

Exploration of the Lived Experiences of Young British Muslims in  
Wales: Through a Postcolonial and Epistemic Injustice Lens.

Christopher John Mort

Grad. Dip. Professional Development (Education). MA (Education)

Director of studies: Dr. Caroline Lohmann-Hancock

Supervisor: Dr Nichola Welton

Advisor: Associate Professor Jane Waters

Submitted in partial fulfilment for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Wales Trinity Saint David

2020

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.**

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisory team past and present who have been instrumental advising, encouraging, supporting and mentoring me over the years. I am deeply grateful to Dr Jane Waters, Dr Caroline Lohmann-Hancock, and Dr Nichola Welton for their guidance and assistance which has proved invaluable in shaping this thesis.

I am also indebted to Professor John Parkinson for his support and guidance at the beginning of my studies, and the late Dr Howard Tanner for his contribution in encouraging and supporting the research proposal.

I also want to show my appreciation to Dr Sue Lyle who has shown unwavering faith in my ability to engage in higher education since 2004. Without Dr Lyle's continuing encouragement and unfailing mentorship I doubt whether I would have continued my academic journey this far.

I dedicate this thesis to the above named, who I value not only as professional colleagues, but also as friends. Diolch yn fawr, thank you.

My appreciation also to the anonymous Muslim men and women who gave their time, their trust and their stories, allowing me a unique opportunity to put into words their experiences of Islamophobia. I hope this thesis serves them and other Muslims in Wales well. As-Salamu-alaikum.

Finally, to my wife Dawn who has been a constant support in allowing me the time and space to progress and continue my studies, very often at the expense of having time to spend together.

## **DECLARATION**

**This sheet MUST be signed and included within the thesis**

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

Signed ..... (student)

Date .....23rd October 2020.....

## **STATEMENT 1**

This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Where correction services have been used the extent and nature of the correction is clearly marked in a footnote(s). Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended.

Signed ..... (student)

Date .....23rd October 2020.....

## **STATEMENT 2**

I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations.

Signed ..... (student)

Date .....23rd October 2020.....

## **STATEMENT 3**

I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for deposit in the University's digital repository.

Signed ..... (student)

Date .....23rd October 2020.....

# CONTENTS

<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>DECLARATION .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>CONTENTS.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>2. CHAPTER 2: MULTICULTURALISM TO 9/11 A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE .....</b>	<b>29</b>
2.1. <i>Introduction.....</i>	29
2.2. <i>Migration and Government Legislation in the United Kingdom .....</i>	31
2.3. <i>The Emergence of Islamophobia as a Concept.....</i>	36
2.3.1. <i>The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain.....</i>	40
2.4. <i>Multiculturalism .....</i>	45
2.5. <i>The Role of The Media in the Reporting of Islam and Muslims in Britain post 9/11 .....</i>	60
2.6. <i>Conclusion .....</i>	73
<b>3. CHAPTER 3: POST 9/11 AND MUSLIM COMMUNITIES.....</b>	<b>76</b>
3.1. <i>Introduction: The Prevent Strategy.....</i>	76
3.1.1. <i>The Background to Prevent.....</i>	77
3.2. <i>The Emerging Prevent .....</i>	80
3.2.1. <i>Security Legislation.....</i>	82
3.2.2. <i>Critics of Prevent .....</i>	85
3.2.3. <i>Schools and Prevent: from Fundamental British Values to Statutory Duties.....</i>	86
3.2.4. <i>Fundamental British Values.....</i>	91
3.2.5. <i>Statutory Duties .....</i>	94
3.2.6. <i>How Prevent has been Implemented in Schools and colleges .....</i>	97

3.3.	<i>Media construction of Muslim as the "Other"</i> .....	103
3.4.	<i>Conclusion</i> .....	106
<b>4.</b>	<b>CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL POSITION</b> .....	<b>108</b>
4.1.	<i>Introduction: The Research Journey</i> .....	108
4.2.	<i>Critical Pedagogy</i> .....	113
4.3.	<i>Developing a Theoretical Stance</i> .....	116
4.4.	<i>Critical Theory</i> .....	120
4.5.	<i>Islamophobia as an Ideology</i> .....	122
4.5.1.	<i>False Consciousness</i> .....	128
4.6.	<i>Postcolonialism as a Theoretical Position</i> .....	132
4.7.	<i>Epistemic Injustice</i> .....	144
4.8.	<i>Medina</i> .....	148
4.9.	<i>Conclusion</i> .....	154
<b>5.</b>	<b>CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</b> .....	<b>157</b>
5.1.	<i>Introduction</i> .....	157
5.1.1.	<i>Research Process Map</i> .....	159
5.2.	<i>Research Aim and Research Questions</i> .....	160
5.3.	<i>Research Methods</i> .....	161
5.4.	<i>Community of Enquiry: 10 Step Process</i> .....	166
5.5.	<i>Research Participants</i> .....	169
5.6.	<i>Research Setting</i> .....	170
5.7.	<i>Data Collection and Preparation</i> .....	171
5.8.	<i>Reflexivity</i> .....	174

5.9.	<i>Methodology</i> .....	177
5.10.	<i>Initial Research Design</i> .....	181
5.11.	<i>Revised Research Design</i> .....	184
5.11.1.	Table 5.11.1. Illustrating methods used in the initial one-to-one interviews and subsequent Community of Enquiries as data collection tools, with limitations and mitigations identified in this research.....	189
5.12.	<i>Analysis of Data</i> .....	192
5.12.1.	Standards of Validation and Evaluation.....	193
5.13.	<i>Ethical Considerations</i> .....	196
5.13.1.	My Ethical Stance .....	196
5.13.2.	Interviewer Effect and Power Relations During Interviews.....	196
5.13.3.	Informed Consent.....	199
5.13.4.	Confidentiality .....	201
5.14.	<i>Conclusion</i> .....	201
<b>6.</b>	<b>CHAPTER 6: DATA ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNITY OF ENQUIRY CONDUCTED WITH THE COHORT OF MUSLIM MEN.....</b>	<b>203</b>
6.1.	<i>Introduction</i> .....	203
6.2.	<i>Brief Pen Pictures of the Respondents</i> .....	204
6.3.	<i>Introduction to the Community of Enquiry</i> .....	205
6.3.1.	Question 1. Why is it when Muslims do bad, their religion is the main cause of blame regardless of other factors e.g. nationality and personality? .....	206
6.3.2.	Question 2. Why is there Isolation between Muslims and wider community? .....	207
6.3.3.	Question 3. Do you really know Islam? .....	207
6.3.4.	Question 4. Do common stereotypes influence your own perception about Islam, even though you are Muslim?.....	208
6.4.	<i>Conclusion</i> .....	261

<b>7. CHAPTER 7: DATA ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNITY OF ENQUIRY CONDUCTED WITH THE COHORT OF MUSLIM WOMEN.....</b>	<b>265</b>
7.1. <i>Introduction.....</i>	265
7.2. <i>Brief Pen Pictures of the Respondents.....</i>	266
7.3. <i>Introduction to the Community of Enquiry.....</i>	267
7.3.1. Question 1. Why is it that the first thing that comes to mind to a non-Muslim is 'terrorist'?	
268	
7.3.2. Question 2. Is the media misrepresenting Islam for their own gain? .....	269
7.3.3. Question 3. Should Muslims integrate into the wider community? Is it a priority to educate people about Islam? .....	269
7.3.4. Question 4. Should Muslim women continue to speak out? .....	270
7.3.5. Question 5. Should Islam be taught at primary school level? .....	271
7.4. <i>Conclusion .....</i>	317
<b>8. CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS.....</b>	<b>321</b>
8.1. <i>Introduction.....</i>	321
8.2. <i>A Summary of the Findings .....</i>	324
8.3. <i>Postcolonialism and Epistemic Injustice.....</i>	327
8.4. <i>Research Question 1:.....</i>	330
8.4.1. A Move from Postcolonialism to Epistemic Injustice. ....	342
8.5. <i>Research Question 2: A Summary .....</i>	344
8.6. <i>Research Question 3:.....</i>	350
8.7. <i>The Contribution of the CoE .....</i>	353
8.8. <i>Reframing Muslim narratives in the context of Human Rights, Epistemic Injustice and Community of Enquiry Approaches .....</i>	357
8.8.1. Human Rights and Epistemic Injustice .....	357

8.8.2.	A CoE Approach .....	359
8.9.	<i>Relevance of Research</i> .....	360
8.10.	<i>Summary</i> .....	361
<b>9.</b>	<b>CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>362</b>
9.1.	<i>The Research Process</i> .....	362
9.2.	<i>Reframing Muslim Narratives</i> .....	365
9.3.	<i>Limitations of Study</i> .....	367
9.4.	<i>Further Research</i> .....	370
9.4.1.	Postcolonialism .....	370
9.4.2.	Deep Epistemic Injustice .....	371
9.4.3.	Safe Spaces for Muslim Discussion.....	372
9.4.4.	Islamophobia seen through an Epistemic Injustice Perspective .....	373
9.4.5.	Muslims as Researchers .....	374
<b>10.</b>	<b>REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>375</b>
<b>11.</b>	<b>APPENDICES.....</b>	<b>439</b>
11.1.	<i>Appendix 1: COE Muslim young women: 10th December, 2011. Facilitator- Kim</i> .....	440
11.2.	<i>Appendix 2: COE – Muslim Young Men : 6th October, 2012. Facilitator Kim</i> .....	454
11.3.	<i>Appendix 3: Summary of One to One Interviews</i> .....	471
11.4.	<i>Appendix 4: Research Information Leaflet: An Analysis of the ways in which young Muslim Men and Women construct their identities.</i> .....	480
11.5.	<i>Appendix 5: CMSS Workshop: Building Resilience – Countering Extremism and Racism</i> .....	482
11.6.	<i>Appendix 6: Glossary of Terms</i> .....	483
11.7.	<i>Appendix 7: Summaries of Relevant Acts, Policies and Reports from Chapter 2</i> .....	486



11.8. *Appendix 8: Summaries of Relevant Acts, Policies and Reports from Chapter 3.....497*

## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Diagram	4.1.1. The Theoretical Journey .....page	112
Diagram	5.1.1. Research Process Map.....	pages 111 and 159
Table	5.11.1. Illustrating Methods Used in One-to-One Interviews .....	pages 189-191

## **ABSTRACT**

The catalyst for this thesis were my experiences as a retired police officer volunteering with a charity supporting minority young people, which informed my understanding of Islamophobia and encouraged a desire to challenge social injustice.

I examine the role of the UK government's Prevent Strategy and Fundamental British Values in 'othering' Muslims in Britain. I identify a weakened multiculturalism, the print media and the securitisation of Britain's Muslims as factors limiting Muslim voices in society and dismissing them as epistemic agents. Therefore, the aim of the research is to explore the lived experiences of young British Muslims living in Wales, in the light of postcolonial and epistemic injustice theories.

The study brings the unique voices of two groups of young Muslim men and women living in Wales. This research identifies securitisation for the men and objectification for the women as constructs that impact their lives in public space embedded with Islamophobic assumptions.

Using a Community of Enquiry, a collaborative form of purposeful discourse, data collection supported the voices of respondents to construct the research questions for themselves and enabled the voices of all respondents as they created inter-subjective meaning together.

Data analysis pioneered a 'thinking through theory' approach using postcolonialism, Islamophobia and epistemic injustice to open up ways of thinking with data. Epistemic injustice revealed how injustice occurs. It shifts conversation to universal justice instead of culture and religion which are misrepresented in postcolonial constructs. Testimonial and hermeneutical injustice reveal how the respondents are marginalised for being Muslim. Epistemic injustice prevents non-Muslims from becoming virtuous hearers and giving credibility to Muslim testimony.

The study concludes that widespread Islamophobia, notions of securitisation and objectification contribute to postcolonial conditions existing for Muslims. Epistemic injustice may displace the lacuna of Islamophobia in the social imagination of the public for the benefit of Muslims.

## 1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This thesis explores the lived experiences of young British Muslims living in Wales through a postcolonial and epistemic injustice lens. It comes at a time when Islamophobia is increasing and government response has been to securitise the Muslim community. The thesis arose directly from my MA thesis into the construction of identity of young Muslim men (Mort, 2008a). It originated from my interest in the experiences of young Muslims in Wales and my desire to hear their voices. I wanted this research to provide a platform for the voices of young Muslim men and women in order to advance understanding of their lived experiences. As with any study, the research conducted in this thesis has a background and context.

### *Background*

On the 11th September 2001 (9/11) in New York and Arlington County, Virginia USA, coordinated attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon were carried out by Al Qaeda, a militant group of Muslim extremists who opposed the policies and interventions of the United States and the United Kingdom, in Muslim countries. On 7th July 2005 (7/7) the London bombings took place. With the occurrence of these events, there was an increase in Islamophobia, manifested as verbal and physical attacks on young Muslims throughout Britain (Runnymede, 2017; Tellmama, 2018; All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018). The response to these events from government was manifest in the CONTEST Strategy (Home Office, 2011) and later the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) which, I argue securitised Muslims in Britain.

'Islamophobia' is defined as "The dread, hatred and hostility toward Islam and Muslims" (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 1). It is a contested term (Runnymede, 2017; Tellmama, 2018; All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018) affording little protection in law for Muslims in Britain and it is argued, does not accurately reflect prejudice against them. Islamophobia as a concept is examined in Chapter 2 and as a protected ideology in Chapter 4 which is instrumental in the construction of the theoretical framework that guides the research.

Recent research has focused on how Islamophobia operates within the fabric of British society, including the workplace (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018) and where incidents of global and domestic terrorism have been sensationally and selectively reported by sections of the print media contributing to the rise in Islamophobia (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018; Petley and Richardson, 2011). In this thesis I argue that postcolonial conditions exist for Muslims living in Britain and that by continuing to research, publish and frame British Muslims in this context the media narrative has contributed to reinforcing postcolonial conditions for them. Research beyond postcolonialism for this group is vital in order to hear their voices. Meer (2014, p. 515) suggests an alternative "scholarship beyond the postcolonial tradition" which I argue lies within an epistemic injustice framework allowing narratives around their marginalisation to be reframed in advocacy which addresses issues of social justice. Succinctly, Epistemic Injustice embraces testimonial and hermeneutical injustice.

"Testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's word" (Fricker, 2007, p.1). Fricker (*ibid*) further argues that hermeneutical injustice occurs before testimonial injustice "when a gap

in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences".

In using the term 'British' or 'Britishness' I acknowledge that this research does not extend to considering 'Britishness' in the context of Northern Ireland as I argue the Prevent Strategy and associated Fundamental British values are concerned with notions of so-called 'Islamism' and not security concerns generally associated in Northern Ireland, which is outside the scope of this research. I further acknowledge Irishness and Northern Irishness having distinct cultural and political identities.

### *Context*

I now briefly describe my professional work continuing my academic and theoretical journey in Chapter 4. From 1980 until 2010 I was an operational uniformed police officer working in the South Wales area. In 2001 I formed a professional relationship with a Muslim youth worker who worked with a local charity supporting young Muslims. Together we produced audio/visual resources for schools to challenge incidents of Islamophobia which had increased since the events of 9/11. We continued this work until I retired from the police service in 2010 (Mort, 2004, 2008). From 2012 until 2015 I continued to work for the charity delivering a series of workshops I had devised (THINK Project, 2012) to NEET white Welsh young people across South Wales to challenge far right-wing extremism ideology (for NEET [not in education, employment or training] see for example, Welsh Government, 2018).

From 2004 until 2010 in my work as a police officer I worked as a schools community police officer delivering a range of Personal, Social and Educational lessons (All Wales Core Programme, 2004) to pupils aged 5 to 16 years of age. I also delivered these lessons in pupil referral units and the youth wing at a local prison.

In 2004 I was enrolled at university to study for a graduate Diploma in Professional Development (Education). This was a mandatory condition set by the (then) National Assembly for Wales in association with Education Authorities in Wales so Schools Community Police Officers may be competent in classroom delivery. This was my first experience of higher education which subsequently led to me engaging in Master's and Doctoral degrees. As a consequence of my studies and wider reading of the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) and Fundamental British Values (DFE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) I reflected that I may have unwittingly marginalised some of the young people I had worked with in delivering the All Wales Core Programme (2004) and the THINK project (2012) by deeming them to be vulnerable, limiting their choices and imposing aspects of Prevent in my delivery. These two 'critical incidents' which I examine in Chapters 4 and 5 further shaped the theoretical journey and subsequent theoretical framework.

Through the context of my work as a police officer and informal educator, I was aware that there were heightened verbal and physical attacks on Muslims and their properties that had rapidly increased during the ten-year period prior to the start of this research. In my doctoral work therefore, I wanted to hear what young Muslims had to say about their experiences and be able to challenge Islamophobia with the aim of lessening its effects and at the same time highlight

the harm perpetrated on young British Muslims. I sought beneficence for young British Muslims and to work "for the social 'good' " (Clough and Nutbrown, 2002, pp. 4-6). An initial review of the literature showed a lack of research on Muslim voices and I sought to mitigate this lacuna by the research presented in this thesis. Research and personal experience as a former police officer and youth liaison officer, informal educator and researcher suggest that bringing the voice and narratives of young Muslims to non-Muslims may be a powerful tool to challenge Islamophobia (Think Project, 2012; Thomas, 2013; Cantle and Thomas, 2014; Cantle, 2017).

This thesis argues that British Muslims are marginalised and portrayed as potential terrorists as a result of sections of the British print media distributing misinformation. This is compounded by the British government's anti-terrorism strategy focusing on them as a 'suspect community' (Petley and Richardson, 2011; Morey and Yaqin, 2011; Esposito and Kalin, 2011; Thomas, 2010, 2012, 2014). Furthermore, the introduction of Fundamental British Values (FBVs), (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) within British education, has contributed to the legitimating of a postcolonial Britain for Muslims. The Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) is a government-led initiative with Fundamental British Values introduced as part of education policy in England and Wales. They have also been inextricably connected by the associated definition of extremism (HM Government, 2011; DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) legislated by Counter-terrorism (*Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*) and Department for Education guidance (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015). This makes counter-terrorism duties not only statutory for schools, colleges and universities but also a part of the National Curriculum in England and Wales



(Home Office, 2015). Prevent, FBVs and the *Counter-terrorism and Security Act* are postcolonial constructs which have the potential to make Muslims in Britain feel and appear different or 'othered'. The terms 'othered' and 'colonised' are used throughout this thesis to signify Muslims being marginalised as a consequence of postcolonial conditions existing for them. Employing such terms in this thesis further acknowledges Spivak's (1988) use of the term 'subaltern' in describing persons subjugated as a consequence of political control. This thesis argues that Muslims in Britain are politically impotent (Qurashi, 2018) and their agency as Muslims restricted.

### **Overview of the Thesis**

The initial aim of this qualitative research was an analysis of the ways in which young Muslim men and women construct their identities, with the intention of uncovering their experiences of Islamophobia in post 9/11 Wales. However, the semi-structured one-to-one interviews carried out did not uncover their experiences of Islamophobia and a revised research design employing a Community of Enquiry was carried out with the remaining cohort of Muslim men and women.

I used the Community of Enquiry (CoE) (Muirhead, 2018; SAPERE, 2007) as a data collection tool, adopting an interpretive phenomenological position. I carried out and transcribed two communities of enquiry with one group of young Muslim men and one group of young Muslim women and then began an iterative process that involved critiquing government policy, the media, and theory to construct a theoretical position through which to 'read' the data. This also shaped the

direction of the research changing its aim and research questions. The thesis began as a response to increasing Islamophobia and a desire to understand its impact on Muslims living in Wales. As the research progressed it was influenced by theory, in particular that of postcolonialism and epistemic injustice that informed the revised central aim of the research to:

- Explore the lived experience of young British Muslims living in Wales in the light of postcolonial and epistemic injustice theories.

The key concepts of Islamophobia, postcolonialism and epistemic injustice informed the development of the overarching research question for the focus of the thesis:

- What are the lived experiences of young British Muslims living in Wales?

The objectives of the research are expressed through the research questions that evolved as the empirical work progressed driven by analysis of my Muslim respondents' voices:

- Is Postcolonialism visible in the narratives of young Muslims living in Wales and if so, in what ways?
- Is Epistemic Injustice visible in the narratives of young Muslims living in Wales and if so, in what ways?
- How might we understand Islamophobia in light of Muslim experience?

In this chapter, I introduce the theoretical concepts that came to be most significant for the thesis: postcolonialism, epistemic injustice and Islamophobia.

The literature reviewed for the thesis emerged from the iterative process of reading theory and data together. The material included focuses on government

policy and examines a move from multiculturalism to the Prevent Strategy and the introduction of Fundamental British Values in education. I now provide working definitions of each significant theoretical concept.

### *Postcolonialism*

Postcolonialism is used to illustrate how Muslims living in Britain are made to feel different, or 'othered' and their minds 'colonised' by negative media reporting, the Government's Prevent Strategy, associated Fundamental British Values, and the normalising of Islamophobia in British society. Postcolonialism is used as a lens through which Community of Enquiry data is analysed locating areas of injustices in the lived experiences of young Muslims. The theory of postcolonialism is vital in explaining how Muslims living in Britain are controlled by policy and legislation restricting their agency as Muslims. The argument I put forward in this thesis is that the Prevent Strategy and Fundamental British values are both postcolonial constructs that exclusively and negatively affect Muslims living in Britain.

Postcolonialism is explored in depth in Chapter 4.

### *Epistemic Injustice*

The theory of epistemic injustice emerged from the research journey when considering a Marxist approach progressing through Critical Theory to Postcolonialism. Throughout the theoretical journey Islamophobia was considered to be an ideology, a false consciousness, protecting Islamophobia from challenge. In order to address this impasse, Bhargava's (2013) observation, that restricting intellectual freedom was an epistemic injustice, was furthered to argue that curtailing intellectual freedom is associated with false consciousness for the wider

non-Muslim British public and the Muslim respondents in this research. This permitted false consciousness to be synthesised to hermeneutical injustice, an epistemic injustice, further allowing the community of enquiry data to be also analysed through an epistemic injustice lens which additionally located instances of injustices caused to Muslims. Moreover, epistemic injustice allowed Muslim narratives to be heard free from postcolonialism that sought to continue to 'other' Muslim voices. Epistemic injustice aligns itself to a Human Rights approach and is offered as an alternative lens with which to further Muslim voices. Epistemic injustice is explored in depth in Chapter 4.

### *Islamophobia*

Having earlier provided a working definition to Islamophobia and signposted its position as an emerging concept in Chapter 2 it may also be seen as a protected ideology which is explored in Chapter 4. I argue that the definition of Islamophobia, although ineffective in protecting Muslims as it has no legislative authority, is inadequate. A phobia of Islam or Muslims is not enough to offer protection in law of Muslims who are not a race of people but rather followers of a religion. The argument I put forward in this thesis is Islamophobia is so normalised in British society that it blinds both non-Muslims and Muslims from recognising it. This research therefore suggests that Epistemic Injustice approaches be considered when examining the lived experiences of Muslims living in Britain.

In the roles I have taken as police officer, youth liaison worker, informal educator and researcher, I have been increasingly concerned at the impact of Islamophobia

that prevents Muslim voices being heard in our society today. This is a human rights issue for societies where a group of people not seen as valid epistemic agents are denied their human right to participate. Being recognised as a valid epistemic agent means having a voice that is heard and acknowledging its credibility. However, Muslims living in Britain are understood through the deficit discourse of Islamophobia. Consequently, rather than being recognised as rights-holders with agency they are understood as 'other', and because this deficit understanding is so deeply ingrained in our society, Islamophobia is normalised within the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim public (discussed in Chapters 2 and 4).

I wanted to understand the lived experience of young Muslims and examine the impact of Islamophobia on their lives and what opportunities they have to participate as knowers in our democratic society. This led me to postcolonialism and epistemic injustice which are examined in depth in Chapter 4.

Statutory legislation coupled with the print media misrepresentation of British Muslims has reinforced postcolonial conditions for British Muslims, creating a "new Orientalism" (Amin-Khan, 2012, p. 1596) allowing notions of Islamophobia in the social imagination of the British public (Runnymede, 2017; Tellmama, 2018; All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018). This thesis further argues that Islamophobia, a protected ideology, prevents Muslim voices being heard by the wider non-Muslim British public as a consequence of false consciousness (Lukacs, 1971). The voice of the Muslim is rarely heard in Britain today. To hear the voices of the Muslim men and women in this research, an epistemic injustice lens was used to explore the postcolonial conditions that has resulted in a

colonising of the Muslim mind, shaping the political agency of British Muslims. This research proposes a way forward by extending and synthesising false consciousness to hermeneutical justice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) employing epistemic injustice as the primary tool in the analysis of the data in order that Muslim testimony may be understood (Fricker, 2007). It therefore has implications for policymakers, commentators and researchers.

The focus of this research has been to locate areas of injustices that cause or contribute to the ideology of Islamophobia, and in so doing identify the rationale for holding stereotypical and prejudicial views toward Islam and Muslims in Britain. I have suggested that a lack of knowledge or ignorance can create a vacuum in which alternative 'knowledge' is created to fill a void, particularly where sections of the British media present an incomplete and negative view of British Muslims. The young Muslim men and women respondents in this thesis articulate narratives of their lived experiences that are uniquely individual, and in their own words show how discrimination impacts on their lives as they struggle for others to know more about them.

### **Contribution to knowledge**

This thesis makes methodological and theoretical contributions to knowledge which I discuss below.

Methodologically, this thesis advances a different approach to analysis of the raw data gathered from the CoE. I developed an innovative analytical process to be used following a CoE that involves reading and thinking with theory alongside the data, to construct a theoretical paradigm to make sense of and interpret the data.

This has implications for the researcher who may have to examine theory and policy they may have initially not considered. This approach to analysing raw data generated from the CoE is a contribution to the generation of knowledge in qualitative research. The approach has the potential to address the inter-subjectivities of heterogeneous groups working across different contexts.

Theoretically, this thesis adds to an understanding of epistemic injustice in the context of postcolonial thinking. The presence of Islamophobia prevents Muslims from being heard in society and they are negatively affected by epistemic injustice. By combining a consideration of how government policy and wider media misinformation contributes to 'othering' of Muslims I argue that the social imagination of Muslims and non-Muslims are both influenced by Islamophobia. I further argue that a weakening of multiculturalism for Muslims protects, maintains and sustains an ideology of Islamophobia which is seen as normalised in postcolonial Britain. As such knowledge of Muslims is controlled and their agency to be heard is limited to postcolonial discourse.

The findings in this research can help us think about human rights and epistemic justice for Muslims living in Britain and as such is a contribution to knowledge in the field and calls on us to explore the value of a human rights approach in furthering Muslim agency.

### **Delineation of the Thesis**

This study is designed such that the chapters build upon one another and the ways in which the chapters inform one another is important. In Chapter 2, I present a review of the literature from Multiculturalism to Prevent. It begins with a

brief historical perspective of economic migration into Britain followed by an account of how government legislation attempted to deal with racism in Britain. Key incidents that shaped multicultural Britain are examined to identify how reactive policies and legislation impacted on British Muslims. The review considers selected policies tracing a gradual transformation from multiculturalism to political multiculturalism to securitisation by the introduction of the Prevent strategy. The review examines how a rise in Islamophobia was not checked by a refusal to introduce legislation to protect British Muslims allowing the British print media to propagate misinformation about Islam and Muslims without the fear of prosecution. Multiculturalism has been examined and critiqued for its effectiveness in celebrating British Muslim identity against a hostile narrative which seeks to position Muslims as 'other'.

Chapter 3 provides an outline of the government's Prevent strategy from its introduction following civil disturbances in British northern towns in the summer of 2001 and the events of '9/11' in 2001, evolving into legislation customised by successive British governments into statutory requirements affecting public bodies including schools, colleges and universities. The Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) which started as a voluntary cultural awareness-raising programme encompassing all culturally diverse communities, evolved into a key counter-terrorist and statutory requirement (*Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*). Chapter 3 argues that Prevent focuses on Muslims and Muslim communities, impacting on their agency to openly display their identities, particularly in respect to political dissent and also examines the government's drive to promote Fundamental British Values (FBV), (Cameron, 2011, 2015; DfE, 2014). FBV



makes Muslims appear more different as a result of FBV being linked by a common definition of extremism from the Prevent strategy (Clarke, 2014).

Furthermore, making FBV a statutory requirement in schools (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) means they have become a part of the National Curriculum in England and Wales and as such makes those teaching it "agents of the state" (Davies, 2016, p. 6). The chapter concludes with an examination of how the print media construct Muslims as the 'other'.

Chapter 4 provides the theoretical position employed within this thesis justifying the choices made in locating injustices toward and analysing data about the young Muslim respondents. This chapter connects with my personal and professional journey and examines my own ethical entanglement as a non-Muslim researcher seeking to collect and interpret data. This reflexive stance was a catalyst for me to re-examine the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) and to consider it within a postcolonial construct along with Islamophobia. Furthering a Marxist approach led me to examine critical theory and to arrive at a stage of considering Islamophobia as an ideology which is a "false consciousness" (Lukacs, 1971; Rosen, 1996, p. 33; Adorno, 1974; Eyerman, 1981, pp. 52-54) protecting Islamophobia from challenge. A synthesis to epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) furthers the theoretical position along with a postcolonial position when analysing the data gathered from the young Muslim respondents.

Chapter 5 justifies the choices made in designing a framework to gather data. It includes the aims, objectives and research questions that guide the research along with the methods used. I provide an account of the ethical considerations in

respect of the young Muslim men and women who participated in this research including informed consent and the methods used to protect their anonymity. A Community of Enquiry (CoE) approach is justified as a viable method of collecting data with marginalised groups of people. Employing both postcolonialism and epistemic injustice as tools to interrogate the CoE data is explored and justified as ways of "plugging in" and viewing data across multiple perspectives (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012, p. 2).

Chapters 6 and 7 present an analysis of the raw data gathered using the Community of Enquiry approach. This approach allowed the young Muslim men and women to articulate their lived experiences providing a unique and privileged insight into their lives. In approaching the data, I read the transcripts alongside theory in order to identify what new meanings may come from the data. I engaged with literature from critical theory, postcolonialism and Marxism to illuminate my understanding of the transcripts. I employed Fricker's (2007) notion of epistemic injustice and the theory of Islamophobia (Esposito and Kalin, 2011; Sayyid and Vakil, 2010; Allen, 2007, 2007a, 2012) in my search to see the impact of Islamophobia on my young Muslim respondents. In this way I sought to better understand the marginalisation of Muslims in Britain and by extending my knowledge of theory, create a theoretical premise from which an effective counter-argument to Islamophobia may be positioned. I synthesised my conception of false consciousness (Lukacs, 1971) within an epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007) proposal as a way to isolate false consciousness from Islamophobia and position my data interpretation within a framework that seeks out justice free from perceived cultural and religious stereotypes. Further analysis of the CoE data

using postcolonialism as an interrogation tool, showed that the lived experiences of the young Muslim men and women was that of being 'colonised'. The data indicated that the young men had been 'securitised' just for being Muslim, while the young Muslim women had been 'objectified' by the public and the wider media. These are both postcolonial constructs (Young, 2001; Said, 1978; Spivak, 1988) as discussed in Chapter 4.

Chapter 8 discusses the findings of the thesis, identifies gaps in the body of academic knowledge and the contribution that the CoE makes. The chapter continues by exploring the value of a human rights approach in furthering Muslim agency and aligning the similarities of the research process with elements of human rights. The research indicates that a Muslim-focused Prevent strategy, Fundamental British Values and biased print media reporting are factors that sustain Islamophobia within a Western postcolonial construct. Although Prevent and FBV could not be conclusively evidenced in the narratives of the respondents they remain important considerations in the construction of postcolonial conditions for Muslims living in Britain and warrant further research. A focus of concern from the Muslim respondents was their wish for the wider non-Muslim British public to have knowledge about them. I acknowledge that postcolonial conditions existing for them limits their agency in furthering Muslim voices and argue that epistemic justice is an alternative paradigm where their voices may be heard.

Chapter 9 provides the conclusion to the research, summarising the research process employed followed by acknowledging potential implications in reframing Muslim narratives and the rationale for doing so. The contribution to knowledge and the limitations to the research are considered and suggestions for future

research discussed. The findings in this thesis has implications for government policy and conduct of the wider media at a time when Islamophobia is still a contested term. By reframing the experiences of Muslims through an epistemic injustice discourse, I hope this research will help to decolonise the minds of non-Muslims. Finally, the use of a CoE as a research tool by young Muslims themselves could be a useful tool of empowerment.

## **Conclusion**

The Muslim respondents in this research wanted non-Muslims to have knowledge of them and of Islam. In ways that Muslim identity is conjoined with religion, their testimonies as Muslims can only be articulated through Islam which is distorted through the postcolonial construct of Islamophobia. This research recognises an impasse in Muslims being heard and employs a concept of false consciousness as a stepping-stone to a hermeneutical injustice position as a way of reframing their narratives. This enables injustices against them to be seen in a human rights context and destabilises the normalising of Islamophobia to afford them some protection. Hermeneutical injustice also accedes the ideology of false consciousness to be understood through epistemic injustice so that non-Muslims may recognise an unconscious bias when giving a lesser credibility to the testimony of Muslims. Epistemic injustice allows us to recognise that a lacuna exists in the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim British public which has been filled with Islamophobia as an ideology, and not ignorance. If Islamophobia is recognised as a barrier to understanding between Muslim and non-Muslim then testimonial exchange between them can flow.

Britain's historical legacy in global colonialism is under-acknowledged. It is also a reminder for the wider non-Muslim British public that their fellow citizens who are Muslim continue to be 'othered' in postcolonial thought. It is vital that cognizance of postcolonialism for Muslims living in Britain be considered so that alternative thought can be progressed. In this thesis I argue that epistemic injustice be given precedence in analysing narratives around Muslim discourse to identify injustices against them. Future discourses, free from narratives of postcolonial 'othering', can contribute to deconstructing and exposing Islamophobia as an ideology. This would additionally negate the need for a new definition of Islamophobia which, to date, successive governments have denied largely on the grounds of religion and freedom of speech.

In this chapter I have introduced my aims for the research and the research questions that shaped it. I discussed the adoption of the CoE as my key research tool and introduced the concept of 'plugging in' to data to engage with the transcripts of the CoE. I introduced the key concepts of Islamophobia, postcolonialism and epistemic injustice and explained how these theories were read alongside the CoE raw data to analyse and make sense of it. I outlined my contribution to knowledge and discussed key findings from the thesis. Finally, I presented an overview of the chapters in the thesis.

I now turn to the first part of the literature review which examines how government policy shaped the identities of Muslims living in Britain before moving on to Chapter 3, a continuation of the literature review, which examines the Prevent strategy.

## 2. CHAPTER 2: MULTICULTURALISM TO 9/11 A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

### 2.1. Introduction

This literature review examines how the print media's representation of Muslims living in Britain, coupled with a shift in the United Kingdom's Government policy from one of inclusion to one of securitisation, has contributed towards the marginalisation of Muslims in Britain and a rise in Islamophobia. The government's policy and legislation impact on how society sees cultural diversity within the United Kingdom. I argue that the history of multiculturalism and its metamorphosis into the government's Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) coupled with the selective and negative reporting of Islam and Muslims by the print media, influences how society views Muslims, stereotyping them as one homogenous Muslim community. I argue that the Prevent Strategy (aspects of which are underpinned by the *Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*) has alienated Muslims living in Britain by positioning them as a suspect community closing down the potential for cross-cultural dialogue. The lack of a safe space for dialogue compounded by continual negative reporting from the print media, in particular the right-wing press, has put the Muslim community under immense pressure. Some young Muslims who are afraid to openly debate issues affecting them may seek out knowledge of Islam from the internet and social media where risks that include dangerous ideological radicalisation are present. It is crucial that Muslims be allowed to engage in political debate to argue issues affecting them, and I further argue that people's social experiences may be structurally prejudiced against Muslims.

In Chapter 4, I show how through a postcolonial lens implementation of the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a), a reactionary government policy, has stigmatised Muslims living in Britain, setting them apart from British society and rendering them vulnerable to verbal and physical abuse without legislative protection afforded to other minority groups. I evidence how this anomaly is indiscriminately exploited by sections of the print media to further alienate British Muslims from society by associating Islam and Muslims with terrorism. This allows them to be seen as suspect community in the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim public where loyalty to Britain is questioned. I illustrate how early 'defensive' multiculturalism used legislation to protect minority groups, reinforcing perceived differences and failing to address Muslim concerns within a secular multicultural Britain.

In Chapter Three, a continuation of the literature review, I trace the historical and reactionary implementation of Prevent in response to world events contributing to normalising Islamophobia, securitising and objectifying Muslims in Britain, lessening agency to engage with political Islam and to protest at Britain's foreign policy.

I make the case that successive government policy has created negative spaces for Muslims living in Britain where agency to engage with multiculturalism is eroded to such a degree that notions of securitisation has replaced multiculturalism for them. Government focus on legislation in addressing predominantly racial issues failed to protect Muslims living in Britain.

I have been selective in identifying literature, choosing key moments in the multicultural timeline for Muslims so that I may examine how I believe multiculturalism for Muslims in Britain has failed. I explore multiculturalism for Muslims living in Britain in depth further in this chapter acknowledging that, as a concept, its "meaning varies by context and writer" (Bloemraad *et al.*, 2008, p. 159). Succinctly, multiculturalism may be defined as the ability for Muslims living in Britain to publicly celebrate their religion, culture, heritage and identity.

In this chapter I examine how migration and government legislation initially shaped multiculturalism before turning to key events that focused on Muslims and prompted a government response. The concept of Islamophobia is interrogated before turning to the future of a multi-ethnic Britain and multiculturalism as a concept. I continue to examine the role of the print media in reporting Islam and Muslims post 9/11. I now trace the beginnings of Multiculturalism and government legislation to promote a multicultural Britain.

## **2.2. Migration and Government Legislation in the United Kingdom**

For many years Britain has attracted migrants from across the world. During the late 1940s and 1950s immigrants from the former colonies of India, Pakistan and the Caribbean arrived in Britain to fill labour shortages in predominantly low-paid, unskilled work (Small and Solomos, 2006). Although legislation was passed initially to stem the flow of primary immigration in the 1960s (Modood and May, 2001) entry of dependants allowed for family reunification seeing African-Caribbean, Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis bringing their spouses and children to Britain. Their presence in Britain was not always welcomed with



minority groups facing racism, inequality and poor housing in their day-to-day lives (Small and Solomos, 2006; Hopkins and Gale, 2009). In the decades that followed, this pattern of discrimination continued largely unchecked with young men from minority communities feeling particularly marginalised both socially and economically (*ibid*). By 1976 many young black men felt they were being targeted by the police, who were using the notion of "mugging" as a racial crime to discriminate against them (Gilroy, 2002, p. 108). The product of these and several other influencing factors provoked large scale civil disturbances or riots occurring in British towns and cities over nearly 30 years. Following the Brixton riots in 1981 the Scarman Report (1981; discussed in Appendix 7) made several recommendations that affected how the police would use stop and search powers particularly after Scarman noted how its indiscriminate use had alienated black youths. A timeline of events include: Nottingham and Notting Hill (1958); the inner city riots in Chapeltown, Leeds, (1973, 1974, 1975); Notting Hill carnival riot (1976); St Paul's riot, Bristol (1980); Handsworth riots (1981); Brixton riot (1981); Chapeltown riots (1981); Toxteth riots Merseyside (1981); Chapeltown riot (1987); Brixton riot (1995), largely reported as 'race riots' (Gilroy, 2002; Lentin and Titley, 2011; Fekete, 2009). The Millennium saw a resurgence of civil unrest with the 2001 riots in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley where Asian youths took to the streets to protest against long-term marginalisation and discrimination against working-class Asians (Abbas, 2005; Amin, 2003).

The reactive policies that the Government adopted in the wake of this civil unrest among minority communities did little to address the underlying issues of inequality among black and Asian citizens which continued to be centred on issues

of race. The revision of the *Race Relations Act 1976* in 2000 (discussed in Appendix 7) placed legislative responsibilities on public bodies to have policies and procedures in place to prevent or counter incidents of race discrimination (Small and Solomos, 2006). Earlier, the Rampton (1981) and Swann (Department of Education and Science, 1985) reports dealing with racism and underachievement of Black and Asian pupils in schools respectively, reported schools were focusing on understanding cultures of minority communities (depicted as 'saris, samosas and steel bands') (Modood and May, 2001; Kymlicka, 2012), at the expense of the day-to-day lived experiences of white, black and Asian working class people (discussed in Appendix 7). Following the murder of an Asian student in a Manchester school, the Burnage Report (Macdonald, 1989; discussed in Appendix 7) was critical of the ways anti-racist policies had been implemented, paying lip service to multiculturalism and increasing racial tension in school and community. This led Manchester Education Committee to adopt a policy of equal rights and practices informing its staff that failure to follow this approach would lead to dismissal (*ibid*). This may be seen as a turning point where policies of celebration and cultural identity move toward policies that embrace punitive measures.

Thus far, the identity of Muslims living in Britain had been subsumed into the umbrella term of 'Asian' with government policies keen to address racism through the prism of racial identity. It would take the publication of a work of fiction to highlight that Asians living in Britain also had Muslim identity and that a connection with fellow Muslims globally (The Ummah or Umma) transcended British geographical boundaries. The Ummah may be defined as a feeling of global

"solidarity" (McRoy, 2006, p. 39) with fellow Muslims, or a "global network of Muslim brotherhood" (Archer, 2009, p. 76) and sisterhood, and "imaginings of a global *Umma* (Islamic community)" (McLoughlin, 2009, p. 133).

### **The Rushdie Affair**

'The Satanic Verses', first published in 1988 (Rushdie, 1988) marked a change in how Muslims were reported by the media. Until then Muslims had generally been viewed as part and parcel of the British Asian community which had chiefly concerned itself with issues concerning race and racial abuse. Two chapters in Rushdie's book have been widely interpreted to refer to the Prophet Mohammed, his wives and other sacred references to the Koran and were seen as highly offensive and hurtful to Muslims. Although these chapters caused intense anger among some Muslims, in general the book was perceived to have caused "a sense of hurt, not their anger but their distress" (Parekh, 1990, p. 3). Parekh reported that Muslim leaders quietly pursued their concerns with the publishers, Members of Parliament and the Attorney General and were content to have a codicil included in the book stating that it was a work of fiction. Muslim leaders failed to have their concerns taken seriously, they were dismissed by the press who mocked them as 'intolerant' (*ibid*). On 2nd December 1988, a noisy but peaceful protest in Bolton, burned a copy of the 'Satanic Verses' but failed to gain national publicity. On the 14th January 1989 in Bradford, after contacting the press, another copy was burned, however rather than drawing attention to the inflammatory nature of the book, it attracted a hostile reaction from the press who compared the 'uncivilised' Muslims to 'barbarians', 'fanatics', and 'Nazis' (Parekh, 1990, p. 3). The Muslim leaders tried to 'internationalise' the issue by bringing it to

the attention of Muslim leaders overseas, with the result that the Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran pronounced a 'fatwa' or sentence of death on Salman Rushdie (*ibid*, p. 4; McRoy, 2006, p. 15). This marked a development in the Muslim consciousness; having been powerless for so long they were now courted by the British Government and received the attention of the British press. The press reporting created the impression that the "entire Muslim community was seething with a bloodthirsty spirit of vengeance" (Parekh, 1990, p. 4).

Parekh (1990) made an important point when he said the press had unintentionally united the Muslim community creating a new orthodoxy "and made every Muslim who wished no harm to Rushdie feel 'inauthentic' and not 'Muslim' (Parekh, 1990, p. 4). The Rushdie Affair resulted in some commentators calling for a review of the *Blasphemy Act* (in effect, Common Law Offences which were abolished in 2008) to include protection for Islam as well as Race Relations Legislation to protect Muslims (McRoy, 2006). Others went further calling for the creation of Muslim only schools to redress Rushdie's blasphemous narrative of Islam and the British government's "refusal to act against *The Satanic Verses*" (McRoy, 2006, p. 14). However, many of the Muslim respondents were ill-prepared and unable to articulate themselves well with the media within the confines of the, "principles British Society avowed. Nor did they produce well-argued pamphlets or articles" (Parekh, 1990, p. 7). Nevertheless, the 'Rushdie Affair' for some British Muslims was seen as a political awakening (Morey and Yaqin, 2011) and the "beginning of a British Muslim political identity" (*ibid*, p. 82) not just in Britain but also by forming allegiances with supporters of the fatwa against Rushdie, for example "the Islamic State in Iran" (McRoy, 2006, p. 15).

The Rushdie Affair illuminated a dormant Muslim identity particularly among young Asian men who, up until Rushdie, had largely experienced racial abuse in terms of skin colour rather than religion. The Rushdie Affair was the catalyst for Muslims in Britain to become more politically aware of their Muslim identity and along with international conflicts (discussed in Appendix 7), 7/7 and 9/11, rekindled notions of Muslim solidarity and adherence to the "Ummah" (McRoy, 2006, pp. 9-10). Some Muslims in Britain turned to political activism joining prominent 'Islamist' groups in the UK (Khan, 2016, p. 52) in search "for a Muslim identity that differed from their parents" (*ibid*, p. 56). Previously Muslim involvement in civil protest or disturbances in the UK had been limited for example, those involving African-Caribbean British youths. The colonial histories of their Asian forefathers were also different as imperial subjugation and not slavery had associated them with Britain. However, the tentative claim that Asians feel more British and less likely to confront the establishment is under-researched (Maxwell, 2009).

Following Rushdie, international conflicts between 1990 and 2012, and in particular Bosnia, where Muslims suffered great atrocities, cannot be ignored. The subsequent effect on Muslims in Britain is beyond the scope of this research but a summary is provided at (Appendix 7).

### **2.3. The Emergence of Islamophobia as a Concept**

A rise in anti-Muslim hostility in Britain (Runnymede Trust, 1997) prompted a need for this to be addressed other than by a focus on race. The publication of 'Islamophobia: A challenge for us all' (*ibid*) followed the report 'A Very Light Sleeper' (Runnymede Trust, 1994) which examined anti-Semitism in contemporary

Britain and had recommended that the Runnymede Trust set up a commission to consider Islamophobia. The report heralded a series of academic and non-academic studies looking specifically at Muslims and Islam in Britain and has been the catalyst for academic and non-academic publications examining every aspect of the British Muslim and in a wider global context (Allen, 2007). At the conclusion of their report the commission considered their use of the word 'Islamophobia' as being:

...not ideal but is recognisably similar to 'xenophobia' and 'Europhobia', and is a useful short-hand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam and therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 1).

The commission recognised the need for a term to describe "anti-Muslim prejudice" (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 4) and the need for a descriptor which would encompass the proposed definition however, they maintained reservations about the definition. The commission examined anti-Muslim prejudice, the history of Muslims in Britain, the role of the media in reinforcing Islamophobia, the vision of an ideal society, social exclusion and inclusion, anti-Muslim prejudice in other religions and the need for legislative change to protect Muslims. The descriptor used to encompass prejudice toward Muslims was termed 'Islamophobia', defined as:

The dread, hatred and hostility towards Islam and Muslims perpetuated by a series of closed views that imply and attribute negative and derogatory stereotypes and beliefs to Muslims (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p.1).

During their deliberations the Commission highlighted a comment made by journalist Peregrine Worsthorne who mistakenly referred to Muslims as 'Islamic' instead of 'Islamist' and who went on to link 'Islamic' to political rather than

religious Islam (Worsthorne, 1978). These terms have persisted for 20 years since the Runnymede report and still feature prominently in print media discourses of Islam and Muslims in Britain. Other views of Islam that continue to persist are the closed views of Islam as being monolithic, separate, inferior, an enemy and manipulative (Allen, 2007), effectively naturalising Islamophobia:

Criticism made by Islam of the 'West' is rejected out of hand, whilst hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p.5).

The commission noted that the fall of communism had left a space for the demonisation of Islam to flourish, quoting from Huntington's 'Clash of Civilisations' (Huntington, 1996) which some commentators say has been realised. I argue the continued reporting of a closed view of Islam and Muslims has had the effect of not only demonising Muslims, subjecting them to Islamophobia, but in promoting a growing belief that Islamophobia is justified (Allen, 2007).

The consequences of Islamophobia for British Muslims are feelings of injustice where they are perceived not to have the same rights as other British citizens. Young Muslims may develop a sense or feeling of "cultural inferiority" which may make them vulnerable to extremism and to consider using violence as a means to redress marginalisation (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 12; Davies, 2008; Khan, 2016). "Islamophobia" silences Muslim voices excluding them from society (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 12) so they can't be part of any solution.

The description and definition afforded to the term "Islamophobia" (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 1) is incomplete in terms of its failure to protect Muslims from being 'othered' in British society. Islamophobia by definition as a 'dread, hatred and

hostility to Islam and Muslims', identifies a prejudicial attitude towards a religion and its followers. I argue that this is incomplete for three reasons. First, Islam is an all-encompassing way of life in beliefs and practices for most Muslims, from which Muslims cannot be separated. Secondly, the definition fails to highlight that Islamophobia as a concept has the power to discipline Muslim autonomy for political identity within the British political arena, acting as a form of cultural racism (Kaya, 2011) or a form of governmentality (Finlay and Hopkins, 2019). Thirdly, the culpability of prejudice within the term is highly contested and legislation is ineffective to protect Muslims in law.

In considering changes that have since been made to incorporate the recommendations from Parekh (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 61), there were no changes made to blasphemy laws to include Islam or the recognition of Muslims as a distinct ethnic group, in contrast to Sikhs and Jews who are recognised and have protection in law. There have been changes in law to protect Muslims from discrimination in the workplace and elsewhere such as the introduction of religiously aggravated crimes ([The] *Crime and Disorder Act 1998* (as amended); [The] *Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006*). However Section 29J of the latter *Act* allows for expressions of "antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or practices of its adherents" ([The] *Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006*, pp. 6-7). By allowing Islam (and by association) Muslims to be insulted I argue that this furthers Islamophobia allowing it to be a vehicle for carrying stereotypical cultural, religious, and identity prejudice positioning Muslims in Britain as the 'other'.



A continuing negative discourse linking Islam to terrorism alongside many non-Muslims having little knowledge of Islam and Muslims culminates in non-Muslims not being able to contextualise the reporting of Islam and Muslims and not being able to differentiate between "what is normative and mainstream Islam and what is a diversion" (Esposito and Kalin, 2011, p. 16). Such conditions allow a 'normalisation' of Islamophobia to occur, sustaining racist and divisive political discourses.

### **2.3.1. The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain**

Following the Runnymede Trust report (1997), Bhikhu Parekh (now Lord Parekh), was commissioned to look into the future of multi-ethnic Britain. The Commission was established in January 1998 by the Runnymede Trust and chaired by Parekh. Their remit was to analyse the current state of multi-ethnic Britain and propose ways of countering racial discrimination and disadvantage, making Britain a confident and vibrant multicultural society at ease with its rich diversity (Parekh, 2000, preface). This required covering wide-ranging issues including social, economic, health, education and legislation. Their report is interesting for two potential ways that the commission saw as a way forward. The nations of Britain (England, Scotland and Wales) were viewed to be at turning points in their histories and two possible scenarios were presented: First, a narrow, inward-looking country unable to forge agreement between themselves or between the regions and communities from which they are composed. Secondly, become a community of citizens and communities at the level of Britain as a whole and within every region, city, town or neighbourhood. The Parekh report (2000) was derided by the press accusing it of 'political correctness' and according to

Pilkington (2008) was "bridling from the Macpherson Report's inferences of 'institutional racism' and looking for a way to strike back" (Morey and Yaqin, 2011, p. 50).

The Macpherson Report (1999; discussed in Appendix 7) was a wide-ranging and influential report published as a response to the murder of black teenager, Stephen Lawrence in 1993. The report was critical of the way in which the metropolitan police investigated the murder and how institutional racism, professional incompetence and a failure of leadership impeded the recognition that Stephen Lawrence's murder was racially motivated. The 70 recommendations from Macpherson's report led to changes in law and practice affecting both the police and public bodies, however, it failed to assuage Muslims in Britain by not furthering recommendations made by Runnymede (1997) in respect of amending the *Blasphemy Act*.

The Home Secretary Jack Straw initially welcomed the report from Parekh, but in the face of negative and hostile press headlines changed his stance to defending "Britishness" and attacking the "unpatriotic left" (Pilkington, 2008, para.2.4). Headlines published prior to and following the publication of the report give a clearer account of the ways the press reported Parekh's findings: "Straw wants to rewrite our history" (*The Telegraph*, 10th October 2000), "British is racist, says peer trying to rewrite our history" (*The Daily Mail*, 10th October 2000), "Drop the word 'British' says race trust" (*The Times*, 11th October 2000) "Ministers welcome report which says 'British' is racist and all our history must be rewritten" (*The Sun*, 11th October 2000), "Racism slur on the word 'British' " (*The Daily Mail*, 11th October 2000), and following Straw's comments in the face of hostile media

reporting, "Race report angers 'proud Briton' Straw" (*The Daily Express*, 11th October 2000).

Anger directed at Parekh's Report (2000) and not Macpherson's Report (1999) (which shared many of the same assumptions), was believed to be on account of the police and government largely accepting Macpherson's report. Among Parekh's findings were a selective focus on national identity, particularly notions of 'Britishness' which coupled with resentment to change (Pilkington, 2008), made Parekh's findings the catalyst for venting an uneasy perception of Britain's hierarchy in the world order. By 2003, two thirds of Parekh's recommendations had been acted upon, notably for example, religious discrimination in the workplace, and later on the introduction of a unified single equality act (Runnymede Briefing Paper, 2004).

In 2017 the Runnymede Trust's 20th anniversary report highlighted a need for a refined definition of Islamophobia (Runnymede, 2017) and for an accountability mechanism. The report suggested that, "Islamophobia is anti-Muslim racism" (*ibid*, p. 1) [short version] which should be accepted by the government and the inclusion of 'racism' in the definition ensured existing legislation could be used to enforce incidents of 'Islamophobia'. The report made further recommendations including more regulation of discriminatory media reporting and investigation by the press regulator for publishing Islamophobia, racism and hatred (Runnymede, 2017). The role of the media in reporting Islam and Muslims is covered further in this chapter and in Chapter 3 with respect to 'othering' Muslims. The report also called for a "full independent and fully transparent inquiry into the government's counter-terrorism strategy" (Runnymede, 2017, p. 3) and "an independent review

must answer whether the Prevent strategy should be withdrawn" (*ibid*). The report drew attention to whether the state should separate security apparatus from wider safeguarding or social policy strategies and not target British Muslims in their integration policies, but to encourage wider civic participation as a "shared concern" (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018, p. 55). Community cohesion (Cantle, 2001; 2012; 2017; Cantle and Thomas, 2014; Cantle and Kaufmann, 2016) is considered in Chapter 8 as a progression from multiculturalism to interculturalism.

On the 17th October 2017 Lord Bourne, when asked, "whether the government has a definition which guides its work in this area" replied, "The government do not currently endorse a particular definition of Islamophobia" (Bourne, 2017), adding that it had not attracted widespread acceptance. When the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for State in the Home Office, Victoria Atkins was asked on the 12th March 2018 whether it was time for a proper legal definition of Islamophobia, replied, "We do not accept the need for a definitive definition" (Atkins, 2018).

In November 2018 a proposed definition was put forward by the All party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on British Muslims (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018) focusing on a rise in Islamophobia and Muslim hate crime in Britain. This brought attention to the government's hate crime plan, highlighting that Islamophobia had not been included in its 2012, 2014, or 2016 versions (*ibid*).

The report by the APPG reiterated Islamophobia had become 'normalised' in everyday bigoted discourse and that not only Muslims were impacted by Islamophobia but :

...British society at large who, by virtue of normalised prejudice against Muslim beliefs and practice, come to imbibe a panoply of falsehoods or misrepresentations and, consequentially, discriminatory outlooks to the detriment of social inclusion (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018, p. 9).

The above quote taken from the APPG (2018) report, encapsulates how this research sees the ideology of Islamophobia affecting the social imaginations of non-Muslims in Britain. This is explored in Chapter 4 as 'false consciousness' and 'hermeneutical injustice' for both Muslims and non-Muslims.

The APPG (2018) report also referred to work carried out by the Runnymede Trust (1997; Runnymede Briefing Paper, 2004; Runnymede, 2017) "strongly echoing the findings of the 2004 report" (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018, p. 44) and alternative definitions, for example by the United Nations.

Similarly, reports from the Runnymede Trust (1997) and the APPG (2018) on British Muslims specified areas where discrimination against British Muslims had occurred and the definition provided is only a reference point from which to identify specific discriminatory policies and procedures: "Islamophobia is rooted in racism and is a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimness or perceived Muslimness" (*ibid*, p. 56). Building on from previous definitions the proposed definition includes 'racism' (previously proposed) and 'Muslimness', allowing discrimination for being Muslim to be covered in the definition. At the time of writing the British government has not adopted the proposed definition, and there is little hope that it will be addressed.

There are some local councils which have supported and adopted the APPG (2018) proposed definition (see Perraudin, (2019) for example), but none are legislated in the UK. Allen (2020) refers to a lack of political will by successive

governments in addressing Islamophobia. Failure in adopting the proposed definition is seen by Allen (2020, p. 125) as, "political failure, policy impotence" and a "mere smokescreen" (Allen, 2020, p. 7; Allen, 2019) to detract from it being a highly political and politicised phenomenon.

The APPG (2018) continue to push for their proposed definition of Islamophobia to be legislated by the British government, allowing British Muslims to be protected in law. I argue that if the APPG proposed definition were to be legislated, Islamophobia would lend itself to 'punitive' (see for example, Macdonald, 1999; *Counter-terrorism and Security Act, 2015*) measures being enacted, further closing down the spaces and hiding behind closed doors, the agency allowing Islamophobia as an *ideology* to be critically explored and deconstructed. It is my intention to explore the conditions in which Islamophobia reveals itself through the lived experiences of the respondents in this research rather than focus on proposed definitions of Islamophobia which, I will argue, have not fully described the hurt caused to Muslims in Britain. By employing Postcolonial and epistemic injustice thought, this research will locate conditions that have allowed Muslims to be widely considered as un-British causing them to be 'othered' and marginalised by sections of the wider non-Muslim public.

I consider and explore Islamophobia as an ideology in Chapter 4 but now turn to multiculturalism for Muslims in Britain.

## **2.4. Multiculturalism**

Having traced the journey of race and related policies that has provided protection in law for racial minority communities this chapter now examines multiculturalism

as a concept, focusing on how it has evolved from being a celebration of diversity to a system of control for Muslims in Britain.

I begin by introducing the concept of multiculturalism followed by how recognising and celebrating cultural differences progressed to highlighting cultural and religious differences for Muslims in Britain. I continue by showing how a change in government policy from multiculturalism to community cohesion failed to acknowledge Muslim identity by focusing on cultural differences and not recognising matters of faith which are central to Muslims. I consider the argument forwarded by Kymlicka (2012) and show how multiculturalism in Britain failed to accommodate British Muslims. I go on show how the events of 9/11 in 2001 and 7/7 in 2005 focused on British Muslims as a distinct group of people whose cultures and religion were stereotypically linked to breaches of human rights and terrorism respectively with little or no options in law to redress the negative and hostile reporting of them. I show how some young Muslims reaffirmed their faith and association with the Ummah engendering a political awakening leading to them opposing areas of government foreign policy seen to marginalise fellow Muslims. Throughout this section I will continue to show how reactive government policy and legislation lessened Muslim agency to publicly celebrate multiculturalism by its metamorphosis into the Prevent Strategy. Prevent securitised Muslims, limiting their agency for political public dissent and subsequently by the introduction of Fundamental British Values, portrayed them as outsiders, questioning their loyalty to Britain, and reinforcing the view that depicted British Muslims as foreigners.

The term 'multiculturalism' comes from countries with long historical experiences of immigration for example, Canada, Australia and the United States. Initially the term referred to European settlers who were expected to assimilate (have Anglo-conformity) and attain citizenship (Modood, 2007). When non-whites were allowed to settle it was accepted that full assimilation would not be possible due to cultural differences but some assimilation would occur (*ibid*). Multiculturalism in Britain had a narrower focus particularly on racism and the right to settle which may not be a concern for countries where citizenship is bound by issues associated with a legacy of colonialism (*ibid*). This chapter will study the British experiences of multiculturalism and its effect on Muslims living in Britain.

A common view of multiculturalism (for example, Thomas, 2012) sees multiculturalist policies pre-2001 focused on supporting minority communities (financially or otherwise) with the unintended effect of reinforcing differences between ethnic minorities and perceived mainstream culture. Thomas (2012) argues that minority identities were strengthened resulting in an inward looking society where some chose to live "parallel lives" (Cantle, 2012, p. 15). Parekh (2000) argued that since the inception of multiculturalist policies the world evolved to expose more people to diversity or a "super diversity" (Cantle, 2012, p. 140) where relationships constantly change. Hope for a more positive relationship between diverse communities failed to materialise culminating in some communities retreating into their own identities, embracing identity politics, and supporting separatist ideologies (Cantle, 2012).

Multiculturalism has generally allowed for the celebration and recognition of cultures to exist in diverse communities (Lentin and Titley, 2011). This has been



strengthened by changes in legislation and training in diversity issues so public bodies may be aware of and be sensitive towards the needs of people from different races and cultures (*Race Relations Act, 1976*). However, a central theoretical criticism of multiculturalism is that groups and cultures "do not exist in the ways it is presupposed" (Modood, 2007, p. 82), and that culture and those who share culture are not all alike. Succinctly, "the cultures or groups it speaks of do not exist (*ibid*). An anomaly in highlighting differences in race and culture are the exaggerations in the differences instead of the commonalities between people resulting in essentialising groups for convenience. This position may be considered in the context of multiculturalism unwittingly and benignly being a colonial device in segregating minority communities. However, for many Muslims living in Britain, Islam defines identity with culture being enacted from differing traditions and heritage. It may be that multiculturalism for some is not as important as recognition and respect for example, to be recognised as a practicing Muslim, particularly when government considers that religion "is not necessary for the functioning of the state" (Modood, 2007, p. 25).

Government appears to have abandoned multiculturalism around 2001 following rioting in Northern towns and cities including Oldham, Burnley and Bradford (Thomas, 2012; Thomas and Sanderson, 2011). Well-meaning policies introduced since 1981 may have improved situations for minority communities in Britain, including a reduction of marginalisation and disadvantage, see for example, [The] Scarman Report, (1981), [The] Swann Report (Department of Education and Science, (1985), [The] Burnage Report (Macdonald, 1989), [The] Macpherson Report (Macpherson, 1999), [The] *Race Relations Amendment Act (2000)*, [The]

*Equality Act (2010)*. However, an unintentional downside of a reification of identity (a hallmark of multicultural approaches), was minority communities grouped together in areas sometimes disparagingly referred to as "ghettos" (Cantle 2012, p. 140), where trans-national loyalties to culture took precedence over free mixing between cultures. Cantle (2012, p. 59) argues that some communities learned that to be different created a political advantage rewarded in terms of "representation and resources". Ouseley (2001, p. 10) however, reported that ethnic groups were increasingly desegregating themselves to protect themselves from fear of "harassment and violent crime" and "to promote, retain and protect faith and cultural identity and affiliation". Establishing minority community areas in some cases led to "white flight" (Cantle, 2012, p. 60) where traditional white working-class communities relocated to predominantly white residential areas. Furthermore, a decline in industry (which at one time fuelled a thriving economy), economic disadvantage, competition for limited poorly paid work, and a rise in far-right wing groups in northern towns, all contributed to rioting in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley in 2001 (Amin, 2003; Cantle, 2012, p. 96). The new focus of government was now on 'community cohesion' which was seen as the antidote to 'toxic' multiculturalism (Lentin and Titley, 2011), now judged to be 'not fit for purpose'.

Cantle's (2001; 2012) community cohesion approach reinvigorated the concept of contact theory encouraging interaction and common experiences to reduce the potential for stereotyping, prejudice and irrational fears to flourish. The government were keen to progress community cohesion, blaming rioting on Muslim youths and the Muslim community for self-segregation, failing to learn

English, forced marriages and generally failing to conform to 'Britishness' (Pilkington, 2008, para.3.3; *Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007*) and British values. The government appears to have forgotten Macpherson's (1999) emphasis on institutional racism, along with the decline in the textile industry leading to the deprivation of largely Muslim communities as being significant factors creating conditions leading to the disturbances. The focus for the government was 'fitting in' and not the celebration of diversity or culture which I argue is a move from "defensive multiculturalism" (Cantle, 2012, p. 56) which sought to protect minority communities by legislative means at the expense of integration, maintaining a "multicultural separateness" (*ibid*). "Anti-racist politics has long struggled with and against multiculturalism" (Lentin and Titley, 2011, p. 14). I continue with the impact that legislation has on multiculturalism.

The introduction of legislation to protect minority communities from racial abuse also saw conditions of so-called "political correctness" emerging (Modood, 2007, p. 54) allowing urban myths to flourish about what may or may not be allowed to be said about people from minority communities. The unintentional consequence of the myth of political correctness, particularly in the tabloid press, was a closing down of spaces where conversations between different races and cultures could occur (Browne, 2006). Younge (2010, p. 60) noted that in the period of one month in 2006, the British press used the term 'political correctness' "on average ten times a day". A reluctance to speak about racial differences (which may be associated with historical inaccuracies in biological determination and superiority), allowed a new category to be created where difference may be hierarchically positioned as culture and cultural difference. This allowed differences between

people to be progressed as a narrative that did not focus on race, thereby avoiding being accused of racism. For Muslims in Britain attacks on their faith is a "continuation of the racial vilification, by using faith as a proxy for race" (Cantle, 2012, p. 49).

Aly (2015) argued that there is a clear genealogical line from biological racism to its replacement with ethnicity and culture as markers of identity within the context of British ethnic governmentality. Furthermore, multiculturalism has been misread as a failed anti-racist project and that its coming and going "seems inconsequential" (Aly, 2015, p. 31) and it will emerge as another set of policy terms "to repackage and obscure Britain's unresolved postcolonial condition" (*ibid*; Hesse, 2000; Gilroy, 2006). I argue that postcolonial conditions exist for Muslims living in Britain and that focusing on cultural differences distracts from addressing postcolonialism.

Highlighting differences between cultures subjects them to categorisation where individuals are grouped, pigeonholed and labelled for convenience (Storry and Childs, 1997) allowing minority groups to be targets of demonisation either politically or by the media. I argue that replacing race with culture allows unfettered prejudice to be facilitated against minority communities by imposing notions of belonging and identity to be couched in so-called British values. This makes it easy to criticise multiculturalism by adopting the default position in arguing that we do not have agency over our race but have agency over our culture. This infers that decisions whether to integrate and assimilate in society are individual choices when many Muslims in Britain believe that their religion and culture are inseparable and are indivisible in constructing their identities (Hopkins

and Gale, 2009). This has given rise to generalising that Muslims are inextricably monocultural and by definition unable to integrate although included in the multicultural family (Modood, 2007). "Self-segregation" (Cantle, 2012, p. 60) may not always be a free choice, being concerned more with socio economic factors when contrasted with "white flight" (*ibid*) which may be more of an informed decision by some of the majority population in Britain.

Another area where control may be exerted over minority communities is the distribution of political resources for example, where political containment or a "micro-colonialism" (Lentin and Titley, 2011, p. 11) may be employed. Lentin and Titley (2011) suggest that multiculturalism may be seen as an area where the coded evasions of political correctness can be discussed, such as race, culture, legitimacy and belonging. Multiculturalism may be presented as a "failed experiment" (Lentin and Titley, p. 2011, p. 13) where anxieties of migration, globalisation and socio-political transformations can be explained or lamented as a benevolent naive attempt to manage the problem of difference. Lentin and Titley (2011, p. 14) argue that the "death of multiculturalism" came after 9/11 to be replaced by a politics of "shared values" which serve to identify "those who do not possess them and must be cultivated and coerced to respect them". McGovern (2017, p. 49) argues that the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) has:

little or nothing to do with people being 'drawn into terrorism' ", but is directed at a suspect community of British Muslims predicated on a rejection of multiculturalism and the promotion of an integrationist agenda.

Politics has the capacity to affect society in many ways. For young British Asians living in Britain, (most of whom are Muslim), being disengaged from society is more indicative to their membership of a social underclass in Europe rather than

their perceived allegiance to foreign politics for example, events concerning Muslims in the Middle East. "This alienation is cultural, historical and above all religious, as much if not more than it is political" (Rieff, 2005, para.2). The riots in the British northern towns occurred before the events of 2001, which is recognised as a watershed in a deterioration of relations with the Muslim community in Britain following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (McRoy, 2006; Thomas, 2012 ). Britain's Asian community was already a marginalised community before 9/11 (Allen, 2015) with tensions existing between Asian and white communities. The drive of multiculturalism in maintaining minority group identity was at odds with the expectations that migrants would assimilate and accept the values of their new countries. However, although multiculturalism had made many societies a fairer place in which to live when compared to life before its inception, it has been dogged by the criticism that "modest gains are taken as licence to ignore and negate continuing and shifting racism in multicultural societies" (Lentin and Titley, 2011, p. 14).

Characterised by class divisions, British society has seen the importance of class as a marker of social identity diminish in importance (Storry and Childs, 1997; Malik, 2015). After the working-class lost economic and political power with the demise in traditional industry and union power, the difference between the politics of the left and that of the right ceased to be so far apart. The institutions that once brought disparate communities together had gone and the emergence of the global market caused some communities to seek identity not in political terms but in ethnicity, culture or faith (Malik, 2015). People defined the community they belonged to instead of the kind of society they wanted (*ibid*). Multicultural policies

that had recognised and financially rewarded the various ethnic minority communities discovered there were more ethnicities present in British society than were expected resulting in competition between "communities for resources" (Malik, 2015, p. 3). To be ethnically different was seen as being key to entitlement: the more different the ethnic need, the better chance of having power and influence (*ibid*). The issue for Muslims, however, was not so much an identity based on ethnicity, but an identity based on religion, which did not fulfil multicultural criteria in being a distinct ethnic group (Hopkins and Gale, 2009). "Religion is far more important to Muslims' sense of identity than it is for others" (Ipsos MORI, 2018, p. 37).

Having highlighted culture and cultural differences instead of structures of power associated with ethnic and class inequality, multiculturalism created a framework where minority communities may be categorised. I suggest that when categorisation is established, comparing and contrasting those who are perceived to be different progresses seamlessly to stereotyping. Essentialising groups of people and allowing multiculturalism to be used as a space where "cultural racism" (Modood, 2007, p. 9) is produced, sanctions minority communities to be marginalised without fear of accusation of 'racism' (Modood, 2007; Hopkins and Gale, 2009). Building on a multicultural framework is thus straightforward in invoking concepts such as for example, British values, citizenship, belonging, integration, assimilation and identity. I argue that creating a stronger national identity based on colonialist styled and imaginary values magnifies difference, highlighting vulnerable communities.

When New Labour came to office in 1997, there was much emphasis on rebranding Britain as being 'Cool Britannia', as a "young country" (Tony Blair), a "mongrel" nation (Gordon Brown), a "chicken tikka masala eating" nation (Robin Cook) (Modood, 2007, p. 9). However, following civil disturbances in the northern towns in Britain and the attacks of 9/11, there followed Government reversal in promoting multicultural policies (Modood, 2007) and a focus on British Muslim loyalty to Britain. Sections of the British press were keen to hear Muslims opposing terrorist attacks (referred to incorrectly as 'jihad'), which ultimately led to questioning Muslim citizenship in Britain (Morey and Yaqin, 2011). Criticisms of multiculturalism continued with Malik (2001) arguing that it unwittingly helped to segregate communities far more effectively than racism. Young (2001a) claimed multiculturalism was a useful Bible for 'Jihadis' to override their civic duties with Meer (2006) claiming that a 'politically correct' multiculturalism had fostered fragmentation rather than integration for Muslims who imposed self-segregation. The Chairman of the Race Equality Council Trevor Phillips said that "multiculturalism was useful once but is now out-of-date, for it made a fetish of difference instead of encouraging minorities to be truly British" (Baldwin and Rozenburg, 2004, quoted in Modood, 2007, p. 11).

For proponents of multiculturalism however, the announcement of its death is premature. Kymlicka (2012) defines multiculturalism as being "ideas about the political and the legal accommodation of ethnic diversity" (*ibid*, p. 1) and that it still remains a live option for Western democracies. Kymlicka's (2012, p. 2) checklist posits that multiculturalism works best:



1. If relations between the state and minorities are seen as an issue of social policy, not as an issue of state security.
2. There is a shared commitment to human rights across ethnic and cultural lines.
3. There are no fears over border controls.
4. When immigrants come from many countries rather than one.
5. When immigrants are seen as contributing to society, particularly economically.

I argue from a British perspective (how Muslims are perceived within Britain), the checklist for the successful implementation of multiculturalism indicates we cannot implement multiculturalism.

Notwithstanding that Kymlicka (2012) uses of the term 'immigrant', the checklist is important for British Muslims who are widely viewed as 'foreign' and in the context of this research which positions Muslims as 'othered' and are seen to be 'immigrant' rather than British (Phoenix, 2018). Kymlicka (2012) furthers his position saying that when the facilitating conditions are seen as high-risk multiculturalism is most needed. He does not, however, support giving religious groups protection in law as part of a multicultural society, claiming that some Muslim leaders may use such laws to control apostasy within the Muslim community rather than use it as control against hostile discourses against non-Muslims (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 43).

It is important to recognise the multicultural paradigm employed in Britain so we can see how a weakening of Muslim agency came about, particularly post 9/11, when discourses of Muslim identity became widely known. Prior to the events of 9/11, Muslims had generally been subsumed into a category defining them as

being 'Asian', using perhaps their Country of heritage, for example Bangladeshi or Pakistani-British (Modood, 2007). Following 9/11 Modood (2007, p. 97) argues that many young people are likely to identify as "British Muslims", reinforcing their religious identities, or as Younge (2010, p. 147) argues, "not a religious revival, but an establishment of identity". I argue that as world events unfolded, their identity and worth as British Muslims in a multicultural society was questioned, including questioning the extent to which Muslims embrace human rights pushing them further to the margins of British society.

"Multiculturalism is itself a human rights-based movement, inspired and constrained by principles of human rights and liberal democratic constitutionalism" (Kymlicka, 2012, p. 8), the goal of which is to challenge those illiberal and cultural practices that have been called into question by the human rights movement. Acknowledging this, as multiculturalism aligning with citizenship, it is logical to assume that groups 'associated' with such practices such as forced marriage, female genital mutilation, criminalisation of apostasy (Kymlicka, 2012) and homophobia, may be seen as an antithesis of the multicultural family.

While culture and perhaps other religions may be interpreted differently, Islam and its associated practices govern the day-to-day activities of many Muslims (Bari, 2004). In particular the Holy Quran (Quran, 2000) is seen as irrefutable by Muslims and understood to be the words of Allah. Attempts to interpret Islam may be seen as apostasy (Eaton *et al.*, 2008) therefore interpretations are unlikely, even though failing to do so would be seen by some to offend areas of "human rights" (Lentin and Titley, 2011, p. 223; Morey and Yaqin, 2011, p. 22).

According to Esposito and Kalin (2011) an obstacle in the continuation of the multiculturalism debate for Muslims is the "secular-liberal ideals of the European Enlightenment" (*ibid*, p. 5) which were deemed to be the only emancipatory power in the modern world (Esposito and Kalin, 2011) which could not "accommodate a non-Western religion such as Islam" (*ibid*, p. 5), thus preventing Muslims from taking part in multicultural debate. This isolates Muslims to negotiate their identity in a hostile media controlled discourse of ethnic and religious profiling. Muslims who identified themselves as Muslim before becoming British were accused of having dual or multiple loyalties jeopardising their right to full citizenships in the eyes of commentators (*ibid*). Bano (2010) argues that all people in public spaces are expected to embody notions of Britishness regardless of culture and religion. Those, whose cultural and religious differences are deemed to be unacceptable in the public space, find themselves to be the focus of "regulation, surveillance and management of specific religious communities in British society" (Bano, 2010, p. 136), permitting the state to define limits of religious practice in public spheres.

An absence of multiculturalism and an environment of securitisation for Muslims living in Britain allows a constant 'othering' of Islam and Muslims by questioning their loyalties or by referring to Islam as being incompatible with British values. The wider media's use of cultural markers for example, the hijab, veil, and cultural dress in defining all Muslims are frames of reference discussed in Said's 'Orientalism' (Said, 1978) which is considered as the foundation document in the field of postcolonialism.

The events of 9/11, the subsequent invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan by American and allied troops and latterly the conflicts in Syria created a relatively new social

category in Britain, namely, the 'Muslim community' (McRoy, 2006; Thomas, 2012). There have been Muslims in Britain for hundreds of years, however, attacks on the twin towers in New York in 2001 and subsequent political and military incursions changed how Muslims were viewed (*ibid*). Widespread Islamophobia in Britain along with attacks on Muslims and Mosques produced a verbal backlash with some outspoken and unrepresentative radical Muslims being reported by the British media (Petley and Richardson, 2011).

The concept of the Ummah is an important area for some Muslims in Britain who see the plight of fellow Muslims as something they are duty bound to alleviate. If they feel that Muslims abroad are being treated unfairly as a consequence of British foreign policy, then it is incumbent for them to protest against the British government. However, this is often seen and reported by government and the media as non-conformity by British Muslims and reluctance to fully integrate into British society and embrace British Values (Lander, 2016, p. 275; Smith, 2016). A refusal, perceived or otherwise, by Muslims to assimilate, cooperate, and adhere to British values, positioned them as potential threats which could not be politically controlled by multiculturalism (Modood, 2007) and thus positioned multiculturalism as having failed in the political supervision of Muslims. A different approach to the social superintendence of Muslims was now deemed necessary by the government. In 2006 the Prevent Strategy (HM Government, 2006; Home Office, 2011a) was launched, having previously existed as part of the government's ongoing counter-terrorism strategy within the United Kingdom. The examination of the Prevent Strategy is an essential constituent of this research. I argue that

Prevent has replaced multiculturalism with a structure akin to colonialism seeking to control British Muslims within their own country.

The media have an important role in accurately presenting news to the general public. At one time reference to the media generally referred to newspapers and televised coverage by the broadcasting channels. Nowadays the media has grown to include online coverage such as social media platforms including, Twitter, Face Book and YouTube, attracting millions of followers worldwide (Petley and Richardson, 2011). Online platforms are rarely subject to regulation and can be forums where hateful, biased comments on Islam and Muslims may be made. This form of biased reporting resulted in marginalising Muslims, not only causing hurt and anger to Muslims, but also negatively affecting knowledge of Muslims. As a matter of caution, it is relevant to comment that the extent to which the media (in all its forms), influences the public perception of Islam and Muslims is "contentious and debatable" (Allen and Nielsen, 2002, p. 46). I now turn to examine the extent to which the media negatively presents Islam and Muslims, in turn shaping how the public is presented with an increasingly securitised discourse.

### **2.5. The Role of The Media in the Reporting of Islam and Muslims in Britain post 9/11**

Throughout this thesis I refer to 'the media' as being responsible for negatively reporting Muslims in Britain supporting the argument by referencing the print media, which is the default position. I acknowledge there are other sources of media including broadcast and online platforms and will cite the appropriate sources when referring to media other than print. Where references are made to

'the media' by authors who do not specify the type of media referred to, I use the term 'wider media' to encompass this.

The Western print media have a long history in negatively reporting Islam and Muslims (Ahmed and Matthes, 2016). Reporting largely focuses on using extreme examples to support stories which invariably describe the actions of a minority in Britain or the actions of terrorists purporting to be Muslims. In using their considerable power in such an essentialist framework the media creates hostility in the social imagination of its audience reinforcing perceived differences between Muslims and non-Muslims, engendering 'us and them' discourses. Imaginary historical recantations such as 'Christianity versus Islam' are supported for example, by the theories of Huntington (1993; 1996) positioning Islam and Christianity appearing as irreconcilable. As a consequence of the media focusing on cultural difference such as Islamic cultural dress for example, the thobe and the hijab, they present Muslims as belonging to Middle-Eastern regions not in Western society, where they are portrayed as unwelcome foreigners whose allegiances lie within Islamic states (Morey and Yaqin, 2011).

Since 9/11, a higher profile has been assigned to Islam and Muslims whose identities as Muslims were tarnished initially by the actions of terrorists for example, Al Qaeda (the base), and more recently the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ISIS and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL (acronyms used by the press as translations for terrorists operating within Syria) (Tharoor, 2014). These groups continue to justify criminal acts for political gain in the name of Islam. In Britain atrocities carried out by terrorists claiming to be Muslim and having allegiances to ISIS, do much harm to the safety and credibility of Muslims

living in Britain. This includes Muslims who are vocally anti-British being featured prominently by the media, even though they are not representative nor enjoy widespread support from Muslims in Britain (Morey and Yaqin, 2011).

It follows that the unintended effects of multicultural policies resulting in minority groups appearing more different (Cantle, 2012) and the implementation of the Prevent Strategy (Mohammed and Siddiqui, 2013) (which focused on the Muslim community post 9/11), has led to discourses of Islam and Muslims in Britain appearing different or 'othered'. I argue that 'othering' Muslims has allowed for an expectation by the majority community that Muslims need to be regulated so that they conform to notions of "Britishness" (Lentin and Titley, 2011, p. 184) and "at a moment's notice be erected as objects of supervision" (Morey and Yaqin, 2011, p.6). Furthermore, tolerating other values and opinions is limited by the parameters set by the majority community in any society (Seth, 2001).

Sections of the print media portray Islam and Muslims as being in binary opposition to British society without space for differing interpretations in the ways Muslims live their lives. In contrasting the Western discourse on individualism, Islam is presented as distinctly 'communal', relying on third world traditions, sharia law, arranged marriages, the segregation of men and women, and the perceived subjugation of women at the hands of bearded misogynists:

The dominant view in the UK media is that there is no common ground between the West and Islam, and that conflict between them is accordingly inevitable (Petley and Richardson, 2011, p. 250).

The dominant view presented by the print media may not be as philosophical as Petley and Richardson (*ibid*) who allude to Huntington's theories (1993).

Alternatively, it may be as straightforward as the media wanting to sell newspapers and be part of the burgeoning anti-Muslim discourse framed for example, around 'British values' as the antithesis of inclusive multiculturalism, positioning Muslims as outsiders. I argue that by the media adopting tactics such as dialogic framing including stereotyping and the use of metonymy to visually depict Muslims and Islam negatively, it creates a 'normalisation' of Islam and Muslims associating both to discourses of suspicion and fear in the social imagination of Britons.

Following 9/11 Islam was thrust into the spotlight as an ideology responsible for driving acts of terrorism around the world and by association, Muslims as potential terrorists (Petley and Richardson, 2011). The print media were quick to capitalise on the sensationalism of portraying a visible ethnic minority not just by the colour of skin, but by clothing, culture and religion (*ibid*). The terrorists responsible for their crimes had ensured this legacy by purporting to be Muslims guided by Islam to legitimise their acts of terrorism. Media reporting of terrorists showing hostages being killed fuelled an unprecedented level of attacks on Muslims and Mosques around the world (Petley and Richardson, 2011). From this a succession of 'home-grown' terrorists was identified in Britain and attacks in London on the 7th July 2005, known as 7/7; the attack on Glasgow airport on 30th June 2007, and more recent attacks in Paris (*BBC News*, 9th December 2015), London for example, (*BBC News*, 23rd May 2013; *BBC News*, 22nd March 2017; *BBC News*, 3rd June 2017; *BBC News*, 14th August 2018; *BBC News*, 29th November 2019; *BBC News*, 2nd February 2020) and Manchester (Smith and Chan, 2017) solidified the view that Britain was not safe from the 'Islamic terrorist'.



By focusing on the Rushdie Affair, 9/11, 7/7 and other events, British Muslims are portrayed by the print media as "angry fundamentalists" (Archer, 2009, p. 74) who are asked to "explain and situate themselves and their religious identities/practices through a simplistic, narrow dichotomy" (*ibid*). By the print media highlighting differences along with a decline in working-class jobs in the manufacturing industry in Britain since the early 1980s has provided fertile ground for the seeds of xenophobia to grow, particularly when jobs are in short supply, or the need for services are being stretched. The sight of a non-white person gaining social advantage before a white person is ideal fodder for the likes of far right-wing groups in Britain to promote xenophobia within communities. The British National Party (BNP), who were "active" (Phillips, 2009, p. 25) in many poorer communities for example, Rochdale, Bradford and Oldham following the rioting in 2001, find recruitment and support for their ideologies far greater in number than in previous years (Chappell *et al.*, 2010; Lewis, 2007).

The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), set up in 1997, was initially courted by the government who wanted a "single representative body" for Muslims in Britain (Morey and Yaqin, 2011, p. 83). However, the government quickly discovered that the MCB was not representative of Muslims, did not always align with the views of the government and therefore was not a body that they could control or, from its representation, be able to exert influence over Muslims in Britain (Lewis, 2007). Having control over people who largely have an identity and culture based upon faith was proving to be difficult for the government, who will only recognise them if they "don't rock the boat" (Morey and Yaqin, 2011, p. 111). A lack of representation in government means that many Muslims feel that politics, particularly at a National

level does not represent them (Ahmed, 2009), nor can they enjoy protection from the law as other racially defined groups. Such a situation evolved as a result of successive courts failing to accept Muslims as a distinct ethnic group, unlike Sikhs and Jews. Islam is a religion and a Muslim follows that religion; this is an important area of contention and one which has been debated for some time (Bari, 2004). Because religion is separate from race the wider media are able to negatively report Islam and by association Muslims. Reporting British Muslims within a narrow dichotomy for example, only in terms of their 'Muslimness', "they do not appear as 'normal' members of British society and the 'British public" (Archer, 2009, p. 74) and "that the current media panics are enacting a form of representational violence on Muslims in Britain" (*ibid*, p. 75). The negative reporting of Islam and Muslims by the Western media in response to local and global issues is now further explored.

