaning having started from a centre already sensitive to centrifugal forces would handicap the meaning, making it simply not functional, just as Wellhausen’s decentralisation of meaning, on top of the b’ centre, (already distant and insensitive to centripetal forces of a unifying narrative in the Bible) made the meaning a part of history.\footnote{158} This leads me to conclude that the method has to start with sensitivity to the


\footnote{155}{Following Kuhnian criteria for choosing a paradigm (see Section 2.1.4 above), rather than just entertaining Wright’s repeating of the phrase that ‘the proof of the pudding is in the eating’.

\footnote{156}{A popular hermeneutical fallacy attributed to Martin Luther who applied the salvation-by-faith rule to the text of the Bible. The outcome was an unbridgeable incompatibility of the epistle of Jacob with the rest of the biblical canon. ‘St. John’s Gospel and his first epistle, St. Paul’s epistles, and especially Romans, Galatians, and Ephesians, and St. Peter’s first epistle are the books which teach all that is necessary for salvation, even if you read no other books. In comparison with them, James is a right straw epistle, for it has no evangelic manner about it.’ Even more; ‘Let us banish this epistle from the university, for it is worthless. It has no syllable about Christ, not even naming him except once at the beginning.’ (Preserved Smith, *The Life and Letters of Martin Luther* (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1911; repr. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1914), pp. 268,69.) Also Oswald Bayer, ‘Luther as an interpreter of Holy Scripture’, in *The Cambridge Companion to Martin Luther*, ed. by Donald K. McKim, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 73-85.


\footnote{158}{Kaiser, ‘Biblical Theology and the Interpretation of Messianic Texts’, (p. 196).}
smallest details found in the variants of the text, but then also to proceed to decentralisation towards the overarching theme and structure in the wider scriptural context.

However, as one might expect, the pendulum of history of interpretation did not stop at C centre (text), on its route from behind the text (from c’ centre). After experiencing irritants associated with a lamp located in the text as the centre of meaning, the pendulum seemed to be moving forward, towards the centres in front of the text. A closer look at the trends and methods of this period is what follows.

3.5.3 Cognitive Gravity in Front of the Text

In the latter part of the twentieth century, the majority of methods used in biblical studies could be described as switching on the lamp in front of the text. The common feature of these approaches to the Bible (despite many differences) is that they moved their presupposed centre of meaning from C centre (text), towards the voices heard in front of the text, that is to D centre (image of the first recipient/s) or E centre (image of the contemporary recipient/s).

However, as presented above, every shift of the pendulum presented a change in the location of the ‘main stream’ in biblical studies of that time. I think that in my presentation of the methods earlier in this thesis, it was evident that many varieties in methods in biblical studies co-exist at all times, whereas my intention was always to discern the shift of the ‘mainstream’. However, in terms of the variety exercised in methods in biblical study, the latter part of the twentieth century is not comparable to any other epoch. In other words, the shift of the location of the ‘mainstream’ was a shift towards un-uniformed practice and decentralised meaning. In those terms, grouping together the methods of this period is indeed an almost utopian endeavour. Utopian since not to be grouped was the very trend of the time unless under the label of ‘ungrouped’. Almost utopian, since the shift towards decentralisation of meaning did take place via a few critical steps, which, thus, provide some ground for association.
Furthermore, as I understand it, the purpose of the shift was, of course, not ‘toelong to the ungrouped’. It was rather the outcome of the process of moving
towards the voices in front of the text. The complex reality is that the voices on
this side of the text are of so many groups and contexts, that the decentralisation
of methods, of fields of study, and indeed of the meaning (as the outcome of the
study) was inevitable.

It is thus understandable that my presentation of the methods in this section has to
be on the level of a general overview, far more general than in the previous
sections. However, I believe that it will fulfil the purpose of this thesis.
Accordingly, I believe that visualising the relations between the ‘main’ streams at
this period of history is always helpful. Illustration 22 below, shows only the
most important years and names of the persons whose writings represented a step
forward (even if the person was not the most influential person at the time of the
step).
The first glance at the illustration above, I believe, directs us to two main trends in biblical scholarship of the time, both of them rooted in philosophy of language.
in general and semiotics in particular. On the one hand, de Saussure’s semiotics leads towards the so-called structuralism as the overarching theory for explaining language, communication, human understanding and, in fact, the whole reality. On the other hand, Bakhtin’s proposal with the same purpose was the theory of dialogism. When introducing Bakhtinian literary theory in Chapter 2 above, I used the incompatibility of the two theories as the way to explain them. It is thus already obvious that the two theories were in fact two worldviews, pregnant with potential to develop new methods as well as to establish groups of practitioners. The incompatibility of the two groups is the main line of my argument visualised in Illustration 22 above.

The first signs of this movement of the hermeneutical pendulum can be traced back to James Muilenburg (1896-1974) and his ‘rhetorical criticism’, initiated with his article ‘Form Criticism and Beyond’ in 1969.\(^{159}\) Muilenburg, in fact, followed up Gunkel’s notion of intrinsic literary qualities of Scriptures.\(^{160}\) This is the crucial point, the one I highlighted when introducing Gunkel’s hypothesis earlier in the thesis.\(^{161}\) Both the form critics of the nineteenth century and ‘new’ literary critics of the late twentieth century rightly called their methods ‘literary’.\(^{162}\) The essence was the same, even though the outcomes of it and even the elements of the method were so diverse. On the one hand, the common essence for both streams, as I am seeking to explain, is indeed ‘the lamp’. On the other hand, the basic difference is in the centres of focus.

In the same year, 1969, the second turnover took place: Edmund Leach published his *Genesis as Myth and Other Essays*\(^ {163}\) and set the milestone of a symbiosis between anthropology and ‘new’ literary criticism. Moreover, he (as a

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\(^{159}\) James Muilenburg, ‘Form Criticism and Beyond’, *JBL*, 88 (March 1969), 1-18 (p. 1).


\(^{161}\) See Section 3.5.1 above.

\(^{162}\) Thus, ‘[a] few generations ago much ‘literary’ criticism was just as diachronic as the work of most biblical interpreters [that is, of most (source and form) critics].’ John Barton, ‘Historical-Critical Approaches’, in *The Cambridge Companion to Biblical Interpretation*, ed. by John Barton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 9-20, (p. 14).

structuralist anthropologist) applied structuralism as a method for reading biblical text. This is why he is on the left side, of Illustration 16 above, visually belonging to the ‘structuralist’ stream (notice the thick solid line arrow denoting direct lines of thought, whilst the dotted lines on the illustration denote the background theories, being present and influential, even though not intrinsic to biblical studies).

Thirdly, in 1974, Fernando Belo applied a political agenda to his rendering of the Bible (more precisely, the New Testament). This will be paired-up with Phyllis Trible’s *God and Rhetoric of Sexuality*, in which the text of the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament is rendered with having a feminist agenda in mind.

However, the pairing of Belo and Trible should not be over simplified. Belo was a structuralist, Trible a rhetoric critic disciple of Muilenburg. The differences are as important as the similarities. Namely, rhetorical criticism can stand close to structuralist approaches, but it is not necessarily always the case. My understanding of this is that the very idea of rhetoric is so vague that the scope, majority of tools and thus the outcomes of the methods used by rhetorical critics can overlap with those of the structuralist. Accordingly, rhetoric criticism in its early phases had more in common with so-called ‘close reading’ of the Bible, in the form of Bakhtinian criticism, than with structuralism. This was even more evident after the publication of Robert Alter’s *The Art of Biblical Narrative* (1981) and Meir Sternberg’s *The Poetics of Biblical Narrative* (1987). Both of them applied a Bakhtinian approach to the biblical text.

164 For consequent steps, see for example articles from 1972 in *Semeia 1: A Structuralist Approach to the Parables*, ed. by Robert W. Funk (Atlanta, GA: SBL, 1974).
166 Trible, *God and Rhetoric of Sexuality*.
168 Ibid.
I believe this ‘close’ reading of the Bible is then best understood, if the opposing, structuralist approach is labelled as a ‘distant’ reading. It is important to read (and not misread) these labels in the context of the comparison. Simply put, for Bakhtin the smallest details, nuances in a speech/text are where the logic of reasoning rests. A simple experience of reading Sternberg’s rendering of a biblical text is a good way to test this. Conversely, for structuralists, moving a step or two away from the small details in order to recognise the big structure of the speech, text, language as a whole, is not just welcome but essential, since that is where their logic of reasoning rests.

This difference should lead to the conclusion that both of the approaches have their strengths and weaknesses, as is always the case with opposing theories. However, regarding the issue of the de/centralisation of meaning, some of the weaknesses of structuralist approaches seem to me to be anomalies, not just irritants. More precisely (as noted during the analysis of Wright’s method, when applied to reading a text) if the overall structure of the text is what defines the meaning of the particles in the text, what are the criteria for recognising the structure? It cannot be the details in the text itself, since structuralist logic takes exactly the opposite direction. The lack of these criteria was the irritant, growing into the anomaly that led to ‘poststructuralism’ in general and ‘deconstruction’ in particular. Whilst poststructuralism had (and still has) many forms, subject to the field of study in which it is applied, deconstruction is its best example in the field of philosophical-literary analysis of a text.

More precisely, Jacques Derrida proposed the theory of deconstruction in his *Of Grammatology* (1967). Derrida has claimed that his deconstruction is not a

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method, nor critique, analysis or any type of poststructuralism. Respecting this claim, it is thus appropriate to talk about Derrida’s agenda. Approaching it from the issue of de/centralisation, the agenda could be summarised as follows.

As I understand it, the essence of Saussurean heritage is the notion that reality functions in forms of binary opposites (for example, a cat is understood and defined by differences between cats and dogs). Challenging and changing the future is thus achievable by challenging and eventually changing the binary opposites. This idea, applied to a text, sets the agenda according to which the binary opposites in the text are searched for and then exposed. Furthermore, the purpose of the exposition is to show that all the hierarchies, past and present, are based on presupposition that structures are an intrinsic feature of the reality (just as the binary opposites are), whereas the structures are not an intrinsic feature, according to Derrida. Thus, restructuring the binary opposites in a text, leads to restructuring assumed hierarchies in the text, and consequently in societies as well. This restructuring is called deconstruction. Thus, deconstruction is, in fact, changing the frame-structure within which a text and its particles carry meaning, so that the meaning of the text is changed and directed towards challenging hierarchical structures in societies.

It is not difficult to see how this agenda can be applied to biblical text as well. Nevertheless, a link with structuralism is also obvious. However, Derrida’s twist to it is what I would describe as structuralism detached from a centre of meaning. In order to further the analogy with the biblical text as mirror and lamp, it seems adequate to describe Derrida’s rendering of the text as if the text was a torch. Accordingly, the text is seen as being able to enlighten any topic, preferably a current issue of gender, economic, political, racial or any other form of oppression in current societies.

As it transpired, the gender issues, addressed by Trible in 1978 were the meeting point of Bakhtinian and structuralist streams in biblical studies. The torch was

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switched on and the borders between the two streams seem to have slowly started diminishing, allowing them to merge under the umbrella of ‘ideological criticism’.

However, this did not happen at once. Thus, on the one hand, one can still discern the stream of Bakhtinian-type approaches represented by the works of Adele Berlin, Robert Polzin, Shimon Bar-Efrat, Lyle Eslinger, George Savran, Joel Rosenberg and others. On the other hand, the stream of structuralist approaches is furthered by the work of Jobling and others. Finally, essentially deconstructive approaches are discernable in the works of Peter D. Quinn-Miscall, Mieke Bal, Athalya Brenner, Cherly J. Exum, Ellen Van Wolde, Regina Schwartz, Yvonne Sherwood and others.

172 On the link between structuralism, poststructuralism and feminism see (especially chapter 12 in) A History of Feminist Literary Criticism, ed. by Gill Plain and Susan Sellers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
173 Adele Berlin, Poetics and Interpretation of Biblical Narrative (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1983).
175 Shimon Bar-Efrat, Narrative Art in the Bible (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1989).
181 See, for example, the contributors to Semeia 18: Genesis 2 and 3, Kaleidoscopic Structural Readings, ed. by Daniel Patte (Atlanta, GA: SBL, 1980; repr. 1983).
However, it is important to note that when I introduced the dialogical features of Bakhtinian literary criticism, it was obvious that it was already a decentralised methodology (see Chapter 2 above). Conversely, the shift of the hermeneutical pendulum towards deconstruction also reaches decentralisation, but on the grounds of the detached structure of the text, and not on the grounds of genuinely decentralised borders between centres of meaning.

In addition, when introducing the terms essential for understanding Bakhtinian dialogism, it was explained that every utterance features orientation, achieved by accentuation via dialogical overtones in the utterance itself (see Section 2.2.7 above). Thus, during the natural development of language, re-accentuation represents a change in what has earlier been accepted as a stereotype, or, simply, conventional in the language.


Thus, when re-accentuation is applied to an utterance, by modifying dialogical overtones in it, a change in the meaning conveyed by the utterance is achieved. This is, in essence, deconstruction of a text, in terms of Bakhtinian dialogism. It is achieved by maximising the act of authoring on the side of the addressee. In those terms it is not a decentralisation, but the opposite of it; it is a centralisation on the a’ centre of meaning (the contemporary recipient centre on Illustration 11, above). In this way, the text is thus seen as a torch, being able to illuminate (bear witness to?) any context, any issue on ‘this’ side of the text; just like a torch that can be directed towards any (deconstructed) recipient on this side of the canon. In what follows, I will show how this detachment of the hermeneutical focus from the C centre presents considerable problems. The two cases presented in what follows are deconstructions of the D centre and E centre (on Illustration 11 above).

### 3.5.3.1 Cognitive Gravity of Deconstructed Recipients

As argued above, the reader-response theories of interpretations have in common, a focus on the voices heard in front of the text. Deconstruction criticism is an ample yield of the shift; the biblical text is interpreted as detached from its canonical context, and immersed in another context, presumably a more relevant one to the contemporary interpreter of the text. There is thus hardly any need to cut the biblical text into fragments, as was the practice when the focus was on voices behind the text. This time the whole text is transposed into a new whole, foreign to the times when the biblical canon was the relevant context. The newly chosen, more relevant contexts are various: the contemporary ecological/scientific context, socio/political context, or even the context of another canon, like, for example, the early Christian Apocrypha.

I think that an example of the latter focus can provide grounds for understanding the anomalies of all the methods centred on a context detached from the C centre

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190 It is appropriate, thus, to see theology as being ‘particularised’ according to many contexts/issues in which it could find its locus; feminism, liberation of the oppressed (black or Latin American), or local contexts of Africa, South Asia, East Asia respectively. See The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology since 1918, ed. by David F. Ford and Rachel Muers (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 427-552.
(on Illustration 11 above). More precisely, the irritants/anomalies of this focus on non-canonical traditions from the contexts in front of biblical text can be clarified by an exposition of Bart D. Ehrman’s approach. At first glance, Ehrman’s method is developed according to the notion of the biblical canon. In other words, Ehrman places the focus of his method at the time and place of writing of the biblical books (in particular the New Testament). However, his presupposition is that the correct meaning of the canonical books is only properly understood in the context of (even more so in contrast with) the books, which did not make it to the scope of the canonical opus. More precisely, the locus of Ehrman’s method is not in the voices heard in the canon of the Bible, but in the voices heard at the outer edge of the border of the canon. Thus, contrary to Wellhausen’s and Gunkel’s master narrative, reflecting Darwin’s *The Origin of The Species*, Ehrman locates the master narrative of his theological paradigm (rather implicitly than explicitly) in the writings of Roman philosophers promoting polytheistic, decentralised and, above all, tolerant ideals of ideology and politics. This master narrative is the basis for Ehrman’s paradigm in which the attitude of ‘proto-orthodox’ Christians (to be selective in their evaluation of canonical and non-canonical writings) is seen as intolerant, unfair and, in fact, unacceptable. This intolerance of the proto-orthodox tradition, responsible for selectiveness and limitedness of biblical canon is thus the main irritant and, indeed, the anomaly that made Ehrman subscribe to other ideologies/paradigms available at the time of making the canon.

Contrary to Ehrman’s method, I think that whilst there are logical reasons for pointing to the relevance of the non-canonical writings for our understanding of the message of the canonical writings, granting the non-canonical writings presumed relevance greater than the relevance of the canonical writings is illogical and against the principles of relevance, as explained in Section 2.3 above. Consequently, the idea that the winner writes the history is only partially

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191 The main logic of argument against the ‘proto-orthodox’ intolerance, as contrasted to Roman tolerance (presumably common to all of the non-Christian societies) is implicit in the next paragraph, and echoed throughout the book: ‘This intolerance was not something proto-orthodox Christianity derived from its broader Roman milieu. In point of fact, the polytheistic religions of the Roman Empire were famously tolerant of one another.’ (Bart D. Ehrman, *Lost Christianities: The Battles for Scripture and the Faiths We Never Knew* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 254.)
true, since Ehrman develops his conclusion specifically on the historical writings of the losers. Furthermore, the fact that the ‘losers’ did not get to write the ‘mainstream’ history, does not necessarily make the losers’ view on history more relevant, objective or true. As R. A. Baker comments in his review of *The Lost Christianities*, ‘Five hundred years from now someone will dig up some twentieth century Neo-Nazi writings that describe and explain the struggle of the Nazi party of the 1940’s against the Allies. Why would anyone believe this testimony over the writings of Winston Churchill or Dwight Eisenhower?’  

Furthermore, what Ehrman does is to locate his method at a centre of meaning which does not have a stable ‘winning’ master narrative, and thus does not represent a delineable utterance. An even more critical move in the method is to apply decentralisation of meaning, after locating the centre of his method at the centre alien to the canonical. The outcome of his method, as could be predicted, is not just one paradigm of the non-canonical writings but many of them, all of them being in conflict with the biblical paradigm (and with each other). Consequently, and not surprising that Ehrman cannot find an answer to his question: ‘Where did we get our New Testament Gospels in the first place, and how do we know that they, rather than the dozens of Gospels that did not become part of the New Testament, reveal the truth about what Jesus taught?’ (The italics are the author’s).  

Following the same line of his hermeneutical logic, Ehrman explicitly ranks the apocryphal revelation as greater than the canonical revelation. The outcomes of this hermeneutical method are, as could be predicted, at best odd to the voices heard from the canonical context (and at worst, in direct conflict with them). Thus, as mentioned above, there are indeed many contexts, many traditions of interpretation of the canonised texts that could be granted greater relevance than

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194 The idea that Jesus had a twin brother. See ibid., pp. 39-59.  
195 Authorship of 1 Timothy, for example. See ibid., p. 39.
the canonical context itself – early Christian Apocrypha (in the case of Ehrman’s method) being only one possibility. Accordingly, the torch can be directed to enlighten the A centre in Illustration 11 above (the image of historical events/theological ideas). The effect of this needs to be clarified in what follows.

3.5.3.2  Cognitive Gravity of a Deconstructed Image of the World

After the biblical text presumably got the function of a torch that can be detached from its canonical context, the text could illuminate an image of the reality (the A centre in Illustration 11 above), which presumably did not claim anything prescriptive or propositional regarding the actual reality. In other words, the A centre can be deconstructed, so that it receives new features and functions. By the same deconstruction, theology and science divorced, by an agreement that theology will continue to be responsible for images, whilst the real world is a matter for science.¹⁹⁶ The artificial and deceiving assumption that these two fields of study are delineable is hard to defend for many reasons. I find the following three reasons most relevant for this thesis.

Firstly, the biblical text claims to be historical by nature, even though the type of historicity is not scientific. In other words, the fact that the contemporary audience fails at attempts to re-construct the actual minutiae of the pre-history of Scriptures is not logical grounds for denying the historicity of the Scriptures. Moreover, the part of the history of the text, which the contemporary audience’s

¹⁹⁶ This is a solution already proposed by Kant, who followed up Hume’s argument against religion’s attempt to explain the natural world. Thus, religion’s field of study is ethics/morals, whilst the study of nature is to be left to science. This view is extremely popularised in writings of, for example, Stephen Jay Gould. An example of a moderate version of the separation between science and religion is presented by Van Huyssten. See Stephen Jay Gould, Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life (New York, NY: Ballantine, 1999); Wentzel J. Van Huyssten, The Shaping of Rationality: Toward Interdisciplinarity in Theology and Science (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999). For more on the metaphors used for the relation between religion and science in Europe in pre-modern and modern time, see Margaret J. Osler, ‘Mixing Metaphors: Science and Religion or Natural Philosophy and Theology in Early Modern Europe’, History of Science, 36 (1998), 91-113.
enquiry can reach, has shown that the text and its (also historical) context cannot be clearly delineated.\textsuperscript{197}

Secondly, the biblical image of the world, author, text and the primary recipient is authorised in its own terms, just as any other writing authorises its images. More precisely, our understanding of the type of accuracy of biblical presentation is subject to our sensitivity to the way time and space are presented in a particular biblical text. Thus, instead of imposing criteria foreign to the text, the text itself should be consulted when a choice of criteria for measuring the accuracy of the biblical text is made. Thus, the assumed agreement between biblical studies and scientific studies regarding the monopoly over matters of nature and the world is deceiving in that it implies that standards required by and from a scientific piece of writing are imposed on the Scriptures. The same way, the dichotomy in itself is false, since the standard of the scientific accuracy between the two (between a scientific writing and the Scriptures) is different does not necessarily mean that one of them (in this case the Scriptures) does not have any scientific accuracy, and thus any credibility in explaining the natural world.

Thirdly and finally, superimposing the type of scientific presentation of the world over the biblical presentation (so that the scientific presentation becomes the criterion for the measure of scientific accuracy of the biblical presentation) is nothing else but centralisation on the context of the contemporary recipient of the biblical text. In other words, there is no such thing as the science, but rather the current state of the science.\textsuperscript{198} Consequently, the scientific rendering of the world

\textsuperscript{197} This became especially relevant after the great archaeological discoveries during the twentieth century. See William Foxwell Albright, \textit{The Archaeology of Palestine and the Bible}, Kiraz Classic Archaeological Reprints 5 (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias, 2009), p. 127.

\textsuperscript{198} The fluidity of scientific knowledge has never been an issue. To the contrary, it was the fluidity that initiated the conflict regarding the ways the fluidity/growth functions. In addition to the resources I used when introducing the conflict between Kuhnian and Popperian theory in Chapter 2 above, see also Nectarios G. Limnatis, \textit{German Idealism and the Problem of Knowledge: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel}, ed. by Reinier Munk, Studies in German Idealism (New York: Springer, 2008); John Waller, \textit{Fabulous Science: Fact and Fiction in the History of Scientific Discovery} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Friedel Weinert, \textit{The Scientist as Philosopher: Philosophical Consequences of Great Scientific Discoveries} (Berlin: Springer, 2005); Aharon Kantorovich, \textit{Scientific Discovery: Logic and Tinkering} (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993); William A. Wallace, \textit{Galileo’s Logic of Discovery and Proof: The Background, Content, and Use of His Appropriated Treatises on Aristotle’s Posterior
is not a constant. Thus, by definition, it should not be used as a criterion for any rendering of the biblical image of the world. The real criterion is thus not any constant, but the current recipient/audience. Even more particularly, the real criterion is cognitive structure of the audience’s paradigm. Lack of understanding of the reader-centeredness of this approach to the biblical text creates the possibility for ‘scientific’ approaches to the Bible to keep claiming their scientific validity, or theological validity, or in the worst case, both

Meanwhile the personal choice of faith regarding the existence of a gap (or absence of it) between the biblical presentation of the world and the real world, that is between the A centre and a’ centre (on Illustration 11 above), is apparently set aside.

3.6 CONCLUSION: NEED FOR DYNAMICS IN THE METHOD

After reconsidering the three groups of methods (according to their sensitivity to the realities behind, in and in front of the text) in this Chapter, and summarising the irritants these methods have failed to resolve, I can draw the conclusions which will further shape my method. These conclusions will lead into the exposition of my method in the following Section.

To conclude, denying the existence, or simply ignoring either the centrifugal or the centripetal forces of Scriptures, is both foolish and problematic. A pursuit of

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199 The function of the cognitive part of a paradigm is an often-neglected part of the process of scientific progress/revolution. Nevertheless, the neglect of the cognitive factor in scientific progress/revolution is what makes critical realism seem like a feasible way to reconcile science and religion. My point is that critical realism in general is an agenda rather than a method. Thus, the agenda of reconciliation is furthered at the cost of neglect of the cognitive structure offered by biblical text, on the text’s terms. For more on the relation between realism and cognitive structures (particularly in the process of scientific revolutions) see Peter Barker, Hanne Andersen and Xiang Chen, The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 164-80.

this kind makes some peculiar solutions seem viable, often even essential. However, such solutions have rarely been functional.

A far too strong emphasis on the centrifugal forces will delineate and in fact estrange the Scriptures from its unifying image of the genuine biblical paradigm. In contrast, far too strong an emphasis on the centripetal forces will delineate the genuine paradigm from its basis, the Scriptures, thus robbing the image from the criteria according to which the image was created in the first place.

The logical question to ask is: What is the balanced level of centralisation and decentralisation? The answer, I believe, has to be based on the purpose of the method, that is to satisfy the expectations the reader has set forth for the text. In the light of the history of interpretation, as I have briefly reviewed it in this Chapter, I find it inappropriate to align with methods which focus on the prehistory of the text so much that they deprive the Bible from its functionality in the current religious context. Likewise, expecting the Bible function only in the narrow context of one particular religious tradition, limited to one specific time and space, is equally unsatisfying. A method which is sensitive to, instead of ignorant of the competing fields of gravity surrounding the centres of meaning is the method which serves the purpose of this thesis.

3.7 EXPOSITION OF THE ZOOM LENS METHOD

Based on the theory of interpretative relativity, zoom lens model and my review of the conflicting methods of interpretation, I conclude that the method which will be able to increase the reader’s sensitivity to the dependence markers in the text should comprise the following seven steps/tasks. The first three reflect methodological centralisation, the last three, methodological decentralisation, whilst the fourth task represents the mainstay of the method: validation of the dependence between two texts. The literal meaning of the text is appropriated by

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the first three steps, whilst pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic by the last three steps of the method. 202

The steps of the zoom lens method I propose are:

1. Centralisation on aural divisions: raising potential questions regarding voices, utterances, plot, chronotopes, and social ideologies.

Purpose of the step: validation of: double-voicedness, polyphony, plot, chronotope(s), and heteroglossia.

2. Centralisation on visual divisions: raising potential questions regarding words, sentences, verses, chapters, textual criticism.

Purpose of the step: validation of insights from linguistics and textual criticism.

3. Centralisation on dependence markers: initial validation of highlighters (direction markers) in the text.

Purpose of the step: initial validation regarding the presence of monophonic dependence markers.

4. Conclusion regarding the type of dependence: validation of dependence.

Purpose of the step: validation of in/stability of pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings and of an image of a paradigm of the dependent text.

Final validation of the presence of monophonic dependence markers in the text.

5. Decentralisation towards the independent text: validation of independence.

202 Literal, pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings as they were explained in Sections 1.8 and 3.4 above.
Purpose of the step: validation of stability of an image of a paradigm in the text. Validation of stability of meaning within the image of the paradigm. Validation of the text’s potential to qualify to status of the master narrative.

6. Decentralisation towards the recipients: Validation of rhetorical function of the dependence markers.

Validation of allusion, reference, citation, quotation, or paraphrase with five options of rhetorical functions (B≈A; B=A; B≠A; B>A; B<A) in each case.

7. Decentralisation towards other centres: validations of answers to the questions.

Validation of implications (of the reading) for a particular view on the text, seen from particular centres of meaning. In other words, the implication should involve an attempt to answer the questions about the text, raised at the first three steps. An application of these steps to reading the narrative text in Exodus 16 is the purpose of the following Chapter.
CHAPTER 4: THE ‘SABBATH OF THE LORD’ MOTIF IN EXODUS 16

In this Chapter, I will apply the zoom lens method whilst analysing the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif in Exodus 16. The literal meaning of the text will be appropriated by the first three steps of the method, whilst pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings by the last three steps. With this purpose in mind, I will explain my logic of reasoning through the steps of the method, hopefully making it more clear by delineating some steps, that, in practice simply come in a more synchronic way.

Owing to the scope of this thesis, the application of the method to the text in Genesis 16 will be limited, focussing on the one single dependence marker, the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif. Therefore, the rendering of the sections of biblical text in this Chapter is not intended to produce an extensive commentary on biblical text.

The ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif occurs only twice in the narrative texts in the Torah, namely as part of the following two expressions: שמחת יום ליהוה in Exodus 16.23 and as דחיוב השמות ליהוה in Exodus 16.25. In the next step, I will delineate the text in which these expressions are logical.

4.1 ‘SABBATH OF THE LORD’ MOTIF AS A PART OF AURAL DIVISIONS

Whilst it was concluded earlier in this thesis, that the first context the narrative was used in was oral/aural, it is noteworthy that even details such as complex chiastic structures, have been shown as functional in the context. In other words, even the features usually perceived as visual (e.g. complex chiastic structures) can be appropriated without the text being seen/read. Thus, my rendering of the text at this first step of the zoom lens method, by listening to, instead of reading or seeing, the narrow, as well as the wider context/plot of Exodus 16, will be justifiable.

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1 For the feasibility of complex chiastic structures as part of the oral/aural context see Section 3.5.1 above.
The ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif in Exodus 16.23,25 is part of the narrative regarding the congregation of Israel in the wilderness of Sin (Exodus 16.1-31). This is the narrow context of the motif. In addition, the same text is a part of a wider context of the wandering of the congregation, from the crossing of the Red Sea (Exodus 13.17) to the arrival at Sinai (Exodus 19.1). Both blocks of the canonical text make recognisable wholes.

Furthermore, my endeavour to understand the orality of this text is facilitated by the recognition of the use of the text in the Jewish oral/aural tradition. Here we find Exodus 16.23,25 as part of the sixteenth parasha/seder in the yearly cyclus, and its sixth aliyah (sixth reading). Nevertheless, the fifth and sixth aliyah make a logical sequence of sense sections. They start with Exodus 15.27 recounting that in Marah, after God through Moses turned bitter water sweet, the congregation encamped at Elim, a place abundant with sweet water, which had precisely twelve springs of water (the exact number of the tribes of Israel). The link is thus clear between the previous (fourth) aliyah and the following two from chapter 16, with a new description of moving to another wilderness: the wilderness of Sin (16.1). However, since verse 15.27 serves as a bridge between the two miracle-in-a-desert events (without introducing a new voice), I will focus on Exodus 16.1-36 as a whole (without the bridge-verse), when analysing the voices in the narrative.

4.1.1 POLYPHONY OF VOICES AND DOUBLE-VOICEDNESS IN EXODUS 16.1-36

To appropriate the function of orality in Exodus 16, we firstly need to recognise the multiplicity of voices in the narrative. The following five voices are recognisable in the oral/aural section of Exodus 16.1-36: the narrator, God, Moses, Aaron, and the congregation (of the sons of Israel, also called ‘the house of Israel’ in verse 31). All five voices form a whole of interconnected dialogism, being dependent on each other and mutually affecting each other. In addition to heteroglossia, plot, chronotopes and confronting ideologies, which will be discussed later, the dialogism is also developed by representation of the voices themselves.
Namely, none of the voices is represented as fully independent. In other words, a limited independence of the voices comes to the fore only in rather rare instances when a particular voice is meant to propel the dialogism forward, only to immediately be dissolved again among the other voices. The following examples will clarify the dynamics between the voices.

The voice of the narrator seems to lead the narrative. However, the narrator not only describes and narrates, but also assists the other individual voices to have their say. Thus, the utterances of the other voices are heard almost fully, so that the direct speech of the other voices (within quotation marks, according to our rules) are a regularity in the narrative, not an exception. Thus, the narrator’s voice serves the same role as in verse 15.27, the role of bridging the quoted utterances of the other voices.

Furthermore, even when the narrator carries out his/her role as the bridge between other voices, the bridging seems to be inefficient. Consequently, the narrator is not represented as a fully developed authority in the text. Rather, the other voices exercise the authority to interrupt the narrative, and to aim it in their direction. A comparison between the portions of verses 3-7 and 12-14 illustrates this. Namely, the narrator’s voice is already onstage. He/she could have effortlessly narrated what happened, how, why, and with what consequences. However, the narrator chooses to almost hide behind other voices, even at the cost of clarity in the flow of the narrative. Thus, the audience needs to focus on who said what and to whom in order to follow the sense division, despite the fact that simply focussing on the narrator’s narration would have been much easier.

This choice of the narrator’s voice results in a vivid representation of the other voices. However, none of them are represented as independent. Namely, Moses’ voice acts as the leading voice compared to the other human voices (Aaron’s and the congregation’s voice). However, even Moses’ voice is primarily represented as merely a repeater of God’s utterances (compared to rare instances of paraphrasing/narrating what God has said).
The double-voicedness is furthermore highlighted in verses 6-7, with a doubled reported speech of Moses and Aaron. ‘At evening you will know that the LORD has brought you out of the land of Egypt; and in the morning you will see the glory of the LORD, for He hears your grumblings against the LORD; and what are we, that you grumble against us?’ Whose words were these? Did Moses and Aaron talk in unison? If not, what is the sense of using a quoted utterance, instead of simply paraphrasing what the two of them announced to the congregation?

Furthermore, after being merged into one, the two voices, Moses’ and Aaron’s split and act according to what was supposed to be the formal pattern of Moses’ official speeches, from the time Moses was called into leadership ministry (Exodus 4.15,16 and 7.1,2). Thus, Moses tells Aaron what to say to the congregation, so that Aaron can pass on the words of Moses. However, the almost ironic representation of the voices is that the narrator quotes what Moses told Aaron to quote, whilst the quotation is already part of a quote of the doubled quotation of Moses’ and Aaron’s doubled voice in verse 8!

Nevertheless, the double-voicedness is equally present in the voice of the congregation. That is to say the congregation is presented in unison, while, in reality, it is the only voice that naturally comprises multitudes of voices, lives, aims … Thus, when the congregation says something, the voice is a single voice – the congregation grumbled, said, complained and so forth (verses indirectly 2,) However, a way of splitting the consciousness of the congregation’s voice, in verse 22, is achieved by presenting what the leaders of the congregation did (but never the way they uttered something!) even when there was an opportunity to allow someone as an individual from the congregation’s consciousness have a say, the opportunity was not made use of.

In addition, when the voice of the congregation acts as split, in verse 27, the act is presented as a conflict within the one united consciousness. Thus, ‘It came about 

2 The NASB translation will be used throughout this Chapter, if not stated otherwise.
3 Note that here, as well as in the rest of the thesis, I use the term ‘aim’, as defined in Section 1.1 above, as ‘the fundamental direction of a person’s life, or some fairly stable subset of that fundamental direction’.
on the seventh day that some of the people went out to gather, but they found none’ Hence, this act is presented not as an act against Moses, (as when the congregation said something earlier) but as a conflict within one consciousness, resulting in a ‘rebellion of neglect’ against God. (I labelled this event as a ‘rebellion of neglect’, since it is represented as a neglect of what God said, rather than as an open, loud rebellion against God, like for example Miriam and Aaron’s and Korah’s rebellions in Numbers 12 and 16, respectively.) Accordingly, God’s reaction in the following verses (28 and 29), clarifies this point, directing his reaction not only against the people as a whole, but also against Moses, who is part of humankind!

Thus, God directs the critique to Moses, despite the fact that Moses had clearly not done anything wrong in the context of the events in the wilderness of Sin. However, this universalisation is understandable in the context of the Pentateuch/Torah, as a whole, recalling the context of the first act against the explicit will of God in the Garden of Eden (Genesis 3).

Thus Moses is part of the whole of humanity, whose transgression is represented here by the entire congregation in the wilderness of Sin. In what follows, it will be shown that this universalisation of double-voicedness of all the voices is intentional, serving the rhetoric of this narrative.

In addition, the representation of God’s voice in this section needs to be analysed. The voice of God is represented as the most authoritative voice compared to any human voice. However, God’s voice is not represented as independent, either. Thus, God adapts how much to say, whenever he is heard. Accordingly, God does not reveal everything about future events, thus creating an element of surprise throughout the events in the desert. In this way, God’s voice adapts its revelation according to the needs of the congregation. However, I believe this limitation is somewhat theological. Nevertheless, the rhetorical limitations of God’s voice are striking.

The narrator’s voice is the one who actively limits the representation of God’s voice. Thus, direct quotes from God are limited to only two utterances, in verses
4-5 and 12. In contrast, the narrator chooses to let God’s voice be hidden behind Moses’ voice! Thus, it is through Moses’ utterances that we, as the recipients, ‘listen’ to what God uttered. Accordingly, in verses 16, 23, and 32, what Moses described as a quotation or a paraphrase of God’s utterance we are not permitted to hear as God’s direct speech. The repression of the representation of God’s voice is clearly seen in verse 24, where the narrator chooses to represent the revelation and instruction (about keeping the manna overnight without it being spoilt) as coming from Moses, and not from God! This contradiction of the voice of Moses, who claims that his utterance in verse 23 is a quotation or paraphrase of God’s utterance, is so strong, that NASB, chose to render the pi’el meaning of בָּקַע in the verse as ‘meant’ instead of ‘said/commanded/told’, in contrast to the latter meaning used in ASV, CPB, KJV, YLT, LHDOT, CJB, even GNT, NLT, and MSG. Thus, NASB’s rendering of this verse softens the contrast between the narrator’s perspectives in the parallelism with verse 32, where the same pattern is used (Moses quoting God’s utterance), but the narrator’s comment (in verse 34) is clearly on God’s behalf.

Finally, the culmination of this double-voicedness of God’s voice, I believe, is in verse 29. Namely, in contrast to all the other quoted utterances in the narrative, it is only in verse 29 that the quotation is ambiguous in terms of the voice that uttered it. More precisely, the utterance starts (as the last part of verse 28) as a typical quoted utterance, with an introduction provided by the narrator. Accordingly, the quotation in verse 28 represents God as talking in the first-person singular. However, in verse 29, the perspective is changed, so that the audience is confused regarding whose voice is heard. Is it God who speaks about himself in the third-person singular, or Moses, whose voice is, in the latter case, represented as blended with God’s voice? According to my basic presuppositions in this thesis\(^4\) I argue that this blending of voices (of God and Moses) is intentional, aiming to convey to us the way God’s voice is and remains accessible in the Scriptures.

\(^{4}\) See Section 1.5 above.
4.1.2 Utterances and Heteroglossia in Exodus 16.1-36

According to the purpose of this Chapter, I am mostly interested in the two utterances in verses 23 and 25, already identified as double-voiced, as these verses will help us to see how the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif functions in heteroglossia. Even so, there are also some general qualities, common to all the utterances in the text that need to be noted here. Namely, there is not a single utterance with ambiguities in terms of implicit finalisation, expressivity, addressivity or personal proximity. In contrast, as shown above, there is only one field of ambiguities, and that is the field of delineation of utterances. Thus, analysis of other unambiguous features of the utterances reveals how the ambiguities in the text seem to be intended, and finely tuned.

The entire text gives the impression of a dynamic sequence of announcements/commands, and actions in accordance with or against what was announced/commanded. Thus, this finalisation of utterances with a clear, explicit expectation of a response on behalf of the respective addressee(s) is probably the most precise feature of the utterances in the text.

Furthermore, some of the expressivity has already been evaluated above, when I concluded how God’s voice was represented as the most authoritative. This expressivity of utterances of God reveals the relations he has with other voices in the narrative. In addition, it is Moses who commands Aaron what to say and do, never the other way around, even though they are also described as talking together/in unison, as analysed above. Furthermore, it is the utterances of the congregation which are represented as being suppressed, with only two types of utterances being heard from this voice; the utterance expressing dissatisfaction, discomfort, rebellion and anger in verse 3, and the utterance expressing wonder and amazement in verse 15.

Finally, the narrator’s voice is not neutral either, even though one could argue that the narrator’s voice is indeed the least expressive. In other words, the narrator’s voice expresses its relation to the events and topics by his/her choice of representation. As explained above, the choice not to allow the congregation to
have their say in more than two types of speech clearly shows what the narrator considered to be the most appropriate types of utterance with which to represent the congregation’s voice. A comparison with other instances in the Pentateuch/Torah, where there was always (at least) one among the despairing people/congregation who kept the faith, showed faithfulness and kept the commandments when the huge majority ceased to do so proves that this representation is an exception. This exception shows that the narrator is not neutral but expresses his/her ideology by the chosen style of narration.

This leads us to addressivity and personal proximity of particular utterances in verses 21-30, as I narrow the context on verses 23 and 25. God never relates directly to the congregation. Earlier, verse 10 described only that they saw/met each other, almost as if God could not avoid looking at them, the addressivity of the text in verse 10 would suggest. In verses 21-29 this idea is developed further, so that God actively avoids talking directly to the congregation. The culmination is, of course, verses 28-29, where God, described as more desperate than angry, chooses to talk to Moses as if talking to the congregation. In accordance, the voice of the congregation is totally silenced. Not one utterance is heard as the congregation’s voice. The voice of congregation is not described as uttering anything. Only the ‘leaders’, as a specially privileged group from within the congregation, are described as uttering something, without their voice being allowed to be heard by the addressee of the text.

One of the most interesting choices made in the text is that Aaron’s voice/consciousness is completely absent from this segment, in fact between verses 11 and 33. He is last seen in verse 10, where the congregation saw God, somehow, over Aaron’s shoulders, whilst Aaron was talking. After the view moved from Aaron to the Lord, ‘whose glory appeared in the cloud’, Aaron disappears completely until he is given a special role in the text; to take care of the manna, in the Sanctuary. Thus, in this segment (verses 11-33), the role of Aaron’s voice is absent, until it reappears when the view is moved to the Sanctuary. I believe that it is thus not surprising, that in Jewish tradition, the fifth aliyah finishes with this dramatic ‘behold, the glory of the LORD appeared in the
cloud’ in verse 10, hence leaving the imbalance between personal proximities of utterances in the sixth aliyah to come to the fore.

In accordance, the only voices that the author could use to express his/her proximity to other voices in this context, are God’s voice and Moses’ voice. However, as will be shown they are sufficient tools. In verses 21-30, the narrator authorises dual representation of proximity between God, Moses and the congregation. Namely, on the one hand, Moses has the role of the interpreter of God’s will. It is Moses who knows all, so the congregation comes to him for everything that happens, conveying either grumbling or questioning. In other words, it is Moses who is supposed to know, whilst the congregation is supposed listen, learn and obey.

Accordingly, Moses has a privileged relationship with God whom Moses is supposed to listen to, learn from, and obey. Thus, God and Moses are described as having a very close relationship, whilst the congregation has been described as having distant relationship with Moses, and even more distant with God. However, this proximity gradually changes, so that Moses is described as increasingly close to the congregation, distancing thus the proximity between him and God. Verse 24 highlights this point, when the narrator chooses to represent the command coming from Moses. The gradation reaches a peak when God reacts to the wrongdoings of the congregation by addressing the critique to Moses, as a part of the congregation in verse 28. Consequently, in verse 29, one could argue that the representation of God’s voice makes it so much more distant that even Moses hears it as indirect speech.

In addition to this change in proximities, there is a strange usage of the term Shabbat. For the sake of clarity in delineation of the steps of the method, I will leave analysis of this problem for the section when I focus on the literal divisions in the text, below.⁵ For now, it is sufficient to note that the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif occurs for the first time in the Bible in verses 23 and 25, in the

⁵ See Section 4.2.2 below.
context of the proximity between God and the congregation, and even humanity as a whole, being the furthest apart.

Finally, this change in proximities between the represented voices and the aspect of heteroglossia in them, that we have focused on in this section, emphasises the importance of the plot as a representation of the dynamics in relations between the characters in the narrative. In other words, the change of places in relational hierarchy directs the reader’s focus on what has happened before, and at the same time, sets expectations for any future changes in the following parts of the narrative.

4.1.3 Plot in Exodus 16.1-36 and 13.17-17.16 (-18.27)

The interest in the events before and after the events described in the desert of Sin, is in fact, a call to recognise the plot of the narrative. Thus, the first impression is that this event has its strategic place between two similar accounts, being the already mentioned event in the desert of Marah (15.22-27, with the camping at Elim serving as a bridge between the two desert-type accounts) and at Massah and Meribah (Exodus 17.1-7). This account in Exodus 16 is the longest among the three and can be understood as the peak of a chiasm developed on the theme of rebellions in the deserts. Finally, the chiasm is supported with two parallel accounts of victories on the journey, the one culminating with the Song of Moses in 15.1-21 and the other in 17.8-16 as the victory over Amalek at Rephidim. Passing through the Red Sea (13.17-14.31) is thus roughly paralleled with the account of the battle with Amalek and the visit of Jethro (18.1-27).

Accordingly, I do not assume that any parallelism, either in the Bible or in languages and rhetoric in general, should comply with strict mathematical rules. Thus, I understand that chiastic rings are mostly thematic, rather than mathematically precise. Here I see latitude for differences between Jewish and Christian traditions regarding traditional divisioning of the biblical text. Namely, the account of Jethro’s visit is in Jewish tradition rendered as a part of the account of the Sinai event (the seventeenth parasha in the yearly cyclus, Exodus 18.1-20.23), whilst Christian tradition attaches the Jethro account to the
previously described sequence of events preceding the events at Sinai. However, whichever way the text is divided, one can see that Jethro’s visit serves as a bridge between the desert-type events (Exodus 14-17) and the events taking place at Sinai. Thus, no matter how one looks at a bridge, there are always two ends to it.

There is one key idea emerging from this short look at the wider structure of the narrative. Namely, the composition of the plot reaches one of its chiastic peaks in the account of manna in Exodus 16, considered from the perspective of the wider narrative in Exodus 13.17-17.16 (-18.27).

However, one should bear in mind that what I have tried to emphasise throughout this thesis is that this wider composition is only a secondary tool for rendering the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of the text. In other words, a big chiastic structure is like a big ladder: very helpful, providing one knows where and in which direction to set it. Thus, as I suggested earlier in the thesis, it is the other details in the text itself which are to be used as the criteria for the correct place and direction of our exegetical ladder, called plot.

Accordingly, the details in the text seem to support the idea that Exodus 16 is the thematic and narrative centre of the plot developed between the two major events, exodus and the revelation at Sinai. However, I suggest that the direction of the plot in Exodus 16 in particular is of vital importance. For the purpose of understanding the referential directions in the plot, analysis of representations of time and space in Exodus 16 is essential.

4.1.4 CHRONOTOPES AND GENRES IN EXODUS 16.1-36

Representation of time and space in Exodus 16 further supports the above-noted markers of the plot. The first verse already serves that purpose. Thus, the space is represented by just two coordinates: Elim and Sinai. Elim is in many ways an

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expected reference, since that was their previous place of encampment. However, the narrator knows that Sinai is not the following place of encampment (but rather Massah and Meribah, according to the narrative). Accordingly, the reference to Sinai is the choice of the narrator, a choice, I believe, with a specific rhetorical function.

In the same way, the representation of time in the text employs specific highlighters. Thus, verse 16.1 refers to the point in time ‘of their departure from the land of Egypt’. Accordingly, verse 3, describing the ‘grumbling’ of the congregation (of the sons of Israel), demonstrates extreme selectiveness in their representation of time and space. Namely, the gap between the time of living in Egypt and the present is minimised, as if no events ever took place in between (the events of God’s miraculous salvation of this congregation). Thus in the representation, there are only two points: the past time of eating in Egypt, and the present time of starving in the desert.