The attack on the twin towers on 9/11 was a watershed in many ways. It identified the mastermind behind the attack, Osama Bin-Laden, showed Prime Minister Blair and President Bush united in the 'war on terror', and created a hiatus in journalism that allowed journalists to be swept up in the national feelings of fear and outrage (Bonner, 2011). Bonner (2011) recalls the many incidents post 9/11 that journalists were quick to report and sensationalise that subsequently turned out to be untrue, particularly when journalist use the phrase "linked to Al Qaeda" (*ibid*) so their stories would be published in the print media. Bonner acknowledges his part (and other journalists) in failing to check allegations fed to them by intelligence officials without any journalistic investigation. In the British media:

There is general consensus among observers of Western media that on September 11, 2001, the conventional rules of newsgathering and reportage ceased to apply (Pludowski, 2007, p. 31).

From a journalistic aspect it was held that previous reports of terrorist attacks positioned the terrorists for example, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as "holding out the possibility of negotiation and resolution" (*ibid*, p. 31). However, the attacks on 9/11 were completely different. Al Qaeda's declaration of war to bring down Western democracy meant that any objectivity in reporting was not forthcoming from the Western news media, just as it wasn't in their coverage of the Nazis in 1939-45 (Pludowski, 2007). A lack of a journalistic detachment signalled an uneasy alignment of the media with the aims of the state in its "war on terror" (Morey and Yaqin, 2011, p. 214), with the Western media reluctant to critically examine or report Muslim grievances.

Biased reporting of Islam and Muslims by some of the media is constructed in a framework where a balanced counter-view or argument is rarely allowed (Sobolewska and Ali, 2012). The media create frameworks predominantly focusing on "terrorism and cultural differences" (*ibid*, p. 678) and it is vital therefore that the reader takes responsibility to interpret the story being reported. Said (1981) argues that the reader needs to work through their own affiliations with society, including patriotism, and must draw on their formal education and understanding, employing disciplined reason in order to gain knowledge of other societies and cultures. This task is more difficult when the reader has to make reasoned decisions based on the wider media's single or "alternative narrative" (Petley and Richardson, 2011, p. 22) between Islam and the West (Petley and Richardson, 2011), reinforced by the inference that Muslims are a suspect community and "doubts are cast on their loyalty as citizens" (Modood, 2009, p. 194).

It is beyond the scope of this research to investigate 'reason' as a way of arriving at a sound conclusion, save for the work of Mercier and Sperber (2017), who say that when faced with moral judgments based upon our emotions, we are unlikely to change our view even when faced with a credible counter-view. However, if we were individually engaged in a debate over such an issue then we may well change our minds (*ibid*, p. 307).<sup>1</sup>

I argue negative media reporting, the twin spectres of securitisation in the form of Prevent and the influence of Fundamental British Values contributes to discriminatory and exclusionary practices against Muslims. I further argue that prior to 9/11 Muslim identity was subsumed within being referred to as Asian, post 9/11 Muslim identity has been hijacked by the wider media, securitised by the state and enveloped in a postcolonial construct creating imaginary borders around those who are 'othered' within its society.

It is difficult to assess the impact that negative reporting has, for example, on either a rise in hostility toward Muslims or on an individual being the victim of a hate crime. It is well documented that a rise in "anti-Muslim attacks" (Khan, 2016, p. 190) on Muslims and/or Muslim places of worship occurs following terrorist attacks where Islam or Muslims are purported to be involved (Tellmama, 2018; Petley and Richardson, 2011; Hopkins and Gale, 2009; McRoy, 2006; Morey and Yaqin, 2011). Reporting these attacks accurately or with a negative bias can result in a rise in so-called Islamophobia in either case. It is the stereotypical link between the

---

<sup>1</sup> This research has used an epistemic injustice approach to analyse CoE data with credibility of testimony being a central theme in being able to further a credible counter-view (see Chapter 8).

attacks and all Muslims that is of concern with negative media reporting reinforcing the link. The following research by Allen (2012), which was presented to the All party Parliamentary Group on Islamophobia, documents the role of the traditional British broadcast and print media in their reporting of Islam and Muslims. While there is no direct evidence that the media causes Islamophobia or hatred toward Muslims in Britain, Allen (2012, p. 3) argues that research shows "the media plays a fundamental role in the formulation and establishment of popular views and attitudes in society". I provide a summary of Allen's research to illustrate how negative reporting of Islam and Muslims in Britain by the Western media "shape and inform the ideological component of Islamophobia" (Allen, 2012, p. 5).

I acknowledge that there are also other messages and meanings that inform Islamophobia as an ideology:

1. 64% of the British public claim that what they know is 'acquired through the media' (YouGov poll from 2002).
2. 74% of the British public claim that they know 'nothing or next to nothing' about Islam (YouGov poll from 2002).
3. Research from 2006 suggests that the press coverage relating to Muslims and Islam in British newspapers had increased by approximately 270% over the preceding decade.
4. 91% of that coverage was deemed negative
5. 84% of press coverage represented Islam and Muslims either as 'likely to cause damage or danger' or 'operating in a time of intense difficulty or danger'
6. Research from 2008 once again confirmed that the press coverage of British Muslims had increased significantly since 2000, peaking in 2006, and remaining at high levels in 2007 and 2008.
7. 2008 was shown to be the first year in which the 'volume of stories about religious and cultural differences' (32% of stories by 2008) overtook terrorism related stories (27% by 2008) (Allen, 2012, p. 2).

Allen's (2012, p. 2) research concluded that the consequences of this type of media coverage was:

- Likely to provoke and increase feelings of insecurity, suspicion and anxiety amongst non-Muslims;
- Likely to provoke feelings of insecurity, vulnerability and alienation amongst Muslims, and in this way to weaken the Government's measures to reduce and prevent extremism;
- Unlikely to help diminish levels of hate crime and acts of unlawful discrimination by non-Muslims against Muslims;
- Likely to be a major barrier preventing the success of the Government's community cohesion policies and programmes;
- Unlikely to contribute to informed discussions and debate amongst Muslims and non-Muslims about ways of working together to maintain and develop Britain as a multicultural, multi-faith democracy.

Research carried out by Whitaker (2002) prior to and after 9/11 found that there had been increases in the publication of articles involving Muslims ranging from the *Daily Express*, 219% to the *Sun*, 658% where:

All Muslims were becoming homogenised as an indistinguishable and undifferentiated group where all of its members 'Muslims' were seen to have the same attributes, qualities, capabilities and characteristics most of which were extremely negative ( Allen, 2012, p. 7).

A report published five years later suggested a worsening of the negative reporting where the newsworthiness of Islam and Muslims on a 'normal' week had increased by approximately 270% (Poole, 2002; Allen, 2007).

Research carried out by Cardiff University (Moore, *et al.*, 2008) confirmed the previous report adding that approximately 36% of all stories involving British Muslims now involved terrorism with an association being made between Islam and

Muslims involving threats, problems or opposition to dominant British values.<sup>2</sup>

Cardiff University further reported that the media presented the view that Islam is dangerous, backward or irrational with nouns such as terrorist, extremist, Islamist, suicide bomber and militant being used. The most common adjectives used were radical, fanatical, fundamentalist, extremist and militant, with negative assessments prominent in the tabloids (*ibid*). Negative reporting of Muslims and Islam by the media has created the illusion of the Muslim as a single entity whose allegiances lies in foreign lands, with covert links to terrorism and a rejection of Britishness, explicitly, the enemy within.

On Tuesday 20th February 2018, oral evidence was presented to the Home Affairs Committee on 'hate crime and its violent consequences' (Commons Select Committee, 2018). The impact of evidence being presented culminated in the publication of 'Islamophobia Defined', (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018) referred to earlier, and some 21 years after calls for the definition of Islamophobia to be re-defined. In respect of Islamophobia and the print media, it is relevant here to include the evidence given by Rt Hon Baroness Warsi and Professor Chris Frost, Chair of the Ethics Council, National Union of Journalists. Baroness Warsi commented on Islamophobia passing the 'dinner table test' (*ibid*; Allen, 2020, p. 104) and said that other than herself, no mainstream politician had spoken about Islamophobia. Warsi spoke about the daily occurrence of untrue stories about Muslims in the British press and its effect in normalising Islamophobia

---

<sup>2</sup> It is pertinent at this stage to note that there is now a statutory obligation for teachers to promote Fundamental British Values, the definition of which migrated from the wording in the Prevent Strategy (see Chapter3).

within the public arena (Commons Select Committee, 2018). She further pointed out the dangers of 'normalising' by the public perception influencing politicians in their decision-making processes with regard to policy. She recalled how two of her fellow politicians had commented to her about the context of a story about Muslim family fostering a 'Christian' girl, published by the Times newspaper, which has proved to be false (IPSO, 2018) with *The Telegraph* urging Politicians to hold an inquiry (*The Telegraph*, 2017). Giving oral evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee (Commons Select Committee, 2018), Professor Frost said that newspapers editors were putting pressure on journalists to look for and create stories about Muslims which were designed to "raise issues of fear to sell newspapers", and to "pick an 'othered' group from the community and make them fearful". He continued saying that newspapers were under commercial pressure from social media outlets to sell newspapers (*ibid*). Furthermore, newspapers could publish largely defamatory stories about Muslims, without fear of prosecution or rebuttal from its regulatory authority IPSO (Independent Press Standards Organisation) set up by publishers, which he referred to as being "unfit for purpose" (Commons Select Committee, 2018).

On 29th November 2012, The Leveson Inquiry into 'Culture, Practice and Ethics of the Press', was published. It evidenced, among other issues, wrongdoing by the British press, who were telling journalists to look for Muslim stories (Leveson, 2012). Leveson (2012, volume 2, Chapter 6, paragraph 8.51) commented that "the evidence of discriminatory, sensational or unbalanced reporting in relation to ethnic minorities, immigrants and/or asylum seekers, is concerning". At the conclusion of part one of the inquiry Leveson made recommendations to the government which



included regulation of the press. This was dismissed by the Prime Minister David Cameron. Part two of Leveson's inquiry was scheduled to be heard at the conclusion of police inquiries which were ongoing at that time. In the week following evidence from Baroness Warsi, the Sun and Telegraph newspapers offered apologies over inaccurate stories written a year previously (Osborne, 2018). During the same week the *BBC* broadcast a story concerning unregistered schools in London focusing on inappropriate behaviour by a 'teacher' within an unregistered Jewish school. There was also footage shown of 'Forbidden', a book written by Muhammad Saleh al-Munajjid, advocating the murder of gay people, which the *BBC* claimed came from an unregistered school in Birmingham (Titheradge, 2018), even though the focus of the report was the abuse within the Jewish school. The broadcast also featured an interview with Ofsted's Chief Inspector, Amanda Spielman, who lamented the lack of power that Ofsted had to intervene and prosecute unregistered schools. Spielman is a supporter of Fundamental British Values being taught in schools and following the General election in June 2017 agreed with Prime Minister David Cameron on the need to teach children British values so they can be resilient against extremism (Pells, 2017). Spielman (2018) criticised schools for focusing too much on league tables above pupil interest and said that Ofsted inspectors would hope to "find good examples where schools have mastered this teaching, so that others who have struggled with the new requirements can build on their work" (*ibid*). Spielman also wanted schools to actively "promote fundamental British values" to "counteract terrorism", quoting the recent attacks in Westminster, London Bridge, Manchester and Finsbury Park (Spielman, 2018). The day after the *BBC* broadcast, (Titheradge, 2018), the *BBC* reported that the then culture Secretary Matt Hancock had announced that the

second part of the Levison inquiry was not needed, citing that the press had "cleaned up its act" (*BBC News*, 1st March 2018). While Health Secretary Hancock dismissed Warsi's pursuit of a campaign against Islamophobia saying, "there are others who take a more balanced approach" (Malik, 2019).

## **2.6. Conclusion**

This chapter has focused on the shift of Governmental policy from a multiculturalist agenda to one of reactionary and largely punitive legislation. The role of the media in creating a single narrative of Islam and Muslims in the mind of the non-Muslim majority community thereby creating the illusion of a suspect community of British Muslims by misrepresenting them has been examined. The literature cited has been selected for its relevance in the creation of conditions within British society where Muslims have been subject to marginalisation. In Chapter 3 I continue to argue that multiculturalism was replaced by the Prevent Strategy, however, this is only so for Muslims and would not be relevant for other minorities in Britain in the ways Prevent and its association with so-called 'Fundamental British Values' has impacted on their lived experiences (Home Office, 2011a; DfE, 2014). This anomaly allows for the majority non-Muslim communities in Britain to remain firmly outside of the framework of securitisation that has been created, and as such engenders them with a perspective on Muslims which I argue in Chapters 4, 6 and 7 are constructions of epistemic injustice. Political policy and intervention are designed typically to curb certain behaviours and rarely "change public opinions, attitudes or thinking" (Allen, 2020, pp. 45-46).

More recently, Modood (2019) has argued for a new form of multicultural secularism where religious minorities are treated in the same ways as other racialised groups. Modood calls for religious minorities to be accommodated in the here and now instead of a one-size-fits-all approach where Muslims living in Britain are marginalised by a multiculturalism that prioritises secularism over religion. Modood (2019, pp. 14-15) calls for "compulsory religious education" (including Humanism) in schools and a widening of multifaith perspectives so that in understanding religion a multicultural recognition for Muslims will occur. Islamophobia is central to understanding how Muslims living in Britain are marginalised. In this Chapter I examined Islamophobia as a concept. In Chapter 4 I examine Islamophobia as an ideology and suggest a reframing of Muslim voices in a secularly informed paradigm as a way to challenge Islamophobia. I accept this approach is at odds with Modood's position in accommodating religion in multiculturalism, and I recognise that reframing Muslim voices is not an attempt to diminish their identity but to challenge Islamophobia by the most effective means available in conditions of postcolonialism that exist for Muslims living in Britain.

I have considered the following as being important considerations when critiquing Multiculturalism in this chapter. In Appendix 7 at 11.7, I provide summaries of each to place them in context.

- [The] *Race Relations Act 1965, 1976, Race Relations Amendment Act 2000.*
- [The] *Equality Act 2010.*
- [The] Scarman Report (Scarman, 1981)
- [The] Burnage Report (Macdonald, 1989)

- International conflicts and Muslim reaction (1990-2012) (No references provided for International Conflicts)
- [The] Macpherson Report (Macpherson, 1999)

In Chapter 3, I continue the literature review bringing into focus the British government's Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Home Office, 2011) and in particular the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) which I argue, influences the social imagination of Muslims and non-Muslims living in Britain, colonising the minds of the former and shaping public opinion of the latter.

### 3. CHAPTER 3: POST 9/11 AND MUSLIM COMMUNITIES

#### 3.1. Introduction: The Prevent Strategy

The Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a), is part of the government's counter-terrorism strategy referred to as CONTEST (Home Office, 2011). Prevent is designed to be the "hearts and minds" approach in stopping people from becoming terrorists or engaging in terrorist activity (O'Toole *et al.*, 2016, p. 162). It has been revised several times since its inception in 2003, often in response to terrorist activity either domestically or globally. Since 2015, it has become statutory within public bodies including schools (*Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*). The messages it wishes to give are therefore embedded in the public consciousness through the statutory requirements and its dissemination through public bodies including schools, colleges and universities.

In this introduction I begin by providing an account of early development in the Prevent Strategy, linking it to domestic and world events that have contributed to its development. I go on to examine its progression and subsequent legislative development which I argue can be seen as part of the history of engaging with minority communities that has emanated from government since 1976 (*Race Relations Act 1976*), "from where Britain's multicultural policies were developed" (Warikoo, 2019, p. 5). In Chapter 2, I provided an overview of key milestones on the journey from multiculturalism to a time when the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) had effectively replaced multiculturalism for Muslims in Britain. In providing an account of how the media, in particular the British press, negatively reported on Islam and Muslims I acknowledge that Prevent may have contributed to the ferocity of media coverage by deliberately placing Muslims within a

securitised framework. In this chapter I focus on how Prevent, and its focus on Fundamental British Values (FBV) has marginalised Islam and Muslims enabling sections of the media to stereotype them by situating them within a legislative and security framework.

I introduce the idea that the current Prevent Strategy unfairly marginalises Muslims by the statutory limited choices presented to them in either assimilating to FBV (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) or being viewed as potential security threats (Warsi, 2017). I argue that this limits the extent to which Muslims can participate in free speech and political debate within Britain. I also examine the statutory obligation of educationalists to teach so-called Western-based FBV and to report those perceived to be at risk from radicalisation (DfE, 2015). By migrating part of the definition of extremism from the Prevent strategy into statutory duties to teach FBV (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) FBV has been subsumed into the National Curriculum. I present an argument to support the claim that Prevent duties alienate Islam as a religion and by inference Muslims.

A fundamental concept employed in this thesis in examining the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) and FBV (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) is Epistemic Injustice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013), which is examined in Chapter 4.

### **3.1.1. The Background to Prevent**

The United Kingdom Government's overall response or "counter-terrorism strategy" to the threat of terrorism whether committed at home or abroad is referred to in abbreviated form as CONTEST:

The aim of CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence (Home Office, 2011, p. 3).

The 2011 policy is the fourth publication since its inception in 2003; revisions took place in 2006 and 2009. The policy is split into four areas or objectives commonly known as the four P's: Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare.

Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks; Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism; Protect: to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack; and Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack (Home Office, 2011, p. 6).

The United Kingdom has a history of having to respond to the threat of terrorism, particularly in response to the years referred to as 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland where the IRA (Provisional Irish Republican Army) and other off-shoots such as the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) were engaged in acts of terrorism (Thomas, 2012). Following the attacks that occurred in the United States of America on the 11th of September 2001 (9/11), the long-running military involvement in Afghanistan from October 2001 and the subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2003, a new threat emerged in the form of 'Al Qaeda', "a major global threat" (Hopkins and Gale, 2009, p. 185) which, along with its affiliated groups, are threats to 'The West' which includes the United Kingdom.

On the 7th of July 2005 (7/7), four British Muslims carried out a series of suicide bombings in London, attacking the city's transport system resulting in the deaths of 52 commuters and causing life-changing injuries to many more. Two of those responsible for the attacks, all from the West Yorkshire area, had recorded video tapes of themselves warning the British Government about involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq (London Assembly, 2006; Petley and Richardson, 2011).

A further failed attack in London on the 21st July 2005 (*BBC News*, 16th December 2014) and a subsequent attack on Glasgow airport in June 2007 (Brocklehurst, 2017), reinforced the potential threat from so-called 'home grown terrorists', or "home grown bombers" (Younge, 2010, p. 185) who self-identified as Muslims engaged in a Jihad, or war.

The interpretation of 'Jihad' is widely reported on ranging from 'Holy war' to a 'struggle for a good cause' and are wide-ranging as are definitions of what is a Muslim (Kundnani, 2014; Lewis, 2007). One interpretation argues that a person cannot be Muslim if they engage in violence toward another, while others say a Muslim (a follower of Islam), has authority under Jihad to use violence toward enemies of Islam (*BBC*, 3rd August 2009). It is the latter of these two definitions that CONTEST focuses its considerable might. The differences between the threat in Northern Ireland and that of so-called "Islamic extremists" are considerable. During 'The Troubles' (1968-1998) it was generally accepted (although there were some exceptions) that terrorist attacks were preceded with a warning so as not to involve civilian casualties. With so-called Islamic terrorist attacks, no such warnings are given. Civilians are seen by these terrorists as being supportive of their democratically elected governments and therefore are indirectly targets. This has been demonstrated by attacks in Europe where so-called Islamic terrorists carried out atrocities in Spain, France and Belgium resulting in the loss of life and life-changing injuries for members of the public (Eurojust, 2018), (see also, Sbrant, 2006; *BBC News*, 14th January 2015; *BBC News*, 2nd September 2020; Williamson, 2020).



Recent attacks are now being claimed by an incarnation of previously fragmented terrorist groups now known as ISIS or ISIL, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, which is alternatively translated as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. A change from Al Qaeda came about in 2014 after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was named its caliph and as such the so-called caliphate claimed religious, political and military authority over all Muslims (*BBC News*, 28th October 2019). The claiming of a caliphate essentially extended a duty upon all Muslims to 'do the bidding' of the caliph including upholding Sharia law. For some Muslims, this was seen as a 'call to arms', and if possible, followers should travel to support ISIS in the areas that they operate, which at the time of writing are Syria and Iraq. ISIS does not represent the majority of Muslims who overwhelmingly abhor its use of indiscriminate violence. The trans-national call to arms, however, is one that can and has resulted in a few Muslims changing their ideologies to align with that of ISIS. It must of course be reiterated that the mainstream and moderate interpretation of a Muslim is one who is a follower of Islam and as such is a peaceful person who will not support acts of violence. Unfortunately, the term 'Muslim' is subject to being negatively stereotyped as someone who is a potential terrorist or whose loyalties to the country they reside in is questioned (Petley and Richardson, 2011; Fekete, 2009; Khan, 2016). It is this background that has influenced the development of Prevent.

### **3.2. The Emerging Prevent**

Prior to the attacks in Britain on the 7th July 2005, the Prevent strand had been the least developed of the four strands making up the CONTEST Strategy (Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2011). Since October 2006, it has become "the

world's most extensive counter-radicalization policy" (Neumann, 2011, p. 21), culminating in 2015 where Prevent training in a wide body of public arenas was made statutory by part five of the *Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*. This included Local Government, the National Health Service, Universities, colleges and schools, with the onus on staff to additionally report those at risk of, or who have been, radicalised (*Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*). This of course is an important area in order to keep the United Kingdom safe by identifying potential terrorists. However, It is fraught with danger as this aspect of the Prevent Strategy may be seen as a 'witch hunt' or a hunting down of the 'enemy within' by stereotyping Muslims and linking them with a terrorist group which selectively chose to include 'Islamic' in its name for example, [The] Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The dangers in allowing 'home grown terrorists' to escape the notice of the authorities is a concern for those responsible for protecting British citizens. In response to the 7/7 bombings in London, Thomas (2012, p. 28) noted:

The attackers were four young men from West Yorkshire in the North of England, 3 of them Pakistani-origin from Beeston in south Leeds, and one an African-Caribbean convert to Islam from nearby Huddersfield. All had been brought up and educated in Britain, with broad Yorkshire accents.

The Prevent Strategy is the eyes and ears of the security services and reaches far into the community to try and identify those who are most at risk of radicalisation. Under the Labour Government, the policy was commonly referred to as Prevent 1 and under the coalition Government, as Prevent 2, (Home Office, 2011a) as reviewed by Lord Carlisle.

The most recent change to the Prevent strategy is found within part 5, Chapter 1 of the *Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015* which created a statutory duty:

...on a range of Government organisations working with the public, including the police, local authorities, prisons, schools, and universities, to prevent people being drawn into terrorism (Cumbria Safeguarding Children Partnership Procedures Manual, 2015).

The 2011 Prevent strategy has three objectives:

1. Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it;
2. Prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and
3. Work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address (Home Office, 2011a, p. 7).

In addition to the work of Prevent, it is crucial to consider that the other three areas of CONTEST (Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2011) are actively prosecuted in Britain. Some, which have been subject to legislative change (*Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*) include temporary passport seizure, exclusion orders, investigation measures, internet protocol, border security, and Channel (HM Government, 2015), a voluntary deradicalisation programme operated through Prevent (discussed in Appendix 8). However, the focus of this chapter will remain the Prevent strategy through its history and its impact on the Muslim community which are discussed in the analysis of the interview data in Chapters 6 and 7.

### **3.2.1. Security Legislation**

At the time of data collection with the young men and women who took part in the CoE, the *Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015* was three to four years away from implementation and there was no statutory element of the Prevent strategy

operating in schools or universities. There was, however, the *Terrorism Act 2000*, which legislated against engaging in terrorism or threats of terrorism and had wide-ranging powers for the security services to stop and search, detain and arrest those suspected. The Act also listed proscribed groups including domestic and international organisations that the Home Secretary deemed 'concerned in terrorism'. Those having an affiliation with proscribed groups allowed the security services to suspect them of being concerned in terrorism. Section 13 of the Act also extended to wearing of:

...an item of clothing such as to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation is sufficient to be prosecuted for a terrorist offence (*Terrorism Act 2000*).

Although legislation had roots in outlawing paramilitary styles of uniform worn in public by some groups in Northern Ireland, it was viewed by some to include traditional and cultural styles of Muslim attire as being signifiers of a potential terrorist instead of a signifier of traditional or conservative Muslim values and religious piety (Pool, 2017). This stereotyping is at its most dangerous when a Muslim's "ethno-religious identity" (Modood, 2007, p. 98) is seen as having an association with terrorism. Unfortunately, this is most prominent for Muslim women who wear the hijab, Niqab, or burqa that are highly visible as Muslim (Allen and Nielsen, 2002).

Stereotyping Muslims is a catalyst for hate crime and anti-Muslim attacks, which increased following the vote to leave Europe in June 2016 and following subsequent terrorist attacks in Britain (Runnymede, 2017). This highlights how, in a 'supposed' multicultural society, identity politics has permitted the hijab to be excluded from one's cultural heritage and positioned as a religious signifier of

identity, associating female Muslims with oppression or terrorism (Morey and Yaqin, 2011). Some Muslims feel they are singled out by the law as potential terrorists due to cultural dress and practices leading some to limit displays of 'Muslimness' in public, "where to look like a Muslim or to be a Muslim creates suspicion, hostility, or failure to get the job you applied for" (Modood, 2007, p. 65). Displays of pious or conservative ethno-religious clothing worn by some Muslim men may be seen by some as signifiers of a Muslim identity that will attract unwanted attention from the security services (Bonino, 2013). Displays of ethno-religious dress is not, of course, an offence, unless it supports a view that the wearer is a member of a banned or proscribed organisation, for example 'ISIS' (*Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*). However, stereotyping in its most negative forms has potential to create association in supporting terrorism restricting agency for some Muslims.

Legislation introduced to strengthen security in Britain includes amendments which make it an offence to be in possession of books or items for the purposes of terrorism (Section 57), and to collect information useful for terrorism (Section 58) *Terrorism Act 2000*. These have proved perilous for some Muslims when accessing the internet either out of curiosity or for research if they are found in possession of such material (Fekete, 2009).

While the security services would of course wish to prosecute those that are suspected of committing terrorist offences, the Act restricts those, some of whom are young Muslims, from accessing potentially hostile and inflammatory texts. This research suggests this may limit their abilities to challenge violent ideologies rather than protect them against radicalisation.

### 3.2.2. Critics of Prevent

The rationale in highlighting Muslims and Muslim communities creates a single narrative about Muslims where the actions of a minority of those claiming to be Muslims, stereotype all Muslims. Islam and Muslims are subsequently viewed as being associated with Islamist violent extremism domestically and globally and in doing so fall under the remit of the government's counter-terrorism strategy (Home Office, 2011), which has attracted generous funding and personnel to implement its various strategies, including Prevent (Thomas, 2012). The same cannot be said for other forms of domestic violent extremism some of whom have advocated violence, for example, animal rights groups, anti-globalisation and anti-capitalisation protestors, and far-right wing groups (*ibid*), who are not targeted with the same intensity as Muslims. It may be because these groups do not fall under the category of international terrorism that they are given a lesser priority from the counter-terrorism agenda, which is reflected in their lack of media coverage. However, more recently Extinction Rebellion (an international global environment movement) were temporarily deemed to be an extremist organisation (Grierson, 2020) under Prevent, with more than 250 people in Wales being referred to Prevent amid concerns of extremism (both right wing 24% and so-called Islamic 15%) (*BBC News*, 5th February 2020).

Since 9/11, the invasion of Iraq, Afghanistan, and conflicts in Libya and Syria has seen the rise of ISIS as a major terrorist group (Tharoor, 2014). Events coupled with the atrocities perpetrated by terrorists purporting to be Muslims across the world, have stigmatised and marginalised a world-wide community of Muslims who are overwhelmingly peaceful. At domestic levels, a rise in Islamophobia (Esposito

and Kalin, 2011; Kumar, 2012; Runnymede, 2017; Allen, 2020 ) has seen Muslim communities become more insular in the face of what they perceive as an attack on their loyalty to Great Britain creating "invisible boundaries across which members of the Muslim community are not 'welcome' to step" (Runnymede, 2017, p. 38). According to critics of the Prevent Strategy (Busher *et al.*, 2017; Thomas, 2012; Bonino, 2013), Prevent (Home Office, 2011a) securitised Muslims in Britain due to the actions of a few British Muslims and terrorism worldwide carried out by terrorists calling themselves Muslim.

Continuing the critique of Prevent, we now turn to how the introduction of FBV in schools and its subsequent legislation made Muslims feel different.

### **3.2.3. Schools and Prevent: from Fundamental British Values to Statutory Duties**

In 2014, the Government decided that British values should be taught in schools (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) largely as a result of the so-called "Trojan Horse affair" findings (Holmwood and O'Toole, 2018, pp. 127-141) where evidence of an Islamist campaign to target certain schools was allegedly uncovered (Wilshaw, 2014). The alleged attempts by some governors of the schools to control the appointment of favoured staff, as well as curriculum content, was viewed as the progression of a narrow-minded religious-based ideology (*ibid*). The alleged evidence of anti-white, anti-Christian, anti-Jewish, homophobic and gender segregation by some schools all contributed to the fuelling of the anti-Islam and Muslim campaign. The appointment of Peter Clarke as Education Commissioner for Birmingham was also viewed by some as controversial as Clarke had previously been Deputy Assistant Commissioner with the Metropolitan Police in

London leading the Counter-terrorism Command (Holmwood and O'Toole, 2018).

Clarke's appointment led Sir Albert Bore, Labour council leader for Birmingham, to comment:

I think many of the community in Birmingham would not want an investigation to be conducted along those lines because they do not believe that the activities in the schools are the starting point for terrorism in the city (*BBC News*, 15th April 2014).

The Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Chris Sims, also referred to Clarke's appointment as "desperately unfortunate" (*BBC News*, 15th April 2014).

A main part of Clarke's remit was to investigate the allegations largely in relation to child safeguarding which concluded that there was no evidence of terrorism, radicalisation or violent extremism in the schools of concern in Birmingham.

Clarke was at pains to mention within his executive summary that he did not look for evidence of terrorism, but that there was clear evidence that some people in positions of influence within schools, espouse, endorse, or fail to challenge extremist views (Clarke, 2014). Clarke made specific reference to the definition of extremism in the Prevent strand of the CONTEST strategy and appeared to link this to Prime Minister Cameron's speech at Munich in February 2011 (Cameron, 2011). During his speech the Prime Minister denounced the doctrine of state multiculturalism which he claimed had encouraged different cultures to live separate lives and to allow segregated communities to behave "in ways that run completely counter to our values" and that it had allowed a "weakening of our collective identity" (*ibid*). Cameron also announced that his government would now be more proactive and would not shy away from confronting the ideology of extremism in all its forms including organisations that did not believe in universal



human rights, including for women, people of other faiths, equality before the law, democracy and whether they encourage integration or separation (Cameron, 2011). The Prime Minister's speech came on the same day that 3,000 English Defence League supporters marched through Luton chanting anti-Islamic slogans. This was viewed by some commentators to be ill-timed on the part of the Prime Minister as his speech was seen by some right-wing activists as an endorsement of their views (Helm *et al.*, 2011; Taylor and Davis, 2011). The reaction by some Muslims was that the speech was just another example of an attack on Islam and Muslims, with the Muslim Council of Britain's assistant secretary general, Dr Faisal Hanjra describing it as 'disappointing' (*BBC News*, 5th February 2011). Among the findings of the Office for Standards in Education's (Clarke, 2014; Wilshaw, 2014) report into the 'Trojan Horse' controversy (Holmwood and O'Toole, 2018), was one of the schools inspected by Clarke had failed to protect children from the risks of radicalisation and extremism. This prompted the then Education Secretary Michael Gove to announce in the House of Commons that schools in future would be required to "actively promote 'British values' " (Gove, 2014) but did not say what they were, leaving the media and other commentators to forward their own definitions including equality between genders and tolerance of other faiths (Wintour, 2014; Struthers, 2017, p. 96). The promotion of British values was not new and was originally included in the Department for Education's Teachers' Standards (DfE, 2011). What is of interest within the document is that the definition of 'Fundamental British Values', which include "democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs" (*ibid*, p. 9), is taken from the Prevent strategy's definition of "extremism" (Home Office, 2011a, p. 107) to define an extremist as in "vocal or active

opposition to fundamental British values" (*ibid*). The original definition was brought about to clarify particular groups or organisations, including Muslim groups, that the Home Office would or would not fund, or talk to and work with, dependent on how they fit into the definition. The rationale behind this is the ideology or narrative known as 'Islamism', based on a theory claiming that it was the root cause of terrorist acts (Richardson and Bolloten, 2014). The Standards' document (DfE, 2011) required teachers not to undermine the above values within and outside of school. To reiterate, the definition of extremism taken from Prevent (Home Office, 2011a) and legislated includes:

...the vocal or active opposition to our shared values. These include democracy and the rule of law, mutual respect and tolerance of other faiths and beliefs (*Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*).

The definition of Fundamental British Values, legislated by DfE (2014, p. 5) guidance is:

...democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths.

As a codicil to the so-called 'Trojan Horse Affair', the investigation established that there was no attempt to 'Islamicise' schools or any evidence of radicalisation (Holmwood and O'Toole, 2018). There was contestation over concepts of British values, and that the schools in question were judged on their implementation of the Prevent Strategy when there was, at that time, no guidance issued (Holmwood and O'Toole, 2018). Holmwood compared the handling of the so-called Trojan Horse Affair to the Hillsborough scandal (Scraton, 1999; Hillsborough. Report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel, 2012), and was later quoted as saying that he could think of no other case in which the government and media had so

destructively colluded to create a false narrative of events that vilified an entire community (Osborne, 2018). A Parliamentary select committee concluded:

We note once again that no evidence of extremism or radicalisation, apart from a single isolated incident, was found and that there is no evidence of a sustained plot nor of a similar situation pertaining elsewhere in the country (Education Select Committee, 2015).

However, in 2014, the government's drive for 'British values' to be implemented in schools continued unabated with the Department for Education (DfE, 2014) announcing that they would censure schools for failing to actively promote what it calls "Fundamental British Values" (Osborne, 2018; Revell and Bryan, 2016). The guidance offered by the Department for Education preceded the findings of the official enquiry into the 'Trojan Horse Affair' (Holmwood and O'Toole, 2018) which raises the question whether the government used the affair to implement the promotion of its 'British values' agenda rather than wait for its findings, as argued earlier (Allen, 2015; Struthers, 2017). In this thesis I argue the 'British Values' agenda is part of a political drive to 'normalise' the differences the public at large perceive between themselves and Islam, and by inference British Muslims. Furthermore, FBV are "open to conflicting interpretations, and over the years have had different meanings at different times and in different contexts" (Richardson and Bolloten, 2014, p. 10; Struthers, 2017), leaving educators largely to their own devices in implementing FBVs (*ibid*). This research further argues that FBV in the curriculum may be seen as educative practice, formally used in colonial settings (Fanon, 1952; 1961), and is considered in this research as a postcolonial construct. I now turn to how the British values agenda became part of the educational agenda, and through statutory legislation, part of the curriculum.

### 3.2.4. Fundamental British Values

The Department for Education published its 'Promoting Fundamental British Values' advice document in November 2014 (DfE, 2014). The advice was deemed as non-statutory although under section 78 of the *Education Act 2002*, schools in England were required to promote the spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development of pupils at the school and of society (DfE, 2014, p. 3; *Education Act 2002*). The publication of the document was met with mixed responses, particularly considering schools were already obliged to follow the framework of the Equality Act (*Equality Act 2010*), which included much of what FBV were seen to be. However, prior to 2014 there were several statements by British politicians who inserted their own interpretations of 'British values' into the public domain, with Tony Blair proclaiming "fighting poverty and unemployment", "securing justice and opportunity" and being a "compassionate society" (Blair, 1997; Struthers, 2017, pp. 93-94). Blair continued, "fair play, creativity, tolerance and an outward-looking approach to the world" (Blair, 2000; Struthers, 2017, p. 94), "the belief in democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, equal treatment for all, respect for this country and its shared heritage" (Johnston, 2006; Struthers, 2017, p. 94). Gordon Brown continued the theme during a speech (Brown, 2004), illustrating... "a strong sense of national identity", "a passion for liberty anchored in a sense of duty and in an intrinsic commitment to tolerance and fair play", and "the idea of duty as the virtue that reinforces neighbourliness and enshrines the idea of a public realm and public service". Following the 2005 terrorist attack in London committed by radicalised British citizens (London Assembly, 2006), the government commissioned a report to strengthen "national identity and British values through the curriculum" (Osler, 2008, p. 12) making the issue of

'Britishness' part of the English secondary school curriculum (Department for Education and Skills, 2007).

In 2011 the coalition government's review of Prevent (Home Office, 2011a, p. 107) defined 'extremism' as being "vocal or active opposition to FBV" laying down the seeds for FBVs to be made statutory for education (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015), along with Prevent duties (Home Office, 2011a) being legislated by the *Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*, thus connecting Prevent with the Curriculum in England and Wales. The delivery of FBV by teachers was not straightforward with divisions over exactly what British values were and whether they are shared by all (Maylor, 2014). As the definition of extremism was migrated from the Prevent Strategy, teachers were perturbed by "such blatant reinforcement of teachers as instruments of the state within a liberal democracy" (Lander, 2016, p. 275).

Although the introduction of FBV may be popular having political consensus, they were not wholly representative and seen as "troublesome" when forging cohesion (*ibid*). According to Hoque (2015), this was intentional, creating notions of insider-outsider citizen or "the subaltern internal 'Others'" (Taras, 2013, p. 420) reflecting notions of postcolonialism. Political and military events across the world, as well as European incidents of terrorism and the events covered in this chapter, have led to "the proliferation of securitised requirements for schools such as the need to promote Fundamental British Values" (Lander, 2016, p. 275) leaving teachers and student teachers to rely on "nostalgic imperialist constructions of Britishness" (*ibid*, p. 276), when what should be taught is a transformation of British values to:

...embrace an inclusive notion of Britishness which reinforces notions of belonging to a multicultural, multilingual and multiethnic Britain no matter where schools are sited in the country (Lander, 2016, pp. 278-279).

I acknowledge that the delivery of Fundamental British values in Northern Ireland has "relatively little association with national security and Islamism as framed by the Prevent Strategy" (McCully and Clarke, 2016, p. 354).

An alternative interpretation of FBV has been explored by Smith (2016) who examined 'Britishness' within the framework of racist nativism to examine constructions of 'Britishness' through political, media and student-teachers' comprehension. Using the definition by Perez Huber *et al.*, racist nativism is defined as:

The assigning of values to real or imagined differences, in order to justify the superiority of the native, who is perceived to be white, over that of the non-native, who is perceived to be People and Immigrants of Colour and thereby defend the rights of whites, or natives to dominance (Perez Huber *et al.*, 2008, p. 43).

In respect of native racism and its association to FBV, the responses from student-teachers in Britain over a 3-year period revealed an awareness of FBV along with references to the 'other', without actually naming the 'other'. Students also tended to "position those who constitute the 'us' as superior, replicating political and media presentations" (Smith, 2016, p. 309).

In essence, therefore, the racist nativist discourse apparent in the students' responses demonstrate how the term FBV is a signifier for the 'what' and 'who' of Britishness, the who of Britishness, constituting the 'us', are those who hold these values and do the tolerating of 'others', and in so doing, are superior (Smith, 2016, p. 310).

Smith (2016) concludes by acknowledging that students were thinking critically about FBV, recognising its effects on pupils and their families and giving hope for opening up critical debate between students. However, Smith warns of the proposal by Ofsted to introduce Prevent training into teacher education and that such training may be provided by external organisations without students having

an understanding of the political history that has led to notions of 'Britishness' (*ibid*). "In short, we may witness the collapsing of discussions on identity to assertions about security" (Smith, 2016, p. 311). In respect of FBV, Struthers (2017) argues that a vague definition by the government may be part of broader policies of a patriotic nature which "can be a powerful political tool" (Cole, 2000; Glazer, 1997; Soutphommasane, 2012).

There is an existing body of literature that would suggest that the FBV agenda may represent an expression of nationalistic sentiment and a desire to retain exclusivity in the face of ever-greater multiculturalism (Soutphommasane, 2012, pp. 30-31).

The above would appear to add weight to claims made in Chapter 2 that multiculturalism has been weakened for Muslims in Britain, at the expense of Prevent (Home Office, 2011a) and FBVs (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015).

There is a deceit in legislating that educators work "hand in glove" (Sukarieh and Tannock, 2016, p. 29) with security services to deliver a politically driven agenda of "official thinking biases and prejudices" (*ibid*) without being able to question British foreign policy for fear of being labelled 'radical' and 'extremist'. I now turn to the introduction of legislation which ensured compliance from educators.

### **3.2.5. Statutory Duties**

The introduction of the *Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015*, Part 5 Chapter 1, placed statutory duties to deliver Prevent by public bodies, including schools, colleges and universities. At the National Union of Teachers annual conference in Brighton in March 2016 the General Secretary Christine Blower said:

The NUT believes there is a moral obligation on schools and teachers to protect children and young people against extremism of whatever nature. The Union does, however, have some concerns regarding aspects of the current Prevent strategy (Blower, 2016).

The General Secretary's comments came after a motion was put forward and backed by delegates at the conference calling for Prevent to be scrapped:

Teachers have voted overwhelmingly to reject the Government's prevent strategy, designed to tackle extremism, over concerns that it causes "suspicion in the classroom and confusion in the staffroom" (Adams, 2016).

One delegate at the conference, Gary Kaye from North Yorkshire, called for the Government to withdraw the Prevent duty from schools and colleges "and stop education professionals being the secret service of the public sector" (Adams, 2016, unpagged ). Whilst Alan Kenny, an NUT executive member who moved the motion said that teachers were receiving Prevent training "of varied context, provided by a multiplicity of organisations, without accreditation or regulation" (*ibid*). The conference reaffirmed its opposition to Prevent, claiming Prevent stopped teachers discussing global issues and the legitimate "expression of (political) opinion" by students (NUT, 2016, p. 39; Sukarieh and Tannock, 2016). One prominent NUT activist, Rob Ferguson (Ferguson, 2015, 32.53-33.15) addressing the 2015 Marxism conference quoted from paragraph 10 of the 'Prevent duty to schools' saying that, "non-violent extremists purport to identify grievances to which terrorist organisations then claim to have a solution" and "that one clause wipes out any pretence or claim at a commitment to free discussion and debate in the university lecture hall or the classroom". Geraint Evans, Ofsted's National Lead for Extremism took an opposing view about shutting down debate for fear of referral to the authorities, "good practice is where schools and



college look for opportunities for young people to have discussions about controversial issues" (Dickens, 2015, unpagged). The advice from the Department for Education concurs with Evans wanting extreme views discussed and challenged within the classroom, rather than closing down debate. One head teacher described having the dual problem of parents subscribing to far-right wing and Islamist extreme views (Khan, 2016).

The 2015 University and College Union conference claimed Prevent would force its members to spy on learners, "help racist parties such as UKIP to flourish" and encourage discrimination against Muslim staff and students and normalise racist views in society (UCU Left, 2015). The 2016 NUT conference "voted that the Government should entirely withdraw Prevent from schools and develop a totally new strategy" (Khan, 2016, p. 110).

According to Sukarieh and Tannock (2016), a growing concern for schools, colleges and universities was the erosion of radicalism as "an expression of legitimate political thought" (*ibid*, p. 24) due to the term 'radicalism' being embedded in Counter-terrorism strategies, influencing individual education policies. Not only are Prevent and FBV harmful to young Muslims but their agency to challenge government for its policies may be seen to contribute to social problems in Britain (Sukarieh and Tannock, 2016). This includes criticism of Western foreign policy in the Middle East, which for some Muslims living in Britain, is highlighted by the concept of Ummah due to British foreign policy affecting Muslims worldwide. This has implications for Muslims and non-Muslims who want their voices heard within the largely abandoned "radical tradition in education at precisely the time it is needed most" (*ibid*, p. 24). Furthermore, educators may be

reticent to engage in promoting "transformational educational practice" (*ibid*) for fear of being seen to condone 'radicalisation' within the remit of Prevent (Home Office, 2011a). Now that 'radicalisation' is policed in educational establishments and often positioned alongside policies that include, "sexual exploitation, crime, drug abuse and child neglect" (Sukarieh and Tannock, 2016, p. 34), it is no wonder that young people are "fearful of speaking out and being labelled as radical" (*ibid*). I acknowledge that radicalisation is a contested term founded on concepts of vulnerability, which as indicators of radicalisation, may unfairly categorise young people in pre-criminal spaces (Heath-Kelly, 2013; O'Donnell, 2018).

### **3.2.6. How Prevent has been Implemented in Schools and colleges**

The United Kingdom is the only nation in the world to deliver counterterrorism within its education, healthcare and social care sectors as safeguarding (Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2018, p. 10).

It is important to separate the statutory duties of educators in referring a young person under the Prevent strategy guidelines, and their focus on teaching and reinforcing 'Fundamental British Values' in a diverse multi-ethnic community. The latter has proved problematic for some teachers to define British values. Some schools adopted alternative descriptions such as "school/college values", "community values", "democratic values" and "universal values" (Busher *et al.*, 2017, p. 28). It appears phrasing 'British values' was seen to have connotations of harking back to the "British Empire and all that kind" (*ibid*), and it, "feels a little bit BNP, UKIP-y to sort of say, I mean patriotism's kind of been robbed from us hasn't it really, in some respects?" (Busher *et al.*, 2017, p. 27).

It is clear from Busher *et al.*, (2017) that teachers recognised a rise in the popularity of right-wing politics globally which affected patriotism being unfairly seen through a prism of division and racism, particularly where Muslims were concerned. Furthermore, teacher professionalism culminated in some engineering terminology to lessen any offence or suspicion to young Muslims (*ibid*). The report by Busher *et al.*, (2017) also shows how Prevent has largely been successfully implemented within schools by teachers having better training, comfortably subsuming Prevent in the school's safeguarding procedures. There is however, issues as to whether or not to report and refer young people having had 'difficult conversations' with students over issues affecting them. Furthermore, whether it is more appropriate they should be discussed and delivered to young people by the 'Prevent team' responsible for Local Authority delivery in schools (*ibid*). Teacher training is limited to issues of safeguarding either by accessing an online course, for example WRAP (Home Office, 2020) or online resources recommended by Prevent , but not, I argue, including matters concerning foreign policy which may be relevant to some Muslim students as they explore their understanding of the Ummah.

It is vital that young people have spaces where they can talk about 'dangerous or difficult conversations' they feel strongly about in an environment where they can have answers as well as state their views. Teachers may be able sanitise FBV in its delivery, whereas there is little room to sanitise 'difficult conversations' other than closing down debate. Although some teachers claimed (Busher *et al.*, 2017) they were confident or fairly confident in having conversations about extremism and radicalisation, when interviewed, some staff commented that there were some

areas such as Syria and ISIS-inspired extremism, where they did not know enough to answer, to continue with 'difficult conversations,' or because of "saying the wrong thing, getting it wrong" or that "comments would be misconstrued as racist or Islamophobic" and "I think that's a real fear in the [further education] sector" (*ibid*, p. 34 ). The authors of the survey were keen to make the distinction of teachers being confident in their responsibilities for having conversations with students about extremism and radicalisation within their safeguarding frameworks, compared with actually having those "difficult conversations" (Busher *et al.*, 2017, p. 35), "or at least that their confidence in having such conversations is of limited depth" (*ibid*, p. 36). The research showed that 83% of staff who were part of a safeguarding team or those with specific knowledge were confident with having 'difficult conversations', while 45% of those who were not part of that team or in the case of recently qualified teachers said they were "confident about implementing the duty" (Busher *et al.*, 2017, p. 38). This appears to show that subsuming Prevent in the remit of safeguarding policies made it easier to deliver. However, this does not negate the issue that Prevent duties are at work "through the lens of a securitised framework of surveillance" (O'Donnell, 2017, p. 178), and may be seen as a "pedagogical injustice" (*ibid*). Teachers also reported Prevent was "clearly a continuation of monitoring and reporting already in place" (Busher *et al.*, 2017, p. 53), and that 43% reported more open discussions. However, in response to the question 'has the Prevent duty made it more likely or less likely that Muslim students might feel stigmatised?' 14% reported 'considerably more likely,' and 43% 'more likely'.

Research carried out by Taylor and Soni (2017, p. 242) showed the "securitisation of educational settings inevitably limits freedom of expression" and that they are no longer considered safe spaces for political and moral debate (Saeed and Johnson, 2016). Considering the critics of Prevent, post 2015, such criticism must be viewed as 'work in progress' as at the time of writing there are daily examples of opposition to the implementation of Prevent appearing in the media, almost exclusively relating to over-zealous or security-focused intervention by teaching staff. This is an unfair criticism of educators who very often have received limited and/or poor quality training, and as Khan (2016, p. 112) notes, how many teachers, for example, would know the differences between the "conservative practices of Islam and extremist beliefs".

The Prevent strategy addresses both far-right and so-called Islamist extremism (Home Office, 2011a). These can be difficult areas for educators to understand and deconstruct so they can put forward a counter-view to extremist narratives allowing young people to safely debate these issues in schools. This may be difficult for some teachers who are universally duty-bound to report young people they identify at risk of radicalisation and may be easier for some to avoid these conversations. I argue that it is easier for some teachers to have a conversation involving far-right wing extremism than a conversation involving Islamic extremism. This is true when the majority of students are white, and right-wing rhetoric may be more commonplace and teachers are used to deciding what is 'banter' and what would need reporting. This in itself 'normalises' right-wing racism as "commonplace", as argued by one senior teacher in West Yorkshire (Busher *et al.*, 2017, p. 26).

Many young Muslims get their knowledge of Islam or being a Muslim from their parents, which may include incomplete knowledge founded on "cultural norms" (Lewis, 2007, p. 39) rather than religious teachings and subjected to cultural interpretation (discussed in Chapter 6). There may also be a reluctance between some Muslims to critique or openly discuss knowledge of Islam and being a Muslim when knowledge from their parents is doubtful. Any critique or deconstruction of normative areas of Muslim practice may be seen as an attack on Muslim identity where having to defend Islamic knowledge may lead to them being labelled as at risk of radicalisation. Struthers (2017, p. 100) argues that the teaching of FBV in the United Kingdom is a potentially discriminatory act toward "minority groups" which I argue are overwhelmingly Muslims living in Britain and, according to Struthers, in direct conflict with the teaching of human rights values by 1) the "discriminatory interpretation of the values it promotes" (Struthers, 2017, p. 91) and 2) being likely to "perpetuate anti-human rights sentiments" (*ibid*) by failing to challenge misconceptions. Struthers (2017) argues that a lack of guidance in defining 'values', allows teachers to interpret statutory duties in different ways with some expressing viewpoints "more commonly associated with the front pages of certain sections of the tabloid press" (Struthers, 2017, p. 101). Furthermore, the guidance given to schools fails to mention the broader human rights framework included in the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a; DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015). Struthers (2017) argues that British values should be taught within a human rights framework placing it within an area of secularism. In Chapter 4, I support Struthers' (2017) argument by reframing Islamophobic discourse to epistemic injustice, also a secular and Human rights infused paradigm.

If we are to rely on the definition of FBV to hail from security legislation and not from a multicultural and inclusive perspective that encompasses "belonging" (Healy, 2019, p. 428) then schools run the very real risk of promoting a powerful exclusionary force to the detriment of minority groups, particularly British Asian Muslims. Furthermore, by embedding Prevent within the normal and accepted safeguarding processes in schools, it runs the risk of 'normalising' the securitisation of Muslims (Busher *et al.*, 2017; Struthers, 2017), setting them once again as 'other'.

It is vital that cognizance be given to teachers and educators in the ways they implement Prevent and FBVs in their workplace. Recent studies reveal that educators vary greatly in their interpretation of Prevent and FBVs obligations, along with what constitutes 'Britishness' (Farrell, 2016), attempting to carry out their statutory duties by reducing its most harmful effects (Jerome *et al.*, 2019; Vincent, 2019). This is "testament to the professionalism and dedication to student well-being both of school/college staff and, indeed, local Prevent teams" (Busher *et al.*, 2017, p. 8). Teaching of FBV however, remains a problem for practitioners, some of whom claim it stigmatises Muslim students (Busher *et al.*, 2017), generating different responses from educators in their delivery of what some see as a problematic philosophy (Vincent, 2019), that has the potential to be seen as monocultural (Moncrieffe and Moncrieffe, 2019).

Wolton (2017) makes the comparison between Prevent and the suffragettes' extremist tactics as an example of the dichotomy between yesterday's heroes and today's extremists. A part of Wolton's (*ibid*) concerns were how teachers could on the one hand recognise the worth of criminal acts committed by some suffragettes,

and at the same time promote democracy and British values to their pupils. Just as Wolton (*ibid*) argued that the suffragettes were opposed to the British values of their time, I argue that Muslims are similarly experiencing being marginalised from an increasingly comprehensive 'call to order' by Prevent and its securitisation reaching into Muslim spaces, including schools and universities. Some commentators see recent advice from the Department for Education (DfE, 2020) as attempts to suppress dissent by targeting organisations who promote anti-capitalism or teaching materials branded as 'extreme' from being heard in English schools (Mohdin, 2020; Merrick, 2020; Shadijanova, 2020). The recent guidance is beyond the scope of this research but is worthy of further research alongside issues of free speech (Office for Students, 2018; *Higher Education and Research Act 2017*; see also Appendix 8).

In Chapter 2, I explored how sections of the media reported on Islam and the media post 9/11. In the next section I explore how the media report and construct the Muslim living in Britain as 'other'.

### **3.3. Media construction of Muslim as the "Other"**

Since the events of 9/11, there has been a marked rise in the way that the British media in general has negatively reported on Muslims and Islam (Fekete, 2009; Allen, 2007a, 2012; Petley and Richardson, 2011; Kumar, 2012; Kundnani, 2014; Talwar and Ahmad, 2015). Naturally one would expect a rise in coverage following a terrorist attack where the perpetrators have claimed to have acted in defence of Islam and who self-identified as being Muslim. There is, however, evidence to suggest that a rise in the overwhelmingly negative coverage of Islam



and Muslims is a self-generating phenomenon, fuelled by stereotyping and media bias. Petley and Richardson (2011) provide compelling evidence that increased media output in relation to Islam and Muslims is independent of terrorist attacks and continued long after the story was newsworthy. Assuming the media are driven to increase its output in relation to Islam and Muslims then a logical conclusion would be that a market or 'appetite' exists for such interest, which extends beyond the so-called 'war on terror' including the cultural differences between Muslims and non-Muslims (Moore *et al.*, 2008). There may be another conclusion equally worthy of consideration, that the media narrative shapes public discourses creating a mood of Islamophobia exacerbated by the actions of a minority of Muslims who hold radical anti-Western sentiments. For example, Abu Hamza, a one-time leader at the Finsbury Park Mosque, currently serving a long prison sentence in the United States (Adams, 2017), and Anjem Choudary a one-time solicitor, also sentenced in Britain in the summer of 2016 for encouraging the support of the so-called Islamic State or ISIS (Swerling, 2019). Neither holds any Islamic qualifications or credentials but were seen as the first port of call for some members of the media to collate quotes and referring to both as 'radical clerics' or 'preachers', even though both were largely denounced by Muslims as not representative of them.

It would be unfair to suggest that the media alone are responsible for the rise in Islamophobia. Cultural differences between Muslims and non-Muslims existed for centuries and that prior to 9/11, between the 22nd and 24th June, and the 7th and 9th of July 2001 there had been disturbances involving both Asian and white youths as a result of proposed marches by the National Front and its sympathisers

gathering in the Northern towns of Burnley and Oldham (Kundnani, 2001). Both white and Asian youths were responsible for attacking the police amid allegations of 'heavy-handed' policing (Thomas, 2012), and both white and Asian businesses were attacked. The aftermath resulted in heavy prison sentences with subsequent reports from Sir Herman Ouseley calling for the creation of "social harmony" (Ouseley, 2001, p. 1),<sup>3</sup> and Cantle (Cantle, 2001), who was commissioned by the then Home Secretary David Blunkett, to Chair the community cohesion review team. Cantle's findings found both white and Asian communities living parallel lives with ignorance of each other's communities which, "can easily grow into fear, especially where this is exploited by extremist groups determined to undermine community harmony and foster divisions" (Cantle, 2001, p. 9). Cantle reported the annoyance that minority communities felt over the biased reporting of the riots by the press, which were inflammatory, referring to "problem areas" and printing anonymous "letters to the editor" which were deemed to be "preserving free speech" but in fact undermined the freedom of minority communities in some cases (Cantle, 2001, p. 45). Cantle was also explicit in referring to communities 'living parallel lives' or "parallel societies" (Cantle, 2012, p. 15) and how separate identities which were potentially antagonistic to each other could harden as a result of mono-cultural situations. This was certainly a reference to earlier multicultural policies which favoured reification of distinct ethnic and faith identities, which had given certain Asian groups more funding than their white neighbouring communities (Thomas, 2014). Following the events of 9/11, the term 'Asian' was largely substituted for 'Muslim' and wrongdoers widely reported by the media in

---

<sup>3</sup> Written before the 2001 riots.

religious rather than racial terms. This is seen as "the starting point of an increased focus on British Muslims" (Petley and Richardson, 2011, p. 45), which saw media stories concerning British Muslims rise from less than 500 in the year 2000 to over 4000 in 2006 (*ibid*).

Following the 'Trojan Horse' (Clarke, 2014; Holmwood and O'Toole, 2018) controversy, the media were also keen to remind people of British values: "Cameron tells UK Muslims: Be more British" (*The Mail on Sunday*, 2014; Cameron, 2014). I suggest that British values are more often than not, values that are universally shared by the majority of people in Britain, and not confined to one section of the community. It is not clear whether Cameron is calling for Muslims to integrate by adhering to so-called 'British values' or whether he is suggesting that those who do not subscribe to British values may fall into the extremist or terrorist category and be made subject of counter-terrorism legislation. Rather than an attack on Islam as a religion, the focus on British values may be more to do with the culture and practices of some Muslims who are deemed to be different rather than a question of values, which are likely to be shared by most Muslims (Asim, 2015), dependant on how values are interpreted.

### **3.4. Conclusion**

In this chapter I have identified and analysed the implementation of the Prevent strategy from its inception to its current form and in doing so tracked its effects on some members of the very diverse Muslim community in Britain. I have highlighted the increased securitisation of Prevent, to seeing Prevent subsumed into educational curricula in schools in the guise of vaguely defined Fundamental

British Values which has the potential to 'other' young Muslims. I argue FBV as an extension of an alien postcolonial construct, limiting Muslim agency to engage in political dissent. This is an epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013).

At the time of writing, there are calls for the government to scrap the Prevent Strategy (Grierson, 2019; Hooper, 2020; Proctor, 2020; Walawalker, 2020). Lord Carlisle (one of the architects in the implementation of Prevent), was removed as an independent reviewer of Prevent following a legal challenge by Rights Watch UK (Bowcott, 2019) over his impartiality. Although the legally binding deadline for the review was August 2020, the government has removed the statutory deadline and now aims to complete the review by August 2021 (Home Office, 2020a).

I have considered the following as being important considerations when critiquing Prevent in this chapter. In Appendix 8 at 11. 8, I provide summaries of each to place them in context.

- [The] Channel Programme (HM Government, 2015)
- [The] Casey Review (2016)
- [The] Office for Students (2018), ([The] *Higher Education and Research Act 2017*), and Prevent on Campus

Chapter 4 shows how I engaged with theory, policy and data, shaping the construction of my theoretical position, subsequently allowing analysis of the data to better understand the young Muslim men and women.

## **4. CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL POSITION**

### **4.1. Introduction: The Research Journey**

I begin this chapter with an account of the catalyst for this thesis, my work as a former police officer working in education. Reflection on my role as an educator led me to critical theory and critical pedagogy which kick-started the theoretical journey that underpins this thesis. This journey was an iterative process and is central to understanding how I developed my theoretical position over time. My journey moved from critical theory, to examining Islamophobia as an ideology and false consciousness, before postcolonialism emerged as my key theoretical position and epistemic injustice the primary data analysis tool. Throughout the process I read theory alongside the raw data gathered from the Communities of Enquiry (CoE) carried out with two groups of Muslim men and women, alongside my investigation of government policy from multiculturalism to Prevent. In the development of the theoretical frame I recognise that my reflections on the experience of the CoE contributed to my thinking. I begin with my personal journey.

In Chapter 1, I briefly referred to my work as a police youth liaison officer where I delivered safety lessons to young people in primary and secondary schools in Wales. I also worked with young people in pupil referral units and the youth wing of a local prison. I engaged in higher education as a student and since retiring from the police service had the opportunity to lecture at university and to continue my work with a charity challenging and disrupting far right-wing extremism (Think Project, 2012; Cantle and Thomas, 2014; Sheldrick, 2014; MacTiernan, 2015; Griffith, 2015; Cantle, 2017; Cifuentes, 2016; Cifuentes *et al.*, 2013; Smith, 2014;

Ramalingam, 2014). I worked with young people engaged in 'alternative curriculum' in schools and those 'not in education, employment or training' (NEET) (Welsh Government, 2018). The hopelessness that I recognised in many of the young people I worked with led me to study critical pedagogy and to put into practice some of the theory I had learned. Many young people harboured negative and discriminatory views about Muslims, asylum seekers and economic migrants from Europe (Cantle and Thomas, 2014), shaping my research journey and theoretical position.

In this chapter I examine a range of theories influential to my research methodology and analytical framework including my reflexive position and reading CoE data with theory (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012). I show how engaging with critical pedagogy influenced the research methods leading me to consider a critical theory approach. I go on to show how postcolonialism (an effective tool to analyse the CoE data and identify Islamophobia as an ideology), guided me to consider false consciousness (Lukacs, 1971) and finally epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) which I employed as my primary data analysis tool. Critical pedagogy was compelling for me in understanding my reflexive position as an educator and in recognising that policy created for good (Home Office, 2011a; DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) may also harm Muslims.

It will be seen from a preview of the research process map, further on in this chapter, that the initial research design comprised of a series of one-to-one semi-structured interviews carried out with a cohort of Muslim adults. The interviews did not uncover Islamophobia and a review of the collection methods used resulted in two Community of Enquiries (CoE) being carried out with a new cohort of Muslim

men and women. Scrutiny of the data from the one-to-one interviews shaped my thinking in reflecting on my experiences, the use of stimulus in the CoE and engaging in critical pedagogy. The data from the one-to-one interviews were a start point in my research journey and though not subjected to data analysis, transcripts from the interviews are available to view if required, and a summary of themes provided at Appendix 3. The CoE is used as the primary data collection tool and is explored at length in Chapter 5.

I next provide a preview of the research process employed (a copy taken from Chapter 5), which I describe in sections 5.10 and 5.11, followed by an overview of my theoretical journey at diagram 4.1.1. I continue thereafter with an account of critical pedagogy.

### 5.1.1 Research Process Map







Diagram 4.1.1 The Theoretical Journey



## 4.2. Critical Pedagogy

Critical pedagogy is derived from critical theory. A key proponent, McLaren (1998) argued that schools reproduce inequality from a curriculum imposed by the incumbent government. I recognised from my work with young people that this may also include work-related training programmes designed for 'low achievers' to meet the demands of low paid and semi-skilled market forces. Critical theorist Gramsci (Smith, 1971) revealed how Italy adopted the vocational school in order to 'modernise' but it was also seen as a way to keep the population in its place. By limiting the choices that young people have in not engaging with the National Curriculum, hegemony that marginalises them and limits agency to engage in the world of work is present (Apple, 2001).

Some of the young people I worked with knew they were treated differently from their peers but were unable to change their situation, being required to re-sit more examinations to be able to gain employment. They recognised their 'oppression' (Freire, 1970) but did not have the skills to progress outside of their area of knowledge. McLaren (1998, p. 172) argues that this is a contradiction of the ethos of many schools in allowing "the inadvertent oppression of less able students by a system which aspires to help all students attain their 'full potential'".

Critical pedagogy also made me question aspects of the 'All Wales Core Programme' (2004; Roberts, 2006) I taught during my time as a police officer and educator, from 2004 until 2010. The content of the programme comprises a series of lessons underpinned by legislation<sup>4</sup> and delivered to young people from 5 to 16

---

<sup>4</sup> A presumption of what is right or wrong in the eyes of the law.

years of age. It is important young people know the legal consequences of their actions and to stay safe. However, on reflection I considered that some of the lessons I delivered limited the choices of the young people by restricting agency to debate and disagree what they were told by presenting only right and wrong options. There was no space for them to challenge hegemony they perceived to be wrong or engage in epistemic friction (Medina, 2013). For example, one of the lessons focused on anti-social behaviour and its consequences (All Wales Core Programme, 2004). As a result of engaging with critical pedagogy I considered there was a moral argument in supporting dissent which, "is to be valued" (O'Donnell, 2016, p. 65) in challenging policies underpinned by legislation that prioritise political will over freedom of speech. This is important for all young people, particularly Muslims living in Britain, some of whom may want to explore opposing political views (perhaps in respect of foreign policy), and are "afraid of speaking their minds" (O'Donnell, 2018, p. 994) for fear of being labelled 'extreme' under Prevent Strategy legislation (Home Office, 2011a; Taylor and Soni, 2017; Saeed and Johnson, 2016).

Critical pedagogy made me question whether I had been acting as an instrument of government, using my position as a police officer and educator teaching contentious aspects of the programme to young people. Further, I may be responsible for limiting agency to question what I told them (Giroux, 2011; 2016). This had implications for my delivery of the THINK Project which although judged successful (Think Project, 2012; Cantle and Thomas, 2014; Cantle, 2017; Cifuentes, 2016; Smith, 2014) had association with Prevent. I created a project I thought to be worthwhile but had some misgivings in further marginalising young

white Welsh people, imposing a government-sanctioned programme, informed from my knowledge of Prevent. McLaren describes content of a course as being the "micro objectives defined by its narrowness of purpose and content-bound path of enquiry" (McLaren, 1998, p. 172). He contrasts his argument with 'macro objectives', "designed to enable students to make connections between the methods, content, and structure of a course and its significance within the larger social reality" (*ibid*), and that it is a lack of macro objectives which prevent students from having a dialectical mode of inquiry to allow them to see the connections between content and the wider society. To reiterate the founder of critical pedagogy Freire, the 'oppressed' must be made aware of the nature of their situation to remove themselves from it (Freire, 1970). This was a dilemma for me which needed further investigation. I had placed great store adhering to Prevent Strategy ideology as a way of informing white Welsh youngsters of dangers posed by right-wing ideology. I presented them with a course laden with micro objectives (Think Project, 2012; McLaren, 1998, p. 172), informed by Prevent (Home Office, 2011a), limiting agency to critically analyse what I was telling them and thus unintentionally marginalising them.

As a consequence of incorporating Prevent ideology in my delivery of the THINK Project (2012) I considered ways that Prevent may have impacted on the Muslim respondents in this research and reflected on how best to analyse data from the CoE to uncover "micro objectives" (McLaren, 1998, p. 172) identified in my work with white, Welsh young people. I wanted to explore whether I could use a similar proposal in my research with young Muslims. I suspected that further engagement with critical theory as a continuation of critical pedagogy outside of the classroom

was the way forward and I would also have to re-appraise my association with Prevent.

### **4.3. Developing a Theoretical Stance**

The theoretical framework emerged as an iterative process which included a recognition that the British government had strengthened its position on Prevent and Fundamental British Values. By the government creating legislation ensuring compliance from schools, universities and public bodies (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015; *Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*), it paved the way for Prevent and FBV to be a statutory instrument in education. The CoE data was collected between 2011 and 2012, which preceded statutory implementation of Fundamental British Values (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) and *Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015* legislation. However, the decisions made by the government in legislating was a catalyst in my examination of how policy impacted upon Muslims living in Wales. I suspected that Prevent and FBV created suspicion about Muslims in the social imagination of the wider public making them appear different and setting them apart from society and contributing to Islamophobia (Home Office, 2018).

I considered the concepts of oppression and powerlessness as being important allowing me to look more deeply at critical theory. The idea of 'powerlessness' is not a new concept and can be traced back to Marx's theory of alienation as a critique of capitalism (McLellen, 2000; Gamble *et al.*, 1999) which in simple terms argues that in society there are some who have power, and some who do not. In Marxism there are difficulties in reconciling why the exploited accepted their

situation yet failed to bring about change. This led for example, to "Marxist-inspired theories regarding hegemony" (Cunningham, 2014, p. 526) being developed to explain these difficulties (Smith, 1971). Engels argued that a "false consciousness" (Heywood, 1994, p. 85) kept the working classes from recognising oppression and would only be able to rise to "trade union consciousness" improving their lot in a system of capitalism (*ibid*). Gramsci (Smith, 1971) rejected this, (citing the theory of cultural hegemony) arguing that power is unrecognisable, normalised, and maintains cultural oppression, with Freire (1970) arguing to strive for change, the nature of oppression must be recognised. The concept of 'false consciousness' distinguished between a universal application of 'false consciousness'<sup>5</sup> and the application of ideology (as a form of explaining by intellectuals) to legitimise false consciousness (Eyerman, 1981, p. 43). I explore false consciousness as one of my central theoretical foundations further in this Chapter at 4.5.1., however, I continue to make reference to false consciousness during my theoretical journey.

I considered that if Islamophobia in British society is 'normalised', it supports Gramsci's (Smith, 1971) theory of cultural oppression. Gramsci argued that to reach a consensus, rulers must paint a picture on which society will agree (*ibid*), including a moral and political agreement appearing as 'commonsense' or 'normalised'. Consent to this is achieved by the majority agreeing to power being exerted against a minority for example:

---

<sup>5</sup> A distorted and limited form of experience that could be applied to all social groups and classes.

Political leadership based on the consent of the led, a consent which is secured by the diffusion and popularization of the world view of the ruling class" (Bates, 1975, p.352).

My prior research on the implementation of Prevent (Home Office, 2011a) and FBV (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) and underpinning legislation (*Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*) strengthened my argument that by limiting Muslim agency to allow them to strive for change (Freire, 1970; Gamble *et al.*, 1999; Boothman, 2008), a cultural oppression or hegemony (a dominant moral or intellectual leadership) had functioned against them (Smith, 1971). I suspected widespread Islamophobia inculcated a 'false consciousness' in the social imaginations<sup>6</sup> of the wider non-Muslim public (Smith, 1971; Maglaras, 2013; Boothman, 2008). I was confident in applying Marx's theory of alienation of the 'working class' to my Muslim respondents and the wider British Muslim community to collate them as an oppressed group. However, Muslims are a unique religious and cultural social community, which became a defining issue in my theoretical search. I recognised a potential danger in replacing 'Muslim' with 'working class' as I had now removed the 'economic' element of 'working class', replacing it with a different cultural form (Eyerman, 1981, p. 44). However, removing 'economically oppressed' and replacing it with 'culturally and religiously oppressed', allowed me to move from a position of class-consciousness to an area where a synthesis of false consciousness would allow me to progress.

I suspected that by following the Marxist tradition of conscious-raising and employing education as a way to "eliminate false consciousness" (Cunningham,

---

<sup>6</sup> I acknowledge this would require further research and collaboration with 'hegemonic consent' to justify this.

2014, p. 529), I could move from a position where a lack of knowledge about Islam and Muslims by the wider non-Muslim population may be considered. I believed at that time, a lack of knowledge about Muslims rather than biologically informed racism, or "racisms" (Gilroy, 2002, p. 36) was responsible for Muslim oppression. If this were correct then it is likely the wider non-Muslim public may also be 'oppressed' in their social imaginations of Islam and Muslims living in Britain, allowing me to consider Muslims being misrepresented by the manipulation of knowledge about them. I began to think that sections of the British print media were responsible for transmitting values by 'consensus' (Smith, 1971), and it was possible that such a perception and knowledge of Islam and Muslims may contribute to a form of false consciousness existing in the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim public, maintained by widespread Islamophobia.

The traditional Marxist view of false consciousness is concerned with a "theory of working class false consciousness" (Eyerman, 1981, p. 49). Lukacs (1971) argues that in a capitalist society false consciousness is a form of consciousness produced "in the very life practices of capitalist society" (Eyerman, 1981, p. 49). The difference between Lukacs' and Gramsci's use of false consciousness is Lukacs applies false consciousness to both the "capitalist" and the "working class" (*ibid*, p. 52) allowing me to consider both Muslims and the wider non-Muslim British public.

Critical theory had thus far proved to be the key in unlocking a scenario where Muslims living in Britain could be seen to be 'colonised' in British society and that its citizens were unwittingly colonisers. I had wrongly assumed that the Muslim respondents were the only 'oppressed' group in terms of 'false consciousness'. I



was unsure whether my synthesis of 'working class' for 'Muslim' as an 'oppressed' group would be theoretically sound. Though the theory of Lukacs (1971) was founded on lived or epistemological experiences, I considered Fromm's argument (Eyerman, 1981, pp. 52-54) to be significant. Fromm argued that false consciousness evolved from a distorted experience, cognitively and emotionally. If this were correct, then I could consider Islamophobia as being a false ideology. Accepting Fromm's theory, I would be unable to apply Marx's theory to examine 'false consciousness' because of the emotional attachment in Fromm (*ibid*), and the emotional element present within the definition of Islamophobia (Runnymede Trust, 1997). This has potential in protecting false consciousness in the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim British society concealing it from analysis. I now go on to examine critical theory but return to the concept of false consciousness to reassess how this may be unpicked to expose it for critical analysis.

#### **4.4. Critical Theory**

The transformative intent of critical theory encompasses a range of thought stemming from the early days of the "Frankfurt school" (Cunningham, 2014, p. 526) also referred to as the "Institute for Social Research" (How, 2003, p. 13). I considered that social justice for Muslims living in Britain would be best served by critical theory to locate, critique and challenge structures of power that negatively affect them (Horkheimer, 1972). Identifying hegemony that protects and maintains power (Smith, 1971) and marginalises Muslims, this research progresses to construct an alternative paradigm where Muslims may proffer a counter-argument.

Research identified sections of the media, the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a), and FBV (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) as structures that 'other' or marginalise Muslims living in Britain. This, I argue, contributes to a 'colonising' of the Muslim social imagination preventing them from recognising Islamophobia and challenging it. I reflected on whether Prevent and FBV could be considered as a form of "intellectual colonialism" (Sharonova *et al.*, 2018, p. 339) for Muslims in Britain. In defining it as the "cultural and intellectual enslavement of the population" (*ibid*, p. 339), Sharonova (*et al.*, 2018) presents a formidable argument that manipulation of systems of education allow the assimilation of "ethical, moral and ideological norms taught (by this particular university)" (Sharonova *et al.*, 2018, p. 341). Although considered as an important concept particularly in this research which claims a 'colonising of the Muslim mind', further research would be required to substantiate claims of intellectual colonisation which are outside the remit of this research (see for example, Bhargava, 2013, p. 413). I have however, considered the position put forward by Struthers (2017, p. 89), who claims FBVs are "vague and potentially discriminatory". Struthers (2017, p. 98) argues that British values (FBVs) should be couched within the broader framework of human rights, a secular position which would contribute to "societal cohesion and harmony". Working with a similar concept, I later show how I synthesise the problematic phenomenon of Islamophobia to epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) as a way of potentially negating the harmful effects of a problematic phenomenon. However, as argued, 'othering' British Muslims by the introduction of FBV securitisation led me to consider postcolonialism (an offshoot from critical theory) as a potential theoretical position which I also examine later.

In Chapter 2, I introduced Islamophobia as an emerging concept and how a definition proved problematic in protecting Muslims living in Britain. I now turn to consider Islamophobia as an ideology, to better understand how it 'others' Muslims yet remains hidden from view, before returning to false consciousness arguing its importance for seeing Islamophobia in ideological terms.

#### **4.5. Islamophobia as an Ideology**

In this section I extend critical theory and examine how Islamophobia may be seen as an "ideology" (Allen, 2020, p. 34). I show how ignorance, notions of whiteness, and belief systems may be seen in an epistemic injustice context as ways of better understanding Islamophobia. I then return to false consciousness placing it in context of Islamophobia to argue that it is a protected ideology.

Mills' (2017) argument that racism be considered as an ideology is important when arguing for an epistemic injustice approach to data analysis of the CoE. Mills traces the influence of Marxism, Critical Theory, and the contributions from Lukacs (1971) and Gramsci (Smith, 1971) all of whom have been instrumental in shaping the theoretical position in this research. One weakness of Marx's theory was the concept of oppression centred on class. By widening Marx's social class oppression to group oppression I argue Islamophobia as an ideology encompasses four forms of consciousness proposed by Shelby (2003). This broader notion is also significant in tracking deficient cognition in "whiteness" as an internalised white superiority (Mills, 2017, p. 108) and also within an epistemic injustice framework discussed later. I exchange 'Whiteness' with notions of FBV and 'White ignorance' (Mills, 2007) in a context of hermeneutical injustice as a way

of interpreting a lacuna in the hermeneutical resources of non-Muslims. I acknowledge there are both black and white non-Muslims referred to in the context of the 'wider non-Muslim community' and further acknowledge research is required so as to isolate or include groups of people. In the context of this research I allude to the majority 'white' population when referring to the 'wider non-Muslim public, community or population'. According to Mills (2007), a white ignorance responsible for the subjugation of 'blacks' (members of the black community) does not have a lacuna to be filled with knowledge. "Whites are imprisoned in a cognitive state which both protects them from dealing with the realities of social oppression and, of course, disables them epistemically" (Mills, 2017, p. 108).

It may be that for some members of the wider non-Muslim population "white supremacy" (Mills, 2017, p. 105) and racial domination toward Muslims constitutes their worldview. Even if white ignorance (*ibid*) were to be corrected, according to Du Bois (1903) a white supremacist view would remain. The work of Du Bois (1903) in respect of double consciousness is interesting, however, this research has not extended to gauging the views of the wider non-Muslim public and as such any claims to significance are to be considered within the parameter of the research, which primarily concerns Islamophobia, as being distinct from racism.

The "Standard View" of ignorance, according to Le Morvan and Peels (2016, p. 12) is a lack or absence of knowledge. The 'New View' however, is that ignorance is the lack of or absence of true belief, with varieties of ignorance being subject to a sliding scale in degrees of ignorance (*ibid*). Ignorance has significance for epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) in respect of "active ignorance" (Medina, 2013, p. 27) and "wilful hermeneutical ignorance" (focusing on the

sociality of the knower) (Pohlhaus, Jr., 2012, pp. 714-735) where both testimonial and hermeneutical injustices contribute to the "preservation of ignorance" (Peels and Blaauw, 2016, pp. 160-177). Ignorance may also be seen as a philosophical construct where for example, a belief that there is no God by the wider public may benefit Muslims in Britain by keeping them "under the radar" (McBrayer, 2016, p. 154). However, knowledge is also a prerequisite "with regard to moral virtue" (*ibid*, p. 155) and essential for the virtuous agent to become the virtuous hearer. I argue that a lacuna in the collective epistemic resources of the wider non-Muslim public is occupied by Islamophobia, an ideology, and not ignorance, preventing the hearer from making sense of Muslim voices. Furthermore, I argue that because these conditions exist within a construct of postcolonialism for Muslims (discussed in 4.6), Muslims wrongly believe that if non-Muslims have knowledge of Islam they will no longer be ignorant of them, thereby lessening oppression (see also data Chapters 6 and 7). Knowledge and ignorance were central to European colonial empires demanding the "domain of knowledge" (Alcoff, 2017, p. 398) to be controlled. This is also a consideration in how Western philosophy failed to include non-European philosophical writing into its canon (*ibid*, p. 397). The concept of 'ignorance' is explored in terms of epistemic injustice further in this Chapter (see for example, Peels and Blaauw, 2016; Medina, 2013; Fricker, 2007).

Remaining with the concept of a lacuna occupied by Islamophobia, How (2003, p. 98) turns to Adorno's study of "Oedipus complex" in that the lack of a leader or "father-figure" creates a vacuum in unconsciousness. Adorno (1974) believed that the popularity of fascism was underpinned by the appeal and imagery of fascist propaganda filling a vacuum in the unconscious need of followers even though the

propaganda lacked any rational content and in fact "must not be rational" (*ibid*). I considered this had relevance when considering how Islamophobia may be deconstructed as an irrational "fear (phobia) or dread of Islam or Muslims", emerging "from the experience of imperialism and colonialism" (Abbas, 2010, p. 22).

Mills (2013) is critical of both Fricker (2007) and Medina (2013) in their use of the terms 'hermeneutical injustice' and 'collective hermeneutical resources' being available for those having "white racist ideology" and those who have "white ignorance" (Mills, 2013, p. 40). Mills (2013) clarifies his previous use of the terms and warns that "race, white racism, and white privilege have been under-theorized" (*ibid*, p. 39). He further argues that white ignorance may also be shared by non-whites (Mills 2007), which reinforces Marxism's early class structure narratives that people (whatever colour) can be imprisoned in a cognitive state protecting them from social realities (Eyerman, 1981). This has implications for how hermeneutical injustice is seen when one considers the 'collective hermeneutical resources' available to progress counter-hegemonic alternatives, as I also include Muslims as having a false consciousness. Acknowledging Islamophobia as an ideology (Kaya, 2011) allows the exploration and location of widely held beliefs, by sections of the non-Muslim public, which are not wholly dependent on ignorance of Islam and Muslims. Epistemic injustice and in particular hermeneutical injustice is dependent on degrees of ignorance held by a person, to either change a level of credibility or to change the amount of hermeneutical resources available to a person, for them to make sense of a situation (Medina, 2013; Fricker, 2007). I acknowledge Mills' (2013) warnings but

return to the argument that Islamophobia as an ideology and not white ignorance is foremost in the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim public.

Shelby rejected the "inferiorization model" (Shelby, 2014, p. 66) of racism proposing that racism should be thought of as a type of ideology which introduces belief systems that can change over time and depend on cultural, political and economic contexts (*ibid*) to allow a philosophical approach. Considering racism as an ideology, for example, allows oppressive social consequences to be explored and conduct to be examined to locate where and how prejudices are constructed.

Thinking of racism, (or Islamophobia), as ideologies, allows constructs to be unpicked, identified and examined, enabling counter-arguments to be put forward to disrupt harmful content. Shelby argues (2003, p. 154) "I contend that ideology-critique is indispensable for understanding and resisting the forms of oppression that are characteristic of the modern world". Mills (2017, p. 104) argues ideologies serve to "justify, rationalize, legitimize, and/or obfuscate wrongful social domination" supported and maintained by "vested group interests" (*ibid*). Shelby (2002) goes on to argue that racially profiling members of the black community leads to stereotyping that positions them as prone to crime and in need of societal surveillance. I argue such a view is replicated by the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) and FBV (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) securitising Muslims living in Britain and further reinforced in the social imagination of the public by hostile media reporting contributing to widespread Islamophobia.

Shelby (2003, p. 155) goes on to defend the use of ideology furthering philosophical thought by considering ideologies are "menacing forces that are

capable of having an enormous impact on social relations and the prospects for progressive social change" (*ibid*, p. 155). He defines ideology as follows:

1. The beliefs in the subset are widely shared by members in the relevant group; and within the group, and sometimes outside it, the beliefs are generally known to be widely held.
2. The beliefs form, or are derived from a prima facie coherent system of thought, which can be descriptive and/or normative.
3. The beliefs are part of, or shape, the general outlook and self-conception of many in the relevant group.
4. The beliefs have a significant impact on social action and social institutions (Shelby, 2003, p. 158).

Though Shelby explains (1-4 above) in terms of racism, they may apply equally to Islamophobia, elements of which are inculcated in the social consciousness of the wider non-Muslim British public. However, rather than being wholly false, ideologies may contain "half-truths", the "neglect of pertinent facts" and the "misuse of authoritative sources" (Shelby, 2003, p. 166). "Normative" belief systems which include religious, moral and political beliefs may also include beliefs that are illusory (*ibid*, p. 167). "It is the task of the specifically *epistemic* dimension of ideology-critique to unmask or reveal the illusory character of racist and other ideologies" (*ibid*, p. 169). Furthermore, the need to acknowledge that as social circumstances change so does the content of ideologies, allowing "the philosopher, social scientist and social critic" to "have an important role to play in diagnosing and undermining the various illusions of ideological consciousness" (Shelby, 2003, p. 169).

Having explored Islamophobia as an ideology I now return to false consciousness where I begin by considering it as an ideological illusion. I go on to argue how



Islamophobia may be seen to be a false consciousness protecting, sustaining and hiding itself from exploration in the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim British public.

#### **4.5.1. False Consciousness**

According to Marcuse (1964, p. 13), "false consciousness" (of their rationality) becomes "true consciousness" and "ideology into reality" having significance in considering Islamophobia as an ideology. Marcuse (1964, p. 149) continues arguing that "false consciousness" contributes to the "preservation of a false order of facts" which I believe resonates with effects of Prevent and FBV as technical apparatus responsible for reproducing the false order of facts (*ibid*).

Having argued earlier that Islamophobia may be considered an ideology, Shelby (2003, p. 171) concurs that it is widely held that even after rational criticism of racist belief, people still hold such beliefs even when they "have been shown repeatedly to be without merit". Moreover, if a false consciousness is held "irrationally" (Shelby, 2003, p. 170; Rosen, 1996, p. 34) it lends support to the view that if such beliefs are held, they are held with, and unaware of, cognitive failings. "Ideologies are forms of social consciousness that suffer from distorting illusions and are widely held with a false consciousness" (Shelby, 2003, p. 172). How (2003, p. 31) argues ideologies are "not so much a matter of false consciousness" in holding mistaken ideas about class interests but "went all the way down, structuring how events in the everyday world were perceived".