Likewise, representation of the space is limited to the following two points: the proximity of ‘the pots of meat in the land of Egypt’ and the vast distances in ‘this wilderness’. The irony in the narrator’s account of the grumbling of the congregation is found in the extremely unrealistic representation of time and space on behalf of the congregation. This already invites the reader/listener to think about ideologies conveyed by this representation of time and space. Nevertheless, before considering ideologies, there are few specific utterances with their chronotopes vital for understanding the function of the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif in the text.

Verses 4 and 5 juxtapose this grumbling in an untypical manner. Namely, the role of the narrator is minimised (as explained above) whilst God’s (apparently immediate) response comes to the fore. Representation of time and space in this utterance of God’s is of vital importance. Specifically, with an exclamatory ‘Behold!’ God invites the congregation to re-structure its representation/rendering of time and space. Verse 4 re-structures space: the meat is not in pots, by which the congregation is to sit, but, in God’s representation, the meat will be sent as
rain upon them, so that they are to go out into that vast wilderness as if into the rain. Thus, God’s representation turns the limitlessness of space in the desert into a limitless pot of miraculous blessings. This is also reinforced with the contrast between the verbs ‘sit’ and ‘go’. The life in bondage had been represented as the life of limited space within which to move. Accordingly, God asked the pharaoh to let God’s people ‘go’ (not ‘sit’). The verb ‘go’ is thus in essence the representation of the limitless life and space of freedom.

Furthermore, verses 4 and 5 introduce a re-structured time. Whilst the congregation represents the time as only between ‘then-past’ (next to the Egyptian pot with meat) and ‘now’ (in the desert), God represents the time as between ‘now’ (in the rain of meat) and ‘then-future’. Furthermore, the congregation’s ‘then-past’ was an undivided, solid, homogenous time. God’s ‘then-future’ is time that is split into six sections with a difference between them; the difference will be shown on the sixth day. Accordingly, the time in the congregation’s representation has already past, whilst in God’s representation, the time is just about to begin, ‘at evening’, at the beginning of the first time-section in the row, having a clear course towards the sixth day.

Accordingly, the text reads as a dialogue in a somewhat unnatural way, almost as if God had waited for a while with the prepared representation of space and time to confront the congregation’s representation of space and time. Since the congregation initiated the dialogue/dialogism, God comes with a ready answer. That is to say, there is no account of God investigating the murmurs, there is no description of God weighing up whether to act this way or another way; God’s solution is presented as a ready-made solution.

Finally, these confronted representations of chronotopes are not just arbitrary choices. God’s utterance in verses 4 and 5 emphasises this horizon impending confrontation with the words ‘that I may test them, whether or not they will walk in My instruction’. Accordingly, verses 6 and 7 broaden this polarisation

7 The ‘My’ in the verse is written with capital ‘M’ in NASB. For the sake of consistency, I keep it unchanged.
between God and the congregation to two teams with two representations of time and space: God, Moses and Aaron on the one hand, and the congregation on the other hand (clearly delineated with the doubled double-voiced utterance ‘At evening you will know that the LORD has brought you out of the land of Egypt; and in the morning you will see the glory of the LORD, for He hears your grumblings against the LORD; and what are we, that you grumble against us?’

Therefore, the matter at stake is not hunger or appetite, but trust and paradigm. In other words, God’s rationale for his solution is not ‘then you will be hungry no more’, but ‘you shall know that I am the LORD your God.’ (verse 12) Thus, the solution for that problem is not provision of the food, but restructuring of the paradigm, by providing the food.

This conflict between voices in the text can be rephrased in the terms of chronotopes. Namely, God has no problem when people authorise formal and internal chronotopes that are in accordance with his external chronotope. Accordingly, people are called to creatively develop, change focus and use the chronotopes they authorise. Thus, for example, the narrator chooses to set the focus on time, instead of space in the formal chronotope of Exodus 16. Moses and Aaron did likewise in verses 6-8. Moreover, it is God who chooses not to reveal the information about the seventh day until the morning of the sixth day. Thus, selectiveness in representation (formal and internal chronotopes) is not wrong, but is a normal, natural part of the process of authorisation of utterances in every dialogue.

However, the flexibility of representations of formal and internal chronotopes does not seem to be applicable to external chronotopes as well. For example, God’s restructuring of time and space, through the miracle with the quails and manna, is not a statement regarding focus, accent or selectiveness on the level of

8 In order to clarify this point, God chooses to perform an extra miracle every day with the volume of manna (verses 16-18). Namely, people are allowed to collect ‘as much as he should eat/according to his eating’. When the manna collected is measured, it turns out to be the same volume for every person, independent of his/her appetite. Furthermore, there are rotten leftovers as well (verse 20) showing that the miracle of the equal distribution of every person’s daily portion is intentional, meaning that the matter at stake is not appetite, but faith and belief.
formal or internal chronotopes, but a statement regarding the whole paradigm and its external chronotope. Accordingly, the chronotope God introduced was not meant to replace the congregation’s formal or internal chronotopes, but the external, that is the metaphysics, their belief. Thus, this new chronotope offered by God is also a statement about himself, and about the congregation; about the Creator of the world and the ‘photographers’ in the world, since only the former decides on the external chronotope, whilst the latter is created to decide (only) on the formal and internal chronotopes.

Thus, it is here that the broader understanding of the rhetorical function of the fine-tuned representations of voices can be understood (see the rendering of the doubled double-voicedness of Moses’ and Aaron’s utterance in verses 6 and 7, as presented earlier in this Section). This unnatural way to represent voices, generating many questions regarding the narrative, is now understood as a rhetorical device used to emphasise the conflict of chronotopes, and, even more, the conflict of ideologies.

The disappearance of Aaron’s voice/consciousness after verse 10, also makes this rhetorical point that the conflict is really between only two parties: God and the congregation. Moses’ and narrator’s voice are still essential for the narrative to flow, so they are present. However, the presentation of time and space does not change until verse 31.

In verse 31, God’s voice is described as mentioning Egypt for the first time in the narrative (previously, it was mentioned only in the congregation’s utterance, in verse 3). Accordingly, it is the first instance of God’s chronotope having something in common with the congregation’s chronotope. This mention of Egypt is nevertheless made with the perspective of God’s representation of the ‘then-future’ time. Accordingly, the past, present and future are structured, but in a very different way from the congregation’s chronotope. Namely, in God’s restructuring, the references used are: salvation as a historical and geographical point in the chronotope, the present time and space, and the future time and space of ‘throughout your generations’. The final reference is the most striking, since
God’s promises previously recounted in the Pentateuch/Torah, given to the predecessors of this congregation, assume the unlimited/vast time and space (see God’s promises to Abraham, Isaak, and Jacob regarding the promised descendants/generations in, for example, Genesis 13.14-16; 15.18-21; 22.17-18).

Finally, and according to this rhetorical point, the chronotopic references are mixed in verses 32 and 33 (thus, suddenly, the time after the erection of the Sanctuary is mixed with, apparently, the present time before the Sanctuary, in addition to Aaron’s re-appearance in the narrative). It is important to notice that the blending of the referential points is done on the level of the formal chronotope, and in accordance with God’s external chronotope. In other words, the change in the formal chronotope does not jeopardise the previously introduced God’s chronotope, but indeed supports it.

Thus, after authorising this mixing of time and space, (on the level of the formal chronotope) the narrator sets the chronological and spatial references back to their initial place in verse 35. Even then, the referential point in the narrator’s formal chronotope is in accordance with the promised ‘then-future’ (the perspective used in the verse is the perspective of the congregation who made it to the Promised Land).

Accordingly, a short conclusion regarding the genres in the narrative is beneficial. Thus, I would suggest the following three genres be recognised in the text. Firstly, the narrator’s genre is a travel-type genre, where the places are changed, and distance is covered through the pages turned. With this narrator’s travel-type genre, the other two acquire their rhetorical functions. Thus, secondly, the genre of the utterances of the congregation is pessimistic, romantic, nostalgic (even when charged with the motif of surprise and awe regarding manna). The accent is not on the actual space (acquired from the narrator’s genre) but rather on a melancholic remembrance of the time past (consequently, wherever similar occasions took place, the reaction of the congregation would have been the same). Thirdly and finally, the genre of God’s, Moses’ and Aaron’s utterances is the opposite; the accent is on the future time (the seventh section, in seven days’
time, and the time of the life in the Promised Land). The genre conveys constructive optimism and, accordingly, the accent is again not on space but rather time. This precedence of time over space is even more drastic when the new time perspective is brought in the narrative in verses 32-35 (the life in the Promised Land), thus breaching the representation of the space (wilderness of Sin) for the sake of the representation of time (evident as ‘throughout your generations’). In what follows, the ideologies that we have already observed as being in conflict in this narrative will be summarised and further explained.

4.1.5 Social Ideologies in Exodus 16.1-36

The above-analysed voices and double-voicedness, as well as heteroglossia, chronotopes and genres, all point to the narrator’s strategy to describe the dominant ideology in the text. The plan is fulfilled, but at a price, namely at the cost of fluency, consistency and coherency in the narrative. Accordingly, the text develops a presentation of the conflict between the pessimistic, destructive, doubtful ideology (on the side of the congregation) and the optimistic, constructive and faithful ideology (on the side of God, Moses, and Aaron).

This conflict of ideologies is presented implicitly by the fact that the congregation murmured. Simply put, they complained about the situation which they evaluated as worse than another situation. Accordingly, what is implied in the text is criteria for the evaluation of what is good or better, and what is bad or worse.

Furthermore, it is only God who utters the words that explicitly refer to the idea of criteria (test, commandments and laws in verses 4 and 28). This exclusiveness of the utterances of God is highlighted by the narrator’s choice not to allow any other voice to utter the direct nuance of the criteria for goodness. As a result, even though there were instances when the narrator could allow Moses, or the congregation to utter the nouns ‘commandment’ or ‘law’ (for example, if they murmured ‘the law/commandments of the Egyptians provide a much better life!’), the opportunity was never used. However, the verb ‘commanded’ is uttered by Moses and the narrator in verses 16 and 32. This, however, does not
rule out the point of the exclusiveness of the commandment and law to be heard only via God’s voice in the narrative.

Thus, this detail regarding the utterances of God supports the idea of conflicting criteria for determining the goodness. In other words, the context in the narrative implies that the congregation evaluated the goodness of the situation according to the proximity to the pots of meat. In contrast, God explicitly determined the goodness of the situation according to the test of following his commandments and laws.

Finally, the only verse that gives an indication of the resolution of the conflict is verse 30: ‘So the people rested on the seventh day’. However, the basis for this rest clearly does not conform to the ideology presented by the congregation. Hence, the narrative does not give any clue of the congregation changing its ideology. The conflict is implied as still present. Thus, there is still a need for further development of the conflict of ideologies towards a more complete resolution.

I believe this need for further development of a resolution is emphasised with the crossing of the borders of time and space in the formal chronotope, in verses 31-36. Namely, the closing verses of the chapter serve as an invitation to search for the resolution outside the borders of this event in the wilderness of Sin. Thus, the chronological and spatial loops are introduced by the narrator. However, the loops are also accentuated by the special textual/visual peculiarities of this narrative. Therefore, the analysis of the textual peculiarities of the narrative is the purpose of the following step.

4.2 ‘SABBATH OF THE LORD’ MOTIF AS A PART OF A TEXTUAL DIVISION

This is the second step of the zoom lens method where I, as the reader, having previously listened to the text, centralise on words, sentences, verses, chapters, and various textual markers in the written text. Here I will raise potential questions regarding these elements. Accordingly, some of the previously raised
questions will be answered, whilst newly raised questions need to wait for the subsequent steps to be taken.

4.2.1 COMMON AND SPECIAL VERSES AND PARAGRAPHS

In this section, petuchot and setumot (i.e. the sense/paragraph divisions indicated in the Hebrew text by special textual markers) support my rendering of rhetorical sense divisions explained above. Thus, the narrative is divided in two petuchot (the first one being Exodus 15.20-16.10, and the second being 16.11-36).

Accordingly, this divisioning supports the assumption that the three ‘desert-type’ events (15.22-26; 16.1-36 and 17.1-7) were intended to be read in a sequence. In addition, the divisioning also supports the presupposition that each of the events in the narrative was also an account in itself (thus, Exodus 17.1-7 constitutes a separate petucha).

Moreover, the divisioning in petuchot and setumot in the narrative shows clear signs of rendering the text in regard to its content. Thus, the change of the scene, with the sudden disappearance of the voice of Moses is marked by the shift of petuchot. Likewise, the initial utterance of the congregation is rendered as one setumah (15.27-16.3). The same is the case with God’s reply in the following two verses (4, 5).

4.2.2 COMMON AND SPECIAL WORDS, PHRASES AND TEXTUAL NOTES

The first note, in verse 1, the exact place of the wilderness of Sin is not known. This, I understand, only further supports the idea that the particular chronotope in the narrative prioritises time over place. Accordingly, the references to place are not intended to put the focus on the place itself, but on the new circumstances. Hence, the sequence of encampments between the lists in Exodus 17.1 and Numbers 33.11-12 differs.

Furthermore, in verses 2 and 7, the verb ‘to murmur/grumble’ (הָעָנָן) seems to suggest that the narrative belongs to the texts of the earliest developments of Hebrew literary history. More precisely, the verb only occurs in Exodus 15, 16,
17, Numbers 14, 16, 17, and Joshua 9:18. In addition, Masoretic notes to verses 1 and 7 contain permuted K-Q forms of the verb, suggesting that the spelling of the verb developed in pluriform traditions. This point seems to be supported by the fact that \( \text{שָׂנָה} \) in both verses bears witness to a unique spelling. Thus, the Q in 16.2 is niphal imperfect, denoting that the congregation ‘grumbled themselves’, whilst the Q in verse 7 is hiphil, signifying that the congregation ‘caused grumbling’.  

Furthermore, verses 6 and 7 use a grammatically unusual expression of ‘evening’. That is to say that the sequence of ‘morning’ following ‘evening’ is typical as a phrase (see Genesis 1), but often, if there is a reference only to ‘evening’, it is usually introduced with a preposition (either as a separate word or as a prefix, as is the case here in verses 8 and 13, and elsewhere in Genesis 19.1; 29.23; Exodus 12.18; Deuteronomy 16.5, and so on.). Thus, even though the usage of \( \text{מִסְכָּנֶה} \) as a temporal marker is verified, it is still very unusual.

The G variants of verses 6, 8, 9, 29 and 32 do not seem to have any bearing on the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of the text. The same is the case with textual variants regarding the quails, which God used to feed the congregation in the evening in verse 13. Verse 14 now introduces the first hapax legomenon, within the description of manna. Namely, \( \text{ןָחָּן קַמַּנָּנָה} \) has a very ambiguous meaning. In other words, the basic meaning related to flakes, seems to be insufficient to describe the manna in the narrative. A comparison with other descriptions of manna, support this point (cf. G, which only repeats the description from verse 31, as if being unable to translate the original \( \text{ןָחָּן קַמַּנָּנָה} \). See also Numbers 11.7 and BDB, 341).

This idea of the uniqueness of manna seems to be further supported by the congregation’s utterance and the phrase \( \text{מִשְׂרַת חֲכָלָה} \) (in verse 14). Namely, it stands in

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9 BDB, 534.
10 Thus, in verse 2: K: \( \text{לָעַל} \), Q: \( \text{לָעַל} \). Conversely, in verse 7: K: \( \text{לָעַל} \), Q: \( \text{לָעַל} \), whilst \( \text{לָעַל} \).
11 See Durham, Exodus, p. 216.
12 GKC (§112.00), 337.
13 For more on \( \text{מִסְכָּנֶה} \) as Coturnix Communis, (quail,) see, for example, BDB, 969.
contrast to Moses’ and God’s description of manna as נְהַבָּד in verse 15, and throughout the narrative, until verse 32, when the instruction is given to keep a portion of it in the Sanctuary. However, throughout the narrative, God, Moses and the narrator seem to avoid calling manna by name, choosing the rather general name ‘bread’ or simply the pronoun ‘it’. Verse 31 explicitly states that the name-giver was not God, the narrator, Moses, or Aaron, but that the congregation (as the ‘house of Israel’, or the ‘sons/children of Israel’) named ‘it’ manna.

Furthermore, in verse 14, the expression אֲרָץ אֵלֶּה is not only strange and ambiguous, but also one which occurs only once more in the Bible, in the Passover narrative, in Exodus 12.4. Additionally, in verse 18, the uniqueness of manna is further emphasised with the measure of ‘omer’ instead of ‘ephah’ as a common measure. If one understands that verse 36 is a later addition to the text, the question regarding the absence of any other instance of usage of ‘omer’ in other texts from this period still remains. The question is even more significant in the context where the mentioning of the measure for the sake of measuring does not seem to be supported by the context (since the reader already knows that, miraculously, everyone gathered as much as he/she needed). Thus, how much the portion of manna precisely weighed or how much it measured in its volume, is rational in the following two cases. First, to support the idea that appetite was not the main concern, since all the differences based on different appetites disappeared after they collected manna and measured it. Second, to support the idea that it was a miracle, and that the miracle concerned manna as something totally unique. Therefore, I believe, the explanation of how much one omer was in volume, compared to an ephah, serves only one single purpose; to bridge the gap between the internal chronotope of the narrative, and the new formal chronotope with its perspective from the Promised Land (after the two chronotopes mingled in verses 32-36).

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14 See BDB, 35, 771.
Verse 23 contains the word Shabbat and its derivatives for the first time in the entire Bible. Thus, now is the time to focus on the problematic nature of this, when rendering the aural divisions in the text. Namely, this and the following verses witness a striking increase in the usage of the term Sabbath. Thus, the multiplicity of Sabbath-related forms is witnessed in the following verses: verse 23, (שַׁבָּתָה), verse 25 (שַׁבָּתָה), verse 26 (שַׁבָּתָה), and in verse 29 (שַׁבָּתָה). In other words, there are no two verses that use the same form of the Sabbath-related term or phrase. Nevertheless, there is only one common train of thought, and that is the idea that the Sabbath is ‘לְיָמֵי’, as ‘to the LORD’ (common to verses 23 and 25).

In strong contrast to this multiplicity of forms related to the Sabbath, it is apparent that it is only Moses who uses them. In other words, when the narrator or God is ‘heard’ talking, they seem to avoid the terms. Thus, the Lord does not mention anything about the Sabbath in verse 5, which is something the reader might expect, since the Lord would keep the additional information as a surprise for the sixth and the seventh day. However, why not mention the Sabbath by name given that it was already announced in verses 26-28? Why did God choose to use the more general term of ‘My commandments and My instructions’, instead of ‘my Sabbath’? The only mention of the word Sabbath, as (potentially) in God’s utterance, is in the verse 29. However, as already mentioned above, it is one of the most ambiguous utterances in the whole narrative, since the reader cannot separate that utterance from Moses’ utterances. In addition, that is the utterance in which the distance between God and the congregation is at its greatest. In addition, if this is the utterance of God, addressed to Moses then, the only instance of God pronouncing the term Sabbath in the text is when speaking about himself in the third-person singular, and when seeing at Moses as part of the errant congregation and, indeed, humanity as a whole.

In accordance with this strange avoidance of God’s voice to pronounce the term Sabbath, the narrator’s voice will not use the term, either. Instead, in the utterances of the narrator, it is ‘the seventh day’ (verse 27, 30). Why is the task to declare the name of the day left exclusively to Moses’ voice? Accordingly, there
is a strong contrast between the congregation’s naming manna, and Moses’
declaring the Sabbath. The text does not support any thought of Moses naming
the seventh day as ‘Sabbath’ – in fact the opposite: Moses explains that the
Sabbath is ‘of/to the LORD’. Accordingly, verse 29, which might be understood
as God’s voice, even though with all the peculiarities described above, the G
stream of witnesses suggests the reading τῆν ἡμέραν ταύτην instead of ἔραν,
making it even clearer that all the occurrences of the term ‘Sabbath’ were heard
only via Moses’ voice.

In addition, verse 23 has variants that attest to my interpretation of the text as part
of the oral/aural context (I raised the question concerning whose ordinance it was:
Moses’ or the Lord’s, cf. verse 24). Namely, pc Mss seem to suggest that the
utterance belonged to Moses, thus G^BST^I V add ἔραν, so that the focus is on
Moses who uttered it. Nevertheless, G^B seems to highlight that the utterance
should be rendered as belonging to the Lord, thus G^B adds κύριος.

However, it seems that Moses’ choice of words, when describing manna in verse
23, sounded odd, to some of the recipients. This seems to be the reason for G
witness to a stream of Mss with the other reading, namely τοῦτο τὸ ῥήμα ἐστίν,
as Moses’ choice of words/phrases in verses 16 and 32. Still, it seems that neither
of the textual variants provides final answers to any of the questions raised above.
Thus, I suggest, seeking for the answers in the subsequent steps of the zoom lens
method (instead of entertaining any speculative answer at this step in the
method).

Furthermore, in verse 31, at the segment where chronotopic borders are mixed,
there are variants that attest to the reading ‘children of Israel’, instead of ‘the
house of Israel’. Thus pc Mss, namely GST^Ms read יְהַיֶּה instead of יְהֹוָּא. Even though
one could argue that the reason can be a synonymous reading, the idea of children
as descendants is far more in line with the rhetorical point of vast space and time,
explained above.

Finally, verse 31 introduces the other hapax legomenon in the text, when
describing the vessel/jar in which manna is to be held as a witness for generations
to come. The noun ἄρωμα is translated as, in G, στάμνον χρυσοῦν, (a golden jar) and, in V, vas (vessel/vase). Both of the meanings are in accordance with Heb. 9.4, as an additional witness in the context of Christian Scriptures. My understanding of the usage of the hapax legomenon is in accordance with the other hapax legomenon in verse 14. Namely, both of them are connected to manna, further supporting the idea that it was something unique.

All the above noted aural and visual markers need to be evaluated in terms of their potential to direct the recipient of the text to the relation this text has with other texts (both biblical and extra-biblical). This analysis is the purpose of the next step.

4.3 ‘SABBATH OF THE LORD’ MOTIF AS A PART OF DEPENDENCE MARKERS

Here, at the third step of the zoom lens method, I centralise my focus on the specific dependence markers that stand out as unusual or unique, my plan is to validate the potential of the text to direct the reader to another text. All the above-mentioned peculiarities are thus going to be re-evaluated according to this strategy.

There are only four con/texts that I find as candidates to be recognised as the con/text(s) that Exodus 16 points to. Namely, first, Deuteronomy 34 (the congregation reaching the Promised Land/Canaan), second, Numbers 11 (multitude of similar elements; murmuring, manna, quails, God’s rebuke), third, Exodus 12 (the beginning of the exodus from Egypt and paschal ritual), and, fourth, Genesis 1-3 (the six-day creation and the first Sin). In what follows, I will argue that the markers of dependence are present in all four of the texts, whilst the relations between the texts are not of the same type.

4.3.1 MARKERS OF THE RELATION BETWEEN EXODUS 16 AND DEUTERONOMY 34.

The main link between the two texts, Exodus 16 and Deuteronomy 34, I find in the accentuation of Exodus 16. 31-35. In other words, the link is based on the introduction of the time and space of the context in which the congregation reached Canaan.
Nevertheless, these links, I believe, are not monophonic, but are echoic. Hence, one can hear echoes of Deuteronomy 34 (the time at the border of Canaan), echoes of Exodus 25.16-21; 40.20, even Hebrews 9.4 in the context of the Christian Scriptures (the ‘Testimony’, the jar with manna), and finally echoes of Joshua 5.10-12 (the cessation of manna at the time the congregation reached Canaan).

In those terms, the text in Exodus 16 is not specific enough to justify focusing on any one of the above-mentioned texts as the one which Exodus 16 points to in a specific way. More precisely, the rhetorical change of the formal chronotope has the specific purpose, as analysed earlier, of visualising the ‘then-future’ time and the vast space according to God’s (external) chronotope and his ideology. After this rhetoric achieves its purpose, in verses Exodus 16.32-36, the narrative returns to using the formal chronotopes of the ‘travel-type’ genre, (see Exodus 17.1). Accordingly, this shift of the formal chronotope into the time of the Promised Land makes the narrative in Exodus resemble all the texts that share the same chronotope (of the Promised Land,) and not just one specific text.

Furthermore, these links between the texts are not just limited and vague, but also leaning both ways. Consequently, as much as Exodus 16 echoes Exodus 40 and Hebrews 9.4, I believe, just as much, and even more so, it could be argued that Hebrews 9.4 draws its meaning from Exodus 16. In the same way Exodus 40.20 has more value if the reader is aware of the echo from Exodus 16.33-34, where ‘the testimony’ was already mentioned. The same applies to Joshua 5, I believe. Therefore, I do not find sufficient support to view the above-mentioned relations as monophonic, whilst I do see them present as polyphonic, echoic relations with their echoic markers.

4.3.2 Markers of the Relation between Exodus 16 and Numbers 11

Markers of the links between Exodus 16 and Numbers 11 are explicit as well as implicit. The explicit links are: murmuring, presence of voices of God, Moses, and the people, then also yearning for the food from Egypt, manna with its
appearance and methods of preparation, prayers for ending life/desperation, and finally the presence of quails in both of the narratives.

The implicit links are: God as the most authoritative, also the one who has the highest authority to bring judgment, Moses as the leader among God’s people, as well as his role as the accused (both by God’s people and by God, see Numbers 11.10-15), the motif of Moses’ assistant(s) (Aaron’s voice is absent from Numbers 11, but the motif of assistants to Moses is equally present), the motif of the people having to go out and collect their food, as well as the motif of measuring of the collected food.

However, the differences between the two texts clarify the specific rhetorical dependence of Numbers 11 on Exodus 16. Namely, the text is ironic in terms that it resembles a mirror-image of Exodus 16. More precisely, the Exodus narrative describes an event towards the beginning of the desert-journey (thus, closer to the border with Egypt), whilst the Numbers narrative describes an event towards the end of the (initially planned) journey (thus, closer to the border with the Promised Land). The former describes the introduction of manna as the food; the latter portrays a people fed up with it. The former describes God as being incredibly slow to anger; the latter depicts God as being fed up with the murmuring of the people. Even the description of manna between the two narratives seems to be deliberately different (if something is the main quality of manna, like its scaly surface, why would a totally different quality suddenly become the most apparent feature of it?). After these initial differences the following details in the two narratives make this rhetoric’s purpose undeniable.

Namely, the former narrative recalls quails preceding manna; the latter turns the sequence around. The former narrative describes the quails appearing in the evening, followed by manna in the morning; the latter turns that sequence around as well. The former describes God as rebuking Moses; the latter describes Moses as applying a complaint to himself and, thus, advising God to rebuke him to the full (take away his life). The former describes one assistant to Moses who disappears in the middle of the narrative; the latter does not mention Aaron,
whilst seventy totally new persons appear as new assistants to Moses.
Furthermore, the former narrative does not add any new voices; the latter introduces the voice of Joshua and a young boy (voices of the elders are not heard, but are also described as present).

In addition, the former narrative describes the quails ‘coming-up’ on their own; the latter states that the quails were brought with the wind. The former describes the quails as a one-night event; the latter as lasting at least two days (whilst God’s plan was to provide them for a whole month, see Numbers 11.19-21). The former narrative describes a measurement of one kind applied to manna; the latter a measurement of another kind to quails. The former uses the measurement of (two) omers per person; the latter of (ten) homers\(^{15}\) per person. The former focuses on the fact that manna was not to be preserved for the following day; the latter puts the accent on the fact that the people collected quails and preserved them for the future. The result of eating manna in the former narrative was the well-being of the people; the result of eating the quails in the latter narrative is plague. The former narrative describes the people naming manna; the latter describes the people naming the place. Finally, the former narrative ends with a commemoration of the prosperity by preserving the manna; the latter finishes with commemoration of the plague by ‘keeping’ the name for the place as הַגְּנֵבָּה הָעֵצְפִים (‘the graves of desire’).\(^{16}\) Finally, at the level of chronotopes (whilst both of the narratives represent the chronotopes layered on internal, formal and external), the first narrative accentuates time in its formal chronotope; the latter accentuates space.

Accordingly, I cannot doubt that the two narratives are in a mirror-image relation. However, there is still the question whether the dependence is echoic or monophonic. My understanding is that, according to the analysis of Exodus 16, the narrative in Exodus does not borrow from Numbers 11. However, the opposite seems to be the case. Thus, Numbers 11 does not add to the meaning of

\(^{15}\) I follow the difference in translation and transliteration from omers to homers, as used in NASB. Cf. Exodus 16.16 and Numbers 11.32.
\(^{16}\) BDB, 869.
Exodus 16, whilst the narrative in Numbers acquires greater meaning when, for example, the reasons for God’s anger, are considered in the light of his patience in Exodus 16. The same is true regarding the judgment brought on the people who do not make progress with regard to their temper during the span of time between the two narratives. Accordingly, the character of the people’s voice as the one single common constant between the two narratives comes to the fore and connects the two mirror-image events.

In addition, the argument against Exodus 16 borrowing from Numbers 11 is that the link between the two events supports the context of the latter narrative and not the context of the former. In other words, the account of the inauguration of the seventy elders to assist Moses in Numbers makes sense as a preparation to what follows most explicitly in Numbers 14, that is, the need to establish a leadership system which can tolerate and organise the people for the following forty years of travel. The opposite, however, is not true, since the focus of Exodus 16, that is the event of introducing manna and its seven-section time system does not seem to be clearer by the link with Numbers 11.

In conclusion then, it would seem that Exodus 16 develops its narrative according to its relation to a text other than Numbers 11. There are, however, two more texts that are candidates for a potential link with Exodus 16, namely Exodus 12 and Genesis 1-3.

4.3.3 MARKERS OF THE RELATION BETWEEN EXODUS 16 AND EXODUS 12

My understanding is that the events described in Exodus 12 definitely contribute to the reader’s understanding of the narrative in Exodus 16. In other words, Exodus 16 would not make much sense if it were not a part of the greater narrative of Exodus, as a whole, and, consequently, was related to Exodus 12. However, it seems to me, that Exodus 16 does not develop its narrative primarily in terms of importing meaning from Exodus 12, but rather in terms of continuing the narrative. However, a closer look to the markers in Exodus 16 will clarify the relation.
The first link between the two narratives is in the expression לְפִי אֶכְלָלוֹת ‘according to his eating’,\textsuperscript{17} which, as remarked earlier in this Chapter, occurs in the Bible only in these two narratives (specifically, Exodus 12.4; 16.14,21). Thus, the relation between the two narratives is indeed emphasised. However, further analysis is needed to clarify the relation between them.

Accordingly, the paschal lamb was supposed to be killed in the evening, as well as the quails. Both events were meant to show that God is ‘the LORD’ (cf. 12.12; 16.6-7). Furthermore, 12.14 states that the paschal lamb and the whole event is to be remembered, by establishing something called לְאָדַרְתָּהּ ‘a memorial … throughout your generations’, just as the manna was לְאָדַרְתָּהּ ‘to be kept throughout your generations’ (16.32). However, the choice of the narrator in the latter case not to use the verb ‘remember’, or the noun ‘memorial’, seems to be intentional, since it was the underlying thought, that the point of keeping the manna is to remember, not to keep it just for the sake of keeping it.

However, already by comparison of the details above, I can see that the contrasts between the two texts are not consistent in any logical way. More precisely, the paschal lamb shares some details with the manna, whilst in other instances the details regarding the lamb are in common with the details from the account with quails. This type of relation, it seems to me, is present throughout the comparison of all the following similarities between the two narratives. Namely, verse 12.15 introduces the seven-section time, something that corresponds to the seven-section time in 16.22-31. Moreover, 12.16 introduces a cessation of work on the seventh day, clearly linked with the cessation of work in 16.29,30.

Furthermore, verses 12.17-20 introduce the ‘feast of unleavened bread’ as a holy convocation, which is to be kept as a remembrance of God’s act of salvation from Egypt. This, I believe, in a way resembles, manna, which is to be kept as a reminder of God’s act of salvation in the desert. This seems to be further supported by the fact that God prefers to call it ‘bread’, not ‘manna’, as remarked above.

\textsuperscript{17} BDB, 37, 805; \textit{GHCLOT}, 43.
In addition, verses 12.26,27 make the same shift of the formal chronotope with the time and space of the people that made it to the Promised Land, just as we also saw the narrator in 16.33-35. These similarities seem to show that the two narratives are connected. However, the differences between them will clarify the relation even further.

In contrast to the similarities mentioned, there is a number of dissimilarities between the two narratives. Verse 12.2 introduces, via the paschal event, a religious time system. Thus: ‘This month shall be the beginning of months for you; it is to be the first month of the year to you.’ In other words, whilst it is true that it uses the seven-section time system, the focus is not on the seven sections, but on the monthly and yearly sections of the time. This is, however, not the case with the narrative in Exodus 16.

Furthermore, whilst it is true that the measuring of the food is present in both of the narratives, the measuring in Exodus 12.3-5 is focused on the food as a sacrifice (a sheep or goat lamb) which the families are to offer (see 12.7). In contrast, Exodus 16.4,8,15 puts the accent on quails and manna as something that God gave to the congregation.

This is further supported by verse 12.5 where the people are warned to select the finest animal, without blemish or fault, as their offering, shaping this event into a ceremonial/sacramental ordinance. In contrast, the narrative about quails and manna provided no hint of a sacrificial system. Even when manna was to be linked to the ceremonial/sacrificial system of the Sanctuary, in 16.32-35, the accent was not on the sacrifice, but on the ‘Testimony’, that is, on the two tables of stone with the Ten Commandments engraved by the finger of God. The manna was thus linked to God, as the life-giver, life-sustainer, and life-organiser, and not to a sacrifice in the sacrificial system of the Sanctuary.

This is again supported by the choice of the narrator in 16.32-35 to avoid using the verb יִשָּׁנָו ‘to remember’, or its noun יִשָּׁנָה ‘remembrance’, which in 12.14 was so clearly linked to the ceremonial/sacrificial system, which God was to establish. Accordingly, when the verb ‘to keep’ was unavoidable, the narrator’s choice in
16.32,33 was to use it in a noun form מְשָׁפַר ‘keeping, preserving’, \(18\) instead of its verb form in 12.24,25 שָׁמַר ‘keep, observe’, \(19\) as the verb form was used there in connection with the paschal lamb or its rituals.

Furthermore, verses such as 12.12,13,25,35, make it clear that the context in the paschal narrative, God has an enemy to fight against, and whom God will ‘judge’, ‘destroy’, ‘smite’, ‘strike’… (In the context, the enemy is Egypt and its gods.) Accordingly, God’s people are perfectly loyal to God, as is very much stressed in verse 12.28,35,50. (Thus, ‘the sons of Israel went and did so; just as the LORD had commanded Moses and Aaron, so they did.’)

In contrast, God has no enemy in Exodus 16. All the problems are solely with the ignorant, murmuring, misbehaving, even childish congregation. There is not one indication that God has an enemy. Accordingly, even when Egypt and Canaan, as the chronotopic references are used (in 16.1,3,6,32,35), these lands are not presented as lands of an enemy, but only as lands of their departure and of the journey’s destination, respectively.

Finally, 12.43-49 introduces an idea of a ritual proximity to God. More precisely, the children of Israel, the circumcised, are presented as being ‘close’ to God, whilst the sojourner, foreigner, an uncircumcised slave/servant, is presented as being ‘far’ from God. However, the presented proximity is ritual, religious, since the narrative explains that, in reality, it is about the people who are present all together, in the same house/household, thus ruling out the option for the proximity to be spatial. Accordingly, the way to ‘come closer’ to God is to be circumcised (12.48).

Furthermore, the people’s voice, that of those who went out of Egypt, whilst being presented as in unison in obedience in chapter 12 (12.28,35,50), is polyform in its proximity to God, with some of the people closer to God, and some of them further away from God. Conversely, the manna narrative presents all of the individuals behind the congregation/people’s voice in unison in their

\(18\) BDB, 1038.

\(19\) BDB, 1036.
proximity to God, but polyform in their obedience. Thus, ‘on the seventh day that some of the people went out to gather …’ (16.27).

This analysis shows that the contrast between the two narratives is stronger than the similarities between them, therefore it is not justifiable to claim that Exodus 16 draws from Exodus 12, based on the similarities between the two. However, the contrast is not as strong and direct as in the case of the relationship between Exodus 16 and Numbers 11, for example. Accordingly, one cannot argue that Exodus 16 draws from Exodus 12, based on the contrasts between the two. Therefore, I will argue, that the two narratives draw from a common source, that is, from Genesis 1-3. Thus, my focus in what follows is on the relationship between Exodus 16 and Genesis 1-3, but much of the relationship between the latter and Exodus 12 will be elaborated on as well.

4.3.4 Markers of the Relation between Exodus 16 and Genesis 1-3

Genesis 1-3 is the narrative that is best understood in the context of the above-analysed dissimilarities between Exodus 12 and Exodus 15. Consequently, I argue, Genesis 1-3 has the potential to be the referential text for both Exodus 12 and Exodus 15. Accordingly, there are the following dependence markers in Genesis 1-3 that emphasise the relation between that narrative and Exodus (12 and) 15.

In Genesis 1.1, the very first word in the narrative (and the Bible) יַהֲנָא, ‘beginning’, 20 focusses the reader on the representation of time. Thus, it can be seen as referring to the introduction of the first time section in Exodus 16.6,8,12,13. It is especially interesting that the text in Exodus 16 stresses that the first time section begins ‘in the evening’ (followed by the ‘day’ part of the time section), corresponding with the pattern established in Genesis 1.5,8,13,19,23,31.

Furthermore, the same verse, Genesis 1.1, presents God as the creator of time and space, thus, the chronotope is presented as, first of all, God’s, and not solely the narrator’s. This is in fact a multi-layered representation of time (‘mise en

20 BDB, 912.
abyme’\textsuperscript{21} by which the narrator authorises a representation of time and space in which God’s representation of time and space is being authorised. However, the reference to this in Exodus 16 is found, I believe, in the clear intonation in the manna narrative that the seven-section time construct is God’s.

Nevertheless, the three types of chronotopes (external, formal and internal) present in every utterance, (as explained in Section 2.2.2 above,) are not delineable in Genesis 1. That is to say that whilst the reader knows that there must be the writer’s chronotope (the external one, as a part of the author’s paradigm), the chronotope used in the text in order to narrate (the formal one, integrated into the author’s utterance), and the chronotope narrated about (the internal chronotope, time and space), these layers are not delineable in Genesis 1. That is to say, the layers are assumed but are never alluded to, in the text. Thus, the narrator’s representation of time and space, and God’s representation of time and space make one whole. Accordingly, this homogeneity of the chronotope in Genesis 1 stands in contrast to all the other narratives analysed above (since all the above-analysed narratives featured intermingling of internal, formal and external chronotopes present in the text).

In addition, the last part of Genesis 1.1, presents God as the creator of not just the representation of time and space, but of actual time and space, in terms of everything.\textsuperscript{22} In other words, what was the time before ‘the beginning’? What was there before ‘the heavens and the earth’ were created? Moreover, what remains, if ‘the heavens and the earth’ are taken away?

Furthermore, the description of the Earth as \textit{אֲרֵץ}, ‘formless’,\textsuperscript{23} and \textit{אֲרֵץ} ‘void/empty’,\textsuperscript{24} indicates that God formed spatial vessels and later filled them

\textsuperscript{21} ‘Mise en abyme’ is literary device by which an intermingling of representations of time and space is achieved, so that representations of time and space on internal, formal and external levels mutually intrude on each other.

\textsuperscript{22} Accordingly, the phrase ‘the heavens and the earth’ is rendered as a merism of totality, in accordance with Isaiah 44.24, Psalm 103.19, Jeremiah 10.16, Joel 3.15-16.

\textsuperscript{23} BDB, 1062.

\textsuperscript{24} BDB, 96.
with the created beings. The same can be said about the temporal vessel ‘one day’, formed in Genesis 1.3-5, which was to be filled (with creative acts). Accordingly, verse 1.5 clarifies the difference between the spatial vessels as static and the temporal vessel as flowing in night and day sequences (charting evening and morning as the night and day time of the one day).

Therefore, this representation of God as creating the totality of the time and space is to be understood as the basis for the rest of the narrative, namely, narrational description of the notion that God has no enemy in the chronotope of the creation (since there was nothing before he created the chronotope). This notion is further developed in Genesis 1.3,6,9,11,14,20,24,26 with the pattern ‘God said … and it was so’. Hence, the totality of everything is presented as having no hint of a force that would counteract God’s utterance. This seems to be referred to in Exodus 16.12-14, where God announces what will happen that evening, and ‘it was so’. In other words, there was no trace of a force that could counteract the utterance of God. Not even the murmuring congregation was presented as counteracting God’s (creational) force in Exodus 16.

Furthermore, this idea of the absence of any opposition to God in Genesis 1 is supported by Genesis 1.2, which introduces the Spirit of God (literally עַלְוַי ‘wind, spirit, energy of life…’) as עַלְוַי ‘hovering’ over the waters. Accordingly, there is a contrast between this representation of the wind/spirit/energy of life, which hovers (‘like a vulture over young’ in Deuteronomy 32.11) and any other possible representation of a wind in terms of a force that could resemble any form of warfare.

Genesis 1.4 introduces the idea of the goodness of what was created in a direct way and, accordingly, the goodness of the creator, in an indirect way. Subsequently, this pattern of God evaluating his creation at each stage of the

25 The similarity between this representation of the universe, as a specific time and space construct that is to be filled up, with the one presented by Einstein’s theory of relativity, seems stunning to me. For the latter see Section 2.2.2 above.
26 BDB, 926.
27 BDB, 926.
process of creation becomes the mainstay of the narrative in Genesis 1.4,10,12,18,21,25 culminating with the conclusion that ‘all’ God created was ‘very good’ (verse Genesis 1.31).

Therefore, it is clear that this totality of goodness supports the previously established idea of the absence of evil in the narrative. Nevertheless, this measurement of goodness also introduces questions about law and origin of evil. Consequently, the existence of measuring the goodness implies the presence of criteria for measuring the goodness and the opposite of it, the evil. In addition, the accent on the goodness (and not just a simple, unaccented mentioning of it) implies that there is also a reality where the totality of it is not good. Simply put, why would the accent be on the fact that the creation was good, even very good, if everything has been very good, all the time?

This, I believe, resembles the conflict between the two ideologies with their opposing systems of criteria in Exodus 16. Namely, the congregation claims, according to their representation of time and space, that the time and space of the past is the better one, very good even. In contrast, God’s ready-prepared representation of the time and space claims that this time and space, which God is about to set in place, is better, very good even.

It is also important to note that whilst the emphasis on the idea of the measuring of goodness in Exodus 16 is implicit, the emphasis on the idea of the criteria for the measuring is explicit in Exodus 16.4,28 (criteria such as proximity of pots and vastness of the wilderness, versus God’s criteria such as following his commandments and laws). Accordingly, as analysed above, it is only God who explicitly mentions his מָצוֹן ‘commandment(s)’ and his נַחֲלָת ‘instruction(s)/law’.  

In addition, in Genesis 1, the idea of the created vessels to be filled up is not delineable from the idea of the criteria for measuring within the chronotopic vessels. Accordingly, whilst the idea of ‘filling up’ implies both spatial emptiness which is to be filled up (by God’s creations) and emptiness in terms of time (to be

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28 BDB, 846.
29 BDB, 435.
filled up by God’s acts of creation), the two are constructed so that the expanse (space) incorporates created criteria for time, namely ‘the bigger light’ and ‘the smaller light’ (and the stars, Genesis 1.14-18).

Nevertheless, it is important to note that these criteria for time, are not represented as something God used, since he delineated the day-sections prior to the luminaries being introduced. Accordingly, the author accentuates another measuring, which is defined when God ‘measured’ everything created, and concluded that the creation was ‘good’ (already in Genesis 1.10,12). Consequently, the single main criterion emphasised in Genesis 1 is God’s word according to which the world was made good.

Furthermore, Genesis 1.5 expands the idea of who names what as the rhetoric that conveys meaning. Namely, it is God in the creation narrative who gives names to light (‘day’), darkness (‘night’), expanse (‘heaven’), dry land (‘earth’), and the gathering of the waters (‘sea’) in Genesis 1.5,8,10. In other words, God gives names/authorises the vessels of his chronotope, which are subsequently to be filled up. In contrast, there is no description of God naming the human couple. God’s act of naming of the chronotopic vessels is especially prominent in the light of the fact that Adam’s name was never introduced with the motif of naming. More precisely, neither Genesis 1.26, nor 2.7 gave any explicit significance to the name, even though the play on the words הָאֲדָם ‘Adam’\(^{30}\) and הָאָדָם ‘ground’\(^{31}\) is present.

Accordingly, this differentiation between the chronotopic vessels and humans makes it possible to analyse the relation between them. More precisely, whilst all of them are blessed by God, only the chronotopic vessels are named by God. This is referred to in Exodus 16.4,28-30, where God’s efforts seem to be making the congregation accept the given chronotopic borders, both spatial and temporal, as something superior to humans (see especially verse 29). In fact, there is no other problem God seems to have in the narrative in Exodus 16.

\(^{30}\) BDB, 9.
\(^{31}\) BDB, 9.
Hence, the act of naming implies the idea of authority. Thus, the narrator, as the other voice in the creation narrative is not described as naming anything (as for example, if he/she in verse 1.21 uttered that, ‘the great sea monster’ which is today called that and that … or, which I/we call that and that …, which would not be a strange pattern in Biblical narratives, just as it was not strange in Genesis 11.9; 16.14; 21.31; 22.14 and so on).

However, the idea of delegated hierarchical authority is further developed in 1.26-28 where God creates the first human couple and sanctions them to exercise authority over the rest of the creation on the Earth (but not over the chronotopic vessels). Thus, this idea of humans as beings with authority is developed on the basis that the humans are made ‘in the image of God’, not on the basis that they received a name from God. In other words, after clarifying that the human couple is not of a higher authority than the chronotope/chronotopic vessels authorised by God, the narrator moves on to clarify the relation between the human couple and other creations within the chronotopic vessels.

In this context, the human couple is described as those who are to סָבַד ‘subdue’[32] the Earth and מָלַע ‘rule over, dominate’[33] the co-habitants in the chronotope. How is the subjugation and domination to be understood? In a context in which God has an enemy, the terms would normally be used to convey a warfare scenario, where the enemy is to be brought into bondage. In contrast, this context is depicted as God having no enemy. In addition, if an explanation of these terms would be reached from the perspective of the narrator’s voice, a direct or indirect formulation of the external chronotope would have to be made. This would go against the rhetoric the narrator intended, since in that case, a layering of the chronotopes would have become explicit, whereas the narrator sought to represent all the layers as one.

Therefore, not being able to import an explanation from another chronotope, the narrator chooses to leave these terms unexplained at this point in the narrative. I

32 BDB, 461.
33 BDB, 921.
argue, the explanation will be given in the course of the narrative which describes
the man naming the woman (something I will expand on when analysing Genesis
2.18-23, in what follows).

Furthermore, Genesis 1.29,30 introduces the idea that God’s intention regarding
food for humans was a plant-based diet. This is evidenced in the notion that the
quails in Exodus 16 seem to be God’s way of proving that he can provide pots of
food better than the Egyptian pots from the congregation’s chronotope (and not
something intended to be the basis for the congregation’s diet). Accordingly, he
makes the entire micro-chronotope in the wilderness in Sin become a huge pot of
food. Thus, the quails are not described as ‘flying’ to the camp, but as ‘coming
up’ (Exodus 16.13, unlike the description of the quails in Numbers 11.31, where
they were brought with a ‘wind from the Lord’).