In Chapter 2, I argued that Islamophobia was 'normalised' within the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim public, doubting whether Islamophobia was ideological having cognitive defects that undermine its claim to knowledge.

Acknowledging the harm from Islamophobia, Shelby (2003, p. 174) argues we should:

...oppose and seek to subvert ideologies, not simply because they are rooted in illusions and irrationally held, but because of the oppressive social consequences of their wide acceptance.

Islamophobia is an ideology that maintains negative views of Islam and Muslims. Ideology may be considered as accurate in "reproducing the structure of reality", "and misleading" or "inverted at the same time" (Rosen, 1996, p. 33), and is a "necessary false consciousness" (Adorno, 1974, p. 169) with religion and politics "being especially liable to false consciousness" (Rosen, 1996, p. 10). However, some theories do not support the position that societies are self-maintaining and self-advancing (Rosen, 1996) and deference must be given to explaining human nature differently from the dominantly held rational Western view. Succinctly, the rationalist view is to seek the path which is in our "long term interests" to follow (*ibid*, p. 17) instead of the line of "least resistance".

However, according to Fromm (Eyerman, 1981) it is also where our emotions can take precedent over rational thought and allowing an ideology which is false; a false consciousness. Notwithstanding that Fromm (*ibid*) wished to separate ideology from false consciousness, I maintain Islamophobia is an emotionally charged ideology and a false consciousness. Rosen (1996, p. 31) suggests a third false consciousness where "distortions of identity" and "deformation of a

subject" or "collective" identities of a subject (in this research, Muslims living in Britain) occurs, which I have argued occurs in the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim British public. Islamophobia has been normalised to such a degree that rational thought is so diluted that reflection, argument and discursive activity are not effective counter-remedies to highlight falsehoods in Islamophobia. I turn to Rosen (1996, p. 34) again to support the view that Islamophobia is ideological and a false consciousness:

If one reason why some explicit beliefs are ideological is that they are characteristically *irrational*, then one of the most likely ingredients in that irrationality would be that the person who holds the belief is not aware of the reasons - the real reasons - for holding it. In that case, as well as the original explicit belief, they may have a second, conscious false belief-a belief about the first belief - which is the account that they would give to themselves of their reason for holding it.

Supporting the position that Islamophobia is both ideological and a false consciousness, I turn to the latter part of the definition of Islamophobia, 'phobia' which is "an abnormal and *irrational* [my emphasis] fear or dread aroused by a particular object or circumstance" (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2007, p. 2186). I argue that the definition of Islamophobia does not reflect the harm caused to Muslims living in Britain and has become 'normalised' in the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim public (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018, p. 9). Tania Saeed (2018, pp. 38-39) defines a 'phobia' as being "far from an irrational fear, informing social and political contexts that rationalizes such fear and hatred of Muslims", a view supported by Amir Saeed (2007, p. 443) who argues Muslims are the subjects of "public anxiety", and Taras "who frames contemporary responses to Muslims within a persisting European anxiety about Orientalism" (Taras, 2012, p. 112), supporting the argument for postcolonialism and 'othering'.

I have therefore reconsidered my earlier position and now argue that a false consciousness may also exist in the minds of my respondents whose perceptions of their non-Muslim British public advocates may be seen as a cognitive false consciousness (Rosen, 1996, p. 31). The Muslim respondents cannot recognise that their non-Muslim advocate is ideologically hampered by a false consciousness of Islam and Muslims as a result of Islamophobia. It is in the interest of the wider non-Muslim public not to be a victim of false consciousness. However, if this is a consequence of their perception of religious belief then, "rational criticism cannot be successful against such false consciousness unless it is also able to deal with the sources of the emotional disorders behind it" (Rosen, 1996, p. 55). It is possible that Islamophobia prevents non-Muslims from adopting a critical awareness to re-examine their negative views about Islam and Muslims.

It appears that wide-spread and "normalised" Islamophobia (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018, p. 9) may limit agency for Muslims to articulate oppression. Furthermore, along with postcolonial conditions existing for them, the wider non-Muslim British public would, I argue, dismiss Muslim voices. This weakens challenging false consciousness in a critical theory discipline as well as lacking a counter-argument to Islamophobia thereby limiting the achievement of an ethical position to destabilise false consciousness in the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim British public. There are no widely available sources of information available to the British public from which they have the opportunity to reject, such as, a "blanket rejection of evidence" (Meyerson, 1991, p. 155) or a "derogation of the source of information" (*ibid*).

Further on I show how by extending the concept of false consciousness to hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007, p. 6) I justify this position.

Recognising that Prevent and FBV may have impacted on the lived experiences of Muslims living in Britain (at that stage of my research journey and in a critical theory paradigm) I searched for narratives that have "political edge" (How, 2003, p. 24) from where I may be able to construct a framework to analyse the CoE data. My reading of postcolonialism illuminated 'othering' and objectification in the CoE data offering a way to examine the concept of 'othering' and progressing my theoretical journey from a wholly critical theory paradigm. I acknowledge similarities and differences in both approaches (Ingram, 2019) and accept that I have prioritised "responsibility to otherness" over the "responsibility to act" (White, 1991, p. 20) where I may be able to examine the effects of Prevent (Home Office, 2011a) and FVB (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) which I believe are "normative political values and normative political objectives" (Scott, 1999, p. 135).

#### **4.6. Postcolonialism as a Theoretical Position**

In this section I show how I engaged with postcolonial thought to further my theoretical position, tracing its history and the influential theorists who shaped it. In the development of the theoretical framework I recognise that my reflections on the experience of the CoE contributed to my thinking, and by cognizance of concepts including false consciousness and Islamophobia I show how I engaged with theory and data (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012). Through postcolonialism I show how 'othering' controls and interprets knowledge of the 'colonised' (Young, 2001) and how I attempt to bring about positive changes in alleviating oppression

for example, by critiquing the effects of Prevent and FBV through my interpretation of the CoE data, undoing the "ideological heritage of colonialism" (*ibid*, p. 65). I argue that such conditions may be seen as a 'red pedagogy' (Grande, 2007) which privileges indigenous voices and political integrity (Rigney, 1999) and "is concerned with the dehumanizing effects of colonization on both the colonized and the colonizer" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 82).

I examine the theory of postcolonialism (Young, 2001; McLeod, 2007) to explore how prejudice against Muslims in Britain acts to privilege the voices, needs and desires of the non-Muslim wider community. I also examine how, although prejudice against Muslims is widespread and deeply embedded within society, it remains largely unchallenged (Warsi, 2017) and that such prejudice perpetuates deficit models of Muslims (Morey and Yaqin, 2011; Edwards and Cromwell, 2018).

The argument I put forward in this thesis are repositories of knowledge in the social imagination of the British public may have induced a 'false consciousness' thus allowing me to consider how a 'normalising' of Islamophobia may have led to injustices being committed toward Muslims. I am conscious not to replicate marginalising Muslims using postcolonialism, but strive to locate theory or combinations of theory to de-stabilise 'normalising' Islamophobia.

In her reading of Foucault and Derrida, Spivak (1988, p. 82) refers to "epistemic violence" of imperialism done upon Indian 'subalterns', (Spivak's construct for 'discourse'). I considered Spivak's epistemic violence in terms of hegemony responsible for marginalising Muslims living in Britain. Spivak uses the term 'subaltern' (having a false universal value system imposed upon them by the

West), giving an example of the ban on 'sati'<sup>7</sup> (Spivak, 1988) by British colonisers deciding that 'sati' was a barbaric practice even though it was not universally practiced. I considered that the introduction and legislation of FBV (and its association with the *Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*) may also be seen as imposing values which have potential to 'other' Muslims, a continuation of colonisation. The analogy is unrepresentative of the relationship between 'sati' (Hindu values) and FBV but serves to illustrate the dismissal of values by legislating minorities. Spivak further warned the subaltern being spoken *for* and not *by* themselves (Spivak, 1988) describing it as keeping the subaltern in a 'space of difference', which in postcolonial thought is "everything that has limited or no access to the cultural imperialism is subaltern" (de Kock, 1992). To better define my use of terms I use 'othered', 'oppressed', 'marginalised' and 'colonised' to signify Spivak's use of the term 'subaltern' in this research.

Similarly, while Gramsci (Smith, 1971) was imprisoned he used covert language referring to the 'proletarian', the working class. This research does not specifically focus on a class-based structure of oppression where one group is just waiting turn, not having their piece of the pie (de Kock, 1992) or victim mentality. I argue Prevent and FBV deny Muslims a voice which 'others' them simply for being Muslim. Identifying structures of 'othering', this research clears a space (Spring, 1996) for Muslims to be heard rather than speaking for or representing them. Beverley (2001, p. 233) summarises the position on Muslim discourse succinctly:

---

<sup>7</sup> The practice where the widow would throw herself on the funeral pyre with her dead husband

The subaltern can, of course speak, but only (allowed) through us, through our institutionally sanctioned authority and pretended objectivity which gives us the power to decide what counts as relevant and true.

I argue that Muslims living in Britain are positioned in a politically constructed paradigm (Home Office, 2011a; DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) obstructing them from breaking free from the ideological bond (that placed them there) and being able to forward counter-hegemony. Both Gramsci (Smith, 1971) and Spivak (1988) argued for the working class and subaltern to have their own voice or as Gramsci argued, for the working class to have their own organic intellectuals (Burke, 1999) from within their own groups not by 'intellectuals' claiming to represent them.

Said (1978; 1993; 1981) argued how the West (the occident) appropriated discourse about the East (the Orient) in order to control it. Using the term "Orientalism" (Said, 1985, p. 90) he referred to "communities of interpretation" (*ibid*, p. 93) subjected to repeated interpretations over time.<sup>8</sup> Orientalism however, allowed communities to be seen in need of representation as they were considered as unstable. Said (1978) initially situated the West and the East as being in direct opposition in a manufactured clash of civilisations which he suggested could be cut across using a 'humanist critique' (Said, 1978) as a better framework in which to understand cultures. He argued that such position would, "introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprisons us" (*ibid*, preface 17). I considered that a 'humanist critique', an approach suggested by Said (1978), appeared to offer a way forward in highlighting the similarities between Muslims

---

<sup>8</sup> For example, how Shakespeare's work was continually interpreted.



and non-Muslims instead of focusing on the perceived differences between Islam and the West.

I considered that under postcolonial conditions existing for Muslims in Britain, their agency to inform non-Muslims of their oppression was limited to prioritising Islam as a method of discourse and not, for example, cultural, political, or humanistic ways as conduits to wider British non-Muslim enlightenment. I acknowledge that this view is a direct opposite of the one proposed by Gandhi (Young, 2001, p. 338) in his opposition to British colonial rule where spirituality was diffused into all aspects of everyday life as Islam does for Muslims. This could be considered as a counter-cultural and political technique used in colonised societies by creating cultural spaces where the colonisers (or those controlling hegemony) are forced to parley (*ibid*). However, in examining Gandhi's counter-cultural technique (Gandhi, 1910) it was noted that he had garnered public support for his subversion which is not currently the case for Muslims in Britain. I turn now to Nandy (2015) to examine how a counter-argument may be constructed with which to challenge colonisation.

Nandy (2015) reflected on Gandhi's legacy proposing a colonisation of the mind or a psychological resistance to colonisation needed to be recognised by the colonised to move from oppression. He subsumed Gandhi's thinking and political strategies (Young, 2001) bringing together discourse (Said, 1978; 1993; 1981) and his own theory of the psychological effects of colonialism (Nandy, 2015) which he claimed needed to "be defeated ultimately in the minds of men" (*ibid*, p. 63). This research shows how the British government distanced itself from an ideology of colonising the mind by underpinning FBV with legislative powers (*Counter-*

*Terrorism and Security Act 2015*), transforming the ideology into issues of security that largely attracted support from the public. The 'colonised' Muslim mind has little or no room for critical thinking when Counter-terrorism legislation underpins Prevent, controlling Muslim dissent (*Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*; Home Office, 2011a). Fanon (1961), whose work was subsequently seized upon by "theorists of colonial subjectivity" (Sardar, 2008; Nandy, 2015), focused on how the colonised felt including the psychological effects of colonisation. Fanon (1961) argued the effects of colonisation is not only as the physical presence of the colonisers but pre-colonial history was devalued. FBV may be seen as an attempt to re-write or affirm a meaning of 'belonging', or as a range of belongings such as "belonging to" and "belonging-with" (Healy, 2019, p. 428) as part of a British narrative claiming a type of nationalism as identity at the expense of accurately recalling Britain's colonial past. Avoiding a direct attack on Islam, the government affirmed so-called FBV framing them in a cultural arena so other values are viewed as inferior. This endorses theories from Huntington (1993) and Said (1978) where the fear of 'Orientalism' contributes to constructing Islamophobia. I argue that FBV are postcolonial constructs. To consider how language is appropriated in a British Muslim context and to examine how reframing of British Muslims presents them as 'different', I now turn to the work of Calvet (1974) as a way of extending cultural markers within postcolonial ideology.

Calvet's theory (1974) has its roots within an orthodox Marxist framework focusing on how the function of the language of the colonised is devoured by the colonised and replaced by the coloniser's language preventing the colonised from partaking in social and political life. This has great significance for my argument that Muslim

free speech and lawful protest has been curtailed by government legislation. Calvet believed that colonialism "is an extreme version of the capitalist state structured according to material inequality and thus social conflict" (Young, 2001, p. 393). Extending Calvet's quote to encompass what I believe is an ideology fuelled by a hegemony of Prevent (Home Office, 2011a), Young (2001, p. 393) says:

The state maintains its power by direct force, together with accompanying juridical and legal structures that serve to legitimize its dominance. The discourse of the state reinforces its ideological superstructures, which in the colonial situation will include the value system that operates in favour of the language and culture of the colonizer against those of the colonized.

Calvet (1974) warned that traditional linguistics has failed to define concepts such as language and dialect in relation to social power (Phillipson, 2003, p. 39) and that a "language is a dialect that has succeeded politically" (Calvet, 1974, p. 54). Calvet's work with indigenous communities does not have the same relevance in this research other than the need to consider ideological and political forces in the analysis and interpretation of Muslim voices to recognise powerlessness in their discourses.

In sum, the Prevent strategy is a postcolonial ideology contributing to colonising Muslim minds by legislation and a 'postcolonial gaze'. The attitudes and perceptions of the Muslim community are conveyed by Prevent (Home Office, 2011a), disseminated to the public through the media and clearly informing the thinking of the respondents in this study (discussed in Chapters 6 and 7). The 'common sense' or 'everyday thinking' view perpetuated by media and political

discourse is that Islam and Muslims are 'different' and if they "were more like us" (Allen, 2015, p. 8) then the problem would be solved.

Political inactivity in addressing Islamophobia (Allen, 2020) reinforces 'normalising Islamophobia', in the minds of the non-Muslim public in their "common-sense" "everyday thinking" (Hall and O'Shea, 2013, p. 8). In Chapter 2 I argued that multiculturalism for Muslims has been diluted to such a degree that notions of securitisation filled a lacuna in the wider non-Muslim public imagination limiting the agency of Muslims to publicly identify as Muslims and moving markers of race identity from skin colour to culture. Barker (1981) and later Allen (2015) recognised its use by the Conservative government in the late 1970s and early 1980s to describe minority groups in Britain which revealed, "more overt expressions of racism" (*ibid*, p. 8).

The shift to use cultural markers as descriptors allowed minority groups to be singled out to be 'different' thereby avoiding the label of 'racist' being attributed to the government. The effects of targeting culture as markers of 'difference' made 'difference' problematic threatening to create a new racism exaggerating difference and its perceived consequences (Barker, 1981) allowing a new racism to appeal to the 'common sense' of the British public. "Common sense" (Allen, 2020, p.34) can be seen to support the "normalisation" of Islamophobia (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018, p. 8) in the social imagination inculcating false consciousness. According to Kundnani (2016) Islamophobia (as a lay ideology) offers an everyday common-sense explanatory framework placing the Muslim outside of the social order. Kundnani (2016, p. 7) argues that oppressing Muslims may be 'normalised' by negatively framing Muslims in an Imperial ideology:

Thus Islamophobia involves an ideological displacement of political antagonisms onto the plane of culture, where they can be explained in terms of the fixed nature of the 'other'.

Kundnani (2016, p. 17) further argues that Western values and whether Muslims accept them or not are always viewed across a plane of Western culture and that Islamophobia is a way of containing Muslim knowledge of imperialism. "Muslim dissent against empire is never heard as dissent but only as extremism". The consequences of using 'British values' to further exaggerate differences between Muslim and non-Muslim communities makes it "a forceful and vengeful political vehicle that seeks to differentiate, demarcate and subsequently discriminate against Muslims and their communities" (Allen, 2015, p. 9).

Gilani-Williams (2014) argues that an Islamic critical theory tool within the area of education would offer an alternative view of critical theory encompassing Islam and its moral guidance as a way forward. I argue that although Muslims are restricted in putting forward religiously informed counter-arguments, it is still within the spirit of critical theory, as "a paradigm that gives Islam and Muslims visibility and the right to dialogue from their own predilection" (Gilhani-Williams, 2014, p. 19), which I suggest is an example of a counter-argument with which to challenge conditions of colonisation.<sup>9</sup>

Meer (2014) warns of the potential in replicating colonial injustice when applying "postcolonial thought" (*ibid*, p. 502) particularly the "relationship between knowledge, representation and politics" (Meer, 2014, pp. 505-506). Accordingly,

---

<sup>9</sup> In this thesis I argue against using Islamically informed narratives as counter-arguments to challenge Islamophobia. However, it is acknowledged that research into the credibility of such use is beyond the scope of this study.

Muslim consciousness may exist beyond the postcolonial tradition and within liberal democratic frameworks which challenge Islamophobia (*ibid*, p. 515). I argue the lived experiences of some Muslims are so deeply informed by Islam, their cultural identity is subsumed within the ideology of Islamophobia. Therefore, cultural contexts as conduits for Muslim voices will fail. The common denominators "religion and culture", which define Muslims (Dobe and Chhokar, 2000, p. 382) are not concepts that will allow the political representation of Muslims in Britain and challenge the ideology of Islamophobia. Furthermore, the supposed historical incompatibility of European and Western values is "central to the rise in Islamophobia" (Taras, 2013, p. 419), all of which suggests that analysing CoE data through a postcolonial lens would not further Muslim voices. Meer argues that postcolonialism informs the concept of Islamophobia in three ways, first by *continuity* where "historical colonial dynamics are reproduced in contemporary postcolonial environments" (Meer, 2014, p. 515), second by *translation* which relies on the first but with an Orientalist critique for the concept of Islamophobia (*ibid*). The third concerns an account of Muslim consciousness, lying in "terrain that is also populated by scholarship beyond the postcolonial tradition" (Meer, 2014, p. 515). Meer argues that this is an area where Muslims construct their identities against a background of Islamophobia (*ibid*), without, I argue, voices which the wider non-Muslim British public are able to hear. The terrain where Muslims *may* have a voice beyond postcolonialism is not clear. Meer argues that postcolonialism in the form of *continuity* and *translation* is used to "inform the concept of Islamophobia" (Meer, 2014, p. 515). He calls for an alternative third way, separate from the tradition of postcolonialism to a way involving Muslim consciousness.

Recognising the limitations of the scope of this research and the warnings of using postcolonial thought, I considered whether a humanistic, ethical and moral paradigm may bridge the divide between religion and culture to where oppression of Muslims and non-Muslim actors could be considered.

It is not ethical for either Muslim or non-Muslim to be oppressed and I considered the executive summary of the most recent proposed definition of Islamophobia:

It is not just British Muslims who are impacted by Islamophobia. It is British society at large who, by virtue of normalised prejudice against Muslim beliefs and practices, come to imbibe a panoply of falsehoods or misrepresentations and, consequentially, discriminatory outlooks to the detriment of social harmony and social inclusion (All Party Parliamentary group on British Muslims, 2018, p. 9).

Bhargava (2013) (in his study of epistemic injustice and colonialism in India under British rule), recognised that the belief in the cultural superiority of the colonisers not only conquered lands and goods but also the Indian mind. He argued that when an epistemic framework is created that prevents the colonised from accessing concepts and categories by which they can understand themselves, then epistemic injustice occurs. "Epistemic injustice occurs when the basic epistemic forms of a group are altered by the arbitrary or deliberate actions of another powerful or dominant group" (Bhargava, 2013, p. 414). Where an epistemic framework is sustained, preventing members of a social group from accessing conceptual goods then a damaged capacity results in a persistent failure to think for oneself (including intellectual freedom) (*ibid*, p. 415) which is an epistemic injustice.

Bhargava (2013, p. 416) makes a connection between intellectual freedom for academics in India, and a "new phase of colonization with the academization of

Indian intellectual life" where a "near-total reliance on academic practices and books and journals that are transmitters of a new inescapable form of colonial power". Bhargava (2013, p. 416) argues that this is an "epistemic injustice" and that sufferers must not view it as a subjection but strive to renew "a potentially common tradition". I argue that Bhargava's notion of intellectual freedom has an association with false consciousness for the wider non-Muslim British public and for the Muslim respondents, whose intellectual freedom is also affected. I considered that both Muslims and non-Muslims were victims of an epistemic injustice and that Bhargava (2013) is a catalyst allowing me to consider an amalgamation of my reading of postcolonialism. I considered that by extending the concept of false consciousness into an epistemic injustice paradigm I could progress my theoretical framework to a secular, ethical, and humanistic area beyond postcolonialism for both Muslim and non-Muslim voices.

I also considered that I may be adding to the layers of institutional practices in Western academia (Pitts, 2017, p. 153; Bhargava, 2013) by giving voice to the oppressed, thereby failing to heed the warnings from Spivak (1988), sustaining Western academic thought and colonising the Muslim mind. However, as argued, my intention is to progress from postcolonialism toward epistemic injustice in order to challenge and deconstruct the ideology of Islamophobia paving the way for epistemic justice and a platform for Muslim voices.

Postcolonial conditions exist for Muslims living in Britain. British Muslims are made to feel different and their rights as British citizens questioned. This negatively impacts on their sense of belonging, citizenship, representation and their ability to publicly celebrate being a Muslim in Britain. Similarly, sections of



the wider, non-Muslim public view Muslims as 'foreign', an 'enemy within', practicing a "barbaric" (Allen, 2020, p. 58) religion with allegiances to the Middle East. These conditions affect the concept of Britishness permitting British Muslims to be placed outside of what is considered to be British, denying them their rights as citizens and making them appear as guests of Britain rather than British citizens. Maintaining postcolonial conditions for Muslims living in Britain is a structure of social control, which must be explored and challenged. In order to progress such challenge, I now turn to epistemic injustice focusing on the theories of Fricker (2007) and Medina (2013).

#### **4.7. Epistemic Injustice**

I begin with an examination of Fricker's (2007) notion of epistemic injustice. I argue that prejudice against Muslims results in them being victims of two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice, where their voices are not given due credibility, and hermeneutical injustice, where there exists a lacuna in society's knowledge of Islam and Muslims which is filled by Islamophobia. Drawing on Fricker, I then turn to Medina (2013) who, in extending epistemology to encompass oppression and resistance, widens and deepens the theory of knowledge. Together, Fricker and Medina pave the way for the analysis of the interview data illustrating how the British public's knowledge of Muslims and Islam has been constructed and misrepresented, resulting in the marginalisation and subsequent oppression of Muslims living in Britain.

Adopting a postcolonial lens allowed me to locate the negative spaces where state hegemony marginalised British Muslims. To use an analogy, postcolonialism has

been the lens through which I locate injustice and epistemic injustice is the microscope through which I can observe how knowledge maintaining injustice for both Muslims and non-Muslims operates. Building on arguments further in this chapter I examine how negative spaces within the concept of epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) are also repositories for hegemony. Similarly, epistemic injustice must be located in the negative spaces of the lived experiences of Muslims. 'Normalising' injustice (Fricker, 2007) creates a need for the 'hard to reach' spaces to be explored. Epistemic injustice allow this to occur so 'othering' of Muslims seen in a postcolonial context may be also seen in an alternative paradigm.

Fricker (2007, p. 1) focused on the negative spaces where epistemic wrongs have occurred and adopting an ethical standpoint, termed injustices as:

1. 'testimonial', "when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speakers word" and,
2. 'hermeneutical', "when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences".

Socially constructed 'othering' of British Muslims by Prevent, media stereotyping and FBV has enabled Islamophobia to germinate in the social imagination of the public. As a consequence, hermeneutical injustice to Muslims living in Britain has been "caused by structural prejudice in the economy of collective hermeneutical resources" (Fricker, 2007, p. 1). Structural identity prejudice or "identity power" (Fricker, 2007, p. 14) against British Muslims is largely based on negative assumptions about their cultural practices. Along with Islamophobia, this occupies the minds of some members of British society leading them to give a lesser degree

of credibility to the testimony of British Muslims, resulting in hermeneutical injustice. 'Hermeneutical marginalisation' represents a marginalised group or community (Fricker, 2007, p. 153) and in the context of this research, Muslims living in Britain.

I argue that there are similarities between "false consciousness" (Eyerman, 1981, p. 44; Rosen, 1996) in the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim British public and a "cognitive disablement" or a "hermeneutical lacuna" (Fricker, 2007, p. 151) impeding making sense of or understanding an experience. Both Muslim and non-Muslim are cognitively handicapped by a cognitive disadvantage. However, only Muslims remain vulnerable to be 'othered' as a consequence of their membership of a marginalised group (Fricker, 2007) and therefore only Muslims are 'affected' by hermeneutical marginalisation.<sup>10</sup>

Having argued that non-Muslims are also negatively affected by a "hermeneutical lacuna" (Fricker, 2007, p. 151) it is in their interest to have a better understanding of their cognitive behaviour so they may be able to move to a position of a "virtuous hearer" (*ibid*, p. 171) where they may give credibility to the testimony of Muslims.

Drawing on my argument that postcolonial conditions exist for Muslims in Britain, I re-frame 'othering' of Muslims by using epistemic injustice as my primary data analysis tool. This allows Muslim narratives to be seen in ethical and secular

---

<sup>10</sup> It may be that postcolonial conditions for Muslims living in Britain is the font from where the ideology of Islamophobia and subsequent concepts, including false consciousness, emerge. This claim requires further research to substantiate which is beyond the scope of this research.

terms by focusing on notions of justice and removing them from their religiously defined position which I claim is an impasse in a postcolonial construct. I use epistemic injustice to challenge Islamophobia by using a counter-false consciousness narrative discourse by appropriating the concept of the 'virtuous hearer' (Fricker, 2007, p. 171) to bring about epistemic justice. Recognising that an economy in the hermeneutical resources of the wider non-Muslim British public has allowed for a lacuna to be filled by Islamophobia I adopt an epistemic injustice approach rather than critical theory allowing me to replace false consciousness with hermeneutical injustice. Staying with the idea that false consciousness is ideological, it is logical to suggest that it is in the wider non-Muslim public's interest to move to be "virtuous hearers" (*ibid*, p. 169) ridding themselves from being negatively affected by hermeneutical injustice. Fricker's definition of hermeneutical injustice differs from Medina's (2013) in respect of whether a person suffers injustice due to being unable to "properly comprehend her own experience" (*ibid*, p. 6). I argue Islamophobia has created a cognitive disadvantage in the minds of some of the non-Muslim British public, preventing them from comprehending their situation and being able to move on to an ethical position.

Fricker's later work (2017, p. 56) acknowledges the legacy of Marxism, the ideology of false consciousness (Lukacs, 1971) and the need to make epistemic injustice a tool that may be used in "everyday lived experiences of injustice", not burdened with class, gender or race. Fricker (2017, p. 56) also recognised the need to "start with the experience of powerlessness and show that it raises philosophical questions" which I see supporting the methodological position adopted in using a CoE to gather Muslim responses (discussed in Chapter 5).

Having introduced the work of Fricker (2007; 2016; 2017), I now turn to the work of Medina (2013).

#### **4.8. Medina**

Medina (2013; 2017) extends the work of Fricker (2007) by identifying a range of epistemic injustices responsible for marginalising individuals. Medina explores the theory of knowledge as ways to understand how human behaviour, in many instances, is programmed to look after its owner very often at the expense of others. Medina uses societal concepts of hierarchy to argue that some people are unable to comprehend specific categories of knowledge caused by hierarchy 'blinding' them to another's situation. However, Medina (2017, p. 42) does not excuse or "let off the hook" the responsibility of the person who commits hermeneutical injustice(s). Along with Fricker (2007, pp. 168-169), Medina calls for an epistemic "virtue" or a "responsible agency" to be adopted (Medina, 2013, p. 128) to 'see' the plight of others. Medina clarifies that "insensitivity and numbness" (Medina, 2013, p. xii) is more appropriate than 'blindness' in describing how our epistemic sensibilities can be affected.

On this basis, Islamophobia may be seen as a product of epistemic injustice (maintained by Prevent, FBV and negative media reporting) allowing Muslims in Britain to be 'othered'. Using Medina's visual analogy, I use epistemic injustice as a microscopic lens to analyse the CoE data, magnifying instances, (perceived or real), identified as problematic in the lived experiences of Muslims living in Britain. I then engage with the concept of "epistemic resistance" or dissent (Medina, 2013, p. 3) "to undermine and change normative structures and the complacent

cognitive-affective functioning" sustaining them (*ibid*). I later use "epistemic friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 289) as a way to further Muslim voices (discussed in Chapter 8) in recognising "beneficial and detrimental epistemic friction" as ways to rid "the kind of stubbornness that gets in the way of knowledge" (Medina, 2013, p. 50).

Medina (2017, p. 41) defines hermeneutical injustice as, "phenomenon that occurs when the intelligibility of communicators is unfairly constrained or undermined, when their meaning-making capacities encounter unfair obstacles". He suggests forms of hermeneutical injustice are so damaging they may result in "hermeneutical death" (Medina, 2017, p. 41) leading to a radical curtailment of voice, interpretive capacities, and status as a participant in meaning-making and meaning-sharing practices (*ibid*). The similarities between hermeneutical death and silencing of voices within a postcolonial context are not easily dismissed. Medina goes on to offer four possible criteria in distinguishing and classifying hermeneutical injustice; the source of the problem, dynamics of the problem, breadth of the problem and depth of the problem.

- The "*source of the problem*" is categorised as *semantically produced*, where unavailable 'labels' or words or a lacuna exist, instead of where a name should. (Medina, 2017, p. 45). I consider Islamophobia within this category.
- The second category is "*performatively produced*" where the subjects' accent, unorthodox demeanour (Medina, 2017, p. 46) or "expressive style" (Fricker, 2007, p. 160) may be perceived as indicative of "intelligibility" (Medina, 2017, p. 46). I consider being identified as a Muslim living in Britain as befitting this category.
- Medina's second criteria, *the dynamics of the problem* also forms two categories, *structural or institutional*. This is where I see the Prevent

Strategy, FBV, the media, and *interpersonal dynamics* such as communicative intimidations where Muslims in Britain are accused of being medieval, barbaric, terrorist sympathisers, the enemy within, receiving 'funny looks', "which may be nothing" (Allen, 2020, p. 58), and where such micro-aggressions constrain their testimonial capacities (*ibid*).

- Medina's third criteria, *breadth*, seeks to find out how far the injustice reaches across the social fabric. This includes both incidental and systematic cases of hermeneutical injustice. The CoE data (Chapters 6 and 7) reveal the extent that Islamophobia has reached into the lives of the Muslim respondents.
- Medina's fourth criteria, *the depth of the problem*, shows how deep the hermeneutical harm goes in undermining or destroying meaning-making and sharing capacities. I consider the Muslim participants as relevant here.

I have argued that as a consequence of Islamophobia false consciousness has prevented Muslims from recognising Islamophobia which remains protected, maintained, and hidden. A hermeneutical death may be considered to have occurred when the interpretive powers of Muslims fails to see Islamophobia resulting in their voices being "killed" (Medina, 2017, p. 47). The extent of harm subjected to Muslim voices are considered in the data analysis chapters (6 and 7), and in the findings (Chapter 8).

It may be that oppressed groups refuse to engage with "oppressive rhetorical spaces" (Pohlhaus, Jr., 2012, p. 228; Medina, 2017, p. 50), choosing to do so and "maintaining hermeneutical privacy" (Fricker, 2016, p. 169). In postcolonial thought this is considered to be a counter-argument or challenge from an oppressed group not wanting others to speak for them (Spivak, 1988).

Fricker (2007, p. 159) argues that hermeneutical injustices are epistemic wrongs that simply happen, without perpetrators, "it is a purely structural notion". Medina clarifies his position which differs from Fricker (*ibid*) saying that it is not whether there "are expressive and interpretive resources available for meaning-making, but how these resources are used, by whom, and in what ways" (Medina, 2017, p. 43). This has significance in my reference to the wider non-Muslim public who are not the subject of data analysis, but as a body of people, use the resources available to them in different ways. To reiterate, Medina does not excuse them (non-Muslims) from their epistemic responsibility and that "refuge (in) ignorance" is not acceptable (Medina, 2013, p. 140) as is also the case for criminal law in Britain (Law and Martin, 2014).

I considered the possibility that Muslims in Britain may be reticent in discussing issues that they feel are important for fear of being labelled extremist. Medina (2013, p. 5) says:

Democracy is not only about voting but also about talking. In fact, talking is prior to voting because, if voting is about ratifying certain proposals, public discourses are antecedently needed for the formulation and discussion of these proposals.

Anderson (2006, p. 11) concurs with Medina saying we need a "model of democracy in which its epistemic success is a product of its ability to take advantage of the epistemic diversity of individuals". British Muslims are not able to engage in a "resistance model of democracy" (Medina, 2013, p. 10), or in the practices "of resistance in which epistemic friction can be found" (*ibid*, p. 16) in order to be able to "fight against ignorance, to know oneself and others" and "to collaborate in the pursuit of epistemic justice" (*ibid*, p. 17). This, of course is



applicable to everyone, which I recognise in arguing that false consciousness prevents an understanding that is in their interest. Medina (2013) argues that only "when significantly different perspectives are available and they are allowed to interact" (*ibid*, p. 18) can we learn from each other and work toward democratic social interaction. This requires epistemic resistance to become exposed to self-questioning and becoming "perplexed" (Medina, 2013, p. 18) about who we are to unmask and undo the "social construction of our perspective" and "interrupting the flow of familiarity and obviousness" (*ibid*, p. 19). At first glance this appears as a wish list to achieve utopian ideals in self-improvement. However, unless we can unpick hegemony seeking to normalise and make comfortable Islamophobia, 'othering' and 'hermeneutical marginalisation' for British Muslims will endure. Returning to Freire (1970, p. 26) "only power that springs from the weakness of the oppressed will be sufficiently strong to free both". Recognising hermeneutical marginalisation and false consciousness in Muslims and non-Muslims respectively, illuminate 'oppression' so that progression from it may occur.

This research argues that postcolonialism is an affective concept to locate injustices perpetrated against British Muslims. Medina (2013, p. 13) refers to "ubiquitous hermeneutical and testimonial injustices" that surround us in our everyday practices, appearing as normal, desensitising us from real injustices. This, I argue is a reflection on how postcolonialism operates in Britain using a veil of securitisation over Muslims as a result of Prevent, FBV, Islamophobia and negative media reporting. The introduction of FBV and its link to security issues in Britain normalises negative views of Muslims ensuring that "self-questioning" (*ibid*, p. 18) and "being perplexed" (*ibid*, p. 19) encompassing the epistemology of

resistance (*ibid*, p. 22) are not areas engaged in or critiqued by the wider non-Muslim public . In epistemic injustice terms, Prevent contributes to a "hermeneutical injustice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 6) and "detrimental epistemic friction, ...censoring, silencing, or inhibiting the formation of beliefs, the articulations of doubts, the formulation of questions and lines of enquiry" (Medina, 2013, p. 50) for some Muslims in Britain.

The social imagination of the British public is a palette of grey narratives fed by misinformation which requires a change to a "kaleidoscope" of colours (Medina, 2013, p. 22) in the social imagination to expand our social sensibilities recognising oppression within British society. Medina described oppression in epistemic relations (specifically inequality), as being "the enemy of knowledge" (*ibid*, p. 27). The range of injustices categorised by Medina allowed this research to locate and explain how Muslims became negatively affected by epistemic injustice and further show knowledge of their lived experiences. Summarising, social inequalities affecting Muslims living in Britain have epistemic consequences including injustice. Epistemic injustice is caused by the flow of information being manipulated to suit a class or social group marginalising, 'othering', duping, stereotyping, and denying people inhabiting a 'different' group. Medina (2013; 2017, p. 48) offers a "challenge by exerting epistemic friction against the normative expectations of established interpretive frameworks" of which postcolonialism may be considered an example.

#### **4.9. Conclusion**

In this chapter I provide an account of my educational journey and how reflecting on my experiences and the CoE has shaped this thinking. Young people are often negatively stereotyped and categorised as suitable for certain types of work at the expense of being given skills to think critically and independently. I saw the work of critical pedagogical theorists as being important considerations in considering critical theory as a way of disrupting, challenging and potentially de-stabilising government policy that I argued were oppressive to Muslims living in Britain. In Chapter 3 I argued that the Prevent strategy and FBV are oppressive postcolonial constructs which limit Muslim agency.

I suggested that Islam and Muslims are portrayed as abnormal within British society and that at the time of writing no other group of people are treated with such suspicion and hostility. I believe they are being 'colonised' within the confines of their own country and that the implementation of a postcolonial perspective has allowed this research to examine the various ways in which power has been used to firstly colonise groups (in this instance Muslims) and secondly to control them.

I outlined the work of prominent postcolonial theorists as a way of constructing a framework that I used to locate areas of power imbalance and to illuminate how young Muslims accept that they are 'othered' in British society. Using postcolonial theory I argued that although the wider non-Muslim public were ignorant of Muslims and Islam, a false consciousness in their social imagination was filled by an ideology of Islamophobia. Having identified that Islamophobia created an

impasse in continuing to analyse my data through a postcolonial lens I engaged with wider theory and data (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012). This allowed me to consider that moving to a secular position may enable me to reframe discourses of 'othering' and marginalisation of Muslims by a universal justice approach instead of a religiously and culturally informed postcolonial narrative. I formed the view that by moving from a postcolonialism clouded by the fog of a normalised Islamophobia to an epistemic injustice position I may be able to remove barriers to knowledge. Furthermore, this would provide a conduit through which a counter-argument could inform the social imagination of the British public to challenge Islamophobia thus contributing to social justice for Muslims in Britain.

In the data analysis that follows in Chapters 6 and 7, I use both postcolonial thought and epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) as lenses through which to interrogate the young Muslim's responses in order to evidence Muslim marginalisation within the social imagination of the British public. I introduce the idea that young Muslims experience prejudice in Britain because they are identifiably Muslim and are considered as a distinct and separate group within society (Storry and Childs, 1997). By employing epistemic injustice, and specifically hermeneutical injustice, I show how Muslims are marginalised when others hold unjustified or incorrect attitudes about them based on their membership of a social group (Fricker, 2007). I further argue that the Prevent Strategy contributes to Muslims in Britain becoming victims of hermeneutical injustice as a result of being securitised within British society and 'othered' by the creation of divisions as a consequence of the initiation of FBV (Cameron, 2011; Home Office, 2011a).

Having outlined the theoretical framework I now move to Chapter 5 which provides an account of my methodological approach including the justification for the research methods employed.


## **5. CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

### **5.1. Introduction**

In this chapter I state the aims, objectives and research questions at 5.2 followed by the research methods used in this qualitative study at 5.3. In section 5.4 I describe the 10-step process employed in the Community of Enquiry (CoE) and in section 5.5 I introduce the research participants followed by the research setting in section 5.6. In section 5.7 I continue with the data collection and preparation with the transcripts of both sets of CoE data available at (Appendix 1 and 2). In section 5.8 I continue by describing how my reflexive position shaped the research and in section 5.9 describe the methodological position adopted for this research. In section 5.10 I provide an account of the initial research design justifying not using the one-to-one semi-structured qualitative interview data from key Muslim adults, instead prioritising the community of enquiry(CoE) interview data from young Muslim men and women. In section 5.11 I continue with the revised research design, tracing my research journey (see 5.1.1). As an aid to show how my thinking was influenced, a short biography of the participants from the one-to-one interviews is provided and a summary of themes from the interviews at (Appendix 3). The inclusion of this data is important in understanding how its initial scrutiny was a catalyst for me to further engage with theory, government policy and data, shaping the theoretical position and decisions made throughout the research journey. This process allowed me to uncover the phenomenon Islamophobia and to place it within a theoretical framework where I could locate areas of injustice and consider a way forward. Table 5.11.1 provides contrasting accounts of the limitations and mitigation of both data collection tools used in this research, however, these are not grounds for rigorous comparison, serving only to show how

they were used in this research. In section 5.12 I continue with my rationale for analysis of the data. In the discussion of the CoE data I briefly revisit my theoretical position justifying choices made in the analysis of the data. I continue with standards of validation and evaluation in section 5.12.1. The chapter concludes with the ethical considerations employed (see 5.13) which includes my ethical stance, interviewer effect, informed consent, and confidentiality, with the conclusion at 5.14. I once more provide an overview of the research journey in section at 5.1.1 below, referring to it at 5.10 and 5.11 further in this chapter.

### 5.1.1. Research Process Map





I now turn to the research aim and questions that have guided the thesis followed by the research methods employed where I provide a rationale of my principle research tool, the Community of Enquiry.

## **5.2. Research Aim and Research Questions.**

The overarching research aim for this thesis is to:

- Explore the lived experience of young Muslims living in Wales in the light of postcolonial and epistemic injustice theories.

The research questions are:

- Is Postcolonialism visible in the narratives of young Muslims living in Wales and if so, in what ways?
- Is Epistemic Injustice visible in the narratives of young Muslims living in Wales and if so, in what ways?
- How might we understand Islamophobia in light of Muslim experience?

These questions evolved concurrently alongside my methodological position, informing my reading of theory and government policy, allowing me to engage with the data over time and subsequently becoming important to my thinking.

Underpinning the research throughout was the aspiration to identify where Islamophobia had impacted upon the lives of my respondents and to locate the areas where injustice toward them prevailed. This warranted a focus on the lived experiences of my respondents in order to get rich and "thick descriptions" (Cohen *et al.*, 2000, p. 311; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 9; Geertz, 1973) of their experiences. I now turn to the methods employed in this research providing accounts of my rationale along with limitations and mitigation of the methods used (see table 5.11.1).

### **5.3. Research Methods.**

Following my initial research design using semi-structured one-to-one interviews with Muslim adult workers I engaged with wider theory and policy (see research process map 5.1.1) employing a CoE approach as a data gathering tool with a group of young Muslim men and a group of young Muslim women. I will now justify the CoE as a data collection tool followed by a description of how the process of a CoE was carried out.

The one-to-one interviews had produced largely biographical narratives of how the key Muslim adults lived their lives as Muslims in Wales with little reference to Islamophobia (see Appendix 3). I knew many of them had been subjected to Islamophobic abuse but had chosen not to speak about these experiences. I suspected that somehow, elements unknown to me in the employment of the one-to-one interviews, were not conducive to enabling the key Muslim adults to speak of their experiences of Islamophobia. I thought about my work in schools and how groups of young people spoke about personal and sometimes distressing experiences within Community of Enquiry settings. I had experience of the Community of Enquiry (CoE) being facilitated in schools and university settings and had been trained to SAPERE level 1 in Philosophy for Children (P4C) (SAPERE, 2007) while studying for my Graduate Diploma. A group of young Muslim men and women had already agreed to be part of the study and I considered using a community of enquiry approach as a data collection tool instead of the one-to-one interviews. The main pedagogic tool of P4C is the community of enquiry and I wanted to assess the efficacy of a CoE approach as a tool to gather data encompassing a phenomenological approach. I re-engaged

with the theory of critical pedagogy which gave me confidence that the CoE may be considered as a critical pedagogical tool in my research and that the ethical construct of a CoE (see 5.13) prioritised the voices of the participants or "partners" (Kincheloe *et al.*, 2011, p. 164). I believed that the CoE exemplified critical pedagogical research where the Muslim participants were able to "see more critically, think at a more critical level, and to recognise the forces that subtly shape their lives" (*ibid*). Furthermore, the structure of the CoE would allow them to collectively generate questions which concurs with the work of Freire (1970) who used his knowledge of a community along with the knowledge produced by his students to inform curriculum (Kincheloe *et al.*, 2011). The CoE is therefore a viable research approach in qualitative research with a particular focus on researching the beliefs, attitudes, perceptions and values of respondents. At that stage in my research journey the work of Freire (1970) strengthened my confidence in using a CoE as a data collection tool, and my theoretical stance to uncover hidden power. Succinctly, I argue that a CoE approach is a pedagogically infused data collection tool and is positioned within the empowering tradition of critical pedagogy (Freire, 1970), which provides a rationale to uncover false consciousness. Critical pedagogy would prove to be the catalyst in furthering my theoretical journey to locate, uncover and deconstruct hidden power that I argue sought to marginalise Muslims in Britain.

Initial scrutiny of the themes in the one-to-one interviews identified elements of a political disconnect and lack of representation for Muslims in British politics (see Appendix 3), and that critical research was "unafraid to consummate a relationship with emancipatory process" (Kincheloe *et al.*, 2011, p. 164). I knew that a CoE

was a respectful way of discussing philosophical questions where participants would be able to move an enquiry forward and that facilitation is a skilful task. I made the decision that I would engage an experienced CoE practitioner to conduct the enquiries and that my involvement in the data collection process would be limited to the facilitation of each research conversation along with the management of the audio/visual recording equipment. This was not to address any bias or interviewer effect (see 5.13.2) but a decision made that the CoE would be better served being conducted by an experienced practitioner. The facilitator is referred to as 'Kim' in the data analysis at Chapters 6 and 7.

I wanted to encourage a philosophical narrative among the young Muslim men and women and by following the 10-step process, (described further on), allowed both groups to democratically choose the questions that would guide each enquiry. I decided to use a DVD produced four years earlier as a stimulus to the enquiries which would allow them to develop questions for the participants to vote on. The choice of stimulus in Step 1 of the ten-step process was a deliberate decision by me to forefront Islamophobia. I used a 10-minute DVD that I had produced (Mort, 2008) showing Muslims in the South Wales area speaking about their experiences of Islamophobia. This allowed me to forefront the phenomenon I wanted to explore and in phenomenological terms would move the research to a hermeneutical phenomenological position (Creswell, 2013; van Manen, 1997) by not bracketing the essence (Islamophobia). This would allow the respondents to see the phenomenon of Islamophobia and interpret their "lived experience(s)" (van Manen, 1997, p. 4; Lavery, 2003, p. 24) of Islamophobia creating meaning and achieving a sense of understanding (Wilson and Hutchinson, 1991). Shifting the

focus from the position of Husserl (1970), "phenomenology's recognized founder" (Ladkin, 2014, p. 613), to Heidegger (1962), a position of 'knowing' to 'experiencing and understanding', would allow me to explore the historical, cultural and social experiences of Muslims in Wales (which subsequently informed my theoretical interpretive and analytical positions within this research). The decision to move from bracketing the phenomenon Islamophobia made clear to me the need to establish criteria for trustworthiness of my research. Allen (1995) argued that a clear distinction between phenomenology and hermeneutical phenomenology does not exist. However, in methodological terms a hermeneutical approach allows the researcher to "engage in a process of self-reflection" (Laverty, 2003, p. 28) allowing biases and assumptions to be "embedded and essential to interpretive process" (*ibid*). I explore standards of validation and evaluation in the data analysis section at 5.12.1 and justify discarding epoche within the methodology. I also discuss epoche in reflexivity at 5.8, as a way to reinforce my values in wanting to make things better for young Muslims by addressing the phenomena.

Having adopted a CoE as my primary data collection tool I now consider its efficacy as an example of ethical practice and in particular how it may be used to disrupt the binary situation of researcher and researched to allow the voices of the participants to be prioritised.

Most commonly used with children in classrooms under the auspices of Philosophy for Children (Lipman, 2003) the CoE is used in over 60 countries and research evidence supports its claims to promote deliberative enquiry in a variety of ways (Lipman, 1998; Hess and McAvoy, 2015). Ethical considerations are

central to Philosophy for Children (P4C) as exemplified in the way a space is created for all voices to speak and be listened to. Dialogue is valued as a key to self-knowledge and mutual understanding and collaborative talk is the key dialogic mechanism. It is the participants who generate the question they wish to explore following presentation of a stimulus. In this way participants are treated as active epistemic agents (Lyle, 2008). The aim of the CoE is to uncover through dialogue personal understanding and knowledge in order to discover the truth (Fisher, 1995; 1998). This links to Bakhtin's (1984, p. 110) notion that truth is not to be found inside the head of an individual, "... it is born *between* people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction". Questions are not decided by the researcher but created by the participants and the sum knowledge created by the participants in dialogue is greater than any one individual.

Echeverria and Hannan (2017) argue that the community of philosophical enquiry is an example of an educational model that allows participants to engage in the process of democracy encouraging them to think deeply and listen to each other.

The role of the facilitator is to enable the participants to share ideas and insights and support and challenge each other's ideas and thinking. It seeks to empower participants and take the researcher out of the spotlight.

If one considers traditional research in "Western epistemological frameworks" focuses on the researched as "passive subjects" rather than "relevant stakeholders" (Iwowo, 2014, p. 632) then I argue this may be seen as underpinned by postcolonialism in knowledge creation. Succinctly, the use of a CoE empowers participants by prioritising their voices and challenging dominant structures.

I now turn to the "10-step process" of the Community of Enquiry (Muirhead, 2018, pp. 7-17) which provides a clear model for both enquiries and discuss its use as a data collection tool. Each step is explored and justified in the data analysis of the CoE's in Chapters 6 and 7. An important component of the CoE process is that the respondents choose the question for their enquiry. The 10 steps are set out below:

#### **5.4. Community of Enquiry: 10 Step Process.**

1. Choosing a stimulus for the enquiry.
2. Presentation of the stimulus.
3. Individual thinking time.
4. Forming questions
5. Justifying the choice of questions
6. Voting.
7. The enquiry: first thoughts.
8. Middle words.
9. Last words.
10. Review of the enquiry.

A Community of Enquiry may be described as a "workshop-style session that offers space for a group of people to collaboratively explore ideas and ask rich and meaningful questions of each other" (Muirhead, 2018, p. 2), and as "a collaborative form of purposeful discourse" (Garrison, 2014, p. 147). A CoE, alternatively referred to as a Community of Inquiry (CoI), is normally understood as a pedagogic practice (Dumitru, 2012; Christie *et al.*, 2007). A Community of Inquiry (CoI) has been used in action research as a learning model, "for learning and creativity", "problem-solving" and "constructing new ideas and knowledge" (Garrison, 2014, p. 150) about which research has been carried out (Andrews *et al.*, 2019; Coghlan and Brydon-Miller, 2014). A CoI is normally used as a

collaborative philosophical enquiry (see for example P4C; Topping and Trickey, 2007) as a teaching tool or as an intervention strategy to see if a CoE improves outcomes for children (Yan *et al.*, 2018).

A CoE allows the participants to share their experiences and to listen to other participants' points of view. The question or problem for the enquiry are set by the participants who define what they want to discuss. The whole process is facilitated by a practitioner who guides the enquiry through the 10-steps explaining each step to the participants.

Steps 1 and 2 involve a stimulus being shown to the group with steps 3 to 6 set aside for them to think about and discuss forming questions before democratically choosing a question for the enquiry. Steps 7 to 9 allow each participant an opportunity to discuss the question. There are strict rules in not interrupting a speaker and participants may choose to pass to another rather than speak. Speakers are encouraged to disagree but are also encouraged to give reasons for their comments. The facilitator is there to ensure the rules are observed and intervene only to clarify or offer alternative points of view for the participants to build on the conversation or gain a deeper understanding of each others' views. Step 10 allows the group to summarise they key points discussed and to see if there are further issues arising for discussion.

There are currently a number of papers out for review on the use of the method (Lyle, 2019) however there are limited comprehensive accounts as to how the CoE can be used as a research tool. Golding (2015, p. 205) argues that the CoE “provides a new method for collecting and testing data”. He further suggests that



in a CoE the researcher is able to gather in-depth information about the participants because of its dialogic and collaborative nature. The argument for the value of a dialogic approach to enquiry using the CoE is discussed in Lyle (2008). Golding (2015) argues a CoE as a research method blends collaborative philosophical enquiry and empirical data collection and analysis methods. This research has used the CoE as a tool to gather data which proved particularly beneficial with groups of marginalised people in community settings. I have, however recognised its limitations in this research (see table 5.11.1) in the researcher being unable to set questions for discussion relying instead on the choice of stimulus used to generate questions in the area of the phenomenon to be explored. In addition, by not subjecting the cohort of one-to-one interviewees to a CoE it is not known whether such a method would have uncovered their lived experiences of Islamophobia. Nevertheless, utilising a CoE allows participants autonomy on the direction of the CoE prioritising and articulating areas that concern them, which may be different from those of the researcher. The significance of this is reflected in my "plugging the theory and the data into one another" (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012, p. vii) permitting me agency to explore the wider literature for ideas with which to consider theoretically rather than approach the CoE with a pre-defined theoretical position. Although this process was born from my initial design it developed over time allowing me to engage with wider policy and theory to shape the theoretical framework and be able to analyse the CoE data (see also 5.1.1). I now introduce my research participants.

### **5.5. Research Participants.**

The young Muslim men and women who took part in two separate CoE at a meeting room provided for the purpose were recruited either by word of mouth or from a social media platform used by young Muslims at a local University. I had produced a research information leaflet (see Appendix 4) which I left at a local drop-in centre used by young Muslim men and women, asking the workers there to distribute to young Muslims. I also asked a female Muslim colleague to post the research information leaflet on a female-only Muslim social media site that was being used at a local university. I discuss 'gatekeepers' or "key informants" (Creswell, 2013, p. 94) in the research setting at 5.6. I wanted all of the participants to be able to self-select to become part of the research cohort without coercion or feeling pressured. In my research information leaflet (see Appendix 4) I had provided a brief pen picture of myself including a reference to 'Oanez', a well-known Muslim youth worker in the community who I had collaborated with over a 10-year period. I wanted the young people to have someone they trust as point of reference should they want more information about me and my intended research.

I considered my position as a "participant as observer" (Creswell, 2013, p. 166) in the gathering of the data employing a "purposeful sampling" strategy (*ibid*, p. 154) with both groups who met the criteria of being Muslim and living in Wales. The young people are not representative of the diverse Muslim community in Britain and each person has an opportunity to tell their lived experiences of being a Muslim living in Wales including "experience of the phenomenon being studied" (Creswell, 2013, p. 155) Islamophobia. The sample size for the CoE with the men

were less than the 12 persons recommended by (Echeverria and Hannam, 2017) but were sufficient for them "to develop a collective story" (Huber and Wheelan, 1999, pp. 381-396). I referred to the cohort as being 'young Muslims' with their ages ranging from 19 to 32 for the men and 13 to 29 for the women. My use of the term 'young Muslim' does not follow the definition of 'young person' in Wales which is 13-25 and is not used in order to categorise them by age but refer to the CoE cohort. I deal with the suitability (by age) of the two 13 year-old young Muslim women in the informed consent section at 5.13.3.

I set dates when I was able to use the research setting for the CoE (see 5.6) restricting 20 persons per enquiry. I used the voluntary services of three Muslim youth workers, referred to as 'Arvind', 'Oanez' and 'Deeba', to liaise with and collate the first 20 Muslim men and 20 Muslim women who wanted to be part of the research and subsequently gave each group dates and location for the CoE. I was not aware of how many young people would turn up until the day of each enquiry and was made aware by each 'gatekeeper' that those wishing to take part had viewed my research information leaflet prior to attending the research setting. The CoE with the women involved 15 participants, and the CoE with the men 9 participants. Pen pictures for each person are provided at the beginning of the data analysis at (Chapters 6 and 7).

### **5.6. Research Setting.**

The two CoE with the Muslim men and women were conducted on separate occasions nine months apart at a local support centre where most of the young people were frequent visitors. It was important that both groups had exclusive use

of the centre and could not be seen by any other persons who were not involved in conducting the CoE. Due to the use of the centre by various agencies and the academic term commitments of those studying at university it was not possible to conduct the second CoE sooner. Permission was given for me and my facilitator to use the centre and the Muslim youth workers responsible for collating both cohorts were present at both CoE. Neither "gatekeeper" (Creswell, 2013, p. 94) took part in the CoE and were not within hearing of the CoE. The gatekeepers neither selected nor coerced any of the participants but were instrumental in allowing me to access them. The 'gatekeepers' Arvind, Oanez and Deeba also took part in the one-to-one interviews (see Appendix 3). Of those who attended as participants, all but one person chose to take part. Refreshments were provided and an opportunity to get to know each other facilitated by myself before each CoE commenced. The relaxed and informal surroundings of the venue as well as specific ethical consideration as regards to gender proprieties (see 5.13) allowed for a comfortable and respectful environment in which to conduct research.

### **5.7. Data Collection and Preparation.**

Data was collected from the one-to-one interviews using an audio recorder and were subsequently transcribed. The following transcripts were created:

- Interview with male Muslim adult youth worker (revert/Asian)
- Interview with an Imam.
- Interview with Muslim male adult youth worker (revert/ white).
- Interview with a female member of the Muslim community.
- Interviews with two Muslim female youth workers.

The transcripts of the six one-to-one interviews are not included in the research but are available to view. Research diaries were made and are also available to view upon request. A summary of the interviews with each interviewee is included at (Appendix 3) where they were scrutinised for themes. Scrutiny of the one-to-one interviews formed the start of the research process and were instrumental in shaping the revised research design. The one-to-one interviews did not show evidence of Islamophobia, although I knew from experience that most of the participants had experienced it.

It was my intention to continue one-to-one interview with a cohort of young Muslim men and women using the same questions as used earlier with the cohort of adults. However, following a review of the data I decided to use a CoE as a data collection tool where the phenomenon Islamophobia would be forefronted in an attempt to uncover it. Hence, the focus of my research changed from 'an analysis of the ways in which young Muslims construct their identity' (see, research information leaflet at Appendix 4; research process map at 5.1.1) to forefronting Islamophobia in Community of Enquiry research settings so as to be able to uncover and challenge it.

Both Communities of Enquiry ( CoE) were audio and video-recorded and subsequently transcribed. I used research diaries to capture my thinking and the connections I made to theoretical ideas when I examined the transcripts, which I go on to describe at 5.12. I repeatedly revisited the transcripts and my diaries to seek new connections and ideas. The following transcripts were created:

- Community of enquiry with Muslim women (Appendix 1).
- Community of enquiry with Muslim men (Appendix 2).

The recordings made with both CoE are explored in the informed consent section at 5.13.3, and a transcript from the research conversation (Farrell, 2005) with the women is available on request. A research conversation was carried out with the men while we were gathered for a meal prior to their CoE, but not recorded. The research conversations are an important part of informed consent and are included at 5.13.3. The question decided by the Muslim men in their CoE was: "Do common stereotypes or media influence your own perception about Islam even though you are Muslim ?" (discussed in Chapter 6). The question chosen by the women in their CoE was: "Is the media misrepresenting Islam for their own gain ?" (discussed in Chapter 7).

Following the transcription of both audio and audio/visual recordings from each CoE the raw data were subjected to initial analysis and further engaging with theory, policy and personal experience so as to be able to 'read' and interpret the data. This lengthy process which encompassed the theoretical journey (see diagram 4.1.1) is shown in the research process map at 5.1.1. Through the iterative process of reading theory with data (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012) the analytical process were revised at two points during the research process allowing an amalgamation of theoretical and interpretive positions to be employed to construct research findings.

It will be seen that the raw data in Appendices 1 and 2, although checked and edited for accuracy against both audio and video recordings, remain in their 'raw' state following transcription by a service provider and are not edited to an academic standard for writing.

I now go on to explain my reflexivity statement followed by the methodology at 5.9 in which I discuss the methodological and philosophical assumptions that have driven my research journey.

### **5.8. Reflexivity**

As a researcher I have engaged in critical self-awareness to recognise how I am situated within the research and how reflexivity has shaped my interpretation of the CoE data and analysis. I first summarise reflexivity and acknowledge that it is woven throughout the research for example, in critical incidents that made me:

- Question my role in potentially marginalising young people (see Chapter 1 also 4.2 at Chapter 4) leading to me considering the Prevent Strategy and Fundamental British values as responsible for marginalising Muslims living in Britain.
- Scrutinise the one-to-one interviews (see Appendix 3) leading me to consider that Islamophobia was not visible to the Muslim cohort.
- Consider how knowledge for young Muslims and about Muslims living in Wales is subject to control.
- Try to 'read' the CoE data and in failing to do so engage with wider policy and theory.
- Bring all of the above together in employing postcolonial thought to analyse and interpret the young Muslim voices.
- Recognise the need to move from postcolonialism to redefine Islamophobia as a protected ideology (see Chapter 4).

Using theories associated with postcolonialism, I positioned myself as a researcher-investigator looking for authority that I believe 'othered' Muslims living in Britain. I interrogated their voices through a postcolonial lens which I determined to be 'marginalised' and 'othered' voices. Turning the postcolonial lens toward myself as researcher (Berger, 2015) I recognised critical incidents in my

role as an educator (All Wales Core Programme, 2004; Think Project, 2012) leading me to consider that policies and procedures designed for social good also have the potential to harm.

My role in the collection of data in both CoE was confined to introducing and welcoming each respondent, operating the recording equipment, facilitating the research conversations (Farrell, 2005) (see also informed consent at 5.13.3) and presenting the stimulus to the CoE. In the DVD, I feature as a presenter and interviewer and both groups would have seen that I was a former police officer. They would also be aware that the aim of the DVD was to show how Islamophobia had affected Muslims living in South Wales and that as a resource for schools it was produced with the intention of being for the social good of Muslims. This was an important consideration for the young Muslims to know that my research would be focused on the well being of Muslims (see also research information leaflet at Appendix 4).

As a consequence of forefronting Islamophobia by using the DVD as stimulus I acknowledge that I did not 'bracket' the phenomena Islamophobia (Smith *et al.*, 2009; see methodology at 5.9) which was a deliberate decision in order to uncover Islamophobia and I acknowledge this decision in doing so. I had experience and knowledge of Muslim colleagues not wishing to speak about incidents of Islamophobia (see Appendix 3). I had been in the company of Muslim friends when they told me that some members of the public had given them "funny looks" (Allen, 2020, p. 58; Fricker, 2007, p. 37; Medina, 2013) see also (Aya in Chapter 7, line 262 in Appendix 1). I had not recognised, nor was I able to understand "funny looks" and this was an important consideration when trying to uncover incidents of



Islamophobia. It was central to the CoE that Islamophobia be uncovered so I may be able to locate, identify, and challenge it.

By using a CoE approach to gather data the Muslim men and women were able to control their own narratives in the construct of a pedagogically infused data collection tool which is aligned with the empowering tradition of critical pedagogy. Moreover, a CoE is a safe space for political thought and an "emancipatory process" (Kincheloe *et al.*, 2011, p. 164) with which to challenge perceived injustices (see table 5.11.1; Freire, 1970). The Muslim men and women articulated narratives of 'othering' in their respective CoE (discussed in Chapters 6 and 7) lending support to my assumption that postcolonial conditions existed for them and that confirmatory supporting literature would be needed to underpin such an assumption. Both men and women said that they enjoyed the process of the CoE and saw the benefit of further CoE with non-Muslims (see Chapters 6 and 7; Men's transcript lines 499-522 and Women's transcript lines 53-56 at Appendix 1 and 2).

I acknowledge my role as a participant in the construction of knowledge during the CoE and that by interpreting the participants' narratives through postcolonialism the knowledge produced is an amalgamation of the respondents and myself. I also considered whether I may be further contributing to the canon of postcolonial thought in asserting an "imperial ideology" (Kundnani, 2016, p. 7) in speaking for Muslims (Spivak, 1988) and analysing Muslims through an "imperialist gaze" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 171), validating and consolidating structures of domination (*ibid*) ( see also revised research design at 5.11). In recognising the potential to misrepresent and harm the young Muslims I extended my theoretical

position to the theory of epistemic injustice allowing analysis of the CoE data along with postcolonialism to locate areas of injustice and further interpret Muslim voices in narratives where their voices may be able to be heard (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) (discussed in Chapters 6 and 7). A continuing theme through both CoE was the need for young Muslims to gain knowledge of Islam and for non-Muslims to have knowledge of Muslims. This is a vitally important area which I have argued is shaped by government policy and disseminated by sections of the media who misrepresent them. Epistemic injustice encompasses theories which seek to unpick how knowledge (a lack of or an ignorance of) (Peels and Blaauw, 2016) contributes to injustices being caused to marginalised groups (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013). In Chapter 8, I propose a way forward to redefine Islamophobia from what I argue is a protected ideology and a postcolonial construct in an attempt to improve the lives of young Muslims living in Wales. I now turn to the methodological approach adopted in this research.

### **5.9. Methodology**

In their introduction to qualitative research Denzin and Lincoln (2011, p. 6) state that it encompasses a "multiparadigmatic" approach which allows the researcher a range of interpretive practices. I have conducted qualitative research to explore the phenomenon of Islamophobia in the lived experiences of a group of young Muslims living in Wales. Creswell (2013, p. 48) says that qualitative research is suitable for research with groups or a population to be studied that possesses "variables that cannot be easily measured". Qualitative research is also conducted when we want to empower individuals to "share their stories, hear their voices, and minimise the power relationships that often exist between a researcher

and the participants in the study" (*ibid*). This is important when investigating a snapshot of a diverse marginalised community whose voices have traditionally been ignored.

Building on the iterative and reflexive process of the research journey (see diagram 5.1.1) the aim of the research was to 'Explore the lived experiences of young British Muslims living in Wales in the light of postcolonial and epistemic injustice theories'. In order to do so I have adopted a qualitative research "social constructionist" (Creswell, 2013, pp. 24-25) paradigm approach which is appropriate in enabling me to "isolate target populations, show the immediate effects of certain programs on such subjects, and isolate the constraints that operate against policy change in such settings" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 15).

"Qualitative inquiries study how people and groups construct meaning" (Patton, 2015, p. 5); this allows me to evaluate and assign meaning to how the Muslim respondents interpret ways that Islamophobia affects them. Subsequently, as researcher I have also assigned meaning or interpretation to their voices using theory as an "act of composition" (*ibid*) in order to determine what is meaningful and to present a counter-argument to challenge Islamophobia.

Researching the phenomena of Islamophobia means capturing people's stories, subjecting them to qualitative analysis by close attention to the language used and the "nuances of culture, politics, economy, history, geography, resources and institutions" (*ibid*, p. 9). I argue that this may not be sufficiently achieved by a traditional form of phenomenological inquiry where there is a bracketing or suspension of one's beliefs (LeVasseur, 2003; Zahavi, 2019). Drawing upon my

own experiences (Moustakas, 1994) I engaged with theory and concepts (including a weakening of a multicultural society for Muslims living in Britain, the media and the government's Prevent Strategy letting me doubt suspending the notion of Islamophobia in the CoE. I considered that by extending phenomenological inquiry to encompass my theoretical and experiential position a hermeneutic or interpretive approach may be employed to further phenomenological inquiry. Thus, phenomenological research is suffused with a hermeneutic or interpretive approach as well as an idiographic analysis of Islamophobia, encompassing the constituent parts of 'Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis' (IPA) (Smith *et al.*, 2009) allowing the 'lived experiences' (Alase, 2017) of the research participants to be examined "without fear of distortions and/or prosecutions" (Moustakas, 1994, p. 135). Although originally considered a psychological approach (Smith, 1996), in respect of reflexivity, "IPA does in fact go further than many other approaches in addressing these issues" (Brocki, and Wearden, 2006, p. 92) and is increasingly being used in human, social and health sciences (Noon, 2018; Shinebourne, 2011). The objective of IPA is to understand lived experiences and explore how individuals make sense of their personal and social worlds (Smith and Osborn, 2003), and is "compelled with affording privilege to the voice of participants" (Noon, 2018, p. 80). IPA may also be "a particularly useful methodology for researching individuals or groups of individuals whose voices may otherwise go unheard" (Noon, 2018, p. 80; Creswell, 2013). The in-depth phenomenological interpretation and analysis of the phenomenon Islamophobia is central in allowing this research to explore the lived experiences (van Manen, 1997) of young Muslims in Britain.

Chapter 4, the theoretical position, traces my journey in engaging with theory culminating in a synthesis of false consciousness as a way of disrupting the dominant and harmful ideology of Islamophobia in Britain. My broader philosophical assumption is that post 9/11 an increase in Islamophobia has impacted upon young Muslims in Britain. My theoretical position is informed by personal and professional reflexivity (see 5.8) and engaging with the wider literature and policy has led me to use a social justice approach to analyse the CoE data. In my interpretive framework I use a postcolonial approach to locate injustices committed towards Muslims in Britain which I consider to be a progression from critical theory and a humanistic Marxist approach, political in its desire for a radical change of circumstance for Muslims in Wales. I overlay postcolonialism with epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) as a way to move from the warnings of speaking for a marginalised group of people (Spivak, 1988), or falling into the trap of "inquirer-oriented power" (Cannella and Lincoln, 2011, p. 82) within postcolonial discourse, to my primary data analysis tool where I synthesise false consciousness (Lukacs, 1971) within an epistemic injustice framework (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013). This allows me to consider Islamophobia as an ideology as well as a phenomenon to be explored. By exposing Islamophobia as a construct within a postcolonial paradigm I go on to employ epistemic injustice as a "countercolonial alliance" (Cannella and Lincoln, 2011, p. 82) to challenge the effects of the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) and Fundamental British Values (Cameron, 2011; DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) which has 'othered' Muslims living in Wales. This is an ethical perspective and an emancipatory paradigm (Alderson and Morrow, 2004) or condition of "beneficence" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 66) which I acknowledge when

making representations of "marginalized peoples" (Cannella and Lincoln, 2011, p. 82) which may also maintain 'othering' which I have referred to as a 'colonising' of the Muslim mind. Beneficence, "for the social good" (Clough and Nutbrown, 2002, pp.4-6) encompasses an epistemic injustice paradigm (Medina, 2013; Fricker, 2007), a central theoretical approach adopted in this research which seeks "self-empowerment" (Medina, 2013, p. 7) for members of minority groups. Postcolonial and epistemic injustice thought also allowed me to empathise with the respondents to share and better understand the hurt they feel as a consequence of experiencing Islamophobia. I also recognise my own position and privilege in constructing 'the other' (Cannella and Lincoln, 2011, p. 83) in using a postcolonial narrative (Kincheloe *et al.*, 2011, p. 171) which I further acknowledge in reflexivity at 5.8 and in ethical considerations at 5.13.

This research has strived to justify and evidence a theoretical paradigm with which to drive the research process and not be seen as critical or a "disguised version of Marxism" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 2) with which to singularly discredit British government policy and legislation. This is an important distinction as the theoretical and methodological position in this research has been informed by critical theory which has used Marxism as a stepping-stone to progress, concluding with postcolonial and epistemic injustice paradigms.

#### **5.10. Initial Research Design.**

My initial research design (see research process map 5.1.1) comprised of a qualitative phenomenological inquiry employing semi-structured questions to carry out one-to-one interviews with six key Muslim adults who had experience of working with young Muslims. The aim of my research was to analyse the ways in

which young Muslim men and women living in Wales construct their identities (against a background of widespread Islamophobia). I wanted to gauge the extent to which Islamophobia was present in their lives. I personally knew six adult Muslim youth workers who I identified as being 'key' because they had background knowledge of young Muslims as well as their own experiences working with and supporting young Muslims. I had worked with the 'key adults' for a number of years to challenge Islamophobia and was confident that they would address incidents of Islamophobia when interviewed. I had identified five areas to question them with an overarching aim to understand how Islamophobia might influence Muslim identity amongst young people. These were home, family, school, mosque, and the Ummah. My rationale for interviewing the adults was to 'set the scene' and have background information about young Muslims in Wales. I was also aware that five of the six key adults had been subjected to Islamophobic abuse. The respondent who had not received any Islamophobic abuse was a white revert to Islam who told me prior to being interviewed that no one had ever 'abused him for being Muslim'. Following the semi-structured interviews, I intended to carry out further interviews with young Muslim men and women using the same interview questions. I identified Islamophobia as the phenomenon or essence of a problem that exists for Muslims in Britain and that it would be the focus of my research. However, not all of my one-to-one respondents had experienced Islamophobia, which I now consider may have been a weakness in adopting a phenomenological approach, where I initially made the assumption that all of my research participants had experienced the phenomenon to be explored (Creswell, 2013, p. 76).

I had wrongly assumed that my interviewees would highlight incidents of Islamophobia without semi-structured interview questions having to specifically probe for incidents. This was an error in my philosophical assumptions. I did not want to portray nor suggest that my interviewees were victims and I was confident that a phenomenological approach was the right one to analyse the lived experiences of my respondents in the light of having identified Islamophobia as being the essence of the phenomenon that I wanted to explore (Patton, 2015). In my over-zealous adherence to Husserl's concept of epoche or "bracketing" (Patton, 2015, p. 117; Creswell, 2013, p. 78), my personal knowledge of Islamophobic abuse experienced by my respondents, along with limiting my epistemological claim to know how Islamophobia had affected five of the six Muslim respondents did not forefront Islamophobia as the 'essence' of my research. The result was that my respondents presented largely biographical accounts of their lives as Muslims with little or no accounts of their lived experiences of Islamophobia (see Appendix 3). I was unable to reflect on my experiences and knowledge of the Muslim community and my respondents, as well as my knowledge of Islamophobia. I also considered that in adhering to epoche, or bracketing the phenomenon, I may have created a vacuum which prevented me from immersing myself in the research along with my Muslim respondents. This method did not, however, reveal the phenomenon in enough depth in order to progress to a position where a social justice perspective could be achieved.



### 5.11. Revised Research Design

Following the one-to-one interviews with the key adults (see research process map 5.1.1), I decided that I would cultivate a "curiosity" (LeVasseur, 2003, p. 418) of Islamophobia (the phenomenon or essence being explored) among my interviewees, encouraging philosophical discussion to generate themes about Islamophobia. Building on my initial research design efforts to identify Islamophobia within a phenomenological construct, I considered my experiences working with young Welsh people (Think Project, 2012; All Wales Core Programme, 2004) and critical pedagogy, becoming aware that I may have unwittingly 'othered' them.

In Chapter One, I referred to two critical incidents which gave rise to the consideration that I may have 'othered' young people while at the same time trying to educate them to stay safe (All Wales Core Programme, 2004) and be aware of the dangers in right-wing extremism (THINK Project, 2012).

I engaged with critical pedagogy and in particular, applied a "critical pedagogical lens" (Kincheloe *et al.*, 2011, p. 167) to see how I may have 'othered' young people when teaching them. Critical pedagogy and critical theory allowed me to "plug the theory and the data into one another" (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012, p. vii) shaping my theoretical position (discussed in Chapter 4). However, critical theory did not go far enough in illuminating the data to uncover how Muslims had been 'othered'. I could tentatively see that the data from the one-to-one interviews suggested the 'othering' of my respondents had a political element to them being voiceless as Muslims living in Wales.

I considered my methodological stance and decided to employ a CoE as a research tool to generate questions and produce data from young Muslim men and women living in Wales (see also 5.3 and 5.4). The democratic nature of each CoE necessitates that the participants not only drive the enquiry but also steer its direction. The use of a stimulus prior to the enquiry is, in my view, central in planting a seed to allow the participants to formulate a question for enquiry. For researchers this potentially may take the nature of the enquiry away from the central research question or area for research and the researcher may not get the data relevant for their research. Remembering that the role of the facilitator is to progress the enquiry and not introduce his or her agenda requires an act of faith that the relevant stimulus is fit for purpose and that any probing questions put by the facilitator is to progress the enquiry and not take it into areas that the research participants have not chosen. Nonetheless, an important aspect of the nature of a CoE is the production of knowledge which may not specifically answer the researcher's question, but may give an insight into the lived experiences of the respondents that may be more relevant, insightful, personal and meaningful than initially considered. In this research the Muslim men and women addressed the essence or phenomenon of the research but articulated their lived experiences in their own ways and in their own voices positioning them as individuals who construct and produce knowledge, in a "critical realism" paradigm (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 11) which they interpret through their lived experiences as young Muslims living in Wales.

My research had moved from a general phenomenological perspective to a phenomenological study where the essence or phenomenon of Islamophobia may

now be interpreted within a paradigm of a shared experience for the young Muslim men and women. Furthermore, my experience and knowledge of the Muslim community along with knowledge of theory led me to extend the phenomenological perspective to a phenomenological study and finally to adopt an interpretive phenomenological analysis of my CoE data. I hoped the DVD stimulus chosen would cultivate a curiosity (LeVasseur, 2003) potentially raising a notion of Islamophobia and prompt the respondents to consider how they had been 'othered' in their lives.

I have acknowledged the limitations of my initial research design but learned from it in order to progress my research by reading my data and seeking out the wider literature in order to construct a theoretical framework and position as researcher. I now discuss the iterative process in more detail, in particular drawing on the work of Jackson and Mazzei (2012) and their ideas around plugging theory and the data into one another.

Traditionally qualitative researchers focus on language for understanding the reality of the respondents in research (MacLure, 2013). I wanted to engage with the dynamic reality of the data by using theory to illuminate the words of the respondents (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012). In my data analysis I sought to look beyond and between the actual lines of what was said through the process of plugging the data into theory to better understand how action in the world acts on what is said. By reading the data alongside the theory I sought to find meaning in the CoE transcripts.

The move from the process of coding community of enquiry data to allowing the young Muslim men and women to "speak for themselves" (*ibid*, p. viii; Mazzei and Jackson, 2012, p. 745) is not a rejection of an interpretive approach but is a way of including previously un-thought of data. By using theory alongside data the concepts woven throughout this thesis, for example, the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a), Fundamental British Values (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) and the notion of the 'colonising' of the Muslim mind, "multiple, conceptual perspectives" (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012, p. ix) achieve significance in the reading of the data rather than resorting to mechanistic coding which potentially may not (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012, p. ix). Jackson and Mazzei (2012, p. 2) refer to the process of "plugging in" as a production of knowledge that connects the previously unconnected fields of a) reality (data, theory, method), b) field of representation (producing different knowledge, resisting stable meaning) and c) a field of subjectivity (becoming researcher) (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012, p. 2). Building on their focus on theoretical concepts, I used my theoretical framework and postcolonialism to plug into the data and to seek the voice that is not "normative, but one that is transgressive" (Jackson and Mazzei, 2009, p. 4) in order to further a social justice narrative for Muslims in Britain.

I engaged with wider literature, theory, and government policy exploring and critiquing incidents of 'othering', evidencing them as Islamophobia, where they remained unrecognisable to my Muslim respondents. I considered my reflexive position, re-read the one-to-one interviews and considered postcolonialism. Revising my analytical position (1), I attempted to illuminate and uncover Islamophobia extending postcolonial theory to consider that a 'false

consciousness' (Lukacs, 1971) existed in the 'colonised' social imagination of my Muslim respondents. I used the concept of false consciousness as a way of explaining why it potentially hindered Muslims from recognising Islamophobia, instead, blaming their 'othering' as a consequence of a lack of knowledge on the part of non-Muslims, including the media. Having recognised and rejected the normalising of Islamophobia within a postcolonial construct, the work of Kincheloe *et al.*, (2011) referring to this process as committing knowledge to work to help address the "ideological and informational needs of marginalized groups and individuals" (*ibid*, p. 164) was useful. Similarly, taking cognizance of the four areas of radical enquiry proposed by Clough and Nutbrown (2002, pp. 24-27), radical listening, radical looking, radical questioning, and radical reading is suffused throughout the thesis to construct a sound methodological claim. I revised my theoretical position to include epistemic injustice, correspondingly revising the aim, research questions and analytical process (2). I acknowledge that postcolonialism has been an effective concept and data analysis tool to locate injustices perpetrated against Muslims in Britain and consider my use of postcolonialism as a "resistance version of critical theory" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 93). However, I also recognised the warnings in speaking for the 'other' and lay bare my research for the reader when considering my theoretical, positional and methodological reasoning.

**5.11.1. Table 5.11.1. Illustrating methods used in the initial one-to-one interviews and subsequent Community of Enquiries as data collection tools, with limitations and mitigations identified in this research.**

Methods	Limitations	Mitigation
<p>Initial one-to-one semi-structured Interviews conducted with six key adults</p>	<p>Traditional phenomenological paradigm brackets the Phenomenon (Patton, 2015, p.117; Creswell, 2013, p. 78) and it may not be revealed.</p> <p>Semi-structured questions may place boundaries on certain areas of discussion. The areas selected for discussion may not be the one's the interviewees wish to address when speaking about their 'lived experiences'.</p> <p>Potential for interviewer effect in silencing the voices of the participants.</p>	<p>The researcher is able to directly ask questions to inform the problem being researched (although within traditional phenomenological inquiry, the essence is bracketed). However, an Interpretive Phenomenological Approach (IPA) (Smith <i>et al.</i>, 2009) allows the essence to be forefronted, and affords privilege to participants (Noon, 2018, p. 80)</p> <p>The researcher has more flexibility in narrowing down the areas of importance.</p> <p>This research recognised that the respondents may have chosen not to address Islamophobia.</p>

<p>Community of Enquiry</p>	<p>May not address nor answer the problem that the researcher is trying to research due to the democratic nature in respondents choosing the question for enquiry, although the choice of a stimulus allows the enquiry to narrow its focus in discussion.</p> <p>The implications for the analysis of the data lies in allowing the data from the CoEs to drive the choice of theoretical framework.</p> <p>Some researchers may want to test their theory (ies) with the data, which in the case of CoEs, may have been driven in a different direction by the participants.</p> <p>When engaging with wider literature and theory to interpret data, the researcher may seek out a confirmatory theory through which to analyse the CoE data. It is vital in social research that theory attempts to lessen or negate the problematic phenomenon and not solely as an academic exercise.</p>	<p>The Community of Enquiry participants decide the nature of the enquiry, prioritising their voices and areas of enquiry they wish to address.</p> <p>A Community of Enquiry is a respectful Philosophical process that allows enquiry to return to the roots of Philosophy.</p> <p>The work of Jackson and Mazzei (2012) was instrumental in plugging theory and data into one another to engage in wider literature.</p> <p>Prioritising the voices of the CoE participants is vital in social justice research, allowing groups of marginalised people to democratically choose areas that concern them for discussion and subsequent research. An insight into the lived experiences of the respondents may be more relevant, insightful, personal and meaningful than initially considered by the researcher.</p> <p>Engaging with wider literature and theory may take the researcher out of his/her comfort zone to areas which may enrich academic research. A CoE approach is suited to social justice and pedagogical enquiry (Kincheloe <i>et al.</i>, 2011, pp. 164-165; Freire, 1970). A CoE approach is a pedagogically infused data collection tool aligned within the empowering tradition of critical pedagogy, and in particular Freire (1970).</p>
-----------------------------	---	--

		<p>A CoE is a safe space for political thought and critique to occur and "unafraid to consummate a relationship with emancipatory process" (Kincheloe <i>et al.</i>, 2011, p. 164), and to challenge perceived injustices. Further engaging with theory allowed me to progress from postcolonialism to concepts of ideology and false consciousness (Lukacs, 1971), which I was able to synthesise to epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) as my primary data collection position.</p>
--	--	---



## 5.12. Analysis of Data

In the initial reading of both sets of CoE data I identified significant statements from each CoE group but at that time could not 'read' the data to understand what they were saying. Succinctly, I was unable to make sense of their lived experiences other than be able to recognise themes, specifically, oppression and powerlessness, within each CoE. As the theoretical framework progressed it shaped my approach to data analysis. Following my reading on postcolonialism, the Prevent Strategy, and Fundamental British Values, I concluded that the concept of 'othering' is essential to understanding and uncovering Islamophobia. I therefore began my analysis of both sets of CoE transcripts by applying postcolonial thought identifying areas where the participants told their lived experiences of being 'othered'. This approach allowed me to see how the participants articulated Islamophobia, a postcolonial construct, uncovering the essence or phenomenon Islamophobia, permitting me to interpret their narratives and locate them in the context of postcolonialism which so far, had been concealed from analysis.

I continued by re-reading both sets of CoE transcripts this time employing my primary data analysis tool, epistemic injustice, with which to analyse the data. The work of Medina (2013) was instrumental in furthering Fricker's approach by allowing me to consider the importance of dissent, epistemic "resistance" and "friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 7) as ways in which to further young Muslim discourse outside of a postcolonial paradigm. By employing "epistemic friction" approaches (Medina, 2013, p. 27) as "resistant ways of imagining" (Medina, 2013, p. 252), I am able to offer Muslims in Britain an alternative approach to consider when

contesting "exclusions and stigmatizations" (*ibid*). Medina also allowed me to view my interviewees not as informants, but as givers of knowledge (Medina, 2013, pp. 92-93), thereby allowing Muslim voices to be heard within a paradigm aligned to Universal Human Rights discourse rather than an ideologically informed and socially constructed postcolonial paradigm .

Writing in this way took a lot of time and commitment to constant examination of the data and expansion of my reading to understand how theory can inform practice (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012). I read the CoE transcripts from the men and women (Appendix 1 and 2) separately, allowing my reading of both sets of raw data to be interpreted through postcolonial and epistemic injustice lenses, constructing two interpretations of the participants' lived experiences of being 'othered', influencing analysis of the data (discussed in Chapters 6 and 7). The limitations to analysing data in this way are primarily the length of time taken to engage with the wider theoretical literature along with the data and in this research, government policy. By engaging with a wide corpus of theory, policy and reflexivity, and having the welfare of young Muslims living in Britain as a priority, this research provides a practical and theoretical paradigm which young Muslims may choose to engage with, in order to further their own agency and challenge Islamophobia.