In contrast, manna in Exodus 16.4 is described as bread from heaven ‘raining
down’. Accordingly, instead of sitting next to the Egyptian pots, God’s construct
of time and space placed the congregation in the centre of the provided food.
However, manna was intended to be the principal food for the congregation.
Accordingly, the narrative resembles God’s choice regarding food for humans in
Genesis 1.

The relation between the two narratives is further developed by the description of
manna. Strictly speaking, it would seem more logical, to have quails as
something ‘falling’ down, and the manna as something ‘coming up’ (beneath the
dew, especially in the light of Genesis 2.6.) The unusual representation of manna
is also evidenced in that it was not just raining down (like from a cloud) but
raining from heaven.

Moreover, manna, as opposed to quails, is not something that was at hand, in
terms that it already existed in the wilderness. Thus, whilst the miracle with the
quails was one of many miracles God provided in Egypt and on the way out of
Egypt, the miracle with manna, the narrative suggests, is a unique one. In other
words, for all the other miracles, God used the already created chronotope and its
‘filling-up’ elements, in an unusual, miraculous way (basket, bush, rod, serpent,
leper/illness, blood, frogs, flies, hail, darkness, death, wind, a tree, and now finally the quails). Accordingly, all of them were used within a very limited time span.

In contrast, manna is described as a new element in God’s chronotope, to be used throughout the entire journey. In this sense, the manna narrative accentuates the awe of the congregation that could not recognise manna as something already existing in the created world. Thus, it sounds like God continued the narrative from Genesis 1-3 by creating yet another element to fill up the chronotopic vessels.

In addition, Genesis 2.1 further develops the idea of the hierarchy of the delegated authority among the created beings, as is suggested by the military-like terminology of הַגְּדָה ‘host, army’[^34] and its application to both the cosmic elements and the beings on the Earth. Accordingly, it is interesting to note that this is the only instance in the Bible where this term is applied to all the things created on the Earth and in the heavens as God’s army (since the other instances of God creating the hosts refer only to ‘the heavenly hosts’, like for example in Deuteronomy 4.19; 17.3). Thus, the focus of the hierarchy (previously centred on the relationship between humans and the chronotopic vessels, that is, day, night, heaven, Earth and seas) in Genesis 1, moves to the relation between the humans and the other elements in the chronotopic vessels, in Genesis 2.

Consequently, Genesis 2.1-3 begins[^35] by representing God, at the top of the hierarchic structure, taking pleasure in the newly created chronotope. He is trying

[^34]: BDB, 838.
[^35]: There is no consensus among contemporary theologians regarding the particular border between the two representations of the creation in Genesis 1-2. Accordingly, numerous articles have been written regarding the matter. However, for the zoom lens method a precise border between the sections is not a prerequisite. The zoom lens method is more focused on the flow of the narrative, even when borders between sections are noted. Thus, it is interesting to observe that the first setumah is found only at the end of Genesis 3.15 thus focussing the reader’s attention on the depth of the verse. Nevertheless, the setumah also makes it clear that the three chapters are to be read as one whole. Even more interesting is that there are two more setumot in Genesis 1-3; namely the oracle about the consequence of sin over the woman (verse 3.16) and the rest of the chapter as the last setumah). This concentration of the setumot in this last part of the narrative helps the reader understand the accentuation of the three chapters as a whole (on the sin and its consequences). Furthermore, the same accentuation is also a sign of delineation. Namely, the
it out first. The culmination of the ‘very good’ impression is implied by God’s decision to separate, bless and sanctify the seventh day. This is the first time in the creation narrative that the reader is to understand that God’s chronotope is seven-section time based (even, more precisely, a six-plus-one-section construct, since the seventh day was implicitly separated, as a ‘special’ time vessel, and not as a ‘new’ time vessel). It almost comes as a surprise, since there is no hint of it in the preceding text.

In the same way, God is described in Exodus 16.5 as keeping ‘the best for the last’ as a surprise. In other words, he leaves people with the impression that what was to come was a six-day event, so that on the sixth day ‘it shall be twice as much’ manna. Only, after the chronotope developed to the sixth day, was the seventh day revealed as the climax and culmination of the chronotopic construct.

Nevertheless, the structure of Genesis 2.3 suggests that the separating, blessing and sanctifying of the seventh time-section is indivisible from what God himself did, that is, cease from his ‘work’ and ‘rest’. Accordingly, יִבְרָעָל ‘to bless’36 and פָרֹע ‘to sanctify’37 as terms, in this context, are not linked to a ceremonial/sacrificial system, (since none is presented as existing) but are linked to God himself.

Hence, the presentation of the seventh day in Genesis 2, follows the implicit idea of the absence of evil, a sacrificial system, and sacrifice, as well as the explicit idea of the presence of hierarchy. Thus, after God experienced the chronotope, he blessed and sanctified the seventh day, making it a special/sanctified temporal vessel in his chronotope. Accordingly, the seventh day was also the final thing he divided (implicitly and not explicitly in the text), the seventh from the six days, the day to be filled with creative rest, as opposed to the other days, filled with creative acts.

whole of chapter 4 makes a new sense division. Finally, petuchot in the three chapters show a deep sense of the small thematic division. Accordingly, every day of the creation is a new petucha, as well as 2.1-3 and 3.16-21.

36 BDB, 138.
37 BDB, 872.
In addition, the difference in the hierarchical authority between the seventh day (as a special vessel) and created beings (as elements for filling up the chronotope) is achieved by God blessing both the day and the beings, whilst sanctifying only the seventh day (cf. Genesis 1.22,28). Accordingly, the seventh day is the first thing sanctified in the Bible, among all the created elements that were (only) blessed.

I see this reflected in Exodus 16 with the deliberate choice of the narrator to selectively distribute the authority given to voices in order to utter and name things. Accordingly, only God utters the terms ‘law’ and ‘commandment’, since he is the one who created and constructed the chronotope according to the laws and rules. In addition, the only law in Genesis 1 is also the only criterion for goodness, and was only God’s word. Therefore, it seems understandable that the narrator in Exodus 16 does not take the privilege of using the terms ‘law’ and ‘Sabbath’. However, it is logical to question the reasons for giving Moses the privilege to utter the term ‘Sabbath’ in the narrative. I believe that Genesis 2.4-25 provides an explanation for these reasons.

Namely, Genesis 2.4-6 re-introduces the creation of the vessels in order to quickly change the focus onto the hierarchic relations, as mentioned above. Thus, Genesis 2.7 zooms the focus onto the relation between the man and the Creator. Accordingly, the formal (representational) chronotope in the narrative changes (whilst the reader’s questions regarding internal and external chronotope naturally arise). Suddenly, temporal categories are moved to the background, whilst spatial categories come to the fore and convey pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings. Thus, God is represented as creating not with a distant ‘fiat’, but with his personal close touch. Consequently, man has the following two closest entities: God as the first and the Earth as the second (which has, in Genesis 1.24, already been represented with attributes of a being). Accordingly, the immense, vast space of the creation narrative in Genesis 1, is suddenly narrowed to a close-up of the man.
Later, in 2.8-14, the spatial categories direct the focus to zoom out so that the
habitat for man is depicted. Along with the depiction of the habitat, the reader is
oriented, so that geographical/spatial categories have the purpose of pointing out
the following: first, God prepares the place for man; second, it is good/beautiful,
even very good/beautiful; and third, the reader is informed that the only
chronotope changed in the narrative is the formal (representational).

In particular, the narrator shifts the formal chronotope in verses Genesis 2.10-14,
so that the perspective changes and moves to the chronotope of the first recipients
of the narrative, that is, the time and space when/where ‘Pishon’, ‘Havilah’,
‘Assyria’ are all common terms. The reader thus acquires the orientation which
helps her/him to delineate the external chronotope (introduced in Genesis 1),
representational chronotope (in which the geography, socio-political state of
affairs in the world of Genesis 2.10-14 are the contemporary reality), and the
internal chronotope (the time and space of the creation of man, as described in
Genesis 2). In other words, just as Genesis 2 zooms into one detail from Genesis
1 (the creation of the man), so the chronotope of Genesis 2 zooms into one layer
of the chronotope of Genesis 1 (the formal, representational chronotope layer). A
similar change of the formal chronotope was observed in Exodus 16.32-36, as
analysed in Section 4.1.4 above.

After this orientation is given to the reader, the narrator changes back to the
formal chronotope and pulls it away so that the internal chronotope attracts the
attention and conveys the author’s point. More precisely, the limited authority of
man comes into focus in Genesis 2.15-17. Man is described as having authority
over the rest of creation on the Earth. However, the limited nature of his authority
is also clearly presented (verse 17).

Furthermore, in Genesis 2.16, the idea that these verses follow up the ‘military-
like’ introduction at the beginning of the chapter is also emphasised with the
narrator’s usage of the term הָלַ֫ךְ ‘commanded’,\(^{38}\) as opposed to אָמַ֫ר ‘said’\(^ {39}\) throughout the whole narrative, and once again already in verse Genesis 2.18. This commandment, thus, is especially prominent in the context of God’s ‘fiat’ in Genesis 1, which had no hint of conflict, having God only ‘say’ and ‘bless’ someone and something. In contrast, according to the focus of the narrative, the instruction to man regarding the limitations of his authority is represented as the first commandment in the narrative, and indeed in the whole Bible.

Finally, Genesis 2.18-25 finishes the representation of this hierarchic authority by further utilising the ‘who names who’ principle. Accordingly, the focus zooms in, back to man who is now granted the privilege of naming all the cohabitants in the chronotope. In other words, whilst the earlier part of the narrative utilised the detail that both the humans and the animals (and Sabbath) were blessed (and only the Sabbath sanctified), the focus in this part of the narrative utilises the detail that both the animals and man were made from the ground, whilst only he, the man, received the authority to name other cohabitants in the chronotopic vessels.

Accordingly, the creation of the woman receives special focus. The zoom closes in, even closer, on the ribs of the man. Whilst God formed the animals and man from the ground, the woman is exclusively formed from the man’s rib. On the one hand, the potential superiority of the woman (formed from previously refined material) over the man (formed from the raw ground) is ruled out by the fact that the refined material was in fact the man’s rib. On the other hand, the potential superiority of the man over the woman (who names the woman and she is given the name, without her giving a name to anyone and anything) is ruled out by the fact that the man himself did not receive a name either in the narrative.

Accordingly, even though the logic of the narrative and the play on the words אָדָם ‘Adam’\(^ {40}\) and בָּרָא ‘ground’\(^ {41}\) would demand an answer to the question who gave the man his name, this information is concealed, so that the accentuation can

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\(^{38}\) BDB, 845.  
\(^{39}\) BDB, 55.  
\(^{40}\) BDB, 9.  
\(^{41}\) BDB, 9.
support the idea of the equality of the couple, created/formed equally in the image of God.

Thus, this description of God forming the woman from the man’s rib (and not his heel, the only other part of the human body mentioned in Genesis 3!) supports the equality between the man and the woman, already introduced a in Genesis 1, where both of them received the blessing and the call to subdue the Earth and rule over ‘every living thing that moves on the earth.’ It is also important to note that the man has never received a call to subdue the woman. Furthermore, the verb used in Genesis 3.21 is עָלַל הָאָדָם ‘to rule’ and not the previously explained עָלָה ‘subdue’ and רָם ‘rule’, denoting, thus, a different nature of the dominion acquired after the first experience of sin. In addition, whilst God called people into the dominion before the first sin, he never commanded or invited them into the type of the dominion that took place after the sin. Accordingly, the dominion after the sin is the consequence of the sin, not part of the original plan and God’s will.

Furthermore, in Genesis 2.24 the formal chronotope, becomes more vivid again to further support the above-presented equality between the man and the woman. Namely, whilst in the external chronotope it is (only) the man who is to leave his mother and father (a nuance of a difference between the man and the woman), the reason for that is that the spatial proximity between the man and woman reduces so that they become bound to each other, becoming thus ‘one’. What is more, the idea of the absence of shame in Genesis 2.25 is the last hint of the absence of evil and presence of harmony and maximum proximity between the man and the woman (since the same idea of the shame will be linked to the idea of fear and explained as the main effect of the sin, causing spatial, temporal and ideological distancing between God, man and woman in Genesis 3).

Thus, I argue, that the reader is left with only one plausible rhetorical function of the account of the man naming the woman. Namely, the account of naming the woman serves as the explanation of the context of the terms ‘subdue’ and ‘rule’.

42 BDB, 605.
More precisely, after reading about the couple that was invited to subdue the Earth and rule over the other living creature in Genesis 1, the reader is introduced to the scenario where God brings forth the subordinates to the man, so that he can name them. It is thus understandable that the part of subduing and ruling is the act of naming. In accordance, the narrator accentuates that ‘whatever the man called a living creature, that was its name’, as if even God did not interfere in that, since it was indeed the man’s area of authority.

However, in order to rule out any potential misunderstanding on the part of the reader, the narrator focuses on another act of naming, this time of the woman, who was previously introduced as the creature who is not to be subdued (but to be the co-subduer). Thus, the principal idea of naming, in the context of the world without evil forces on it, is described as an act filled with amazement, respect and awe. In other words, whilst the living creatures on the Earth are to be subdued, this was to be done, without a trace of the context from the time after the first sin, that is, with the respect, amazement and awe, initiated by the perfection and beauty in everything created.

Accordingly, the narrative in Exodus 16 in general and particularly the emphasis on the congregation giving the name to manna, acquires a special meaning in the light of the focus on hierarchies. More precisely, the congregation was allowed to name manna, resembling thus the first human couple who received the limited authority to subdue the rest of the creation on the Earth. In addition, the explicit repetition of the motif of awe on the side of the name-giver is more than just coincidental.

Likewise, following-up this principle, the narrator builds up the dependence markers in the two narratives. Accordingly, whilst God introduces rules, laws and limitations in Genesis 1-2 (just as in Exodus 16), he does not name the seventh day as ‘the Sabbath’ in Genesis 1-2 (just as in Exodus 16). Therefore, the narrator reserves the authority for Moses to utter the name for the seventh day. In other words, if the narrator would present Moses as the one who names the seventh day as the Sabbath, the narrative could be misunderstood as implying that Moses is of
a higher authority than the Sabbath, which is not in accordance with Genesis 1-2. Likewise, if God in Exodus 16 were presented as naming the seventh day as the Sabbath, the marker from Genesis 1-3 (where God did not name the seventh day as the Sabbath) would be thus removed, as well.

Furthermore, in Exodus 16.16,32 God is depicted as giving commands. Not surprisingly, the commands were related to manna, as the created food for the congregation (just like the command in Genesis 2.16). Moreover, all the other utterances, which are not commandments, were depicted as proclamations of the blessings God was about to bestow upon humans. Accordingly, by this choice of the narrator, the relation between the Genesis 1-2 narrative and the manna narrative in Exodus 16 is stressed once again.

The narrative continues with the text in Genesis 3.1-3. The text utilises the same chronotope, giving space precedence over time, since the reader understands that the woman is in the midst of the Garden, and near the tree from which the fruit was forbidden to be eaten. The chronotope is supported by the fact that the woman adds a spatial detail to God’s command from 2.17, so that the tree and the fruit are not to be touched.

Furthermore, this is the first chronotope in the Bible in which God is represented as absent or distant. In that context, and, in fact, according to it, a totally new idea is introduced, which is the motif of a deceiver. The deceiver misrepresents God, his intentions and his creation. Consequently, the first human couple is deceived to transgress the borders of the created hierarchy (implied to by the statement ‘you will be like God, knowing good and evil’ in Genesis 3.5).

After the committed sin, the ironic ‘opening of their eyes’ illuminates their hopeless state. Furthermore, Genesis 3.9-11 depicts God as taking the initiative to reduce the spatial gap between him and humans. Afterwards, an investigation takes place and a judgment is made. The reader is privileged to hear the utterances of God, who, as the life-giver, proclaims changes in the conditions of life (Genesis 3.14-19). In contrast, the narrator informs the reader that Adam, according to the pattern in Genesis 2, gave a new name to his wife (Genesis
3.20). Ironically enough, this time, he does not receive the privilege of his voice being heard whilst changing the name of his wife. However, the new name, which strongly hints to further developments of the narrative, clearly directs the focus of the reader to the generations that are to come.

Furthermore, in a nutshell, Genesis 3.21 introduces a second totally new idea, which is the idea of a sacrifice. Namely, in order to ‘make’ the garments of skin for Adam and his wife, and even to clothe them, the implied death of an animal is necessary. Conclusively, Genesis 3.22-24 utilises the spatial elements again, in order to convey the meaning of an apparently permanent distance between God and humans. The chapters that follow develop further the motive introduced by the woman’s new name, that is, the motif of new generations that are to appear on the stage of the narrative, under the new conditions of life.

I argue, that the markers highlighting the relationship between Exodus 16 and Genesis 3 are all on the ideological level. Namely, both narratives depict transgressions related to food. Both the transgressions are caused as part of a neglect of and misconduct against the revealed will/law/command of God. Both of the narratives depict God as taking action towards a resolution.

However, I believe that the differences between Genesis 3 and Exodus 16 are vital. Namely, the latter narrative represents no hint of an enemy neither any trace of investigation. Consequently, there is no judgment in Exodus 16. God in Exodus 16 only blesses and commands, never judges. Accordingly, I do not see sufficiently consistent dependence markers between Genesis 3 and Exodus 16 to validate a monophonic dependence between the two texts. In addition, all the similarities between the two texts are based on the similarities between Exodus 16 and Genesis 1-2, and, thus, only in that indirect way to Genesis 3.

Nevertheless, there are two questions regarding this reading of the narratives which I find logical, and which I have left to the end of this section. First, what is the relation between Genesis 1-3 and other texts analysed above (Deuteronomy 34, Numbers 11 and Exodus 12)? Since my explanation of the relations has to be subject to my focus on Exodus 16, I will here point to only the specific markers
mentioned earlier, but not explained specifically. Thus, it is worth noting that the term יְבָדֶלium occurs only in Numbers 11.7 and Genesis 2.12. Further analysis of other markers between the two texts should follow the same principles utilised in this Chapter, I suggest. However, that pursuit has to be left for a future research.

In addition, the relation between Exodus 12 and Genesis 1-3, I suggest, is found in the context of what was recounted in Genesis 3. Accordingly, as analysed above, Exodus 12 follows up the context of the presence of the force opposed to God. There is an enemy that is to be judged and conquered. Nevertheless, the enemy is not the congregation, the people (but the Egyptians in Exodus 12). However, the rebellious people (the Egyptians in Exodus 12) are duped and misled. Namely, they subscribe to an incorrect construct of time and space, and, accordingly, follow the incorrect criteria for measuring goodness within their chronotope. God’s solution is to employ a twelve-section based formal chronotope (months and years) in order to introduce the idea of a sacrifice in a sacrificial system, which will even further support humans in accepting their role in the created world, and coming to terms with the creator. This construction of the formal chronotope in the religious/sacrificial system is meant to keep them safe from the snares of the deceiver.

However, many of the Egyptians do not accept the hierarchy introduced with the presentation of the sacrificial system. Accordingly, delineation between those who subscribe to the word of God as the criterion, and those who subscribe to any other criterion (Pharaoh’s word, the word of his magicians and prophets, the word of the Egyptian gods …) takes place. Consequently, the outcome of personal choices of each of the voices in the narrative is recounted. However, there are specific rhetorical features in the narrative, especially the descriptions of the relation between God and the Pharaoh. Understanding of the rhetorical features is, I believe, subject to the reader’s acquaintance with the text in Genesis 1-3. Accordingly, I understand that this draft of the analysis already provides clues regarding the relationship between the two texts. However, a deeper analysis of relations between these texts would require future research.
Finally, the second question: why is God presented as avoiding naming the seventh day in Genesis 1-2? That is to say, there seems to be no internally directed reason for that in the narrative. However, instead of trying to speculate on answers according to the information provided by this step of the research, it is judicious to wait for subsequent steps of the method, to provide them.

4.4 VALIDATION OF PARADIGMATIC DEPENDENCE

This is the fourth step of the zoom lens method. After following the centripetal forces present in the text, and thus concentrating (centralising) my reading to the smallest details in the text (so called ‘close reading’), I am about to draw a conclusion regarding the type of dependence between Exodus 16 and Genesis 1-3.

Accordingly, the fourth step of the method is the central one, where the centripetal orientation of the method will acquire the foundation to switch to centrifugal, in compliance with the conclusions drawn at this step. The conclusions drawn at this step are in/stability of pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of the utterance, and in/stability of an image of a paradigm in the utterance. These conclusions will prove essential in the remaining three steps of the method, where I will decentralise my reading to the level needed for my satisfaction, as the reader of Exodus 16.

4.4.1 IN/StABILITY OF MEANINGS OF THE UTTERANCE EXODUS 16.1-36

As observed above, the principal case for the instability of pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of the utterance in Exodus 16.1-36 is found in verses 22-30. Namely, the meanings of the Sabbath as an institution are understandable in the light of what follows in the narrative, in terms of the laws and regulations in the rest of the book of Exodus, as well as the last three books of the Pentateuch/Torah. However, the account of the Sabbath institution in the wilderness of Sin does not seem to ‘fit’ in the preceding parts of the narrative in the book of Exodus.
In particular, the sudden expansion of the terms related to the institution of the Sabbath is most surprising. Many terms do not seem to be introduced at all. Accordingly, if מָצָאֲכִים in Exodus 16.23 already means ‘Sabbath observance’ what are the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ pattern, in the same verse?

Especially surprising is the fact that even though one of the expressions for the Sabbath is the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’, the Lord in the narrative does not seem to use the name of the Sabbath for the seventh day! Instead, the narrator and God seem to prefer the terms ‘seventh day’, and (God’s) ‘commandments and instructions’. The congregation and Aaron do not even refer to the seventh day.

This matter seems to be even more puzzling in the context of the whole utterance in Exodus 16 that utilises the formal chronotope with such a strong accent on time, which takes precedence over space. In addition, the role of the Sabbath in the subsequent history of Israel makes this silence regarding its name hardly likely to be accidental. Therefore, the absence of any additional explanation of the name of the Sabbath and even of the whole institution of the Sabbath (in any preceding text in the book of Exodus, or the Pentateuch/Torah as a whole) seems to be an even greater enigma.

Accordingly, the text on its own does not provide sufficient information to help the reader to stabilise pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of almost half of the verses in the text (in addition, regarding the Sabbath, importation of the motif of the Sanctuary and the Testimony in verses 32-36, seems to destabilise the meanings even further). Therefore, I understand that this text has developing, unstable meanings, and accordingly has the potential to be qualified as an alluding text (i.e. a text in which the intended pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings are developed by allusions which trigger the stable meaning of a previous text in order to facilitate importing that meaning into the alluding text, as explained in Sections 1.8 and 3.4 above).

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43 BDB, 992.
4.4.2 IN/STABILITY OF AN IMAGE OF A PARADIGM IN THE UTTERANCE EXODUS 16.1-36

The paradigm(s) featured in the text are no less an issue than the problem of the institution of the Sabbath in the text. Namely, whilst there is a clear-cut polarisation of the voices of the narrator, God, Moses and Aaron on the one hand, and the congregation on the other hand, identification of the paradigm of the first group is not an easy task. More precisely, verses Exodus 16.22-36 leave far too many questions unanswered when the text is read on its own. Namely, if the restructuring of time and space is so prominent in God’s paradigm, why is he then so unwilling to popularise the name of the Sabbath? In addition, if it was the best solution in order to confront the opposing paradigm of the congregation, why is this method not used in the case of the other two desert-type narratives which frame the text into a larger whole (Exodus 15.22-17.7)?

This unwillingness to promote the Sabbath as the key-ritual in the context of developing the new paradigm seems even more crucial when viewed at the level of the role of rituals in a paradigm. More precisely, faith-life imagery visualised in rituals is the common arena for all the three aspects of every paradigm (metaphysical, methodological and sociological aspects). Accordingly, a developed paradigm has symbols of communal identity, which is so prominent in the role the Sabbath acquires in the subsequent texts in the Torah/Pentateuch, but which seems to be missing in this narrative. Therefore, I cannot conclude that the narrative in Exodus 16 features a developed, stable paradigm.

4.4.3 CONCLUSION REGARDING THE TYPE OF DEPENDENCE EXODUS 16.1-36

As was analysed in the previous Chapter of the thesis, every text which has a developing meaning has the potential to be alluding, that is, to import a meaning from another text (alluded to). Furthermore, if an alluding text also features an unstable, developing paradigm, it has the potential to be paradigmatic. This potential is utilised when monophonic markers in the text direct the reader to an independent text from which the paradigmatic text imports and stabilises its
meaning and paradigm. Therefore, a validation of the independence of the independent text is needed.44

4.5 VALIDATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF GENESIS 1-3

This is the fifth step of the zoom lens method. The orientation of the method is now already centrifugal, since the developing meaning and/or paradigm of the dependent text demands orientation towards other parts of the text or another text(s) in order for the meaning of the dependent text to develop further.

Furthermore, according to the analysis of the narratives that Exodus 16 could potentially refer to (in Section 4.3 above), I am most interested in validating the stability of the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings and of the paradigm featured in the creation narrative in Genesis 1-3. However, in order to validate the stability of the meaning of the utterance, in this case, a validation of the stability of the paradigm featured in the utterance is essential. Subsequently, a validation of the creation narrative’s potential to function as the master narrative is needed.

4.5.1 STABILITY OF THE IMAGE OF THE PARADIGM IN GENESIS 1-3

The analysis of the paradigm featured in the creation narrative is subject/limited to the purpose of this Chapter (to show the feasibility of zoom lens method). Therefore, I find it justified at this (sixth) step of zoom lens method to decentralise my reading to the previous research/analyses of the relation between the Genesis creation narrative and other ANE creation narratives.

However, it is also important to note that this decentralisation towards other ANE narratives does not contradict the previously argued principle that C centre of meaning (the text) should always be prioritised over c’ centre of meaning (the textual variants available as predecessors of the text in focus).45 That is to say that if there was a non-canonical text to which Exodus 16 could possibly point, and

44 Independent text is the text which is seen from another (dependent) text as the text which has a developed stable image of the paradigm in which (the image of the paradigm) the meaning of the (independent) text is developed as stable.
45 See Illustration 11 above.
Genesis 1-3 (as the canonical text) to which Exodus 16 could point, the exegetical priority should be given to Genesis 1-3. However, if there is no canonical text that could be validated as the reference text to Exodus 16, the search should broaden to non-canonical texts as well.

My analysis of Genesis 1-3, in this Chapter, shows that Genesis 1 is the only other narrative (in addition to Exodus 16) that places the accent on the seven-section construct of time in its chronotope. Therefore, the reference from Exodus 16 to Genesis 1 has already been perceived. However, if Genesis 1 were also to refer to Exodus 16, as the only other narrative accentuating the seven-section construct of time, their dependence would have been mutual, echoic, without any importation of meaning or paradigm on either side (since, in that case, neither of them features a stable paradigm that could be imported).

Thus, the following two questions are sufficient to validate both the canonical place of Genesis 1 and the stability of the paradigm in the Genesis 1-3 narrative. The first is: Does Genesis 1-3 refer to Exodus 16? The second is: ‘Does Genesis 1-3 stand in a dialogue with other ANE creation narratives?’

Regarding the first question, it has already been observed earlier in this Chapter, that Genesis 1 is the only text among all the analysed texts that features an absence of layering of its chronotope, an absence of emphasis on pluriform criteria in the chronotope, and an absence of any link to a sacrifice/sacrificial system. Accordingly, starting with Genesis 2, additional features of the narrative are added to the basis provided by Genesis 1 so that the narrative develops towards the introduction of the enemy to God and the need for sacrifices/a sacrificial system. Therefore, Genesis 2 introduces layering of its chronotope and pluriform criteria in its chronotope, however there is still an absence of any conflict between chronotopes or the criteria in them. Finally, Genesis 3 introduces a breech in the harmony so that, for the first time, a conflict between representations of time and space is featured as well as a conflict between criteria in the respective chronotopes.
Accordingly, Genesis 2 is dependent on Genesis 1, in that Genesis 2 builds its chronotope on the representation already introduced and established in Genesis 1. Moreover, Genesis 3 is dependent on both Genesis 2 and (indirectly) Genesis 1, since Genesis 3 introduces new elements to the basis provided by Genesis 2 (and Genesis 1). Therefore, arguing that Genesis 1-3 imports its meaning from Exodus 16, or any other text among the canonical texts, is an argument against the logic of dependence featured so clearly in Genesis 1-3 itself. Thus, Genesis 1-3 forms a whole developed according to the dependence of Genesis 2 and Genesis 3 upon Genesis 1. However, there is still the question of the dependence of Genesis 1 to be answered.

The answer to this (second) question has, in the latter part of the twentieth century, reached the status of an undisputed observation. Namely, ever since the time of Gunkel and his observation of the parallel themes between Genesis 1-3 and Babylonian epic the dialogue/dialogism between Genesis 1 and other ANE creation narratives has been discussed in terms of how strong and what type the relation between the narratives is, not whether the relation exists.

Accordingly, parallels between Genesis 1 and, for example, the Babylonian creation narrative Enuma Elish (from latest circa 1100 BCE) could suggest that the former borrowed from the latter. More precisely, the main similarities between the two narratives are creation of light, firmament, dry land, luminaries, and the divine rest on the seventh day. However, none of the advocates of the hypothesis of Genesis 1 borrowing from Enuma Elish have denied the unique focus the former has on the representation of God as the single creator of the world.

Accordingly, the other differences between Enuma Elish and Genesis 1 are so great, whilst the similarities between them so common with other ANE creation narratives, that many conclude that there is no borrowing between the two, but rather common engagement in the conflict of ideologies regarding the origins of the world.\textsuperscript{49} Accordingly, the same can be concluded regarding the relation between Genesis 1 and the Babylonian Epic of Atrahasis (from circa 1600 BCE), as well as Egyptian creation narratives. Therefore, there are the following seventeen claims of Genesis 1-3 that have been recognised as a response to the ideological claims of the other ANE creation narratives from the end of the second millennium BCE.\textsuperscript{50}

The Genesis creation narrative is so compact that every detail in it seems to be stable, in contrast to other ANE narratives that feature a plurality of streams of their development.\textsuperscript{51}


\textsuperscript{51} This argument has been used against the so-called ‘Wortbericht’ and ‘Tatbericht’ hypotheses that tried to validate layering of the Genesis creation narrative according to what God said against what he did, according to the narrative. Accordingly, the layer describing God’s action preceded the layer of God’s ‘fiat’ utterances. For a critique see Odil Hannes Steck, \textit{Der Schöpfungsbericht der Priesterschrift: Studien zur Literarkritischen und Überlieferungsgeschichtlichen Problemattik}
In addition to the idea of monotheism, the Genesis creation narrative takes God’s existence for granted in that God’s origins are not reflected in any thought. In contrast, theogonies in other creation narratives are a common feature.

God’s word is propositional in the biblical account, in that it expresses his will in a clear, discursive manner. Conversely, the gods in the other creation narratives use magical utterances.

As analysed above, in Genesis 1-3, there is no force that would oppose God’s word/will. In contrast, theomachy is a common feature among the narratives describing gods who, for example, struggle to divide the firmament from the waters.

‘Image’ and ‘likeness’ of God were used as rationale for separation of higher and lower societal classes in Babylon and Egypt, respectively. In contrast, Genesis 1 makes a statement that humanity as a whole is created in (both) the image and likeness of God, making the creation the rationale for equality between social strata.

Free will is a gift, granted to the humans, according to Genesis 1-3. In contrast, this idea is never accentuated in the other creation narratives (and is often implicitly questioned).

Free will becomes the rationale for the presence of evil on the Earth. Accordingly, evil is not a created entity, but deviation of the creation which was good, even ‘very good’. In contrast, evil in the other creation narratives is either created or co-existent with other gods.

In addition, God’s actions and the free will granted to the humans become the rationale for the creation of humans, created to reflect the responsibility,
accountability and consistency, characteristic of God. In contrast, even the gods in other creation narratives are often described as of dubious morals.  

This mutual responsibility of both God and humans’, becomes the rationale for both the judgment upon the fallen world (on behalf of God) and maintenance and restoration of the fallen world (on behalf of both humans and God), in Genesis 1-3. In contrast, the plagues and calamities brought upon humans in the other creation narratives are often described as the ego-centred caprice of gods.

The rationale for judgment and consistent ethic in Genesis 1-3 is furthermore supported by the accent on the ethical reasons God had when he planted the tree of life. In contrast to this ethical motif of the tree of life, the other creation narratives accentuate the aesthetics of the tree of life.

Accordingly, the tree of knowledge in Genesis 1-3 receives the foremost focus, at the expense of the focus on the tree of life. Thus, morality takes priority over immortality in the biblical creation account. In contrast, the opposite is focussed upon in the other creation narratives.

The Genesis account demythologises the serpent, the waters, sun, moon, stars, and sexuality, all of which were represented as gods or semi-gods to be worshiped in the other creation narratives.

In addition, the ‘great sea monster’ Tiamat from the primordial sea of the ANE narratives is in Genesis 1.21 demythologised into a creature, equal to all the other animals God created.

The creation of man in Genesis is the pinnacle of the actual creation, and not the by-product of it, as was the case in the other creation narratives.

Even though the seven-day time construct is present in other narratives as well, it is only in the Genesis account that it is embedded in God’s own experience of

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(rest in the) time and space he had created, and in God’s decision to separate, bless, and sanctify the seventh day.\textsuperscript{53}

The rationale for the proximity between God and humans is based on God’s creating will and thus independent of the movements of any single cosmic entity. In contrast, the proximity between gods and humans is in the other narratives rationalised as influenced by the sun, moon and stars.

Finally, in contrast to other ANE creation narratives, Genesis 1-2 describes the creation process without a single word of a sacrifice or a sacrificial system.

These differences invite us to understand that the paradigm of Genesis 1-3 clearly stands in contrast and as a response to the paradigms conveyed by the other ANE creation narratives. Furthermore, the ideological claims explained above, within their context of discourse with the other ANE cosmogonies, provide answers to the previously raised questions regarding the meaning of the utterance Genesis 1-3.

4.5.2 Stability of the Meanings of the Utterance Genesis 1-3

It is important to note that the ideology of Genesis 1-3 stabilises the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of particular utterances in the narrative, as well as the meaning of the narrative as a whole. For instance, the ‘heavenly beings’ in the narrative are only ‘the bigger light’, ‘the smaller light’ and ‘the stars’. In other words, according to God’s created time and space, stars are not to be named, since he named only those parts of the chronotope that are to function as the vessels which are to be filled. Thus, the expanse is named, not the creatures which are to fill the expanse. Therefore, the idea of the cosmic bodies not being gods is supported by the logic of the creation order, cosmogony. Simply put, the cosmic bodies cannot be gods, since they are not created according to the pattern that would make them be gods (Cf. Jeremiah 10.2).

Thus, even though the narrator knew the names of the cosmic bodies (see Genesis 15.12,17; 19.23; 28.11; 32.32; 37.9), he/she could not use them, according to the message he/she wanted to convey. In other instances, the composition of the same message/meaning demanded usage of specific terms such as ‘image’ and ‘likeness’. Therefore, it made perfect sense to use the two, otherwise synonymous, terms together, since in the context of discourse, they responded to two different narratives, Babylonian and Egyptian respectively.

Consequently, the solution to the ‘missing’ name for the Sabbath is found by following the same logic of the discourse. Namely, Cassuto argued that the absence of the name Sabbath is caused by the very similar term ‘Sapattu’, the Babylonian day of the full moon (the fifteenth day of the month).

However, in the light of the previously mentioned usage of terms that do resemble the Babylonian and Egyptian gods, this argument does not hold water. More precisely, the narrator in Genesis has used the expression יָם תִּהְיֶה ‘great sea monster’ that resembles the name Tiamat. A similar play on the words and sounds has been claimed even concerning the term יָם הָאָבִיב ‘the deep, abyss’. Accordingly, I believe, there have to be additional reasons for the narrator’s choice not to use a term that would resemble the Sapattu day.

That first reason, in my opinion, can be found in the additional detail in the discourse between Genesis 1-3 and the other ANE cosmogonies. Namely, the seventh day in the Babylonian calendar was regarded as an especially negative day. The prohibition of work and sacrifices on that day supported the idea that the seventh day was indeed negative.

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55 BDB, 1072.
56 See Wenham, *Genesis 1-15*, p. 16.
57 BDB, 1062.
58 Thus, already in 1905 Hans König observed that ‘the Babylonians and Assyrians solemnized the seventh, fourteenth, twenty-first, and twenty-eighth days of the month, while, as far as we know, the only week which the Babylonians had the whole revolving year through was a week of
Thus, there was a double system of counting time in Babylon. On the one hand, the system was based on the ‘full moon day’ and resonated the name of the Sabbath. On the other hand, the system was based on the ‘evil day’ and resonated the time-structure of the Sabbath institution. In order to confront ANE cosmogonies, the biblical narrator chose to introduce a combination of both the name of the ‘full moon day’ and the time-structure of the ‘evil day’.

Therefore, in contrast to the Babylonian worship of the moon on Sapattu, within the moon-evolution based time, the narrator in Genesis 1-3 introduces the moon as a lesser light, and evades any misleading support for Sapattu by avoiding usage of the name Sabbath whilst nevertheless introducing seven-day time structure as the main time structure in the created universe. According to the same logic, the negative connotation of the seventh day in the ANE religions is in the Genesis narrative confronted with the introduction of the seventh day as the culmination of the narrative, and the first entity ever sanctified.

However, the second reason for the narrator’s choice not to use a term that would resemble the Sapattu day is in the very structure of the Genesis 1-2 creation narrative itself. Namely, whenever God separated something, in order to create a new chronotopic vessel, he named it, so that a clear distinction from other vessels and from the ‘filling-up’ created entities is unequivocal. Accordingly, if the narrative in Genesis 2.2,3 were to describe the seventh day as being divided and named, it would automatically imply that the seventh day is a new type of chronotopic vessel in general and temporal vessel in particular (like the day, night, heaven, earth and seas were). Since the seventh day is not a new temporal entity, but identical to the previous six, an addition that is blessed and sanctified, an explicit separating and naming of the seventh day would simply convey a different, unintended meaning.

five days. … This [the seventh] day was regarded by them as ‘ḫul’, which word of itself signifies evil ... and on it they particularly feared the anger of the gods.’ (Eduard König, The Bible and Babylon: Their Relationship in the History and Culture (London: Religious Tract Society, 1905), p. 61.)
Therefore, the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of the utterance of Genesis 1-3 are made stable once the discursive context and the conflict between paradigms among the ANE narratives are recognised. Accordingly, for the writer of the narrative in Exodus 16, Genesis 1-3 could definitively serve as a reference text with a stable paradigm conveyed by it and a stable meaning within the paradigm.

4.5.3 GENESIS 1-3 AS A POTENTIAL MASTER NARRATIVE

As explained in Sections 2.1.7 and 2.3.4 above, not every reference text to which a paradigmatic text refers is necessarily a master narrative. However, every master narrative is, by definition, a text with a stable meaning and stable paradigms. Accordingly, the decisive criterion for text with a stable meaning is its narrational and ideological features. Namely, a master narrative has to be compact, coherent, and consistent. In addition, it has to implicitly convey the set of beliefs about reality to which the recipients feel compelled to subscribe. In addition, every set of beliefs has its limitations as well. Therefore, the master narrative needs to be solid enough to be able to convey the limitations of the set of beliefs.

According to these findings, I argue that the narrative in Genesis 1-3 meets all of the requirements necessary for a master narrative. Accordingly, I conclude that Genesis 1-3 is the master narrative from which Exodus 16 imported the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings in order to develop and stabilise its own.

4.6 RHETORICAL FUNCTION OF THE ‘SABBATH OF THE LORD’ MOTIF

This is the sixth step of the zoom lens method. The ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif was shown to be the most problematic motif in Exodus 16, when the narrative is read on its own. Nevertheless, the same motif is shown to encapsulate the rhetorical function of the whole narrative in the wilderness of Sin. More precisely, the most distinctive claims of the creation narrative in Genesis 1 are reiterated in Exodus 16 by importation of the pragmatic, sociological and
paradigmatic meanings via the motif of the Sabbath in general and the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif, in particular. In other words, I can see that the other Sabbath-related expressions in Exodus 16 (namely, the seventh day, law, commandment, and בֶּדֶשׁ נִבְּשֵׂדֶשׂ ‘Sabbath observance’) gradually allude to the context in Genesis 1-2. Nevertheless, the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif brings that context to its conclusion, just as the narrative in Genesis 1-2 culminated in the motif of God resting in his newly separated, blessed, and sanctified seventh day.

In addition, it is understandable that the context in Exodus 16 is the context of God dealing with the congregation made up of generations brought up in Egypt, with the above explained ideologies common to ANE. Accordingly, there was no better way to reintroduce God’s ideology (and its external chronotope), then by importing to Exodus 16 the claims from the Genesis 1-3 narrative that served the same purpose at the beginning of the Bible.

Accordingly, this importation of the motif of God’s seventh day from the summit of the chiastic structure between the two representations of the biblical cosmogony (Genesis 2.2,3), is validated by the goal of bringing to culmination the desert-type narratives in Exodus 15.22-17.7. Thus, the manna narrative in general and the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif in particular serve the purpose of bringing the two parts of the Scriptures (Genesis 1-2 and Exodus 15.22-17.7) into the dialog/ism with clear ideological purpose.

Therefore, at this sixth step of the zoom lens method, I can conclude that an allusion is utilised between the paradigmatic text in Exodus 16 and the master narrative in Genesis 1-3, in which the rhetorical function of B=A type enables further development and stabilisation of the paradigm and pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings in the paradigmatic text.

4.7 POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE READING

This is the last (seventh) step of the zoom lens method, where the decentralisation of the meaning developed so far extends back to the initial questions regarding

59 BDB, 992.
the text (the questions raised before centralisation was applied). However, decentralisation is to be applied even further, so that the meaning reaches the contemporary recipient/reader of the text, as well. Thus, at this step the personal contentment of the recipient is likely to be challenged, since the meaning of the newly established paradigm in the text is likely to address the reader as well. However, as mentioned earlier, many of the conclusions technically belonging to this step had to be explained earlier in this Chapter, so that the initial questions have now found answers, the last answer being the reason for the sudden expansion of the terms related to the Sabbath, without God pronouncing them in the narrative in Exodus 16.

Nevertheless, there are also many more general issues which are likely to be affected by the newly stabilised paradigm and pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings in Exodus 16. The first on the list, I suggest, is the issue of the canon. This reading supports the idea of the consistency of canonical ideas not only on the level of sociological meaning, but also on the level of the (biblical) paradigm (paradigmatic meaning). However, it is important to note that this consistency was not achieved at the expense of polyphony in the narrative. In fact, the opposite was the case, the narrator has utilised every single polyphonic element in order to convey the link between Exodus 16 and Genesis 1-2.

Furthermore, this compactness of the canon, with this ideological coherence between its parts, challenges the reader on the level of applied ideology in everyday practice. More precisely, every ideology is part of the metaphysical aspect of the paradigm. Accordingly, faith-life imagery, charged with the metaphysics and visualised via rituals becomes the primary source for signs of communal identity. Consequently, it seems to be logical that the consistency of the faith-life imagery should be evaluated. Namely, the reader should rightly evaluate any changes of the faith-life imagery (ritual praxis). In other words, in the situation that demands a change of the faith-life imagery, the criteria for the change have to be in accordance with the constant ideology.
Accordingly, the reader should be challenged by the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of the text, based on the addressivity of the text as an utterance. Nevertheless, as observed in the previous Chapter, the addressivity is subject to the reader’s personal choice of faith. In other words, it is the reader who has the free will to open and close his/her consciousness towards the ideological claims found in the text. Accordingly, it is the reader who chooses whether to subscribe to the belief offered by the text, or not.

My understanding is that each of the seventeen claims offered by Genesis 1 and imported into Exodus 16 has the potential to make changes in this world. In particular, these seventeen claims will firstly have practical implications on the personal life of the believer, as well as on his/her appropriation of: knowledge, her-/himself, health, life, work, nature, sexuality, material wealth and death. Secondly, these changes in the consciousness of the believer will affect his/her understanding of the ‘co-subduers’ of the earth and the animals in the external chronotope we are created to share. Accordingly, the ideology will have practical implications on the development of society. Thus, in times of challenged equality within societies of the world, this seems to be a promising solution to achieve genuine democracy in the world. Finally, these changes will affect the religious life of the believer. In particular, his/her religious practice will utilise faith-life imagery in practice, and, accordingly, develop his/her communal identity.

4.8 CONCLUSION

In this Chapter, I have applied the zoom lens method to the narrative in Exodus 16. Accordingly, the rhetorical and textual features of the narrative led me to analyse the relations between the narrative in Exodus 16 and narratives in Deuteronomy 34; Numbers 11; Exodus 12 and Genesis 1-3. Consequently, an echoic relation between Exodus 16 and Deuteronomy 34 was validated. In addition to these echoic relations, further research was suggested towards validation of an allusive importation of pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of Genesis 1-3 into the narratives in Exodus 12 and Numbers 11.
Additionally, an allusive importation of both the paradigm, and pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings from Genesis 1-3 into Exodus 16 was validated. This validation revealed a distinction between the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif and other Sabbath-related terms, meaning that the former has the potential to convey the context of Genesis 1-3 in the most compact and explicit way.

According to this extremely limited explicitness of the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif in Exodus 16, I am drawing a conclusion about the way the narrative texts were used in order to utilise the allusion. Namely, none of the analysed texts used exact markers of the relation of dependence between the texts. In other words, all of them used only implicit dependence markers, with the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif being the closest to an explicit marker. However, even this motif was implicit in its nature, since just the idea of holiness of the Sabbath in Exodus 16.23 could be argued to be an explicit link. However, all of the analysed narratives were shown to feature implicit dependence markers, which conveyed the dependence in an effective way.

This conclusion confirms Klingler’s reasoning that there is a considerable difference between the means available to a narrative to utilise a relation of dependence, and the means available to a text in other genres. The same conclusion should also have been expected on the basis of Bakhtin’s theory of genres as specific utterances, which prefer specific types of chronotopes, and accordingly acquire specific stylistic elements for conveying their meaning. Accordingly, I assume that the Biblical writers used a different way of developing and conveying dependencies among legal texts that make use of the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif. Study of those texts (Exodus 20.8-11; 31.15-17; 35.2; Leviticus 23.3, 38; 25.2, 4; and Deuteronomy 5.14) should be undertaken as a continuation of my research in this thesis.

60 See Klingler, pp. 130-31, 243.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

In Chapter 1, this thesis focused on the vicious circle in biblical interpretation according to non-conduit models of communication. I proposed that the possible solution to the problem is to develop a theory of meaning which could analyse the process of interpretation as a matter of (de)centralisation motivated by the reader’s (dis)satisfaction with his/her paradigm. I also explained my reasons for choosing Kuhn’s theory of paradigms, Bakhtin’s theory of literature, and Sperber and Wilson’s theory of relevance as the theoretical framework for developing my theory of meaning. I have drawn conclusions regarding this initial choice of my theoretical framework.

In Chapter 2, I introduced the three theories (of paradigms, literature, and relevance) as well as the tools these theories provide. I compared and contrasted those tools with the purpose of elucidating the common elements in the theories. Based on those common features, I tuned/adapted those theories to develop a theoretical whole which I could use as the basis for my theory of meaning.