#### **5.12.1. Standards of Validation and Evaluation**

I return briefly to summarising the methodological perspective adopted in this research:

- I have allowed the research questions to emerge during the research journey. The lack of uncovering Islamophobia as essence or phenomenon during the one-to-one interviews allowed me to engage with my personal and professional experience and the wider literature to allow the lived experiences of the young Muslims in the CoE's to drive the research questions by adopting a democratic and philosophical approach to enquiry.
- The CoE is an effective and ethical method to gather sensitive and personal data from groups of people who are marginalised within society and it prioritises their voice.
- I make my assumptions clear from the start of this research that Islamophobia is the essence or phenomenon to be uncovered and position myself reflexively within the research to illuminate my subjectivity.
- I am explicit with the theory used and my synthesis of concepts within the research (see Chapter 4).
- My study has value in answering the "so what?" question (Creswell, 2013, p. 255) attempting to make things better for young Muslims in Wales.

I acknowledge my interpretive standpoint which seeks to benefit the Muslim community in Wales by facilitating a platform where their voices may be more clearly heard. I acknowledge my reflexive position within the research and have made clear my position as researcher with the participants in the Communities of Enquiry (Creswell, 2013) see also 5.8. The "concept of verisimilitude" where my writing captures my thinking (Richardson, 1994, p. 521) is a deliberate attempt to make clear the decisions made in the research journey to be "clear, engaging and full of unexpected ideas" (Creswell, 2013, p. 54). This research is transparent and reflects "all the complexities that exist in real life" (*ibid*) so that readers may be

engaged and have an understanding of the lived experiences of the Muslim men and women. I have interrogated the voices of the young Muslim men and women through theories of postcolonialism and epistemic injustice and together these corroborate instances of Islamophobia where my respondents have been 'othered' and made the focus of epistemic injustices in their lived experiences. Thus, interpretive standards in conducting qualitative research (Richardson and St. Pierre, 2005) may be applied to this research to assess its efficacy.

In respect of phenomenological research, Creswell (2013) asks whether the author has an understanding of phenomenology and a clear 'phenomenon' to study; do they use procedures of data analysis recommended by Moustakas (1994) or van Manen (1997) and convey the overall essence of the experience of participants whilst remaining "reflexive" throughout the study (Creswell, 2013, p. 260). I have traced my research journey illustrating (see 5.1.1) and critiquing how I uncovered Islamophobia in order to challenge it. Decisions made in my theoretical framework and in this chapter were made to avoid misrepresenting Muslims and at the same time provide academic rigour to the research process and findings. Transparency in decision making has allowed me to produce research which is "interpretively rigorous" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 120) which I extend to my "research participants" (*ibid*) to consider a new paradigm (discussed in Chapter 8) as a way of benefiting themselves as Muslims living in Wales to challenge Islamophobia.

I have made clear my bias and decisions made in respect of bracketing and epoche and the use of a CoE as a data collection tool in order to allow Muslim voices to be prioritised. I acknowledge my role in the construction of knowledge in

my interpretation of CoE data (and the possibilities for variation in interpretation by other researchers). I justify my position as researcher and make clear the values I hold throughout the research so that its integrity may be judged. I now turn to the vitally important area of ethics.

## **5.13. Ethical Considerations**

### **5.13.1. My Ethical Stance**

It is important to consider how I came to the research in the light of my previous and ongoing professional experiences. I provide a brief review of my professional journey and its impact on this research in Chapter 1, expanding in Chapter 4. I acknowledge how my work as a former police officer and educator in a range of contexts impacted in the analysis of the research data and that my reflexive stance influenced the interpretive position I adopted in the reading of the data. I next describe how my ethical stance encompasses the areas of interviewer effect, informed consent and permission, and finally confidentiality.

### **5.13.2. Interviewer Effect and Power Relations During Interviews**

I considered whether my work as a police officer may have had an effect on the responses of the young Muslims in both CoE. My concern was the recognition and "understanding" of researcher bias or effect, not its elimination (Delamont, 2002, p. 8). I wanted to know how Kim and myself as non-Muslims and particularly me as a former police officer may contribute to interviewer effect in both CoE. Although my role was limited to introductions, research conversations and managing the audio/visual recording equipment, I was aware of the potential for unequal power dynamics. I wanted to mitigate for the possibility that my

presence may have a "bearing on the amount of information" the participants would be "willing to divulge" (Denscombe, 1998, p. 169).

Medina presents an interesting argument that marginalised groups "are often forced to hide" certain bodies of their knowledge, for example, that they know more about their oppression than their oppressors (Medina, 2013, p. 44). Denzin and Lincoln, (2011, pp. 457-458) interpret silences by respondents on specific issues (such as fascism) as evidence of a "scar" or a "wound" in everyday experience, whilst Passerini (1980, p. 9) sees it as a "preoccupation with the events of everyday life". However, further research (along with false consciousness) would be called for to substantiate whether interviewer effect has any relevance in contributing to respondents choosing to 'hide' the ideology of Islamophobia from discussion.

The Muslim respondents in this research knew I was a former police officer and that the 'gatekeepers' Arvind, Oanez and Deeba had knowledge of me and my previous work with young Muslims, should they need it. I recognise that traditional forms of qualitative interviewing has the potential for an "unequal power dynamic between the interviewer and the interviewee" (Creswell, 2013, p. 173), and that this may be more so as a consequence of my association with the police. I carried out research conversations (Farrell, 2005) with both CoE groups, which were continued by the facilitator Kim, in explaining the process of the CoE. These were the beginnings of an undertaking addressing any potential imbalances of power. This was mitigated through the democratic and pedagogically infused content of the CoE (see 5.3) allowing the respondents full control over the questions decided

upon for each enquiry, and they alone decided whether or not they wished to contribute to the CoE. The collaborative nature of a CoE allowed the respondents to stimulate ideas from each other contributing to the progression of the enquiries. This is a major shift in control from the interviewer to the interviewee where knowledge is not found but constructed by each interviewee.

Overwhelmingly both CoE groups articulated wanting Muslims and non-Muslims to have the right knowledge of Islam with some recognising the limitations in getting the right information particularly for young Muslims learning about Islam (discussed in Chapters 6 and 7). This may be seen as confirmation of an ethical consideration by the respondents since to interpret or synthesise knowledge of Islam (other than in Islamic scriptures) is considered non-negotiable and an act of potential apostasy.

My role as researcher and the role of Kim in facilitating the CoE are recognised in the ethical considerations employed in the research process. The use of the CoE is a vitally important consideration in mitigating the potential for interviewer bias which was justified in the comments made by interviewees in their responses in experiencing the CoE (see Chapters 6 and 7 and transcripts at Appendix 1 and 2). I acknowledge that using a stimulus prior to each CoE may be seen as potential bias to try and uncover Islamophobia, however I mitigate this charge in the methodology by justifying its use in my revised research design. In Chapter 8, I argue potential rationale as to why the interviewees chose to articulate experiences of 'othering' in their own terms and not narratives expressing

Islamophobia. I continue exploring the content of the research conversations used which forms a part of informed consent to which I now turn.

### **5.13.3. Informed Consent.**

Prior to conducting both CoE respondents were reacquainted with the research information leaflet (see Appendix 4) which outlines the research along with a checklist to be read and signed by each respondent. Additionally, research conversations were carried out prior to each CoE (a transcript of the women's is available upon request). The research conversations included introductions, the aim of the research, the structure of the recording process, anonymity, safe keeping of the data and its eventual destruction including the original mini CDs and mini DV tapes at the conclusion of the research. I explained my role in the CoE and the role of the facilitator. I also explained that following transcriptions of the recordings, each respondent would be emailed a copy to check for accuracy. I asked whether everyone was happy to continue and if there was anything that I could do to make things better before the research commenced. Everyone intimated that they were happy to continue. The CoE facilitator Kim then continued the research conversation explaining the process of the CoE.

In her work with children, Farrell (2005, p. 60) refers to this process as making "visible the moral work involved in the ethical process of gaining consent from research participants (who are children)". This of course has advantages for researchers who, having presented their proposals to the respondents should be confident that they have 'come clean' and have not held back any important un-ethical issues (Arksey and Knight, 1999). In addition, that the respondents were



provided with such information that would be likely to influence their decisions (Diener and Crandall, 1978).

Two of the fifteen young women who presented themselves for the CoE were 13 years of age. Both were members of the young person's group at the centre and were told of the research by two of the youth workers (gatekeepers), Oanez and Deeba (who were in loco parentis of both girls as members of the Centre). I spoke with both girls who recognised me from when I had delivered a project at their school (from the research information leaflet, see Appendix 4). I was happy for them to continue as part of the cohort (some of whom were known to them) and applying a rationale (that they were competent to be part of the group and to continue without parental consent) (Taylor, 2007; Wheeler, 2006) that their voices as younger Muslims were important (United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989; BERA, 2011, p. 6, para.16-24). Both girls referred to as Naomi and Nessa contributed to the CoE (see Chapter 7). Although the process of the CoE is briefly referred to at the beginning of their CoE, it was also video-recorded showing Naomi and Nessa interacting and actively contributing to the research process with their peers.

All of the participants were e-mailed a copy of their respective CoE to check for accuracy. None replied saying that they were unhappy or did not want their CoE conversations to be used. I have strictly followed the guidelines for educational research (BERA, 2011), particularly with regard to my responsibilities to my Muslim participants, which have included informed consent, anonymity,

confidentiality and transparency. I now turn to explaining how I provided confidentiality to my respondents.

#### **5.13.4. Confidentiality**

In order to provide anonymity to my respondents pseudonyms were assigned to each person taking part (Kamberelis and Dimitriadis, 2011). Each respondent selected their own pseudonym known only to themselves and me so that in any subsequent reading of this thesis only they would know texts that could be attributed to them. The audio and audio-visual recording were made on mini CD and mini DV tapes respectively. At the conclusion of the research the original recordings will be deleted in the presence of two of the key adults referred to as Deeba and Oanez and any digital audio/visual files kept by myself deleted. All hard copies have been edited so that respondents remain anonymous and all stored data can only be accessed by the author.

#### **5.14. Conclusion.**

The decision to use a CoE as a data gathering tool with young Muslims was born out of attempts to uncover Islamophobia from the one-to-one interviews conducted with the key adult Muslims. At the time I conducted the CoE with the young Muslim men and women I was not fully aware of why the one-to-one interviews did not uncover Islamophobia. I conducted the CoE with two groups of young Muslims as a way to test a CoE as a method to gather data but was not able to 'read' and interpret the CoE data. I further engaged with theory, literature and government policy becoming more aware of a potential range of possibilities that may have contributed to the 'othering' of young Muslims. I had deliberately

forefronted Islamophobia as a stimulus in both CoE to uncover it in the lived experiences of young Muslims. My research journey was an 'iterative' process (see diagram 5.1.1) where only after understanding the data by engaging with theory (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012) was I able to interpret the data within postcolonial constructs. Recognising the warnings of speaking for Muslims in postcolonial terms I moved to consider how Islamophobia may be hidden and protected, synthesising false consciousness to epistemic injustice which shaped my research questions.

I have provided a transparent research process through which the research methodology and methods used allow Muslim voices to be interpreted in order to identify, locate and challenge forces that 'other' them. The process employed along with theoretical positioning informs the wider literature and addresses a gap in knowledge of how Muslims living in Wales articulate their lived experiences of Islamophobia. I now turn to the analysis of the CoE beginning with the Muslim men.

## **6. CHAPTER 6: DATA ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNITY OF ENQUIRY CONDUCTED WITH THE COHORT OF MUSLIM MEN.**

### **6.1. Introduction**

In this chapter I present the transcript of the community of enquiry carried out with 9 Muslim men (Appendix 2). I refer to the original transcript by line numbering. My analysis of the transcript is woven through the chapter as the question for enquiry is identified and explored by participants. Five key and related ideas are explored during the enquiry:

- being made to feel different;
- media influence on Muslims without knowledge of Islam;
- media influence on non-Muslim's knowledge of Muslims and Islam;
- the lack of knowledge of Muslim young people of their religion;
- the lack of knowledge of non-Muslims of Islam.

Thinking with the ideas identified in Chapters 2 and 3, I identify postcolonialism and securitisation as underpinning concepts that informed the enquiry. Drawing on the ideas of Miranda Fricker (2007) and Jose Medina (2013), I recognise Islamophobia as a lacuna that impacts on Muslim ability to speak out and creates epistemic relations and practices which cause both Muslim and non-Muslim to be wronged as epistemic subjects. I identify discriminatory epistemic injustice that includes identity prejudice, credibility deficit, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, as important concepts that I use to analyse the discourse of the respondents, in order to shed light on how Muslims are wronged as epistemic subjects in Britain today. I begin by providing brief pen-pictures of the respondents before presenting the transcript of the community of enquiry, which I

have subjected to critical analysis using the key concepts of Islamophobia and discriminatory epistemic injustice.

## **6.2. Brief Pen Pictures of the Respondents**

The nine Muslim men who took part in the community of enquiry originated from a range of social backgrounds encompassing those studying at a local university (including foreign students) and those in employment. Some of the men knew each other and others were introduced for the first time. The men at university used the on-campus Mosque while the others had attended Mosques either in the North of England or in South Wales. The brief pen pictures that follow are limited in their description to preserve the anonymity of the Muslim men.

- Abdullah: Is in his late 20s and is educated to degree level in social sciences. He is in full-time employment in a large public sector organisation.
- Abdullah B: Is in his early 20s and in full-time employment with a predominantly non-Muslim workforce.
- Arikarikam: Is in his early 30s and in full-time employment as a qualified youth worker.
- Bongo: A foreign student is in his early 20s studying at a South Wales university. He lives in Tanzania, East Africa.
- Carlito: Is in his early 20s and is in full-time employment.
- El-Fino: Is a full-time university student in South Wales.
- Mr Fish: Is in his late teens and is a full-time university student.
- Sandman: Is in his early 20s and is in full-time employment.
- Abdul: Is in his late 20s and is in full-time employment.

### **6.3. Introduction to the Community of Enquiry.**

The Community of Enquiry (CoE) took place at a community centre on the 6th October 2012. A research conversation was carried out prior to the CoE and a 10-step process was followed to progress the CoE.

#### *Step 1: Choosing a stimulus for enquiry.*

A ten-minute video 'Being Me' was selected. The DVD focuses on audio/visual face-to-face interviews with young Muslim men and women about their experiences of Islamophobia in Swansea. The recording also included 'vox pop' (popular opinion represented by informal comments) street interviews with members of the public who were asked what Islam and Muslims meant to them.

#### *Step 2: Presentation of the stimulus*

The DVD was shown to the group.

#### *Step 3: Individual thinking time.*

Participants were asked to take some time to reflect and make notes on what the DVD made them think about.

#### *Step 4: Forming questions*

The men were split into four groups and were asked to formulate a question they would be interested in discussing. The following were offered for enquiry and in Step 5: the groups explained why they had formulated their questions.

**6.3.1. Question 1. Why is it when Muslims do bad, their religion is the main cause of blame regardless of other factors e.g. nationality and personality?**

Bongo justified the choice of question saying that whenever Islam is discussed, Muslims are framed as doing bad things such as committing terrorist acts.

Negative framing is not applicable for non-Muslims committing crimes and they are not judged by religion. Bongo continued saying that a person committing crime should be judged on their personality or nationality rather than religion. This suggests the group is aware that as Muslims, they are targeted as a suspect community by the media who misrepresent Islam and Muslims focusing on criminal acts and categorising Muslims as potential criminals and terrorists.

*Discussion*

Bongo lives in Tanzania, East Africa, where approximately 35% of the population are Muslim and 61% Christian. The remainder of the respondents live in Britain which has a Muslim population of approximately 4.8% (Office For National Statistics, 2012). Bongo suggests that Muslims in Britain are primarily judged by religion while non-Muslims are not. The group believe the media deliberately misrepresent Islam linking Islam and Muslims to criminality, specifically terrorism. Bongo says the media should report on the person committing the offence and not their religion suggesting that knowledge of Muslims living in Britain is manipulated to create negative stereotypes.

### **6.3.2. Question 2. Why is there Isolation between Muslims and wider community?**

Step 5: Abdullah B spoke on behalf of his group and referring to the media and specifically the film industry that influence society's perception of Muslims through negative portrayal. He spoke about a lack of knowledge by non-Muslims about Islam and Muslims, as well as the isolation of Muslims who have been rejected by the wider society. He suggested there were many issues that could be discussed if their question were selected from many angles.

#### *Discussion*

The isolation experienced by the Muslim community and rejection as a community from wider society, stems from the perception propagated by sections of the media that they are a suspect community. The men suggest a lack of knowledge of Islam and Muslims makes society more likely to be influenced by the media that contributes to Isolating Muslims from wider society (Hopkins and Gale, 2009).

### **6.3.3. Question 3. Do you really know Islam?**

Abdullah B explained that their question asked whether people judge Islam by the actions of the Muslim and not by Islam which is pure. Abdullah B's group were concerned that Muslims who do not have the correct Islamic knowledge misrepresent Islam and by inference the wider community, who were not seeing a true picture of Islam because of the 'impurity' of the Muslims who do not know Islam. He went on to say that Muslims who do not know their religion, confuse cultural practices with Islam to the extent that they are unsure of the 'laws' governing being a Muslim. The group are aware that much of the media



misrepresent them and should be more responsible. Abdullah B also said that his group thought the media should know more about Islam and their reporting post 9/11 demonstrated a lack of knowledge. He concluded by saying that the group believe knowledge of Islam should be a focus of greater depth in religious education lessons in schools. He said that he knew Islam, had good knowledge of Islam and was aware that terrorism is not a part of Islam.

### *Discussion*

This discussion argues that good Muslims should know their religion and that Muslims who do not know their religion are just as culpable as the media in misrepresenting Islam and Muslims. They believe that more education and knowledge of Islam to provide a counter-argument against misrepresentation by the media is needed. The group identify the importance of education for both Muslims and non-Muslims.

#### **6.3.4. Question 4. Do common stereotypes influence your own perception about Islam, even though you are Muslim?**

Abdullah argues that a lack of knowledge of Islam by non-Muslims and Muslims is detrimental. He makes a reference to the stimulus employed at step 2, where British Muslims were shown to say that they were proud to be British or Welsh Muslims. Abdullah was critical of some of the Muslims shown in the DVD for not knowing their religion and doubting whether or not terrorism has a place in Islam. He said that such a lack of knowledge of Islam would jeopardise the claims made that they are proud to be Muslims. Abdullah said that this was an "identity crisis for some Muslims" and if they don't know their religion then they are unable to

counter abuse levelled against them or their religion. He said someone who was Bengali, Pakistani, or Polish would be able to counter racist claims. He believed that a lack of Islamic education by Muslims and non-Muslims was to blame. He continued by referring to news coverage the previous day about the extradition of Baba Ahmad (Ahmad and others, 2013). The media had only shown the photo of Abu Hamza when there were four others involved in extradition proceedings who were not like Abu Hamza but were portrayed as being similar by the media. He concluded by inferring that the media were selective in their news reporting showing video news footage of the banned so-called Islamic group Al Muhajiroun (an alternative name for the proscribed group Al Ghurabaa) (Home Office, 2017) protesting, when moderate Muslims considered the extradition of some of the group illegal and immoral and all five cases different. Abdullah B supported Abdullah agreeing that the media misreport and that there is a feeling that Muslims are being targeted, saying, "but that's another question".

### *Discussion*

The group argue that stereotypes exist in society and are normalised to a degree that Muslims are not exempt from stereotyping. They know both Muslims and non-Muslims lack knowledge of Islam and that the media exploit this by associating terrorism and Muslims. It therefore follows that Muslims who do not have knowledge of their religion are not only unable to put forward a counter-argument but may also doubt whether violence is part of their religion. Abdullah suggested a lack of knowledge about their religion could lead to an identity crisis. Muslims may be able to put forward a counter-argument when racially abused, but not attacks on Islam when they do not have knowledge to rebut false claims. This

led to an interesting conclusion by the group suggesting that Muslims without Islamic knowledge may also be considered as culpable in stereotyping Islam and Muslims as the media.

### *Summary*

The concepts evident in the four questions put forward by the Muslim men include the following:

1. Muslims are negatively stereotyped by the media as being a suspect community linked to acts of terrorism.
2. Muslims feel isolated and rejected from wider society.
3. Knowledge is the key to understanding Islam and Muslims. Knowledge is needed by Muslims in order to be able to put forward counter-arguments to support and defend Islam and is vital for Muslims to understand their identities as Muslims; knowledge can be manipulated by the media to their detriment.

### *Step 6: Voting*

A 'blind' vote was carried out to choose one question to explore further during the CoE. The question chosen was No.4: 'Do common stereotypes or media influence your own perception about Islam even though you are Muslim'?

### *Discussion*

The Muslim men recognise that narratives of their identity as Muslims are controlled which is reflected in their choice of question for discussion. Their choice of questions additionally encompasses an affirmation for Muslims to know their religion better and so be knowledgeable enough to put forward a counter-argument. Their question highlights that knowledge of Muslims is controlled and

negatively stereotyped by the media. They want to address injustices of stereotyping, isolation, rejection, and 'othering' by wider society. They know that having the 'right kind of knowledge' will help them challenge being 'othered'. Thus in this early stage of the enquiry the respondents are seen to be keen to challenge easy generalisations and assumptions about Muslims perpetrated by sections of the British press and its presentation of Muslims as 'all the same'.

*Step 7: The Enquiry: First thoughts*

Respondents sit in a circle facing each other to address the chosen question: 'Do common stereotypes or media influence your own perception about Islam even though you are Muslim'? The group whose question it was are invited to begin.

Abdullah was the first to respond to the question:

I think in my own view a lot of Muslims are totally affected by what they see in the media and also about common stereotypes, it gives a kind of inferiority complex that people doubt certain aspects of their faith because they don't have the knowledge about Islam or about that subject matter (lines 31-34).

Here we see how the CoE approach allows room for thoughts on the meaning of the question. Abdullah has recognised that the media link terrorism with Islam and Muslims. He introduces a theme that constantly reoccurs in this research that Muslims need to have knowledge of Islam. It is a lack of knowledge of Islam that works against the interests of Muslims in not being able to effectively challenge or counter stereotyping of them. Abdullah continues, "and so for example, the key question would be does terrorism have a place in Islam?" (line 34). Abdullah has taken it upon himself to forward his own question (rather than the one chosen by the community) so he can progress the enquiry his way. He wants to explore the

importance of having the 'right' knowledge of Islam. Abdullah has recognised that the view presented by the media infers Islam endorses terrorism and by association Muslims must be treated with caution lest there be terrorist sympathisers among their ranks (Edwards and Cromwell, 2018). Abdullah says that he is knowledgeable about his religion (from reading the Quran and from the readings of the Prophet Mohammed), and that he obtains his information from different sources (other than the media). He says that Muslims who do not have knowledge may believe that terrorism does have a place in Islam.

Abdullah believes that knowledge of Islam and Muslims are negatively manipulated by the media, and that some Muslims may be influenced by this (Petley and Richardson, 2011; Fekete, 2009; Morey and Yaqin, 2011). He supports his assertion by giving an example of Muslims who 'joke' about fellow Muslims being overtly Muslim in appearance as being likened to the 'Taliban' (lines 31-33). The implication of this example are that Muslims who make jokes do not have sufficient knowledge of Islam to know that terrorism does not have a place in Islam. Abdullah is aware that the media portray Muslim protesters as "angry and crazy" (line 46), even though "we have legitimate protests" (line 44). Abdullah is making an important distinction between Muslims (such as himself) who have Islamic knowledge and are secure in their Muslim identity to publicly display it and those who do not. This manifests itself, for example, by growing a beard and trimming the moustache in line with the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed. He contrasts this view with those who he believes lack the knowledge to separate Islam from terrorism by being influenced by the media (lines 31-33).

Muslims without knowledge may be seen as suffering from testimonial injustice as a result of being misinformed by the media; they have a credibility deficit (Fricker, 2007) compared to fellow Muslims who *have* Islamic knowledge. They are not however, victims of testimonial injustice in the eyes of the public that agree with the media and Muslims without knowledge do not voice a challenge which will be given a lesser credibility (Fricker, 2007) by the wider non-Muslim public. I argue that Muslims without knowledge suffer from the effects of Islamophobia and hermeneutical injustice as they remain part of the Muslim community and are wronged in their capacity as subjects of social understanding (*Ibid*).

I further argue that negative reporting of Muslims and Islam by the media influences the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim British public contributing to conditions of postcolonialism existing for Muslims. Islamophobia occupies a lacuna in the social imagination of the British public displacing the potential for ethical concerns for Muslims to exist there. This allows for an "unduly deflated credibility judgement" (Fricker, 2007, p. 22) towards Muslims. Medina argues that practices of resistance or contestation by oppressed subjects are "epistemic friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 16) and that we should look for possibilities of resistance in every discursive practice. Abdullah believes (in this instance) that a counter-argument or "epistemic friction" (*ibid*) to challenge Islamophobia is for Muslims to learn about Islam. Medina (2013, p. 17) further argues that to fight against ignorance one has to:

...know oneself and others in certain respects, to learn and facilitate the learning of others, to resist epistemic vices and to work toward epistemic virtues, to meliorate epistemic habits and attitudes, and in short, to collaborate in the pursuit of epistemic justice (Medina, 2013, p. 17).

The need for Muslims to have knowledge of Islam is seen as a way for Muslims to disassociate themselves and Islam from terrorism to deter fellow Muslims living in Britain from believing that terrorism is part of their religion. When significantly different perspectives are available to us and we question areas of our lives we may become "perplexed" (Medina, 2013, p. 18) and our perspectives interrupted "by the flow of familiarity and obviousness" (Medina, 2013, p. 19) preventing us from engaging in epistemic friction. I argue the transmission of Fundamental British Values (FBVs) by the media and others works against "interrupting the flow of familiarity and obviousness" (*ibid*). Such conditions hinder Muslims from becoming perplexed, engaging with epistemic friction and achieving epistemic justice. "Perplexity and self-estrangement are of the utmost importance for cognitive, affective, ethical and political learning; democratic sensibilities depend on them" (Medina, 2013, p. 19). However, when one form of moral position is 'normalised', for example the notion of FBVs, the "*perplexities* we feel in the normal course of everyday life" (*ibid*), which can arouse our "social sympathy" (Medina, 2013, p. 19) with others is thwarted.

#### *Step 8: Middle words*

Carlito built on Abdullah's assertion that Muslims in Britain were portrayed by the media as potential terrorists by providing an example from his own experience when after the events of 9/11 a teacher in his Mosque (Rochdale area) did not want to talk about terrorism and "it wasn't until later life I actually from my religious views I discovered that terrorism isn't part of my religion" (line 52). This concurs with Muslims being uncomfortable addressing issues that which have no place in Islam but fail to be discussed when religious scripts are relied upon to be

interrogated and interpreted. Carlito was left to find out for himself that "terrorism isn't part of my religion" (line 54). Carlito recognised the need to negotiate his own understanding of Islam and discovered something that contradicted his early experiences and here he recounts his move to a more adult religious identity. This insight into how he has coped with the impact of Islamophobia that labels him as 'terrorist' came from his own resources not from his Mosque.

It is an important consideration that some teachers in Islamic centres for example, Mosques and Madrassas are reluctant to address terrorism when Muslims are being accused of being terrorist sympathisers. The failure by Mosques to address issues affecting young Muslims is a recurring theme within this research and is one I have considered as 'othering' in the context of Postcolonialism. However, as Medina argues, "nobody can be exempted from the obligation to resist and to contribute to the formation of a kaleidoscopic social imagination" (Medina, 2013, p. 22). Carlito believes none of the tutors from his Mosque wanted to discuss terrorism with him because of his age, even though he made it known he wanted to know more about Islam and terrorism. Carlito had made the connection between Islam and terrorism and wanted clarification to assuage doubts. The gap or lacuna in his knowledge had been filled with messages from the media who misrepresented Islam and Carlito did not have the hermeneutical resources to counter the widely held perceived link between Islam and terrorism. The tutors at Carlito's Mosque could have helped him, however, I assume they failed to recognise his cognitive inability to find out whether terrorism was a part of his religion. Carlito was subjected to a hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007) in being part of a disadvantaged social group where fellow members did not give him



knowledge. Although Mosque tutors were also part of a hermeneutically marginalised group they failed in their "epistemic duties" to engage in "epistemic friction" and to strive toward achieving "epistemic justice" for young Muslims (Medina, 2013, pp. 17-22).

The Mosque members who were charged with passing on Islamic knowledge were "participating unequally in the practices through which social meanings are generated" (Fricker, 2007, p. 6) and were afraid they would be misrepresented by others due to them being seen as part of a 'suspect community'. The Mosque members that decided he was too young to understand terrorism, even though he was seeking knowledge about it, also hermeneutically marginalised him. The only knowledge he had of Islam and its perceived association with terrorism, had been constructed by the media. Carlito did not have the knowledge to challenge messages from the media nor agency to exercise "epistemic friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 18). Fricker, (2007, p. 153) argues that, "the notion of marginalization is a moral-political one indicating subordination and exclusion from some practice that would have value for the participant", which lends support to my argument that the Muslim mind may be 'colonised '.

Abdullah B agrees with Carlito that the media influences some Muslims providing examples from the Islamic society at university. He says that over the past five years:

...many of the students have come up to me and they have told me that their parents told them not to join the Islamic society and that's because the media making the Islamic society as a hot bed for extremism and you hear you know in the news, Islamic societies, the presidents of students...you know, you hear university students blowing people up

and that kind of stuff or attempting to blow people up and they think 'ooh', even the parents are thinking 'my son', especially the sons more than the daughters, yeah, are going to an Islamic society event or something like that, is going to label them a terrorist and especially when people become more observant [sic], maybe from a physical point of view, maybe he starts growing a beard or he starts praying...many Muslims come from a background where the family are not that religious, so many...the family themselves don't really pray and all that, so some families, for example, the kids or students, ...lots of Muslims are learning Islam from a society because they are staying with their fellow Muslims and when they start doing stuff that perhaps their parents should be doing from a religious point of view, the person starts thinking 'wow, look what the media says, is my son becoming the next Osama Bin-laden' or something like that, because the media is giving that perception to them and that is quite daunting from the kid's point of view because they are a bit confused...they think they are doing a good thing but unfortunately you know media stereotypes (lines 58-74).

Abdullah B knows his fellow Muslims at university connect spiritually with each other while on campus but their parents and family members are concerned that they risk being labelled as terrorists or are becoming terrorists. He is aware that some parents are influenced by media misinformation which they pass on to their sons and daughters as being fact and that some Muslim students attending British universities have gone on to commit terrorist offences even though this has been proven to be factually inaccurate (Thomas, 2016). Some parents believe that on-campus Islamic societies are linked to terrorism or being recruiting agents for terrorist organisations and that their sons are at risk (Saeed and Johnson, 2016). The men believe their parents and families are not able to question media misinformation about this due to a lack of Islamic knowledge. This makes them suffer from a situated hermeneutical inequality in that "a collective hermeneutical gap prevents them from making sense of an experience which it is strongly in their interests to render intelligible" (Fricker, 2007, p. 7). They pass on incorrect knowledge of Islam and being a Muslim to their sons making them sufferers of

hermeneutical injustice as 'knowers'. Furthermore, they suffer from a testimonial injustice and in their capacity as 'givers' of knowledge as their knowledge of Islam is partial and incomplete. However, Abdullah B has knowledge of Islam and believes that as a possessor of 'true' Islam (which he obtains from reliable sources), he is qualified to give knowledge to British non-Muslims to 'put the record straight'. He believes he is able to exercise "epistemic friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 7) and that the wider non-Muslim public can hear him. Abdullah B is a member of a marginalised group who are given a lower credibility in their testimony and he is therefore subjected to hermeneutical injustice. He is also the subject of "testimonial justice" as a giver of knowledge, even though he believes given the opportunity, he will be heard (Fricker, 2007, p. 7). Medina (2013, p. 27) argues that "members of groups that have been systematically disadvantaged" are often depicted as intellectually inferior, given less credibility than other members of groups which can lead to their "capacity to impart knowledge to others and to receive knowledge from others" being negatively affected (Medina, 2013, p. 28). Abdullah B possesses Islamic knowledge so may be considered privileged as a knower among his peers and parents. He may also be given credibility in his testimony as a young Muslim with other Muslims. However, as a Muslim living in Wales his testimony is given lesser credibility as conditions of postcolonialism sustain widespread Islamophobia.

Bongo challenges the perception that linking Islam and terrorism is a generational issue because of a lack of knowledge and offers a counter-example. He says that Islam has been around for thousands of years and that it has come about because of:

...events that are happening in the society and how the society interact with each other. So it is just recently it's been a situation whereby in Islam, there is a direct link between Islam and terrorism. Now this direct link ... is a perception ... most people get informed about Islam is from the media, you see, and this media is not taking responsibility ... they are just taking the one part of the story and but they are not showing the other part of the story, you see? (lines 81-88).

It is not clear whether Bongo's reference to the media being to blame stems from his experiences while studying in Britain or from his life in Tanzania. He is aware that the media may distort 'perception' or knowledge of Islam and that people are more likely to be influenced by how society interacts with each other rather than parental influence. It is clear that the media are one of several influences that contribute to postcolonial conditions existing for Muslims sustaining Islamophobia. Muslims are subjected to hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007) from a lack of knowledge about them and are hermeneutically marginalised as a consequence of a gap in their hermeneutical resources being filled or 'colonised' by media misinformation. For some Muslims an absence of knowledge may lead to a response or epistemic resistance to pursue a route of violent extremism, which may (for them) be seen as a form of "epistemic friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 16).

Mr Fish challenged Bongo saying that he believed it was a generational issue and gave an example from his experience. He believes his parents' generation saw the news as being 'gospel' whereas younger Muslims accessed social media rather than mainstream news. Mr Fish continued saying that his family had told him not to grow a beard (as a visible signifier of being a Muslim) because he would not get a job and "I said if that's the case then that's it isn't it? That's the world then so I'm not going to like adapt myself just to get a job - that's just pathetic really. Yeah" (lines 105-106). Mr Fish knows he may be 'othered' by employers

who were Islamophobic but decided his Muslim identity was more important. This contrasts with his family who believe he would be considered less employable identifying as a Muslim instead of as a Pakistani young man. Mr Fish knows that being identifiable as Muslim may harm his chance of employment but is clear his identity as Muslim is more important. Mr Fish recognises his family are aware of negative identity prejudices against Muslims and want him to hide his Muslim identity. They believe that non-Muslim employers consider him untrustworthy and have situated him as both sufferer of hermeneutical and testimonial injustice (Fricker, 2007). Mr Fish says his family believe the media, making them possessors of incomplete knowledge which they pass to him. As a way to contrast his parents' generation being 'othered' by the media Mr Fish says that young British Muslims get their knowledge from social media (which I argue he believes to be more accurate than the media) and that he is confident to display his 'Muslimness' even at the expense of lessening his opportunity for employment. Mr Fish has recognised structural identity prejudices against Muslims in Britain and has been hermeneutically marginalised by membership of a marginalised group. Furthermore, his chances of employment in a predominantly non-Muslim British workforce may be lessened by his testimony as a Muslim being given lesser credibility (Fricker, 2007). In fact, concealment of identity or "strategic ignorance" (Bailey, 2007, p. 77) and "social silence" (Medina, 2013, p. 117) by Muslims to protect themselves from Islamophobia or to promote mobility has been well documented.

In recognising that they are marginalised the young Muslim men have "beneficial epistemic friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 50) which allows them to identify media

misinformation. However, Muslims without knowledge who are marginalised by media misinformation linking them with terrorism may be seen as having "detrimental epistemic friction, censoring, silencing, or inhibiting the formation of beliefs, the articulation of doubts, and the formulation of questions and lines of enquiry" (*ibid*). In this thesis I argue postcolonialism and Islamophobia sustain detrimental epistemic friction.

Abdullah B agreed with Mr Fish that there was a generational gap with Muslim parents who had migrated to Britain for economic purposes with the:

...utopian goal of going back to their country and living in a villa, living in a mansion, perhaps I'm going too much into our culture, too much yeah (laughs), but what's happened 30/40 years down the line, they actually settled down here. They haven't realised that. Most of them in their 70s now they still thinking 'I want to go back home again'. Most likely, no offence here, but their graves are going to be in [name of town]" (lines 110-115).

Abdullah B continued by saying that young Muslims are now more in touch with reality than their parents, considering themselves as British and that he should be:

...able to print my identity inside British society and so we're a bit more free...you know...we don't feel that we need to conform to you know, make our people happy, so I think the parents probably have a bit more inferior complexity than the kids themselves. We were born into a society where we probably interacted with the whites more than they do and so it's not actually a big deal. They actually think it's a big deal but it's actually not a big deal (lines 121-126).

Abdullah B is progressing an argument that their parents' generation consider themselves to be temporary or migrant workers dreaming of returning to the country of their birth. The young Muslims want to be seen as British citizens and have equal rights. Abdullah B continued by saying that his employer is fine with

him taking some time from work to pray but that his wider relatives and a lot of the older generation would not ask their employer for time to pray (lines 129-135).

Abdullah B knows there are differences in how his generation and the generation before view 'Britishness' and citizenship. His parents' generation position themselves as being subservient even though their wish to return 'home' is likely to be a 'pipe dream'. They remain 'othered' in Britain unable or unwilling to assimilate or 'print their identity' as British Asians and British Muslims. They locate themselves as 'cultural Muslims' who are unable to counter media attacks on Muslims and Islam due to a lack of knowledge of religion. Their sons have enough knowledge to know their religion but have not articulated so far that they are able to forward a counter-argument themselves. Abdullah B says he should be able to "print his identity" (line 121) within British society, but has not said if he *is* able.

Fricker helps us to think about Abdullah B's ideas differently. Using Fricker's lens we can see that previous generations of Muslims have been "wrongfully excluded from the community of trusted informants" and "demoted from subject to object, relegated from the role of active epistemic agent" (Fricker, 2007, p. 132). They have been confined to "the role of passive state of affairs from which knowledge might be gleaned" (*ibid*). Older Muslim generations accepted subservient citizenship which Fricker allows us to name as hermeneutical marginalisation (Fricker, 2007).

Abdullah B believes that his parents' generation have not embraced their entitlement to British citizenship, which Abdullah B demands as a young Muslim living in Wales. He is aware of how his parents' culture, lack of knowledge and

education shaped their lives and how they are hermeneutically marginalised (*ibid*). Without a voice they adopt a "self-imposed public silence" (Medina, 2013, p. 102) which may be their only choice, and is an example of postcolonial conditions existing for them. However, Abdullah B is not content for this to happen to him and seeks political justice to challenge the "political dysfunction" (Medina, 2013, p. 87) which silenced his parents' generation reflecting their testimonial virtues being both moral and epistemic (Medina, 2013, p. 86). The theories of Medina (2013) and Fricker (2007) depart here with Fricker maintaining the primary harm done to a speaker as a knower, is an ethical harm (Fricker, 2007, p. 44). Medina furthers Fricker's claim by including a moral and political revision to her theory, allowing for the "differential treatment of entire groups" (Medina, 2013, p. 88) to be encompassed. Medina qualifies his revision and expansion of Fricker by calling for "sustained political action and deep interventions in social and political structures" (Medina, 2013, p. 86) when the "normative structures that govern our epistemic, ethical, and political lives become corrupted" (*ibid*). I argue Prevent and FBV contribute to normalising Islamophobia and that the epistemic excesses of authority and credibility on the part of the wider non-Muslim public spoil epistemic character creating a meta blindness or a meta-insensitivity to the plight of Muslims living in Wales requiring a "political reeducation that touches on all aspects of people's lives in common" (Medina, 2013, p. 89).

Abdullah then returns to the theme that their parents still see themselves as economic migrants:

I think a lot of the parents who come to this country, they see themselves as guests of this country and on any occasion where you have guests, the guest never wants to upset the host and so he feels



that Islam or whatever in the media, if it's going to antagonise the native community, basically, even if that makes people feel uncomfortable or whatever they want to avoid that at all costs ...and so there is a real problem in that we see the parents and we also have to look at most of our parents especially in the Asian community, Pakistani, Bengali, most of our parents come from a country which is pretty much illiterate. A big proportion of the community/population is illiterate, particularly the women and so most of their knowledge of Islam, they can't rely on books or texts or articles to arrive at an understanding of Islam, this limits their knowledge and so this is a real problem. Because we know English and because there's a lot of texts and a lot of Islamic scriptures that have been translated into English, we have a lot more access to Islamic knowledge than our parents and so their understanding and ideas of Islam is slightly different to ours, and that's why we tend to say that they are very traditional in their views (lines 136-155).

Abdullah uses the term 'traditional' to describe subservience among his parents' generation who see themselves as guests and not citizens in Britain. He blames a lack of English language for poor Islamic knowledge and that their knowledge of Islam has come from the media. By associating Islam with terrorism it has brought his parents' generation into conflict with younger educated Muslims. The use of the word 'natives' by Abdullah (lines 144-145) referring to non-Muslim white citizens and 'guests' to refer to Muslim parents are examples of postcolonial thought which reinforce subservience. The word 'native' also has an association with colonial European rule for example, 'colonised' however, as argued in this research the emphasis is the 'colonising of Muslim mind'.

It is unclear whether previous generations of Muslims were subjected to hermeneutical injustice as membership of a marginalised community or due to limited English language capabilities and lesser agency were unable to engage in citizenship. If the latter were to be the case then they would not have been hermeneutically marginalised as the definition requires this to be systematic. This is a situation that is highly context dependent, depending on whether the

'informant' is considered a "good informant" or has "markers of 'trustworthiness'" (Fricker, 2007, p. 130) which would not undermine the informant in their capacity as a speaker. Fricker describes 'good informants' as having signs of "positive markers" in that such speakers have a proven track record in being truthful (Fricker, 2007, p. 117). Similarly, Fricker distinguishes between two kinds of socially produced silences based upon identity prejudices. In the first instance groups may be silenced by not being included in communicative exchanges referred to as "pre-emptive testimonial injustice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 130). In the second instance a group may be allowed to communicate but they are only treated as "sources of information" (Medina, 2013, p. 92) who convey information but not as informants, subjects of knowledge or "epistemic agents" (Fricker, 2007, p. 133) who convey information. This is an important distinction which this research recognises and prioritises, particularly when using a postcolonial construct to locate areas of injustice and equally using epistemic injustice to interpret the voices of young Muslims. I also recognise and acknowledge that "public silences should not be equated with a complete expressive and interpretive capacity" (Medina, 2013, p. 101) and that other oppressed and marginalised groups have used silence or have appeared to be "silent on the outside" (Medina, 2013, p. 102) as ways of finding safe spaces of interaction, and hidden communicative processes (Mills, 2007).

Abdullah continues by exploring how Mosques cater for older generations of Muslims by employing Imams who speak Bengali or Urdu but may not be able to speak English. This allowed the early generations of migrant Muslims to have Islamic guidance but nowadays the English speaking younger generation of

Muslims are not able to understand. Abdullah says the generational gap is never bridged because of a lack of qualified Imams who can be understood by everyone. Each Mosque caters for its own community and its home language (lines 155-66).

Abdullah's claims suggest that knowledge of Islam is negotiated by older Muslim men at the expense of younger ones. They want an Imam who can speak English so they can access Islamic knowledge which is vital for constructing their identity as British Muslims and to be able to address identity crises. If this is the case, the young Muslims suffer from a hermeneutical injustice and are hermeneutically marginalised (Fricker, 2007) in being denied knowledge from the Mosques who prioritise the older generation of Muslim men. The older and possibly 'respected' Muslim men are preferentially treated in the distribution of knowledge leading some younger Muslims to turn to social media to get knowledge and potentially be misinformed by the media about their religion. It may be that some Mosques rely on interpreting Islam through a cultural rather than Islamic lens which serves the need of less informed older Muslims. This appears to be recognised by educated younger Muslim men who are aware of the differences between cultural and true Islam for example when their 'traditional' (lines 136-155) parents interpret Islam through a prism of culture and heritage and not Islamic scriptures. A "silence" by older men at Mosques (Medina, 2013, p. 102) to address terrorism may have also been influenced by the events post 9/11 where oppressed groups are justified in "maintaining their oppressor's ignorance and inability to make sense of certain experiences until a more equal participation in hermeneutical practices is available to all" (Medina, 2013, p. 117). Medina differs from Fricker (2007) in his views of hermeneutical responsibilities suggesting that certain communities can suspend

such responsibilities because it is the ethical thing to do. Medina (2013, p. 140) extends epistemic responsibility to challenge those who seek to hide their actions in individual or "collective ignorance". Medina (2013, p. 144) introduces a "cognitive minimum" of social knowledge to achieve "responsible agency" to extend epistemic injustice so it may be identified. I consider a denial of knowledge about Islam and culture, though reinforced as a consequence of oppressive legislation, lends support to the argument that postcolonial 'othering' exists for Muslims in Britain.

Carlito continues the theme of Mosques by saying that when he lived in a northern British town his uncle was the chairman of the Mosque. After the older Imam died an Imam who was able to speak Urdu, Arabic and English was employed. Carlito said the new Imam was able to pacify the older generation saying, "when you came here you had an Imam to explain everything to you in terms you could understand. You know everything. You've been here, now it's our time to teach the younger generation" (lines 174-176). Carlito said he was able to speak to the Imam about personal issues which he could not have done with the previous Imam and that it would be good if all Mosques could offer that (lines 178-184). Carlito wanted knowledge from an Imam but was initially hermeneutically marginalised by being unable to access knowledge from his parents due to their lack of knowledge and absence of an English-speaking Imam.

Sandman agreed with Carlito saying that his Mosque kept the old Imams who focused on aspects not important for modern day young Muslims and that they spoke "the native languages such as Urdu, or Gujarati and for me as a person I

don't understand Gujarati ... so I never used to benefit from any of the talks" (lines 189-191). Sandman continued:

I felt intimidated too. I would never ask them about any personal issues because firstly I didn't understand them and they probably would not have spoke English with me and I think again a lot of the time it's a lack of education in a sense for the youth and um, also the elders in a sense too (lines 192-195).

Sandman has identified an obstacle in getting knowledge of Islam because of language barriers. He recalled how he attended a Madrassa to listen to talks from the Imam but could not understand him. He said that he didn't learn anything and couldn't approach the Imam for advice on personal matters. Sandman also felt unable to approach his family for help and said that a lot of the time: "it's a lack of education in a sense for the youth and um, also the elders in a sense too" (lines 194-195). Sandman says both young people and the elder community are missing out on being educated at Mosques due to language barriers between themselves and the Imam. The concept of credibility is an important element in epistemic injustice and is being articulated by the Muslim men to explain how knowledge of Islam and being Muslim is managed by Mosques. The voices of the younger Muslims are given less credibility than the older men positioning them as being hermeneutically marginalised (Fricker, 2007) due to their age and status in the Mosque community and as subjects of social understanding (*ibid*). However, as argued earlier it may be that the older men are suspending their hermeneutical obligations (Medina, 2013, p. 117) as a way to challenge the dominant media narratives that contribute to widespread Islamophobia.

I Initially thought that Sandman was criticising a lack of education by young people and elders in not being able to speak the language of the Imam. However, the thread of the discourse was a lack of Islamic knowledge due to the Imam not being able to speak English, which was confirmed by Abdullah B who said:

...the last portion of the talk has been about the elders but it does also affect a lot of the youngsters in the sense... a lot of parents... the Muslim generation back three generations, the really elder generations were quite religious and quite traditional, then the ones in between, probably in their fifties or their forties, they are not as religious and some of them are not they are not religious at all... they are having children who know nothing whatsoever about their religion.... so they are learning their Islam from the media itself... so, whatever the media portrays, they start thinking 'is that what Islam really is'? ...but they have no background knowledge whatsoever and, in a sense, that is affecting their faith... the media is affecting their perception of Islam (lines 199-211).

Abdullah B is confirming what has been said previously about their parents' generation not knowing religion but instead learning about it from the media. A lack of Islamic knowledge subjects their parents to hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007) in that the knowledge they have of their religion is incomplete, manufactured and distributed by the media. Conditions of epistemic injustices are spread to their sons who, being unable to access knowledge from Mosques are also subjected to hermeneutical injustice (*ibid*). A lack of agency in accessing knowledge is additionally indicative of postcolonial conditions existing for Muslims living in Britain. Returning to epistemic injustice Medina (2013, p. 120) argues that:

It is indeed very hard to live up to one's epistemic responsibilities under conditions of oppression and systematic injustice, but not for everybody equally and to the same degree.

Bongo returned to how the media misrepresent Islam and Muslims saying that many young Muslims are attracted to the entertainment industry but there are movies that inaccurately portray Muslims, for example in their depiction of terrorists on film who are portrayed saying "Alahu Akbar" (line 221) prior to the detonation of explosives or whilst committing terrorist acts. Bongo clarified that the term used (which in translation means 'God is great') had been corrupted by the entertainment industry to such a degree that "Muslims themselves say 'no I won't say God is great in Arabic in case...I'd rather keep quiet'" (line 228). Bongo recognises that Muslim agency has been restricted by the corruption of a commonly used Muslim expression by the entertainment industry. They have taken an Arabic phrase used to praise God (Allah) turning it into a phrase used by terrorists for the consumption of Western audiences and at the expense of causing "enormous chaos in Islamic countries" (line 218). Knowledge of Islam has been constructed linking Islam and Muslims to acts of terrorism. Appropriation of language by the entertainment industry has subjected Muslims across the world to suffer epistemic injustices by misinformation being spread and normalised. It manifests in permitting Muslims to repeat an incorrect understanding of 'Jihad' and restricted their agency to avoid saying 'Jihad' because they believe it has a connection to terrorism. This makes them suffer testimonial injustice as knowers and givers of information of their religion (Fricker, 2007). The use of the word 'Jihad' by anyone may allow them to be considered as a victim of testimonial injustice in that they are wronged in their capacity as a giver of knowledge which is a falsehood. However, this is dependent on the context in which the word is said. For example, if both hearer and speaker know the correct meaning of 'jihad' then at that instant no testimonial injustice would occur (*ibid*).

The entertainment industry, in similar ways as the media, stereotype Muslims as potential terrorists and inculcate the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim public a normalising of Islamophobia and that according to Medina (2013, p. 129) "the normalization of a presumed justice and the concomitant abnormalization of injustice have important ideological effects". Medina further argues that such injustices contribute to active bodies of ignorance being formed, perpetuating injustices and making us insensitive to the suffering of others (Medina, 2013).

Abdullah builds on Bongo's remarks by discussing how religion, including Christianity, are viewed in the United Kingdom by the liberal media: "I think religion is generally perceived as something that is against science and something that's backward, you know something of the old that needs to be let go" (lines 231-233). Abdullah continues by making comparisons between Muslims and Christians for example, when atheist authors such as Richard Dawkins (see for example, Dawkins, 2007) and the late Christopher Hitchens attack religion (see for example, Hitchens, 2007). Abdullah argues that Muslims have to deal firstly with attacks on faith generally being perceived as backward (Brown and Richards, 2016), also the negative stereotyping of Islam (lines 234-240). Abdullah continues by exploring how the media stereotype Muslims by linking them to political events that may be interpreted in several ways which:

...complicates things even more for the Muslims, ...because this is where the real identity crisis comes from ... more complicated than religion where you got like every person has their own political ideas and opinions um and what we see in the world is sometimes most of us feel as though we are under attack and I'm saying this quite clearly; I think people think their Islamic faith is under attack from certain forces ...and this complicates things a lot more for them because, for example, the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan; those people who are politically-minded, the Muslim populated-minded [sic], or even the



Muslim activists, when they talk about some of these issues then sometimes they are perceived to be disloyal to this country or something or against the native population but that's not the case, it is that they have different, they interpret politics differently um because um they are not really directed from the newspapers, but they actually go to the sources um and comments like David Cameron when I think he was in Germany I think the EDL (English Defence League) were on the march the same day and he made this you know he said that multiculturalism had failed and the same comment was made in Germany and then we see the rise of the far-right parties in Belgium and Switzerland and France and other countries as well and then you see like George W Bush saying 'you are with us or against us' and so people think that Muslims sometimes think their faith is under attack and when they speak out against it, they are normally engaged in political activities and that's where the news from the cameramen catches them and this is what kind of fuels this stereotype and Islamophobia in society (lines 242-261).

Abdullah is aware that Christianity in Britain has declined and that some commentators are broadly hostile to faith. He returns to the theme referred to earlier where Muslims experience an "inferiority complex" (line 32) due to being stereotyped. Abdullah now refers to Muslims having a "real identity crisis" (line 242) as a result of Islam being drawn into political events around the world and by linking Islam and Muslims to conflicts or "war" in Iraq and Afghanistan (line 248). Abdullah recognises that Muslims may have different political views but that in the end they are all stereotyped as being 'Muslim' by the media particularly when Muslims are protesting in Britain. Their identities as political activist or protester is always forefronted by their Muslim identity and they are presented as being anti-British with their loyalties aligned to Iraq or Afghanistan. The perception that Muslims are anti-British is widely held and is an element that contributes to widespread Islamophobia and attacks on British Muslims (Esposito and Kalin, 2011; Faith Matters, 2018) further supporting the argument that conditions of postcolonialism exist for Muslims. Abdullah says that Muslims who are more

politically aware are not "really directed from the newspapers but they actually go to sources um and comments like from David Cameron" (lines 252-253). This concurs with previous comments made in the CoE confirming that Muslims without knowledge learn about Islam from the media while those who are knowledgeable get their information from other sources. It may be that the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) is constructed to lessen the agency of politically-minded British Muslims who want to protest against government policy particularly with regard to its effects in the Middle East. In associating legitimate political protest and dissent by British Muslims to notions of anti-Britishness, the media and government have 'othered' Muslims in political and democratic discourse setting Muslims apart from society. Abdullah has made the connection of a perceived disloyalty to Britain by protesting Muslims referring to the speech in Munich of the then Prime Minister David Cameron. Cameron attacked multiculturalism as being dead and warned British Muslims to be more British and to follow Fundamental British Values (Cameron, 2011). Abdullah is also aware of the irony in the timing of Cameron's speech which was delivered on the day the English Defence League (EDL) marched in Britain against Muslims. He concluded by noting the rise of the far-right parties in Belgium, Switzerland and France and in comments made by George W. Bush to Muslims "you are with us or against us" (lines 257-258). Abdullah has interpreted Bush's comments to refer to the Muslim community whereas Bush's speech was directed at anyone supporting terrorism and not specifically to Muslims (*The Guardian*, 2001). Abdullah is mistaken in assuming Bush was calling for Muslim assimilation into Western life and relinquishing their identity which is the antithesis of a multicultural society. In contrast to Bush's speech however, David Cameron's Munich speech, I argue, is part of a drive to

reinforce notions of Britishness in order to create a perceptible difference between Muslimness and Britishness. Cameron's vision was later shored up by curriculum and legislative control and maintained by sections of biased media reporting. It appears that there are no 'safe spaces' for Muslim voices to be articulated in the British political arena without them being labelled as anti-British.

The young Muslim men practice Islam to a greater degree than their parents. Their parents know this could bring their sons into conflict with a Western view of Islam and Muslims in Britain and are keen that their sons avoid conflict. The Muslim men are educated in their religious beliefs and recognise the media in Britain misrepresents Islam and Muslims. They also know that political rhetoric and security legislation seeks to limit their agency as Muslims by positioning them as a suspect community. The effects of distorting their identity as Muslims living in Britain creates epistemic disadvantage for them.

Abdullah has addressed several issues of concern to himself and his fellow CoE respondents where liberal commentators debate a decline in religious beliefs for Britons (Field, 2018). I consider the trend of being a less religious society in the context of Muslim testimony and epistemic injustice. During testimonial exchanges for example, between believer and non-believer, a person with a belief in a faith may suffer an epistemic injustice when their belief is questioned. However, for it to be epistemic in its nature it would require that prejudice exists rather than a difference of opinion in faith or belief in religion (Fricker, 2007). If there is prejudice toward Islam and Muslims then I argue that Muslims are the victims of hermeneutical injustice simply for being Muslim. However, it is difficult

for Muslims to understand whether 'attacks' (lines 234-261) on Islam are founded on belief or prejudice, presenting further challenges to Muslims in understanding of Islamophobia. Medina (2013) initially makes the distinction between the responsible agent who has self-knowledge and knowledge of the environment and those who have knowledge of the intentional states of others under special circumstances. Minimal knowledge of both states does not mean that the person is not a responsible agent, whereas a total lack of self-knowledge or a total lack of knowledge of the intentional states of others "is sufficient to disqualify someone as a responsible participant in discursive practices" (Medina, 2013, p. 125).

However, "when an agent is systematically deceived about her own intentional states, we do not consider her a responsible agent" (*ibid*). Medina further argues that minimal knowledge is not enough for responsible agency and calls for a "minimal social knowledge of others and minimal empirical knowledge of the world" (Medina, 2013, p. 127). Medina calls for the "presumption of epistemic authority in all the different areas of ordinary knowledge required for everyday activities" (*ibid*). The implication being that the wider non-Muslim public should have a minimal knowledge of Islam and Muslims living in Wales. However, the existence of widespread Islamophobia which is responsible for "pervasive epistemic injustices" (Medina, 2013, p. 128) prevents agents from attaining responsibility and their epistemic authority is in fact an epistemic deficit.

Abdullah B continues the theme of Muslim citizenship and injustices perceived to have been committed against British Muslims by citing the example of the extradition of Baba Ahmad, a British citizen (Ahmad and others, 2013) to the United States:

...we had Mosques around the UK with an *epetition* with over 150,000 Muslims signing a petition because and we had a lot of non-Muslims signing that petition because they thought it was unfair with the law that you could extradite a British citizen to America, but you can't do it the other way around, with very minimal evidence whatsoever and so that's partly why we had a big response. Unfortunately he failed the appeal, but we have a twitter generation and so on who believe may be Babar Ahmad today, your son tomorrow, we don't know why we still don't know why he is being sent to America, we still don't fully know why because they still didn't represent the full evidence... you know it feels like we are under siege again you know because apart from one suspect the rest are Muslims you know... the guy who tried to hack into the American system, the rest of the suspects are all Muslim and most of them British-born Muslims so it just makes it more complicated (lines 296-306).

Abdullah B clearly believes the British authorities capitulated to American security services in allowing the extradition of a British citizen to America with what he believes to be minimal evidence. Abdullah B referred to an 'epetition', used as a way to protest against the extradition of Baba Ahmad and that it had failed. He continued saying that: "we have a twitter generation" (line 300), intimating online and social media platforms are preferable means of protest for Muslims instead of protesting in public where they are misrepresented by the media or vulnerable to arrest. Abdullah B uses the terms "British citizen" (line 298) and "British born" (line 305) emphasising that 'Muslim Britishness' is not the same as 'Britishness' and that the extradition of British citizens would not go ahead if it were not for the fact that four of the five men are Muslim, citing "the guy who tried to hack into the American system" (lines 304-305) as being the only non-Muslim to face extradition.

Abdullah B believes the British government are guilty of structural identity prejudice (Fricker, 2007) by ignoring the 'epetition' to challenge the extradition. He believes the government have marginalised Muslims living in Britain warning "it

may be your son tomorrow for something" (line 301) suggesting that the law had been circumvented for British Muslims. This indicates that Muslims in Britain have been subjected to a hermeneutical injustice by their membership of a community "wronged in their capacity of social understanding" (Fricker, 2007, p. 7). Medina differs from Fricker by way of introducing privilege as "white ignorance" (Medina, 2013, p. 108). I draw on Medina to illustrate how white ignorance, an injustice, are both "epistemic and non-epistemic (e.g., economic, legal, political) interests" (*ibid*). Medina (2013, p. 108) argues that the white community, "those without resources to understand their racial identities and experience" do not suffer the practical consequences of being victimised by racial ignorance. Although hermeneutically disadvantaged, it is in their interests to comprehend white privilege to improve their understanding making them responsible agents. To acknowledge this would make them "vulnerable, undermines their authority, and requires them to pay attention to things that can be uncomfortable and disempowering" (*ibid*).

Abdullah responds to the theme of Muslims not being able to express themselves politically saying:

...when we were told to you know express our opinion, freedom of expression, express freely but the moment that the people were beginning to express themselves especially with regards to political events, then they are under siege. I think that's when they feel like certain events that have happened, I don't know why they should be targeted for example the Muslims when they use, they are under the radar, are being checked and so on and when they go to the airports and so on. It's like what happens is that sometimes, like, if you have a broad mind sometimes some of the decisions and policies that have been made is basically meant to try to kind of create an internal barrier around the Muslim mind that you can't express regarding politics, outside that, if that makes sense... if you talk about certain events then sometimes there is suspicion that you may be under the radar. We are not talking about extremists; we are just talking about people who are politically aware (lines 308-318).

Abdullah is expressing the view that young people are encouraged to speak freely exercising freedom of expression. However, he knows Muslims who do so draw attention to themselves as "being under the radar" (line 317) suggesting they have yet to be brought to the attention of the security services. Abdullah believes being politically vocal and Muslim alerts the security services risking further scrutiny as potential terrorists and gives examples of Muslims who are 'racially profiled' (Morey and Yaqin, 2011). Abdullah goes on to speak about decisions and policies which create "an internal barrier around the Muslim mind" (lines 315-316) which I interpret to be the effects of the government's counter-terrorism strategy, specifically the Prevent strategy (Home Office, 2011a) which had received widespread condemnation for unfairly targeting Muslims. Abdullah articulated that to be political was to be considered anti-British and a potential terrorist, "you can't express regarding politics outside" (line 316). His analogy of "an internal barrier around the Muslim mind" (lines 315-316) is indicative of postcolonial conditions existing for Muslims and was recognised by Abdullah who is politically well-informed.

The messages received by Muslims are they are viewed as potential terrorists and are "under siege" (line 310-311). This is an epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007).

The presence of Prevent may also be seen as "an alternative to a reified panoptical state" (O'Toole *et al.*, 2016, p. 166) in controlling Muslim agency.

These conditions have been referred to in this research as a 'colonising of the Muslim mind' and support the argument that conditions of postcolonialism exist for Muslims living in Britain.

Abdullah believes the government does not make a distinction between Muslims being politically vocal or active and Muslim extremism (lines 316-318), and is subjected to an epistemic injustice in that his democratic right to protest is restricted for fear of prosecution. This is an infringement on his democratic rights as a British citizen and an infringement of his human rights (*Human Rights Act 1998*). He is also part of a "hermeneutically marginalized" community (Fricker, 2007, p. 152) and by "negative identity prejudices" (*ibid*, p. 35) from Islamophobia where there has been "an unreliable empirical generalization" (Fricker, 2007, p. 32) about Muslims in Britain.

To further Medina's (2013, p. 108) argument of "white ignorance" and "white privilege", and acknowledging that postcolonialism exists for Muslims in Britain, I consider how Abdullah articulates being subjected to a white colonialist gaze. It may be that the West has recreated a version of the Orient allowing for an "epistemic irresponsibility" (Medina, 2013, p. 189) where the "interrelated cognitive minimums of social knowledge of others and self-knowledge are violated" (*ibid*). In Chapter 4, I employed the concept of 'false consciousness' synthesising its use to one of hermeneutical injustice as a way of illustrating how the effects of a postcolonialist Islamophobia protects it from being understood. In similar ways, Medina argues for cognitive minimums so as to achieve epistemic responsibility (Medina, 2013, p. 85; pp. 119-135).

Abdullah B responds by making reference to a joke among his Muslim friends that George Galloway, then a Member of Parliament for the Respect Party (Robinson and Mason, 2012), an opponent of the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, and a



supporter for the state of Palestine, can get away with criticising British foreign policy. However, he continued, should a Muslim do so, they would be locked up in Paddington Green (a high security police station) (lines 319-324).

Abdullah B has returned to the theme of Muslims unable to lawfully protest like non-Muslim Britons, without having a genuine concern they may be arrested. As a consequence of feeling they are unable to protest Muslims are denied a voice in influencing policy to benefit them, for example, changing the legal definition of Islamophobia which could afford them some protection and potentially lessen its effects. This may allow the virtuous hearer (Fricker, 2007, p. 169) to challenge hermeneutical injustice (Islamophobia) to bring about hermeneutical justice (*ibid*) for Muslims in Britain. By failing to effectively challenge Islamophobia the British government is contributing to Muslims in Britain becoming victims of hermeneutical injustice.

To support a challenge to negative influences of concepts including the Prevent Strategy, FBV and conditions of postcolonialism, I turn to Medina (2013, p. 252):

...when it comes to injustices that concern issues of knowledge, ignorance, and interpretation we need to address how the social imagination can become exclusionary and stigmatizing, making certain groups vulnerable to expressive and epistemic harms, and promoting the social tolerance of their suffering.

I argue negative reporting by the media, the introduction of Prevent, and notions of FBV absolved the wider non-Muslim public from a degree of epistemic responsibility and positioning them as bystanders (although as May (2010) argues, legal responsibility is shared with the moral responsibility of bystanders). Medina (2013, p. 252) argues, "our interventions must critically engage with structural

processes and their subjective accompaniments simultaneously". Having argued that structural processes negatively affect Muslims in Britain, I also acknowledge Medina's "resistant imagination" (*ibid*) which requires our imaginations become "pluralized, polyphonic, and experimentalist" (Medina, 2013, p. 252). I provide examples of resistant imagination in the CoE from the responses of Arikarikam and Abdullah B who discuss how the media look to Muslims to condemn acts of terrorism. Arikarikam responds to Abdulla B saying: "I think there is some do you know, do you mean like condemning bad things?" (line 333).

Abdullah B confirmed he believed a lot of Muslims do condemn (bad things) but the media do not want to listen (or report). He gave examples of The Sun (newspaper) reporting "a so-called cleric is calling the 9/11 bombers 'the magnificent 19'" (lines 340-341), saying that it was not the view of the majority of Muslims. "The Sun ain't going to sell four million newspapers per day saying oh Muslims are saying they are against the burning of the (laughs)... rather what they say is 'those Muslim guys with beards, shouting Allah' and burning down the Embassy...that is going to sell" (lines 336-338).

Abdullah B confirms the view that the media stereotype Muslims and fail to report Muslims who speak out against acts of terrorism. He said that he doesn't know of any Muslim who has condoned acts of terrorism and he believed that this was the view of the majority of Muslims (lines 335-341). What is not clear is whether the media fail to report Muslims who speak out against acts of terrorism or whether Muslims do not feel able to publicly criticise these acts. This raises the question as to whether Muslims fear accusations of apostasy by engaging in tenets of Islam

which they are not able to interpret to modern day meanings (Eaton *et al.*, 2008) (notwithstanding terrorism has no place in Islam and is not supported by the majority of Muslims living in Britain).

Abdullah B knows Muslims who condemn terrorist attacks but also that the media fail to report Muslims who do so. Muslims living in Britain are not represented by any single organisation nor is there a spokesperson to represent them. Due to structural inequality, Muslim voices are effectively silenced as a consequence of being hermeneutically marginalised as Muslims. Abdullah B has demonstrated he has a "resistant imagination" (Medina, 2013, p. 252) in recognising the role that the media have in "distorting and excusing the suffering" (*ibid*) of his fellow Muslims in Wales and that Muslims are negatively portrayed, in order to "sell four million newspapers per day" (lines 336-338). The perceived lack of a Muslim response concurs with a suspension of "hermeneutical obligation" (Medina, 2013, p. 116) in that it is prudent for Muslims to be out of the news, maintaining a "social silence" (*ibid*, p. 117) given that a climate of widespread Islamophobia exists for them. Arikarikam offers a counter-example to Abdullah B:

...yes there are some also who believe um why should we condemn it? I didn't do anything. And I reckon it's the majority. I'm not sure how everyone else feels here but the majority will think um 'why should I condemn it? Of course it is a bad thing' see what I mean? Yes, I'm a Muslim but I was not there you know? Um, also, for example, um what Carlito said before, yes, people were scared to talk about things and they still are scared to talk about things. You always have to watch what you say and I'm not sure if that is the case for everyone but if you say the wrong thing then you can land yourself in trouble and may have a policeman knock your door or ring your telephone saying 'how is this?' Don't grow your beard, there were some people mentioning that um 'don't grow your beard'. I was told myself that when I went on the lesser pilgrimage to Mecca when I came back I was in the Mosque like five times a day you know I was really spiritual I had a buzz you know. Somebody said to me 'do you go five times?' And I said 'yeah, and this

was a family member now', 'because they might be watching you'. 'What do you mean? 'Who?' And you know there's a conception that you know, yeah, you're being watched. You know, what we do, what we say will have a huge impact. We could end up in the cells without a reason. I mean, I don't think there is anybody here I'm not sure and I think the majority as well who don't believe or actually believe they can end up in the cells without a reason and this is just a personal thing because there have been many people who have just gone in for nothing, but it was just a perception and also media, also influencing (referring to the question chosen for discussion on the flip chart)...or influencing perceptions, your own perceptions as a Muslim. I think if you have the basic knowledge, I don't think the media can influence you that much um because you have a point of contact to go to talk to people, real people who you know, know their thing and you can talk to them, OK, and get your answers like Carlito said if you have an Imam you can talk but then the ones who don't have much knowledge then there's a vulnerability there as well that they could be researching themselves and who knows what they could find..." (referring to Muslims who look on the internet for Islamic guidance) (lines 343-367).

Arikarikam has articulated a counter-argument to challenge dominant media narratives. He believes the majority of Muslims in Britain do not condone acts of terrorism carried out in the name of Islam, but also do not feel the need to apologise for something that they are not responsible for. He returns to the theme of Muslim agency speaking of issues that he believes will bring Muslims to the attention of the security services. "People were scared to talk about things and they still are scared to talk about things. You always have to watch what you say" (lines 347-348) and not looking too Muslim, such as growing a beard for fear of being arrested and "end up in the cells" (line 357). Arikarikam is citing a genuine fear by Muslims that they are a 'watched community' and that those without the basic knowledge of Islam are so afraid to speak about or question sections of Islamic knowledge that they may turn to the Internet for information rather than ask someone. There is a fear that they will be arrested and "are scared to talk about things" (line 348). The Muslim men have previously highlighted the need for an

English-speaking Imam to give them knowledge of Islam which, they claim is not widespread in Britain. Additionally those without basic knowledge of Islam are more likely to believe the media reports about Islam and Muslims. Arikarikam makes the distinction between those who have knowledge and those who do not in the degree to which the media influences them, referring to his fellow Muslim participants as having knowledge.

Repeatedly, the effects of the anti-terrorism laws (Home Office, 2011a) and negative media reporting influences those Muslims who are perceived not to have knowledge of Islam, and creates "an internal barrier around the Muslim mind" (line 315-316), limiting their agency to discuss issues they feel are important. The notion of an 'internal barrier' that limits discussion suggests that being viewed as anti-British is a matter of concern for Muslims. The Prevent Strategy, notions of FBVs and not being able to celebrate their religion publicly positions Muslims outside multiculturalism and into securitisation. Corruption of knowledge about them is an epistemic injustice allowing their testimonies a lesser credibility and engendering "hermeneutical injustice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 7) for Muslims. "The cognitive minimum violated" in this instance, (Medina, 2013, p. 139), a lack of knowledge of Muslims, supports the argument that a weakening of multiculturalism has allowed for securitisation (which manifests as Islamophobia) to occupy a lacuna in the social imaginations of non-Muslims. Although Arikarikam recognises the value of having Islamic knowledge as a counter to internalising corrupted knowledge of Islam and Muslims, he is nevertheless unable to publicly articulate his views because he is part of a hermeneutically marginalised group. Communities share a collective responsibility to "facilitate everyone's ability to

participate in meaning-making and meaning-expressing practices" (Medina, 2013, p. 109) but there is a hermeneutical lacuna occupied by widespread Islamophobia, the dynamics of which "block new forms of understanding and foster communicative dysfunctions" (Medina, 2013, p. 111).

Abdullah B responds to Arikarikam quoting an incident after the 7/7 bombings in London (London Assembly, 2006). He recalls how the management committee at his London Mosque stopped all activities for young Muslims, being concerned the authorities "might get suspicious" (line375). He continued, "they didn't want them (the authorities) to make them feel suspicious all of a sudden, even though everyone knew they were very spiritual guys" (lines 375-376), "we also had a cleaner who was cleaning our area saying 'why is your Mosque open? It should be shut down'. He was saying it to people going to the Mosque, 'because your religion is the one you know that is you know attacked' and that kind of stuff" (lines 377-381).

The management committee at the London Mosque were aware that young Muslims would be targeted for abuse. They chose to curtail their 'Muslimness' by restricting public events that would highlight Muslim identity afraid it may bring young Muslims to the notice of the security services. This comment conflicts with what was said earlier in that those with knowledge would not necessarily believe that innocent Muslims would be arrested and "end up in the cells" (line357). I assume the management committee have Islamic knowledge, but that local tension in the area around the Mosque necessitated prudence. The management committee believed the public would stereotype Muslims as 'potential terrorists'

subjecting them to abuse. Their decision to limit injustices from occurring by curtailing the young people's Muslim identity is seen by Medina (2013, p. 117) as a suspension of hermeneutical obligation or responsibility. Furthermore, possessing knowledge of Islam was not enough for them to challenge the widespread view that Islam and terrorism are connected. The Mosque decided that the young people going to and from the Mosque would bring them to the attention of the security services, even though the Mosque knew the young Muslims to be "very spiritual guys" (line 376). The Mosque management were subjected to hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007) in that they knew the widely shared public knowledge about them in Britain disadvantaged them in being able to display Muslim identity. They were "silenced" (Medina, 2013, p. 117) in public, unable to present a counter-argument marginalising them in their Muslim identity and 'othering' them as British citizens in conditions of postcolonialism.

Abdullah B continued the theme of Muslims having to apologise for acts of terrorism in Britain saying:

...it is not something done in our religion...done in our name and we don't see the politician Tony Blair or...making hundreds of apologies of what happened in Iraq yet he has not apologised...do you know what I mean? And that is affecting the Muslim mentality and that is bad (lines 389-392).

He returned to the theme of Muslims who have a lack of Islamic knowledge:

...there is a concept of the hypodermic syringe model right? Or slowly getting de-sensitised (laughs)... basically um especially from Muslims who are not educated for example...might not be as into the religion, the more and more media exposure Islam is bad...Muslim is bad, this is bad. The first time you may think, 'oh it's just the media', ...but the more you keep bombarding them with it..., slowly, slowly, slowly they will start believing that message. They will slowly get desensitised to it. I do think, especially those who may not be as knowledgeable they might be

vulnerable to you know believing what the media is saying (lines 392-399).

Abdullah B is unable to publicly criticise the decisions Tony Blair and his government made in respect of the invasion of Iraq. He is aware that political decisions made by the government have implications for the Ummah globally in that attacks on Muslims worldwide affect British Muslims, who are not able to publicly articulate their concerns. He feels there are 'double standards' when Muslims are pressured to apologise after terrorist attacks but this does not apply to Tony Blair whom he sees as responsible for Muslims abroad being killed.

The analogy of a "hypodermic syringe model"<sup>11</sup> (line 393) by Abdullah B, is used to justify and expose an approach used by the media that he sees as being responsible for influencing some Muslims in Britain. Medina (2013, p. 109) argues that maintaining privilege can be a "powerful source of resistance against expanding one's hermeneutical sensibilities" and that a hermeneutical insensitivity or white ignorance has resulted in an active ignorance that protects the privileges and also "hides complicity with oppression" (*ibid*). Abdullah B concludes by reiterating his fellow respondents saying that Muslims without Islamic knowledge are vulnerable. He continues saying that Muslims need to have more knowledge of their religion so that they will not be influenced by the media and will be equipped to forward a counter-argument against attacks on Islam and Muslims and have a Muslim identity in British society. He does not say how or whether it is possible to exercise Muslim agency to speak about international issues affecting

---

<sup>11</sup> This is also referred to by Lala in the data analysis of the CoE with the women in Chapter 7. See also Lasswell, 1927 and Appendix 1 lines 323-329



Muslims in Britain, but he is fearful that Muslims will not embrace Muslim identity due to media misinformation about Islam. It may be overwhelming for some to locate a lacuna "where the name of a distinctive social experience should be" (Fricker, 2007, pp. 150-151) and recognise Islamophobia, which is protected from being seen as 'different'. Fricker (2007, p. 150) recalls how "speak outs" were created for some women to speak of their sexual intimidation long before labels such as 'sexual harassment' for example, were used to be able to describe it. This research has used the term 'platforms' to describe a way for Muslim voices to be articulated and heard. Muslims in Britain are still looking for platforms from where they can challenge Islamophobia which remains 'normalised'.

Abdullah B knows that Muslims are vulnerable to injustices caused by believing media misinformation and that their identities as Muslims is negatively affected. He believes that knowledge of Islam will provide some defence for Muslims who are affected by being negatively stereotyped. However, their collective testimonies as knowledgeable Muslims will not be heard because of a structural identity prejudice against them.

Bongo responds to Abdullah B by returning to the theme of the Ummah quoting a story attributed to United States congresswoman Michelle Bachman who said falafel should be banned "because this is the Jihadi's food" ('Jihadi'- the common misinterpretation of a word denoting a 'struggle for a good cause') (everyone laughs) (line 404). Bongo continues saying:

Now just think if this passes into law and given the United States is a close ally to Britain, you could see it could just easily spill over to the other side and all the Western world will burn falafel because she says

that ok if they start that to falafel hmm we'll go to shawarma (Arabic food) (everyone laughs) after that they may say what else comes from Arabia the after a few seconds into Arabic music and the Koran and God knows what else (lines 404-409).

Bongo is repeating a widely circulated story subsequently proved to be false (Nisita, 2012; Weber, 2012). However, he believes the story is true and continues to tell of a seemingly plausible decision to ban falafel due to it being linked to 'Jihadis'. Although Bongo is the subject of a hoax, he passes his knowledge of the hoax to his fellow respondents prompting Abdullah B to tell a similar anti-Muslim story. The difficulty for Muslims to get accurate knowledge has been a recurring theme throughout the CoE with the consensus being that Muslims who are knowledgeable are able to recognise media misrepresentation. When faced with 'another' story purporting to marginalise Muslims and Islam the men accept what they have been told as true.

They are subjects of a "situated hermeneutical inequality" in that:

...their social situation is such that a collective hermeneutical gap prevents them in particular from making sense of an experience which it is strongly in their interests to render intelligible (Fricker, 2007, p. 7).

The young people believe the story about Muslims because it is integral to previous narratives which have 'othered' them, and has prevented them from looking for other sources of information that would have revealed the story as 'fake news'. In ways that the wider non-Muslim public in Britain believe 'fake news' about Islam and Muslims, so the young Muslims have been 'duped'. However, as Muslims they are hermeneutically marginalised and subjects of testimonial injustice between themselves due to their "collective hermeneutical impoverishment" (*ibid*) as 'knowers'. Bongo is demonstrating he recognises the

"cultural stereotyping" of Islam and Muslims (Medina, 2013, p. 165) and how as suspect communities they have knowledge about them manipulated (*ibid*, p. 169), including a postcolonial gaze (Said, 1978) to Middle Eastern food. The story Bongo refers to reinforces Western media obsession with "images of violence and disorder in their coverage of Third World countries" (Medina, 2013, p. 177) that is transposed to falafel. This is a "well-established trend in Postcolonial studies" (*ibid*), which Bongo has internalised in his acceptance of being negatively stereotyped as a Muslim. Medina's (2013, p. 184) hypothesis explores how "distortions and bodies of ignorance" support multiple forms of oppression due to a lack of epistemic friction, which in Bongo's case led him to be hermeneutically marginalised. Abdullah B responds to Bongo saying:

Recently, there was another commentator talking about the boy band, I don't even know them, most people know about them, the 'One Direction' for example yeah and I think they have a Muslim member in the band? And they were saying the right-wing commentator from the US was saying basically we should stop our daughters from listening to 'One Direction' because he is undercover and is a 'Jihadi' and is trying to get them into Islam basically and I was thinking 'what?', and the funniest thing is he wears a Palestinian scarf around his neck which is fashion, but he is wearing the Palestinian number one symbol for Jihad (laughs). But I think that is the extreme instance. I don't think most of the non-Muslim read this kind of stuff and they would probably start laughing as well. I think they were extreme right wings (lines 411-421).

Abdullah B has identified what he believes to be the "extreme right wings" (line 421) in American anti-Muslim discourse. His story refers to the writings of an American right-wing blogger Debbie Schlussel, who wrote "that parents should keep their daughters away from Zayn" (Malik) during One Direction's tour of America (Wheeler, 2012). Abdullah B makes reference to "undercover Jihadi" (line 415) and once again "the number one symbol for 'Jihad'" (line 419) in contexts that suggest he is not quoting from a reliable source but from his own

knowledge in describing an 'Islamic terrorist'. Abdullah recognises an apparent *faux pas* by Abdullah B and reminds the community of the true meaning of 'Jihad':

He mentioned a key word basically that proves the point that was mentioned about 'are we being influenced' and that word 'Jihad', because Jihad itself is a very noble concept and again it goes back to that point that when Muslims talk about Jihad openly I'm not talking about the Jihad that is the media's definition of Jihad which is holy war; that's not the case but Jihad itself is a noble concept which is struggling to purify yourself and to better yourself and to be closer to God so that example with Jihad is a very good example to prove that non-Muslims and Muslims are being influenced by the media because they are avoiding discussions about Jihad in their own circles and in their own study circles and classes and so on um yeah I think people have come to ...before I finish I think people need to name their children Jihad (laughs) (lines423-431).

Abdullah has recognised that Abdullah B has been influenced by the media's interpretation of the meaning of 'Jihad' and is keen to show that he has knowledge of its true meaning. He softens the blow given to Abdullah B saying that "non-Muslims and Muslims are being influenced by the media" (lines 428-429).

However, he then returns to his argument that Muslims avoid talking about 'Jihad' due to a lack of Islamic knowledge and media influence (line 429). He concludes by once again softening the blow to Abdullah B by making a joke that "people need to name their children 'Jihad' " so that it can't be avoided in discussion (line 431). Abdullah argues the answer to the question for discussion is 'yes', the media *does* influence the way Muslims think. He has made his point at the expense of challenging the knowledge, or lack of knowledge by Abdullah B, an educated young Muslim. He reinforces narratives articulated earlier that Muslims without Islamic knowledge run the risk of avoiding legitimate discussions among themselves and are therefore weakened in their abilities to challenge media misinterpretation of them and to strengthen their Muslim identity. A testimonial

injustice has occurred between Abdullah and Abdullah B in Abdullah B's use of the word 'Jihad', which Abdullah has recognised as being incorrect. Abdullah B's knowledge of 'Jihad' has been influenced by the media causing him to use the word 'Jihad' in ways that a person without Islamic knowledge would. A testimonial injustice (Fricker, 2007) has occurred between hearer, Abdullah, and interlocutor, Abdullah B. Abdullah B has been subjected to a hermeneutical injustice (*ibid*) due to him being a subject of social understanding whose knowledge of 'Jihad' was compromised in front of his fellow Muslims. Medina (2013) suggests that the "epistemic agency that a subject has within a discursive practice is such that their knowledge and ignorance are co-constituted" (*ibid*, p. 294). This excuses the charge that Abdullah B should have known better, concurring with Abdullah who blames the media in influencing Muslim knowledge rather than suggest that Abdullah B is ignorant of Islam.

Arikarikam continues with the theme of misinterpreting 'Jihad' by recalling how it has been seen by non-Muslims: "I know someone who is called 'Jahid' and somebody attacked him 'cos his car [number plate] said 'Jahid ' as well. They got him outside and attacked him" (lines 435-436). Arikarikam has chosen to continue a lack of knowledge theme quoting a story about non-Muslims having a lack of knowledge. It may be that Arikarikam is 'taking heat' off Abdullah B by recalling stories of non-Muslims having no knowledge of 'Jihad'.

Themes encapsulating lack of Islamic knowledge by non-Muslims and Muslims alike appear to be connected with how the media corrupt knowledge against Muslims allowing them to be subjected to hermeneutical injustices (Fricker, 2007).

The media maintain an epistemic authority (Medina, 2013, p. 130) over Islam and Muslims which appears to be their "default status" (*ibid*) until evidence to the contrary emerges questioning their authority. Muslim testimony is unable to challenge Islamophobic media narratives which maintains a "credibility excess" (Medina, 2013, p. 59) and "epistemic arrogance" (Medina, 2013, p. 31) normalising Islamophobia. Although Medina (2013) differs from Fricker (2007) in respect of people in authority being harmed by a credibility excess in a single "testimonial exchange" (Medina, 2013, p. 59), he acknowledges that epistemic harm is done when "maintained through a sustained effort over time and across interaction" (*ibid*). This adds weight to the argument that Muslims who believe media misinformation are hermeneutically marginalised and subjects of injustices.

Abdullah B returns to the theme of 'Jihad' blaming 'educators' associated with Mosques for not teaching the true meaning of 'Jihad':

They are finding it hard to talk about the concept of Jihad ...Muslim educators because they think that if they talk about Jihad the Sun newspaper is going to get hold of it '[name of local Mosque] is teaching Jihad!' and without knowing what the context is, people will say 'these guys are Jihadis' ...but it is important for the Muslims themselves to learn about the concept of Jihad because otherwise if you do not know the true concept of Jihad, most people will be ignorant and even the non-Muslim will be ignorant, but the problem is because of the media influence, Muslims are scared to talk about the concept of Jihad, and as I know myself Jihad in Islam is for a noble cause but you know even if I said that now probably I'd be in a police station, they would probably arrest me now (laughs) just because I made that comment but yeah I do believe in that sense... definitely in the concept of Jihad, Muslims have been influenced by the media... that is one taboo subject no-one's going to talk about even to give the right concept, they just think if someone gets hold of it that the Mosque is teaching them about jihad, people would just take it the wrong way basically (lines 438-451).