In Chapter 3, I developed the theory of meaning (i.e. the theory of interpretative relativity) and a model of that theory (i.e. the zoom lens model). According to the theory and its model, one can distinguish between the textual meaning, pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of any given text. According to my theory and model, only the textual meaning is stable, while the latter three change as the reader’s paradigm changes. In this sense, cognitive acts of centralisation and decentralisation guide the reader to appropriate the textual meaning, as well as the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings in a given context. More precisely, the cognitive process from centralisation to decentralisation is facilitated by the textual clues of relations of dependence between the text in the reader’s focus and other texts, biblical and non-biblical.

Accordingly, the reader’s appropriation of the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings is not stable, since they are a product of the reader’s cognitive dynamics (cognitive movements towards and away from the text and other centres of meaning). In this sense, there is no intrinsic stability of meaning.
on the level of pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings. Instead, every reading is indeed a cognitive journey.

In this sense, every text can be read anew, based on the impact of the cognitive challenges the reader has experienced since the previous reading. Every new reading is a cognitive journey which effects the later readings.

However, I also conclude that the stability of the textual meaning is a compelling factor in forming the reader’s cognitive universe. More precisely, if the reader can experience the attractive force of the cognitive field of gravity of the text, the reader will experience non-textual centres of meaning as secondary, subject to the textual.

This precedence of the textual centres of meaning does not imply that the other non-textual centres of meaning do not affect the reading. In fact, their attractiveness is directly proportional to the lack of attractiveness of the textual centres of meaning. The less the text attracts the reader, the more attractive other centres of meaning appear to be. This is the most obvious in the special case of my theory of meaning, when the reader cannot approach the text on the level of its pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings. In that case, the attractiveness of other centres of meaning is not jeopardised by the attractiveness of the textual centres of meaning. In that special case, the non-textual centres of meaning govern the reader’s perception of pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of the text.

In addition, I briefly reviewed the methods of interpretation proposed since the time of Enlightenment. I grouped some exemplary methods according to their sensitivity to cognitive gravity of centres of meaning. I also showed that there is a correlation between a method’s limited sensitivity to cognitive gravity and the irritants the method is unable to resolve. I concluded that the method, which is in harmony with my theory of meaning, has to resort to a dynamic change of sensitivity to different centres, where the dynamic process should start from the gravity of the text as a centre of meaning. As part of the conclusion, I also
proposed the seven key steps of my method which combine centralisation and decentralisation of the meaning in the process of interpretation.

In Chapter 4, I utilised my zoom lens method whilst reading the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif in Exodus 16. My findings reveal that the method is feasible in that it provides the reader with the tools needed for appropriating the textual, pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of the motif in the given text. My findings confirm that there is a clear relation of dependence between the text in Exodus 16 and that of Genesis 1-3. Based on this dependence of Exodus 16 on the text in Genesis, I drew conclusions regarding the pragmatic and paradigmatic meanings of the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif.

Moreover, one of the results of the reading were a validation of the findings of Klingler’s analysis of the narratives in the Bible. Namely, my conclusions confirm that the tools utilised by texts of the same genre are most always on the level of implications and allusions, as opposed to the tools that express dependence in a far more explicit way (e.g. paraphrase, citation, quotation …).

In addition, my reading of the meaning of the given text in Exodus 16 did not bring about any change in my initial presuppositions, that is my initial set of questions regarding the entire enquiry. According to those questions, the purpose of reading was to find an explanation of how the text can affect my understanding of my world and time. I found a satisfactory answer and all the challenges I experienced during the enquiry proved solvable, within the initial paradigm.

Accordingly, I conclude that this reading of Exodus 16, as well as the research done in this thesis as a whole, has not brought about change of my initial presuppositions. However, my theory of meaning clarifies and predicts when that is possible, but is not the purpose of this thesis. I can conclude, in line with my theory and the findings in this thesis, that if my reading of Exodus 16 did not lead me towards a master narrative in another textual centre of meaning, I would have been much more inclined to search for other master narratives in textual and non-textual sources of meaning.
I now draw additional conclusions concerning the potential effect these findings can have on scholarship in the future. The conclusions are related to the following six fields of enquiry in which the findings of this thesis can be applied: first, judicial interpretation, second, history of interpretation, third, positivist and post-phenomenological interpretation, fourth, theories of meaning in the area of signed languages, fifth, relation between quantitative and qualitative research, and sixth, development of denominational identities in postpositivism. This list is not extensive, but rather exemplary.

Firstly, in this thesis, I applied my theory of meaning to the narrative in Exodus 16. Using the same approach to legal texts with the same literary motif (i.e. the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif in Exodus 20.8-11; 31.15-17; 35.2; Leviticus 23.3, 38; 25.2, 4; Deuteronomy 5.14) will lay the foundation for applying my theory of meaning to the sphere of judicial interpretation. This research will also test the flexibility and universality of my theory of meaning.

Secondly, I did not focus my research on the history of interpretation before the time of Enlightenment. However, the findings in this thesis suggest that it is possible to analyse one’s interpretation by focusing on the centres of meaning that, that interpretation was associated with, just as I have done, to a limited extent, by reviewing the shifts in the history of interpretation after the time of Enlightenment. Consequently, it should be possible to reassess the history of interpretation and philosophy of language as the history of centralisation and decentralisation in interpretative paradigms. In other words, one could analyse movements in philosophy and biblical studies and compare them as regards their centralisation on a given centre of meaning, likewise from the earlier periods in history.

For example, in philosophy in general and philosophy of language in particular, one could analyse the sequence of turns from the so-called ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy, the subsequent rise of modern linguistics, and finally the speech-act theory as a reaction to the previous movements. In this example, the ‘linguistic turn’ is usually understood as the shift of the methodologies in philosophy from
those based on the ‘mind–world’ relation to those based on the ‘language–world’ relation. However, I suggest that the shift could also be interpreted as the transition from methodologies focused on the context associated with A centre (religious ideas, systems) to the context related to C centre (the text itself) on Illustrations 7 and 11 above. In this sense, Saussure’s approach to language, and the modern linguistics advocated by Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) are just examples of extreme centralisation on the C centre of meaning. Furthermore, as a reaction to the previous focus, the so-called speech-act theory centralises interpretation on either B centre (the author) or D centre (the ancient first recipient).

Thirdly, in this thesis, I directed my research in accordance with postpositivist presuppositions and my particular theoretical frame. I suggest that a comparison with results acquired when considering the same or very similar postpositivist presuppositions, but with an alternative conceptual structure will contribute to a better understanding of the vicious circle in biblical research. Thus, on the one hand, I suggest future research be directed within a framework incorporating the following postpositivist theories: theory of the growth of knowledge in line with the theories of Popper, Lakatos or Barbour, and far side pragmatic theories in line with Grice, John R. Searle (1932-) or Stephen C. Levinson (1947-). If needed, one can also utilise methods for close reading of texts in line with for example David Kaplan (1933-) or Robert C. Stalnaker (1940-).

On the other hand, since my findings show that the reader’s satisfaction plays a critical role in interpretation, I suggest that further research is directed towards affective approaches to matters of interpretation. More precisely, I suggest that my findings be compared and contrasted with, for example, readings which implement the theories of Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) and Félix Guatarri (1930-1992) (i.e. their immanent philosophy and ‘body without organs’ approach). I

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suggest that there may be ways to determine that through the theoretical framework of Deleuze and Guatarri, it is possible to see epistemology and phenomenology on the one hand, and post-phenomenology on the other hand, as a whole. The essence of the whole is, I suggest, the reader’s affective experience in general, and his/her satisfaction in particular.

Fourthly, I believe that my findings can be used in the study of signed languages. Namely, my theory of meaning is suitable for interpreting the text as a speech act in the area of both spoken and signed languages. The most crucial element in my theory of meaning (i.e. the recipient’s satisfaction) applies to both domains. Furthermore, my theory of meaning is based on context as a cognitive space/sphere. This idea of the cognitive space, is in close proximity to the speech act in signed languages, where the use of the signing space is essential for establishing the cognitive context. I suggest that further research be undertaken on this assumption, providing a foundation for the better understanding of the vicious circle in interpretation in both spoken and signed languages. The likely outcome would be understanding spoken and signed languages as a whole.

Fifthly, my theory of meaning can be further tested by using it in the quantitative enquiry. In other words, the theory should be applied in reading texts of the analytical scientific genre. Sensitivity to the paradigm in which a set of data is provided is the objective of scientific enquiry, often associated with quantitative research. If my theory of meaning is relevant to genres related to the quantitative enquiry, the findings can support the view in which qualitative and quantitative research are one entity.

Finally, I conclude that there is a potential impact my distinction between faith (i.e. the choice to believe) and belief (i.e. a given tenet/system of ideas to which one subscribes) can have in the light of the findings in this thesis. Specifically, this distinction can impact the realm of one’s personal affiliation with a given denomination related to the Bible. If the acceptance into the denomination is based on the matter of faith, is it easier or more difficult to maintain the faith in the various interpretive paradigms (i.e. positivist/modernist, constructivist,
critical theory, or poststructural paradigms)? How likely is it that one’s interpretive paradigm will affect his/her choice to join a given denomination (e.g. Lutheran, Anglican, Catholic, Seventh-day Adventist, etc.)? Is the nature of the choice in any way different within the of branches of Judaism (e.g. Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, or Reconstructionist)?

In this sense, I believe that my theory of meaning would be useful in the development of denominational identities. The findings in this thesis support the conclusion that there should be a contrast between the conversion in terms of paradigm shift and the conversion in terms of one’s mindset. Therefore, I suggest that the former be called the cognitive conversion, and the latter the spiritual conversion.

If this distinction is not applied in the process of the development of denominational identities, every new paradigm shift on a communal level (e.g. the Western society/culture) will result in the denominations established in one of the former paradigms, becoming incompatible with the need for nurturing faith in the new paradigm. This conclusion might explain why some denominations with their roots in the 19th century – positivism function well in the cultures/communities which still entertain presuppositions of that interpretative paradigm. However, the same conclusion might clarify the reasons why such denominations have difficulties nurturing faith in the parts of the world where the majority of the society entertains postpositivist/dialogical presuppositions.

In the light of my findings in this thesis, it appears that many current issues related to denominational identity, in general, resonate with the problems of the first Christians. The age-old question in many denominations is whether postpositivists who choose faith need to become positivists/modernists, to be accepted by God as saved Christians? My findings in this thesis suggest that the same force that compels positivists to a satisfactory interpretation of the Bible also compels the postpositivists. In the final analysis, we all search for the meaning that is in harmony with our personal pathway from irritants to satisfaction.
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Appendix A: Display of Illustrations

Illustration 1: Lukic’s Circular Reasoning Characteristic for the Normal Science Mode

1. Metaphysical Aspect

has to make sense within the context of

3. Method/Problem-solving Aspect

develops a disciplinary matrix which provides the context for

2. Sociological Aspect

basic epistemic context for
Illustration 2: Lukic’s Kuhnian Paradigm and its Aspects

1. Metaphysical Aspect
   - Set of beliefs about reality which is not made explicit

2. Sociological Aspect
   - Group of practitioners trained within the context of a particular metaphysical aspect, which develops a concrete disciplinary matrix within its limitations

3. Methodological/Problem-solving Aspect
   - Concrete problem-solutions produced by the group of practitioners which tacitly carry the metaphysical commitments of that group
Illustration 3: Lukic’s Inverted Dynamics of the Normal and Extraordinary Science Modes
Illustration 4: Lukic's Manifestations of the Metaphysical Aspect of a Paradigm and its Influence on the Sociological Aspect

Master Narrative
(narrational manifestation of the metaphysical aspect, which states its limitations in story form)

Ritual
(visible manifestation of a master narrative and a symbol of communal identity)

1. Metaphysical Aspect

2. Sociological Aspect
Illustration 5: Adaptation of Lukic’s Manifestations of the Metaphysical Aspect of a Paradigm and its Influence on the Sociological Aspect

Illustration 6: Barton’s Centres of Meaning
Illustration 7: Five Centres of Meaning

A. Historical Events or Theological Ideas

B. Author(s)

C. Text

D. Ancient First Recipient

E. Contemporary Recipient

Illustration 8: Centres of Meaning after Application of Bakhtinian Theory

A' – Historical Events/Theological Ideas

A – Image of Historical Events/Theological Ideas

(Eventually Canonised)
Scriptures with Meta Narrative and Image of the Scriptural Paradigm

C

C' – Scriptural Variants

B – Image of Ancient Author(s)/Editor(s)

D – Image of First Recipients

E – Image of Contemporary Recipients

B' – Ancient Author/Editor

D' – First Recipients

E' – Contemporary Recipients
Illustration 9: Klingler’s Intertextual Relation

Intertextuality

Intertextual Dependence
- Diachronically focused.
- Concerned with dependence.

Textual Dependence
- Concerned with the rhetorical appeal of a text to something contained in a previous text.
- Contributes to meaning of developing text via appeal to previous text.

Text Dependence
- Concerned with logical dependence of the whole of one text upon the whole of a previous text.
- Based on or builds upon a previous text.

Intertextual Relation
- Synchronically and semiotically focused.
- Concerned with interrelation, not dependence.

Literary Reference
- Relates to providing the identity of a person, place, or thing in a previous text or the current text.

Literary Citation
- Relates to the location of meaning in a previous text.

Literary Quotation
- Relates to the word for word validation of meaning via a previous text.

Literary Paraphrase
- Relates to the paraphrastic validation of meaning via a previous text.

Literary Allusion
- Relates to the importation of meaning from a previous text.

Echo
- Terms or phrases originating in a text that has become colloquial in meaning and used in other texts.
Illustration 10: Adaptation of Klingler’s Intertextual Relation: Intercontextuality

Relation of monophonic dependence, resembling only one stable meaning and having (sufficient) dependence markers.

Thus, the context is narrowed into one relation of dependence, taking place either within a centre of meaning (e.g., biblical canon, sociological context of the first recipients, sociological context of a contemporary recipient...) or with the relation of dependence taking place over borders of a single centre of meaning in the context between two single centres of meaning so that the context is still stable, being fixed between those two centres of meaning.

If the relation of monophonic dependence is in a written context, it is called intertextuality. Thus, intertextuality always takes place with dependence markers pointing to a previous part of the same text or to a text from an earlier time.

Forms of intertextuality are thus: literary reference, literary citation, literary quotation, literary paraphrase, and literary allusion.

Literary allusion is a literary device utilized by an author whereby allusive textual markers are placed into the alluding text (i.e., developing literary context) in order to activate meaning in a text previously alluded to (i.e., the stable meaning of a previous text) for the rhetorical function of importing that meaning into the alluding text in order to assist in the development of the author of the alluding text’s intended meaning.

Relation of polyphonic dependence, resembling many stable meanings and being without (sufficient) dependence markers.

Thus, the context remains broad enough to accommodate more than one relation of dependence taking place across any number of centres of meaning and lacking (sufficient) dependence markers.

Echo with only few dependence markers, leaving the meaning vague and unstable.
Illustration 11: Centres of Meaning after Application of Bakhtinian- and Relevance Theory Combined

a' – Historical Events/Theological Ideas

A – Image of Historical Events/Theological Ideas

C

(Ultimately Canonised) Scriptures with Meta Narrative and Image of the Scriptural Paradigm

C' – Scriptural Variants

B – Image of Ancient Author(s)/Editor(s)

b' – Ancient Author/Editor

D – Image of First Recipients
d' – First Recipients

E – Image of Contemporary Recipients
e' – Contemporary Recipients
Illustration 12: The Master Narrative as the Centre of Cognitive Gravity

Legend:

- Master narrative as the centre of cognitive gravity
- Worldview of others i.e. public formulation of the paradigm
- Mindset of the reader i.e. private articulation of the paradigm

Force of attraction in the field of cognitive gravity
Illustration 13: Angle of View, Centres of Meaning, and Relations within the Field of Cognitive Gravity

Legend:

Position of the Camera

A) Centre of Meaning: Image of Historical Events/Theological Ideas
B) Centre of Meaning: Image of Ancient Author(s)/Editor(s) and Their Worldviews
C) Centre of Meaning: Scriptures with Meta Narrative and Its Image of Paradigm
D) Centre of Meaning: Image of Ancient First Recipients and Their Worldviews
E) Centre of Meaning: Image of Contemporary Recipients and Their Worldviews

→ Line of Potential Dependence on A)
→ Line of Potential Dependence on B)
→ Line of Potential Dependence on C)
→ Line of Potential Dependence on D)
→ Line of Potential Dependence on E)

--- Line of Potential Relevance
**Illustration 14: Angle of View with Different Contexts**

Legend:
- **Position of the Camera**
- **A** A) Centre of Meaning: Image of Historical Events/Theological Ideas
- **B** B) Centre of Meaning: Image of Ancient Author(s)/Editor(s) and Their Worldviews
- **C** C) Centre of Meaning: Scriptures with Meta Narrative and Its Image of Paradigm
- **D** D) Centre of Meaning: Image of Ancient First Recipients and Their Worldviews
- **E** E) Centre of Meaning: Image of Contemporary Recipients and Their Worldviews
- **Line of Potential Dependence on A)**
- **Line of Potential Dependence on B)**
- **Line of Potential Dependence on C)**
- **Line of Potential Dependence on D)**
- **Line of Potential Dependence on E)**
- **SR1-SR3**: Sphere of Relevance (Context), from Narrowest (SR1) to Widest (SR3)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predict</th>
<th>Understand</th>
<th>Emancipate</th>
<th>Break</th>
<th>Deconstruct</th>
<th>Next???????</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Positivist</td>
<td>*Interpretive</td>
<td>*Critical</td>
<td>*Poststructural Postmodern</td>
<td>*Neopositivist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mixed Methods</td>
<td>Naturalistic</td>
<td>Neomarxist</td>
<td>Postcolonial</td>
<td>Neopragmatist</td>
<td>Citizen Inquiry</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Constructivist</td>
<td>&lt;Feminist&gt;</td>
<td>Postcritical</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Phenomenological</td>
<td>Critical Race Theory</td>
<td>Posthumanist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Participatory Dialogic Policy Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnographic</td>
<td>Praxis-oriented</td>
<td>Post-Fordist</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Posttheory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic Interactionist</td>
<td>&lt;Freirian Participatory Action Research</td>
<td>Queery Theory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Post-post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretive Mixed Methods</td>
<td>Gay &amp; Lesbian Theories</td>
<td>Disability Studies</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Critical Ethnography</td>
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<td>&lt;Discourse Analysis</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Race-feminist Poststructuralism (Wanda Pillow)</td>
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<td>Postparadigmatic Diaspora (John Caputo)</td>
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<td>Post-everything (Fred Erickson)</td>
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</table>

*Indicates the term most commonly used  < Indicates cross paradigm movement
Illustration 16: Apparent Change of Distance Representing Cognitive Gravity

Ratio R1 with the camera at the minimum distance and zoom at 25 mm

Ratio R2 with the camera at the medium distance and zoom at 472 mm

Ratio R3 with the camera at the maximum distance and zoom at 600 mm
Illustration 17: Cognitive Gravity at Relative Distance, Ratio 1, Zoom of 25 mm

Legend:
- Position of the Camera
- S1 Distance between the Camera and the Subject (5 cm)
- B1 Distance between the Camera and the Background (105 cm)
- A) Centre of Meaning: Image of Historical Events/Theological Ideas
- B) Centre of Meaning: Image of Ancient Author(s)/Editor(s)
- C) Centre of Meaning: Scriptures with Meta Narrative and Its Image of Paradigm
- D) Centre of Meaning: Image of Ancient First Recipients
- E) Centre of Meaning: Image of Contemporary Recipients

Ratio Background to Subject:
\[ \frac{R1}{B1/S1} = \frac{105}{5} = 21 \]
Illustration 18: Cognitive Gravity at Relative Distance, Ratio 2, Zoom of 379 mm

Legend:
- Position of the Camera
- S2 Distance between the Camera and the Subject
- B2 Distance between the Camera and the Background
- A) Centre of Meaning: Image of Historical Events/Theological Ideas
- B) Centre of Meaning: Image of Ancient Author(s)/Editor(s)
- C) Centre of Meaning: Scriptures with Meta Narrative and Its Image of Paradigm
- E) Centre of Meaning: Image of Contemporary Recipients

Ratio Background to Subject:

R2 = B2/S2
Illustration 19: Cognitive Gravity at Relative Distance, Ratio 3, Zoom of 600 mm

Legend:
- Position of the Camera
- S3: Distance between the Camera and the Subject (300 cm)
- B3: Distance between the Camera and the Background (400 cm)
- B: Centre of Meaning: Image of Ancient Author(s)/Editor(s)
- C: Centre of Meaning: Scriptures with Meta Narrative and Its Image of Paradigm
- E: Centre of Meaning: Image of Contemporary Recipients

Ratio Background to Subject:
R3 = B3/S3 = 400/300 = 1.3
Illustration 20: Wenham’s Conglomeration of Sources According to Documentary Hypothesis

Illustration 21: Dating of the Sources to Pentateuch/Torah

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Date bce</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
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<td>E</td>
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<td>P</td>
<td>500</td>
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<td>JEDP</td>
<td>450</td>
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Illustration 22: Lamp and Torch in front of the Text as a Canonised Utterance

Semiotics and Structuralism (circa 1915–)

Ferdinand de Saussure, Vladimir Propp, Claude Lévi-Strauss (A. J. Greimas and Gérard Genette)

Focus on the structure as a whole instead of on small details. The small details owe their meaning to the structure of the whole. The structure is perceived as critical, even ideal, universal and stable.

‘Distant reading’ more critical than ‘close reading’ – most sensitive to the plot of a narrative, from which centralisation is applied, without deconstruction.

Semiotics and Dialogism (circa 1963–)

Mikhail Bakhtin and his ‘circle’

Focus on smallest elements of dialogism, i.e., dialogical overtones. Dialogical elements are tools for authoring of meaning in a fluid dialogism between author, literature (object) and the recipient. The dialogical overtones are perceived as most critical, in shaping the dialogue in its rhetorical/literary form.

‘Close reading’ more critical than ‘distant reading’ – most sensitive to dialogic details, from which decentralisation is applied, without deconstruction.

Lamp in front of the Text

1969. Edmund Leach
1974. Fernando Belo

Semiotics and Deconstruction (circa 1967–)

Jacques Derrida

Aims at exposing presupposed contradictions and internal oppositions in a text. The text is rendered by deconstruction (and afterwards by decentralisation).

The outcome is semiotics without a criterion of probability. Derrida claims his deconstruction not to be method, nor critique, analysis or type of post-structuralism. A hardly controllable decentralisation.

Torch in front of the Text

‘Marginal’, ‘deconstructed’ and/or ‘dialogical’ readings

1969. James Muilenburg
1978. Phyllis Trible
1981. Robert Alter
1985. Meir Sternberg

Bakhtinian readings of the Bible, with (at least fairly) controlled decentralisation
### Appendix B: Glossary

**Accentuation**: a literary technique that utilises dialogical overtones as accents in an utterance, and thus narrows the scope of possible meanings the utterance can convey and highlights the direction of the utterance. (See also *Canonisation, Direction, Heteroglossia* and *Re-accentuation*.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Act of authoring</strong>: the process of developing images (e.g. the author, voices in the text, their motivations, intentions, aims, mindsets, worldviews, as well as of paradigm, recipients of the text) conveyed by the dependence markers in the text. (See also <em>Image of a voice</em> and <em>Utterance</em>.)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Addressivity of every utterance</strong>: a measure of the effect the relation between the addressee and the author will have on the choice of genre of the author's utterance. (See also <em>Finalisation, Expressiveness, Personal proximity</em> and <em>Utterance</em>.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aim</strong>: the fundamental direction of a person’s life, or some fairly stable subset of that fundamental direction. (See also <em>Master narrative, Intention, Motivation, Mindset</em>, and <em>Worldview</em>.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Allusion (literary)</strong>: a literary device expressing a relation of a monophonic dependence. It is a literary device utilised by an author whereby allusive textual markers are placed into the alluding text (i.e. developing literary context) in order to activate meaning in a text previously alluded to (i.e. the stable meaning of a previous text) for the rhetorical function of importing that meaning into the alluding text in order to assist in the development of the author of the alluding text’s intended meaning. (See also <em>Citation, Paraphrase, Reference</em> and <em>Quotation</em>.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Allusive dependence</strong>: a one-directional relation between a dependent text (with a developing unstable meaning, but a developed stable paradigm) and an independent text, where there is only one, dominant relation of dependence, emphasised by dependence markers in the dependent text. Thus, one stable meaning can be delineated to be exclusively resembled in the stabilised meaning of the dependent alluding text.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Alluding text**: a text with a developing unstable meaning, but a developed stable paradigm as well as markers of a monophonic dependence. (See also *Allusive dependence, Echoic text, Referential text, and Paradigmatic text*.)

**Anomaly**: is an irritant which causes frustration. (See *Irritant frustrating and Irritant challenging*.)

**Belief**: a tenet to which a person of faith can subscribe. In contrast to the one type of faith, different beliefs have different tenets, so that there is always a plethora of possible tenets/beliefs to which a person of faith can subscribe. (See also *Faith*.)

**Canonisation (of an utterance)**: the final stage of the process of interaction of centrifugal and centripetal forces in formation of an utterance, resulting in blurring of heteroglossity of its voices and making its form and accentuation rigid. (See also *Accentuation, Direction, Heteroglossia, Re-accentuation*.)

**Carnival genre**: the form of utterances, which features a horizon of expectations, brought on an utterance that is used with the purpose of developing a grotesque representation of the world, in which the world is in its unfinished form, with all boundaries in the world under development and movable. (See also *Genre, and Grotesque realism*.)

**Centralisation**: the cognitive act of reconsidering the same expression as part of a narrower context. (See also *Decentralisation* and *Context*.)

**Centre of meaning**: a source of information available to the recipient of an utterance regarding specific characteristics of the utterance. (See also *Utterance, and Context*.)

**Chronotope**: a unique representation of a composition of time and space as one whole in an utterance. This composition is characteristic for a specific sphere of communication, and with the possibility of featuring several layers of time and space in the same utterance, representing, thus, external, formal and internal chronotopes (i.e. the
author’s actual chronotope, the one of the writing as a whole and the one associated with the voices within the written document). (See also *Image, Mise en abyme* and *Sphere of communication*.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citation (literary): a direct literary marker by which the author points the reader to the referenced text. (See also <em>Allusion, Paraphrase, Quotation, Reference</em>.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive gravity: The attractive force of irritants which guides, either via challenge to satisfaction within the paradigm or frustration to satisfaction in another paradigm.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communicative intention: the author’s intention to inform the audience of his/her informative intention. (See also <em>Ostensive-inferential communication, Informative intention</em> and <em>Ostensive stimulus</em>.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context: a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to communication in general and a specific utterance in particular. The presuppositions are concerned with relations of relevance between the utterance and one or more centres of meaning of the utterance. (The centres of meaning are one or more sources of information about specific characteristics of the utterance, available to the recipient of the utterance). (See also <em>Centre of meaning.</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversion cognitive: A paradigm shift as a response to a frustrating irritant (i.e. anomaly). It is the process which causes changes in the metaphysical aspect of a paradigm, and thus is in fact, a shift of the paradigm itself. The process starts with frustrating irritants in one’s paradigm. These irritants call for shift of the person’s motivation, intention, mindset, worldview and paradigm. If no satisfaction with the irritant is found in the old paradigm, the person is forced to look for satisfaction in a new paradigm. This paradigm shift can take place on both personal and communal spheres. (See also <em>Conversion spiritual, Revolutionary science, Paradigm, Worldview</em> and <em>Mindset.</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversion spiritual: a response to a challenging irritant. The decision to accept the challenge of the irritant to improve personal motivation, intention and mindset. (See also <em>Conversion cognitive, Irritant challenging, Irritant frustrating.</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Decentralisation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dependence</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Dependence markers</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Dependent text</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dialogic(al) overtones</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dialogic(al)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dialogism</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Direction (of an utterance)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Double-voicedness</strong></td>
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</table>
**Grotesque realism, Heteroglossia, Polyphony.**

**Echo:** the (only) device expressing a relation of a polyphonic dependence. (See also *Polyphonic dependence.*)

**Echoic dependence:** see *Polyphonic dependence.*

**Echoic text:** a text with a developing unstable meaning, and a developing unstable paradigm as well as with markers of the polyphonic dependence, but without any marker of a monophonic dependence. (See also *Alluding text, Paradigmatic text, Polyphonic dependence,* and *Referential text.*)

**Expressiveness of every utterance:** a measure of the capability of the utterance to convey emotional evaluations of the speaker, regarding the topic discussed. (See also *Addressivity, Finalisation, Personal proximity,* and *Utterance.*)

**External chronotope:** a specific construct of time and space on the level of the metaphysical aspect of the author’s paradigm. (See also *Formal chronotope, Internal chronotope,* and *Chronotope.*)

**Faith:** a cognitive choice of willingness to be open towards a belief. Belief is, in addition, the tenet to which a person of faith can subscribe. Faith can be only of one type, whilst every individual can have it to a certain degree, or simply lack it. In contrast to the one type of faith, different beliefs have different tenets, so that there is always a plethora of possible tenets/beliefs to which a person of faith can subscribe. (See also *Belief.*)

**Finalisation of every utterance:** a measure of the possibility of responding to the utterance, based on semantic exhaustiveness of the theme of the speech, the speaker’s plan and generic forms of finalisation. (See also *Addressivity, Expressiveness, Personal proximity,* and *Utterance.*)

**Formal chronotope:** an artistic construct of time and space in an utterance as a whole, used with the purpose of conveying an image of the world in the utterance. (See also *Chronotope, External chronotope,* and *Internal chronotope.*)

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**Generic forms**: see *Genre*.

**Genre**: a relatively stable form of utterances which features a specific horizon of expectations, brought on an utterance by the specific sphere of communication the utterance is used in, and by the chronotope presented in the utterance. (See also *Carnival genre*, *Chronotope*, and *Sphere of communication*.)

**Grotesque realism**: a representation of the world developed according to the presuppositions that the world is in its unfinished form, with all boundaries in the world under development and movable. (See also *Carnival genre* and *Genre*.)

**Hermeneutic circle**: see *Vicious circle*.

**Hermeneutical model**: metaphorical presentation of a hermeneutical agenda. (See also *Model* and *Type of hermeneutical model*.)

**Heteroglossia**: the literary phenomenon which utilises the ability of voices to use (adapt to) different styles of speech according to the context of the discourse. (See also *Canonisation*, *Chronotope*, *Double-voicedness*, *Grotesque realism*, and *Polyphony*.)

**Image**: a subjective comprehension and depiction of reality. (See also *Image of a voice*, and *Chronotope*.)

**Image of a voice** (e.g. the author’s voice): an image of a voice (consciousness) which is created by the author of the utterance himself/herself, but nevertheless, always more or less different from the real person (the real author) The images of voices represent every voice in both internal and formal chronotopes of the utterance. (See also *Act of authoring*.)

**Independent text**: the text which is seen from another (dependent) text as the text which has a developed stable image of the paradigm in which (the image of the paradigm) the meaning of the (independent) text is developed as stable. (See also *Dependent text* and *Master narrative*.)

**Informative intention**: the author’s intention to inform the audience of something. (See
also **Ostensive-inferential communication, Communicative intention** and **Ostensive stimulus.**

**Intention**: a specific application of an ‘aim’ in a particular situation. (See also **Aim, Master narrative, Mindset, Motivation**, and **Worldview**.)

**Intercontextuality**: a relation of polyphonic dependence, between contexts, within any one centre of meaning or between any number of centres of meaning. (See also **Dialogism** and **Intertextuality**.)

**Internal chronotope**: an artistic construct of time and space in an image of the world, with a focus adapted to the purpose of conveying the message of the author. (See also **Chronotope, External chronotope** and **Formal chronotope**.)

**Intertextuality**: a relation of monophonic dependence in a written context. Thus, it can be expressed by means of reference, citation, quotation, paraphrase or allusion. (See also **Intercontextuality**.)

**Irritant**: a phenomenon perceived as a challenge to the current state of affairs in the world and time of the reader. (See also **Irritant challenging, Irritant frustrating** and **Anomaly**.)

**Irritant challenging**: the irritant matches the interpretative paradigm of the reader, even when opposing the reader’s opinions/conclusions. In this sense, the reader perceives the irritant as a challenge and not a threat to his/her paradigm. The irritant is thus perceived as a new centre of gravity in conflict with, but under control of, the reader’s centre of cognitive gravity. (See also **Irritant frustrating** and **Anomaly**.)

**Irritant frustrating**: a phenomenon which does not match the interpretative paradigm of the reader and causes frustration. With its attractive force, it is a centre of gravity in conflict and also out of the controlling capacities of the reader’s cognitive gravity. For example, in the predicting paradigm, this phenomenon is unpredictable, in explaining the unexplainable, in the critical paradigm, it escapes the criticism and nonetheless does not match the readers centre of gravity. In this sense, the phenomenon calls for shifting of the reader’s fundamental presuppositions and the paradigm as a whole. (See also
**Irritant challenging and Anomaly.**

**Master narrative**: an utterance with a developed stable image of a paradigm in a narrative form. The narrative states the limitations of the implicit set of beliefs about reality. If articulated by a voice privately, the narrative is the voice’s mindset. If publicly, the narrative is the voice’s worldview. If written, the narrative is the formal paradigmatic meaning of the text, conveyed by dialogical overtones, i.e. dependence markers in the text. In this case, the master narrative (i.e. formal paradigmatic meaning of the text) is a narrational manifestation of the metaphysical aspect of the paradigm. (See also Paradigm, Paradigmatic meaning, Metaphysical aspect of a paradigm, Independent text, and Worldview.)

**Meaning**: an articulation of images of a text, voice, community or paradigm as they are presented by a given text (and appropriated as textual, pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings, respectively). (See also Chronotope, Motivation, Intention, Aim, Image of a voice, Textual meaning, Pragmatic meaning, Sociological meaning and Paradigmatic meaning.)

**Metamodel**: the initial set of presuppositions, expressed in a metaphor, which serve as criteria for choosing a particular model. (See also Model.)

**Metaphysical aspect of a paradigm**: an implicit set of beliefs about reality, limited by the paradigm’s master narrative. (See also Paradigm, Master narrative, Methodological aspect of a paradigm, Sociological aspect of a paradigm, and Worldview.)

**Methodological (problem-solving) aspect of a paradigm**: a set of concrete problem solutions produced by a group of practitioners who make the sociological aspect of a paradigm, which (the problem solutions) tacitly carry the metaphysical commitments of that group of practitioners. (See also Paradigm, Metaphysical aspect of a paradigm, Sociological aspect of a paradigm, and Worldview.)

**Mindset**: an utterance of a private, individual, personal articulation of the metaphysical aspect of a paradigm. Thus, it is the individual subset, or variant, of the worldview held
by the society or societies to which the individual belongs. (See also *Aim, Intention, Master narrative, Motivation*, and *Worldview*.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Mise en abyme:</strong> a literary device by which an intermingling of representations of time and space is achieved, so that representations of time and space on internal, formal and external levels mutually intrude on each other. (See also <em>Chronotope.</em>)</th>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Model:</strong> a visual, descriptive or analogical representation of something otherwise too complex, impossible, or difficult to be directly observed. (See also <em>Hermeneutical model.</em>)</th>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Model of interpretative relativity:</strong> model which utilises the telephoto effect. (See also <em>Telephoto effect.</em>)</th>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Monophonic dependence markers:</strong> the features of a text which highlight some of the polyphonic links between the text and another text (or part of the same text) so that the otherwise polyphonic (echoic) links between the two are thus made to stand out, and resemble a monophonic dependence of one text on the other text. (See also <em>Accentuation, Dependence markers</em>, and <em>Polyphonic dependence markers.</em>)</th>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Monophonic dependence:</strong> a one-directional relation between a dependent and an independent text, where there is only one dominant relation of dependence, emphasised by dependence markers in the dependent text. (See also <em>Allusive dependence, Paradigmatic dependence, Polyphonic dependence</em>, and <em>Referential dependence.</em>)</th>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Motivation:</strong> the particular sense that on a specific occasion, a certain action or set of actions is appropriate and desirable. (See also <em>Mindset, Aim, Intention, Master narrative</em> and <em>Worldview.</em>)</th>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Noise:</strong> a synergy effect of negative factors in communication. (See also <em>Synergy.</em>)</th>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Ostensive-inferential communication:</strong> the process in which the communicator (i.e. author, utterer) produces a stimulus which makes it mutually manifest to communicator and audience that the communicator intends, by means of this stimulus, to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions. Thus this</th>
</tr>
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communication model consists of ‘the informative intention’, ‘the communicative intention’ and ‘the ostensive stimulus’. (See also *Informative intention*, *Communicative intention* and *Ostensive stimulus*.)

**Ostensive stimulus**: the act of the author designed to attract the recipient’s attention and focus it on the author’s assumptions. (See also *Ostensive-inferential communication*, *Communicative intention* and *Informative intention*.)

**Paradigm**: a unified whole in which all data gained by observation are organised. One can distinguish three aspects of the unified whole: metaphysical aspect (the set of ideas and beliefs about reality limited by the paradigm’s master narrative), sociological aspect (the set of sociological factors which influence the way the science is done), and methodological aspect (the set of the available scientific methodology). Different paradigms direct enquiry towards different questions regarding the reality. (See also *Master narrative*, *Worldview*, *Mindset*, *Paradigmatic dependence*, and *Paradigmatic text*.)

**Paradigmatic context**: a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to an utterance as an expression of a particular paradigm. (See also *Context*, *Textual context*, *Pragmatic context* and *Sociological context*.)

**Paradigmatic dependence**: a one-directional relation between a dependent text (with a developing unstable meaning caused by a developing unstable paradigm) and an independent text, where there is only one, dominant relation of dependence emphasised by dependence markers in the dependent text. Thus, one stable paradigm is delineated (and consequently the meaning) that is to be exclusively resembled in the stabilised paradigm (and meaning) of the dependent paradigmatic text. (See also *Paradigm*, *Monophonic dependence*, *Allusive dependence*, *Polyphonic dependence*, and *Referential dependence*.)

**Paradigmatic meaning**: an articulation of a paradigm by means of an utterance. More precisely, it is an articulation of a paradigm in a given text conveyed by pragmatic and sociological meanings in the text. One can differentiate between internal, formal, and current external paradigmatic meanings, based on respective chronotopes with which
the meaning is associated. The ancient external meaning is out of the current reader’s sight. (See also *Chronotope, Motivation, Intention, Aim, Image of a voice, Textual meaning, Pragmatic meaning, Sociological meaning*).

| Paradigmatic text: a text with a developing unstable meaning, and a developing unstable paradigm as well as markers of a monophonic dependence. (See also *Paradigm, Alluding text, Echoic text, Paradigmatic dependence, and Referential text.*) |
| Paraphrase: a literary device by which an author of one text intentionally reproduces the meaning of the words of another text. (See also *Allusion, Citation, Quotation, and Reference.*) |
| **Permeability (of language and utterances):** the effect of diffuse borders which cannot prevent blending of otherwise delineated entities. Accordingly, the permeability of utterances implies diffuse borders between the utterances, otherwise delineated by a change of speakers. Every text is an utterance influenced by other texts and influencing other texts. |
| **Personal proximity of every utterance:** a measure of the capability of the utterance to convey the emotional relation between the addressee and the author. (See also *Addressivity, Expressiveness, Finalisation, and Utterance.*) |
| **Phrase:** See Word and phrase. |
| **Polyphonic dependence:** the echoic bi-directional relation between a text (with a developing unstable meaning and developing unstable paradigm) and the rest of the world. The dependence is present as long as none of the dependence markers is modified in order to establish a monophonic dependence on another text. (See also *Monophonic dependence and Polyphony.*) |
| **Polyphonic dependence (echoic) markers:** the features of the text which make the text resemble the rest of the world, so that the text and the rest of the world are in a mutually echoic dependence. (See also *Accentuation, Dependence markers, and Monophonic dependence markers.*) |
**Polyphony**: a literary phenomenon in which mutual engagement of more than two voices takes place at the same time. (See also *Chronotope, Double-voicedness, Grotesque realism, Heteroglossia, and Canonisation*.)

**Pragmatic context**: a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to the author’s intentions, implicatures, and all that is not explicitly present in the text. Thus, an interpretation concerned with intentions and implicatures surpasses domains of pure linguistics and semantics and is part of the field of pragmatics. (See also *Context, Textual context, Sociological context* and *Paradigmatic context*.)

**Pragmatic meaning**: the meaning provided by the pragmatic context. It is an articulation of motivation, intention and aim of a voice in the text. Since the reader’s perception of the pragmatic context changes in the process of interpretation, the pragmatic meaning is not stable. The reader can differentiate between internal, formal, and current external pragmatic meanings, based on respective chronotopes with which the meaning is associated. The ancient external meaning is out of the current reader’s sight. (See also *Chronotope, Motivation, Intention, Aim, Image of a voice, Paradigmatic meaning, Sociological meaning*).

**Quotation (literary)**: a literary device by which an author of one text intentionally reproduces the exact words of another text. (See also *Allusion, Citation, Paraphrase*, and *Reference*.)

**Re-accentuation**: a literary technic by which the changing of accents/dialogical overtones in an utterance and accordingly of the direction and meaning of the utterance is achieved. (See also *Accentuation, Canonisation, Direction*, and *Heteroglossia*.)

**Relativity of meaning**: the phenomenon of unstable pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meaning in contrast to constant literal meaning of a text. The relative meanings (pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic) change as the reader appropriates faith-life imagery presented in the text in general, and its internal and formal chronotopes, in particular.

**Reference (literary)**: a literary device by which an author directly identifies a person,
place, or thing existing in another text with no intention to draw further connections between the text doing the referring and the item referred to. (See also Allusion, Citation, Paraphrase, and Quotation.)

**Referential dependence**: a one-directional relation between a dependent text (with a developed stable meaning, and a developed stable paradigm) and an independent text, where there is only one, dominant relation of dependence emphasised by dependence markers in the dependent text. (See also Allusive dependence, Independent text, Paradigmatic dependence, and Polyphonic dependence.)

**Referential text**: a text with a developed stable meaning, and a developed stable paradigm as well as markers of a monophonic dependence. (See also Alluding text, Echoic text, Paradigmatic text, and Referential dependence.)

**Regular science**: regular scientific research, that is the research that ‘fits’ the presuppositions entertained by the scientific community. (See also Revolutionary science and Conversion.)

**Revolutionary science**: changes in understanding and explaining the fundamental principles in sciences. (See also Regular science and Conversion.)

**Relative distance**: See Telephoto effect.

**Relevance**: a measure of the effectiveness of an utterance to narrow the wider context in which the previous utterance was processed to be situated. (See also Centre of meaning, and Context.)

**Sentence**: a linguistic unit which expresses a relatively complete thought, directly correlated with the other thoughts of a single speaker within his/her utterance as a whole, whilst lacking finalisation, expressiveness, addressivity and personal proximity. (See also Utterance, and Word and phrase.)

**Sociological aspect of a paradigm**: a group of practitioners trained within the context of a particular implicit set of beliefs about reality, which (the group) develops a concrete disciplinary matrix within limitations of the set of beliefs. Their explicit public
worldviews, or private, personal mindsets are parts of the sociological aspect of the
paradigm. (See also **Paradigm, Metaphysical aspect of a paradigm, Methodological
aspect of a paradigm, and Worldview**.)

| **Sociological context:** a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to the state
| of affairs (i.e. sociological circumstances) of the author’s world and time in the way the
text articulates these circumstances. (See also **Context, Textual context, Pragmatic
context** and **Paradigmatic context**.)

| **Sociological meaning:** an articulation of the state of affairs related to mindsets and
| worldviews of voices in the text (i.e. private and public explicit formulations of the
| paradigm, respectively). One can differentiate between internal, formal, and current
| external sociological meanings, based on respective chronotopes with which the
| meaning is associated. The ancient external meaning is out of the current reader’s sight.
| (See also **Chronotope, Motivation, Intention, Aim, Image of a voice, Paradigmatic
| meaning, Pragmatic meaning**).  

| **Speaking consciousness:** see **Voice**.

| **Speech-flow:** a change of speakers engaged in the conversation. (See also **Sentence** and
| **Utterance**.)

| **Sphere of communication:** a group of specific occasions in life in which language is
| used in a specific way characteristic for that and similar occasions (forming, thus,
spheres such as ‘at work’, ‘at court’, ‘at home’, ‘with loved ones’…). (See also **Chronotope**.)

| **Superaddressee:** a third-party in the phenomenon of dialogism, (in addition to the
| author and the addressee) whose perfectly just and correct understanding of the writer’s
utterance is assumed; thus, the functioning of the utterance in the process of
communication is made feasible. (See **Utterance**.)

| **Synergy:** the combined effect of a group of factors working together, where the effect
| of the group is greater than the sum of the outcome achieved by any one factor working
Telephoto effect: changes in the perception of reality achieved by zooming in or out while moving the camera closer to, or further away, from the subject in focus. More precisely, the space/gap between the object in focus and its background is perceived as bigger when the relative distance between the camera and the object is shorter. Here the relative distance is the ratio between the distance between the camera and the object in focus and the distance between the object and its background (achieved by moving the camera closer to the object in focus). In contrast, the bigger the relative distance between the camera and the object in focus (achieved by moving the camera away from the subject), the smaller the gap between the object and its background appears to be. (See also Model of interpretative relativity.)

Textual context: a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to only the explicit realm of a specific text. With this narrow focus, an interpretation of a text remains within the domains of linguistics and semantics. (See also Context, Pragmatic context, Sociological context and Paradigmatic context.)

Textual meaning: the meaning provided by the textual context. This meaning is not different from how the text reads. This meaning is the only stable meaning for the given text. It is the explicit meaning. (See also Pragmatic meaning, Sociological meaning and Paradigmatic meaning.)

Type of hermeneutical model: a group of hermeneutical models that share a common visual metaphor, which explains their similarities and differences, by each particular model adjusting the visual metaphor in a specific way. (See also Hermeneutical model, Hermeneutical circle.)

Utterance: a speech unit that is delineated by the rest of the speech communication by a change of speaking subjects (that is, a change of speakers), whilst featuring finalisation, expressiveness, addressivity and personal proximity. (See also Addressivity, Expressiveness, Finalisation, Sentence, Speech-flow, Word and phrase, and Personal proximity.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Vicious circle</strong>: the closed line of reasoning in the sense that ‘A’ is claimed to be ‘B’ on the basis of what ‘B’ is in terms of its relation to ‘A’. (See also <em>Hermeneutic circle</em>.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Voice</strong>: a speaking personality (speaking consciousness), making poetics resemble a single-voiced reality, and prose resemble a double-voiced reality. (See also <em>Utterance</em>.)</td>
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<td><strong>Word and phrase</strong>: linguistic units used as building blocks of sentences. (See also <em>Sentence</em>, and <em>Utterance</em>.)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Worldview</strong>: an utterance of an explicit and public formulation of the metaphysical aspect of a paradigm. (See also <em>Paradigm</em>, <em>Master narrative</em>, <em>Mindset</em>, <em>Aim</em>, <em>Intention</em>, and <em>Motivation</em>.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zoom Lens model</strong>: the model of the theory of meaning in which the cognitive path of appropriating the meaning of a text (from the reader’s formal chronotope, to formal and internal chronotopes of a given text, and back) is metaphorically explained as the effect of zooming in and out with an actual zoom lens whilst moving closer and further away from the subject in focus. The telephoto effect in the zoom lens metaphor explains why the text appears different on different junctures on the cognitive path.</td>
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