Abdullah B does not want to admit his earlier mistake in his use of Jihad: "I know myself that Jihad in Islam is for a noble cause" (lines 444-445), but then says that Mosques are reluctant to talk about correcting media stereotypes for fear of being targeted by the media or security services. The influence of the media is such that it is able to corrupt Islamic language, shaping how knowledge of Islam is understood that restricts Muslim agency. Abdullah B argues that knowledge of Islam and Muslims is controlled, weakening the ability of Muslims to have knowledge of Islam to be able to challenge being 'othered' by the media and wider non-Muslim public. This is indicative of postcolonial conditions existing for Muslims living in Britain and in terms of epistemic injustice a hermeneutical impoverishment by Muslims subjecting them to both hermeneutical and testimonial injustice (Fricker, 2007).

*Step 9: Last words*

Respondents are invited to give their last words on the enquiry or to pass.

Arikarikam:

I just wanted to say about the influences, but also influences and action I think as well. You form a plan to live your life now in this way because um if you're too open about your religion or anything about that, then you could land in trouble even if it is with the best intentions so you will um or it will fashion the way you are...even naming for example naming your children you think...do you know what I mean?" (lines 457-461).

Arikarikam argues that being a Muslim living in Britain will mean being subjected to forms of abuse, so he chooses to hide his identity as a Muslim. However, he chooses to remain a Muslim through his family, friends and while at his Mosque. He has made sacrifices in hiding his identity as a Muslim to avoid confrontation and intimates that "if you're too open about your religion or anything about that,

then you could land in trouble, even if it is with the best of intentions" (lines 458-459). He does not clarify whether he means being 'othered' as a Muslim or risking the unwanted attention from the security services: "even if it is with the best of intentions" (line 459). What is clear for Arikarikam, however, is that he fears openly identifying as a Muslim living in Wales. This is not only an infringement of his human rights (*Human Rights Act 1998*) but is morally wrong. Although as Medina (2013, p. 28) argues: "Epistemic oppression is not an equal opportunity institution: it affects all of us, but not all of us equally". Arikarikam illustrates as Muslim he is oppressed and "hermeneutically marginalized" (Fricker, 2007, p. 7) due to social injustices breeding "ignorance and irresponsibility simultaneously" (Medina, 2013, p. 131) resulting in a lack of knowledge of Islam and Muslims. Arikarikam has decided to hide that he is Muslim. However, for Muslim women this is not an option (discussed in Chapter 7). In Chapter 4, I argued how social inequality and "conditions of oppression" (Medina, 2013, p. 131) make it harder for non-Muslims to maintain being epistemically responsible, in other words, "being adequately knowledgeable about themselves, about their peers, and about the world" (Medina, 2013, p. 131). In this thesis I argue a false consciousness (Lukacs, 1971) maintains and protects an ideology of Islamophobia (a social inequality and condition of oppression) making it harder to be epistemically responsible and a "virtuous hearer" (Fricker, 2007, p. 170).

Arikarikam's position aligns with earlier comments about the young Muslim men's parents who, "never wanting to upset the host" (line 137-138) and not wanting to be visibly Muslim "in front of the natives" (line 144) encouraged their sons to shun their Muslim identity in public. Arikarikam has considered how Islam and Muslims



are viewed by the British public deciding to appease. This is a postcolonial construct and complies with a notion of being 'colonised' within one's own country and further supports the argument that Muslims are 'othered'. Arikarikam's decision suggests he may be lacking in knowledge of Islam but bases his decision on his knowledge of how Muslims are 'othered' in Britain. He may not like having to choose to hide his identity and may be 'wounded' in his Muslim identity but chooses to 'play the game' and not "upset" his host or "antagonise" the "native community" (lines 136-155), which are options available to the 'colonised' to survive colonialism. He may also be suspending his "hermeneutical responsibilities" (Medina, 2013, p. 90) as a "resistant experience(s)" or "epistemic friction" (*ibid*, p. 7) to challenge conditions of Islamophobia.

El-Fino and Carlito opt to "Pass" (lines 462-463). Abdullah responds to Arikarikam by countering what he has said about 'hiding one's Muslim identity by saying: "I just think er both non-Muslims and Muslims have a duty to kind of learn about their own faith and about other faiths as well and to kind of be confident to explain and to express themselves freely without feeling intimidated and that is the only way you will get rid of stereotypes and negative misconceptions" (lines 464-467).

Abdullah clearly disagrees with the stance taken by Arikarikam by saying "Muslims have a duty" (line 464) and "to kind of be confident to explain and express themselves freely without feeling intimidated" (lines 465-466). By arguing non-Muslims and Muslims "have a duty to kind of learn about their own faith and about other faiths" (lines 464-465), Abdullah is intimating that Arikarikam does not have enough Islamic knowledge to recognise that he has a 'duty' as a Muslim to be

confident to express himself freely and is the only way to "get rid of stereotypes and negative misconceptions" (lines 466-467). Abdullah recognises there is an injustice committed by Muslims hiding their identity. The duty to learn about others is recognised by Fricker (2007) and Medina (2013) as ways to counter epistemic injustice by becoming a "virtuous hearer" (Fricker, 2007, p. 170) as a way to engender hermeneutical justice for Muslims.

Abdullah B agrees with Abdullah: "Both Muslims and non-Muslims should feel less intimidated to have open discussions about these issues because without dialogue we are going to stay ignorant" (lines 468-469).

Abdullah B has recognised that non-Muslims are affected by negative reporting of Islam and Muslims and is keen that Muslims should be allowed to present themselves in "open discussions" (line 468-469) so that non-Muslims have knowledge of them. He disagrees with Arikarikam who has echoed the view of their parents' generation as being outside of society and occupying a position of a subjugated Muslim. He is aware that this may bring him into confrontation with non-Muslims in openly displaying his Muslim identity but is clear that both Muslims and non-Muslims will "stay ignorant" (line 469) without dialogue to counter incorrect and misleading knowledge of them by the media. It may also be that Abdullah B is making reference to the CoE itself as a forum which highlighted the importance of knowledge for Muslims and non-Muslims to try to reduce the 'othering' of Muslims in Britain by being a "virtuous hearer" (Fricker, 2007, p. 170) and produce a "kaleidoscopic social sensibility" (Medina, 2013, p. 306).

Sandman: "Pretty much just to not take media portrayal of certain activities like as the last word basically what Mohammed said to educate ourselves" (lines 470-471).

Sandman summarises what he believes are the salient points made during the enquiry: the media misrepresentation of Islam and Muslims, and the need to have the right knowledge. I believe he is referring to Muslims in his answer, as he clarified his answer with "Mohammed said to educate ourselves" (line 471) aligning Sandman with his fellow respondents who propose having knowledge of Islam is vital for Muslim identity and forwarding a counter-argument to media misrepresentation. This position contrasts the Muslim men from their parents' generation who were described as being "very traditional in their views" (lines 154-155), "not as religious" (line 203) "and are having children who know nothing whatsoever about their religion" (lines 204-205). The young men who have a knowledge of Islam know the Prophet Mohammed encouraged Muslims to educate themselves, used by Sandman: "educate ourselves" (line 471) as justification for what was previously said about Muslims having knowledge about Islam. In using a quote from the 'Hadith', Sandman has intimated that Muslims without such knowledge may not be in the truest sense, Muslims. This position concurs with what Bongo said earlier about Islam having existed for many years and that the attack on it is a socially relevant concept of a post 9/11 world-view (lines 79-88) and that Muslims have battled with a lack of or corruption of Islamic knowledge for years. Positioning Muslims in a socially situated context (Medina, 2013) along with the corruption and control of knowledge aligns with the concept

of hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007) and how Muslims seek to counter how knowledge of them is controlled.

Mr Fish continued the theme of knowledge saying:

Instead of using the media, use books like, our books as the translation as a way of our God, even if you are not Muslim, maybe as the person. Islamic studies probably the prophet, everything is well rounded even like dealing with non-Muslims, even like if you could study like that it would be probably [be] like a book it's that big (laughs)" (lines 472-475).

Mr Fish believes that instead of learning about Islam from the media, Muslims and non-Muslims should read English translated texts of Islam and Muslims. Mr Fish is aware knowledge of Islam and Muslims may be corrupted and that the only true sources stem from Islamic texts. Mr Fish's response, although brief, has summarised the key issues discussed throughout the CoE which was the need for a 'true' knowledge of Islam and Muslims. Mr Fish's summary not only extends to non-Muslims as a way of understanding Muslims but also for Muslims in their dealings with non-Muslims. This suggest that Mr Fish recognises a 'true' knowledge of Islam may challenge Islamophobia: "everything is well rounded even like dealing with non-Muslims" (line474) and that realising the "virtuous hearer" (Fricker, 2007, p. 170) and having "kaleidoscopic sensibilities" (Medina, 2013, p. 306) would lessen the effects of Islamophobia.

Bongo returns to the theme of being allowed to practice one's religion as defined by Article 18 in the United Nations (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948) and human rights, (*Human Rights Act 1998*) and that the media should not be targeting them:

I think we live in the world of humanity and human rights. I think Muslims should be left to practice their own religion as long as it is according to human rights and right now we have the United Nations and I think this is because we almost have over two billion people so things like media and all this stuff should not come into it ... targeting Muslims rather than improving their condition and respecting that they are part of this world, they are part of this planet so we, as humanity, should strive to let Muslims be valued and represented fairly not in a good way but in the reality so it depends what is their real focus, is it good or bad that's for people to decide (lines 476-482).

As a Muslim, Bongo has decided to step outside his identity as a Muslim to consider his response within the context of human rights. He is aware of Human Rights legislation conferring a right to practice religion and knows that the media misrepresent and influence the public's view of Islam and Muslims. Bongo suggests an alternative approach in allowing Muslims to be judged within contexts that free them from media bias to being allowed to practice their religion without having to hide their Muslim identity. Muslims may then be judged not negatively or positively but that it "depends what is their real focus, is it good or bad? That's for people to decide" (lines 482). Bongo has situated the actions of Muslims within human rights legislation where they may be judged individually on their actions and not by stereotyping the Muslim community on the actions of a few. This may be a suggestion by Bongo for Muslims to take responsibility for their individual actions and not misinterpret Islamic texts to justify themselves. Furthermore it may be a proposition for non-Muslims to judge Muslims as individuals and not as 'Muslims' who may or may not justify their actions by their interpretation of Islam. Bongo has metaphorically positioned Muslims within a human rights court of law where they are judged free from bias. Bongo's deference for a human rights paradigm calls for an ethical consideration when reporting Islam and Muslims. Although Bongo agrees with his fellow respondents over media misrepresentation

he differs from the other respondents, some of who were critical of how security legislation in Britain marginalises Muslims. This may be the case as he usually lives in Tanzania and does not have the lived experiences of his fellow Muslims. As a consequence of Bongo aligning himself within a human rights context and re-framing his narrative I considered how an epistemic injustice approach has moved the narrative from an Islamophobic narrative, informed by a colonising of the Muslim mind, to one where injustice may be seen more clearly, and resistance or epistemic friction succeed, free from oppressive legislative control.

#### **6.4. Conclusion**

##### *Step 10: Review of Enquiry*

This part of the enquiry affords all participants the opportunity to summarise key points or to identify further areas for future enquiry.

Abdullah B: I come from a social science background... so this kind of stuff I do kind of enjoy it (lines 499-500).

Arikarikam: It's a very nice way of getting more information out a very nice way, in a nice informal, relaxed manner (lines 504-505).

Bongo: I think what would make it more like better for these discussions if we could have also non-Muslims as well to inside...us because also it would be a challenge also to us like how we are going to speak out and how are they going to speak out and how will this information going to match. You then see then, from their view you get the picture how society is (lines 511-514).

Bongo suggests using a CoE approach with Muslims and non-Muslims as a way of gauging and debating concerns that both groups may have about each other.

Abdullah B responds to Bongo saying:

That would be good research in itself (laughs), having non-Muslims and Muslims having a frank discussion. Sometimes the non-Muslims they might feel like they don't want to be offending us, but the one thing about British society, British people, I'm British myself, we're quite you know, we don't like to...how would you say...intrude into someone else's space...sometimes we've got things we want to say but we keep it all in because so to get an opportunity where we can have a frank discussion where they don't feel intimidated. If they want to talk about it, you know ...if they want to say 'yes from what I have been hearing about Muslims this and that', I want to hear them say it (lines 515-522).

Abdullah B is echoing Bongo's wish for non-Muslims to have the right knowledge of Islam and Muslims, recognising a reticence for some non-Muslims who may be intimidated to engage in a 'frank discussion'. Abdullah is on the one hand praising 'Britishness', reinforcing his 'Britishness', "the one thing about British society, British people I'm British myself we're quite" (lines 517-518) suggesting perhaps the reason they don't have the right knowledge of Islam and Muslims is that they are too polite to ask. He continues by saying a CoE would be good place for non-Muslims to be able to ask questions about what they have heard from the media about Islam and Muslims. Abdullah uses the phrase "where we can have a frank discussion where they don't feel intimidated" (line 520) as a way of perhaps excusing non-Muslim Britons of being Islamophobic. The term 'frank discussion' itself, I would argue, confirms Abdullah B's Britishness in wanting to create a comfortable environment where Muslims can speak to Non-Muslims in a respectful environment. His final comment, "I want to hear them say it" (line 522), is a challenge to the influence of the media on non-Muslims living in Wales and he is

knowledgeable enough to challenge any misinformation that non-Muslims may have about Muslims. His continual reference to 'Britishness' reinforces his identity as a British Muslim and his right to belong in Britain and not be portrayed as a 'foreigner' with a foreign religion, or as argued 'colonised' in his own country. He recognises that as long as his citizenship in Britain is in doubt, he will be treated as the 'other'. Abdullah B is vocalising his ideal by wanting to recreate the respectful environment of a CoE in a Britain where British people talk about Islam and Muslims in conditions of 'fair play' where corrupted knowledge by the media may be challenged. Abdullah B wants an ethical society which encompasses the "virtuous hearer" (Fricker, 2007, p. 170) and "responsible agency" (Medina, 2013, p. 121) and where the 'othering' of Muslims is lessened, improving the lives of Muslims. Step 10, the review of the enquiry is included within the conclusion to prioritise the final comments of the young Muslims to be able to articulate their concerns and have their voices heard by the wider non-Muslim public. They recognise that a CoE was a respectful forum for debate and want others to be a part of it so they will better understand Muslim concerns.

The young Muslim men recognised their identities and citizenship as Muslims living in Britain was being manipulated by sections of the media making them appear and feel different by portraying them as potential terrorists. They also recognised the need for correct or true knowledge of Islam and the difficulties young Muslims have accessing knowledge. Muslims want non-Muslims to know about them but their voices are manipulated by the media. They also want to be able to lawfully protest in public about concerns they may have but are fearful of arrest and prosecution.



Conditions of postcolonialism constructed and existing in the social imaginations of the wider non-Muslim public means Muslim voices will not be heard. Other than Abdullah (lines 240-261) the respondents did not refer to 'Islamophobia' (line 261), instead choosing to articulate their lived experiences in terms of being made to feel different, questioning their 'Britishness' and their ability to celebrate their 'Muslimness' weakened. Their inability to recognise Islamophobia is a concern I address further in this thesis.

In Chapter 8, I bring together both sets of data analysis from the Muslim men and the Muslim women and using my theoretical positioning articulate a framework to argue their voices can better be heard by the wider non-Muslim public. In Chapter 7, I go on to analyse the data from a CoE with a group of young Muslim women. I use Steps one to ten of the enquiry process used in this chapter to examine the data and focus on epistemic injustice as an analytic tool. The *loci* of power that seeks to influence my respondents as young Muslim women is examined. These include the Prevent strategy, Fundamental British Values (FBV's), and the media. The area of visible Muslim identity is also an important area for analysis. I now turn to Chapter 7, an analysis of a community of enquiry with the Muslim women.

## **7. CHAPTER 7: DATA ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNITY OF ENQUIRY CONDUCTED WITH THE COHORT OF MUSLIM WOMEN**

### **7.1. Introduction**

In this chapter I present the transcript of the Community of Enquiry carried out with 15 Muslim women. Line numbering refers to the original transcript (Appendix 1). My analysis of the transcript is woven through the chapter as the question for enquiry is identified and explored by participants. Five key and related ideas are explored during the enquiry:

- being made to feel different;
- media stereotyping of Muslim women as being oppressed;
- media obsession with the Hijab;
- media influence on non-Muslim's knowledge of Muslims and Islam;
- the lack of knowledge of non-Muslims of Islam.

Thinking with the ideas identified in Chapters 2 and 3, I identify postcolonialism and securitisation as underpinning concepts that informed the enquiry. Drawing on the ideas of Miranda Fricker (2007) and Jose Medina (2013) I identify Islamophobia as a lacuna that impacts on Muslim ability to speak out, creating epistemic relations and practices which cause both Muslim and non-Muslim to be wronged as epistemic subjects. I identify discriminatory epistemic injustice that includes identity prejudice, credibility deficit, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice as important concepts that are used to analyse the discourse of the respondents and to shed light on how Muslims living in Wales are wronged as epistemic subjects. I begin by providing brief pen-pictures of the respondents before presenting the transcript of the Community of Enquiry which I have

subjected to critical analysis using the key concepts of Islamophobia and discriminatory epistemic injustice.

## **7.2. Brief Pen Pictures of the Respondents**

The fifteen Muslim women who took part in the Community of Enquiry came from a range of social backgrounds. Some lived in Wales and were studying at a local university; others were foreign students also at university and the remaining women in employment. A few of the women knew each other and the rest were introduced for the first time. The women at university used the on-campus Mosque while the others had either attended Mosques in France, Oman or their local Mosque in South Wales. The brief pen pictures that follow are limited in description to preserve anonymity:

- Kiran: in her late teens and is studying full-time at university. She does not wear the Hijab or a headscarf. She is Sudanese.
- Katrina: in her mid 20s is a full-time student at a local university. She lives locally but was born in Somalia. She wears a headscarf.
- Lala: in her late 20s and is in full-time employment. She wears a head-scarf.
- Shimb: in her late teens and is studying at a local college. She does not wear the Hijab or headscarf.
- Leah: in her early 20s and studies at a local university. She wears the Hijab but not face covering.
- Irah: Is in her early 20s and is studying full time at a local university. She wears the Hijab and headscarf but not face covering.
- Aya: in her late teens and is studying full-time at a Welsh university. She lives in Oman. She wears a headscarf.
- Nessa: Is 13 years of age and is a pupil at a local school. She wears a head-scarf.
- Nouf : Is in her early 20s and is a French citizen. She is a full-time student at a Welsh university. She wears a headscarf.
- Naomi: Is 13 years old and is a pupil at a local school. She wears a headscarf.

- Jill: Is in her early 20s, lives locally and is in full-time employment. She does not wear the Hijab nor headscarf.
- Amina: in her mid-20s, lives locally and is a paediatric nurse. She wears the Hijab but not the face covering.
- Sarah: in her early 20s and is in full-time employment. She does not wear the Hijab, headscarf, nor face covering.
- Areej: in her late teens, is studying engineering at a local university and lives in Oman. She wears a headscarf.
- Khadeejah: Is in her 20s, a full-time student at a local university. She wears the Hijab but not face covering.

### **7.3. Introduction to the Community of Enquiry.**

The Community of Enquiry (CoE) took place at a community centre on the 10th December 2011. A research conversation was carried out prior to the CoE and the 10-step process for the CoE followed (see Chapter 5). The process employed in selecting a question is shown here as an example of how both Muslim men and women choose questions for their enquiries.

#### *Step 1: Choosing a stimulus for enquiry.*

A ten-minute video 'Being Me' was selected. The DVD focused on audio/visual face-to-face interviews with young Muslim men and women about their experiences of Islamophobia in South Wales (Mort, 2008). The recording also included 'vox pop' street interviews with members of the public who were asked what Islam and Muslims meant to them.

#### *Step 2: Presentation of the stimulus*

The DVD was shown to the group.

*Step 3: Individual thinking time.*

Participants were asked to take some time to reflect and make notes on what the DVD made them think about.

*Step 4: Forming questions*

The women were separated into five groups and were asked to formulate a question they would be interested in discussing. The questions were offered for enquiry and in Step 5 the groups explained why they had formulated their questions.

**7.3.1. Question 1. Why is it that the first thing that comes to mind to a non-Muslim is 'terrorist'?**

*Step 5: Justifying the choice of questions*

Shim justified their choice of question by saying that whenever Islam or Muslims are discussed by non-Muslims they immediately stereotype that they (Muslims) must be a terrorist or it concerns terrorism. Katrina agreed with Shim adding that it is a common occurrence.

The group believe that Islam and Muslims are both stereotyped in society and are presented as being inextricably connected to terrorism.

*Discussion*

Jill, Katrina and Shimb know that Muslims are stereotyped and refer to non-Muslims as being responsible. They don't mention the role of the media in stereotyping instead suggesting that it is widespread and not confined to any one particular section of society.

### **7.3.2. Question 2. Is the media misrepresenting Islam for their own gain?**

*Step 5: Justifying the choice of questions*

Lala spoke on behalf of her group saying that the media are strong and that they manipulate how Muslims are represented by linking them to acts of terrorism, for example, 9/11.

*Discussion*

Lala knows the media are responsible for spreading misinformation about Islam and Muslims and that this impacts on Muslims being 'othered'. She recognises that Muslims are misrepresented for financial gain by the media and that they make informed decisions to deliberately report them as a suspect community.

### **7.3.3. Question 3. Should Muslims integrate into the wider community? Is it a priority to educate people about Islam?**

Amina, Leah and Kiran have suggested two questions for enquiry. The first question suggests that Muslims are not part of the wider community and second question makes an assumption that the wider non-Muslim community are ignorant of Islam. The group infer that it is a priority to educate the wider community to reduce their 'othering'. Amina supports her group's question saying that Muslims have a duty to do more than just go to the Mosque and stay in their houses and they need to go out and educate people about Islam to challenge the negative reporting of Islam and Muslims by the media. Amina suggests the media are ignorant of Islam (having never picked up a Quran) which she believes is reflected in their reporting.

### *Discussion*

The first question suggests that the group believe that Muslims in Britain live separate lives from the wider non-Muslim community. The second question appears to inform the first one by providing an answer in that it is a priority to educate non-Muslims about Islam and that it may be a lack of knowledge by non-Muslims that contributes to Muslims wanting to live apart from them. The above questions appear to signpost a situation in Britain where Muslims are limited in their choices other than to live parallel or separate lives due to a lack of knowledge about them resulting in Muslims being 'othered' by non-Muslims. The women recognise the media contribute to this and see it as their duty to challenge misconceptions of Muslims.

#### **7.3.4. Question 4. Should Muslim women continue to speak out?**

Step 5: Areej spoke on behalf of her group saying that as Muslim women are a more visible representation of Islam, they need to get out there and challenge what media say. Areej made reference to Question 3 which she said was similar to her group's question.

### *Discussion*

Areej makes an assumption that Muslim women *are* speaking out. She continues saying that as Muslim women are instantly identifiable as Muslim they are in a position to go out and have face-to-face conversations with non-Muslims to educate them about Islam. Areej recognises the need for this to occur, but in asking the question 'should Muslim women continue to speak out?' infers that perhaps Muslim men are not speaking out. She believes that in being visibly

Muslim and arguably subjected to more abuse than Muslim men, women are best placed to challenge incidents of 'othering'.

### **7.3.5. Question 5. Should Islam be taught at primary school level?**

Aya, Khadeejah and Sarah justified their choice of question saying they initially wanted to include secondary schools in their question but thought that it would not be practicable. Sarah recalled how her fellow primary school pupils questioned why she had different skin colour. She concluded, saying that there is need to educate people about Islam.

#### *Discussion*

The group recognise that non-Muslims do not have a knowledge of Islam and are exposed to misinformation about Muslims. They believe knowledge of Islam should be taught in primary schools so that non-Muslims have correct knowledge to challenge dominantly held views that Islam and Muslims have an association with terrorism. Sarah mentions a lack of diversity awareness while at primary school supporting her group's question to educate young people about Islam. Sarah continues saying their choice of question made her think about racism and that by tackling it in school, 'kids' do not grow up racist and would be able to educate their parents. She says that she feels Muslims no longer mix with non-Muslims and that people's perception of Muslims is still mostly negative. Sarah concluded by saying that 'we come here and learn and educate ourselves but they (non-Muslims) don't feel the need to do the same.'



### *Summary*

The concepts identified from the five questions put forward by the Muslim women include the following:

1. Muslims are negatively stereotyped by the media who present them as being a suspect community linked to acts of terrorism.
2. Muslims feel rejected and isolated from wider society having to live parallel lives.
3. Education of non-Muslims about Islam and Muslims is vital to lessen the effects of Islamophobia.
4. They (Muslim women), being visibly identifiable as Muslim, are best placed to challenge stereotypes and to counter Islamophobia and should continue to do so.

### *Step 6: Voting*

A 'blind' vote was carried out to choose one question to explore further during the COE. The question chosen was No. 4: 'Is the media misrepresenting Islam for their own gain'?

### *Discussion*

The choice of question reflects that the Muslim women have recognised the media deliberately misrepresent and stereotype them for gain. Muslims are presented as a suspect community who have an association with terrorism. The question chosen assumes the media misrepresents Islam and Muslims. However, 'for their own gain' may suggest a deliberate act of misrepresentation for reasons other than selling newspapers for financial gain which is not yet clear. The effects of being misrepresented are articulated by the women as being made to feel different by being securitised and their sense of belonging in Britain questioned. I interpret

these conditions as postcolonial constructs with elements of 'othering' being realised and sustained by widespread Islamophobia which forces Muslims and non-Muslims to live apart and experience parallel lives. Their wish to challenging instances of Islamophobia face-to-face is discussed and that they as women are best placed to do so. In Chapter 3, I argued how the Prevent strategy securitised British Muslims and how Fundamental British Values (FBVs) 'othered' Muslims within British society. The British media capitalise in sensationally presenting Islam and Muslims as suspect in society and align with instruments of power, making a challenge to them misrepresenting Islam and Muslims difficult. Similarly, colonising Muslims in Britain has allowed Islamophobia to flourish in the social imaginations of the public, normalising and legitimising Islamophobia. Control of knowledge of marginalised communities supports the argument of colonisation facilitating epistemic injustices (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013).

#### *Step 7: The Enquiry: First Thoughts*

Respondents sit in a circle facing each other and the group whose question was chosen is invited to begin the enquiry. Nouf was the first to respond to the question:

We were just saying that about the media they always spoke of the bad behaviour of Muslims like we always hear about Muslim did this and that, but they never spoke about what we do right (lines 5-7).

Nouf knows the media selectively report Islam and Muslims negatively. The structure of this type of reporting confirms the wider non-Muslim public discourses in which Islamophobia has become normalised (Petley and Richardson, 2011; Fekete, 2009; Morey and Yaqin, 2011) and rarely challenged. Nouf provides

examples taken from the media in France who failed to report a week of Muslim celebration, instead showing Muslims protesting: "they showed like the bad celebrations they didn't show how we celebrate, how we fast, how we share, how we are happy this day" (lines 11-12). Nouf continued: "there is a girl who, um, wanted to stand up against the high rate of rape in Egypt...and she took a picture of herself naked and put it on her blog, they showed these just to sell headlines" (lines 13-15).

The French media have manipulated knowledge of Islam and Muslims informing public opinion and allowing its readers to have an "unduly deflated credibility judgment" of Muslims (Fricker, 2007, p. 22). Nouf is subjected to Islamophobia and hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007), being wronged in her membership of a marginalised community.<sup>12</sup> Nouf gives an example of a young Egyptian woman who used her social media blog to highlight the: "high rate of rape in Egypt" (line 14). However, rather than support the blogger, French media distribute naked photographs as an act of sensationalism to sell newspapers.

Nouf is mistaken in thinking the media would publicise the blogger's aim as an act of beneficence however, she illustrates that sections of the media will misrepresent Islam and Muslims for commercial gain.

The Egyptian blogger has been subjected to hermeneutical injustice having been wronged by the media by them using images for commercial gain and not for the

---

<sup>12</sup>French Muslims are generally aware of the colonisation of Algeria by France in 1830 which, although does not form part of this research, nevertheless is an important component in the construction of French Muslim identity and postcolonial conditions. See Chapter 4.

original intentions of the blogger which was to highlight high levels of rape against women in Egypt. The blogger is a victim of testimonial injustice and in considering that she is part of a marginalised group of 'othered' women in Egypt, also hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007). Nouf also articulates how the blogger is trying to create an epistemic resistance (Medina, 2013, p. 16) or epistemic friction (*ibid*, p. 48) by attempting to redefine Muslim body image misrepresented by the French media. The blogger's attempt at creating a "beneficial epistemic friction" (Medina, 2013, p.50) has been seized by the French media and represented as a "detrimental epistemic friction, censoring, silencing, and inhibiting the formation of beliefs" (*ibid*). Nouf has responded to the question whether the media misrepresent Islam for their own gain citing evidence of how sections of the French media objectify Muslim women, which is indicative of conditions of postcolonialism existing for them.

#### *Step 8: Middle words*

Lala responded to Nouf by continuing the theme of role models:

...when somebody in the media, it could be anyone, they may not even be practicing Muslim, so they just use religion saying "this was the man who killed another man" whereas in the world there are so many crimes happening, but they never say "this atheist has killed another man", there's loads of different religions, Buddhist, they never use religion with anyone else in the world in a crime, but when a Muslim does something, they might not even be practicing, they might have been born in it, they always say "the Muslim has done something" (lines 20-26).

Lala has recognised that the media deliberately report negative stories about Islam and Muslims highlighting that Islam is a bad religion, but fail to mention religious persuasions of non-Muslims who do bad things. This presents Muslims as being

different, 'othering' them as deviant thus contributing to 'colonising' the Muslim community in Britain (and elsewhere). This exacerbates Islamophobia and hate crimes toward Muslims demonising religious and cultural differences between Muslim and non-Muslim which is the antithesis of a multicultural society. Amina agrees with Lala:

I think the word terrorism is simply giving a label to Muslim people it's become a label to us, the word 'terrorism' and I think the media uses that regular as a regular base, you know? and, I think they all use it with other religions to people who commit something bad. I think they need to understand that there are good people and there are bad people, you know whatever religion you follow because, at the end of the day, not everybody is perfect it's their personal problem that's made them do something bad so we shouldn't be labelled like that at all. They should be labelled for who they are and not for what they follow (lines 27-34).

Amina thus continues the theme of the media linking Muslims to acts of terrorism reiterating Lala's response emphasising how media control information, selectively and negatively reporting on Islam and Muslims. Amina is aware of the injustices caused to Muslims which contributes to Islamophobia and a 'colonising' of Muslims to continue. Amina believes that misrepresenting Muslims as being terrorists is the media's default position in reporting Islam and Muslims. The media have adopted an "epistemic authority" as their "default status" as competent subjects (Medina, 2013, p. 130). Medina argues that the "default status" (*ibid*) is not lost until there is evidence to call it into question. I argue until Muslim voices are heard, the default position of 'normalising' Islamophobia will endure. Katrina agreed with Amina saying:

...it was actually quite interesting, I watched TV you know, the whole 9/11 ten-year anniversary came along, the programmes on TV and one of them was about the fire-fighters, how they can portray you, then you have the fire-fighters who were there on 9/11 trying to save lives and everything, they were seen as heroes, the media created them as

heroes, and what happened was that a couple of months after 9/11 happened they started reporting in the media, stuff about their private lives. Some of the fire-fighters, they were going to clubs, they were getting arrested, getting drunk and the media basically was portraying them as 'look at these heroes they are now drunk in clubs' and getting arrested and it was kind of, like, wait a minute, a couple of months ago they were heroes and you are now portraying them as something bad and I see the same happening 'cos basically it's what sells headlines (lines 35-46).

Katrina has given an example of how the media exploit vulnerabilities to sell newspapers or promote content. However, the New York fire-fighters she describes (who are more likely to be suffering from post traumatic stress disorder) are not a marginalised community in ways argued in this research and do not therefore suffer testimonial or hermeneutical injustices (Fricker, 2007). Katrina continues:

...they [the media] show Muslims in a weird kind of, it's not really the right representation and they always speak the words that are not really good you know, up there [points to her head]...that's how I see it...why not go to the Mosque and ask people. Like when they write about Muslim women, Muslim women are oppressed, Muslim women can't this, go and ask the Muslim woman. That's why I enjoy what you guys did today because you're actually asking us, we are the Muslim women, we live through it every day so don't just write about us, ask us instead of asking the men (lines 49-56).

Katrina has made an assumption that the media lack knowledge of Islam and Muslims and therefore reporting of them is inaccurate and negatively biased. Katrina supports her assumption by referring how the media report Muslim women as oppressed, suggesting they speak to Muslim women to have the correct information. Katrina, is mistaken in thinking the media are ignorant of Islam and Muslims, and similarly Nouf and Amina who argue the media are not interested in facts over sensational reporting, for example, vulnerable post 9/11 fire-fighters. I argue that (for Islam and Muslims) postcolonial conditions already exist where

knowledge of them is concealed in a form of ignorance where anti-Muslim narratives may be accommodated. The concept of ignorance is a continuing theme shown in the narratives of the Muslim women and is worthy of analysis through an epistemic injustice lens as "active ignorance" (Medina, 2013, p. 51), "epistemic arrogance" (Medina, 2013, p. 31) and a range of potential ignorance's (see Peels and Blaauw, 2016). I now return to the analysis of Katrina's response (lines 49-56).

Katrina recognises Muslims are misrepresented and prey to hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007, p. 6). She wants the media to have knowledge about Islam and Muslims, believing they are ignorant. I argue Katrina is hampered by a false consciousness protecting the ideology of Islamophobia from being identified and challenged. The stories reported on Islam and Muslims prevent the wider public from considering their "epistemic obligations to know others" (Medina, 2013, p. 155) and being able to move to "epistemic responsibility" (*ibid*, p. 119) where they may reduce or eliminate perceived differences between Muslims and non-Muslims. In isolating Muslims, the media protect their privilege or "epistemic authority" (Medina, 2013, p. 130) which is "itself an instrument of oppression" (Medina, 2013, p. 155).

Katrina has introduced the concept of Muslim identity, picked up by Nouf who tells of her lived experiences in France as a young Muslim woman:

In school it is not allowed to wear the scarf so when we go to school we have to take it off and when you come out of school you can put it on, but now they forbid women to wear the Niqab, everywhere and also the Mums who want to go out with their children for a day out in school, they are not allowed to come if they wear the scarf and now they are

trying to...of course in France we have a lot of private nurseries, we don't have a lot of public, so they are funded by private people ... who don't want the teacher to wear a scarf...so this is what's going on in France, so everyday there is a new problem (lines 62-71).

Nouf tells us about the lived experiences of Muslim women in France post-2011 where the ban of wearing a Niqab (a Veil covering the face) by Muslim women in public places was legislated (Weaver, 2018) by the French government who were first in Europe to enact law. Some commentators claim it was a political move by the then President Sarkozy to win far-right votes, while others claim it was a move to free Muslim women from oppression, citing the National motto of France, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, and a "threat to the integrity of the Republic (Younge, 2010, p. 177) in support of the ban (Chrisafis, 2011; Weaver, 2018). However, for Nouf the ban had implications not just for the restricted agency of Muslim women in Muslim identity, but for mothers of some Muslim children who have to remove the face covering while taking their child to school and while accompanying their children on school trips. Some women may choose not to go to public spaces fearing prosecution or forego part of their identity as Muslim. I argue it to be an infringement of their right to practice their religion under article 18 (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 948), and an 'objectification' and 'colonisation' of Muslim women by legislative control. The decision to ban the face covering is also an epistemic injustice committed against Muslim women by invoking negative identity prejudice, which Fricker (2007, p. 34) says is, "the most morally problematic kind of prejudice...behind which there lies one or more ethically noxious motivations, such as racial hatred or contempt".



Restricting Muslim identity is an attack on multiculturalism and an attempt to 'colonise' Muslims by legislation. Medina (2013, p. 96) argues that due to "hermeneutical insensitivities", "people's credibility can get undermined" restricting Muslim agency in having a voice to argue their case for wearing the hijab. "Socially cultivated hermeneutical insensitivities" (Medina, 2013, p. 97) allows hermeneutical gaps to be formed in the social imagination of the non-Muslim public preventing them from understanding Muslim cultural and religious needs.

Katrina responds to Nouf by asking: "Is it true also that they are also trying to, is it ban Muslim women from wearing the maxi-dress in France?" (lines 72-73).

Nouf responds saying that the maxi-dress is not banned in France but that she had faced pressure while at school from her teachers:

...when you try to act invisible when you wear a maxi-skirt or dresses you always have problems, like I had a lot of problems in school when I was wearing skirts like teachers were saying to me 'don't you know you are a pretty girl, you should show your legs and all this, so they are trying to make you feel that you're not normal, you have to act as like the other 'cos they are people as they are normal (lines 75-79).

Considering the comments of her (male) teacher as being sexist and unprofessional aside, Nouf has been 'colonised' as a French Muslim by her teacher(s), being made to feel different from the rest of her peers. Her Muslim identity is challenged and she is subjected to negative "identity prejudice", "systematic testimonial injustice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 35) and "hermeneutical injustice" (*ibid*, p. 6). Nouf's identity as a Muslim woman to "try and act invisible" (line75) is an important part of her Muslim identity in not only sustaining modesty

in her appearance but also modesty in how she chooses to live her life as a Muslim.

Katrina responds to Nouf saying that although she disagreed with the ban on face-covering in France, she could understand why they chose to ban it due to needing to see faces, but could not understand why Nouf's teacher(s) "want to see your skin (line 83) ...you can't wear skirts tomorrow the day after that you can't wear colour in public, where does this stop?" (lines 84-85).

Katrina may be intimating that Nouf's teacher is enacting a "white gaze" with Nouf (Medina, 2013, p. 188) while he is "blind to the social relationality" (Medina, 2013, p. 189) in failing to recognise how his own "life, culture, and history are bound up with that of others" (*ibid*). Katrina continued the theme of Muslim women's identity:

I believe that we have a certain responsibility when we wear the Hijab, the scarf. I remember someone saying to me 'whether we like it or not if you wear the scarf, once you have identified yourself as a Muslim, whether you wear the scarf or not you are an ambassador for the religion so whatever you do', so if you walk on the street, loud, rude, insulting people, people might look at you and say 'wait, is that what religion is about?', to try and make me feel inferior, people might believe that, so I do think that we ... that we should take some responsibility, but I understand the girls as well [*indicating to her fellow respondents on her right hand side*] just because we wear the scarf and some people don't, it doesn't mean that the Muslims that do wear a scarf are more religious um 'cos that's just, I feel my religion and my faith is not wrapped around the scarf, it is something deeper. It's probably part of it but it's not like if you don't wear a scarf you are less religious than someone who wears the scarf, communities where people make you feel that way, and yea, it's not right (lines 89-101).

Katrina has extended the theme of Muslim women's identity and the importance of being a role model for Islam initiated earlier by Nouf and continued by Lala.

Katrina does not wear the Hijab but chooses to wear a headscarf. She

acknowledges some respondents wear the Hijab and others wear headscarves in their Muslim identity. Katrina argues that her Muslim identity is not "wrapped around the scarf" (line 98) progressing a counter-argument to Muslims who claim they are defined by what they wear and furthermore, the Niqab (face covering) is a signifier of oppression. Katrina challenges French authorities, undermining attempts to objectify and colonise Muslim women living in France by redefining Muslim identity. Katrina extends a redefining of Muslim identity to encompass Muslims in her own community who may wish to judge her on her degree of 'Muslimness' as a consequence of what she wears: "communities where people make you feel that way, and yeah, it's not right" (lines 100-101). Katrina knows Muslim communities (made up of different cultures and clan loyalties) 'police' Muslims, judging them on a sliding scale of 'Muslimness' depending what they do, say and wear.

It may be that the French authorities underpin their justification in 'colonising' Muslim women by relying on "a socially situated theory" (Fricker, 2007, p. 71) implying Islam and Muslims are associated with terrorism and that Muslim faces need to be seen in public. A negative credibility judgement (*ibid*) is made easier for authorities in Islamophobia being unchecked and sustained by a hostile press. What is not clear is whether 'colonising' Muslim women is as a result of negative identity prejudice or attacks on Islam. Nouf extends Katrina's argument by continuing the theme of Muslim identity:

I find it strange how, as you say, the woman who wears the scarf, but still there is a lot of misunderstanding of it like I think that people who doesn't know about scarf say "oh is it your parents who forced you to wear it"? or, is it "are you a prisoner of your scarf, is it not your will or discretion"? I find it really strange because the scarf is something now, I

think it must be something normal now in our society that Muslim is now, Islam is now the first religion of the world, one month, two months ago [*turning her head to her left to acknowledge this claim*] yeah so a lot of Muslims to wear it is really important that nobody knows about it, they always think it is not a personal choice and I find this opinion very, very strange (lines 102-109).

France has an increasingly Muslim population of about 8.8% (Pew Research Centre, 2016). It is difficult to accurately gauge the exact number of Muslims living in France as laws prohibit the French republic to conduct a census that encompasses elements of race or religious belief, however, independent surveys carried out produce useful approximation. For England and Wales the Muslim population in 2011 was approximately 4.8%. With a decline in traditional Christian religious belief and an increase in French Muslims since 2010 due to migration of Muslims into Europe, the projected Muslim population in Europe is set to increase by 2050 to 14% of the population (Pew Research Centre, 2016).

Nouf says although Islam has rapidly grown in France, there is little knowledge of the significance of the headscarf as being part of Muslim women's identity. It is possible the wider non-Muslim French society view Muslims as having a credibility deficit simply because they are Muslim. The examples given by Nouf, "oh is it your parents who forced you to wear it... are you a prisoner of your scarf"? and "is it not your will or discretion"? (lines 104-105) are examples of "negative identity prejudice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 34) as a consequence of 'normalising' Islamophobia, and that the, "stereotype embodies an *unreliable* empirical generalization about the social group in question" (*ibid*, p. 32). As a member of a marginalised group living in France, Nouf recognises she is 'othered' by wider French society and is subjected to "hermeneutical injustice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 6). Furthermore, as visibly

Muslim Nouf is ready to challenge Islamophobia (as suggested in question four by Lima, Areej and Nessa: "should Muslim women continue to speak out"?). Her positive Muslim identity strengthens the argument put forward by Lala, (line 20), and Katrina (line 89), regarding Muslim women being role-models and ambassadors (line 92) for Islam. I consider that their need to challenge being 'objectified' and 'othered' are examples of "epistemic friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 16) considered as a "duty" by the women (Amina in response to question 3) who want to challenge "active ignorance" (Medina, 2013, pp. 27-40) by having "epistemic resistances" (*ibid*, p. 29).

Fricker (2007, p. 27) recognises that particular groups or peoples are systematically subjected to "tracker prejudice" in a way that follows a group or person. I argue Muslim women are subjected to tracker prejudice as a consequence of an "epistemic irresponsibility" (Medina, 2013, p. 189) from those "blind to differences" (*ibid*, p. 188).

Nouf believes that if she presents a 'true' account of Islam, giving knowledge of why Muslim women wear the hijab (in respect of the Niqab in this instance), her testimony will be believed by non-Muslims. As Muslim Nouf embodies identity that not only hermeneutically marginalises her but her testimony is given lesser credibility than that of a non-Muslim. Her Muslim identity is subsumed in a discourse of negative media reporting and she is 'othered' from French society. Furthermore she is contrasted to an exemplary of French women needing to be 'freed' from her prison clothing, identified as the Hijab by her rescuers: male

legislators. This is a further example of how Muslim women are 'objectified' within postcolonial constructs. Aya provides an example:

A lot of people come on to me and tell me that they actually feel sorry for me, they think I am oppressed. I just want people to stop feeling sorry for me, I'm actually proud and happy and I'm not forced, my Dad didn't force me to wear this (indicating to her headscarf). I'm doing it my way, so there are two types of people, people who feel sorry for us and people who are ignorant, and there are other people who actually *feel* we don't actually have hair (everyone laughs). I have this girl who come up to me and asked me, "so are you sick"? I said "really? [everyone laughs] this is my religion", I just find it like very rude for people to just assume that we are oppressed. We are very happy ladies, I mean it's not that we're forced (lines 111-119).

Aya continues the theme of identity and lived experiences as a Muslim woman in Britain. She argues against those who are ignorant of Islam and those who are rude by assuming she is a victim of Islam. Aya has been hermeneutically marginalised by her interlocutors who assume she is oppressed. They see the Hijab (referred to as a scarf) being a signifier for hiding her identity as a woman and that Islam is culpable for oppressing her reflecting dominant discourses that a hegemonic masculine Islam is responsible.

The need to set Muslim women free from oppression is an example argued by Spivak (1988) in her essays on 'widow burning' or Sati when 'identifying' subalterns in need of rescuing from oppression rather than asking of their needs. Spivak's argument focuses on those having power imposing their values on others who are deemed to be oppressed, which is an example of hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007). Aya wants others to know about Muslim women to understand why they choose to wear the Hijab. Aya is 'colonised' and 'othered' by conditions of postcolonialism existing for her as a Muslim woman. This has allowed for a

lacuna or communication intelligibility in the collective hermeneutical resources of non-Muslims preventing them from becoming "virtuous hearers" (Fricker, 2007, p. 169) which may allow an understanding of Muslim women. Postcolonialism ensures that Muslim women (a subjugated community) do not have a platform from where their testimony may be made. Islamophobia prevents them from being able to articulate "epistemic friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 158) and opportunity for non-Muslims to become "virtuous hearers" (Fricker, 2007, p. 169). Medina (2013, p. 158) further argues that "isolated communities" cannot achieve epistemic friction without the "cooperation with others". I argue the wider non-Muslim public (hindered by false consciousness) cannot see Islamophobia as anything other than 'normal'.

Amina responded to Aya saying: "I just wanted to say about the Hijab that it's not just Muslim women who wear headscarves or cover themselves" (line120-121).

Amina gives examples of Jewish and Hindu women cover their heads with headscarves who are not seen and continues: "I can't understand why the media or people you know have this fascination, why they think we are oppressed or we are not happy" (lines124-126).

Amina knows her identity as a Muslim woman 'others' her while Jews and Hindu women are not subjected to the same degree of discrimination as Muslim women. Amina is reiterating the comments from previous women respondents in the CoE who are similarly hermeneutically marginalised from the effects of negative media

reporting, the French legislation against the hijab<sup>13</sup>, the British Government's Prevent strategy, and FBV. The media's reporting of Muslim women as being 'oppressed' is a postcolonial construct, employed to objectify Muslim women creating hostility toward Muslim men who are seen as the protagonists by forcing Muslim women to wear the hijab.

Amina continues:

Why these questions, you know, why not come and try and understand with us rather than putting these questions into you know, the mind and especially again the media. I feel that they use us women to gain money, to gain status, all these newspapers and television and I think I find it so disappointing because us Muslim women we are doing so much for, you know, this country and we are doing so much, you know other places and it's just clothing, it's just material and underneath we are still flesh and blood and, you know, we are doing so much, why can't they see that, why can't they come and ask us, you know. Ask us about our jobs or ask us when we've done something amazing" (lines132-140).

Amina continued to give an example of the Prophet Mohammed's wife Khadija who fought for equal rights for women long before women in Britain had the right to vote (lines 140-145), "so why us"? (line 145).

Amina knows Muslim women in Britain are unjustly targeted by the media which profit from stories about them and she struggles to understand why. She argues Muslim women do so much for the country and is disappointed stories about them focus on clothing and not the person wearing them. Amina wants people to have

---

<sup>13</sup> Although the French legislation was initially discussed by Nouf, it would affect all Muslim women either living or visiting France.



more information about the work of Muslim women suggesting they ask about their jobs and achievements.

Amina is a qualified practicing paediatric nurse encapsulating someone doing "something amazing" (lines 139-140), however she is vilified as Muslim. Wearing the Hijab not only identifies her as Muslim but an oppressed Muslim and representative of negative discourses about Islam and Muslims.

Amina is 'othered' in postcolonial conditions (Spivak, 1988), and injustices as Aya by similarly failing to recognise an ideology of Islamophobia subjecting her to "testimonial injustice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 7) due to "hermeneutical gaps" or lacuna (Medina, 2013, p. 110), unable to create "epistemic friction" (*ibid*, p. 158) to effect change. Kiran makes a useful distinction to Amina saying:

I just want to say that even though the Muslim women do wear the hijab, even though they are covering their heads does not mean they are covering their personality um and I have to admit like I don't wear a scarf, but when I first came to [*name of town*] and I met all these lovely people cos they wore Hijab, I did kind of keep to myself a little bit more, um, you know, I'd never been in an environment where I'm the only one who doesn't wear one, but you know I took the first step and introduced myself to some people and you know, I was pleasantly surprised. It is a very, very open community and um basically don't judge somebody just because they wear Hijab 'cos that, you know, doesn't really it shouldn't change your perception of people (lines 146-154).

Kiran, who studies at a local university is from Sudan, a predominantly Islamic country, and does not wear the Hijab or headscarf at home. On meeting Muslim women students at university she was initially reluctant to join them as most wore the Hijab. She assumed they were a 'closed community' but was "pleasantly surprised" (line 152) and we shouldn't: "judge somebody just because they wear Hijab" (line 153). Nevertheless, this was Kiran's view on seeing Muslim students

who wore the Hijab. Kiran had preconceived ideas about Muslims who wore the Hijab possibly due to Islam being a minority religion in her region of Sudan where only the more conservative Muslim women wear it. This contrasts significantly with Britain where the majority of Muslim women wear the Hijab (Morey and Yaqin, 2011).

Unwittingly, Kiran is responsible for committing hermeneutical injustice to her fellow students in believing they were a closed group. When she met them and found them to be "a very, very open community" and Kiran became a "virtuous hearer" (Fricker, 2007, p. 169) as she then gave the women a greater degree of credibility due to a gap in her collective hermeneutical resources having been filled. I argue that in her contact with Muslim women who wear the Hijab, Kiran will suspend a "credibility judgment" (*ibid*, p. 173) about them which supports Medina's argument that isolated communities need to exert "epistemic resistance" (Medina, 2013, p. 48) between themselves and other communities to recognise their "epistemic responsibilities" (*ibid*, p. 119) to bring about "beneficial epistemic friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 50) to be self-critical and "to compare and contrast one's beliefs" (*ibid*). Medina qualifies this position with a caveat explaining that epistemic resistance can be positive in unmasking prejudices and bias and conversely negative in a "reluctance to learn or a refusal to believe the kind of stubbornness that gets in the way of knowledge" (Medina, 2013, p. 50). Being insensitive to the presence and influence of cognitive forces is a form of "active ignorance" which impedes the achievement of "epistemic virtues" (Medina, 2013, p. 51) and similarly achieving epistemic justice for individuals and social groups. This differs from the deliberate actions of the media where the 'ability to choose'

being sensitive to Muslims positions the media having "epistemic arrogance" (Medina, 2013, p. 31) in their reporting of Islam and Muslims. Medina articulates being open to many different viewpoints as having "a strong notion of contestability" (Medina, 2013, p. 273). I consider how a weakening of multiculturalism has inhibited contestability in Chapter 2, and explore the work of Cattle's interculturalism (Cattle, 2012) as a "radically pluralistic social sensibility that enables us to come together without having to sacrifice our differences" (Medina, 2013, p. 306) as a potential way forward in Chapter 8. Nouf responds to Kiran giving another example from France:

I was in the first year of high school so I was 16. I was reading for German at that time. We had to go swimming in the swimming as part of the ...Curriculum, part of our education and um it is with the class, ... with all the boys and the girls. I didn't want to go because I didn't want to show my body to the boys, so I went to my GP and asked him to write a sick note for me, he is a Jew, he is our GP for four years now. He totally understood this like um, my opinion about it so he did it for me and when I gave it to my sport teacher he didn't believe it because he knows me, he is my neighbour, so he would see me with my scarf everyday like when I want to go to school and he said "are you really allergic to chlorine?", so I said "of course not but what did you want me to say?" and then he didn't get upset or anything, he told me that woman in France in the 60s and the 70s, they fought for their rights, "they fought for *your* rights, they fought for you to be free", and I was like...I was shocked because I told him "so what, don't you think I am not free so because women fought for their rights do you think that I have to go in the district half naked...is this my right...will men respect me if I wear a mini-skirt and a lot of make up, you know...is this freedom for a woman"? And then he said, "no, no, no it's not about this," so I said, "since when I have the right to vote in Western countries, since when women have a right to vote"? ...since the 20th century. For us, this is the beginning and I said "since the law for contraception because before 1971 it was forbidden in France for a woman to abort. Since when does it exist? So if you just look a little bit at my opinion and my religion you will understand that what you are claiming is wrong" and then he said, "OK, I do understand your position" (lines 167-189).

Nouf is asserting her identity as a French Muslim woman who has to negotiate a way of preserving her modesty in harmony with her identity as a Muslim woman.

Her school failed to recognise this and she was compelled to lie about her reason not to go swimming with her classmates. She has been subjected to a "hermeneutical injustice" (Fricker, 2007, pp. 147-175) by laws that fail to recognise her right to practice her religion. Nouf is further 'othered' and objectified as Muslim by a "white gaze" (Medina, 2013, p. 188) further marginalising her by not recognising her needs as a Muslim living in France where conditions of postcolonialism also exist.

During the conversation with her sports teacher (who is aware she is Muslim), Nouf suffers further hermeneutical injustice (*ibid*) in his assumption that she is forced to cover up by wearing the Hijab. He justifies his assumption referring to how French women fought for their rights in the 1960s and 70s. Nouf challenges him with a counter-view of her right not to show her body if she chooses not to, either as a woman or as a Muslim. Nouf argues an historical timeline of women's rights saying how it was only in the 20th century in Western civilisation that women had rights and that: "for us, this is the beginning" (lines 185-186). Nouf has positioned herself as being outside Western culture and in her identity as a Muslim woman by saying that Muslim women have had freedom to be modest since the Prophet Mohammed's wife Khadija fought for Muslim women's rights. Nouf is inferring that Islam has been more respectful to Muslim women than Western society. Following the conversation with her sports teacher who said: "OK, I do understand your position" (line 189) he became a "virtuous hearer" (Fricker, 2007, pp. 170-171) as he adjusted the degree of credibility afforded to Nouf as a Muslim, even though initially he was aware of her religion. He listened to her and moving from a low credibility judgement to a position "revised upwards" (*ibid*, p. 170) he

neutralised his structural identity prejudice (*ibid*, p. 173) affording Nouf hermeneutical justice (*ibid*). Nouf's GP knew she didn't want to show her body in front of her classmates and though aware that what he was doing was wrong, was prepared to lie and say that she had a chlorine allergy to help her in her identity as a young Muslim woman. He was aware of structural identity prejudices in the policies of the French authorities 'othering' Muslim women and was an element in a subversion of policies making him a "virtuous hearer" (Fricker, 2007, p. 169).

Nouf's sports teacher was aware that she was a Muslim and wrongly assumed she was forced to wear the Hijab. He may further assume Muslim women who wear the Hijab are 'oppressed', however, he may also reserve judgement until he has further knowledge or "extra corroborative evidence" (*ibid*, p. 173) before making or suspending a credibility judgement about Muslim women. Furthermore, although he knew Nouf was Muslim, the knowledge he had about Muslim women was wrong. (This research has not extended to French media and acknowledges it cannot assume the sources of misinformation by Nouf's teacher).

In describing her GP, Nouf emphasises that: "he is a Jew, he totally understood this like um my opinion" (lines 173-174). Nouf chose to highlight her Doctor's Jewish identity as relevant in him helping her. On one hand we may consider the Jew and the Muslim to be diametrically opposed to each other, particularly when conflict between Israel and Palestine are important considerations for many. However, Nouf emphasises his religion illustrating that her GP recognised her predicament in going swimming with her classmates and that religion need not be a barrier between people. Nouf knew that her only option to avoid showing her

body in front of her classmates in the long-term was to fake a chlorine allergy. In agreeing to sanction misdiagnoses of Nouf, Nouf and her doctor colluded to protect her modesty as a Muslim woman. Her doctor was a "virtuous hearer" (Fricker, 2007, p. 169) and an "epistemic hero" (Medina, 2013, p. 186) who lived up to his "epistemic responsibilities" (*ibid*) by recognising Nouf's moral trustworthiness (Medina, 2013, p. 76). This allowed a condition of epistemic trust between them resulting in him giving Nouf testimonial justice, even though she would be lying to the French authorities in her reasons for not going swimming. Nouf was marginalised and 'colonised' in France as a consequence of legislation preventing her from fully practicing her religion in school and furthermore, assuming her identity as a Muslim woman. Areej next sought to clarify Nouf's position further:

I just wanted to point out a bit about women in Islam and freedom. Islam has always been encouraging women to go out there, it has never said 'stay home and take care'; it has always been saying 'get out there'. You can see from the role-model; like Khadija [the prophet Mohammed's wife], she was a strong woman. We have so many women who fought in wars like we have Muslim women like these, she fought in a war and they are role-models. From long time ago we've always been having these models but, again, the media, they just target a few little minor stories saying, 'ah woman in prison, home she doesn't do anything, she is locked up.' Well, that's not true because I am not from here, I'm from Oman and if you see like we are more stronger than the men right now, women are getting really empowered. The media doesn't show this and even here like when I came to this country I was impressed by the sisters here and I have been really motivated by my house mates each one of them, we all come from different cultures and I think all these women are leaders, like that this is our generation to rise, yet the media is not showing this (lines 192-205).

Areej continues the theme of role-models by reference to the Prophet Mohammed's wife Khadija, who has been spoken about several times in the CoE. Areej is critical of the media accusing them of focusing on Muslim women being

prisoners in their homes and probably in their identity as Muslim women. It is not clear if she is referring to media reporting in Oman or the media in general terms. Areej believes Muslim women: "are more stronger than the men right now" (line 200) and "women are getting really empowered" (line 201), but that the media do not report this. I suspect Areej believes the media have an agenda in negatively portraying Muslim women distorting the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim public about Muslims. Her comments about Muslim women being "stronger than the men" may be a reference to the media being controlled largely by men or a reference to Muslim men. Areej is a confident, educated woman studying engineering in a predominantly male environment. Her comments may be a reference to her own position as a minority woman in a male environment and as a potential role-model for Muslims.

Areej describes how Muslim women are marginalised by the media who portray them as subjugated and oppressed and that Muslim men are responsible for oppressing them. Areej challenges the dominant media narrative which is responsible for the spread of "negative identity prejudice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 124) against Muslim women. Her comments "I think all these women are leaders", and "this is our generation to rise" (lines 203-204), are examples of Muslim women aspiring to succeed as Muslims and where their testimonies will be afforded the credibility they deserve and challenging "hermeneutical injustice"(s) (Fricker, 2007, p. 6). Areej is aware of her "epistemic responsibility" (Medina, 2013, p. 119) and the "shared hermeneutical responsibilities" (Medina, 2013, p. 90) of her fellow Muslim women in promoting their epistemic agency as speakers. She qualifies and justifies her position, referring to the Prophet's wife Khadija, identifying male

privilege, or "active ignorance" (Medina, 2013, p. 28) as barriers to Muslim women achieving "epistemic justice" (Medina, 2013, p. 186). Areej has recognised a lack of "epistemic friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 70) for Muslim women in their lives even though they are stronger, getting more empowered as role models than men, and that this is her generation to rise. Areej knows Muslim women are objectified by men and is looking for epistemic friction to present "alternatives" to men whose "vitiating epistemic perspectives avoid friction and protect themselves against alternatives" (Medina, 2013, p. 70). Medina (2013) divides active ignorance of the privileged into subsets of advantage and disadvantage which are crucial in constructing epistemic counterpoints for creating epistemic resistances (resistances to knowledge and to ignorance) which "can contribute to maintaining epistemic oppression, or to fight against it" (Medina, 2013, p. 29). It is not clear whether Areej is referring to Muslim men or non-Muslim men in her reference to male privilege and therefore the category of active ignorance cannot be identified from her responses. Kiran introduces the topic of culture and religion:

I just thought of an issue that can be brought up... nobody really realises the big difference between culture and religion. A lot of people assume that, things like oppression you know, having arranged marriages, and things like that are all Islamic, from Islam where really it's from culture, different backgrounds, Pakistani backgrounds, Bengali backgrounds, Arab backgrounds. It's purely cultural and it does not come from Islam at all (lines 220-225).

There are distinct differences between forced marriage and arranged marriage in British-Asian culture. Forced marriage is a crime in Britain while arranged marriage (providing both parties being married are in agreement), is a common familial arrangement for many British Asians. However, Kiran has linked arranged marriage with oppression (line 222) in an attempt to disassociate any perceived



oppression from Islam. She is aware that the public perception of arranged marriage may be one of forced marriage and tries to explain this in cultural not Islamic narratives. Kiran is from South Sudan where Islam is a minority religion and perhaps arranged marriages may seem as strange to her. This topic is much discussed in Britain where the concept of clan loyalty and the need to look outside of one's community for a partner in marriage may also reflect the need to marry a Muslim or choose outside of a limited gene pool where some communities may be interrelated.

Kiran is aware that there is a blurring between culture and religion which affects both Muslim and non-Muslim communities. This not only affects Muslim communities but also Sikh and Hindu communities where 'honour' is a strong cultural construct in how for example, daughters are considered suitable for marriage. Kiran's contribution to the CoE is to distinguish between cultural practices and Islam to dispel notions that Islam is culpable in oppression. Areej supports Kiran by providing further distinctions between culture and religion:

Someone made a point about Islam, it is exactly what I was going to say that culture is different but it's not the major part like in Islamic countries, in Arab countries, all women have education and every woman has the same rights as men. Women are getting stronger and all these women they get scholarships. Never mind about their background or their income, everyone had a fair chance like, countries which is based on Islam like I'm a, [inaudible] so I can't use your rules, but in an Islamic country I would say yes, women are as strong, but they are really not shown in the media, there are so many of them that I can tell you so many female role-models that I've seen, more than male role-models, even the Muslim men are scared because the female women are getting so strong, we are like, right there [indicating with her hands at her head height] and beating them and beating them, so yes [everyone laughs] (lines 227-237).

Areej challenges the dominant media discourse in Britain that Muslim women are oppressed. She compares how Muslim women in Islamic countries are given the opportunities for education and are "beating" (lines 227-237) Muslim men, but does not explain further. Areej appears to suggest the media in Islamic countries fail to highlight Muslim women's achievements and promoting female Muslim role-models. She does not say that the media outlets in Islamic countries position Muslim women as being oppressed due to the Hijab being 'normal' attire for women in these countries, unlike the vast majority of Western media who equate the hijab to subservience. Areej appears to confirm this view: "culture is different but it's not the major part like in Islamic countries" (line 228) and "every woman has the same rights as men" (line 229) and "everyone had a fair chance like countries based on Islam" (line 231).

Areej argues that though the media in Islamic countries choose not to promote Muslim women as role-models and may be guilty of misogyny, their identity as Muslim women are not subjected to media assault as they are within Western societies. Epistemic injustice provides us with a theoretical lens to analyse this. I suggest that the Muslim women in Islamic countries are subjected to hermeneutical injustice by the Islamic media as they comprise a marginalised group whose testimony as role-models is being given lesser credibility than Muslim men. The Islamic media do not have the same anti-Islam agenda that this research suggests exists in the West and furthermore Islamic state policies do not appear to reflect a postcolonial 'othering' or marginalisation in their treatment of Muslim women. Any instances of misogyny perpetrated by the Islamic media does not appear to exist in the opportunities afforded to Muslim women by the state,

only how their achievements are recognised and circulated among the Muslim communities.<sup>14</sup>

Muslim women are subjected to "epistemic objectification" (Fricker, 2007, p. 132; Haslanger, 2017, p. 285) or "sexual objectification" (Fricker, 2007, p. 133) when they have wrongfully been excluded from the community of trusted informants in the "sharing of knowledge" (*ibid*, p. 132) or their successes as Muslim women. Areej builds on her previous responses saying Muslim men are "scared" and that Muslim women in Islamic countries are "beating them" (lines 227-237). Areej says opportunities for women in Islamic countries are good and they are outperforming Muslim men but obstacles prevent Muslim women from progressing. It is not known if she is referring to the workplace as a consequence of male privilege in Islamic societies. Areej has described a situation where Muslim women in Islamic countries are "hermeneutically marginalized" (Fricker, 2007, p. 6) because they are women. However, the academic opportunities afforded them have the potential for "epistemic resistance" (Medina, 2013, p. 14) in challenging male privilege. Building on the work of Medina (2013) "epistemic resistances" (*ibid*, p. 49) may first need to address the structural inequalities couched in the epistemic advantages of the "privileged" (Medina, 2013, p. 29) before the cognitive attitudes that support "forms of privileged ignorance" may be exposed (Medina, 2013, p. 33).

---

<sup>14</sup> Reference to the Islamic media is an interpretation of the narratives from the women and is not indicative of further research into the media in Islamic countries

*Step 9: Last words*

Respondents are invited to give their last words on the enquiry or to pass.

Sarah responds first by continuing the theme of the media misrepresenting Islam and how this is manifest in the social imagination of the public and in their contact with Muslim women:

I'm not sure what to say but I think the media has a big part to play in what they show. My understanding of what the media is for them to inform people about what's going on around us, not the kind of sways to one side or this side or pass out information that is negative constantly, constantly and they need to look into more positive attributes of Islamic role-models, women out there, inform people about that and not always talk about 9/11 and terrorists the constant thing that keeps coming up again and again, but we really need to educate them ourselves where we are in the century where freedom of speech is a big thing among diverse cultures, people from different backgrounds, it's really, really rude to walk around and ask like, 'What's on your head? What is that you are wearing? Why is your skin colour different?' It comes to a point really where it frustrates me at times because I think, 'what the hell. I'm in a country where you think you'd be accustomed to this', but you're still way backward than us yet they say to us, 'you're backwards because you dress like this' or 'you do this or you think like that', they don't need to do this (lines 243-256).

Sarah believes the media is a powerful influence, shaping the social imagination of the public and should be responsible in what they say. She believes they should report on positive Islamic role models instead of continually negatively reporting on Islam and Muslims and linking them to terrorism. Free speech is important and she wants those without knowledge of Islam and Muslims to "educate themselves" (line 249) before confronting her about her Hijab and being racist toward her. She challenges the assumptions made by her uneducated interlocutors who accuse her of being 'backward' (line 254) arguing that it is *they* who are backward because of their lack of knowledge'. Sarah is misrecognising ignorance, or lack of education which I argue is Islamophobia. She blames the media for not giving the

right information about Muslims which fails to inform the wider public about them. Sarah is hampered by a false consciousness in believing that the media would act differently if they had knowledge of Islam and Muslims. Edwards and Cromwell (2018) suggest, having the right information about Muslims is not important for the media, neither is whether the rise and spread of Islamophobia marginalises Muslims in Britain.

Sarah has recognised that incorrect and negatively framed discourses of Muslim women is carried out by the media and I argue she is subjected to hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007, p. 147) by her membership of a marginalised group and also by being a subject of a "tracker prejudice" (*ibid*, p. 27) in her identity as a Muslim woman. She is marginalised in her identity as a Muslim by Islamophobia and racial prejudice because of her skin colour. She is subjected to a testimonial injustice as a result of an identity-prejudicial credibility deficit (*ibid*, p. 28) in being systematically marginalised. The wider non-Muslim public are subjected to constant negative reporting of Islam and Muslims by the media breeding arrogance, laziness, and closed-mindedness inculcating "active ignorance" in their social imaginations as a result of "circulating distorted scripts" (Medina, 2013, p. 68).

Khadeejah responds to Sarah saying: "I do think the media plays a part in saying non-Islamic stuff, if I were a non-Muslim, I would be afraid of Muslims because of what is in the papers about Islam" (lines 257-258). Khadeejah blames the British media for marginalising Muslim women and that they target Islam. She excuses non-Muslims for their behaviour toward Muslim women saying that if she were a

non-Muslim then she would be afraid of Muslims because of how they are reported on. When Muslims are marginalised following media attacks on Islam it is because of their association with Islam and not wholly skin colour that singles them out.

Not all Asians are subject to Islamophobia, though some are subjected to racism because of their skin colour. I argue rather than the wider public focusing on religious intolerance for example being anti-Islam, Islamophobia as described in this research is infused with cultural intolerance that assumes Muslims to be anti-British. This places Muslims outside British society (and citizenship) and identifiable as the enemy within. This is supported by Khadeejah saying that if she were a non-Muslim she would be: "afraid of Muslims" (line 258). This lends support to the definition of Islamophobia suggested originally (Runnymede Trust, 1994; 1997) rather than a definition wholly focusing on racism. The British government has argued that only a 'race' of people may be the subject of racism and therefore a criminal act and sentiments of anti-religion are not sufficient to warrant a category deserving protection in law.

I briefly recap some key arguments in this research before returning to Aya. I argue Islamophobia should be considered as having elements of cultural intolerance, a harmful constituent that marginalises and 'others' Muslims living in Britain. Cultural intolerance increases the perceived differences between Muslim and non-Muslim communities more than perceived differences between religions. This permits the media to negatively frame Muslims by focusing on culture, reframing imaginary 'Britishness' in the social imaginations of the public and

further pushing Muslims to the margins of society. This research further argues that elements of reframing Britishness and belonging (underpinned by securitisation) are present in the Prevent strategy limiting Muslim agency to free speech and protest. Statutory requirements to teach Fundamental British Values in schools (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) are all postcolonial notions paving the way to 'colonising' Muslims living in Britain. Aya responds to Khadeejah returning to the theme that Muslim women are oppressed by Islam:

We're not oppressed. I wish people would ask me, if people have a problem then just come and ask me, like we wouldn't mind explaining why we wear the scarf and everything, I'm so tired of being misjudged as soon as I enter a lecture room, everyone just looks at me. For example, I joined a fencing society and when I joined everyone just looked at me 'so you're a Muslim, why are you here?' They think we just go to the Mosque and pray, we are just normal ladies, we have fun as well, we laugh, we do things, we do fencing; I think people should just try to educate themselves (lines 260-266).

Aya recalls how as a student in a Welsh university she was conscious of being "misjudged" (line 262) by her fellow students and gives two examples, walking into a lecture room and joining the fencing club at university. Aya does not say what her fellow students said to her, but has 'imagined' what they thought in seeing her at the fencing club: "you're a Muslim, why are you here" (line 264). Aya has recognised what has been termed in this research by other Muslims as receiving 'funny looks', "which may be nothing" ( Allen, 2020, p. 58) or perhaps a "residual internalization" (Fricker, 2007, p. 37). She is aware that people are looking at her disapprovingly or her "sensory receptors are firing" but that does not mean a "particular action is racist" (Yancy, 2008, p. 7). Fricker argues that a form of "rational sensitivity" (Fricker, 2007, p. 5) emerges after countless experiences of testimonial exchange as "testimonial sensibility". However, Medina (2017, p. 46)

argues this is "communicative intimidation" and "micro-aggression" and is symptomatic of hermeneutical injustice which is a "collective hermeneutical impoverishment" (Fricker, 2007, p. 7) or according to Allen (2020, p. 58) "which may be nothing". Medina further argues that hermeneutical injustice can be so severe that it may lead to the radical curtailment of voice, interpretive capacities, and status as a participant in meaning-making and meaning-sharing practices ending in "hermeneutical death" (*ibid*, p. 41).

I suggest that the similarities between hermeneutical death and the silencing of voices within a postcolonial context cannot easily be dismissed. Similarly when the interpretive powers of the young Muslims fail to recognise Islamophobia, their voices are killed (Medina, 2017, p. 47). Aya may be thinking that the person giving her 'funny looks' is giving her lesser credibility, as Fricker (2007, p. 37) explains in what she refers to as "residual internalization" (*ibid*) where a person's genuine beliefs may have moved on but continues as a "sort of half-life" (Fricker, 2007, p. 37) for the once held oppressive ideology (*ibid*). It may also be that Aya is subjected to a "collective hermeneutical impoverishment" (Fricker, 2007, p. 7) preventing her from understanding 'funny looks'. Although her fellow students did not say anything to her, Aya is attuned (from her previous encounters) in knowing what they were (Allen, 2015a). Aya is reflecting an earlier discussion of the wider public viewing Muslim women as being oppressed by Islam. When they see a Muslim woman acting outside of their imagined framework they are surprised by the Muslim actor in a 'strange' situation. At the time that the CoE was carried out universities were being encouraged to engage with the government's Prevent strategy as a way of identifying those who may be vulnerable to radicalisation.



Although Prevent was not yet statutory, it is not known to what extent Prevent, or a lack of knowledge about Muslims contributed to 'funny looks' and a lesser degree of credibility afforded to Aya. Research by Mir (2009) with Muslim students on campus showed that preserving their Muslim identity may take precedence over engaging in friendships with non-Muslim peers and research with Muslim students on-campus in Wales is under-researched.

Aya is subjected to hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007, p. 6) as her fellow students have given her a lesser degree of credibility due to her being a Muslim woman. This is a "prejudicial stereotype" (*ibid*, p. 4) existing in the social imagination of her non-Muslim fellow students. Aya is also hampered in her view that non-Muslims should educate themselves about Islam so they would understand why Muslim women wear the Hijab. Fricker refers to the "virtuous hearer" as being a person who gives increased credibility to the testimony of a speaker (Fricker, 2007, p. 169). However, due to widespread Islamophobia there is a collective hermeneutical gap in the resources of the hearer (*ibid*) to give credibility to the speaker (Muslim woman) in that the testimony of Muslim women cannot be "corrective in structure" (Fricker, 2007, p. 169). A similar gap exists for Aya who believes that more knowledge about Islam by non-Muslims will educate them. Both are victims of epistemic injustice and Aya has a false consciousness concerning an ideology of Islamophobia which she fails to recognise.

Naomi responds next: "You know, people, we need to help them have a further understanding of our religion, it's like media should show that" (lines 267-268).

Naomi wants her fellow Muslims to help non-Muslims increase understanding of Islam, echoing Aya's view that non-Muslims will hear her testimony. Once more Islamophobia has created a lacuna in the hermeneutical resources of the hearer and it follows that Naomi is similarly a victim of hermeneutical injustice and false consciousness. Nessa responds to Naomi by returning to the theme of stereotyping Muslims with terrorism:

I just don't like the fact that, they don't say like, if somebody bombed a place or Christians bombed a place but they would say a Muslim bombed the place, they should just say the person, they wouldn't say a Buddhist bombed the place but they would say a Muslim bombed the place (lines 269-272).

Nessa believes misrepresenting Muslims is the media's "default status" (Medina, 2013, p. 130) in stereotyping Islam or Muslims and is evidence of the media showing they have power and "epistemic authority" (*ibid*) over others. Nessa is hermeneutically marginalised by media who inculcate Muslims as terrorists in the social imaginations of the wider non-Muslim public in Britain and subject her to "hermeneutical injustice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 7).

Areej responds to Nessa saying: "There are misconceptions from the media, they should stop using that because we're getting stronger and um, yeah just" (everyone laughs) (lines 273-274). Katrina picks up the theme of 'last words' summarising her views saying:

I think mine is important as well, I think we should all have a good set of morals and just treat everyone with respect, no matter where you come from, I think if we were a bit more respectful towards each other we would, you know, we wouldn't have that racial ignorance, Muslims, terrorists, all that, treat others the way you would want to be treated (lines 275-279).

Katrina has not recognised the effects of Islamophobia from biased media reporting choosing instead to blame "racial ignorance" (lines 275-279). Katrina is the first person in the CoE to consider moral and ethical considerations as a challenge to stereotyping, calling for the wider public to re-think what they hear and read from the media. Katrina concludes her response by paraphrasing a biblical reference for making peace (Lansu, 2019), saying we should "treat others the way you would want to be treated" (line 279). Fricker (2007) presents an analogy between first, the virtuous agent's moral perceptual capacity and second, the virtuous hearer's testimonial perceptual capacity (*ibid*, p. 72). In the case of the first, if the hearer has had a "proper moral upbringing" or "socialisation" then when confronted with testimony will make a judgment based on their moral compass. In the second case the hearer will be looking for cues or epistemically salient features and social cues that relate to "trustworthiness" (*ibid*) to make a credibility judgement. Fricker (2007, p. 72) argues that the analogies described are dependent on five "closely related points of parallel" described as follows:

1. that in the testimonial as in the moral sphere, the model for judgement is perceptual, and so non-inferential;
2. in both spheres, good judgement is uncodifiable;
3. in both spheres, the judgement is intrinsically motivating and
4. intrinsically reason-giving;
5. and in both spheres the judgement typically contains an emotional aspect that is a proper part of the cognition.

Fricker's last point of parallel (number 5) is vital for non-Muslims to internalise injustices against Muslim women and may allow an increase in testimonial credibility to disrupt postcolonial 'othering' of Muslim women and challenge

Islamophobia. The "reconstruction of cognitive and affective structures" (Medina, 2013, p. 89) by epistemic interventions including "moral and political ones" (*ibid*) may improve "epistemic interactions and interpersonal relations" (Medina, 2013, p. 89) and address the "cognitive and affective numbing" described as, an "insensitivity to insensitivity" (*ibid*). By allowing an ethical or moral re-education to be realised an epistemic responsibility and shared responsibility may be achieved.

The Muslim women want to have a voice and to be heard but fail to locate a platform from where they can present testimony. In Chapter 8, I offer an alternative framework where epistemic justice and moral and ethical narratives may be considered as ways to challenge dominant media narratives. Amina was the next to respond to Katrina continuing the theme of negative media reporting:

...um they [media] should be beginning to take responsibility 'cos I feel in a way they created this hatred between people who don't understand about Muslims and so I think they need to start to, stop writing about these bad things and start writing about good things um, and maybe have, you know, shows on the *BBC* for example, Muslim women who do good things rather than one individual in the community is doing something bad (lines 280-285).

Amina is emphasising (along with some of her fellow respondents) that the media should take responsibility for their reporting and the *BBC* should show Muslim women as role-models. Amina and Aya are subjected to a hermeneutical injustice. Gaps in their collective hermeneutical resources makes them fail to recognise that educating non-Muslims about Islam and how the media operate are postcolonial constructs protecting an ideology of Islamophobia. Amina expects the media to learn about Islam altering their moral compass so they become "virtuous hearers" (Fricker, 2007, p. 169) bringing about hermeneutical justice for Muslims

(*ibid*). Amina's testimony will not be heard by the media and she is thus 'colonised' even though (as this research recognises) Amina does "amazing things" (lines 139-140) as a paediatric nurse in Wales. I also acknowledge that I have afforded Amina's testimony a greater credibility as a paediatric nurse thereby unwittingly subjecting her fellow respondents to a testimonial injustice, an epistemic injustice, by failing to acknowledge their respective occupations.

The testimonial insensitivities of the wider non-Muslim public and the "persistence of hermeneutical gaps" (Medina, 2013, p. 96) render the voices of Muslim women role models "less intelligible" and "less credible" (*ibid*) than non-Muslims. Leah responds to Amina saying:

I agree with all the points being made, they all make good points [laughs] yeah and the media should take responsibility because they play a part in how people, non-Muslims see Islam these days and it would really change their views and maybe we could all get along and treat others the way you want to be treated, on a friendly basis (lines 286-289).

Leah supports the responses of Katrina and Amina: "treat others the way you would want to be treated" (lines 278-279 and 282-283) which is indicative of wanting the media to adopt ethical and moral stances in their reporting to change the negatively held views of the non-Muslim wider population. Leah recognises misrepresenting Muslims subjects them to "negative identity prejudice", which is both an "intellectual and an ethical offence" (Fricker, 2007, p. 124) sustaining testimonial injustice. The goal of *Intellectual* virtues is to gather enough evidence from reliable authorities so as to be able to neutralise the impact of prejudice in making credibility judgements (*ibid*, p. 121). The goal of *ethical* virtues is to do good, show compassion, generosity and consider the well-being of others

(Zagzebski, 2000). Both intellectual and ethical virtues have the same end point, which is to seek testimonial justice and an epistemic trust (Fricker, 2007, pp. 121-123) between non-Muslim and Muslims to neutralise Islamophobia. Leah believes the media are prejudiced to Islam and Muslims by misinformation feeding into the *intellectual* narrative where the public acquire knowledge to make credibility judgments on Islam and Muslims. She calls for the media to be ethical and moral in their reporting changing their *intellectual* repository to accurately reflect Islam and Muslims.

The wider non-Muslim public need knowledge of Muslims and Islam to 'colonise' or fill a lacuna in their hermeneutical resources which allows them to become "virtuous hearers" (Fricker, 2007, p. 169). Leah (and her fellow Muslim women) do not yet have agency to change the *intellectual* narrative of the media, so appeal to the media to have "ethical considerations" (Fricker, 2007, p. 122) for them and take responsibility for their reporting. Leah, Amina and Katrina articulated how the media should adopt a moral position when reporting Islam and Muslims and recognise that they do not. According to Medina (2013), "responsible agency" (Medina, 2013, p. 121) requires a "minimal social knowledge of others and minimal empirical knowledge of the world" or "cognitive minimums" (*ibid*, p. 127).

However, in cases where there are "systematic distortions" and "pervasive epistemic injustices" (Medina, 2013, p. 128) or roadblocks to accessing certain bodies of knowledge, their ability to be responsible agents should be called into question and possibly suspended. In the case of the media who "knowingly" (Medina, 2013, p. 122) disseminated misinformation about Islam and Muslims still adopting position of "epistemic authority" (Medina, 2013, p. 57), adopting a moral

position or that of responsible agents is not commercially in their interest. Kiran returns to the theme of Muslims being linked to terrorism and how Muslims try to further counter-narratives:

I really do think that the sole, that the central issue that Islam and terrorism, 9/11, it's just that one thing that people focus on when it comes to Islam and, you know, it would be, you know, people need to think outside the box, 'cos it is repetitive as Sarah said at the beginning of the issues like terrorism and 9/11, it just keeps popping up again and again and people, not only do people get reminded of 9/11 but people get reminded, like Muslims, we Muslims get reminded of the religious intolerance of that time, and that as well, so it's like, it's bad for normal people to relive 9/11 and Americans because it happened to them, but then it's bad for us as well because it reminds us of the pressures that we went through back then and it's just so much negativity that a little bit of positivity would be nice, like we have, you know, spiritual Muslim leaders out there who, you know, are doing their bit, for example um [name of spiritual Muslim leader] he did a blog during Ramadan and each day he would do, um Ramadan lasts for 30 days, and he did a blog for each day and each day he conveyed a positive message of Islam. Things like that if they were given more recognition, um ... it would be really good for us and will help spread the positiveness of Islam (lines 290-305).

Kiran recognises that the media misrepresent Islam by linking it to terrorism and on the anniversary of 9/11, non-Muslims and Muslims relive it. She refers to non-Muslims in Britain as "normal people" (line 297) inferring Muslims in Britain are 'other'. However, Kiran does not mean Muslims in Britain are 'not normal' but perhaps indicates that Muslims are seen as outside notions of 'Britishness' and is indicative of them appearing different or 'colonised'. Kiran knows she does not have a voice to promote positive messages of Islam which will be heard by non-Muslims. She wants messages from an online Imam to be broadcasted to the wider public in Britain so they may have knowledge of Islam.

Kiran is also mistaken in believing that knowledge of Islam is key to lessening the 'othering' of Muslims. She fails to recognise conditions of postcolonialism exist and that Islamophobia has led to widespread negative identity prejudice against Islam and Muslims. She is suffering from a "cognitive disablement" preventing her from understanding why knowledge of Islam or testimony of Islam is given a lower degree of credibility than she gives to Islam. Her "hermeneutical disadvantage...prevents her from protesting it, let alone securing effective measures to stop it" (Fricker, 2007, p. 151). Irah continues the theme of Islamic knowledge by non-Muslims and the media:

I haven't spoke before but I think on the whole people should have sufficient knowledge before speaking about any religion, even culture, and also people need to stop assuming and judging others regardless of what ethnic background they come from or what religious beliefs that they have and also everybody wants to live in peace. How do people expect to live in peace if they are not showing how to make peace or how to maintain peace so, in order to live in peace we have to have or show how to make peace (lines 307-312).

Irah sees a society where British Muslims have been positioned as 'the other', as a result of Islamophobia and cultural racism being perpetrated against them. She uses the word 'peace' on six occasions during her response suggesting that she considers Islam and Britain to be 'at war' or at least, in conflict with each other with British Muslims caught in the crossfire. British Muslims are unable to defuse the situation due to them not having a voice to effect change and to "have or show how to make peace" (line 312) in a society where the media publish anti-Muslim propaganda marginalising Islam and British Muslims (Edwards and Cromwell, 2018). If there is no 'peace' in Britain toward Islam then it follows that there is 'no peace' toward British Muslims who are seen as a suspect community 'colonised' and positioned outside of British society.



Irah has described how Muslims in Britain are hermeneutically marginalised as a result of "structural identity prejudice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 173) manifesting itself in Islamophobia. To show how to make and maintain peace (310-312) non-Muslims must be able to hear the voices of Muslims in Britain in order to become virtuous hearers raising the credibility of Muslim testimony and achieving epistemic justice. In respect of Irah's comment "show how to make peace" (line312), demands the hearer be able to hear testimony from a hermeneutically marginalised group to become a "virtuous hearer" (Fricker, 2007, p. 169). Nouf responds to Irah summarising her final comments saying:

There is so much to say um... I just wanted to talk about our question. I think it's really in our interests to make this situation of peace between Muslims and non-Muslims. I think if you ask everybody um, they all agree that there are two clans...groups in the world, the Muslims and the non-Muslims. If all of the people who were really like claiming that Muslim people are really bad, that we are violent, that we are animals, we are primitive,...that it is really a lack of knowledge, a big lack of knowledge and there is already stupid people like Huntington who creates two armies and they don't think they just follow, they just follow. I think, um as you said, if you really want to live in peace...we'll have to make peace (313-321).

Nouf begins her response by agreeing that it is in the interests of Muslims to have peace and describes how Muslims are framed in derogatory narratives of being really bad, violent, animals and primitive (lines 317-318). Nouf again reiterates that 'othering' Muslims occurs as a result of a "lack of knowledge, a big lack of knowledge" (line 318) by non-Muslims. Nouf does not mention the media in her response inferring perhaps that non-Muslims must take responsibility for their knowledge even though the media present Islam and Muslims negatively. She makes reference to the theory of Samuel Huntington (Huntington, 1993) (line 319), who argues the fall of the Soviet Union would mean the West would inevitably be

at war with Islam, and "conflicts will therefore occur" (Giddens, 2001, p. 560).

Nouf recognises the theme of 'making peace' by Irah contrasting two clans (line 315) that she believes exists in the world order (Muslims and non-Muslims) along with Huntington's theory and the inevitability of conflict. Nouf argues that if non-Muslims have knowledge about Islam then conflict can be avoided.

Nouf describes how it is "really in our interests to make this situation of peace between Muslims and non-Muslims" (line 314) echoing Fricker (2007, p. 7) who describes situated hermeneutical inequality where:

...their social situation is such that a collective hermeneutical gap prevents them in particular from making sense of an experience which it is strongly in their interests to render intelligible.

Nouf has articulated how I believe this research has argued the ways Muslims are hermeneutically marginalised and that she believes in order to achieve 'peace' knowledge of Islam and Muslims must be transmitted to non-Muslims to challenge the view that conflict with Islam is inevitable. She knows that Muslims must be instrumental in giving this message but cannot identify a conduit where this may occur. This research further argues normalising Islamophobia has prevented Muslim testimony. Lala extends Nouf's idea:

What I would say is the media is creating these so-called terrorists, like people who are young they might be vulnerable and because its everywhere they might actually be thinking 'OK, everyone is thinking we're terrorists', ...actually go out and do violent things...by constantly making people think like that, they might actually give in to it if they are vulnerable, so I think in another way the media should be challenged just for example, newspapers and bombs,...you can always challenge it by writing in with your own point of view. The media should be challenged (lines 322-329).

Lala returns to the media saying that when a young vulnerable Muslim is 'othered' as a potential terrorist because he is Muslim he may act out the identity given to him by the media. She believes the media should be challenged and that they can be challenged (328-329). Lala articulates a 'hypodermic needle theory' that media messages are injected directly into the brains of passive audiences, (see Lasswell, 1927, for example; also Abdullah B, line 393 men's transcript at Appendix 2), and that without knowledge of Islam and Muslims, the recipients are more likely than not to be passive. She suggests challenging the media by writing to them. Lala is subjected to a hermeneutical injustice as a lacuna in her collective hermeneutical resources (Fricker, 2007, p. 7) prevents her from understanding that her written testimony will not be given the credibility it deserves. Lala and her fellow Muslims are right in wanting to resist "the imposition of mainstream meanings and interpretations" (Medina, 2013, p. 114) by the media or, as Medina dramatically asserts: "hermeneutical villains" (*ibid*, p. 115), who are "exceptional in maintaining hermeneutical gaps in place and blocking attempts to bridge those gaps".

The media act with such "epistemic arrogance" (Fricker, 2007, p. 20) in their negative reporting and consideration for vulnerable young Muslims that "a range of epistemic virtues" (*ibid*) is out of their reach making them impervious to such criticism. Chapter 3 argued that following on from the Leveson inquiry (Leveson, 2012), the then Prime Minister, David Cameron could have legislated to make the press accountable but chose not to do so. In reporting Islam and Muslims the media position themselves as "overly esteemed in their capacity as knowers" (Fricker, 2007, p. 20) constantly privileging themselves by focusing on Islam and terrorism and seemingly defending Britain from Islam and Muslims. This

contributes to some readers seeing sections of the press having a "credibility excess" (*ibid*) in their 'knowledge' of Islam and Muslims in Britain, allowing the testimony of the media to be given credibility by its readers thus creating hermeneutical injustice against British Muslims. However, Medina (2013) differs from Fricker (2007) here believing that at the "moments of testimonial exchanges" (Medina, 2013, p. 59), if no harm is done to those with credibility excess, then no epistemic harm may be attributed to them. Jill continues the theme of education:

I think Muslims educate themselves as they go, 'cos like sometimes the media shows the negative side and we try to show ourselves. You know like we need to carry on educating ourselves as Muslim ladies and show we are not like the small minorities and Islam's peace,...and that's it. [Everyone laughs] (lines 330-333).

Jill believes Muslims should educate themselves in respect of Islam as a response to the negative reporting of them by the British media. Jill suggests that knowledge of Islam is an effective counter-argument able to distance Muslims from the dominant media narratives of Islam and Muslims. Knowledge of Islam has been a theme repeatedly articulated throughout the CoE as an antidote for Muslims to employ when faced with negative reporting and education is seen as their 'subversion' to 'colonisation' by the media. Although Jill has not articulated where her knowledge of Islam may be directed, it is the beginning of looking for "possibilities of resistance in every discursive practice" (Medina, 2013, p. 16) to create epistemic friction to "fight against ignorance" and "facilitate the learning of others" (*ibid*, p. 17). Kiran responds to Jill for her final comments:

Can I just ask something really important, ...from what I know, there is um, out of all of this negativity, I think it is, in a way, promoting Islam because there are always people who convert and that the strong negativeness of Islam in the media actually encourages people to go

and educate themselves and then they end up converting themselves which is beautiful (lines 334-338).

Kiran contributes to previously suggested counter-arguments by saying when people educate themselves they can see the 'truth behind a story' and may be drawn into embracing Islam as a result, viewing it as a positive outcome from a negative story. This may suggest that education is the key in forwarding a counter-argument to a 'colonising' of the Muslim mind and recognising that Muslim testimony may be given a higher degree of credibility by those educated about Islam and are "virtuous hearers" (Fricker, 2007, p. 169). The significance of what Kiran says about those who are not educated, (in that she believes they will not be able to understand or embrace Islam), is due to them giving Islam a lesser degree of credibility (Fricker, 2007) preventing them from being 'educated' about Islam. Kiran's counter-argument challenges being 'colonised' but her testimony is unlikely to be heard because she is a victim of both a prejudicial credibility deficit and hermeneutical injustice (*ibid*). Irah has the final word of the enquiry:

Can I just add to that also people say Islam is all about being oppressed but statistics actually shows there are more reverts or converts into Islam than any other religion and if women were to be oppressed why so many women becoming Muslims? Just doesn't make sense to me (lines 339-342).

Irah articulates a challenge against one example of media stereotyping claiming Muslim women are oppressed by their religion, evidencing non-Muslim women are embracing Islam. She articulates an argument from her Muslim respondents that women who are educated are able to see through the fog of media misinformation and able to embrace Islam. These are the educated "virtuous hearers" (Fricker, 2007, p. 169) who are able to hear testimony of Islam from Muslim women and

adjust their credibility upwards. Having heard Muslim testimony they are able to choose to embrace Islam: "and they end up converting themselves which is beautiful" (lines 337-338).

#### **7.4. Conclusion**

Step 10, the review of the enquiry is included within the conclusion to prioritise the final comments of the participants and for them to be able to articulate their concerns and have their voices heard by the wider non-Muslim public.

##### *Step 10: Review of the Enquiry*

The Community of Enquiry brought together fifteen, mostly higher-educated young Muslim women living in Wales to explore a question for discussion chosen by themselves: 'Is the media misrepresenting Islam for their own gain?'

The women explored how the media stereotyped Muslims by linking them to acts of terrorism focusing on Islam as being responsible instead of the person who has committed the crime. Examples were given of how the media praise some individuals following an atrocity and then demonise them afterwards in order to sell newspapers. The women explored how the media portray the Hijab and how this may influence public opinion inculcating in their social imaginations a view that Islam is responsible for the oppression of Muslim women. Nouf, a French citizen provided examples from her schooldays in France to support how teachers had been influenced by the media and in the case of France, government legislation.

The concepts of religion and culture were explored, locating boundaries between them where blurring sometimes occurs allowing oppression to be carried out in the

name of Islam. Areas such as forced and arranged marriages were placed firmly in the area of culture thereby asserting that Islam is not oppressive to women. The role of Islam in Islamic countries was explored by some of the women who resided abroad highlighting the opportunities for women to have an education, often at the expense of Muslim men who were described as being not as strong as the women and in fear of being overtaken by them. Positive Muslim women as role-models was seen to be an important issue for challenging Islamophobia and they considered women to be in the frontline of such challenges.

Negative reporting of Islam and Muslims by the media dominated the enquiry throughout and was discussed at length by the women giving examples of stereotyping and offering counter arguments to challenge the dominant media narrative about Islam and Muslims, not only in Britain but globally. This reflected the views from the women who, although together for the CoE, live very different lives in Islamic and non-Islamic countries.

The concept of 'education' or knowledge was a thread that ran through the enquiry and was discussed in terms of a lack of knowledge by non-Muslims, the media, as well as the need for Muslim women to 'educate' themselves about Islam to be able to challenge Islamophobia and be positive role-models for Islam to change public perception of them. The concepts arising from how knowledge of Islam and Muslims is misrepresented and distilled in the social imagination of the public was analysed through the lens of Fricker (2007) and Medina's (2013) theories of epistemic injustice. This allows us to see the misrepresentation of Islam and

Muslims through a social justice lens to better explain why the wider non-Muslim public in Britain is not hearing Muslim voices.

The concept of 'colonising' the Muslim mind was explored and how this restricted agency and a platform from where to present a counter challenge to Islamophobia. These issues were explored at length within postcolonial thought as a way of bringing together the influences which, I argue, 'others' British Muslims. The efficacy of an online Imam during Ramadan and media platforms for Muslim voices was discussed as a way of promoting positive messages of Islam, but on analysis, fell victim to testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. A central and recurring theme was the need for non-Muslims to have knowledge of Islam and Muslims in order to lessen hostility toward Muslims. The argument in this research asserts that this is not possible, due to a false consciousness permeating the minds of both Muslim and non-Muslim actors. It is therefore crucial to explore why knowledge about Islam and Muslims is trapped in a postcolonial construct maintaining, concealing and protecting Islamophobia. Furthermore, the Muslim women did not refer to nor explore the ideology of Islamophobia, choosing to focus on the media not having the correct knowledge of Islam. Such a view hides deliberate misrepresentation of Muslims and Islam resulting in them being objectified in a postcolonial construct. I see this as further evidence to support how Islamophobia is protected even from those it affects the most.

In Chapter 8, I present the findings from an analysis of the data from both CoE conducted with the Muslim men and women. Through postcolonial and epistemic injustice lenses I show how claims for knowledge by both groups are articulated



through their lived experiences of Islamophobia. I suggest ways in which Muslims may identify injustices caused to them by the protected ideology of Islamophobia by reframing, and allowing their narratives to challenge the political and public spaces where Islamophobia has been allowed to become normalised.

## **8. CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS**

### **8.1. Introduction**

I begin this chapter by reviewing my motivation for wanting to engage in research with young Muslims living in Wales. I go on to review the research process and theoretical assumptions made before showing how I engaged with postcolonialism and epistemic injustice which shaped the analysis of the CoE data. I provide a summary of the main findings before going on to present the findings to each research question in detail. I continue with the contribution that the CoE has made to the research process before proposing a reframing of Muslim narratives through Human Rights, epistemic injustice and postcolonial concepts. I go on to show the relevance and limitations of the research.

In 2001 I formed a professional relationship with Muslims who were working with a locally based ethnic minority charity and together we produced two resources 'What if' (Mort, 2004) and 'Being Me' (Mort, 2008) for use in schools to challenge Islamophobia in South Wales. When I retired in 2010, I continued working with the charity in a voluntary capacity. I was acutely aware of how Islamophobia was affecting Muslims and wanted to further my academic studies, by researching ways that affected their lives, so I may construct a counter-argument with which to lessen its effects. My initial research design using semi-structured interviews with adult Muslims had not uncovered incidents of Islamophobia. I subsequently carried out two Communities of Enquiry (CoE) with young Muslims. Initial scrutiny of the CoE data showed they had been marginalised, but I could not 'read' the data to clearly understand what they were saying. I therefore engaged with wider

literature and theory, including government policy that I suspected may have influenced their lived experiences as Muslims living in Wales.

During this time, I wrote a programme of informal lessons to challenge the rhetoric of far right-wing groups operating in South Wales who were potentially responsible for influencing predominantly Welsh, white young people. Using the available funding and together with a Muslim colleague we delivered the THINK Project (2012) across South Wales over a 3-year period to young people who had been referred to a charitable service provider. Using my knowledge of what the young people were saying about minority communities, including Muslims living in Wales, I constructed a theoretical framework which allowed me to interrogate the CoE data and formulate a hypothesis. I suspected that an inability for Muslims to publicly celebrate their identities stemmed from a weakening of multiculturalism specifically for Muslims living in Britain. From my reading of the CoE data I noted that the Muslims had been securitised and objectified and that their sense of belonging and loyalty to Britain was questioned. My hypothesis broadened to include the government's Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) and political rhetoric around notions of British values (Cameron, 2011). Although the Prevent Strategy had been in force since 2003 and Fundamental British Values not introduced until 2014 (DfE, 2014) events including the Trojan Horse controversy in 2014 (Holmwood and O'Toole, 2018) and subsequent legislation (*Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*) for Prevent and FBV to be enacted in schools (and other public bodies) (ESTYN, 2015) gave rise to a concern for me about its use. This influenced the theoretical framework and the literature review to encompass multiculturalism and Prevent. Both CoE had democratically selected

questions for discussion identifying sections of the British media as responsible for misrepresenting Muslims. This prompted me to examine how the media selectively and negatively report on Muslims living in Britain.

Chapter 5, the methodology, describes how my reading of the CoE data through theory, legislation, and government policy (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012) shaped this thesis. I wanted to locate instances where Islamophobia had 'othered' Muslims, but I was concerned about speaking for marginalised groups within postcolonial thought. Noting that postcolonial conditions had 'othered' Muslims I wanted to progress my research in ways that would not speak for Muslims (Spivak, 1988; Said, 1978) and avoid replicating colonial injustices when applying "postcolonial thought" (Meer, 2014, p. 502).

I further engaged with theory suggesting that if Islamophobia can be considered an ideology then it may also be the case that it is protected by a false consciousness (Lukacs, 1971) existing in the minds of both Muslims and non-Muslims protecting and sustaining a 'normalised' postcolonial constructed belief (Bhargava, 2013) which I believe is Islamophobia. Notwithstanding that the presence of conditions of false consciousness in the minds of Muslims and non-Muslims would require further research, I suggest that a curtailing of intellectual freedom (*ibid*) may also be considered as hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) opening up the area of epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007) to be considered alongside postcolonialism. This would allow injustices perpetrated against Muslims to be identified in an epistemic injustice framework freeing secular narratives from postcolonial constraints.

I now turn to present a summary of the main findings of the research.

## **8.2. A Summary of the Findings**

In Chapters 2 and 3 I argued that multiculturalism for Muslims living in Britain changed as Muslims began to be gradually securitised as a consequence of the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) and perceived as being different by notions of Britishness and belonging forming part of political rhetoric (Cameron, 2011). The data obtained from the CoE preceded the legislation of FBV (DfE, 2014) and subsequent introduction into school curriculum which was underpinned by the *Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*. However, messages from government made Prevent and FBV clear to Muslims living in Britain prior to 2014. In this chapter I shall refer to the line numbers in the men's transcripts as MTL and in the women's transcripts as WTL.

As a result of analysing the CoE data I was not able to prove conclusively that a weakening of multiculturalism nor the introduction of FBV was responsible for a lessening of Muslim agency or belonging. In respect of a weakening of multiculturalism I considered that although there are overwhelming instances of 'othering' in both CoE which is symptomatic of such conditions, it remains unproven. The Muslim men spoke of being fearful of arrest and prosecution by being seen as visibly Muslim and when also voicing dissent while living in Britain. However, Prevent could not be dissociated from other counter-terrorism strategies in force at the time of data collection. It is of interest to note however, that the early formulation of Prevent was founded on "counterinsurgency models which had been crafted in overseas colonial settings" (Kundnani, 2014, p. 162) so the

presence of postcolonial narratives in the CoE should not be seen as extraordinary.

The data showed that the lived experiences of Muslims living in Britain made them feel different. They were portrayed as potential security risks and enemies of Britain wanting to lead separate and un-British lives and having loyalties or "multiple loyalties" (Bloemraad *et al.*, 2008, p. 160) allied to hostile foreign lands. The CoE data strongly showed the narratives of the Muslim respondents being articulated in postcolonial thought. They comment on the lives of their parents in similar terms further recognising that both are positioned as the 'other' in British society. The respondents wanted to be recognised as Muslims and British citizens believing that the wider British public were ignorant of their lives as Muslims and of Islam as a religion. However, the respondents did not recognise that the ideology of Islamophobia, normalised in the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim public, prevented that public from properly knowing Muslims and Islam. Similarly, an apparent inability by the respondents to recognise Islamophobia, a postcolonial construct, suggests they are also cognitively disabled, having been 'colonised' in their social imaginations. My reading of the data has influenced and supported the theoretical assumption that postcolonial conditions exist for Muslims living in Britain and furthermore that these conditions support, maintain and sustain Islamophobia.

The data showed that neither CoE appeared to recognise nor to evidence Islamophobia (other than Abdullah who refers to it in context of the media misrepresenting Muslims) (MTL 260-261), choosing instead to articulate having

been 'othered' mainly in postcolonial narratives of securitisation and objectification. A common theme in the CoE was the need for non-Muslims to have knowledge of Islam and Muslims to counter the negative reporting by sections of the media. Although my hypotheses were not proven conclusively, I suggest that a lack of knowledge of Muslims and Islam may be a consideration in how knowledge of them is shaped in postcolonial thought, including a weakening of their agency to celebrate Muslim identity, positioning them also as a suspect community. The strength of postcolonialism to control the thought and agency of the 'colonised' is its innate ability to hide the hegemony that sustains it. I propose that false consciousness can be considered as a way to explore how both Muslims and non-Muslims fail to recognise Islamophobia.

Arguing that Islamophobia is a postcolonial construct and that its definition does not reflect the harm caused to Muslims, I suggest alternative descriptors. I further propose that the theory of epistemic injustice is a way forward in breaking free from postcolonial thought and that injustices caused to Muslims in Britain be identified and articulated through it. Testimonies of Muslims are largely unheard in Britain and dismissed as unimportant. As a community they are subject to hermeneutical marginalisation where injustices committed against them are 'normalised' in a postcolonial construct and fear reintroduced in a restructured Western "security state" (Amin-Khan, 2012, p. 1597). It is vital that the narrative of their lived experiences is reframed so that the wider non-Muslim public can hear them.

Analysis of the data through both postcolonial and epistemic injustice lenses, showed how the respondents were 'othered' and marginalised in their lived experiences of Muslims in Wales. The inability to have their voices heard in postcolonial conditions is unjust. I adopted an epistemic justice paradigm to deconstruct Islamophobia so that both Muslim and non-Muslim may identify a lacuna in their social imaginations harbouring an ideology of Islamophobia. I now turn to my research journey to show how its progression informed the research questions that have guided and shaped this research to better understand Islamophobia in the light of the lived experiences of Muslims living in Wales.

### **8.3. Postcolonialism and Epistemic Injustice**

I begin by exploring how I engaged with theory and literature to address the aim of the study and how the research questions evolved from the iterative process. I go on to revisit the research questions before addressing each question in turn to discuss the findings.

The overarching research aim for this thesis was to: *Explore the lived experience of young British Muslims living in Wales in the light of Postcolonial and Epistemic Injustice theories*. However, before arriving at a stage where I was able to interpret the data from both CoE I had revised my initial research design, research methods, and engaged with theory and government policy (see research process map in 5.1.1). This was a necessary process for me to read theory, policy and data to authentically portray the voices of the young Muslims using all resources available to me. The data from each CoE was not clear to me until familiar with the theory of postcolonialism and aware of my reflexivity in having subsumed



elements of the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) into the THINK Project (2012). I began to consider my reflexive position where I may have unwittingly been responsible for marginalising young people, categorising them as vulnerable in my delivery of the THINK Project (2012) and the All Wales Core Programme (2004) as a police officer. I began to question how policy for social good may also be responsible for marginalising groups or communities. This permitted me to examine the Prevent Strategy and FBV as being postcolonial constructs that may be responsible for 'othering' young Muslims.

In my reading of the CoE data (and the one-to-one interview data), I identified a recurring theme where Muslims wanted others to have knowledge about them. The quest for authentic knowledge also extended to young Muslims who wanted knowledge of Islam but were often denied this by management at Mosques. These were seen as important areas for the construction of Muslim identity which I saw as representative of postcolonial conditions where knowledge was denied. The data from both CoE showed that the young Muslims blamed the media for deliberately misrepresenting them whilst believing that if the media had knowledge of Islam and Muslims then they would not misrepresent them. I initially considered this as naivety by the young Muslims. However, having engaged with postcolonial theory, I changed my position to consider that this may have been false consciousness. I further engaged with theory suggesting that false consciousness was protecting Islamophobia (if it were seen as an ideology). This concurred with the view that the young Muslims did not appear to recognise Islamophobia, preferring instead to articulate their lived experiences of 'othering' in postcolonial terms. Further reading of the CoE data showed narratives being articulated in

postcolonial terms including notions of a 'colonising of the Muslim mind' along with incidents of 'othering' by securitisation and objectification reinforced my belief that a postcolonial construct had evolved for Muslims living in Britain. My reading of postcolonial theory also warned me of the dangers of speaking for marginalised groups (Spivak, 1988; Meer, 2014, p. 502) and unwittingly framing Muslims within my own "imperialist gaze" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 171). I decided to engage with theory to find an alternative narrative.

My reading of Bhargava (2013) in his study of epistemic injustice and colonialism in India was crucial in linking a failure to think for oneself (or intellectual freedom) (*ibid*, p. 415) with false consciousness. I saw this as an example of hermeneutical injustice, where a lack of hermeneutical resources prevents non-Muslims from giving credibility to Muslim testimony. As I engaged with epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) and the CoE data, I could see that this would offer a way forward from postcolonialism and allow injustices perpetrated against Muslims to be framed in a secular and human rights understanding, where potentially Islamophobia may be redefined. The ever-growing canon of epistemic injustice literature allows for a wide range of alternative descriptions of injustice to be articulated, moving away from narrowly constructed definitions which may serve those who construct them and not those that it claims to protect. The implications for this allowed me to consider that the designated definition of Islamophobia, protected and maintained by false consciousness, was not fit for purpose and that injustices caused by its ineffectiveness necessitate reframing in narratives of universal justice, which I address further in this chapter.

The iterative process of re-reading data, policy and theory (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012) permitted me to construct research questions to guide interrogation of the CoE data and allow me to propose a way to challenge Islamophobia and expose it as a form of 'Trojan Horse' (a destructive programme masquerading as a benign policy). I am aware of the irony in using such a term which was used to discredit Muslim operated schools in Birmingham (Holmwood and O'Toole, 2018). I revisit each research question in turn going on to explore the CoE data from the Muslim men and the Muslim women to see whether the data has answered each question. The research questions were:

- Is Postcolonialism visible in the narratives of young Muslims living in Wales and if so, in what ways?
- Is Epistemic Injustice visible in the narratives of young Muslims living in Wales and if so, in what ways?
- How might we understand Islamophobia in light of Muslim experience?

#### **8.4. Research Question 1:**

- *RQ1: Is Postcolonialism visible in the narratives of young Muslims living in Wales and if so, in what ways?*

Postcolonial conditions existing for Muslims living in Britain is an important concept to understand how knowledge is controlled. I first provide an analysis of the CoE with the Muslim men followed by an analysis of research question 1 from the Muslim women. At the beginning of each analysis I remind the reader of the concepts considered by each group during their CoE before going on to introduce the question they chose to guide their respective CoE.

### *Muslim men*

The concepts identified in the four questions put forward for the CoE by the Muslim men include the following:

1. Muslims are negatively stereotyped by the media as being a suspect community linked to acts of terrorism.
2. Muslims feel isolated and rejected from wider society.
3. Knowledge is key to understanding Islam and Muslims and is vital for Muslims to be able to put forward counter-arguments in support of their religion.
4. Knowledge of Islam is vital in understanding their identity as Muslims.
5. Knowledge can be negatively manipulated by the media to their detriment.

The question chosen for discussion was: *'Do common stereotypes or media influence your own perception about Islam even though you are Muslim'?*

Using the theory of postcolonialism to initially analyse data from both CoEs, I identify instances where an 'othering' of Muslims has occurred. The Muslim men recognise and articulate conditions of colonisation in stories about their parents and their parents' generation (MTL 137) who speak about themselves as "guests" in Britain with the hope of returning to their country of birth (MTL 110) and says that his parents' generation do not want to upset their "host" (MTL 138). He refers to the majority non-Muslim British community as the "native community" (MTL 137-139) and "native population" (MTL 251) and that his parents' generation are "traditional" (MTL 154) adopting subservient positions as citizens. Abdullah B is articulating postcolonial language to describe the attitudes of his parents' generation and in his reference to the wider non-Muslim British public. These are

representative narratives of being 'colonised'. He continues by saying that he wanted to be able to "print my identity inside British society" (MTL 121) unlike his parents' generation who want their sons to subsume their Muslim identity in British society and not be seen as a Muslim. This is a clear indication that Muslims living in Britain recognise they are 'othered' in a postcolonial Britain.

The Muslim men explained that they could not access knowledge of Islam nor how to be a Muslim from their parents who are ignorant of Islam. Their parents often rely on their cultural heritage and reporting from the British media to have knowledge so they may be able to interpret Islam (MTL 203-211). A lack of knowledge or lack of agency to gain knowledge by their parents is indicative of being 'colonised' within postcolonial constructs. Furthermore, lack of knowledge from the Mosques (MTL 159-166; 194-195) may also be considered representative of postcolonial conditions for young Muslims, who are denied access to knowledge of Islam and being a Muslim which are vital elements in constructing Muslim identity.

Abdullah refers to Muslims having an "identity crisis" (MTL 242) and an "inferiority complex" (MTL 32) due to the effects of being negatively stereotyped and not being able to access knowledge that would strengthen their identity as Muslims living in Britain. These are examples of postcolonial conditions existing for Muslims. Arikarikam further recognises Muslims who access the internet looking for sources of Islamic knowledge could be identified by security officials and arrested or prosecuted as a consequence of acting upon incorrect Islamic knowledge (MTL 343-368). This may be seen as a form of radicalism under

Prevent and security legislation (Home Office, 2011a; *Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*), however it may also be seen as an example of 'othering' in postcolonial terms where access to knowledge is controlled and compromised by legislation. Abdullah B recognises the power of the media in influencing Muslims who do not have knowledge of Islam. He also recognises that Muslims who believe negative reporting of Islam and Muslims by sections of the British press may influence them in believing that Islam is bad, preventing them from engaging with their faith and becoming a Muslim in name only (MTL 394-399), which I suggest is a further example of postcolonialism.

When Muslims feel they are aggrieved and want to lawfully protest against perceived injustices (MTL 243-248) they are viewed as being anti-British (men's transcript 250). Additionally, in articulating political beliefs (for example, opposing Britain's foreign policy) in public spaces, Muslims are seen to be "disloyal to this country" (MTL 250) and feel that they are "under siege" in their own country (MTL 303; 310-311). This may be particularly relevant in considering the Ummah, where transnational loyalties to fellow Muslims may take precedence over Britain's foreign policy. Abdullah refers to the speech made by the then Prime Minister David Cameron (Cameron, 2011) who gave examples of how notions of Britishness and his view that multiculturalism in Britain had failed, was used to make Muslims living in Britain abide by FBV (MTL 253-261). This is an important issue recognised by Abdullah who recalled that Cameron's speech was a direct message to British Muslims to be more British. For Muslims living in Britain, notions of Britishness were subsequently made subject of policy (DfE, 2014;

ESTYN, 2015), later followed by counter-terrorism legislation (*Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*) to ensure compliance.

A lack of agency with which to articulate their views as Muslims in Britain may be considered in two ways. First, to speak about Islam other than in religiously sanctioned terms can render Muslims guilty of apostasy. Secondly, Muslim agency is restricted being unable to publicly assert their identity as Muslims for fear of being seen as anti-British or a potential terrorist (MTL 346-368) as a consequence of negative media reporting (MTL 395-396). Arikarikam recalled that he was warned by a family member about being 'too Muslim' and that following a pilgrimage by Arikarikam a family member told him "they might be watching you" (MTL 354-355). This view supports the argument in Chapter 2 that multiculturalism for Muslims living in Britain is weakened and that for Muslims conditions of securitisation and objectification are indicative of postcolonialism. Abdullah referred to decisions and policies made by the British government as creating "an internal barrier around the Muslim mind" (MTL 315-316) which I suggest is a 'colonising' of the Muslim mind restricting how Muslims living in Britain can exercise agency. Abdullah acknowledges that British government policy has influenced Muslims in their thinking, restricting their agency as Muslims. This is an example of postcolonial conditions existing for Muslims living in Britain.

Bongo believes that Muslims in Britain are judged by their religion, which is misrepresented by sections of the media, and the entertainment industry linking Muslims to acts of terrorism (MTL 212-220). He acknowledges that his agency as a Muslim is restricted in what he can say referring to how the Arabic phrase "Alahu

Akbar" (MTL 221) meaning 'God is great'. Bongo explains that 'Alahu Akbar' is spoken by actors in the entertainment industry just before detonating a bomb or when reported by the media following a terrorist act. Therefore, its use in everyday conversation by Muslims is restricted because of its misappropriation by the Western media. This is an example of how the use of language is appropriated to progress a value judgment which has 'othered' Muslims in restricting their use of language. This is a further example of 'othering' by controlling the use of Muslim voices by postcolonialism.

Bongo suggests Muslims be allowed to practice their religion under international law, free from media bias. He makes the point of wanting to refer to everyone as 'being human' and that Muslims should be judged under Human Rights Act legislation and not because they are simply Muslim (MTL 476-482). Bongo recognises that Muslims are negatively stereotyped and suggests that Muslims be judged in an alternative secularly informed paradigm where they are seen as human being who are Muslim. Bongo wants an alternative framework where negative bias against Islam and Muslims may be eliminated. Bongo has articulated that postcolonially informed narratives 'others' Muslims and that a reframing of them in a paradigm that prioritises human rights would serve them better. This summarises and concurs with the theoretical position adopted in this thesis which seeks to move from a postcolonial narrative to epistemic justice.

#### *Summary of Research Question 1 with the Men*

An analysis of the data from the CoE with the Muslim men showed examples of postcolonial thought including 'othering', marginalising, objectifying and



securitising of Muslims. They reported their parents being 'guests' in Britain feeling that they needed to conform to notions of Britishness and encouraged their sons to hide their Muslim identity. The men reported a lack of, or lack of access to, knowledge of Islam and how they are negatively stereotyped by the media for being Muslim. They recognise oppressive conditions exist for them but cannot define them, preferring to be seen as Muslims in a human rights context. They do not recognise postcolonial conditions, believing instead that non-Muslims are ignorant of Islam and Muslims. I now turn to the findings of the CoE with the Muslim women in respect of Research question 1.

### *Muslim women*

A summary of the concepts that are evident in the five questions put forward by the Muslim women include the following:

1. Muslims are negatively stereotyped by the media who present them as being a suspect community linked to acts of terrorism.
2. Muslims feel rejected and isolated from wider society having to live parallel lives.
3. Education of non-Muslims about Islam and Muslims is vital to lessen the effects of being 'othered'.
4. They (Muslim women), being visibly identifiable as Muslim, are best placed to challenge stereotypes and to counter 'othering' and should continue to do so.

The question chosen for discussion was: *'Is the media misrepresenting Islam for their own gain'?*

Using the theory of postcolonialism to analyse CoE data from the Muslim women, I identify instances where 'othering' has occurred. At the start of the CoE the

women had discussed potential questions to progress the CoE choosing to focus on how the British media negatively stereotype Muslims by associating them with acts of terrorism for financial gain. Amina, Leah and Kiran had previously suggested two questions asking whether Muslims should integrate into the wider community and whether it was a priority to educate non-Muslims about Islam. The women recognised that some Muslims live parallel lives from the wider non-Muslim British society and that knowledge about them is controlled and disseminated by the media. In such circumstances they concede that only Muslims are able to give the correct knowledge about them, with Areej commenting in support of her group's question: 'should Muslim women continue to speak out?' Areej knows Muslims are misrepresented and wants to reinforce that they already do speak out against being stereotyped. Sarah commented that young people should be taught about Islam while at school so they can educate their parents who don't feel the need to educate themselves or their children.

Notwithstanding the women had yet to choose their question for the CoE they recognise they are negatively stereotyped by the media and that knowledge of them is controlled, incorrect and lacking. I see these initial comments by the Muslim women as being representative of conditions where they are 'othered' in postcolonial terms.

Having selected their question to progress the CoE the women gave examples where the media only report Muslims after doing something bad. The media then refer to that person as 'Muslim', using the prefix 'Muslim' in ways that negatively associate Islam and Muslims with the bad incident (WTL 20-26). This is the

default position by sections of the British print media. Katrina gave examples of the media portraying Muslim women as oppressed and wanted them instead to go to the mosque and ask the women, instead of asking the men. This suggests that it is the Muslim men who are asked about their lived experiences as Muslims and not the women. If this is correct, then the women are not able to tell of their lived experiences to challenge the dominant narratives that exist for and about them. Katrina continued, saying, "That's why I enjoy what you guys did today because you're actually asking us, we are the Muslim women, we live through it every day so just don't write about us, ask us instead of asking the men" (WTL 54-56).

Katrina is showing support for the process of the CoE and also illustrating that Muslim women's voices are not sought to challenge the media narrative that positions them as oppressed. Most of the Muslim women in the CoE are visibly recognisable as Muslim and as such are subjected to more instances of 'othering' than the men (Perry, 2013). They continue to be objectified as oppressed by the media but their stories to counter the charges of oppression are not sought. Although the women recognise the media deliberately manipulate knowledge about Muslims, they still want them to have knowledge of Islam and Muslims so they will be better informed and not print misinformation about them. The women fail to recognise that an ideology of Islamophobia contributes to them being 'othered' and that the media narrative is a contributing element to postcolonial conditions existing for them. I also acknowledge a contradiction in the women wanting the media to have more knowledge of them (suggesting an ignorance of them) and the 'deliberate' act of the media misrepresenting them.

Nouf (a French citizen) told how a ban on face-coverings restricted the agency of Muslim women in France (WTL 62-66), and how she was told by her teacher "don't you know you are a pretty girl you should show your legs" and act like the others "cos they are people as they are normal" (WTL 77-79). Nouf has articulated an attack on her faith and culture by state legislation in France positioning her as 'not normal'. This is indicative of postcolonial 'othering'. Kiran refers to non-Muslims in Britain as "normal people" (WTL 297) indicating that Muslims are perceived as being the 'other', which is a postcolonial construct. She gives examples of where she has been asked: "are you a prisoner of your scarf?" and "is it not your will or discretion?" (WTL 104-105). Kiran also gave examples where Muslim women were seen as 'in need of rescuing' which are examples of being objectified and 'othered' in postcolonial thought.

Nouf gave other examples of being pressured to go swimming with her classmates in France and how her doctor lied to say that she had a medical condition and could not go swimming. Nouf did not want to be seen in a swimming costume in front of her classmates but this was ignored by the French education authorities who failed to recognise her culture as a Muslim. Aya continued the theme by saying she has had people say they feel sorry for her being oppressed, reinforcing the narratives around Islamophobia which ensures she is seen as part of a subjugated group. Both Nouf and Aya are 'othered' in postcolonial thought where their culture and identities as young Muslims are dismissed.

The Muslim women see themselves as role-models for Islam and attacks on their faith and culture may make some Muslim women feel inferior. However, as

Katrina pointed out her faith is not "wrapped around the scarf" (WTL 98), suggesting perhaps that some women believe their faith is bound by the hijab. Amina gives examples of Jewish and Hindu women who cover their heads but are not portrayed as "oppressed", illustrating that Islam and Muslims are objects of negative media attention and Muslim women are objectified simply for being Muslim (WTL 125). The deliberate 'othering' and objectification of Muslim women are postcolonial constructs.

The women were keen to present themselves as strong Muslims outperforming Muslim men in both educational and workplace settings. However, their achievements are not reported by the media in Britain, nor in predominantly Islamic countries where women are afforded equal opportunities to education and work (WTL 227-237). The women blame the media as responsible for misrepresenting them along with Khadeejah who says: "if I were a non-Muslim, I would be afraid of Muslims because of what is in the papers about Islam" (WTL 257-258). This appears to support the presence of an ideology of Islamophobia rather than racism for Muslims. However, the women fail to recognise Islamophobia, continuing to blame non-Muslims for not having knowledge of Islam and Muslims. They further blame the media, insisting that they should educate themselves. Sarah and her fellow respondents believe that if non-Muslims had knowledge of Islam and Muslims this would lessen the 'othering' of Muslims. The women are labouring under conditions of false consciousness (a postcolonial construct) which prevents them from recognising the ideology of Islamophobia. Katrina summarises her views by stating we should all have " good set of morals" (WTL 275) perhaps wanting to reframe Muslim narratives to one of universal

respect for example, a Human Rights paradigm. The women want the media to take responsibility for reporting on Muslims and to publish positive stories about Muslims living in Britain. However, acknowledging postcolonial theory, any challenge to the dominant narratives in a postcolonial Britain must come from Muslims (Said, 1978; Spivak, 1988). Continuing the theme of positive stories Kiran believes that messages from an online Imam should be publicly broadcast so non-Muslims may become aware of Islam. I believe Kiran is 'colonised' in her social imagination and cannot understand how Islamophobia influences the social imaginations of the wider non-Muslim public when confronted with an Imam giving them knowledge of Islam and Muslims. Irah proposed that there is a need to "have or show how to make peace" (WTL 312). This was taken up by Nouf who went on to describe Muslims and non-Muslims in the world as being "two clans" in the world (WTL 315). This may indicate a belief by Irah that there is a war or conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims which was supported by Nouf making a reference to a "clash of civilisations" (WTL 313-321) (see also Huntington, 1993) and that it is "really in our interests to make this situation of peace between Muslims and non-Muslims" (WTL 314). These postcolonial concepts are strongly articulated by the women.

Lala introduces the concept of vulnerability by suggesting that the media are creating "these so-called terrorists" (WTL 322) and says the media should be challenged by "writing with your own point of view" (WTL 328). The comments made by Lala are illustrations that Muslim women do not have the resources with which to challenge the dominant media narratives of negatively misrepresenting

Islam and Muslims in Britain. Furthermore, neither do they identify a conduit where their voices will be heard.

*Summary of Research Question 1 with the Women.*

The Muslim women strongly articulated narratives of being marginalised, objectified, and 'othered'. They tell of being negatively stereotyped by the media and their achievements ignored. Knowledge about them is controlled and their ability to have others know about them is limited to the voices of others. They describe conditions of postcolonialism neither recognising Islamophobia nor the elements (false consciousness) that sustain it.

**8.4.1. A Move from Postcolonialism to Epistemic Injustice.**

*Summary of analysis of Research Question 1.*

The data from each CoE was analysed through a postcolonial lens highlighting instances where Muslims had been 'othered'. Analysis of both CoE showed that incidents of 'othering' is a constant theme throughout the told lived experiences of the Muslim men and women. This adds weight to the argument proposed in this research that postcolonial conditions exist for Muslims living in Britain. Evidence of postcolonial 'othering' was shown to be present in the descriptions of their families, their access to Islamic knowledge, and how knowledge of Muslims was controlled by sections of the British media. I suggest that postcolonialism for Muslims living in Britain, contributes to sustaining Islamophobia as an ideology which impacts on their lived experiences.

Both Muslim men and women want Muslims and non-Muslims (including the media) to have knowledge of Islam and Muslims and further recognise that sections of the media deliberately misrepresent and stereotype them.

Through postcolonial analysis the men are securitised, access to knowledge of their faith and culture are restricted and political agency obstructed as a consequence of securitisation. The women have also been securitised as a "prisoner" of their scarf (WTL 104), objectified by a "white gaze" (Medina, 2013, p. 188; Yancy, 2008) from white men (in this instance French legislators) who want to 'free' Muslim women. The women Muslim respondents originally from predominantly Islamic countries report that although their achievements are not reported in the press (suggesting perhaps misogyny) they are not 'othered' to the degree that Muslim women are in the Western press. The women see themselves as best placed to continue to speak out (against Islamophobia) as they "live through it every day" (WTL 55). The counter-argument to the colonising of Muslims in Britain has to come from Muslims themselves (Said, 1978; Spivak, 1988).

Islamophobia, an ideology protected by false consciousness, remains hidden in a postcolonial Britain, preventing a counter-argument from being put forward.

Neither the Muslim men nor women refer to 'Islamophobia' when articulating their own lived experiences of being 'othered', suggesting it remains a protected ideology.

Postcolonialism is not restricted to Britain extending to France where Nouf spoke of how she was objectified as a Muslim by her teacher. The historical significance



of postcolonialism for former colonising nations may still be relevant today, along with how Islamophobia is "defined" in each country (Allen, 2020, p. 123) and whether it is supported by legislation.

Moving from postcolonialism to epistemic injustice is a deliberate attempt to reframe Muslim narratives to address and challenge Islamophobia. By prioritising epistemic injustice as my main data analytical tool, I was able to identify instances of epistemic injustice in the lived experiences of the Muslim men and women. I combine their responses, presenting the findings from both CoE in response to research question 2. I first summarise key epistemic injustices identified from CoE with the men and women before going on to broadly summarise how epistemic injustice was visible in the narratives of the respondents in the data Chapters 6 and 7.

### **8.5. Research Question 2: A Summary**

- *RQ2: Is epistemic injustice visible in the narratives of young Muslims living in Wales and if so, in what ways?*

Analysis of both sets of CoE data showed a range of epistemic injustices are present in the lived experiences of the Muslim respondents. The Muslim men told of their experiences in failing to access knowledge of Islam either from the Mosques (MTL 155-166; 178-184; 189-191) or from their parents (MTL 67) causing them to be hermeneutically marginalised in their capacity as young Muslims who are denied access to knowledge of Islam (MTL 204-205). The men also recognise that incorrect knowledge of Islam is being enacted by Muslims who pass false information on as being correct. This makes them "hermeneutically

marginalized groups" and subjects of "testimonial injustice" (Fricker, 2007, pp. 6-7). The men want non-Muslims to have knowledge of them to lessen the effects of marginalisation. The women also want others to have knowledge of them, including the media. However, due to the prejudicial stereotype, Islamophobia occupying the lacuna in the social imaginations of non-Muslims, a credibility deficit exists for both Muslim men and women who don't recognise the ideology of Islamophobia.

The men recognise the subservient position of their parents' generation who live as 'guests' in a country where they do not achieve full citizenship. Their lack of Islamic knowledge ensures they are also "hermeneutically marginalized" (Fricker, 2007, p. 6), not able to give their children knowledge of Islam and perhaps choosing a "self-imposed public silence" (Medina, 2013, p. 102). The women refer to the differences between Muslim and non-Muslim in terms relating to a clash of civilisations (Huntington, 1993) (WTL 319). This is an example of "situated hermeneutical inequality" (Fricker, 2007, p. 7) and they are "hermeneutically marginalized" (*ibid*, p.6).

The young Muslim men do not want to accept their parents' position and strive to be recognised as British Muslims. They are fearful of speaking out and are "scared to talk about things" (MTL 348) and engage in "political action" (Medina, 2013, p. 86). This makes them unable to bring about "epistemic friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 27) with which to make their voices heard and bring the wider non-Muslim British public to be "virtuous hearer(s)" (Fricker, 2007, p. 169-171). They believe the government is guilty of "structural identity prejudice" toward Muslims (Fricker,

2007, p. 170) (MTL 301). They are subjects of hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007, p. 147) due to Islamophobia occupying a lacuna in the collective interpretive resources of the wider non-Muslim British public. Furthermore, "persistent Islamophobia in the media means that young British Muslims develop a sense of cultural inferiority and lose confidence both in themselves and their parents" (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 12). The Muslim women also fail to have their voices heard but want others to know that they are role-models and "this is our generation to rise" (WTL 203-204) from the burden of hermeneutical injustice.

The media misrepresent Islam and Muslims appropriating language (for example 'jihad' and Alahu Akbar) (MTL 221) for their own gain, are examples of testimonial injustice as Muslims are denied status as knowers and givers of information (Fricker, 2007). The media link Islam and Muslims to political and military conflicts (MTL 248) positioning Muslims as anti-British, and potential terrorists. The men are securitised and the women objectified. Nouf (a French citizen studying in Wales) spoke of the French media objectifying Muslim women (WTL 5-7; 14) causing hermeneutical injustices to Muslim women and engendering "detrimental epistemic friction, censoring, silencing and inhibiting the formation of beliefs" (Medina, 2013, p. 50). This was a constant theme throughout the CoE with the women where the media adopt "epistemic authority" (Medina, 2013, p. 130) prioritising their voices over the voices of Muslim women who fail to be heard and unable to engage in "epistemic friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 158) highlighting a failure by the media in engaging their "epistemic responsibilities" (*ibid*, p. 187). The women spoke of wearing the hijab and how the media objectify them as oppressed (WTL 111-119) and in need of being rescued from Islam (WTL 62-71;

75-79). This is "epistemic objectification" (Fricker, 2007, p. 133) or a "sexual objectification" (*ibid*) where the women are excluded from the community of trusted informants in sharing knowledge.

### *Summary*

The use of epistemic injustice as a tool with which to locate injustices caused to Muslims living in Britain gives us a deeper understanding of how injustices are perpetrated against minority communities. In recognising a diverse range of categories including ethics, oppression and responsibility, we can locate injustices caused to Muslims. Furthermore, epistemic injustice theory offers an effective counter-narrative or resistance with which to challenge injustices, allowing responses to be framed in a human rights paradigm where cultural and religious bias may be lessened. Epistemic injustice further allows epistemically marginalised voices to be forefronted, from where a focus on the credibility of testimonies may be examined, rather than Muslim voices being hid in a fog of cultural and religious bias.

Analysis of both CoE showed that Muslims living in Britain are subjected to hermeneutical injustices because their socially situated position makes them powerless. Muslims find themselves in "hermeneutical darkness" (Fricker, 2007, p. 149) preventing them from understanding a significant area of their social experience (Fricker, 2007). Succinctly, they believe that if the wider British non-Muslim public has knowledge of them, the effects of Islamophobia will be lessened. They believe that if the wider non-Muslim British public have 'proper' or 'true' knowledge of Islam and Muslims it would engender an effective challenge to

negative stereotyping of Muslims. I argue the wider non-Muslim population are entrenched in a normalisation or 'darkness' of widespread Islamophobia and that they are negatively influenced by testimonial injustice (Fricker, 2007). They give a lesser credibility to Muslim testimony which prevents them from hearing Muslim voices and recognising injustices caused to Muslims. Succinctly, both Muslims and non-Muslims are "cognitively handicapped by a hermeneutical lacuna" (Fricker, 2007, p. 151) with both unaware they are suffering from a misunderstanding of each other. The Muslim community believe that given the opportunity to give others knowledge of themselves, the wider non-Muslim British people will listen, become better informed, and less Islamophobic. However, the non-Muslim British people are unable to hear Muslim testimony as a consequence of Islamophobia being 'normalised', occupying a void or lacuna where knowledge of Muslims should reside. A cognitive disablement (Fricker, 2007) present for both communities prevents them from understanding significant parts of their experience which is in their interests to understand (*Ibid*). I argue however, that the wider non-Muslim British public are not 'victims' of epistemic injustice in the same ways that Muslims have been disadvantaged. Non-Muslims may be hampered by a cognitive disadvantage in their ability to understand Muslims, but are not marginalised by their testimonies being given a lesser credibility. The wider non-Muslim British public has 'gone along' or has been subsumed into conditions where Islamophobia has 'blinded them' (Medina, 2013, p. 89) from having knowledge of British Muslims. Such knowledge, "corrective in structure" (Fricker, 2007, p. 169), could potentially lessen identity prejudice against Muslims allowing testimonial justice to occur and non-Muslims to recognise when injustices are caused. This may allow them to recognise when Muslims are being

hermeneutically marginalised as a community. However, postcolonial conditions existing for Muslims living in Britain prevent the "virtuous hearer" (Fricker, 2007, p. 5) from correcting prejudicial influences. Fricker describes that the degree of credibility needed, in this case by Muslims:

...is adjusted upwards to compensate for the cognitive and expressive handicap imposed on the hermeneutically marginalized speaker by the non-inclusive hermeneutical climate, by structural identity prejudice (*ibid*, p. 170).

Both groups are "labouring with the same inadequate tools" (Fricker, 2007, p. 7).

Muslims are hampered by not being able to adequately interpret their religion to align with current sensibilities including homosexuality, sexual equality and transgender issues. They may not be free to speak out publicly about the various interpretations of, for example, Jihad, espousal violence, and the differences between forced and arranged marriages for fear of apostasy. This, coupled with the obstacles outlined earlier, contributes to Muslims being the victims of both hermeneutical and testimonial injustice: they are wronged in their capacity as givers of knowledge and in their capacity as subjects of social understanding (Fricker, 2007).

Muslims are limited in their agency to speak about social issues without having to frame their narratives in the teaching of Islam or the Hadith (the sayings and teachings of the Prophet Mohammed). If Muslims speak outside of these narratives they may be accused of criticising Islam or worse, apostasy. Muslims without knowledge of Islam may not want to engage in debate about social issues in Britain and may be wary about giving information about themselves to non-Muslims. Their lack of agency may also be considered as a hermeneutical

injustice, which may be why they articulate 'othering' in terms of racism and not Islamophobia, which may be seen as acknowledging that negative and critical views of Islam and Muslims exist.

Deploying the theories of Fricker (2007) and Medina (2013), I have looked at how the media's influence on Muslims, with and without Islamic knowledge, has shaped how they see themselves as British Muslims. Those without such knowledge are more likely to believe the negative press reports about Islam and Muslims and will limit their Muslim agency accordingly. They may also pass this misinformation onto their children as being factual. Those who do have Islamic knowledge are able to notionally put forward a counter-view to the normalisation of Islamophobia. Their testimonies, however are not given the credibility they deserve (Fricker, 2007) nor a kaleidoscopic social consciousness (Medina, 2013, p. 74) allowing Muslims the opportunity to be heard. Therefore, testimonial and hermeneutical injustices continue to be perpetrated against Muslims living in Britain (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013).

In Chapter 4, I presented my theoretical position arguing that an ideology of Islamophobia is protected by a false consciousness in both Muslims and non-Muslims. I now turn to the final research question.

### **8.6. Research Question 3:**

- *RQ3: How might we understand Islamophobia in the light of Muslim experience?*

The data from the CoE showed how the young Muslim respondents were able to articulate instances of 'othering' perpetrated against them. They told us that the media were responsible for publishing negative information about them and that they were made to feel different or 'othered' just for being Muslim. A constant theme throughout both CoE was the participants' wish that non-Muslims need to have knowledge about Muslims and Islam to lessen 'othering' against them. This research suggests that Islamophobia, an "ideology" (Allen, 2015a; Allen, 2020, p. 34) is protected by a false consciousness that conceals Islamophobia from being recognised as the source of 'othering'. Successive British governments have refused to change the definition of Islamophobia (discussed in Chapter 3) and to introduce policies that would seriously acknowledge and address widespread Islamophobia in Britain. Political inertia and offensive comments made in political spaces (Johnson, 2018; Hughes, 2018) have contributed to Islamophobia being normalised in British public spaces making it difficult for Muslims to recognise it. The focus on a definition may be seen as a smokescreen hiding widespread hate crime toward Muslims (Allen, 2020) who are seen as not belonging in British society and further compounded by hatred, driven by right-wing narratives which are increasingly normalised in everyday conversation about Muslims (Allen, 2020). Islamophobia has been defined in many ways across Europe, shaped by political, historical, and religious associations between Islam and the host country (*ibid*, p. 31). Postcolonial conditions for Muslims living in Britain construct and control the narrative around Muslim discourse (*ibid*), undermining any challenges to Islamophobia. At the time of writing there is currently no political will to effect change. Muslims best articulate the effects of Islamophobia and I suggest that



moving from an inadequate definition and a colonising narrative will better frame Muslim discourse.

Having identified that epistemic injustice is also present in the lived experiences of young Muslims living in Britain, I suggest a reframing of their voices would allow virtuous hearers a better understanding of Muslim voices if the concept of justice was not clouded by postcolonial narratives and false consciousness. I acknowledge that although I move from a postcolonial narrative which has 'othered' them to epistemic injustice, priority must be afforded to Muslims to decide how their voices are heard. I further acknowledge that I have already interpreted their voices through my theoretical position which unwittingly may contain elements of postcolonialism as I present accounts from the CoE data. I also suggest that my proposition of an alternative paradigm may be temporal as society changes and Islamophobia changes its form. Defining Islamophobia has the potential to control the political narrative around its use and to attempt to define it a questionable exercise. Similarly removing it would be "counter-productive" (Allen, 2020, p. 120) as it is already part of a wide body of academic work describing anti-Muslim sentiment and its removal would lessen the conversation around it. I maintain that examining Muslim narratives through epistemic injustice reveal instances of injustice that do not require a definition. This research has moved beyond the usual criticism of "state scrutiny, counter-terrorist policies and media representation" (Allen, 2020, p. 39; Hargreaves, 2015) to interrogate postcolonialism and epistemic injustice to add to the scholarly investigation of Islamophobia. The social construction of postcolonial conditions for Muslims living in Britain is worthy of further investigation to see how they are marginalised in

ways other than identified in this research. Furthermore, this research has focused on Muslim voices and not as victims of crime as included in Hargreaves' article (*ibid*). I now move to explain how I believe a CoE approach could provide advocacy for young Muslims in Wales to prioritise their voices.

### **8.7. The Contribution of the CoE**

In Chapter 5, I outlined the strengths of using a CoE as a pedagogical tool for gathering data. A CoE allows respectful and ethical philosophical discussion to occur, shifting power relationships between the researcher and the young people. It is different to other qualitative methods where respondents respond to questions posed by the researcher. The enquiry allowed the participants to explore what the stimulus meant to them and not to respond to what I as researcher might find important. I argue that this way of working is particularly important in the field of justice and human rights. It is a way of collecting data democratically and is a viable research approach when investigating the beliefs, attitudes, perceptions and values of respondents.

In epistemic injustice terms a CoE may be considered as supporting efforts to "neutralize the impact of structural identity prejudice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 173), clearing the way for "virtuous hearers" (*ibid*, p. 171) and "epistemic responsibility" (Medina, 2013, pp. 119-132) to occur and as a result of "shifting the unequal relations of power" (Fricker, 2007, p. 174) to counteract hermeneutical injustices. The focus on the CoE in producing new knowledge supports the need for knowledge to fill a lacuna that allows the speaker's testimony increased credibility (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013). This is important for Muslims to recognise when

discussing how they want others to have knowledge about them. I have argued that a lacuna exists in society about Muslims that prevents understanding of Muslims. The belief that others are merely ignorant of Islam does not explain what is happening to them. The lacuna of Islamophobia is a key barrier to understanding between Muslim and non-Muslim.

A CoE approach would additionally allow knowledge from marginalised groups to inform current debates, including political recognition and representation for Muslims living in Britain, with the objective of "changing social structures and relations" (Medina, 2013, p. 314) between Muslims and the wider non-Muslim community. This could potentially allow Muslims and non-Muslims to engage in dialogue and share differing views and challenge widely held notions of stereotypes that hinder relations between different cultures, values and beliefs.

I suggest that a CoE approach is also suitable for future academic research by young Muslims and that an acknowledgment of postcolonial influences by the state identified in this research may allow others to interrogate hidden control and authority that seeks to influence and marginalise particular members of British society. However, in articulating Muslim narratives, I suggest that postcolonialism be confined to identifying the sources of injustice and that an epistemic injustice narrative is preferable in articulating a response. This would allow Muslim injustices to be reframed and compared with, for example, the *Human Rights Act 1998* where the secular narrative of epistemic injustice may be used in congruence. However, I accept that some young Muslims may want to choose a postcolonial narrative in order to highlight injustices, locating and identifying them

within postcolonialism as a counter-colonial narrative. If Muslims recognise that postcolonial conditions affect their lived experience, they may want to further analyse postcolonialism for Muslims living in Britain themselves. I see postcolonialism for Muslims in Britain being an obstacle in recognising and affecting a challenge to Islamophobia. Furthermore, convincing British governments that postcolonial conditions exist for Muslims living in Britain, rather than merely within academic research, is challenging.

The existing body of literature regarding Islamophobia and Muslims generally has focused on the marginalisation of Muslims by reference to historical Islam (Sayyid and Vakil, 2010; Esposito and Kalin, 2011), and by concentrating on religious narratives and global territorial conquests chronicling the rise and fall of Islamic societies (Kumar, 2012). Furthermore, a focus on 'Orientalist narratives' (Said, 1978) has sustained the perceived incompatibility of Islam and Muslims in the West, reinforced by "a new form of colonial domination" (Gilroy, 2004, p. 2) by military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan and that "the imperial and colonial past continues to shape political life in the overdeveloped-but-no-longer-imperial countries" (*ibid*).

In 2015, Allen (2015a) suggested that a Human Rights Act approach may be a way forward in reframing the dehumanising narrative of Islamophobia which was largely being propagated by sections of the British print media. This was also suggested by Bongo (see Chapter 6) and Amina (see Chapter 7) in their respective CoE as ways forward in challenging the media who overwhelmingly

only label Muslims as 'Muslims' but rarely label non-Muslims as to their religious denomination when reporting crime.

In Chapter 2, I argued that multiculturalism for Muslims in Britain has been weakened. Bongo and Amina suggest that when people do bad things, they should be identified for who they are and not their religion. Perhaps Bongo and Amina recognise postcolonial conditions exist for them and reject multiculturalism for Muslims, preferring instead Human Rights protection. This would allow a Human Rights approach to supersede "social oppression" and "surveillance" (Anderson, 2016, pp. 2-20) for Muslims from expansive anti-terror legislation. Human Rights approaches may also allow challenges to be made in reviewing Prevent, for example, holding government to account (*ibid*) and permitting Muslims to "lawfully express dissent" (Cunningham, 2007, p. 124). Appiah progresses the argument by suggesting that if a person is responsible for shaping their own life then "state acknowledgement of such identities is intrinsically illiberal" (Appiah, 2005, p. 70), otherwise the state would be advantaging and disadvantaging particular identities, preventing the person from shaping his or her own life (*ibid*).

Unfortunately, other than a failed attempt to change the definition of Islamophobia (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018), and recommendations from Europe (Ramberg, 2004; European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2006) and further afield (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, 2008) a narrative of Islamophobia through a Human Rights perspective appears not to have gained traction as the right-wing Islamophobic narrative in Britain has deepened. A lack of political will in promoting justice for Muslims living in Wales

(also Britain) does preclude reframing Muslim narratives. I suggest an amalgamation of 2 concepts used in this research (the CoE and epistemic injustice) together with a Human Rights approach may progress Muslim narratives further to disturb political inactivity, and I go on to discuss this.

## **8.8. Reframing Muslim narratives in the context of Human Rights, Epistemic Injustice and Community of Enquiry Approaches**

### **8.8.1. Human Rights and Epistemic Injustice**

I now turn to looking at the findings in more depth and suggest ways in which Muslims living in Britain may be able to reclaim lost agency to challenge their lived experiences of being 'othered'.

As a way of illustrating how human rights may be seen in contrast with epistemic injustice as a tool to interrogate data, I provide a brief resume of 4 articles that have been described by the young Muslim men and women in the CoE as having been breached:

- Article 9: Freedom of thought, conscience and religion (*Human Rights Act 1998*). The right to practice one's religion, alone, in a community, in public or in private. Testimonial and hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) perpetrated against Muslims for being Muslim.
- Article 10: Freedom of expression (*Human Rights Act 1998*). The freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority. Hermeneutical injustice and testimonial injustice when given a lesser credibility to one's testimony (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013).
- Article 11: Freedom of assembly and association (*Human Rights Act 1998*). The right to lawful protest. Hermeneutical injustice and testimonial injustice when denied a voice because of religion (Fricker,

2007; Medina, 2013). Hermeneutical injustice when the right to protest by Muslims is seen as anti-British and an enemy within.

- Article 14: Prohibition of discrimination (*Human Rights Act 1998*). Not to be discriminated against due to one's sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. Hermeneutical injustice and testimonial injustices (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013), perpetrated against Muslims.

Having identified breaches of human rights using epistemic injustice Medina (2013) further allows young Muslims to consider "epistemic friction" (*ibid*, p. 158) as ways to challenge perceptions of what is "socially relevant or irrelevant in their life" (Medina, 2013, p. 158). Epistemic friction further involves the "mutual contestation of differently normatively structured knowledges; it interrogates epistemic exclusions, disqualifications, and hegemonies" (*ibid*, p. 281). This allows an interrogation of, in this case, human rights to see if the protection afforded is robust enough to engender justice for them. Epistemic friction may also allow young Muslims to engage with others to consider difficult conversations such as the notion of apostasy which may prevent some Muslims from critiquing Islam; benefitting others in "epistemic cooperation" (*ibid*); or in recognising and criticising Britain's historical past in colonialism.

Although Human Rights legislation may undermine government multicultural policies, in particular "state-based citizenship" (Bloemraad *et al.*, 2008, p. 164), attempts for Human Rights approaches in addressing Islamophobia since 2015 (Allen, 2015a) have not succeeded therefore alternative narratives may offer a way forward.

### 8.8.2. A CoE Approach

The structure of a CoE allows young Muslim men and women as enquirers to democratically decide on questions that they want to explore. I have also suggested that as a tool to gather data it is a viable method to further research with Muslims. Using epistemic injustice alongside a CoE approach to interrogate phenomena may also be seen as innovative methods of working with minority groups of people to better understand their lived experiences. Furthermore, this may allow their "limited" voices (Healy, 2019, pp. 430-431) to be heard contributing to their "perceived belonging" through "a dialogic role" (*ibid*, p. 429) to occur allowing Muslims to be seen by the wider non-Muslim public as full members of British society.

Having described how human rights and epistemic injustice can be used to compliment and critique each other I now consider how a CoE approach allows researchers to: 1) engage with multiple theories and policies or a "plugging in" of data and theory (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012, p. 2); 2) complement and enhance the use of epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013); 3) articulate research methodology.

When I began this PhD, I found the advice of Clough and Nutbrown (2002) invaluable. At the end of my research I return to their work and see how their recommendations have guided and infused my journey. A CoE can empower young Muslims to engage in "radical questioning" (Clough and Nutbrown, 2002, p. 128), allowing the phenomenon to be explored to be articulated through "radical voices" (Clough and Nutbrown, 2002, p. 79); this is aligned with "epistemic friction"



(Medina, 2013, p. 158). "Radical listening" (Clough and Nutbrown, 2002, p. 79) is aligned with being "virtuous hearers" (Fricker, 2007, p. 171). "Radical reading" (Clough and Nutbrown, 2002, p. 99) is aligned with 'epistemic injustice' as a data analysis tool (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013), and the CoE with the use of "focused conversation as a research method" (Clough and Nutbrown, 2002, p. 84).

Furthermore, the CoE as a pedagogical tool allows young Muslims as researchers to consider that the 'oppressed' must be made aware of the nature of their situation to remove themselves from it (Freire, 1970). All of the above are present in the research methodology used in this research which plugged data into theory (Clough and Nutbrown, 2002) and policy.

### **8.9. Relevance of Research**

It is vital for society in Britain that we recognise the harm that is being done to our fellow citizens who are Muslim. We cannot rely on government policy nor media regulation to address hate crime being perpetrated against Muslims living in Britain. Unless we work toward building an inclusive society where Muslims have a voice, they will continue choosing to live separate lives to avoid being targeted. Some Muslims may decide that their only option to defend their right as citizens, is to engage in extremist and criminal activities in order to bring about social change. Unless we tackle hate crime and Islamophobia we will be complicit by our inactivity and acquiescence in a minority of Muslims choosing to engage in extremism. Social cohesion for Muslims living in Britain is a right and working towards challenging Islamophobia and all Muslim-directed hate crime must remain a priority for government.

### **8.10. Summary**

It is vital that young Muslims engage in conversations that locate and identify injustices caused to them as a result of Islamophobia. Government reluctance to recognise Islamophobia (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018) indicates that a reframing of Muslim experience may allow them to acknowledge 'injustices' rather than 'Islamophobia' and be willing to consider protecting Muslims in Britain. The theories of epistemic injustice allow for Muslims to engage with epistemic and political agency to interrogate why "structural conditions" unfairly compromise their "ability to act" (Simpson, 2017, p. 254). They need to speak out in measured and rational ways to challenge injustices that seek to marginalise them and produce evidence through an epistemic injustice lens to hold those in government and media to account. Furthermore, by engaging with the non-Muslim community the concept of ignorance may be explored through epistemic injustice to further explore its potential for harm. In Chapters 6 and 7, the Muslim men and women refer to having a 'duty' (MTL 464-467; see also 7.3.3) to have knowledge of their religion to challenge ignorance or "active ignorance" (Medina, 2013, pp. 27-40) so that non-Muslims may become "virtuous hearers" (Fricker, 2007, p. 170) to engender hermeneutical justice for Muslims.

## **9. CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION**

### **9.1. The Research Process**

This research makes an important contribution to knowledge through the research methodology. By deciding to analyse the data using an epistemic injustice lens, I have taken an ethical, secular position prioritising incidents of socially situated injustices that are seen as 'normal'. The research began as a traditional, qualitative research project. I had a clear research question in mind and set out to answer it through one-to-one research interviews that I intended to transcribe, code, categorise and thematise. What emerged did not produce what I expected, and I had to think again. That was the true beginning of my research journey as I looked for a different approach to data collection. The one-to-one interviews showed me that it is difficult for Muslims to bring their meaning making voices to the public arena. I knew they had experienced Islamophobia, but they did not talk about it in the interviews. I realised that the public space is embedded with Islamophobic assumptions based on deficit stereotypes about Muslims which creates discourses that damage them and dismiss them as epistemic agents. Non-Muslims fail to hear Muslim voices because of the deficit beliefs about Muslims promulgated by the media.

I chose the rarely used Community of Enquiry (CoE) as a research tool. The significance of this approach is its capacity to be a respondent-centred rather than researcher-centred approach to data collection. This research shows what can happen when CoE participants formulate and democratically choose the enquiry questions themselves. Engaging groups of people rather than individuals, it provides an opportunity to hear the voices of all respondents as all have the

chance to express their views on their chosen question. The CoE therefore operates within a paradigm that recognises the contours of inter-subjective meaning and embraces an epistemology where knowledge is not 'found' but constructed by the participants.

The CoE adopts a democratic process to select the question and during the enquiry the structure ensures all voices are heard and responded to. An aim of the enquiry is for participants to gain a substantially clearer understanding of the topic under investigation by the end of the process than at the beginning. It is therefore not mere conversation as one may find in a focus group, but the development of a more complex and comprehensive understanding of the topic under enquiry. It requires a deep respect for all contributors in the enquiry and a willingness to self-correct in the light of the contributors in the community. It depends on empathetic listening and courage to agree and disagree with each other respectfully and to generate ideas that might not have been identified in other research approaches. The resulting enquiry is a collective response to the research question because it is built on the contributions of each participant.

My findings suggest that the CoE has potential as a viable research approach in qualitative research, with a particular value to those who wish to research the beliefs, attitudes, perceptions and values of respondents. The CoE as a research tool has the power to engage participants in dialogue where they share stories, seek intersubjective meanings and recount experiences. The process of the CoE promotes a place of safety and openness that facilitates a flow of shared stories. It has the capacity to capture and communicate the authentic voices of

respondents and give insight into how the specific problematic of power impacts on participants and uncovers the social consequences of power relations.

My research suggests that the CoE is a participatory practice that could also support dialogue between Muslim and non-Muslim by creating opportunities for authentic dialogue where everyone can express their views and opinions. If there were opportunities to hear Muslim voices, particularly in a CoE, I suggest that non-Muslims would be taken aback by the depth of thinking that might be demonstrated and be prepared to examine any deficit beliefs held that are fuelled by Islamophobia. The CoE provides a platform for non-Muslims to hear Muslims enquire in ways that may challenge how Islamophobia has influenced their understanding of what Muslims are like. This could have value for both Muslims and non-Muslims in challenging stereotypes and recognising commonalities not differences.

Having collected the CoE data, I realised that traditional qualitative approaches to coding and interpreting were not appropriate to the CoE. I came across the process of "plugging in" (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012, p. 2) and began exploring theory to help me read the data and create new analytic questions. This approach took me on a journey into the fields of postcolonialism, Islamophobia and epistemic injustice against the wider political context of the government's Prevent Strategy and Fundamental British Values and my own researcher positioning. By articulating my own experiences as a police officer and educator and identifying critical incidents that influenced my thinking, I infused my research with context and embedded a 'thinking with theory' approach to my study. I read together

these theories and policy with the data that was created in this research, looking for what each could tell me about the other and always aware that my own experiences informed how I opened up ways of thinking with data through theory.

My experiences as a police officer and educator prompted my research and my engagement with theory sustained me through the doctoral process. To think about my experiences through theory, took my experience beyond the reflexive process and added a depth of understanding I had not expected. The writing process was central to my journey as the research shifted and evolved over time. Questions opened up that are explored through theory and data together.

I conclude the thesis by summarising how reframing Muslim narratives though epistemic injustice is not an alternative paradigm from where to engage in postcolonial thought, but a genuine desire to allow Muslims living in Britain an alternative paradigm to consider themselves.

## **9.2. Reframing Muslim Narratives**

The implications of my findings are that Muslims living in Britain are a diverse community who are discriminated as a consequence of being negatively stereotyped. Widespread Islamophobia, notions of securitisation and objectification contribute to the construction of postcolonial conditions existing for them which is reflected in the telling of their lived experiences.

I considered that in attempting to produce an alternative narrative I had succumbed to a trap warned by Spivak (1988) and others in speaking *for* British Muslims including more recently being a 'house Muslim' (Tellmama, 2015) trading

on the Muslim as victim by presenting different narratives to the one dominantly held. The Muslim respondents overwhelmingly wanted to challenge oppression of themselves by progressing a counter-argument solely founded on narratives of Islam. They told me that they were unable to further narratives of their lived experiences as Muslims living in Wales and that their identity as Muslims was the only conduit available to them.

I identified state policies and negative media reporting, which marginalised Muslims, contributing to postcolonial conditions and widespread Islamophobia existing for them. I constructed a theoretical framework in which to explain how they are marginalised and offered an alternative paradigm which would allow their voices to be heard.

Following Fricker (2007; 2017) and Medina (2013) I draw on the key concepts of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice and the idea of the virtuous hearer to illuminate the ways in which the young Muslim respondents in this research are marginalised just for being Muslim. Epistemic injustice further allows us to see how the voices of the respondents are not heard as a consequence of Islamophobia filling the lacuna of hermeneutical resources of the wider non-Muslim British public. This prevents non-Muslims from becoming virtuous hearers and giving credibility to Muslim testimony. By framing the responses from the young Muslims within an epistemic injustice framework we are able to construct narratives about them which disassociates their experiences from a religious context to a secular one. Being allowed to hear these narratives and achieving virtuous listening, will "somewhat erode hermeneutical marginalization" (Fricker,

2017, pp. 54-55) lessening the effects of Islamophobia in the social imagination of the public, allowing a lacuna of Islamophobia to be displaced.

I have considered this apparent inability to recognise Islamophobia from both Muslim and non-Muslim perspectives and have considered that an economy of hermeneutical resources affects them both. If both were offered alternative narratives, then Muslims may recognise how they are marginalised and non-Muslims see how they may become virtuous hearers. I do not believe this position highlights 'victims', rather it destabilises the 'normality' of injustice. Fricker's work provides us with a tool to analyse how injustice occurs and how to counter it. A universal or 'common ground' epistemic injustice approach allows conversation to be framed within universal justice instead of culture and religion which are misrepresented in postcolonial constructs. Furthermore, narratives constructed within an epistemic injustice context inform and compliment the secular construct of multiculturalism in Britain, allowing Muslim identity opportunities to be celebrated.

### **9.3. Limitations of Study**

I now consider how future research may progress Muslim voices in being heard. I consider the work of Cattle (2012) as being vitally important in developing dialogue between disparate communities particularly his work in furthering multiculturalism to interculturalism (*ibid*, p. 88). I have also considered this shift from an epistemic position that "given the right socio-political conditions" (Medina, 2013, p. 281), epistemic friction allows us to reframe the way voices and perspectives previously ignored, may be allowed to participate as a reconstruction



of the past (*ibid*, p. 282). Cantle's vision of a new concept to manage community relations is to be applauded; however, there has not been the political will by successive governments to address, nor public support to invest in his vision. Similarly, the Prevent Strategy (Thomas, 2019) is seen to work against community cohesion policies, reinforcing anti-Muslim discourses. This research has argued that in recognising postcolonial conditions exist for Muslims living in Britain, a move from cultural narratives may allow a conduit for their voices to be constructed. I acknowledge that change can only be achieved as a consequence of political will and have decided not to pursue interculturalism as a way forward at this time.

Achieving epistemic justice for Muslims living in Wales assumes individuals will be able to recognise their prejudices, engage with them intellectually and move to become virtuous hearers. Dotson (2014) argues that testimonial and hermeneutical injustices are first and second order forms of oppression and that a third, epistemically oppressive system operates to create an "unlevel knowing field" (Bailey, 2014, p. 62). The result of this is that testimonial and hermeneutical injustices are not recognised due to unequal social power relationships sharing hermeneutical resources in favour of "dominant groups" (*ibid*, p. 64). This research has recognised that postcolonial conditions and resultant dominant discourses of Islamophobia are part of a systematic oppression against Muslims in Britain (and are therefore third-order epistemically oppressive systems of oppression), and that acknowledgement of postcolonialism is vital so it may be disrupted.

The data collection from both sets of CoE was a snapshot in time and this research is based mainly on the two CoE but informed by the one-to-one interviews and my own experience in the field. Although the data from the one-to-one interviews were interesting, the overall word count limited its inclusion in the research directly. On reflection, it would have been useful to conduct a CoE with the one-to-one interviewees and to compare the data from each to see whether the adults would articulate their lived experiences of Islamophobia or 'othering' in postcolonial terms.

The data from the CoE were collated prior to Prevent and FBV being legislated in schools, colleges and universities which may have impacted on the CoE data, possibly strengthening my hypotheses that Prevent and FBV contributed to 'othering'. I am also aware that in Wales FBV are expressed in terms of national values which also acknowledges the words "British values" being a "distraction" (ESTYN, 2020, p. 22; Welsh Government, 2016).

The potential for the CoE to bring different voices together to promote epistemic virtue is limited to an individualistic approach. This is important in understanding people's experiences and in terms of epistemic injustice may engage empathy among liberals who see the treatment of Muslims in Britain as unacceptable. However, the voices and experiences of Muslims may remain in the CoE and it will fail to engage the wider non-Muslim public who have not had a chance to be part of a CoE.

## **9.4. Further Research**

I now consider how future research may progress Muslim voices in being heard. I have identified five areas that are worthy of further research to better understand oppressive behaviour toward Muslims living in Britain, and to bring about social justice for them.

### **9.4.1. Postcolonialism**

I consider epistemic injustice, the Prevent strategy and ignorance as being important considerations for future research within postcolonial thought. If epistemic justice is to become a reality for Muslims living in Britain then further research into postcolonialism as an ideology would be advantageous in presenting evidence to the government that postcolonial conditions for Muslims contribute to Islamophobia being sustained. In their study of Bhabha (1991) Moore-Gilbert *et al.*, (1997) argue that a response to "postcolonial politics" (*ibid*, pp. 166-167) is to seize the dominant narratives and open them up to a "re-articulation from postcolonial perspectives". Examining mechanisms that control Muslim voices is vital in identifying political and social control, for example considering 'false consciousness' in postcolonial conditions and a lacuna in hermeneutical resources in epistemic injustice conditions. This has significance to determine whether false consciousness prevents both Muslims and non-Muslims from recognising the effects of Islamophobia. Furthermore, as covered in the limitations of this research, postcolonial conditions as a third-order oppressive system (Dotson, 2014, pp. 129-133; Bailey, 2014) needs to be recognised so the "unlevel knowing field" (Bailey, 2014, p. 62) may be flattened and postcolonial conditions disrupted

for the benefit of Muslims so that "shared hermeneutical resources" (Dotson, 2014, p. 131) limit Muslim "epistemic exclusion" (*ibid*, p. 130).

The Prevent strategy and associated FBV are worthy of further research as this research considers both concepts need to be examined as ideologies to gauge the extent to which they affect Muslim consciousness and agency.

The concept of 'ignorance' (Peels and Blaauw, 2016) within the canon of epistemic injustice is worthy of further research with Muslims to interrogate how knowledge about them may be better understood. I acknowledge "active ignorance" and "epistemic arrogance" (Medina, 2013, p. 51; 31) are injustices committed against Muslims living in Wales and that further research in 'ignorance' may unlock how false consciousness and "false belief" (Fricker, 2007, p. 21) sustain Islamophobia.

#### **9.4.2. Deep Epistemic Injustice**

It may be that Muslims in Britain are seen by the wider, secular, non-Muslim public (in an epistemic injustice paradigm) as "religious aliens" (Kidd, 2017, p. 389) holding religious belief in "supernatural entities" (*ibid*, p. 392) prejudicially deflating Muslim testimonial credibility. This is particularly true of religious groups who "might be negatively stereotyped" (Kidd, 2017, p. 392). A similar condition is also said to occur within academia where those who hold a "naturalistic worldview" (*ibid*), which argues that belief in religion must be evidence of "epistemic fault" (Kidd, 2017, p. 393) and as such those who claim a religious experience are not given testimonial credibility. The denial by naturalists of this condition, referred to by Kidd as "deep epistemic injustice" (*ibid*), is beyond the scope of this research,

but is worthy of further academic examination. However, an interesting point to note is whether a lack of hermeneutical resources by non-Muslims may contribute to them viewing Muslims as aliens, generating hermeneutical injustices toward them. Haslanger (2017, p. 279) puts forward the view that if knowledge of God is gained "through mystical experience or revelation not available to all rational inquirers, this would not be objective knowledge". Furthermore, religious belief may be attacked by science, rationality and logic precluding it from being considered alongside rights championed by for example, children's rights, feminism, women's rights, anti-racism, animal rights and environmental issues that have all ultimately gained political traction to achieve positive results.

#### **9.4.3. Safe Spaces for Muslim Discussion**

A recent ESTYN report (2020) into how schools were implementing Prevent (Home Office, 2011a) showed that a minority of schools did not have mechanism in place to allow pupils to be consulted or listened to about "risky behaviours or expressions of radical or extremist inspired ideas" (ESTYN, 2020, p. 15), a potential breach of article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989; *School Councils (Wales) Regulations 2005*). There are examples of resilience building to counter extremism, with a strong emphasis in involving Prevent staff (ESTYN, 2020, pp. 17-21). However, I see little to suggest a safe space for Muslim voices to be heard other than within a narrative constrained by Prevent duties (Taylor and Soni, 2017), which I suggest further securitises Muslim voices. The right to be able to tell stories, and to engage in storytelling to construct personal narratives

(Sparkes, 2005; Thomas and Killick, 2007) along with critical thinking without fear of being labelled 'extreme' is a fundamental right for all young people.

I also extend proposed future research to include whether Prevent (Home Office, 2011a) and FBV (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) have significance for Muslim students studying at British Universities in the context of the government's Office for Students (Office for Students, 2018; *Higher Education and Research Act 2017*; discussed in Appendix 8 ) which has relevance for free speech or political dissent on campus.

I have also considered that if I were to write the THINK Project (2012) now, I would consider a different approach for example, allowing white, Welsh young people to consider privilege as a way to exploring postcolonialism, which would include acknowledging Britain's "colonial legacy from which Muslims are now recuperating from" (Bari, 2004, p. 122; see also for example, Dotson, 2014).

#### **9.4.4. Islamophobia seen through an Epistemic Injustice Perspective**

The study of Islamophobia as an ideology from an epistemic injustice perspective would allow injustices to be seen for what they are and not hidden in terminology that presents Muslim hate crime as somehow normal and acceptable.

Islamophobia is invisible in "public and political spaces" (Allen, 2020, p. 129) and I argue there is no need to redefine it but rather locate and analyse it through epistemic injustice so it may be seen. Postcolonial and epistemic injustice descriptors are more relevant than looking for evidence of Islamophobia.

"Religions and religious teachings do not need to be afforded protection; people

however - individuals and communities - sadly do" (Allen, 2020, p. 121). The failure to attribute state policy directly to the 'othering' of the young Muslims does not mean that state hegemony does not exist for them. It means that further research is needed to uncover it and questions for future research must come from Muslims themselves.

#### **9.4.5. Muslims as Researchers**

Finally, and in cognizance of postcolonial warnings of speaking for marginalised groups, further research should be carried out by Muslims themselves and their voices articulated in ways that they see as authentic. This includes allowing narratives to be interpreted through postcolonialism which may be more "comprehensible and politically meaningful to them" (Portelli, 1991; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 457),<sup>15</sup> for them to see the conditions in which they are 'othered' without their narratives being interpreted by others.

---

<sup>15</sup> I note that Trastulli's death was manipulated for political gain and the analogy for Muslims to see 'othering' through postcolonialism is a decision for them to make.

## 10. REFERENCES

- Abbas, T. (ed.) (2005) *Muslim Britain: Communities Under Pressure*. London: Zed, in Thomas, P. & Sanderson, P. (2011) 'Unwilling Citizens? Muslim Young People and National Identity', *Sociology*, 45(6), pp. 1028-1044. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038511416161> (Accessed: 3rd September 2019).
- Abbas, T. (2010) '*Islamic studies in Europe*'. *Islam and Muslims in the UK* [Speech]. The British Academy, 23rd-24th March. Available online at: <https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/sites/default/files/08-Abbas.pdf> (Accessed: 15th March 2020).
- Adams, R. (2016) 'Teachers back motion calling for Prevent strategy to be scrapped', *The Guardian*, Monday 28th March. Available online at: [www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/mar/28/teachers-nut-back-motion-calling-prevent-strategy-radicalisation-scrapped](http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/mar/28/teachers-nut-back-motion-calling-prevent-strategy-radicalisation-scrapped) (Accessed: 16th April 2016).
- Adams, C. (2017) 'Hate preacher Abu Hamza: US prison is too tough', *The Telegraph*, Sunday 17th December. Available online at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/12/17/hate-preacher-abu-hamza-us-prison-tough/> (Accessed: 1st May 2020).
- Adorno, T. W. (1974) 'Ideologie', in *Soziologische Exkurse* (Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, pp. 162-81(p.169), in Rosen, M. (1996) *On Voluntary Servitude. False Consciousness and the Theory of Ideology*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p.1.
- Ahmad and others (2013) Case Summary of 'Ahmad and others v United Kingdom' (2013) 56 EHRR1. (Lawteacher.net, October 2018). Available online at: [www.lawteacher.net/cases/ahmad-and-others-v-uk.php](http://www.lawteacher.net/cases/ahmad-and-others-v-uk.php) (Accessed: 24th October 2018).



- Ahmed, S. (2009) *Seen and Not Heard. Voices of young British Muslims*.  
Leicestershire: Policy Research Centre Islamic Foundation.
- Ahmed, S. and Matthes, J. (2016) 'Media representation of Muslims and Islam from 2000 to 2015: A meta-analysis', *International Communication Gazette*, 79(3), pp. 219-244. Available online at:  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048516656305> (Accessed: 18th January 2018).
- Alase, A. (2017) 'The Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA): A guide to a Good Qualitative Research Approach', *International Journal of Education and Literacy Studies*, 5(2), pp. 9-19. Australian International Academic centre, Australia. Available online at: [doi:107575/aiac.ijels.v.5n.2p.9](https://doi.org/10.1075/aiac.ijels.v.5n.2p.9)  
(Accessed: 18th August 2019).
- Alcoff, L. M. (2017) 'Philosophy and Philosophical Practice. Eurocentrism as an epistemology of ignorance', in Kidd, I., J., Medina, J., and Pohlhaus, Jr., G. (2017) *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice*. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 397-408.
- Alderson, P., and Morrow, V. (2004) *Ethics, Social Research and Consulting with Children and Young people*. Essex: Barnardo's
- Allen, D. G. (1995) 'Hermeneutics: philosophical traditions and nursing practice research', *Nursing Science Quarterly*, 8(4), pp. 174-182, in Laverty, S. M. (2003) 'Hermeneutic Phenomenology and Phenomenology: A Comparison of Historical and Methodological Considerations', *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 2(3), pp. 21-35. Available online at:  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/160940690300200303> (Accessed: 21st November 2019).
- Allen, C., and Nielsen, J. S. (2002) *Summary report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001* (Vienna: EUMC, 2002). Available online at:  
[www.fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra\\_uploads/199-Synthesis-report\\_en.pdf](http://www.fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/199-Synthesis-report_en.pdf) (Accessed: 18th January 2018).

- Allen, C. (2007) *The 'first' decade of Islamophobia: 10 years of the Runnymede Trust report "Islamophobia: a challenge for us all"*. Available online at: [www.mywf.org.uk/uploads/projects/borderlines/Archive/2007/Decade\\_of\\_islamophobia.pdf](http://www.mywf.org.uk/uploads/projects/borderlines/Archive/2007/Decade_of_islamophobia.pdf) (Accessed: 24th April 2017).
- Allen, C. (2007a) "A normal week" in *The search for common ground: Muslims, non-Muslims and the UK media*. London: INSTEAD, pp. 17-30. Available online at: [www.instead.co.uk/search-for-common-ground.pdf](http://www.instead.co.uk/search-for-common-ground.pdf) (Accessed: 1st April 2017).
- Allen, C. (2010) *Islamophobia*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Allen, C. (2012) *A review of the evidence relating to the representation of Muslims and Islam in the British media*. (Written evidence submitted to the All Party Parliamentary Group On Islamophobia 24th October 2012). Available online at: [www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/social-policy/IASS/news-events/MEDIA-ChrisAllen-APPGEvidence-Oct2012.pdf](http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/social-policy/IASS/news-events/MEDIA-ChrisAllen-APPGEvidence-Oct2012.pdf) (Accessed: 9th July 2017).
- Allen, C. (2015) 'Britishness and Muslim-ness: differentiation, demarcation and discrimination in political discourse', *Identity Papers: a Journal of British and Irish studies*, 1(2), pp. 1-12. Available online at: doi:10.5920/idp.2015.121 (Accessed: 31st July 2018).
- Allen, C. (2015a) 'Islamophobia: A Human Rights Perspective' [Lecture]. Cardiff University 6th March 2015. Available online at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNm4ir6BuHw> (Accessed: 28th January 2020).
- Allen, C. (2019) 'A New Pessimism for Tackling Islamophobia Accompanies Boris Johnson's New Conservative Government', Medium.com, 17th December. Available online at: <https://medium.com/@mail.chrisallen/a-new-pessimism-for-tackling-islamophobia-accompanies-boris-johnsons-new-conservative-government-5dbfaeb744b6> (Accessed: 9th January 2020).
- Allen, C. (2020) *Reconfiguring Islamophobia: A Radical Rethinking of a Contested Concept*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Pivot.

- All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, (2018) *Islamophobia Defined: The inquiry into a working definition of Islamophobia*. London: All party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims. Available online at: <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/599c3d2febbd1a90cffdd8a9/t/5bfd1ea3352f531a6170ceee/1543315109493/Islamophobia+Defined.pdf> (Accessed: 28th January 2019).
- All Wales Core Programme (2004) *Evaluation of the All Wales School Liaison Core Programme: Research commissioned by the Welsh Assembly Government*. Published January 2011 by the Centre for Research in Education Inclusion and Diversity. Available online at: [www.docs.hss.ed.uk/education/creid/Briefings25.pdf](http://www.docs.hss.ed.uk/education/creid/Briefings25.pdf) [Accessed: 5th May 2020]. Also available at <https://www.dyfed-powys.police.uk/en/newsroom/press-releases/the-all-wales-school-liaison-core-programme/> (Accessed: 16th March 2018).
- Aly, R. M. K. (2015) *Becoming an Arab in London: Performativity and the undoing of identity*. London: Pluto Press.
- Amin, A. (2003) 'Unruly Strangers? The 2001 urban riots in Britain', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 27(2), pp. 460-463. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.00459> (Accessed: 27th April 2020).
- Amin-Khan, T. (2012) 'New Orientalism, Securitisation and the Western Media's Incendiary Racism', *Third World Quarterly*, 33(9), pp. 1595-1610. Available online at: <https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2012.720831> (Accessed: 27th April 2020).
- Anderson, E. (2006) "The Epistemology of Democracy", *Episteme*, 3(1-2), pp. 8-22. Published online by Cambridge University Press 3rd January 2012. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.3366/epi.2006.3.1-2.8> (Accessed 12th May 2020) also in Medina, J. (2013) *The Epistemology of Resistance. Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations*. USA: Oxford University Press, pp. 8-22.

- Anderson, P. (2016) *Fighting 'terrorism', repressing democracy: Surveillance and resistance in the UK*, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2016/1 University of Warwick School of Law. Available online at: [https://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id2776155](https://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id2776155) (Accessed: 7th May 2020).
- Andrews, N. D., Bothroyd, J., Copeman, M., Lyle, S., and Needle, N. (2019) *Meetings that Matter: Talking together proactively to support learning, development and research mindedness*. Research report. Wales School for Social Care Research. Available online at: <https://www.monmouthshire.gov.uk/app/uploads/2019/08/Collab-not-competition.pdf> (Accessed: 7th May 2020).
- Anwar, M. (1988) *Between Cultures. Continuity and Change in the Lives of Young Asians*. London: Routledge.
- Appiah, K. A. (2005) *The Ethics of Identity*. Reprint. Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press, 2007.
- Apple, M. W. (2001) *Educating the "Right" Way. Markets, Standards, God and Equality*. London: Routledge Falmer.
- Archer, L. (2009) 'Race, 'Face' and Masculinity: The Identities and local Geographies of Muslim Boys', in Hopkins, P., and Gale, R. (eds.) *Muslims in Britain. Race, Place and Identities*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 74-75.
- Arksey, H., and Knight, P. (1999) *Interviewing for Social Scientists*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
- Asim, Q. M. (2015) 'British Values are Muslim Values', *ImamsOnline.com*, February 2015. Available online at: [www.imamsonline.com/british-values-are-muslim-values/](http://www.imamsonline.com/british-values-are-muslim-values/) (Accessed: 18th February 2018).

- Atkins, V. (2018) 'Urgent question: To ask (the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the Home Office), if she will make a statement on hate crime in the light of the inflammatory letters inciting a "Punish a Muslim day" on 3rd April', *Hansard: House of Commons debates*, 12th March 2018, 637, c. 593-4. Available online at: <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2018-03-12/debates/1803121000001/HateCrime> (Accessed: 28th January 2019).
- Bailey, A. (2007) 'Strategic Ignorance', in S. Sullivan and N. Tuana (eds.), *Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance*. Albany: SUNY Press, pp. 77-94.  
Available online at:  
[https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id1334712](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id1334712)  
(Accessed: 8th May 2020).
- Bailey, A. (2014). 'The Unlevel Knowing Field: An Engagement with Dotson's Third-Order Epistemic Oppression', *Social Epistemology and Reply Collective*, 3(10), pp. 62-68. Available online at: <https://social-epistemology.com/2014/09/29/the-unlevel-knowing-field-an-engagement-with-dotsons-third-order-epistemic-oppression-alison-bailey/>  
(Accessed: 9th May 2020).
- Bakhtin, M. (1984) *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics; (Theory and History of Literature)* Edited and translated from the Russian by Caryl Emerson. London and Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Available online at: [www.fulcrum-org.ezproxy.uwtsd.ac.uk](http://www.fulcrum-org.ezproxy.uwtsd.ac.uk) (Accessed: 11th May 2020).
- Baldwin, T., and Rozenburg, G. (2004) 'I Want an Integrated Society With a Difference (Trevor Phillips)', *The Times*, 3rd April, in Modood, T. (2007) *Multiculturalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 11.
- Bano, S. (2010) 'Asking the law questions. Agency and Muslim women', in Sayid, S., and Vakil, A. *Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives*. London: C. Hurst & Co.

- Barker, M. (1981) *New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe*. Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, in Allen, C. (2015) 'Britishness and Muslim-ness: differentiation, demarcation and discrimination in political discourse', *Identity Papers: a journal of British and Irish studies*, 1(2), pp. 1-12. Available online at: [www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/social-policy/Publications-IASS/allen-chris-publications.pdf](http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/social-policy/Publications-IASS/allen-chris-publications.pdf) (Accessed: 31st July 2018).
- Bari, M. A. (2004) *Race, Religion and Muslim Identity*. Swansea: Renaissance Press, 2005.
- Bates, T. R. (1975) 'Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 36(2), pp. 351-366. Available online at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2708933> (Accessed: 27th March 2018).
- BBC (2009) *Jihad*, 3rd August. Available online at: [https://www.bbc.co.uk/religions/islam/beliefs/jihad\\_1.shtml](https://www.bbc.co.uk/religions/islam/beliefs/jihad_1.shtml) (Accessed: 13th May 2020).
- BBC News (2011) *State multiculturalism has failed, says David Cameron*, 5th February. Available online at: [www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994) (Accessed: 30th November 2016).
- BBC News (2013) *Woolwich machete attack leaves man dead*, 23rd May. Available online at: <https://bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22630303> (Accessed: 21st August 2020).
- BBC News, (2014) *Trojan Horse probe headed by ex-Met chief Peter Clarke*, 15th April. Available online at: [www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-27031941](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-27031941) (Accessed: 29th November 2016).
- BBC News, (2014) *Failed 21/7 London bombers lose European court appeal*, 16th December. Available online at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30493640> (Accessed: 30th April 2020).

- BBC News, (2015) Charlie Hebdo attack: Three days of terror, 14th January.*  
Available online at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30708237>  
(Accessed: 5th October 2020).
- BBC News, (2015) Election profile: Respect Party, 27th March.* Available online at:  
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2015-31694255> (Accessed: 26th  
January 2020).
- BBC News, (2015) Paris attacks: What happened on the night, 9th December.*  
Available online at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34818994>  
(Accessed: 21st August 2020).
- BBC News, (2017) London attack: Two killed in Westminster 'terror' incident, 22nd  
March.* Available online at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-39355940>  
(Accessed: 21st August 2020).
- BBC News, (2017) London attack: BBC reporter witnesses van hit pedestrians, 3rd  
June.* Available online at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-40147114>  
(Accessed: 21st August 2020).
- BBC News, (2018) Leveson accused ministers of breaking promises to phone  
hacking victims, 1st March.* Available online at: [www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-43247078](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-43247078) (Accessed: 2nd March 2018).
- BBC News, (2018) Westminster car crash: Man arrested on suspicion of terror  
offences, 14th August.* Available online at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-45180120> (Accessed: 21st August 2020).
- BBC News, (2019) Who was Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi?, 28th October.* Available  
online at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-50200392>  
(Accessed: 30th April 2020).
- BBC News, (2019) London Bridge: Two killed in stabbing attack, 29th November.*  
Available online at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-50604781>  
(Accessed: 21st August 2020).
- BBC News, (2020) Streatham attacker had been released from jail, 2nd February.*  
Available online at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-51349664> (Accessed: 21st August 2020).

- BBC News, (2020) *Extremism: 'More than 250 people in Wales flagged over concerns*, 5th February. Available online at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-51375490> (Accessed: 6th February 2020).
- BBC News, (2020) *Charlie Hebdo: 14 suspects on trial over Paris massacre*, 2nd September. Available online at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-53975350> (Accessed: 5th October 2020).
- BERA, (2011) *Ethical Guidelines for Educational Research*. (British Educational Research Association. Available online at: [www.bera.ac.uk](http://www.bera.ac.uk). (Accessed: 3rd November 2011).
- Berger, R. (2015) 'Now I see it, now I don't: researcher's position and reflexivity in qualitative research', *Qualitative Research*, 15(2), pp. 219-234. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1468794112468475>. (Accessed: 12th September 2019).
- Beverley, J. (2001) 'What happens when the subaltern speaks?', in Arias, A. (ed.) *The Rigoberta Menchu controversy* (pp. 219-236). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, in Cannella, G. S., and Viruru, R. (2004) *Childhood and Postcolonization. Power, Education and Contemporary Practice*. London: Routledge Falmer.
- Bhabha, H. K. (1991) '"Race", Time and the Revision of Modernity', *Oxford Literary Review*, 13(1/2), pp. 193-219. Available online at: [www.jstor.org/stable/43973716](http://www.jstor.org/stable/43973716) (Accessed: 14th May 2020).
- Bhargava, R. (2013) 'Overcoming the Epistemic Injustice of Colonialism', *Global Policy*, 4(4), pp. 413-417. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12093> (Accessed: 4th July 2019).
- Blair, T. (1997) *Leader's Speech, Brighton* [Speech] Available online at: [www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=203](http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=203) (Accessed: 7th January 2020).



- Blair, T. (2000) 'Tony Blair's Britain speech', *The Guardian*, 28th March. Available online at:  
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2000/mar/28/britishidentity.tonyblair>  
 (Accessed: 7th January 2020).
- Bloemraad, I., Korteweg, A., Yurdakul, G. (2008) 'Citizenship and Immigration: Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State', *Annual Review of Sociology* 34(1), pp. 153-179. Available online at: doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.34.040507.134608 (Accessed: 7th March 2020).
- Blower, C. (2016) 'Commentating after the debate on motion 23', *National Union of Teachers Conference*, Brighton, 28th March 2016. Available online at: [www.teachers.org.uk/news-events/conference-2016](http://www.teachers.org.uk/news-events/conference-2016)  
 (Accessed: 16th April 2016).
- Bonino, S. (2013) 'Prevent-ing Muslimness in Britain: The Normalisation of Exceptional Measures to Combat Terrorism', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 33(3), pp. 385-400. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2013.853977>  
 (Accessed: 11th November 2018).
- Bonner, R. (2011) 'The Media and 9/11: How we did', *The Atlantic*, 9th September. Available online at: [www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/09/the-media-and-9-11-how-we-did-/244818/](http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/09/the-media-and-9-11-how-we-did-/244818/) (Accessed: 8th July 2017).
- Boothman, D. (2008) 'The Sources for Gramsci's Concept of Hegemony', *Rethinking Marxism. A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society*, 20(2), pp. 201-215. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/08935690801916942>  
 (Accessed: 10th March 2020).
- Bourne, N. (2017) 'Islamophobia', Hansard: *House of Lords debates*, 17th October, 785, c. 486. Available online at: <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2017-10-17/debates/A731DF08-23EA-4D1F-B206--00FCB7EB2C67/Islamophobia>  
 (Accessed: 28th January 2019).

- Bowcott, O. (2019) 'Lord Carlisle removed from Prevent review after legal challenge', *The Guardian*, Friday 20th December. Available online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/dec/19/lord-carlisle-prevent-review-legal-challenge> (Accessed: 6th February 2020).
- British Nationality Act 1981*, c. 61. Available online at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/61> (Accessed: 16th October 2020).
- Brocki, J. M., and Wearden, A. J. (2006) 'A Critical evaluation of the use of interpretive phenomenological analysis (IPA) in health psychology', *Psychology and Health*, 21(1), pp. 87-108. Available online at: doi:10.1080/14768320500230185 (Accessed: 14th May 2020).
- Brocklehurst, S. (2017) 'The day terror came to Glasgow Airport', *BBC News*, 30th June. Available online at <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-30416026> (Accessed: 30th April 2020).
- Brown, G. (2004) 'British Council annual lecture', [Speech] The British Council, London. 7th July 2004. Available online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/jul/08/uk.labour1> (Accessed: 7th January 2020).
- Brown, L., and Richards, B. (2016) 'Media Representations of Islam in Britain: A sojourner Perspective', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 36(3), pp. 350-363. Available online at: <https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2016.1216627> (Accessed: 13th May 2020)
- Browne, A. (2006) *The Retreat of Reason. Political correctness and the corruption of public debate in modern Britain*. London: Civitas.
- Burke, B. (1999) 'Antonio Gramsci, Schooling and Education', *The Encyclopaedia of Informal Education*, 2005. Available online at: <http://www.infed.org/mobi/antonio-gramsci-schooling-and-education/> (Accessed: 27th March 2018).

- Busher, J., Choudhury, T., Thomas, P., Harris, G. (2017) *What the Prevent duty means for schools and colleges in England: An analysis of educationalists' experiences*. Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University. Available online at: [www.eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/32349](http://www.eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/32349) (Accessed: 20th November 2017).
- Calvet, P. (1974) *Linguistique et colonialisme: petit traite de glottophagie*. Paris: Payot, in Young, R. J. C. (2001) *Postcolonialism. An Historical Introduction*. Reprint. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.
- Cameron, Rt. Hon D. (2011) 'PM's speech at Munich Security Conference', [Speech] Munich Security Conference. 5th February 2011. Available online at: [www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference](http://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference) (Accessed: 29th November 2016).
- Cameron, Rt. Hon D. (2014) 'British values: article by David Cameron', [Speech] *Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street and The Rt Hon David Cameron*, 15th June 2014. Available online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/british-values-article-by-david-cameron> (Accessed: 1st May 2020).
- Cameron, Rt. Hon D. (2015) 'At Ninestiles School in Birmingham, Prime Minister David Cameron set out his plans to address extremism', [Speech] Ninestiles School, Birmingham, 20th July 2015. Available online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/extremism-pm-speech> (Accessed: 18th November 2017).
- Cannella, G. S., and Viruru, R. (2004) *Childhood and Postcolonization. Power, Education and Contemporary Practice*. London: Routledge Falmer.
- Cannella, G. S. and Lincoln, Y., S. (2011) 'Ethics, Research Regulations, and Critical Social Science', in Denzin, N., K. and Lincoln, Y., S. (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. 4th edn. London: SAGE Publications Ltd., pp. 81-89.

- Cantle, T. (2001) *Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team*. London: Home Office. Available online at: [www.tedcantle.co.uk/pdf/communitycohesion%20cantlereport.pdf](http://www.tedcantle.co.uk/pdf/communitycohesion%20cantlereport.pdf) (Accessed: 10th April 2016).
- Cantle, T. (2012) *Interculturalism. The New Era of Cohesion and Diversity*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cantle, T. and Thomas, P. (2014) *Taking the Think project Forward - The Need for Preventative Anti-Extremism Educational Work*. Swansea: Ethnic Youth Support Team. Available online at: [www.tedcantle.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/081-EYST-Think-Project-Report-2014.pdf](http://www.tedcantle.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/081-EYST-Think-Project-Report-2014.pdf) (Accessed: 28th December 2015).
- Cantle, T., and Kaufmann, E. (2016) 'Is segregation on the increase in the UK?', *Open Democracy*, 2nd November. Available online at: [www.opendemocracy.net/wfd/ted-cantle-and-eric-kaufmann/is-segregation-on-increase-in-uk](http://www.opendemocracy.net/wfd/ted-cantle-and-eric-kaufmann/is-segregation-on-increase-in-uk) (Accessed: 30th November 2016).
- Cantle, T. (2016) 'Louise Casey - the unlikely civil servant (Cantle)', *Integration Hub*, 5th December. Available online at: [www.integrationhub.net/ted-cantle-on-the-casey-review/](http://www.integrationhub.net/ted-cantle-on-the-casey-review/) (Accessed: 20th November 2017).
- Cantle, T. (2017) 'In a world of hate, fear and 'alternative facts', education really does matter', *Open Democracy UK*, 27th February. Available online at: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/wfd/uk/ted-cantle/in-world-of-hate-fear-and-alternative-facts-education-really-does-matter> (Accessed: 6th March 2018).
- Casey Review (2016) *The Casey Review: a review into opportunity and integration*. London: DfCLG, December. Available online at: [www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-casey-review-a-review-into-opportunity-and-integration](http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-casey-review-a-review-into-opportunity-and-integration) (Accessed: 24th April 2017).

- Chappell, L., Clifton, J., Gottfried, G., And Lawton, K. (2010) *Exploring the Roots of BNP Support, an ippr briefing paper*. London: Institute for Public Policy Research. Available online at:  
[http://www.ippr.org/images/media/files/publication/2011/05/Exploring%20the%20Roots%20of%20BNP%20Support\\_1766.pdf](http://www.ippr.org/images/media/files/publication/2011/05/Exploring%20the%20Roots%20of%20BNP%20Support_1766.pdf)  
 (Accessed: 23rd November 2011).
- Chrisafis, A. (2011) 'Full-face veils outlawed as France spells out controversial ban', *The Guardian*, 3rd March. Available online at:  
[www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/03/niqab-ban-france-muslim-veil](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/03/niqab-ban-france-muslim-veil)  
 (Accessed: 31st October 2018).
- Christie, D., Cassidy, C., Skinner, D., Coutts, N., Sinclair, C., Rimpilainen, S., and Wilson, A. (2007) 'Building collaborative communities of enquiry in educational research', *Educational Research and Evaluation. An International Journal on Theory and Practice*, 13(3), pp. 263-279. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13803610701632091> (Accessed: 16th May 2020).
- Cifuentes, R., Whittaker, G. R., and Lake, L. (2013) 'The THINK Project: An Approach to Addressing Racism and Far-Right Extremism in Swansea, South Wales', *Democracy and Security*, 9(3), pp. 304-325. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2013.802985>  
 (Accessed: 30th July 2018).
- Cifuentes, R. (2016) 'The Think Project, Brexit and urgent need for better citizenship education', *Open Democracy UK*, 8th July. Available online at:  
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/rocio-cifuentes/think-project-brexit-and-urgent-need-for-better-citizenship-education> (Accessed: 6th March 2018).
- Clarke, P. (2014) *Report into allegations concerning Birmingham schools arising from the 'Trojan Horse' letter*. HC576. Available online at:  
[www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/340526/HC\\_accessible\\_-.pdf](http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/340526/HC_accessible_-.pdf) (Accessed: 29th November 2016).
- Clough, P., and Nutbrown, C. (2002) *A student's Guide to Methodology*. Reprint. London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2008.

CMSS (2015) *Workshop: Building Resilience-Countering Extremism and Racism*, workshops delivered to students at Nedlands Office Centre, 18 Stirling Highway, Nedlands, 6009, on behalf of the Centre for Muslim States and Societies, University of Western Australia, Perth. 23rd, 24th, 30th April, 1st, 8th May, 2015. Available online at:  
<https://www.cmss.uwa.edu.au/events/past> (Accessed: 23rd March 2020).

Coghlan, D., and Brydon-Miller, M. (2014) (eds.) *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Action Research*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd., Volumes 1&2.

Cohen, L., Manion, L., and Morrison, K. (2000) *Research Methods in Education*. 5th edn. Oxon: Routledge Falmer, 2005.

Cole, P. (2000) *Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, in Struthers, A., E., C. (2017) 'Teaching British Values in Our Schools: But Why not Human Rights Values?', *Social and Legal Studies*, 26(1) pp. 89-110. Available online at:  
<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0964663916656752>  
(Accessed: 5th January 2020).

Commons Select Committee (2018) *Committee takes evidence on anti-Muslim sentiments in the print media*. Home Affairs Committee, Committee Room 15, Palace of Westminster, Tuesday 20th February 2018. Available online at:  
[www.data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-affairs-committee/hate-crime-and-its-violent-consequences/oral/78630.html](http://www.data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-affairs-committee/hate-crime-and-its-violent-consequences/oral/78630.html) (Accessed: 25th February 2018).

Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2011) *The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism*, HM Government. Available online at:  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest> (Accessed: 16th May 2020).

*Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*, c. 6, s 26(1). Available online at:  
[www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/contents/enacted](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/contents/enacted)  
(Accessed: 16th May 2020).

- Creswell, J. W. (2013) *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*. London: Sage.
- Crime and Disorder Act 1998, c. 37*. Available online at:  
<https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/37/contents>  
(Accessed: 27th August 2020).
- Cumbria Safeguarding Children Partnership Procedures Manual (2015)  
*Supporting Children and Young People Vulnerable to Violent Extremism and Radicalisation*. Available online at:  
<https://cumbrialscb.proceduresonline.com/index.htm>  
(Accessed: 21st May 2020).
- Cunningham, D. (2007) 'Surveillance and social movements: Lenses on the Repression-Mobilization nexus', *Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews*, 36(2), pp. 120-124. Available online at:  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/009430610703600205>  
(Accessed: 7th May 2020).
- Cunningham, J. (2014) 'Marxism', in Coghlan, D., and Brydon-Miller, M. (2014) (eds.) *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Action Research: Volume 2*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd., pp. 526-529.
- Davies, L. (2008) *Educating Against Extremism*. England: Trentham Books Ltd.
- Davies, L. (2016) 'Security, Extremism and Education: Safeguarding or Surveillance?', *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 64(1), pp. 1-19.  
Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.80/00071005.2015.1107022>  
(Accessed: 5th May 2020).
- Dawkins, R. (2007) *The God Delusion*. Great Britain: Transworld Publishers.
- de Kock, L. (1992) 'An Interview with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak', *Ariel: A Review of International English Literature*, 23(3), pp. 29-47, *New Nation Writers Conference*, South Africa, July 1992. Available online at:  
[www.jan.ucc.nau.edu/~sj6/Spivak%20Interview%20DeKock.pdf](http://www.jan.ucc.nau.edu/~sj6/Spivak%20Interview%20DeKock.pdf)  
(Accessed: 17th May 2020).
- Delamont, S. (2002) *Fieldwork in Educational Settings. Methods, pitfalls and perspectives*. 2nd edn. London: Routledge.

- Denscombe, M. (1998) *The Good Research Guide*. 2nd edn. Berkshire: Open University Press, 2003.
- Denzin, N. K., and Lincoln, Y., S. (eds.) (2011) *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. 4th edn. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Department for Education and Skills (2007) *Curriculum Review: Diversity and Citizenship*, Nottingham: HMSO. Available online at: [www.educationengland.org.uk/documents/pdfs/2007-ajegbo-report-citizenship.pdf](http://www.educationengland.org.uk/documents/pdfs/2007-ajegbo-report-citizenship.pdf) (Accessed: 7th January 2020).
- DfE. (2011) (Department for Education) *Teachers Standards. Guidance for school leaders, school staff and governing bodies*, Department for Education. Available online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/teachers-standards> (Accessed: 30th April 2020).
- DfE. (2014) (Department for Education) *Promoting fundamental British Values as part of SMSC in schools*. Department for Education. Available online at: [www.gov.uk/government/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/380595/smsc\\_guidance\\_maintained\\_schools.pdf](http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/attachment_data/file/380595/smsc_guidance_maintained_schools.pdf) (Accessed: 30th November 2016).
- DfE. (2015) (Department for Education) *Protecting children from radicalisation: the prevent duty*, Published online: Department for Education, 1st July 2015. Available online at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/protecting-children-from-radicalisation-the-prevent-duty> (Accessed: 20th February 2018).
- DfE. (2020) (Department for Education) *Plan your relationships, sex and health curriculum*, Published online: Department for Education, 24th September 2020. Available online at: <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/plan-your-relationships-sex-and-health-curriculum> (Accessed: 5th October 2020).
- Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (2006) *Promoting good relations, fostering shared values and preventing violent extremism in Universities and Higher Education Colleges*. Available online at: [www.webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/tna/+https://www.dius.gov.uk/publications/extremismhe.pdf](http://www.webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/tna/+https://www.dius.gov.uk/publications/extremismhe.pdf) (Accessed: 28th November 2017).



- Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (2009) *The Role of Further Education Colleges in Preventing Violent Extremism: Next Steps*. Available online at:  
[www.safecolleges.org.uk/sites/default/files/17193\\_DIUS\\_Next\\_Steps\\_0.pdf](http://www.safecolleges.org.uk/sites/default/files/17193_DIUS_Next_Steps_0.pdf)  
 (Accessed: 28th November 2017).
- Department of Education and Science, (1985) *Education for all: Report of the committee of inquiry into the education of children from ethnic minority groups* (The Swann Report), London: HMSO. Available online at:  
[www.educationengland.org.uk/documents/swann/swann1985.html](http://www.educationengland.org.uk/documents/swann/swann1985.html)  
 (Accessed: 13th April 2017).
- Dickens, J. (2015) 'Ofsted starts talks over more anti-extremism teacher training', *Schools Week*, 14th November. Available online at:  
<http://schoolsweek.co.uk/ofsted-starts-talks-over-more-anti-extremism-teacher-training/> (Accessed: 18th November 2017).
- Diener, E., and Crandall, R. (1978) *Ethics in Social and Behavioural Research*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, in Cohen, L., Manion, L., and Morrison, K. (2000) *Research Methods in Education*. 5th edn. Oxon: Routledge Falmer, 2005.
- Dobe, K. S., and Chhokar, S. S. (2000) 'Muslims, Ethnicity and the law', *International Journal of Discrimination and the Law*, 4(4), pp. 369-86. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/135822910000400404>. (Accessed: 17th May 2020).
- Dotson, K. (2014) 'Conceptualising Epistemic Oppression', *Social Epistemology. A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy*, 28(2), pp. 115-138. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2013.782585> (Accessed: 9th May 2020).
- Du Bois, W. E. B. (1903) *The Souls of Black Folk*. Reprint. Seattle: Amazon Classics, 2017.

- Dumitru, D. (2012) 'Communities of inquiry. A method to teach', *Procedia - Social and Behavioural Sciences*, 33, pp. 238-242. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2012.01.119>. (Accessed: 17th May 2020).
- Eaton, C. Le Gai., Henzell-Thomas, J., Mostafa, M. (2008) *The Book of Hadith: Sayings of the Prophet Muhammed from the Mishkat Al Masabih*. St. Michel de Montjole, France: The Book Foundation.
- Echeverria, E., and Hannam, P. (2017) 'The Community of philosophical inquiry (P4C): A pedagogical proposal for advancing democracy', in Gregory, M., R., Haynes, J., and Murriss, K. (eds.) (2016) *The Routledge International Handbook of Philosophy for Children*. London: Routledge, pp. 3-10.
- Education Act 1986*, c. 61, Part 4, section 43. Available online at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ugpga/1986/61/section/43> (Accessed: 8th September 2020).
- Education Act 2002*, c. 32, Part 6, section 78. Available online at: [www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/32/contents](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/32/contents) (Accessed: 1st May 2020).
- Education Select Committee (2015) *Extremism in schools: the Trojan Horse Affair*, (HC 473). London: The Stationery Office. Available online at: <https://dera.ioe.ac.uk/222429/1/9780215084200.pdf> (Accessed: 26th February 2018).
- Edwards, D., Cromwell, D. (2018) *Propaganda Blitz: How the Corporate Media Distort Reality*. London: Pluto Press.
- Equality Act 2010*, c. 15. Available online at: [www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/pdfs/ukpga\\_20100015\\_en.pdf](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/pdfs/ukpga_20100015_en.pdf) (Accessed: 17th May 2020).
- Esposito, J. L., and Kalin, I. (eds.) (2011) *Islamophobia. The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- ESTYN (2015) *Guidance for the Inspection of Secondary Schools* (updated September 2015). Cardiff: ESTYN. Available online at: [www.estyn.gov.wales](http://www.estyn.gov.wales) (Accessed: 5th May 2019).

ESTYN (2020) *Prevent-how well maintained schools implement their duties under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*. Cardiff: ESTYN. Available online at:

<https://www.estyn.gov.wales/sites/www.estyn.gov.wales/files/documents/Prevent%20-%20thematic%20report%20en.pdf>

(Accessed: 13th February 2020).

Eurojust (2018) (European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation)

'France, Germany, Belgium and Spain call for the creation of a European Judicial Counter-Terrorism Register', *The Hague*, 21st June 2018. Available online at [www.eurojust.europa.eu/press/pressreleases/pages/2018/2018-06-21.aspx](http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/press/pressreleases/pages/2018/2018-06-21.aspx) (Accessed: 30th April 2020).

European Convention on Human Rights (2010) *Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14*. (Article 10 Freedom of Expression). Available online at:

[https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention\\_Eng.pdf](https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_Eng.pdf)

(Accessed: 8th September 2020).

European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2006) *Muslims in the European Union. Discrimination and Islamophobia*. Austria: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. Available online at:

[https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra\\_uploads/156-Manifestations\\_EN.pdf](https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/156-Manifestations_EN.pdf) (Accessed: 27th August 2020).

Eyerman, R. (1981) 'False Consciousness and Ideology in Marxist Theory,' *Acta Sociologica*, 24(1-2), pp. 43-56. Available online at:

<https://doi.org/10.1177/000169938102400104>

(Accessed: 19th March 2018).

Faith Matters (2018) *Beyond the Incident. Outcomes for victims of Anti-Muslim Prejudice*. London: TellMama. Available online at: [www.tellmamauk.org/tell-mamas-annual-report-for-2017-shows-highest-number-of-anti-muslim-incidents/](http://www.tellmamauk.org/tell-mamas-annual-report-for-2017-shows-highest-number-of-anti-muslim-incidents/) (Accessed: 24th October 2018).

Fanon, F. (1961) *The Wretched of the Earth*. Reprint. Translated from the French by Constance Farrington. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 2001.

- Fanon, F. (1952) *Black Skin, White Masks*. Reprint. Translated from the French by Charles Lam Markmann. London: Pluto Books, 2008.
- Farrell, A. (2005) *Ethical Research With Children*. England: Open University Press.
- Farrell, F. (2016) 'Why all of a sudden do we need to teach fundamental British values? A critical investigation of religious education student teachers positioning within a policy discourse of discipline and control', *Journal of Education for Teaching. International research and pedagogy*, 42(3), pp. 280-297. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/02607476.2016.1184460> (Accessed: 8th January 2020).
- Fekete, L. (2009) *A Suitable Enemy*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ferguson, R. (2015) *Tackling Islamophobia today*. 29th July. Available online at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-2vP-FmVYA> (Accessed: 18th November 2017).
- Field, C. D. (2018) *British Religion in Numbers*. 'Counting Religion in Britain, January 2018'. Available online at [www.brin.ac.uk/2018/counting-religion-in-britain-january-2018/](http://www.brin.ac.uk/2018/counting-religion-in-britain-january-2018/) (Accessed: 24th October 2018).
- Finlay, R., & Hopkins, P. (2019) 'Resistance and marginalisation: Islamophobia and the political participation of young Muslims in Scotland', *Social & Cultural Geography*, pp. 1-23. Published online 5th February 2019. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14649365.2019.1573436>. Also available at: [https://eprint.ncl.ac.uk/file\\_store/production/253960/7E11E0C5-5476-4E55-A575-20AE0255FDAA.pdf](https://eprint.ncl.ac.uk/file_store/production/253960/7E11E0C5-5476-4E55-A575-20AE0255FDAA.pdf) (Accessed: 22nd May 2020).
- Fisher, R. (1995) *Teaching Children to Learn*. Cheltenham: Nelson Thornes Ltd.
- Fisher, R. (1998) *Teaching Thinking. Philosophical Enquiry in the Classroom*. Reprint. London: Continuum, 2000.

- Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007*, c. 20. London: HMSO. Available online at: [www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/20/contents](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/20/contents). (Accessed: 21st May 2020).
- Freire, P. (1970) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Translated from the Portuguese by Myra Bergman Ramos. London: Penguin Books, 1996.
- Fricke, M. (2007) *Epistemic Injustice. Power & the Ethics of Knowing*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Fricke, M. (2016) 'Epistemic Injustice and the Preservation of ignorance', in Peels, R., and Blaauw, M. (eds.) *The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 160-177.
- Fricke, M. (2017) 'Evolving Concepts of Epistemic Injustice', in Kidd, I. J., Medina, J., and Pohlhaus, G. Jr. (eds.) (2017) *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice*. Abingdon Oxon: Routledge.
- Gamble, A., Marsh, D., and Tant, T. (eds.) (1999) *Marxism and Social Science*. London: MacMillan Press Ltd.
- Garrison, D. R. (2014) 'Community of Inquiry', in Coghlan, D., and Brydon-Miller, M. (2014) (eds.) *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Action Research: Vol. 1*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd., pp. 147-150.
- Geertz, C. (1973) 'Thick Description: towards an interpretive theory of culture', in C. Geertz (ed.) *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic books, in Cohen, L., Manion, L., and Morrison, K. (2000) *Research Methods in Education*. 5th edn. Oxon: Routledge Falmer.
- Gandhi, M. K. (1910) Gandhi: *Hind Swaraj, and Other Writings*, Parel, A., J. (ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1017/CB09780511558696> (Accessed: 18th May 2020).
- Giddens, A. (2001) *Sociology*. 4th edn. Reprint. Oxford: Polity Press, 2002.
- Gilani-Williams, F. (2014) 'Islamic Critical Theory: A Tool for Emancipatory Education', *International Journal of Islamic Thought*, 5(1), pp. 16-27. Available online at: doi: 10.24035/ijit.05.2014.003 (Accessed: 17th May 2020).

- Gilroy, P. (2002) *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack*. Oxfordshire: Routledge Classic, 2007.
- Gilroy, P. (2004) *After Empire. Melancholia or convivial culture?* Oxon: Routledge.
- Gilroy, P. (2006) *Postcolonial Melancholia*. New York: Columbia University Press, in Aly, R., M., K. (2015) *Becoming an Arab in London. Performativity and the undoing of identity*. London: Pluto Press.
- Giroux, H. A. (2011) *On Critical Pedagogy*. London: The Continuum International Publishing Group.
- Giroux, H. A. (2016) 'Beyond Pedagogies of Repression', *Monthly Review*, 67(10), 57-71. Available online at:  
<https://www.monthlyreview.org/2016/03/01/beyond-pedagogies-of-repression> (Accessed: 13th March 2018).
- Glazer, N. (1997) *We Are All Multiculturalists Now*, in Struthers, A. E. C. (2017) 'Teaching British Values in Our Schools: But Why not Human Rights Values?', *Social and Legal Studies*, 26(1), pp. 89-110. Available online at:  
<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0964663916656752> (Accessed: 5th January 2020).
- Glees, A., and Pope, C. (2005) *When Students Turn to Terror. Terrorist and Extremist Activity on British Campuses*. London: Social Affairs Unit.
- Golding, C. (2015) 'The Community of Inquiry: Blending Philosophical and Empirical Research', *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 34, pp. 205-216. Available online at: doi: 10.1007/s 11217-014-9420-9 (Accessed: 17th March 2020).
- Gove, Rt. Hon M. (2014) *Extremism in schools: the Trojan Horse affair*, 'Active promotion of British values'. Education Committee. Available online at:  
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmeduc/473/47308.htm> (Accessed: 7th January 2020).

- Grande, S. (2007). 'Red pedagogy: Indigenizing inquiry or, the un-methodology', in Denzin, N. K. & Giardina, M. D. (eds.), *Ethical futures in qualitative research: Decolonizing the politics of knowledge*, Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, pp. 133-144, in Denzin, N. K., and Lincoln, Y. S. (2011) (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. 4th edn. London: SAGE Publications Ltd., p.82.
- Grierson, J. (2019) 'Counter-terror police running secret Prevent database', *The Guardian*, 6th October. Available online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/oct/06/counter-terror-police-are-running-secret-prevent-database> (Accessed: 4th May 2020).
- Grierson, J. (2020) 'Extinction Rebellion guidance raises fresh concerns over Prevent', *The Guardian*, 12th January. Available online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/jan/12/extinction-rebellion-guidance-raises-fresh-concerns-over-prevent> (Accessed: 2nd February 2020).
- Griffith, H. (2015) 'Far right "targeting new, younger generation"', *BBC Wales Today*, BBC News Wales, 17th June. Available online at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-33167441> (Accessed: 29th May 2020).
- Grinter, R. (1990) 'Developing an Antiracist National Curriculum: Constraints and New Directions' in Pumfrey, P., and Verma, G. (eds.), *Race Relations and Urban Education*. London: Falmer Press, pp. 199-213, in Modood, T., and May, S. (2001) 'Multiculturalism and education in Britain: an internally contested debate', *International Journal of Educational Research*, 35(3), pp. 305-317. Available online at: [www.tariqmodood.com/uploads/1/2/3/9/12392325/multiculturalism\\_education\\_britain.pdf](http://www.tariqmodood.com/uploads/1/2/3/9/12392325/multiculturalism_education_britain.pdf) (Accessed: 20th February 2017).
- Hall, S., and O'Shea, A. (2013) 'Common-sense neoliberalism', *Soundings*, 55, pp. 9-25. Available online at: doi:10.3898/136266213809450194 (Accessed: 31st July 2018).

- Hargreaves, J. (2015) 'Half a story? Missing Perspectives in the Criminological Accounts of British Muslim Communities, Crime and the Criminal Justice System', *British Journal of Criminology*, 55(1), pp. 19-38. Available online at: <https://academic-oup-com.exproxy.uwtsd.ac.uk/bjc/article/55/1/19/468451> (Accessed: 12th February 2020).
- Haslanger, S. (2017) 'Objectivity, Epistemic Objectification, and Oppression', in Kidd, I. J., Medina, J., and Pohlhaus, Jr. G. (eds.) (2017) *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Healy, M. (2019) 'Belonging, Social Cohesion and Fundamental British Values', *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 67(4), pp. 432-438. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00071005.2018.1506091> (Accessed: 1st May 2020).
- Heath-Kelly, C. (2013) 'Counter-terrorism and the Counterfactual: Producing the 'Radicalisation' Discourse and the UK PREVENT Strategy', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 15(3), pp. 394-415. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2011.00489.x> (Accessed: 17th May 2020).
- Heath-Kelly, C., and Strausz, E. (2018) *Counter-terrorism in the NHS. Evaluating prevent duty safeguarding in the NHS*. Coventry: University of Warwick. Available online at: [https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/irs/counterterrorisminthenhs/project\\_report\\_60pp.pdf](https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/irs/counterterrorisminthenhs/project_report_60pp.pdf) (Accessed: 21st March 2018).
- Heidegger, M. (1962) *Being and Time*. New York: Harper. (Original work published 1927), in Lavery, S. M. (2003) 'Hermeneutic Phenomenology and Phenomenology: A Comparison of Historical and Methodological Considerations', *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 2(3), pp. 21-35. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/160940690300200303>. (Accessed: 17th May 2020).



- Helm, T., Taylor, T., and Davis, R. (2011) 'David Cameron sparks fury from critics who say attack on multiculturalism has boosted English Defence League', *The Guardian*, Saturday 5th February. Available online at: [www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/feb/05/david-cameron-speech-criticised-edl](http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/feb/05/david-cameron-speech-criticised-edl) (Accessed: 29th November 2016).
- Hess, D. E., and McAvoy, P. (2015) *The Political Classroom*. New York: Routledge, p. 5.
- Hesse, B. (2000) *Unsettled Multiculturalism*. London: Zed Books, in Aly, R. M. K. (2015) *Becoming an Arab in London. Performativity and the undoing of Identity*. London: Pluto Press.
- Heywood, A. (1994) *Political Ideas and Concepts: An Introduction*. London: Macmillan.
- Hickman, K. (2016) *The 1990/1 Gulf War. The Invasion of Kuwait and Operation Desert Shield/Storm*. Available online at: [www.thoughtco.com/the-first-gulf-war-2360859](http://www.thoughtco.com/the-first-gulf-war-2360859) (Accessed: 9th July 2019).
- Higher Education and Research Act 2017*, c. 29. Available online at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2017/29/contents/enacted> (Accessed: 7th September 2020).
- Hillsborough. *Report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel*. (2012) (HC581). London: The Stationery Office. Available online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-report-of-the-hillsborough-independent-panel> (Accessed: 1st May 2020).
- Hitchens, C. (2007) *God is Not Great*. Great Britain: Atlantic Books, 2008.
- HM Government (2006) *Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom's Strategy*. (Cm 6888). London: HMSO. Available online at: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/272320/6888.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272320/6888.pdf) (Accessed: 3rd January 2018).

HM Government (2011) Report to the Home Secretary of Independent Oversight of Prevent Review and Strategy, May 2011, Available online at: [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/97977/lord-carlile-report.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97977/lord-carlile-report.pdf) (Accessed: 27th November 2017).

HM Government (2015) *Channel Duty Guidance. Protecting Vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism*. HM Government. Available online at: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/425189/Channel\\_Duty\\_Guidance\\_April\\_2015.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/attachment_data/file/425189/Channel_Duty_Guidance_April_2015.pdf) (Accessed: 14th April 2016).

Holmwood, J., and O'Toole, T. (2018) *Countering Extremism in British Schools? The truth behind the Birmingham Trojan Horse affair*. Bristol: Policy Press.

Home Office (2011) *Counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST)*. London: Home Office. Available online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest>. (Accessed: 20th May 2020).

Home Office (2011a) *Prevent*. London: Home Office. Available online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-strategy-2011> (Accessed: 20th May 2020).

Home Office (2015) *Prevent duty guidance*. London: Home Office. Available online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance>. (Accessed: 15th April 2016).

Home Office (2017) *Proscribed Terrorist Organisations*. Published online: Home Office. Available online at: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/670599/201712222\\_Proscription.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/670599/201712222_Proscription.pdf) (Accessed: 22nd September 2018).

- Home Office (2017a) *Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2015 to March 2016*. London: Home Office. (Statistical Bulletin 23/17). Available online at:  
[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/677646/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2015-mar2016.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/677646/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2015-mar2016.pdf) (Accessed: 3rd September 2020).
- Home Office (2018) *Hate Crime, England and Wales 2017/18*. London: Home Office. (Statistical Bulletin 20/18). Available online at:  
[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/748598/hate-crime-1718-hosb2018.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/748598/hate-crime-1718-hosb2018.pdf)  
(Accessed: 28th January 2019).
- Home Office (2018a) *Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2017 to March 2018*. London: Home Office. (Statistical Bulletin 31/18). Available online at:  
[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/763254/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2017-mar2018-hosb3118.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/763254/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2017-mar2018-hosb3118.pdf)  
(Accessed: 3rd September 2020).
- Home Office (2019) *Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, April 2018 to March 2019*. London: Home Office. (Statistical Bulletin 32/19). Available online at:  
[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/853646/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2018-mar2019-hosb3219.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/853646/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2018-mar2019-hosb3219.pdf)  
(Accessed: 3rd September 2020).
- Home Office (2020) *E-Learning Training on Prevent*. Available online at:  
<https://www.elearning.prevent.homeoffice.gov.uk/edu/screen1.html>  
(Accessed: 2nd February 2020).

- Home Office (2020a) *The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill - Independent Review of Prevent Fact-sheet*. Available online at: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/893149/cts-independent-review-prevent-factsheet.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/893149/cts-independent-review-prevent-factsheet.pdf) (Accessed 5th October 2020).
- Hooper, S. (2020) 'End Prevent': UK government faces new calls to drop counter-terrorism strategy, *Middle East Eye*, 17th January. Available online at: <https://middleeasteye.net/news/end-prevent-uk-government-faces-new-calls-drop-counter-terrorism-strategy> (Accessed: 6th February 2020).
- Hopkins, P., and Gale, R. (eds.) (2009) *Muslims in Britain*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Hoque, A. (2015) 'British-Islamic Identity: Third Generation Bangladeshis from East London', in Lander, V. (2016) 'Introduction to fundamental British values', *Journal of Education for Teaching*, 42(3), pp. 274-279. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/02607476.2016.1184459>. (Accessed: 21st May 2020).
- Horkheimer, M. (1972) 'Critical Theory: Selected Essays', in How, A. (2003) *Critical Theory*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- How, A. (2003) *Critical Theory*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Huber, J., and Wheelan, K. (1999) 'A marginal story as a place of possibility: Negotiating self on the professional knowledge landscape', *Teaching and Teacher Education*, 15(4), 381-396. Available online at: [https://doi.org/10.1016/s0742-051x\(98\)00048-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/s0742-051x(98)00048-1) (Accessed 16th October 2020).
- Hughes, D. (2018) 'Conservatives rule Boris Johnson comparing Muslim women in veils to letter boxes and bank robbers was "respectful"', *The Independent*, 21st December. Available online at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/boris-johnson-cleared-burka-niqab-bankrobber-letterboxes-conservative> (Accessed: 29th January 2020).

- Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42*. Available online at:  
[www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents)  
(Accessed: 26th October 2018).
- Huntington, S. P. (1993) 'The Clash of Civilisations?', *Foreign Affairs*, 72(3), pp. 22-49. Available online at:  
<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1163/f4daa28038ac47a841beac79b9df2a43e8a.pdf> (Accessed: 17th January 2018).
- Huntington, S. P. (1996) *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Reprint. Great Britain: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd., 2002.
- Husserl, E. (1970) *The idea of phenomenology*. The Hague Netherlands: Nijhoff,  
in Laverty, S. M. (2003) 'Hermeneutic Phenomenology and  
Phenomenology: A Comparison of Historical and Methodological  
Considerations', *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 2003, 2(3),  
pp. 21-35. Available online at:  
<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/160940690300200303>.  
(Accessed: 21st May 2020).
- Ingram, J. D. (2019) 'Critical Theory and Postcolonialism', in Gordon, P., Hammer, E., and Honneth, A. (eds.) *The Routledge Companion to the Frankfurt School*. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 500-511.
- IPSO (2018) 20480-17 *Tower Hamlets Borough Council v The Times*. Independent Press Standards Organisation. Available online at:  
<https://www.ipso.co.uk/rulings-and-resolution-statements/ruling?id=20480-17> (Accessed: 27th May 2020).
- Ipsos MORI (2018) A review of survey research on Muslims in Britain. London: Ipsos MORI Social Research Institute. Available online at:  
[https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/publication/documents/2018-03/a-review-of-survey-research-on-muslims-in-great-britain-ipsos-mori\\_0.pdf](https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/publication/documents/2018-03/a-review-of-survey-research-on-muslims-in-great-britain-ipsos-mori_0.pdf) (Accessed: 21st August 2020).

- Iwowo, V. (2014) 'Post-Colonial Theory', in Coghlan, D., and Brydon-Miller, M. (2014) (eds.) *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Action Research: Volume 2*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd., pp. 631-633.
- Jackson, A. Y., and Mazzei, L. A. (2009) (eds.) *Voice in Qualitative Inquiry: Challenging conventional, interpretive, and critical conceptions in qualitative research*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Jackson, A. Y., and Mazzei, L. A. (2012) *Thinking with Theory in Qualitative Research. Viewing data across multiple perspectives*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Jerome, L., Elwick, A., Kazim, R. (2019) 'The impact of the Prevent duty on schools: A review of the evidence', *British Educational Research Journal*, 45(4). Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1002/berj.3527> (Accessed: 22nd May 2020).
- Johnson, B. (2018) 'Denmark has got it wrong. Yes, the burka is oppressive and ridiculous-but that's still no reason to ban it', *The Telegraph*, 5th August. Available online at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/08/05/denmark-has-got-wrong-yes-burka-oppressive-ridiculous-still/> (Accessed: 29th January 2020).
- Johnston, P. (2006) 'Adopt our values or stay away, says Blair', *The Telegraph*, 9th December. Available online at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1536408/Adopt-our-values-or-stay-away-says-Blair.html> (Accessed: 7th January 2020).
- Kamberelis, G., and Dimitriadis, G. (2011) 'Focus Groups. Contingent Articulations of Pedagogy, Politics, and Inquiry', in Denzin, N., K., and Lincoln, Y., S. (eds.) (2011) *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. 4th edn. London: SAGE Publications Ltd., pp. 545-561.

- Kaya, A. (2011) *Islamophobia as a form of Governmentality: Unbearable weightiness of the politics of fear*. (Willy Brant Series of Working Papers), International Migration and Ethnic relations 1(11). Malmo institute For Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare (MIM): Sweden. Available online at:  
<https://www.mah.se/upload/Forskningscentrum/MIM/WB/Willy%20Brant%2011.1%20final.pdf> (Accessed: 1st April 2018).
- Kelly, R. (2005) [Speech]. Universities UK Conference, Tavistock Square, London, 15th September. Available online at: [https://www.archive.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Abulrahman-Jafar\\_Promoting-good-campus-relations\\_2006.pdf](https://www.archive.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Abulrahman-Jafar_Promoting-good-campus-relations_2006.pdf) (Accessed: 27th November 2017).
- Khan, S. (2016) *The Battle for British Islam. Reclaiming Muslim Identity from Extremism*. Croydon: Saqi Books.
- Kidd, I. J. (2017) 'Epistemic Injustice and religion', in Kidd, I. J., Medina, J., and Pohlhaus, Jr. G. (eds.) (2017) *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice*. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 386-394.
- Kincheloe, J. L., McLaren, P., and Steinberg, S. R. (2011) 'Critical Pedagogy and Qualitative Research. Moving to the Bricolage', in Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (2011) (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. 4th edn. London: SAGE Publications Ltd., pp. 163-178.
- Kumar, D. (2012) *Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire*. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books.
- Kundnani, A. (2001) 'From Oldham to Bradford: the violence of the violated', *Race and Class*, 43(2), p. 105. Available online at [www.irr.org.uk/from-oldham-to-bradford-the-violence-of-the-violated/](http://www.irr.org.uk/from-oldham-to-bradford-the-violence-of-the-violated/) (Accessed: 7th December 2017).
- Kundnani, A. (2014) *The Muslims Are Coming. Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror*. London: Verso.

- Kundnani, A. (2016) 'Islamophobia as Ideology of Empire' [Recorded lecture]. Georgetown University, Berkley Centre for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, Washington, DC. 2007, Wednesday 19th October. Available in hard copy form at: <https://www.kundnani.org/wp-content/uploads/kundnani-islamophobia-as-lay-ideology-of-US-empire.pdf> (Accessed: 16th January 2019).
- Kymlicka, W. (1995) *Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of minority Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000.
- Kymlicka, W. (2012) *Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. Available online at: [www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files.../TCM-Multiculturalism-Web.pdf](http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files.../TCM-Multiculturalism-Web.pdf) (Accessed: 20th April 2017).
- Ladkin, D. (2014) 'Phenomenology', in Coghlan, D., and Brydon-Miller, M. (2014) (eds.) *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Action Research: Volume 2*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd., pp. 613-616.
- Lander, V. (2016) 'Introduction to fundamental British values', *Journal of Education for Teaching*, 42(3), pp. 274-279. Available on line at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/02607476.2016.1184459>. (Accessed: 24th April 2017).
- Lansu, P. (2019) *Treat others the way you want to be treated yourself: Peace within one's own society*. Available online at: <https://paxchristpeacestories.com/2019/06/26/treat-others-the-way--you-want-to-be-treated-yourself-peace-within-ones-own-society/> (Accessed: 17th April 2020).
- Lasswell, H. D. (1927) 'The Theory of Political Propaganda', *American Political Science Review*, 21(3), August 1927, pp. 627-631. Available online at: <https://doi:10.2307/1945515>. Also available online at: <https://collectivonovecento.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/lasswell-the-theory-of-political-propaganda.pdf> (Accessed: 12th November 2018).



- Laverty, S. M. (2003) 'Hermeneutic Phenomenology and Phenomenology: A Comparison of Historical and Methodological Considerations', *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 2(3), pp. 21-35. Available online at: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/160940690300200303>. (Accessed: 21st May 2020).
- Law, J., and Martin, E. A. (2014) *A Dictionary of Law*. 9th edn. Published online: Oxford University Press. Available online at: <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199551248.001.0001/acref-9780199551248> (Accessed: 7th February 2020).
- LeBor, A. (1997) *A Heart Turned East: Among the Muslims of Europe and America*. London: Little, Brown and Company, in McRoy, A. (2006) *From Rushdie to 7/7. The Radicalisation of Islam in Britain*. London: The Social Affairs Unit, p. 23.
- Le Morvan, P., and Peels, R. (2016) 'The Nature of Ignorance: Two Views', in Peels, R., and Blaauw, M. (eds.) (2016) *The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lentin, A., and Titley, G. (2011) *The Crisis of Multiculturalism. Racism in Neoliberal Age*. London: Zed Books Ltd.
- Leveson, Lord Justice (2012) *Leveson Inquiry: Report into the culture, practices and ethics of the press*. (HC 780 i, ii, iii, iv). Available online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/leveson-inquiry-report-into-the-culture-practices-and-ethics-of-the-press> (Accessed: 21st May 2020).
- Le Vasseur, J. J. (2003) 'The Problem of Bracketing in Phenomenology', *Qualitative Health Research*, 13(3), pp. 408-420. Available online at: doi: 10.1177/1049732302250337 (Accessed: 7th May 2020).
- Lewis, P. (1994) *Islamic Britain*. London: I.B. Taurus, in McRoy, A. (2006) *From Rushdie to 7/7. The Radicalisation of Islam in Britain*. London: The Social Affairs Unit, pp. 16-17.
- Lewis, P. (2007) *Young, British and Muslim*. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010.

- Lipman, M. (1998) 'Teaching students to think reasonably: Some Findings of the Philosophy for Children Program', *The Clearing House*, 71(5), pp. 277-280. Available online at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/30189373>. (Accessed: 10th December 2019).
- Lipman, M. (2003) *Thinking in Education*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Local Government Act 1966*, c. 42. Available online at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1966/42/contents> (Accessed: 16th October 2020).
- London Assembly (2006) *Report of the 7th July Review Committee*. London: Greater London Authority. Available online at: [https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/gla\\_migrate\\_files\\_destination/archives/assembly-reports-7july-report.pdf](https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/gla_migrate_files_destination/archives/assembly-reports-7july-report.pdf) (Accessed: 28th January 2020).
- Lukacs, G. (1971) *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*. Translated from the Hungarian by Rodney Livingstone. London: Merlin Press, in Fricker, M. (2017) 'Evolving Concepts of Epistemic Injustice', in Kidd, I. J., Medina, J., and Pohlhaus, Jr. G. (eds.) (2017) *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice*. Abingdon Oxon: Routledge. Also in Gamble, A., Marsh, D., and Tant, T. (eds.) (1999) *Marxism and Social Science*. London: MacMillan Press Ltd.
- Lyle, S. (2008) 'Dialogic Teaching: Discussing Theoretical Contexts and reviewing Evidence from Classroom Practice', *Language and Education*, 22(3), pp. 222-240. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09500780802152499> (Accessed: 11th May 2020).
- Lyle, S. (2019) Email to Christopher John Mort, 1st May.
- Macdonald, I., A. (1989) *Murder in the Playground. (The Burnage report). Report of the Macdonald inquiry into racism and racial violence in Manchester schools*. London: Longsight Press.

- MacLure, M. (2013) 'Researching without representation? Language and materiality in post-qualitative methodology', *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education*, 26(6), pp. 658-667. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09518398.2013.788755> (Accessed: 7th May 2020).
- Macpherson, W. (1999) *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry*. London. HMSO.
- MacTiernan, D. (2015) *Commissioner for Equal Opportunity e bulletin November 2015*. Available online at <http://www.eoc.wa.gov.au/publications/e-bulletin> (Accessed: 28th December 2015).
- Maglaras, V. (2013) 'Consent and Submission: Aspects of Gramsci's Theory of the Political and Civil Society', *SAGE Open*, pp. 1-8, January-March. Available online at: [https://doi: 10.1177/2158244012472347](https://doi:10.1177/2158244012472347) (Accessed: 10th March 2020).
- Malik, K. (2001) 'The Real value of Diversity', in Modood, M. (2007) *Multiculturalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 10.
- Malik, K. (2015) *The Failure of Multiculturalism*. Available online at: <https://kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2015/02/17/the-failure-of-multiculturalism/> (Accessed: 14th February 2017).
- Malik, N. (2019) 'When it comes to Islamophobia, Tory eyes are still wide shut', *The Guardian*, Monday 11th November. Available online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/nov/11/islamophobia-tory-matt-hancock-sayeeda-warsi-muslims> (Accessed: 6th November 2020).
- Marcuse, H. (1964) *One-Dimensional Man*. Reprint. Oxon: Routledge Classics, 2002.
- Maxwell, R. (2009) 'Caribbean and South Asian identification with British Society: the importance of perceived discrimination', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 32(8), pp. 1449-1469. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870802604024> (Accessed: 10th January 2018).

- May, L. (2010) *Genocide*. New York: Cambridge University Press, in Medina, J. (2013) *The Epistemology of Resistance. Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations*. USA: Oxford University Press.
- Maylor, U. (2014) 'Promoting British values opens up a can of worms for teachers', *The Guardian*, 12th June. Available online at: [www.theguardian.com/teacher-network/teacher-blog/2014/jun/12/promoting-british-values-opens-up-a-can-of-worms-for-teachers](http://www.theguardian.com/teacher-network/teacher-blog/2014/jun/12/promoting-british-values-opens-up-a-can-of-worms-for-teachers) (Accessed: 30th November 2016).
- Mazzei, L. A., and Jackson, A. Y. (2012) 'Complicating Voice in a Refusal to "Let Participants Speak for Themselves"', *Qualitative Inquiry*, 18(9), pp. 745-751. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800412453017> (Accessed: 7th May 2020).
- McBrayer, J. (2016) 'Ignorance and the Religious Life', in Peels, R., and Blaauw, M. (2016) *The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McCully, A., Clarke, L. (2016) 'A place for *fundamental (British) values* in teacher education in Northern Ireland?', *Journal of Education for Teaching*, 42(3), pp. 274-279. Available on line at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/02607476.2016.1184459>. (Accessed: 24th April 2017).
- McGovern, M. (2017) 'The university, Prevent and cultures of compliance', in *Prometheus, Critical Studies in Innovation*, 34(1), pp. 49-62. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/08109028.2016.1222129> (Accessed: 8th September 2020).
- McLaren, P. (1998) *Life in Schools. An introduction to Critical Pedagogy in the Foundations of Education*. 3rd edition. New York: Longman.
- McLellan, D. (ed.) (2000) *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*. 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- McLeod, J. (ed.) (2007) *The Routledge Companion to Postcolonial Studies*. Oxfordshire: Routledge.
- McLoughlin, S. (2009) 'Holy Places, Contested Spaces: British Pakistani Accounts of Pilgrimage to Makkah and Madinah', in Hopkins, P., and Gale, R. (eds.) (2009) *Muslims in Britain*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- McRoy, A. (2006) *From Rushdie to 7/7. The Radicalisation of Islam in Britain*. London: The Social Affairs Unit.
- Medina, J. (2013) *The Epistemology of Resistance. Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations*. USA: Oxford University Press.
- Medina, J. (2017) 'Varieties of Hermeneutical Injustice', in Kidd, I. J., Medina, J., and Pohlhaus, Jr. G. (eds.) (2017) *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Meer, N. (2006) "Get off your Knees", *Journalism Studies*, 7(1), pp. 35-59. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616700500450327>. (Accessed: 23rd May 2020).
- Meer, N. (2014) 'Islamophobia and Postcolonialism: continuity, Orientalism and Muslim consciousness', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 48(5), pp. 500-515. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322x.2014.966960>. (Accessed: 17th January 2019).
- Mercier, H., and Sperber, D. (2017) *The Enigma of Reason. A new theory of human understanding*. Great Britain: Allen Lane.
- Merrick, R. (2020) 'Teaching material calling for end of capitalism banned from schools as ministers brand it 'extreme' ', *The Independent*, Sunday 27th September. Available online at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/capitalism-teaching-schools-racism-violence-democracy-gavin-williamson-b625480.html> (Accessed: 5th October 2020).

- Meyerson, D. (1991) *False Consciousness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 Available online at:  
[www.oxfordscholarship.com.ezproxy.uwtsd.ac.uk/view/10.1093/acprof.oso/978098248194.001.0001/acprof-9780198248194-ch](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com.ezproxy.uwtsd.ac.uk/view/10.1093/acprof.oso/978098248194.001.0001/acprof-9780198248194-ch)  
 (Accessed: 20th January 2019).
- Mills, C. W. (2007) 'Multiculturalism as/and/or anti-racism?', in Laden, A. S., and Owen, D. (eds.) (2007) *Multiculturalism and Political Theory*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 89-114.
- Mills, C. W. (2013) 'White Ignorance and Hermeneutical Injustice: A Comment on Medina and Fricker', *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective*, 3(1), pp. 38-43. Available online at: <https://social-epistemology.com/2013/12/17/white-ignorance-and-hermeneutical-injustice-a-comment-on-medina-and-fricker-charles-w-mills/>  
 (Accessed: 30th December 2019).
- Mills, C. W. (2017) 'Ideology', in Kidd, I. J., Medina, J., and Pohlhaus, Jr. G. (eds.) (2017) *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Mir, S. (2009) 'Diversity, Self, Faith and Friends', in Sensoy, O., Stonebanks, C., D. (eds.) (2009) *Muslim Voices in School. Narratives of Identity and Pluralism*. Netherlands: Sense Publishers, pp.117-133.
- Modood, T., and May, S. (2001) 'Multiculturalism and education in Britain: an internally contested debate', *International Journal of Educational Research*, 35(3), pp. 305-317. Available online at:  
[www.tariqmodood.com/uploads/1/2/3/9/12392325/multiculturalism\\_education\\_britain.pdf](http://www.tariqmodood.com/uploads/1/2/3/9/12392325/multiculturalism_education_britain.pdf) (Accessed: 20th February 2017).
- Modood, T. (2006) 'The liberal dilemma: integration or vilification?', *Open Democracy*, 8th February. Available online at:  
[https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/liberal\\_dilemma\\_3249jsp/](https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/liberal_dilemma_3249jsp/)  
 (Accessed: 25th August 2020).
- Modood, T. (2007) *Multiculturalism. A Civic Idea*. 2nd edn. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013.

- Modood, T. (2009) 'Muslims and the Politics of Difference', in Hopkins, P., and Gale, R. (eds.) (2009) *Muslims in Britain*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, p. 194.
- Modood, T. (2019) *Essays on Secularism and Multiculturalism*. London: ECPR Press.
- Mohammed, J., Siddiqui, A. (2013) *The Prevent Strategy: A Cradle to Grave Police-State*. London: CAGE. Available online at: [www.cageuk.org/report.pdf](http://www.cageuk.org/report.pdf) (Accessed: 21st April 2014).
- Mohdin, A. (2020) 'Legal threat over anti-capitalist guidance for schools in England', *The Guardian*, Thursday 1st October. Available online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/education/2020/oct/01/legal-threat-governments-anti-capitalist-guidance-schools-political> (Accessed: 5th October 2020).
- Moncrieffe, M., Moncrieffe, A. (2019) 'An examination of imagery used to represent fundamental British values and British identity on primary school display boards', *London Review of Education*, 17(1), pp. 52-69. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.18546/LRE.17.1.05> (Accessed: 8th January 2020).
- Moore-Gilbert, B., Stanton, G., and Maley, W. (eds.) (1997) *Postcolonial Criticism*. England: Addison Wesley Longman.
- Moore, K., Mason, P., and Lewis, J. (2008) *Images of Islam in the UK: the representation of British Muslims in the national print news media 2000-2008*, Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies. Cardiff: Cardiff University. Available online at: <http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/jomec/resources/08channel4-dispatches.pdf> (Accessed: 4th April 2019).
- Morey, P., and Yaqin, A. (2011) *Framing Muslims. Stereotyping and Representation After 9/11*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Mort, C. J. (2004) *What if*, produced by South Wales Police. [Video Cassette].

- Mort, C. J. (2004) *Schoolchildren help to launch anti-racist film* (copy), *South Wales Evening Post*. Available online at: <https://www.instagram.com/p/CBNNv9uHtSs/?gshid=nsc4wd86ig2d> (Accessed: 10th June 2020).
- Mort, C. J. (2008) *'Being Me'*, (2008), produced by the Ethnic Youth Support Team and South Wales Police, Swansea. (DVD). Resources for Secondary Schools in Swansea.
- Mort, C. J. (2008a) *The Construction of Identity by Muslim young men. Thesis (M.A.)*. Swansea Metropolitan University. Available at: The National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth. (Thesis Collection Wales). MMS ID: 9928922902419.
- Moustakas, C. (1994) *Phenomenological Research Methods*. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage.
- Muirhead, S. (2018) 'Community of Enquiry Guide', *Iriss Conference*. Edinburgh, February 2018. Glasgow: Institute for Research and Innovation in Social Services, pp. 1-20. Available online at: <https://www.iriss.org.uk/sites/default/files/2018-03/iriss-community-of-enquiry-march18.pdf> (Accessed: 12th September 2020).
- Muslim News*, (1990) 'Withdraw non-Muslim Forces', *Muslim News*, No. 18, August, p.1, in McRoy, A. (2006) *From Rushdie to 7/7. The Radicalisation of Islam in Britain*. London: The Social Affairs Unit, p. 17.
- Nandy, A. (2015) *The Intimate Enemy. Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism*. India: Oxford University Press.
- Neumann, P. (2011) *Preventing Violent Radicalization in America*. Washington DC: National Security Preparedness Group. Available online at: [https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/NSPG\\_0.pdf](https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/NSPG_0.pdf) (Accessed: 30th April 2020).



- Nisita, L. (2012) 'Michelle Bachmann wants to ban "Jihadi" falafel...j/k...we think' , *Refinery29.com.*, 3rd October. Available online at: <https://refinery29.com/en-us/2012/10/3752/michele-bachmann-falafel> (Accessed: 28th January 2020).
- Noon, E. J. (2018) 'Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis: An Appropriate Methodology for Educational Research?', *Journal of Perspectives in Applied Academic Practice*, 6(1), pp. 75-83. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.14297/jpaap.v6i1.304> (Accessed: 11th November 2019).
- NUT (2016) 'Final Agenda'. (*National Union of Teachers Annual Conference Agenda 2016*). Brighton: 25-26 March, p. 39. Available online at: <https://www.teachers.org.uk/sites/default/files2014/nut-final-agenda-2016.PDF> (Accessed: 18th November 2017).
- Osborne, P. (2018) 'Trojan Horse affair: When government and media colluded to vilify the Muslim community', *Middle East Eye*, 28th February. Available online at: [www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/trojan-horse-affair-when-government-and-media-colluded-vilify-muslim-community](http://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/trojan-horse-affair-when-government-and-media-colluded-vilify-muslim-community) (Accessed: 1st May 2020).
- O'Donnell, A. (2016) 'Securitisation, Counterterrorism and the Silencing of Dissent: The Educational Implications of *Prevent*', *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 64(1), pp. 53-76. Available online at: doi: 10.1080/00071005.2015.1121201. (Accessed: 1st September 2019).
- O'Donnell, A. (2017) 'Pedagogical injustice and counter-terrorist education', *Education, Citizenship and Social Justice*, 12(2), pp. 177-193. Available online at: doi: 10.1177/1746197917698490 (Accessed: 11th June 2019).
- O'Donnell, A. (2018) 'Contagious ideas: vulnerability, epistemic injustice and counter-terrorism in education', *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 50(10), pp. 981-997. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2016.1217187>. (Accessed: 2nd September 2019).

- Office for National Statistics (2012) *Religion in England and Wales 2011*. Office for National Statistics. Available online at:  
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion/articles/religioninenglandandwales2011/2012-12-11>  
 (Accessed: 10th April 2020).
- Office for Students (2018) Available online at: <https://www.officeforstudents.org.uk>  
 (Accessed: 1st November 2018).
- Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (2008) *1st OIC observatory report on Islamophobia*. Kampala, Uganda: OIC. Available online at: [ww1.oic-oci.org/uploads/file/Islamophobia/Islamophobia\\_rep\\_may\\_07\\_08.pdf](http://ww1.oic-oci.org/uploads/file/Islamophobia/Islamophobia_rep_may_07_08.pdf)  
 (Accessed: 28th April 2020).
- Osler, A. (2008) 'Citizenship Education and the Ajebo report: re-imagining a cosmopolitan nation', *London Review of Education*, 6(1), pp. 11-25.  
 Available online at:  
[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/248933228\\_CitizenshipEducation\\_and\\_the\\_Ajebo-report-re-imagining\\_a\\_cosmopolitan\\_nation](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/248933228_CitizenshipEducation_and_the_Ajebo-report-re-imagining_a_cosmopolitan_nation)  
 (Accessed: 7th January 2020).
- O'Toole, T., Meer, N., DeHanas, D. N., Jones, S. H., Modood, T. (2016) 'Governing through Prevent? Regulation and Contested Practice in State-Muslim Engagement', *Sociology*, 50(1), pp. 160-177. Available online at: [doi: /10.1177/0038038514564437](https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038514564437) (Accessed: 29th January 2018).
- Ouseley, Sir Herman, (2001) *Community Pride Not prejudice - making diversity work in Bradford. The Ouseley Report*. Coventry, UK: Institute of Community Cohesion, Futures Institute. Available online at: [www.resources.cohesioninsitute.org.uk/Publications/Documents/Default.aspx?recordid=98](http://www.resources.cohesioninsitute.org.uk/Publications/Documents/Default.aspx?recordid=98) (Accessed: 10th April 2016).
- Palfreyman, D. (2007) 'Is academic freedom under threat in UK and US higher education?', *Education and the law*, 19(1), pp. 19-40. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09539960701231207>  
 (Accessed 7th September 2020).

- Parekh, B. (1990) *The Rushdie Affair and the British Press: Some Salutary Lessons*. London: Commission for Racial Equality. Available online at: [www.citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.178.6209&rep=rep1&type=pdf](http://www.citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.178.6209&rep=rep1&type=pdf) (Accessed: 15th April 2017).
- Parekh, B. (2000) *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain*. Reprint. London: Profile, 2002.
- Passerini, L. (1980) 'Italian working-class culture between the wars: Consensus for fascism and work ideology', *International Journal of Oral History*, 1(1), pp. 1-27, in Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (eds.) (2011) *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. 4th edn. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Patton, M. Q. (2015) *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods: Integrating Theory and Practice*. 4th edn. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
- Peels, R., and Blaauw, M. (2016) *The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pells, R. (2017) 'Children must be taught British values at school to develop resilience against terror, says Ofsted chief', *The Independent*, Friday 23rd June. Available online at: [www.independent.co.uk/news/education/education-news/children-taught-british-values-school-resilience-terror-ofsted-chief-amanda-spielman-a7804656.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/education/education-news/children-taught-british-values-school-resilience-terror-ofsted-chief-amanda-spielman-a7804656.html) (Accessed: 5th March 2018).
- Perez Huber, L., Lopez, C. B., Malagon, M. C., Velez, V., and Solorzano, D. G. (2008) 'Getting beyond the "Symptom", acknowledging the "disease": theorising racist nativism', *Contemporary Justice Review*, 11(1), pp. 39-51. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10282580701850397>. (Accessed: 22nd November 2018).
- Perraudin, F. (2019) 'Labour formally adopts definition of Islamophobia', *The Guardian*, 20th March. Available online at: [www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/mar/20/labour-formally-adopts-definition-islamophobia](http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/mar/20/labour-formally-adopts-definition-islamophobia) (Accessed: 5th May 2019).

- Perry, B. (2013) 'Gendered Islamophobia: hate crime against Muslim women', *Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture*, 20(1), pp. 74-89. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2013.864467> (Accessed: 4th May 2020).
- Petley, J., and Richardson, R. (2011) *Pointing the Finger. Islam and Muslims in the Media*. England: Oneworld Publications.
- Pew Research Centre (2016) *Estimation of Muslim population in 2016*. Available online at: [www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/29/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe](http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/29/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe) (Accessed: 2nd November 2018).
- Phillips, D. (2009) 'Creating Home Spaces: Young British Women's Identity and Conceptualisations of Home', in Hopkins, P., and Gale, R. (eds.) (2009) *Muslims in Britain*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Phillipson, R. H. L. (2003) *Linguistic Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Phoenix, A. (2018) 'Negotiating British Muslim belonging: a qualitative longitudinal study', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 42(10), pp. 1632-1650. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2018.1532098> (Accessed: 1st May 2020).
- Pilkington, A. (2008) 'From Institutional Racism to Community Cohesion: the Changing Nature of Racial Discourse in Britain', *Sociological Research Online*, 13(3), pp. 78-90. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.5153/sro.1705>. (Accessed: 10th January 2018).
- Pitts, A. J. (2017) 'Decolonial Praxis and Epistemic Injustice', in Kidd, I. J., Medina, J., and Pohlhaus, Jr. G. (eds.) (2017) *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Pludowski, T. (ed) (2007) *How the World's News Media Reacted to 9/11 . Essays from around the globe*. Washington: Marquette Books Llc. Available online at: [www.marquettebooks.com/images/911Book.pdf](http://www.marquettebooks.com/images/911Book.pdf) (Accessed: 8th July 2017).

- Pohlhaus, Jr. G. (2012) 'Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of *Wilful Hermeneutical Ignorance*', *Hypatia*, 27(4), pp. 715-735. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2001.01222.x> (Accessed: 3rd January 2020).
- Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984*, c. 60. Available online at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/contents> (Accessed: 16th October 2020).
- Pool, F. (2017) 'Do Not Mistake a Pious Muslim for a Terrorist', *Fair Observer*, 21st March. Available online at: [https://www.fairobserver.com/region/central\\_south\\_asia/islam-muslims-radicalisation-populism-india-news-88745/](https://www.fairobserver.com/region/central_south_asia/islam-muslims-radicalisation-populism-india-news-88745/) (Accessed: 26th November 2017).
- Poole, E. (2002) *Reporting Islam: media representations of British Muslims*. London: IB Tauris.
- Portelli, A. (1991) 'The Death of Luigi Trastulli: Memory and the event', in A. Portelli, *The death of Luigi Trastulli and other stories: form and meaning in oral history*. Albany: SUNY Press, pp. 1-26, in Denzin, N. K., and Lincoln, Y. S. (eds.) (2011) *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. 4th edn. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Proctor, K. (2020) 'Rebecca Long-Bailey vows to make it Labour policy to scrap Prevent', *The Guardian*, Thursday 20th February. Available online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/feb/20/rebecca-long-bailey-vows-labour-policy-scrap-scheme> (Accessed: 4th May 2020).
- Quran (2000) Translated from the Arabic by Abdullah Yusuf Ali. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Ltd.
- Qurashi, F. (2018) 'The Prevent Strategy and the UK 'War on Terror': Embedding Infrastructures of Surveillance in Muslim Communities', *Palgrave Communications*, 4(1), pp. 17-17. Available online at: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3162117> (Accessed: 18th November 2019).

- Race Relations Act 1965*, c. 73. Available online at:  
<https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/private-lives/relationships/collections1/race-relations-act-1965/race-relations-act-1965/> (Accessed: 28th April 2020).
- Race Relations Act 1976*, c. 74 (Repealed). Available online at:  
[www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1976/74/section/71](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1976/74/section/71)  
(Accessed: 25th November 2017).
- Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000*, c. 34. Available online at:  
[www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/34/contents](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/34/contents)  
(Accessed: 28th April 2020).
- Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006*, c. 1. Available online at:  
[https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/1/pdfs/ukpga\\_20060001\\_en.pdf](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/1/pdfs/ukpga_20060001_en.pdf)  
(Accessed: 27th August 2020).
- Ramalingam, V. (2014) *On the Front Line. A guide to countering far-right extremism*. London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, p. 26. Available online at: <https://tandis.odihr.pl/bitstream/20.500.12389/21928/1/08096.pdf>  
(Accessed: 28th December 2015).
- Ramberg, I. (2004) *Islamophobia and its consequences on young people*. Budapest: COE. Available online at: <https://rm.coe.int/16807037e1>  
(Accessed: 27th August 2020).
- Rampton, A. (1981) *West Indian Children in our Schools. Interim report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Education of Children from Ethnic Minority Groups*. Cmnd. 8273. London: HMSO. Available online at:  
[www.educationengland.org.uk/documents/rampton/rampton1981.html](http://www.educationengland.org.uk/documents/rampton/rampton1981.html)  
(Accessed: 13th April 2017).
- Renton, D. (2008) *Document on Student Extremism Seriously Flawed*. Available at: <https://www.irr.org.uk/news/document-on-student-extremism-seriously-flawed/> (Accessed: 28th November 2017).

- Reuters (2008) *Timeline: What happened during the war in Bosnia?* Available online at: [www.reuters.com/article/us-warcrimes-karadzic-bosnia-idUSL2164446420080721](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-warcrimes-karadzic-bosnia-idUSL2164446420080721) (Accessed: 9th July 2017).
- Revell, L., and Bryan, H. (2016) 'Calibrating fundamental British values: how head teachers are approaching appraisal in the light of the Teachers' Standards 2012, Prevent and the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, 2015', *Journal of Education for Teaching, International research and pedagogy*, 42(3), pp. 341-353. (Available online at: <https://doi/10.1080/02607476.2016.1184464>. (Accessed: 4th October 2020).
- Richardson, L. (1994) 'Writing: A method of inquiry', in Denzin, N. K., and Lincoln, Y. S. (eds.) *Handbook of qualitative research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 516-529. Also in Creswell, J. W. (2013) *Research Design*. London: Sage, p. 218.
- Richardson, L., and St. Pierre, E. A. (2005) 'Writing: A method of inquiry', in Denzin, N., K., and Lincoln, Y. S. (eds.) *Handbook of qualitative research* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 516-529, in Creswell, J. W. (2013) *Research Design*. London: Sage.
- Richardson, R., and Bolloten, B. (2014) '"Fundamental British values"; origins, controversy, ways forward: A symposium', *Race Equality Teaching*, 32(3), pp. 9-20. Available online at: [doi: https://doi.org/10.18546/RET.32.3.03](https://doi.org/10.18546/RET.32.3.03) (Accessed: 5th January 2020).
- Rieff, D. (2005) 'An Islamic Alienation', *The New York Times Magazine*, 14th August. Available online at: [www.nytimes.com/2005/08/14/magazine/an-islamic-alienation.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/14/magazine/an-islamic-alienation.html) (Accessed: 23rd November 2016).
- Rigney, L-I. (1999) 'Internationalization of an indigenous anticolonial cultural critique of research methodologies', *Wicazo Sa Review*, 14(2), pp. 109-121, in Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (2011) (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. 4th edn. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

- Roberts, L. (2006) *National Report. All Wales Police School Liaison Core programme*. Cardiff: NAW. Available online at:  
[http://www.assembly.wales/CommitteeDocuments/SJR\(2\)-13-06Paper2NationalReport-AllWalesPoliceSchoolLiaisonCoreProgramme-September2006-04102006-46773/9f54621d9ae46a32ee08397d70843490-English.pdf](http://www.assembly.wales/CommitteeDocuments/SJR(2)-13-06Paper2NationalReport-AllWalesPoliceSchoolLiaisonCoreProgramme-September2006-04102006-46773/9f54621d9ae46a32ee08397d70843490-English.pdf) (Accessed: 16th March 2018).
- Robinson, N., and Mason, C. (2012) 'George Galloway wins Bradford West by-election', *BBC News*, 30th March. Available online at:  
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/new/uk-politics-17549388> (Accessed: 8th May 2020).
- Rosen, M. (1996) *On Voluntary Servitude. False Consciousness and the Theory of Ideology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Runnymede Trust (1994) *A Very Light Sleeper. The Persistence and Dangers of Antisemitism*. London: Runnymede Trust. Available online at:  
[www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/AVeryLightSleeper-1994.pdf](http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/AVeryLightSleeper-1994.pdf) (Accessed: 26th April 2017).
- Runnymede Trust (1997) *Islamophobia. A Challenge For Us All. Report of the Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia*. London: Runnymede Trust. Available online at:  
[www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/17/74.html](http://www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/17/74.html)  
(Accessed: 15th April 2017).
- Runnymede Briefing Paper (2004) *The Report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000) revisited in 2004*. London: Runnymede. Available online at:  
[www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/RealisingTheVision.pdf](http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/RealisingTheVision.pdf)  
(Accessed: 18th April 2017).
- Runnymede (2017) *Islamophobia. Still a challenge for us all*. London: Runnymede. Available online at:  
<https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/islamophobia%20report%2021018.pdf> (Accessed: 28th November 2017).
- Rushdie, S. (1988) *The Satanic Verses*. London: Vintage, 2006.



- Saeed, A. (2007) 'Media, Racism and Islamophobia: The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Media', *Sociology Compass*, 1 (2), pp. 433-462. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00039.x> (Accessed: 28th January 2019).
- Saeed, T., and Johnson, D. (2016) 'Intelligence, Global Terrorism and Higher Education: Neutralising Threats or Alienating Allies?', *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 64(1), pp. 37-51. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/0071005.2015.1123216>. (Accessed: 4th January 2019).
- Saeed, T. (2018) Written evidence submitted to the APPG on British Muslims, *Islamophobia Defined: The inquiry into a working definition of Islamophobia*, pp .38-39. London: Home Office. Available online at: <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/599c3d2febbd1a90cffdd8a9/t/5bfd1ea3352f531a6170ceee/1543315109493/Islamophobia+Defined.pdf> (Accessed: 28th January 2019).
- Said, E. W. (1978) *Orientalism*. Reprint. UK: Penguin Books, 2003.
- Said, E. W. (1985) 'Orientalism reconsidered', *Cultural Critique*, 1, pp. 89-107. Available online at: [www.jstor.org/stable/1354282](http://www.jstor.org/stable/1354282) (Accessed: 17th June 2018).
- Said, E., W. (1993) *Culture and Imperialism*. Reprint. New York: Vintage, 1994.
- Said, E. W. (1981) *Covering Islam. How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*. rev. edn. London: Vintage Books, 1997.
- SAPERE (2007) *Society for the Advancement of Philosophical Enquiry and Reflection in Education*. Available online at: <https://www.sapere.org.uk/about-sapere.aspx> (Accessed: 7th May 2020).
- Sardar, Z. (2008) 'Forward', in Fanon, F. *Black Skin White Masks*. Translated from the French by Charles Lam Markmann. New York: Grove Press, p.10.
- Sayyid, S., and Vakil, A. (eds.) (2010) *Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives*. London: C. Hurst & Co.

- Sbrant (2006) 'The 12 Muhammed Drawings', *Face of Muhammed BlogSpot*, 3rd March. Available online at: [www.face-of-muhammed.blogspot.com](http://www.face-of-muhammed.blogspot.com) (Accessed: 11th January 2012).
- Scarman, L., G. (1981) *The Scarman Report: The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981*. London: HMSO
- Schools Councils (Wales) Regulations 2005* (SI 2005/3200 (W. 236). Available online at: [www.legislation.gov.uk/wsi/2005/3200/contents/made](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/wsi/2005/3200/contents/made) (Accessed: 13th February 2020).
- Scott-Baumann, A., Guest, M., Naguib, S. (2020) [Forthcoming]. *Islam on Campus: Contested Identities and the Cultures of Higher Education in Britain*. Oxford: OUP Oxford.
- Scott, D. (1999) *Refashioning Futures: Criticism after Postcoloniality*. Chichester: Princeton University Press.
- Scruton, P. (1999) 'Policing with contempt: The Degrading of Truth and Denial of Justice in the Aftermath of the Hillsborough Disaster', *Journal of Law and Society*, 26(3), pp. 273-297. Available online at: <https://www.jstor/stable/1410746>. (Accessed: 21st March 2018).
- Seth, S. (2001) 'Liberalism and the politics of (multi)culture: Or, plurality is not difference', *Postcolonial Studies* 4(1), pp. 65-77. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13688790120046889> (Accessed: 4th May 2019).
- Shadijanova, D. (2020) 'Students React to the Banning of Anti-Capitalist Material in UK Schools', *Vice World News*, 30th September. Available online at: <https://www.vice.com/en/article/4ayzk3/anti-capitalist-teaching-material-rse-uk-schools> (Accessed: 5th October 2020).
- Sharonova, S. A., Trubnikova, N. V., Erokhova, N. S., and Nazarova, H. (2018) 'Intellectual colonialism and national education systems', *XLinguae*, 11(2), pp. 338-351. Available online at: doi: 10.18355/XL.2018.11.02.27 (Accessed: 2nd January 2020).

- Shelby, T. (2002) 'Foundations of Black Solidarity: Collective Identity or Common Oppression?', *Ethics*, 112(2), pp. 231-266. Available online at: doi: 10.1086/340276 (Accessed: 11th September 2019).
- Shelby, T. (2003) 'Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory', *The Philosophical Forum*, 34(2), pp. 153-88. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9191.00132>. Also available at: [www.tommieshelby.com/uploads/4/5/1/0/45107805/ideology\\_and\\_racism.pdf](http://www.tommieshelby.com/uploads/4/5/1/0/45107805/ideology_and_racism.pdf) (Accessed: 30th December 2019).
- Shelby, T. (2014) 'Racism, Moralism, and Social Criticism', *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race*, 11(1), pp. 54-74. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X14000010> (Accessed: 30th December 2019).
- Sheldrick, T. (2014) 'Pioneering project tackling racism and extremism', *ITV News* 6.33 pm, 4th June 2014. Available online at: <https://www.instagram.com/p/CBNP7cineqp/?gshid=19x611b3xwnts> (Accessed: 10th June 2020).
- Shinebourne, P. (2011) 'The Theoretical Underpinnings of Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA)', *Existential Analysis*, 22(1), pp. 16-31. Available online at: [www.researchgate.net](http://www.researchgate.net) (Accessed: 2nd January 2011).
- Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (2007) 6th edn. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Simpson, L. C. (2017) 'Epistemic and Political Agency', in Kidd, I. J., Medina, J., and Pohlhaus, Jr. G. (eds.) (2017) *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Small, S., and Solomos, J. (2006) 'Race, Immigration and Politics in Britain. Changing policy agendas and conceptual paradigms 1940s-2000s', *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 47(3-4), pp. 235-257. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020715206065781> (Accessed: 9th April 2018).

- Smith, G. N. (1971) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*. Translated from the Italian by Quintin Hoare. Reprint. London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., 2005.
- Smith, H. (2016) 'Britishness as racist nativism: a case of the unnamed "other"', *Journal of Education for Teaching. International research and pedagogy*, 42(3), pp. 298-313. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/02607476.2016.1184461> (Accessed: 3rd November 2019).
- Smith, J. A. (1996) 'Beyond the divide between cognition and discourse: Using interpretive phenomenological analysis in health psychology', *Psychology and Health*, 11(2), pp. 261-271. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/08870449608400256> (Accessed: 10th December 2019).
- Smith, J. A., and Osborn, M. (2003) 'Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis', in Smith, J., A. (ed.) *Qualitative Psychology: A practical guide to research methods*, pp. 51-80. London: Sage.
- Smith, J. A., Flowers, P., and Larkin, M. (2009) *Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis: Theory, Method and Research*. London: Sage
- Smith, L. (2014) 'Welsh youngsters learn to rethink racism', *The Guardian*, Tuesday 27th May. Available online at: [www.theguardian.com](http://www.theguardian.com) › Society › Young people (Accessed: 28th December 2015).
- Smith, R., and Chan, S. (2017) 'Ariana Grande Manchester Concert Ends in Explosion, Panic and Death', *The New York Times*, Monday May 22nd. Available online at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/world/europe/ariana-grande-manchester-police.html> (Accessed: 21st August 2020).

- Sobolewska, M., and Ali, S. (2012) 'Who speaks for Muslims? The role of the press in the creation and reporting of Muslim public opinion polls in the aftermath of London bombings in July 2005', *Ethnicities*, 15(5), pp. 675-695. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796812467958>. (Accessed: 27th January 2018).
- Solomos, J. (1988) *Black Youth, Racism and the State. The politics of ideology and policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Soutphommasane, T. (2012) *The Virtuous Citizen: Patriotism in a Multicultural Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in Struthers, A. E. C. (2017) 'Teaching British Values in Our Schools: But Why not Human Rights Values?', *Social and Legal Studies*, 26(1), pp. 89-110. Available online at: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0964663916656752>. (Accessed: 10th October 2019).
- Sparkes, A. C. (2005) 'Narrative analysis: Exploring the whats and the hows of personal stories', in Holloway, I. (ed.) (2005) *Qualitative Research in Health Care*. Berkshire: Open University Press, pp. 191-208.
- Spielman, A. M. V. (2018), in Titheradge, N. (2018) 'Is there a problem with unregistered schools?', *BBC News*, 27th February. Available online at: [www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-43170447](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-43170447) (Accessed: 2nd March 2018).
- Spivak, G. C. (1988) 'Can the Subaltern Speak?', in Nelson, C. and Grossberg, L. (eds.) (1988) *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*. London: Macmillan, pp. 24-28. Originally published as: Spivak, G. C. (1985) 'Can the subaltern speak?: Speculations on Widow sacrifice', *Wedge* 7/8, pp.120-130. Available online at: <https://jan.ucc.nau.edu/~sj6/Spivak%20CanTheSubalternSpeak.pdf> (Accessed: 25th May 2020).
- Spring, M. K. (1996) 'Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty', blog by C. L. Schwenz, *scholarblogs.emory.edu*, July 2017. Available online at: <https://scholarblogs.emory.edu/postcolonialstudies/2014/06/19/spivak-gayatri-chakravorty> (Accessed: 22nd March 2018).

- Storry, M., and Childs, P. (1997) *British Cultural Identities*. 3rd edn. Oxon: Routledge, 2007.
- Struthers, A. E. C. (2017) 'Teaching British Values in Our Schools: But Why not Human Rights Values?', *Social and Legal Studies*, 26(1), pp. 89-110. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0964663916656752> (Accessed: 5th January 2020).
- Sukarieh, M., and Tannock, S. (2016) 'The deradicalisation of education: terror, youth and the assault on learning', *Race and Class*, 57(4), pp. 22-38. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396815621236> (Accessed: 3rd January 2020).
- Sutton, R. (2015) *Preventing Prevent? Challenges to Counter-Radicalisation Policy on Campus*. London: Henry Jackson Society. Available online at: [https://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Preventing-Prevent\\_webversion3.pdf](https://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Preventing-Prevent_webversion3.pdf) (Accessed: 8th September 2020).
- Swerling, G. (2019) 'Where are they now? Anjem Choudary and his "nine lions", the three terror cells who joined forces', *The Telegraph*, 30th November. Available online at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/11/30/london-bridge-knife-terrorist-friend-student-convicted-hate/> (Accessed: 1st May 2020).
- Talwar, D., and Ahmad, A. (2015) 'Government policy "negatively affects" Muslims', *BBC News*, 11th November. Available online at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34777243> (Accessed: 4th May 2020).
- Taras, R. (2012) *Xenophobia and Islamophobia in Europe*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Taras, R. (2013) 'Islamophobia Never Stands Still: Race, Religion and Culture', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36(3), pp. 417-433. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2013.734388> (Accessed: 24th April 2017).

- Taylor, R. (2007) 'Reversing the retreat from Gillick? R (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health', *Child and Family Law Quarterly*, 19(1), pp. 81-97. Available online at: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1967449> (Accessed: 1st September 2019).
- Taylor, M., and Davis, R. (2011) 'EDL stages protest in Luton', *The Guardian*, Saturday 5th February. Available online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/feb/05/edl-stage-protest-luton> (Accessed: 21st May 2020).
- Taylor, L., Soni, A. (2017) 'Preventing radicalisation: a systematic review of literature considering the lived experiences of the UK's Prevent strategy in educational settings', *Pastoral Care in Education*, 35(4), pp. 241-252. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/02643944.2017.1358296> (Accessed: 4th May 2020).
- Tellmama (2015) '*House Muslims*' is just as bad as 'House n...'. Tellmama. Available online at: <https://tellmamauk.org/house-muslims-is-just-as-bad-as-house-n/> (Accessed: 2nd December 2018).
- Tellmama (2018) *Beyond the Incident. Outcomes for victims of Anti-Muslim Prejudice*. Tellmama. Available online at: [www.tellmamauk.org/tell-mamas-annual-report-for-2017-shows-highest-number-of-anti-muslim-incidents/](http://www.tellmamauk.org/tell-mamas-annual-report-for-2017-shows-highest-number-of-anti-muslim-incidents/) (Accessed: 2nd December 2018).
- Terrorism Act 2000*, c. 11. Available online at: [www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents) (Accessed: 30th April 2020).
- Tharoor, I. (2014) 'ISIS or ISIL? The debate over what to call Iraq's terror group', *The Washington Post*, 18th June. Available online at: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/06/18/isis-or-isil-the-debate-over-what-to-call-iraqs-terror-group/?utm\\_term](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/06/18/isis-or-isil-the-debate-over-what-to-call-iraqs-terror-group/?utm_term) (Accessed: 18th January 2018).

- The Guardian* (2001) 'Text of George Bush's Speech', 21st September. Available online at: [www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13) (Accessed: 24th October 2018).
- The Daily Express* (2000) 11th October, in Pilkington, A. (2008) 'From Institutional Racism to Community Cohesion: the Changing Nature of Racial Discourse in Britain', *Sociological Research Online*, 13(3). Available online at: [www.socresonline.org.uk/13/3/6.html](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/3/6.html) (Accessed: 10th January 2018).
- The Daily Mail* (2000) 10th October, in Pilkington, A. (2008) 'From Institutional Racism to Community Cohesion: the Changing Nature of Racial Discourse in Britain', *Sociological Research Online*, 13(3). Available online at: [www.socresonline.org.uk/13/3/6.html](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/3/6.html) (Accessed: 10th January 2018).
- The Daily Mail* (2000) 11th October, in Parekh, B. (2004) *Realising the Vision. The Report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000) revisited in 2004, Runnymede briefing paper April 2004*. London: Runnymede Trust. Available online at: [www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs./RealisingTheVision.pdf](http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs./RealisingTheVision.pdf) (Accessed: 30th September 2019).
- The Mail on Sunday* (2014) 'British values aren't optional, they're vital. That's why I will promote them in EVERY school: As row rages over "Trojan Horse" takeover of our classrooms, the Prime Minister delivers this uncompromising pledge...', 15th June. Available on line at: <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2658171/DAVID-CAMERON-British-values-aren't-optional-theyre-vital-Thats-I-promote-EVERY-school-As-row-rages-Trojan-Horse-takeover-classrooms-Prime-Minister-delivers-uncompromising-pledge.html> (Accessed: 1st May 2020).
- The Sun* (2000) 11th October, in Parekh, B. (2004) *Realising the Vision. The Report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000) revisited in 2004, Runnymede briefing paper April 2004*. London: Runnymede Trust. Available online at: [www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs./RealisingTheVision.pdf](http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs./RealisingTheVision.pdf) (Accessed: 11th January 2018).



- The Telegraph* (2000) 10th October, in Pilkington, A. (2008) 'From Institutional Racism to Community Cohesion: the Changing Nature of Racial Discourse in Britain', *Sociological Research Online*, 13(3). Available online at: [www.socresonline.org.uk/13/3/6.html](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/3/6.html) (Accessed: 10th January 2018).
- The Telegraph* (2017) 'MPs urged to hold inquiry after white Christian girl put into foster care with non-English speaking Muslim family', 28th August. Available online at: [www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/28/white-christian-girl-put-foster-care-non-english-speaking-muslim/](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/28/white-christian-girl-put-foster-care-non-english-speaking-muslim/) (Accessed: 25th February 2018).
- The Telegraph* (2017a) 'Universities told they 'must commit to free speech' under new plans', 19th October. Available online at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/19universities-told-they-must-commit-free-speech--new-plans/> (Accessed: 8th September 2020).
- The Times* (2000) 11th October, in Pilkington, A. (2008) 'From Institutional Racism to Community Cohesion: the Changing Nature of Racial Discourse in Britain', *Sociological Research Online*, 13(3). Available online at: [www.socresonline.org.uk/13/3/6.html](http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/3/6.html) (Accessed: 10th January 2018).
- Think Project (2012) Available online at: [www.eyst.org.uk/project.php?s=the-think-project](http://www.eyst.org.uk/project.php?s=the-think-project) (Accessed: 7th June 2020).
- Thomas, P. & Sanderson, P. (2011) 'Unwilling Citizens? Muslim Young People and National Identity', *Sociology*, 45(6), pp. 1028-1044. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038511416161> (Accessed: 12th April 2018).
- Thomas, P. (2010) 'Failed and Friendless: The UK's "Preventing Violent Extremism" Programme', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 12(3), pp. 442-458. Available online at: <https://doi.10.1111/j.1467-856X.2010.00422.x> (Accessed: 7th September 2020).
- Thomas, P. (2012) *Responding to the Threat of Violent Extremism. Failing To Prevent*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

- Thomas, P. (2013) 'Prevent and Young People' [PowerPoint presentation]. *Wales Conference on Young People and Extremism*. Pierhead Building Cardiff Bay, Tuesday 22nd October. Event programme only available online at: <https://www.runnymedetrust.org/end-racism/event/wales-conference-on-young-people-and-far-right-extremism>. (Accessed: 11th June 2015).
- Thomas, P. (2014) 'Divorced but still co-habiting? Britain's Prevent/community cohesion policy tension', *British Politics*, 9 (4), pp. 472-493. Available online at: doi: 10.1057/bp.2014.16 (Accessed: 2nd October 2019).
- Thomas, P. (2016) 'Youth, terrorism and education: Britain's Prevent programme', *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, pp. 171-187. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/02601370.2016.1164469> (Accessed: 12th March 2019).
- Thomas, P. (2019) 'Deepening divides? Implementing Britain's Prevent counterterrorism programme', in *Islamophobia and Radicalisation: Breeding Intolerance and Violence*. Esposito, J., Iner, D. (Contributors) Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 161-178.
- Thomas, T., and Killick, S. (2007) *Telling tales. Storytelling as emotional literacy*. Great Britain: Educational Printing Services Limited.
- Thomson, A., Sylvester, R., and Woolcock, N. (2017) 'Universities told to guarantee free speech', *The Times*, 19th October. Available online at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/universities-ordered-to-guarantee-free-speech-wxzcr32hh> (Accessed: 8th September 2020).
- Titheradge, N. (2018) 'Is there a problem with unregistered schools?', *BBC News*, 27th February. Available online at: [www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-43170447](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-43170447) (Accessed: 2nd March 2018).
- Topping, K. J., and Trickey, S. (2007) 'Collaborative philosophical enquiry for schoolchildren: Cognitive effects at 10-12 years', *British Journal of Educational Psychology*, 77(2), pp. 271-288. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1348/000709906x105328> (Accessed: 13th September 2010).

- Tyler, I. (2010) 'Designed to fail: a biopolitics of British Citizenship', *Citizenship Studies*, 14(1), pp. 61-74. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13621020903466357> (Accessed: 27th August 2020).
- UCU Left (2015) *Challenging the Prevent Agenda*. Available online at: <http://www.uculeft.org/2015/09/challenging-the-prevent-agenda/> (Accessed: 18th November 2017).
- United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) *Convention on the Rights of the Child*. Resolution A/RES/44/25. Available online at: <https://downloads.unicef.org.uk> (Accessed: 3rd June 2019).
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. A/RES/217A. Available online at: [www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html](http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html) (Accessed: 26th October 2018).
- van Manen, M. (1997) *Researching Lived Experience: Human science for an action sensitive pedagogy*. 2nd edn. London, Canada: The Athlone Press.
- Vincent, C. (2019) 'Cohesion, citizenship and coherence: schools' responses to the British values policy', *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 40(1), pp. 17-32. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01425692.2018.1496011> (Accessed: 27th May 2020).
- Walawalkar, A. (2020) '"Prevent is a failed policy": Government urged to scrap Counter-Extremism Strategy', *Each Other*, 20th January. Available online at: <https://eachother.org.uk/prevent-is-a-failed-policy/> (Accessed: 4th May 2020).
- Warikoo, N. (2019) 'Weak multiculturalism and fears of cultural encroachment: Meanings of multiculturalism among young elites in Britain', *Ethnicities*, 20(1), pp. 49-70. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796819834316> (Accessed: 8th March 2020).
- Warsi, S. (2017) *The Enemy Within: A Tale of Muslim Britain*. UK : Allen Lane.

- Weaver, M. (2018) 'Burqa bans, headscarves and veils: a timeline of legislation in the West', *The Guardian*, 31st May. Available online at: [www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/14/headscarves-and-muslim-veil-ban-debate-timeline](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/14/headscarves-and-muslim-veil-ban-debate-timeline) (Accessed: 31st October 2018).
- Weber, K. (2012) 'Michele Bachmann's "falafel is a gateway food" satire mistaken for real', *The Christian Post*, Tuesday 2nd October. Available online at: <https://www.christianpost.com/trends/michele-bachmanns-falafel-is-a-gateway-food-satire-mistaken-for-real.html> (Accessed: 28th January 2020).
- Welsh Government (2016) *Respect and Resilience: Developing community cohesion*: Guidance doc. no. 196/2016. Cardiff: Welsh Government. Available online at: <https://gov.wales/sites/default/files/publications/2018-03/respect-and-resilience-developing-community-cohesion.pdf> (Accessed: 13th February 2020).
- Welsh Government (2018) *Young people not in education, employment or training (NEET):2018*. Available online at: <https://gov.wales/young-people-not-education-employment-or-training-neet-2018> (Accessed: 9th March 2020).
- Wheeler, R. (2006) 'Gillick or Fraser? A plea for consistency over competence in children: Gillick and Fraser are not interchangeable', *British Medical Journal*, 332 (7545): 807, in 'A Child's Legal rights', Available online at: [www.nspcc.org.uk/preventing-abuse/child-protection-system/legal-definition-child-rights-law/gillick-competency-fraser-guidelines/](http://www.nspcc.org.uk/preventing-abuse/child-protection-system/legal-definition-child-rights-law/gillick-competency-fraser-guidelines/) (Accessed: 15th July 2018).
- Wheeler, R. (2012) 'One Direction's Zayn Malik accused of "boyband Jihad" and "pimping Islam" on fans', *Daily Mirror*, 20th June. Available online at: [www.mirror.co.uk/3am/celebrity-news/one-directions-zayn-malik-accused-903825](http://www.mirror.co.uk/3am/celebrity-news/one-directions-zayn-malik-accused-903825) (Accessed: 26th October 2018).

- Whitaker, B. (2002) 'Islam and the British Press', in Hamid & Sharif (2002), pp. 53-7, in Allen, C. (2012) *A review of the evidence relating to the representation of Muslims and Islam in the British media. Written evidence submitted to the All Party Parliamentary Group On Islamophobia 24th October 2012*. Birmingham: University of Birmingham. Available on line at: [www.birmingham.ac.uk/documents/college-social-sciences/social-policy/IASS/news-events/MEDIA-ChrisAllen-APPGEvidence-Oct2012.pdf](http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/documents/college-social-sciences/social-policy/IASS/news-events/MEDIA-ChrisAllen-APPGEvidence-Oct2012.pdf) (Accessed: 9th July 2017).
- White, S. K. (1991) *Political Theory and Postmodernism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in Gordon, P., E., Hammer, E., and Honneth, A. (eds.) (2018) *The Routledge Companion to the Frankfurt School*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Williamson, L. (2020) 'France teacher had received 'days of threats' before his brutal killing', *BBC News*, 17th October. Available online at: <https://www.co.uk/news/world-europe-54581877> (Accessed: 17th October 2020).
- Wilshaw, Sir Michael. (2014) *Advice notes on academies and maintained schools in Birmingham*. London: Ofsted. 9th June. Available online at: [www.gov.uk/government/publications/advice-note-on-academies-and-maintained-schools-in-birmingham](http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/advice-note-on-academies-and-maintained-schools-in-birmingham) (Accessed: 29th November 2016).
- Wilson, H. S., and Hutchison, S. A. (1991) 'Triangulation of qualitative methods: Heideggerian hermeneutics and grounded theory', *Qualitative Health Research*, 1(2), pp. 263-276. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/104973239100100206> (Accessed: 1st September 2019).
- Wintour, P. (2014) 'Michel Gove wants "British values" on school curriculums', *The Guardian*, Monday 9th June. Available online at: [www.theguardian.com/education/2014/jun/09/michael-gove-british-values-curriculum](http://www.theguardian.com/education/2014/jun/09/michael-gove-british-values-curriculum) (Accessed: 29th November 2016).

- Wolton, S. (2017) 'The contradiction in the Prevent Duty: Democracy vs. 'British values'', *Education, Citizenship and Social Justice*, 12(2), pp. 123-142. Available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1746197917693021> (Accessed: 20th February 2018).
- Worsthorne, P. (1978) *Sunday Telegraph*, 17th December, in Mellor, N. (2017) *Voice of the Muslim brotherhood: Da'wa, Discourse, and Political Communication*. Oxon: Routledge, p. 153.
- Yan, S., Walters, L. M., Wang, Z., and Wang, C-C. (2018) 'Meta-Analysis of the effectiveness of Philosophy for Children Programs on Students' Cognitive Outcomes', *Analytic Teaching and Philosophical Praxis*, 39(1), pp. 13-33. Available online at: [https://www.academia.edu/37972235/Meta\\_Analysis\\_of\\_the-Effectiveness\\_of\\_Philosophy\\_for\\_Children\\_Programs\\_on\\_Students\\_Cognitive\\_Outcomes](https://www.academia.edu/37972235/Meta_Analysis_of_the-Effectiveness_of_Philosophy_for_Children_Programs_on_Students_Cognitive_Outcomes) (Accessed: 13th September 2020).
- Yancy, G. (2008) *Black Bodies, White Gazes. The continuing significance of race*. USA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, INC.
- Young, H. (2001a) 'A corrosive national danger in our multicultural model', *The Guardian*, 6th November. Available online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/06/september11.politics> (Accessed: 28th April 2020).
- Young, R., J., C. (2001) *Postcolonialism. An Historical Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.
- Younge, G. (2010) *Who Are We - And Should It Matter in the 21st Century?* England: Penguin Books Ltd.
- Zagzebski, L. (2000) 'Précis of Virtues of the Mind', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 60(1), pp. 169-177, in Fricker, M. (2007) *Epistemic Injustice. Power & the Ethics of Knowing*. New York : Oxford University Press, p.172.

Zahavi, D. (2019) 'Applied phenomenology: why it is safe to ignore the epoche',  
*Continental Philosophy Review*, pp.1-15. Available online at:  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-019-09463-y> (Accessed: 27th May 2020).

## **11. APPENDICES**

Appendix 1: Community of Enquiry Transcript of the Muslim women.

Appendix 2: Community of Enquiry Transcript of the Muslim men.

Appendix 3: Summary of the one-to-one interviews.

Appendix 4: Research Information Leaflet.

Appendix 5: Poster showing work carried out at the Centre for Muslim States and Societies, University of Western Australia, Perth.

Appendix 6: Glossary of terms

Appendix 7: Summaries of Relevant Acts, Policies and Reports from Chapter 2.

Appendix 8: Summaries of Relevant Acts, Policies and Reports from Chapter 3.



## 11.1. Appendix 1: COE Muslim young women: 10th December, 2011.

### Facilitator- Kim

1

2

3 **Kim:** OK. Alright,so those of you over here it was your question so would one of you like  
4 to start the enquiry by saying what you think?

5 **Nouf:** We were just saying that about the media they always spoke of the bad behaviour  
6 of Muslims like we always hear about Muslim did this and that but they never spoke about  
7 what we do right and for example this week it was a Muslim celebration Surah we  
8 celebrated the day when God saved Moses from the pharaoh yeah, and, as you say, as  
9 you know there is Sunni and Shia in Muslim, like Sunni, we will all fast this day but  
10 they put on the Shia that there are strange ways to be celebrated and like when I looked at  
11 the video I looked at the French media but they showed like the bad celebrations they  
12 didn't show how we celebrate how we fast how we share how we are happy this day I  
13 saw a few months ago I think in Egypt there is a girl who um wanted to stand up against  
14 the high rate of rape in Egypt because it has high rates and she took a picture of herself  
15 naked and put it on her blog they showed these just to sell headlines because when I  
16 went on this famous website journal website, the amount of people who shared this image  
17 was more than people who share about a man killing his family or something more  
18 important. They don't show maybe a lot of ways to protest but they don't show the World  
19 how woman they are protesting so this is what we wanted to do.

20 **Lala:** As we were discussing role models when somebody in the media it could be  
21 anyone, they may not even be practising Muslim, so they just use religion saying "this was  
22 the man who killed another man" whereas in the World there are so many crimes  
23 happening but they never say "this atheist has killed another man" there's loads of  
24 different religions, Buddhist, they never use religion with anyone else in the World in a  
25 crime, but when a Muslim does something, they might not even be practising, they might

26 have been born in it... they always say "the Muslim has done something".

27 **Amina:** I think I agree. I think the word terrorism is simply giving a label to Muslim people  
28 It's become a label to us, the word, 'terrorism' and I think the media uses that regular, as a  
29 regular base, you know and I think they all use it with other religions to people who  
30 commit something bad, I think they need to understand that there are good people and  
31 there are bad people, you know whatever religion you follow because, at the end of the  
32 day, not everybody is perfect it's their personal problem that's made them do something  
33 bad so we shouldn't be labelled like that at all. They should be labelled for who they are  
34 and not for what they follow.

35 **Katrina:** I totally tend to agree with Amina what she said, it was actually quite  
36 interesting. I watched TV you know the whole 9/11 ten year anniversary came along the  
37 programmes on TV and one of them was about the fire-fighters... how they can portray  
38 you then you have the fire-fighters who were there on 9/11 trying to save lives and  
39 everything... they were seen as heroes, the media created them as heroes and what  
40 happened was that a couple of months after 9/11 happened they started reporting in the  
41 media stuff about their private lives. Some of the fire-fighters, they were going to clubs,  
42 they were getting arrested, getting drunk and the media basically was portraying them as  
43 'look at these heroes they are now drunk in clubs' and getting arrested and it was kind of  
44 like, wait a minute, a couple of months ago they were heroes and now you are portraying  
45 them as something bad and I see the same happening cos basically it's what sells  
46 headlines and saying you know about the Muslim celebration that Nouf was talking about  
47 is, like you say, it is a happy celebration and everything but they don't want to know about  
48 them because people are going to know about it in the newspaper so you will hear about  
49 the way they.. the things they do.. that might sell headlines and show Muslims in a weird  
50 kind of way..it's not really the right representation and they always speak the words that  
51 are not really good.. you know up there (*pointing to her head*) .. sorry, that's how I see it,  
52 it's just like why not go to the Mosque and ask people. Like, when they write about

53 Muslim women Muslim women are oppressed, Muslim women can't do this go and ask the  
54 Muslim woman. That's why really I enjoy what you guys did today because you're actually  
55 asking us, we are the Muslim women we live through it every day so don't just write about  
56 us, ask us instead of asking the men or...

57 **Kim:** Can I link what you said to Nouf because you seem to imply from your comment that  
58 actually Muslim women are more mis-represented in the media than other groups and  
59 some of the examples we had which seemed to support that actually women particularly in  
60 France because they've changed the law about wearing... is it that you are allowed to  
61 wear a scarf or is it just the Hijab or the Niqab.

62 **Nouf:** (*speaking of life in France*) In school it is not allowed to wear the scarf so when we  
63 go to school we have to take it off and when you come out of school you can put it on...but  
64 now they forbid women to wear the Niqab, everywhere and also the Mums who want to go  
65 out with their children for a day out in school, they are not allowed to come if they wear the  
66 scarf and now they are trying to (*pause while trying to translate*).....kindergarten.....

67 **Kim:** Nursery teachers.

68 **Nouf:** Nursery teachers.....of course in France we have a lot of private nurseries we don't  
69 have a lot of public, so they are funded by private people...some of them are Muslims,  
70 some of them are Muslims so they don't want the nursery teacher to wear a scarf....this is  
71 what's going on at the moment in France...so everyday there is a new problem.

72 **Katrina:** Is it true also that they are also trying to ... is it ban Muslim women from wearing  
73 the maxi dresses in France? I've heard something about it that they are trying to...

74 **Nouf:** No they don't ban but like in the UK no but when you try to...how can I say this....to  
75 when you try to act invisible when you wear a maxi skirt..or dresses you always have  
76 problems like I had a lot of problems in school when I was wearing skirts like teachers  
77 were saying to me "don't you know you are a pretty girl you should show your legs and all  
78 this so they are trying to make you feel that you're not normal, you have to act as like the  
79 other cos they are people as they are normal.

80 **Katrina:** It's the skirt. I think I agreed, not agreed but could understand why the French  
81 government was saying you know women were not allowed to wear the Burqa because  
82 we need to see their faces, what identity means I can understand that but to go a step

83 further and say you can't wear a skirt because we want to see your skin – that's just a little  
84 bit like , I don't know but for me ..where does this stop? You can't wear skirts tomorrow the  
85 day after that you can't wear colour in public ...where does this stop?

86 **Kim:** Do you think women are in the front line because they are so visible because  
87 obviously the scarf makes you very visible-I notice all of you are wearing a scarf but does  
88 that put women really in the front line and, I mean, that's ...

89 **Katrina:** I think it does and I believe that we have a certain responsibility when wear  
90 the Hijab, the scarf, I remember someone saying to me “whether we like it or not if you  
91 wear the scarf once you have identified yourself as a Muslim whether you wear a scarf or  
92 not you are an ambassador for the religion so whatever you do”, so if you walk on the  
93 street, loud, rude, insulting people, people might look at you and say wait is that what the  
94 religion is really about, to try and make me feel inferior ... people .. might believe that so I  
95 do think that we.....that we should take some responsibility, but I understand the girls as  
96 well (*indicating to her right hand side*) just because we wear the scarf and some people  
97 don't, it doesn't mean that the Muslims that do wear a scarf are more religious um cos  
98 that's just – I feel my religion and my faith is not wrapped around the scarf, it is something  
99 deeper. It's probably part of it but it's not like if you don't wear the scarf you are less  
100 religious than someone who wears the scarf, communities where people make you feel  
101 that way, and its yea...it's not right.

102 **Nouf** I find it strange how, as you say, the woman who wears the scarf, but still there is a  
103 lot of misunderstanding of it....like I think that people who doesn't know about scarf say  
104 “oh is it your parents who forced you to wear it?”or is it “Are you a prisoner of your scarf, is  
105 it not your will or discretion “? I find it really strange because the scarf is something now...  
106 I think it must be something normal now in our society that Muslim is now Islam now is the  
107 first religion in the world, one months, two months ago? (*turning to her left to acknowledge*  
108 *this claim* ) yeah so a lot of Muslims to wear it is really important that nobody knows about  
109 it they always think it is not a personal choice and I find this opinion very, very, strange.

110 **Kim:** What are the implications of that then .... sorry..

111 **Aya:** A lot of people come on to me and tell me that they actually feel sorry for me, they

112 think I am oppressed I just want people to stop feeling sorry for me, I'm actually proud and  
113 happy and I'm not forced, my Dad didn't force me to wear this (*indicating the headscarf*)  
114 I'm doing it my way so there are two types of people – people who feel sorry for us and  
115 people who are ignorant ...and there are other people who actually feel we don't actually  
116 have hair (*everyone laughs*) ....I have this girl who just come up to me and asked me “so  
117 are you sick”? I said really (*everyone laughs*) this is my religion....I just find it like very rude  
118 for people to just assume that we are oppressed. We are very happy ladies, I mean, it's  
119 not that we're forced...

120 **Amina:** I just wanted to say about the Hijab that it's not just Muslim women who wear  
121 headscarves or cover themselves ...in Christianity it's the nuns as well they wear black  
122 and white and totally covered from head to shoulder to up here (*indicates her waist*) I  
123 mean that's exactly what we are doing. Even Jewish women and Hindu women. I think  
124 women they cover their heads as well so I can't understand why the media or people you  
125 know why they have this fascination, why they think we're oppressed or, you know, we're  
126 not happy. I have never seen in the media where they've said something you know, went  
127 to a nun and said “you're oppressed and you shouldn't be allowed to marry”, you shouldn't  
128 you know. We don't question that. Even as Muslims we know that's what they want to  
129 follow and that's their religion – we don't go asking, you know, you're oppressed and you  
130 can't get married and you have to stay in this house ...you know in a confined place we  
131 don't question that because we know that's their religion and we respect that and people  
132 need to respect us for that. Why these questions, you know. Why not come and try and  
133 understand with us rather than putting these questions into you know the mind and  
134 especially again the media. I feel that they use us women to gain money, to gain status, all  
135 these newspapers and television and I think I find it so disappointing because us Muslim  
136 women, we are doing so much for, you know, this country and we are doing so much, you  
137 know, other places and it's just clothing, it's just material and underneath we are still flesh  
138 and blood, and, you know, we are doing so much, why can't they see that, why can't they  
139 come and ask us, you know. Ask us about our jobs or ask us when we've done something  
140 amazing. There are so many amazing women out there and not just now for thousands of  
141 years ago if we look at the Prophets who have , look at Khadija (*the prophet Muhammad's*  
142 *wife*) she was a business woman, you know she was high in her community, she was very  
143 rich and that was like thousands of years ago and she, you know, women had equal rights,

144 I mean, in this country, for hundreds of years people didn't have this luxury, women had to  
145 fight for, to vote so why us? (*looking around to the rest of the group*) why this stigmatism?

146 **Kiran:** I just want to say that even though the Muslim women do wear the Hijab, even  
147 though they are covering their head does not mean they are covering their personality um  
148 and I have to admit like I don't wear a scarf but when I first came to (*town*) and I met all  
149 these lovely people cos they wore Hijab.... it did um, I did kind of keep to myself a little bit  
150 more um, you know, I'd never been in an environment where I'm the only one who doesn't  
151 wear one but, you know, I took the first step and I introduced myself to some people and,  
152 you know, I was pleasantly surprised. It is a very, very open community and um basically  
153 don't judge somebody just because they wear Hijab cos that, you know, doesn't really, it  
154 shouldn't change your perception of people.

155 **Kim:** It's interesting, I have to say something because I was on a train going from  
156 (*town*) up to London and there were a couple of girls from Swansea – you could tell  
157 they were from (*town*) because of their accents – and there were two Muslim girls and one  
158 is in complete western dress and the other one was with the complete scarf and I  
159 say my own prejudiced stereotypes was challenged by that because I thought they  
160 were obviously they were laughing, they were joking, they were obviously best friends and  
161 having fun and my perception was well, if you're a Muslim women who wears a scarf then  
162 you wouldn't be friends with a Muslim woman who didn't wear a scarf, that's what my  
163 perception was and that was a real challenge for me, on that train journey so I mean that's  
164 my own sort of ignorance really.

165 **Nouf:** I just wanted to talk about what Amina said the value of woman in Islam and the  
166 value of a woman in Western cultures, to have some rights that we have it from beginning  
167 and I wanted to tell you a story about what happened to me. I was in high school and in  
168 France in high school, first year of high school so I was 16, I was reading for German at  
169 that time. We had to go swimming in the swimming pool as part of the... curriculum (*Kim*  
170 *says this word*) – part of our education – and um it is with all the class....with all the boys,  
171 and the girls I didn't want to go because I didn't want to show my body to the boys so I  
172 went to my GP and I asked him to write a sick note for me like allergic to chlorine or  
173 something....(*girls laugh*).....so he did it for me, he is Jew, he is our GP for four years now.  
174 He totally understood this like my opinion about it so he did it for me and when I gave it  
175 to my sport teacher he didn't believe it because he knows me, he is my neighbour, so he

176 would see me with my scarf everyday like when I want to go to school and he said “are  
177 you really allergic to chlorine” so I said of course not but what did you want me to say and  
178 then he didn’t got upset or anything he told me that woman in Frances in the 60s and the  
179 70s, they fought for their rights, they fought for your rights, they fought for you to be free  
180 and I was like, I was shocked because I told him “so what, don’t you think I am not free so  
181 because women fought for their rights do you think that I have to go in the district half  
182 naked” is this my right...will men respect me if I wear a mini skirt and a lot of make-up you  
183 know this is how you know.....is this freedom for a woman? And then he said “no, no, no,  
184 it's not about this” ....so I said “Since when I have the right to vote in western countries,  
185 since when women have a right to vote” .....since the 20<sup>th</sup> century. For us, this is the  
186 beginning I said “since the law for contraception because before 1971 it was forbidden  
187 in France for a woman to abort. Since when does it exist?....so if you just look a little bit at  
188 my opinion and my religion you will understand that what you are claiming is wrong” and  
189 then he said ok I do understand your position ...

190 **Kim:** There's an interesting thought isn't it that what do we mean by freedom

191 **Nouf:** ...yeah

192 **Areej:** I just wanted to point out a bit about Women in Islam and freedom, Islam has  
193 always been encouraging women to go out there it has never said stay home and take  
194 care... it has always been saying get out there. You can see from the role model like  
195 Khadija (*the prophet Muhammad's wife*) she was a strong woman . We have so many  
196 women who fought in wars like we have Muslim women like these she fought in a war and  
197 these are role models. From long time ago we've always been having these models but,  
198 again, the media, they just target a few little minor stories saying ah woman in prison,  
199 home she doesn't do anything, she is locked up. Well, that's not true because I am not  
200 from here I'm from Oman and if you see like we are more stronger than the men right now  
201 women are getting really empowered. The media doesn't show this and even here like  
202 when I came to this country I was impressed by the sisters here and I have been really  
203 motivated by my house mates each one of them we all come from different cultures and I  
204 think all these women are leaders, like that this is our generation to rise... yet the media is  
205 not showing this.

206 **Kim:** There's a difference isn't there – sorry – between you and um, you're all educated –  
207 some of you are still at school but most of you are working or university-educated and you  
208 are a new generation I think um, just from my own experience, I used to work with  
209 Pakistani families in Reading and none of the women had ever been educated um, now I  
210 think that there are – a lot of the stereotypes perhaps link-it's much more about class, um  
211 village people that had come from the villages, they didn't have education – the women  
212 were in the home and it was very difficult for them to do anything else to be honest but so,  
213 I mean, stereotypes had arisen from their ..... - there are some factual basis and I mean  
214 the key differences between people who are, I would say, educated middle class, working  
215 class, class I think makes a big factor – it certainly does in Britain for the differences  
216 between working class, middle class people whatever your cultural ethnic background um  
217 so I think, what I'm trying to say is the – to what extent you think that because you're  
218 educated that this is what's making a big difference in the way that you're saying you've  
219 got to be out there.

220 **Kiran:** I just thought of an issue that can be brought up ....there is um, nobody really  
221 realises the big difference between culture and religion. A lot of people assume that, you  
222 know, um, things like oppression you know, having arranged marriages, and things like  
223 that are all Islamic, from Islam where really it's from culture, different backgrounds –  
224 Pakistani backgrounds, Bengali backgrounds, Arab backgrounds. It's purely cultural and it  
225 does not come from Islam at all

226 **Kim:** Thank you ever so much. So, what's the implications of ...

227 **Areej:** someone made a point about Islam, it is exactly what I was going to say that  
228 culture is different but it's not the major part like in Islamic countries, in Arab countries, all  
229 women have education and every woman has the same rights as men women are getting  
230 stronger and all these women they get scholarships. Never mind about their background,  
231 or their incomes, everyone had a fair chance like .....countries which is based on Islam  
232 like I'm a (inaudible) so I can't use your rules, but in an Islamic country I would say, yes,  
233 women are as strong but they are really not shown in the media...there are so many of  
234 them that I can tell you so many female role models that I've seen more than male role  
235 models ...even the Muslim men are scared because the female women are getting so



236 strong we are like right there (*indicating with her hands at head height*) and beating them  
237 and beating them.....so yes.....(*everyone laughs*)

238 **Kim:** I'm very aware of the time and I don't want – and I know that people might feel “my  
239 goodness I really need to go and I feel rude saying I need to go” um so I think we perhaps  
240 ought to try to wind it up a bit and uh just to give a chance for everybody to have a last  
241 word on the enquiry and what we've discussed before we go so if I – and if you don't want  
242 to say anything just say pass and that's fine. Can I go over to you?

243 **Sarah:** I'm not sure what to say but I think the media has a big part to play in what they  
244 show... my understanding of what the media is for them to inform people about what's  
245 going on around us not the kind of sways to one side or this side or pass out information  
246 that is negative constantly, constantly and they need to look into more positive attributes  
247 of Islamic role models , women out there inform people about that and not always talk  
248 about 9/11 and terrorists the constant thing that keeps coming up again and again ..but we  
249 really need to educate themselves where we are in the century where freedom of speech  
250 is a big thing amongst diverse cultures people from different backgrounds its really, really,  
251 rude to walk around and ask like what is that on your head? What is that you are wearing?  
252 Why is your skin colour different, it comes to a point really where it frustrates me at times  
253 because I think what the hell. I'm in a country where you think you'd be accustomed to this  
254 but you're still way backward than us yet they say to us “your backwards because you  
255 dress like this” or you do this or you think like that they don't need to do this. If we are  
256 going to move forward then...

257 **Khadeejah:** I do think the media plays a part in saying non-Islamic stuff...if I were a non-  
258 Muslim I would be afraid of Muslims because of what is in the papers about Islam...

259 **Kim:** You can see why people are influenced by the media

260 **Aya:** We're not oppressed. I wish people would just ask me.If people have a problem then  
261 just come to me and ask me ....like we wouldn't mind explaining why we wear the scarf  
262 and everything .....I'm so tired of being misjudged as soon as I enter a lecture room  
263 everyone just looks at me. For example like I joined a fencing society and when I joined  
264 everyone just looked at me "you're a Muslim, why are you here"? They think we just go to  
265 the mosque and pray we are just normal ladies.....we have fun as well, we laugh we do  
266 things, we to do fencing I think people should just try to educate themselves.

267 **Naomi:** You know people we need to help them have a further understanding of our  
268 religion – it's like media actually should show that....

269 **Nessa:** I just don't like the fact that ...they don't say like, if somebody bombed a place or  
270 Christians bombed a place but they would say a Muslim bombed the place.... they should  
271 just say the person – they wouldn't say a Buddhist bombed the place but they would say a  
272 Muslim bombed the place...

273 **Areej:** There are misconceptions from the media , they should stop using that because  
274 we're getting stronger and um , yeah just....(*everyone laughs*)

275 **Katrina:**I think mine is important as well I think we should all have good set of morals  
276 and just treat everyone with respect, no matter where you come from .....I think if we  
277 were a bit more respectful towards each other we would, you know, we wouldn't have that  
278 racial ignorance, Muslims, terrorists, all that,.....treat others the way you would want to be  
279 treated ...

280 **Amina:** I think I would say to this question is that um they should be beginning to take  
281 responsibility cos I feel in a way they created this hatred between people who don't  
282 understand about Muslims and so I think they need to start to.....stop writing about these  
283 bad things and start writing about good things um and maybe have, you know, shows on  
284 the *BBC* for example Muslim women who do good things rather than one individual in the  
285 community is doing something bad.

286 **Leah:** I agree with all the points being made ....they all make good points (*laughs*) yeah  
287 and the media should take responsibility because they play a part in how people, non-  
288 Muslims see Islam these days and it would really change their views and maybe we could  
289 all get along and treat others the way you want to be treated... on a friendly basis .....

290 **Kiran:** There are misconceptions of the media. I really do think that the sole, that the  
291 central issue that Islam and terrorism, 9/11 – it's just that one thing that people focus on  
292 when it comes to Islam and, you know, it would be, you know – people need to think  
293 outside the box, you know, cos it is repetitive as Sarah said.....at the beginning of the  
294 issues like terrorism and 9/11 – it just keeps popping up again and again and people – not  
295 only do people get reminded of 9/11 but people get reminded – like Muslims, we Muslims  
296 get reminded of the religious intolerance of that time and that as well so it's like – it's bad

297 for normal people to relive 9/11 and Americans because it happened to them but then it's  
298 bad for us as well because it reminds us of the pressures that we all went through back  
299 then and it's just so much negativity that a little bit of positivity would be nice like we have,  
300 you know, spiritual Muslim leaders out there who, you know, are doing their bit, for  
301 example, um, (*spiritual Muslim leader*) he did a blog during Ramadan and each day he  
302 would do, um Ramadan lasts for 30 days, and he did a blog for each day and for each day  
303 he conveyed a positive message of Islam. Things like that. If they were given more  
304 recognition um.. it would be really good for us and will help spread the .. positiveness of  
305 Islam.

306 **Kim:** Thank you.

307 **Irah:** I haven't spoke before but I think on the whole people should have sufficient  
308 knowledge before speaking about any religion even culture and also people need to stop  
309 assuming and judging others regardless of what ethnic background they come from or  
310 what religious beliefs that they have and also everybody wants to live in peace. How do  
311 people expect to live in peace if they are not showing how to make peace or how to  
312 maintain peace so, in order to live in peace we have to have or show how to make peace.

313 **Nouf:** There is so much to say um... I just wanted to talk about our question I think it's  
314 really in our interests to make this situation of peace between Muslims and non-Muslims. I  
315 think if you ask everybody um they all agree that there are two clans.....groups in the  
316 world, the Muslim and the non-Muslims if all of the people who were really like claiming  
317 that Muslims people are really bad that we are violent, that we are animals we are  
318 back.....primitive?... that it is really a lack of knowledge, a big lack of knowledge and there  
319 is already stupid people like Huntington who creates two armies.....

320 (inaudible) and they don't think they just follow...they just follow, they just follow. I think,  
321 um, as you said if you really want to live in peace.....we'll have to make peace.

322 **Lala:** What I would say is the media is creating these so called terrorist, like people who  
323 are young they might be vulnerable and because it's everywhere they might actually be  
324 thinking ok everyone is thinking we're terrorists .. actually go out and be like that. They are  
325 actually committing you know, this whole negative for people to go out and do violent  
326 things.....by constantly making people think like that they might actually give in to it if they

327 are vulnerable so I think in another way the media should be challenged just for example  
328 newspapers and bombs.. you can always challenge it by writing with your own point of  
329 view. The media should be challenged.

330 **Jill:** I think Muslims educate themselves as they go cos like sometimes the media  
331 shows the negative side and we try and show ourselves. You know like we need to carry  
332 on educating ourselves as Muslim ladies, show we are not like the small minorities and  
333 Islam's peace and ....that's it...(everyone laughs).

334 **Kiran:** Can I just ask something really important .....there, you know, from what I know  
335 there is um out of all this negativity I think it is in a way promoting Islam because there are  
336 always people who convert and that the strong negativeness of Islam in the media actually  
337 encourages people to go and educate themselves and then they end up converting  
338 themselves which is beautiful.

339 **Irah:** Can I just add to that also people say Islam is all about the being oppressed but  
340 statistics actually shows there are more reverts or converts into Islam than any other  
341 religion and if women were to be oppressed why so many women becoming Muslims –  
342 just doesn't make sense to me.

343 **Kim:** Thank you very much, I hope you enjoyed it. It strikes me that you are a very  
344 powerful, potentially powerful group of women and I don't know if you like the style of  
345 being able to discuss because you said about make peace – the reason I like using this  
346 approach to discussing issues is because it's very respectful for other people um we are  
347 allowed to disagree with each other, we don't have to agree but as long as we do it in a  
348 nice way and we support our ideas with evidence and we are prepared to be challenged  
349 um and I think to be able to facilitate enquiries like this it's a very useful thing for people to  
350 do so if any of you would be interested in having the training – it only occurs to me while  
351 I've been listening to you, in how to facilitate communities of enquiry .... I would be happy  
352 to do the training for you without charge um because it seems to me that each of you in  
353 your own settings have got the potential to raise the issues, to get them discussed, get  
354 people thinking and reflecting and, for me, it's a very powerful tool, a community of enquiry  
355 because it's very equal, very democratic um and I think that women in particular like it ...  
356 they like the opportunity to sit together and talk .. and share and perhaps move things

357 forward and this is the first time we've ever done anything as a group together and I think if  
358 you met regularly and had enquiries like this with a different question each time um it  
359 would become something where you would develop your own thinking and ideas um so I  
360 would be very happy if people were interested in that .....if you want to, you know, if  
361 you were interested in having training in how to run this – it's normally a two day training  
362 course but we'd probably do a lot in a day if people wanted some support and it would be  
363 really nice to do.

364 Ok, well it is 4 clock and you need to make sure you've filled in your forms as long as you  
365 are still happy .

366 **Chris:** Can I say one thing before you all disappear and I never, ever see you again and a  
367 load of ripped consent forms – can I say just one thing and it will only take two minutes.

368 Ok, I'm going to get some thank you's out of the way first cos there's something else I  
369 wanted to mention and I've got to thank the wonderful Kim um firstly for giving her time  
370 up, secondly for facilitating the Community Enquiry and thirdly for being my support for my  
371 PhD. Um, second thanks to my very good friends, Deeba and Oanez. I've known  
372 Oanez many, many, many years and Deeba for not that long but again you've also  
373 come along on your days off um one of you, two of you (laugh) but I appreciate the time,  
374 the thought you have given and also the arrangements for these wonderful people in  
375 turning up and I know I haven't personally got to know you and to sort of talk to you one to  
376 one but I just want to offer my thanks to all of you – most important of all is whether you  
377 want to be part of this. Now, I can't use your voices without your permission. If you want  
378 to be part of it, that's wonderful – all I would ask you to do is to sign a consent form – first  
379 of all, look at all the boxes and tick them. I need your contact details. Without your contact  
380 details I can't reply to you and if I can't reply to you with my transcript of what we've done, I  
381 can't use it. The next thing is it would be a good idea if you would take your label off and  
382 stick it to your consent form in which case I know exactly who you are. And the last thing  
383 is if you want – like, I've done quite a few in-depth one-to-one interviews with some Muslim  
384 ladies and some Muslim guys. If you wanted to be part of a one to one interview – if you  
385 could just – my email is actually on the form there – if you can make a note of it and email  
386 me and I'll make arrangements with you. This could be next year – that's not a problem

387 and I've got many, many years before I complete what I want to do and I think that's all I  
388 want to say – let me just check it – consent forms, labels. Thanks, that's all I've got to say  
389 other than thank you for your time - you've been wonderful so thank you – I couldn't do  
390 with you – thank you very much.

## 11.2. Appendix 2: COE – Muslim Young Men : 6th October, 2012. Facilitator Kim

1

2

3

4 **Kim:** So our question that we're going with is 'Do common stereotypes influence your own  
5 perception about Islam even though you are a Muslim?' Ok so we've democratically chosen.  
6 Now I just want to go through a few ground rules. In order to make this work obviously we want to  
7 be able to hear what each other have to say (*Kim is saying to someone 'you have to go now do you?*  
8 *- shame*).

9 **Chris:** Happy to continue?

10 Someone then says 'yes'.

11 **Kim:** Nice to see you. Sorry you have to go. (*Lot of background talking*).

12 **Kim:** What I'm going to suggest rather than us discuss how we might do this, I'm just going to  
13 suggest that if you want to say something, you indicate you want to speak up by putting up your  
14 hand, ok. The person who is speaking last chooses the next person to speak ok. We always start  
15 with the people whose question it was so that they can start us off. What we are trying to do here  
16 is um agree and disagree with each other so that we try and get into this question so you might like  
17 to say 'I agree with you because... or I disagree with you because' – that's quite helpful. My job is  
18 not to comment. Not to have any views on this at all because I'm the facilitator but what I might do  
19 is try to help you to think more deeply about it by my intervention, ok. So, is everyone happy to do  
20 that if they want to say something? Yes. So you need to be able to look around and see who  
21 wants to speak so try to give people who have not spoken already a chance if somebody has  
22 spoken a lot um and then we won't speak over each other. We won't interrupt each other. We  
23 show we are really listening by saying 'I agree with you or I disagree with you' and we try to move  
24 forward on this. Now, we are not going to solve this question. We are not going to answer it but  
25 we are going get a chance to explore what we think about it. I think it's a really interesting question  
26 actually and it's the one I was hoping people would vote for and I thought was really interesting so  
27 let's – it's your question and your question, well in fact all three questions so would you like to start  
28 with trying to answer that question? I mean, do you think so. Do common stereotypes or media  
29 influence your own perception about Islam even though you are a Muslim?

30

31 **Abdullah:** I think in my own view a lot of Muslims are totally affected by what they see in the media  
32 and also about the common stereotypes, it gives a kind of an inferiority complex that people doubt  
33 certain aspects of the faith because they don't have a knowledge about Islam or about that subject  
34 matter and so for example the key question would be 'Does terrorism have a place in Islam? As a  
35 Muslim I know very well that today there is no place for terrorism in Islam but that's based on our  
36 own understanding, based on my own readings, going to lectures and so on and also my own  
37 study of the Koran and the life of the Prophet (peace be upon him) but as for the people who don't  
38 have the exposure to Islamic knowledge then perhaps I think they do feel that there is a link  
39 between terrorism and Islam so quite often we even have like some people joke around and say to  
40 other people .....they just joke around and say, for example, 'What's up Taliban?' something like  
41 that just because he has a beard and I've heard it from Muslims joking about other Muslims even  
42 their friends based on their appearance and if you question them they will just say 'I'm just joking'  
43 but it's actually it's the media that has influenced them to think that you know a person who wears  
44 a certain dress code or a person who's protesting you know, we have legitimate protests, but quite  
45 often you see people protesting about something that you assume we are probably angry about –  
46 angry and crazy about something.

47 **Kim:** Right, do you want to respond to that? Just put your hand up.

48 **Carlito:** I think there is like more to the age difference as well cos when I was younger .....9/11  
49 whatever happened it was such a sensitive subject I was like pretty young myself. Nobody actually  
50 ever wanted to confront someone of my age at that time because I was young even if I was in the  
51 Mosque I would ask the teacher about terrorism they were very precautious about how they would  
52 go about teaching you so it was only until later that I had my own understanding of what terrorism  
53 was at that age whatever but it wasn't until later life I actually from my religious views I discovered  
54 that terrorism isn't part of my religion but at that age everyone was so careful about how they  
55 would approach you about it I didn't have a clear understanding of the ....nothing.

56 **Kim:** Can you choose the next person?

57 **Abdullah B:** I agree with him , my brother here in the sense that the media does influence the  
58 Muslims themselves , for example I was involved in Islamic society for the last five years and many  
59 of the students that come up to me and they have told me that their parents told them not to join  
60 the Islamic society and that's because the media making the Islamic society as a hot bed for  
61 extremism and you hear you know in the news Islamic societies the presidents of students ....you  
62 know you hear university students blowing people up and that kind of stuff or attempting to blow  
63 people up and they think 'ooohh even the parents .are thinking my son, especially the sons more  
64 than the daughters yeh, are going to an Islamic society event or something like that is going to



65 label them a terrorist and especially when people become more observant .maybe from a more  
66 physical point of view maybe he starts growing a beard or he starts praying ... many Muslims  
67 come from a background where the family are not that religious so many - the family themselves  
68 don't really pray and all that so some families for example, the kids or students ....lots of Muslims  
69 are learning Islam from a society because they are staying with their fell Muslims and when they  
70 start doing stuff that perhaps their parents should be doing from a religious point of view, the  
71 person starts thinking 'wow, look what the media says, is my son becoming the next Osama Bin  
72 Laden or something like that' because the media is giving that perception to them and that is quite  
73 daunting from the kids' point of view because they are a bit confused .... they think they are doing  
74 a good thing but unfortunately you know the media stereotypes...

75 **Kim:** So are you suggesting that there might be a generational difference here? That maybe the  
76 parents were not as um knowledgeable about Islam or their faith and the younger generation  
77 almost because of 9/11 have become more interested in the roots of their faith? So, who would  
78 like to respond to that?

79 **Bongo:** Um, I think it's um it's not an issue to do with the generation because as the teaching of  
80 Islam – the purpose of the religion was before this is a religion that is more than 1,400 years old so  
81 it's not a matter of the generation but it is a matter of events that are happening in the society and  
82 how the society interact with each other. So, it is just recently it's been a situation whereby in Islam  
83 there is a direct link between Islam and terrorism. Now this direct link between Islam and terrorism  
84 is a perception – it's a perceptive link apparently between Islam and terrorism you see and this  
85 comes because that most of the people that get informed about Islam is from the media you see  
86 and this media is not taking the responsibility of giving uh fair because the media should report  
87 everything as the reality – everything as it's supposed to do. Now, they are just taking the one part  
88 of the story but they are not showing the other part of the story, you see.

89 **Kim:** Do you think it might be different, I mean you're from Tanzania and um, do you think it's  
90 affecting people differently depending on where they're from? I think it might be interesting that um  
91 your experience of having an Islamic society where you're seeing perhaps people – I mean maybe  
92 the parents don't know as much about their religion or maybe they do but they're just afraid that  
93 their children will be targeted um either recruited even or will be perceived by the wider society –  
94 'he goes to Islamic society therefore he is a terrorist' so they're actually – there is like a double  
95 stereotype going on?

96 **Mr Fish:** I think there is a generation difference between the parents and the sons and daughters  
97 for example like parents usually take the news as gospel whereas the children usually take theirs  
98 like – they tend to be distracted more so they really don't care about the news ... they probably

99 listen to music, playing games, playing sport – they don't care what goes on around them so in  
100 those terms there is a generational difference and basically I've got a problem there is like my  
101 family told me not to grow a beard as in allowed to defend myself saying this is the sunah of the  
102 prophet which means that's his thing (salam) and basically I think cos he said to everyone like  
103 basically let it grow, don't shave, just trim your moustache and but like some members of my family  
104 said like you might not get a job or something like that (laughs), do you know something silly like  
105 that and I said if that's the case then that's it isn't it. That's the world then so I'm not going to like  
106 adapt myself just to get a job – that's just pathetic really. Yeah.

107 **Abdullah B:** I think there's also a generational gap in the sense that, in the sense that when our  
108 parents came here they came with the mentality, the majority, I'm not saying all of them yeah, the  
109 majority of the older generation, the economic migration, they came with the mentality that they are  
110 here to come and earn a living and most of them had this Utopian goal of going back to their  
111 country and living in a villa, living in a mansion , perhaps I'm going to much into our culture, too  
112 much yeah (laughs), but what's happened 30/40 years down the line they actually settled down  
113 here. They haven't realised that. Most of them are probably in their 70's now – they are still  
114 thinking I want to go back home again. Most likely, no offence here but their graves are going to  
115 be over here (*a cemetery*) in (*town*). So, what happened but with the younger  
116 generation, they are probably are more in touch with reality in the sense that they know that  
117 (*town*) or Britain is their home now if you know what I mean and they don't think that they need  
118 to – that the parents are worried about the kids for example , he gave the beard example, for  
119 example they do want the kids to earn a living and all that kind of stuff whereas the kids are  
120 thinking to themselves I'm a citizen of Britain, I can do what I like as long as it's within the law and  
121 all that kind of stuff. Um, I should be able to print my identity inside British society and so we're a  
122 bit more free ...you know. We're a bit more you know – we don't feel that we need to conform to  
123 you know make our people happy so I think the parents probably have a bit more inferior  
124 complexity than the kids themselves. We were born into a society, where we probably interacted  
125 more with the whites more than they do and so it's not actually a big deal. They actually think it's a  
126 big deal but it's actually not a big deal.

127 **Kim:** Are they still perceiving themselves as immigrants and you're perceiving yourselves as Asian  
128 British?

129 **Abdullah B:** For example, um, in my workplace where I work they let me pray for example yeah.  
130 If I told my parents , well not my parents they understand but if I told my wider relatives that I'm  
131 going to ask my employer ... I am going to ask them to let me pray they are probably going to say

132 'don't ask them, they're not going to let you' ... and stuff but when I asked my employer if I could  
133 pray he said yeah go ahead, so long as you are being productive go ahead, you can pray, do you  
134 know what I mean but a lot of the older generation they won't .. that.They won't ask their employer  
135 if you know what I mean?

136 **Abdullah:** Just going back to that I think a lot of the parents who come to this country they see  
137 themselves as guests of this country and on any occasions when you have guests the guest never  
138 wants to upset his host and so he feels that Islam or whatever in the media , if it is going to  
139 antagonise... native community basically then they don't want to avoid that at all costs whatever if  
140 possible ..... and so this is the thing with the British born generation – born in this country, they  
141 don't see themselves as guests, they see themselves as natives of this country so that's why they  
142 are willing to express themselves more freely basically, even if that makes some people feel  
143 uncomfortable. For example, they are willing to grow a beard and wear the Islamic attire and so on  
144 in front of the natives but they feel they are the natives whereas our parents feel sometimes that  
145 they are the guests and they don't want to antagonise the natives and make people feel  
146 uncomfortable or whatever...and so there is a real problem in that we see the parents and we also  
147 have to look at - most of our parents especially in the Asian community, Pakistani, Bengali – most  
148 of our parents come from a country which is pretty much illiterate. A big proportion of the  
149 community/population is illiterate particularly the women and so most of their knowledge of Islam  
150 they can't rely on books or texts or articles to arrive at an understanding of Islam and this limits  
151 their understanding of Islam and so this is a real problem because we know English and because  
152 there's a lot of texts and a lot of Islamic scriptures that have been translated into English, we have  
153 a lot more access to Islamic knowledge than our parents and so their understanding and ideas of  
154 Islam is slightly different to ours and that's why we tend to say that they are very traditional in their  
155 views. The other thing is um, that in many cities across the UK where there is a large Muslim  
156 population, most of the Muslims in the UK are from the Asian continent and most Mosques and  
157 Madrassas of the Islamic schools have a real problem which is that they need to find qualified  
158 Imams and teachers who know both English and Bengali as well as Arabic and that is in very short  
159 supply. And so, what you have is basically, you have um uh you have in some mosques are  
160 catered towards the Bengali or the Pakistani or the first generation community at the expense of  
161 the youngsters and in other mosques where there is a bit more modern thinking are catered  
162 towards the young at the expense of the old and so that gap is never fully bridged and the only  
163 solution that I can think of is either the Bangladeshi or Pakistani or whatever country they are from  
164 that those Imams or teachers are fully trained and fully versed in English as well as in their own  
165 kind of cultures and so on so they can give um this Islamic advice to both the new generation and

166 the old generation as well.

167 **Carlito:** I would like to say as Abdulla was saying, I am from Rochdale as well myself, I was born  
168 there, and my uncle is a chairman in one of the mosques there, and the old Imam there he passed  
169 away, but the thing was when the new Imam, he had to go through like tasks, they had to finally  
170 find a guy from South Africa. Really well- knowledged. He could speak Urdu a very popular  
171 language in that area – English and Arabic and when he came, the older generation seemed to  
172 not dislike but have a problem with him... it was probably just the way he tried to teach us. He  
173 was directing it for the new younger generation of children and he had to explain to the older  
174 generation is that when you came here you had an Imam to explain everything to you in terms you  
175 could understand. You know everything. You've been here now it's our time to teach the younger  
176 generation the prospective and there's a certain way about going about that., and since he  
177 explained that to everyone they are a lot more - a lot more happy with this – ok, he really knows  
178 how to respond to a younger crowd whatever, to both sides but it would be nice to have  
179 someone,.... someone like that in every mosque. People go to someone it's like, personally out of  
180 everyone here, would any of you actually see anything good about the old Imams.... asking about  
181 personal questions, honestly? Like, that Imam in Rochdale, I've been to him about really personal  
182 questions. Anything and he'll give me a confident answer about it and I feel comfortable about it  
183 like myself before, with the old Imam... I could never really picture myself going to him about  
184 anything like that.

185 **Sandman:** I think yeah, the point that he was saying is um that in your area it's really good that  
186 the Imams do actually get in touch with the youth whereas in my area it was like the opposite in a  
187 sense that they um kept the um old Imams in a sense and they used to focus more of the talks on  
188 aspects of that probably were important for the modern day in a sense so um ..... a lot of the time  
189 we used to speak in um the native languages such as Urdu, or Gujarati and for me as a person I  
190 don't understand Gujarati I would say my native language in a sense ..... so I never used to  
191 benefit from any of the talks and like you said that when you asked us all if um if we feel  
192 comfortable talking to the Imams, like the older ones , I was like, I felt intimidated too. I would never  
193 ask them about any personal issues because firstly I didn't understand them and they probably  
194 would not have spoke English with me and I think again a lot of the time it's a lack of education in a  
195 sense for the youth and um also the elders in a sense too.

196 **Abdullah B:** Going back to the original question. Muslims ..... What was the question?

197 **Kim repeats:** The question was: Do common stereotypes and media influence your own  
198 perceptions about Islam even though you are a Muslim?

199 **Abdullah B:** Again?: You know ..... the last portion of the talk has been about the elders but it  
200 does also affect a lot of the youngsters in the sense that um like I said a lot of parents themselves  
201 especially now ... if you put the Muslim generation back three generations the really elder  
202 generations they were quite religious and quite traditional, then the ones in between probably in  
203 their fifties or their forties, they are not as religious and some of them are not – they are not  
204 religious at all in many aspects so, you know, they are having children who know nothing  
205 whatsoever about their religion, so they are mostly being born Muslim, Muslim by name, but they  
206 know nothing whatsoever about their religion. Absolutely nothing. So, they are learning their Islam  
207 from the media itself and a lot of them are learning their Islam from the media itself (laughs) so,  
208 whatever the media portrays, they start thinking 'is that what Islam really is ?' but they have no  
209 background knowledge whatsoever and, in a sense, that is affecting – they are being approached  
210 um by – and is affecting their faith in a sense and it is affecting – the media is affecting their  
211 perception of Islam , I would say (don't know what anyone else thinks?)

212 **Bongo:** Talking about stereotypes as well um – movie industry, Hollywood (laughs in the  
213 background) because it's sort of entertainment in the youth right now um the older generation  
214 didn't much have this eh, there were not much into things of movies and what would pass for  
215 entertainment but the youngsters now, they love movies and watching all this stuff. For  
216 entertainment – now within this entertainment industry whereby a large pool of youngsters you see  
217 are attracted, they put, I could say, propaganda due to...to the last movie. .. They've no sense of  
218 Muslims ..... and cause enormous chaos in Islamic countries ..... You see um Muslims now  
219 from these movies, from this entertainment, they are things that they learn they are things that they  
220 take as customs. Now, when they go back to their own society they think that oh, if I do this, this  
221 will happen or, if I say 'Alahu Akbar', you go to the bus station and you just say 'Alahu Akbar'...  
222 you say that phrase, (laughs) that catchphrase, someone will say 'Does he have a bomb or  
223 something '... it's an Arabic term which means 'God is great', you see and it has nothing to do with  
224 bomb or terrorism but it has been linked that and translated inside the movie and switched on to  
225 people, millions of people around the world. Now, if you say that anyway, it will link directly that this  
226 refers to terrorism you see but actually it doesn't mean this or there is no relationship whatsoever.

227 So, you see now how something very small within the entertainment industry could even make  
228 Muslims themselves say no, I won't say 'God is great' in Arabic in case.... I'd rather keep quiet.

229 **Abdullah:** A slightly different point I think is um, I think some of the concerns that Muslims think  
230 about and have issues with basically is shared not just by Muslims but also by religious groups of  
231 other faiths, for example, like Christianity and in this part of the world, particularly the UK, I think  
232 religion is generally perceived as something that is against Science and something that's  
233 backward, you know something of the old that needs to be let go and so what the Christians

234 sometimes feel about their faith being under attack sometimes by figures like Richard Dawkin, and  
235 Christopher Hitchens and also some of the liberal media, we also share the same concerns so  
236 normally we have to tackle the stereotype about Islam in general and we also have to tackle the  
237 stereotype about religion in general and um I think a lot of people who you know don't believe in a  
238 particular faith or who put themselves atheist then they tend to package all the religious  
239 communities into one basket and give them a stereotype so I think we are kind of having to tackle  
240 this on two double fronts um and another thing that I would just like to mention is this um – a lot of  
241 the stereotype of Muslims in the media is always linked to political events and this sometimes  
242 complicates things even more for the Muslims because this is where the real identity crisis comes  
243 from um is because political events can be interpreted in so many different ways; more  
244 complicated than religion where you got like every person has their own political ideas and  
245 opinions um and what we see in the world is sometimes most of us feel as though um we are  
246 under attack and I'm saying this quite clearly; I think some people think that the Islamic faith is  
247 under attack from certain forces um and um and this complicates things a lot more for them  
248 because, for example, the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan; those people who are politically  
249 minded, the Muslim populated-minded, or even the Muslim activists, when they talk about some of  
250 these issues then sometimes they are perceived to be disloyal to this country or something or  
251 against the native population but that's not really the case, it is just that they have different – they  
252 interpret politics differently um because um they are not really directed from the newspapers but  
253 they actually go to the sources um and comments like from David Cameron when I think he was in  
254 Germany I think the EDL (English Defence League) were on a march the same day and he made  
255 this – you know he said that multiculturalism has failed and the same comment was made in  
256 Germany and then we see like the rise of far-right parties in Belgium and Switzerland and France  
257 and other countries as well and then you see like George W. Bush saying you are with us or  
258 against us and so people think that – Muslims sometimes think that their faith is under attack and  
259 so when they speak out against it, they are normally engaged in political activities and that's where  
260 the news from the cameraman catches them and this is what kind of fuels this stereotype and  
261 Islamophobia in society I think.

262 **Kim:** Can you try and sort of summarise a little bit because there are a lot of issues being raised  
263 here which shows how complex this issue is. I mean I think one of the things you are raising is that  
264 we live in this country unlike Tanzania and unlike um any of the African countries or even in  
265 America, we are in a secular society and so the growth of secularism and where maybe 10% of the  
266 Christian population go to church follow their faith and that's why I think it's quite interesting that  
267 you're talking about the 40 or 50 year old maybe Muslim in this country may actually have been

268 moving towards the secular society so influenced by living in a secular society and moving away  
269 from religion there's a global consequence but also um that's on the top of not having a good  
270 understanding of their religion because they would have come from illiterate backgrounds at least  
271 probably in their parents generation maybe their own generation so they don't have the opportunity  
272 to study and understand and then we push into the mix um that the younger generation – now it  
273 seems to me that there's, I don't know, there seems to be two things going on here. There's the  
274 younger generation who take their faith much more seriously and we got that from the young  
275 women didn't we? Because, not all of them were wearing their hijab. Some of them were just  
276 dressed in jeans and t-shirts but they were very vocal about making – and some of them didn't  
277 used to wear the hijab and do now and it was very much about a decision of wanting to show their  
278 religion. They wanted to – they **wanted** people to know they were Muslim and parents saying we  
279 don't want you to do that, afraid of them maybe being targeted in the streets and more likely is a  
280 woman to be targeted I think because the dress is just so much more you know prominent than  
281 maybe just a beard which is like the key thing isn't it for men, um but also there's the generation of  
282 young Muslims who are still rejecting you know ..... so very much part of the secular society so  
283 you've got ...so there's – that seems to be suggesting that's linked to education and not having the  
284 opportunity to really understand their religion which seems to be linked to what Carlito was saying  
285 about where is the opportunity within the mosques without modern Imams who speak English to  
286 actually speak to that younger generation so there's that generation gap. And then, on top of that,  
287 we've got the global context where Muslim communities are being attacked by the west –  
288 Afghanistan, Iraq and so on for ostensibly about the oil but – I'm sorry, about 9/11 (*I think Chris is*  
289 *saying 'Freudian slip there Kim' – laughs in the background*) – in reality it's about oil and resources –  
290 exactly – um, that seems to be – so – it is very complex – you have to be actually very well  
291 educated to be able to handle that whole complexity of what it means to be a Muslim today,  
292 **Abdullah**: I think when you talk about Face-book and other social media as well they can feel part  
293 of a global village they no longer are British, Welsh etc, they are also global citizens, so they take  
294 issues very more seriously about what's happening around the world.  
295 **Abdullah B**: Just for example again we are talking about the extradition of Babar Ahmad appeal  
296 happened like for example we had mosques around the UK with an e petition with over 150,000  
297 Muslims signing a petition because – and we have a lot of non-Muslims signing that petition  
298 because they thought it was unfair with that law that you could extradite a British citizen to  
299 America, but you can't do it the other way around, with minimal evidence whatsoever and so that's  
300 partly why we had a big response unfortunately,... he may appeal, but we have a twitter generation  
301 and so on who believe it may be your son tomorrow for something, we don't know why – we still  
302 don't know why he is being sent to America we still don't fully know why because they still didn't  
303 represent the full evidence .... you know it feels like we are under siege again you know....

304 because apart from one suspect the rest are Muslims you know .....the guy who tried to hack into  
305 the American system, the rest of the suspects are all Muslim and most of them are British born  
306 Muslims so it just makes it more complicated.

307 **Abdullah:** I just want to mention a personal thing...that sometimes we feel there is a contradiction  
308 as well from what's out there, what's already out there for example when we were told to you know  
309 express our opinion, freedom of expression, express freely but the moment that the people were  
310 beginning to express themselves especially with regards to political events, then they are under  
311 siege I think that's when they feel like – and certain events that have happened, I don't know why  
312 they should be targeted for example the Muslims when they use the radar (airport security scanners)  
313 are being checked and so on and when they go to airports and so on. It's like – what  
314 happens is that sometimes like if you have a broad mind sometimes some of the decisions and  
315 policies that have been made is basically meant to try to kind of create an internal barrier around  
316 the Muslim mind that you can't express regarding politics, outside that if that makes sense ...if you  
317 talk about certain events then sometimes there is suspicion that you may be under the radar. We  
318 are not talking about the extremists; we are just talking about people who are politically aware.

319 **Abdullah B:** There is a joke that goes around the Muslim circle sometimes...George Galloway  
320 says sometimes for example if a Muslim said it he would probably be locked up in Paddington  
321 Green station, because George Galloway is seen as the you know a non-Muslim saying these  
322 views, and he's allowed to say certain stuff that a lot of Muslims wouldn't say what he does  
323 regarding the political ... but I don't agree with everything he says .....but regarding political events,  
324 a little joke that he can get away with it, but if Muslims say the same thing.....

325 **Kim:** What do you feel about the new – and I'm trying to represent the media you know – to  
326 summarise what the media says rather than what my personal view is but there've been a lot of  
327 very key events like the Satanic Verses of Salman Rushdie and the Danish cartoons and let's say  
328 it, 9/11 and the London bombings where people were asking Muslims to actually say this was a  
329 bad thing. To say not, you know, I think you were saying earlier people do bad things...why are  
330 they are just labelled Muslim?, but I think a lot of people say well why don't Muslim people say that  
331 was a bad... we don't agree with that. I mean, do you think that .....? (*People talking over each*  
332 *other*).

333 **Arikarikam:** I think there is some – do you know, do you mean like um condemning bad things?

334 **Kim:** Yes.

335 **Abdullah B:** I think a lot of Muslims do condemn it but the problem is the media do not want to



336 listen The Sun (newspaper) ain't going to sell 4 million newspapers per day saying oh Muslims are  
337 saying they are against the burning of the (laughs)..... rather what they say is 'Those Muslim guys  
338 with the beards', shouting Allah and burning down the Embassy ....that is going to sell because, for  
339 example, 9/11 for example, I don't know any Muslims personally who have condoned it for  
340 example, but yet they have you know, The Sun will report this so called cleric is calling the 9/11  
341 bombers 'The magnificent 19'. Now, you know, in the street, that's not the majority view ....  
342 Understand it? but the media over-sensationalise it. (*People talking over each other*).

343 **Arikarikam:** Yes, I almost forgot what I was going to say...Yes, there are some also who believe  
344 um why should we condemn it? I didn't do anything. And I reckon it is the majority. I'm not sure  
345 how everyone else feels here but the majority will think um why should I condemn it. Of course it is  
346 a bad thing – see what I mean? Yes, I'm a Muslim but I was not there... you know. Um, also, for  
347 example, um what Carlito said before, yes, people were scared to talk about things and they still  
348 are scared to talk about things. You always have to watch what you say and, I'm not sure if that's  
349 the case for everyone but if you say the wrong thing then you can land yourself in trouble and may  
350 have a policeman knock your door or ring your telephone saying 'how is this?' Don't grow your  
351 beard , there were some people mentioning that um don't grow your beard. I was told myself that  
352 when I went on the lesser pilgrimage to Mecca – when I came back I was in the Mosque like five  
353 times a day you know I was really spiritual – had a buzz, you know. Somebody said to me 'do you  
354 go five times? And I said 'yeah'. '(this was a family member now), because they might be  
355 watching you.' 'What do you mean?' 'Who?' (group laugh) And you know there's a conception  
356 that you know, yeah, you're being watched. You know, what we do, what we say will have a huge  
357 impact. We could end up in the cells. I mean, I don't think there's anybody here – I'm not sure and  
358 I think the majority as well who don't believe or actually who believe that they **can** end up in the  
359 cells without a reason ....and this is just a personal thing because there have been many people  
360 who have just gone in for nothing, but it was just a perception and also media, also influencing  
361 (referring to the question written on the flip chart)..... or influencing perceptions, your own  
362 perceptions as a Muslim. I think if you have the basic knowledge, I don't think the media can  
363 influence you that much um because you have a point of contact to go to talk to people, real  
364 people who you know... know their thing and you can really talk with them, ok, and get your  
365 answers like Carlito said if you have an Imam you can talk but then the ones who don't have much  
366 knowledge then there's a vulnerability there as well that they could be researching themselves and  
367 who knows what they could find (referring to Muslims who look on the internet for Islamic  
368 guidance).. but general ... (*someone else talking in the background – another person starting to  
369 speak?*).

370 **Abdullah B:** Two things, replying to two things, yeah, thinking about the Muslim population, I  
371 remember when 7/7 happened, in our gathering a lot of conversations were about current affairs,  
372 you know young Muslims were talking ... especially I come from London and I actually come from  
373 the King Cross area so the thing actually happened ....and even our Mosque for a couple of  
374 months actually stopped any youngsters from doing any events as they were worried that they  
375 might get suspicious, the authorities.... they just wanted , they didn't want them to make them feel  
376 suspicious all of a sudden, even though everyone knew they were very spiritual guys.....they  
377 stopped them from doing events eh because they thought you know .....and we also had a  
378 um..... a cleaner who was cleaning our area – the cleaner, he made it look like a kind of er a  
379 racist comment. He was saying 'why is your Mosque open it should be shut down, he was saying  
380 it to people going to the Mosque because you know your religion is the one – you know that is you  
381 know attacked and that kind of stuff. But anyway, going back a lot of Muslims were condoning the  
382 issue and it came to a point when one of my mates was saying 'why do we have to keep on  
383 apologising? We haven't done anything wrong. Why do we have to keep on apologising every like  
384 you know you have a Daily mail reader with a petition you know Muslims should apologise for that,  
385 they ... so much stuff in that area how much more do they have to apologise for and you know we  
386 shouldn't become too apologetic, you know, some people...they haven't gone radical but they will  
387 say 'how come when they are bombing the Muslims, they don't apologise that much you  
388 understand, yeah? Why do we have to – you know, we are not condoning that event but we've  
389 done our apologies you know. We are saying it is not something done in our religion ... done in  
390 our name and we don't see the politician Tony Blair or ..... making hundreds of apologies of  
391 what happened in Iraq ....yet he has not apologised, do you know what I mean? And that is  
392 affecting the Muslim mentality and that is bad. The second issue regarding social....there is a  
393 concept of the hypodermic syringe model right? Or slowly getting de-sensitised (laughs)...  
394 basically um especially from Muslims who are not educated for example ..... might not be as into  
395 the religion, the more and more media exposure .....Islam is bad.... Muslim is bad, this is bad, the  
396 first time you may think oh it's just the media, media... but the more you are keep bombarding  
397 them with it....., slowly, slowly, slowly they will start believing that message. They will slowly get  
398 desensitised to it. I do think, especially those who may not be as knowledgeable they might be  
399 vulnerable to you know believing what the media is saying.

400 **Bongo:** I think coming back to your point of saying that why we should focus on international  
401 context for example regarding – like I come from Tanzania – why has that to do with Muslims and  
402 young people actually being as they are. Just recently for example in the United States – I think it  
403 was a senator or a governor, Michelle Bachman, she say that we should start banning falafel in the

404 schools because this is the Jihadi's food (everyone laughs). Now just think if that passes into law  
405 and given the United States is a close ally to Britain, you see it could just easily spill over to the  
406 other side and all the western world will burn falafel because she say that ok if they start that to  
407 falafel hmmm we'll go to shawarma (Arabic food) (everyone laughs) after that they may say what  
408 else come from Arabia then after just a few seconds into Arabic music and the Koran and God  
409 Knows what else...

410 **Kim:** But not oil (everyone laughs).

411 **Abdullah B:** Recently, there was another commentator talking about the boy band, I don't even  
412 know about them, most people know about them, the 'One Direction' for example yeah and I think  
413 they have a Muslim member in the band? And they were saying – the right wing commentator was  
414 saying, the right wing commentator from the US was saying basically we should stop our  
415 daughters from listening to One Direction because he is undercover Jihadi trying to get them into  
416 Islam basically – and I was thinking 'what?'.....

417 **Kim:** The ignorance is just breathtaking.

418 **Abdullah B:** And the funniest thing is he wears the Palestinian scarf around his neck which is  
419 fashion, but he is wearing the Palestinian number one symbol for Jihad (laughs). But I think that is  
420 the extreme instance. I don't think most of the non Muslim read this kind of stuff and they would  
421 probably start laughing as well. I think they were extreme right wings.

422 **Kim:** But there is a lot of that in America – unfortunately.

423 **Abdullah:** He mentioned a key word basically that proves the point that was mentioned about are  
424 we being influenced and that word 'Jihad', because Jihad itself is a very noble concept and again  
425 it goes back to that point that when Muslims talk about Jihad openly – I'm not talking about the  
426 Jihad that is the media's definition of Jihad which is holy war that's not the case but Jihad itself is a  
427 noble concept which is struggling to purify yourself and to better yourself and to be closer to God  
428 so that example with Jihad is a very good example to prove that non-Muslims and Muslims are  
429 being influenced by the media because they are avoiding the discussions about Jihad in their own  
430 circles and in their own study-circles and classes and so on um yeah I think people have come  
431 to.. before I finish I think people need to name their children Jihad (laughs) but I think in our days..  
432 ....

433 **Kim:** They name the children Jihad (laughs).

434 (A few people are talking over each other here).

435 **Arikarikam:** I know someone who is called Jahid and somebody attacked him cos his car (number  
436 plate) said 'Jahid' as well. They got him outside the car and attacked him ...

437 **Kim:** (mentions the case of a paediatrician who was mistaken for a paedophile)

438 **Abdullah B:** They are finding it hard to talk about the concept of Jihad .... Muslim

439 educators because they think that if they talk about Jihad the Sun newspaper is going to get hold

440 of it – ‘Local Mosque is teaching Jihad!’ and without knowing what the context is people will

441 say ‘ These guys are Jihadis’ ..... but it is important for the Muslims themselves to ...learn about

442 the concept of Jihad because otherwise if you do not know the true concept of Jihad most people

443 will become ignorant and even the no-Muslim will become ignorant, but the problem is because of

444 the media influence Muslims are scared to talk about the concept of Jihad and as I know myself

445 Jihad in Islam is for a noble cause but you know even if I said that now probably I'd be in a police

446 station, they would probably arrest me now (laughs) just because I made that comment but yeah I

447 do believe in that sense .....definitely in the concept of Jihad Muslims have been influenced by

448 the media because honestly I don't think any of us have been to – even in (town), even though I get a

449 lot of good Imam, that is one taboo subject that no-one's going to talk about even to give the right

450 concept they just think if someone gets hold of it that the Mosque is teaching them about

451 Jihad, people would just take it the wrong way basically.

452 **Kim:** We live in a very complex world don't we? We are going to have to pull it together because

453 it's actually 5.10pm and we must do the last thing which is to go around and just give everyone a

454 chance to have a last word. If you haven't got anything to add or you don't want to say anything

455 just say pass, but just to give people a chance just to saying something to pull it together for them

456 and to bring this enquiry to its close. Anybody want to start?

457 **Arikarikam:** I just wanted to say about the influences, but also influences and action I think as

458 well. You form a plan to live your life now in this way because um if you're too open about your

459 religion or anything about that, then you could land in trouble even if it is with the best of intentions

460 so you will um or it will fashion the way you are... even naming for example naming your children

461 you think... do you know what I mean?.

462 **El-Fino:** No nothing to say.

463 **Carlito:** Pass

464 **Abdullah:** I just think er both non-Muslims and Muslims have a duty to kind of learn about their

465 own faith and about other faiths as well and to kind of be confident to explain and to express

466 themselves freely without feeling intimidated and that is the only way you will get rid of stereotypes

467 and negative misconceptions.

468 **Abdullah B:** Both Muslims and non-Muslims should feel less intimidated to have open

469 discussions about these issues because without dialogue we are going to stay ignorant

470 **Sandman:** Pretty much just to not to take media portrayal of certain activities like as the last word  
471 basically what Mohammed said to educate ourselves.

472 **Mr Fish:** I'll say like instead of using the media use the books like, our books as the translation as  
473 a way of our God, even if you are not Muslim, maybe as the person, Islamic studies probably the  
474 prophet, everything is well rounded even like dealing with non-Muslims , even like if you could  
475 study like that it would be like probably like a book – it's that big (laughs) so ....

476 **Bongo:** I think we live in the world of humanity and human rights I think Muslims should be left to  
477 practise their own religion as long as er its according to human rights and right now we have the  
478 United Nations and er I think this is because we almost over 2 billion people so things like media  
479 and all this stuff should not come into um targeting Muslims rather than improving their condition  
480 and respecting that they are part of this world, they are part of this planet so we, as humanity,  
481 should strive to let Muslims be valued and represented fairly – not in a good way but in the reality  
482 so it depends what is their real focus, is it good or bad – that's for people to decide.

483 **Kim:** That's a really nice place to end. Well I really enjoyed that. I found it very interesting – I  
484 think I learned a lot and I feel very privileged to have the opportunity to be here and hear what you  
485 all had to say and, as Chris said, we don't get the opportunity very often to hear different voices  
486 and I know that Chris will represent what you've got to say very fairly in his thesis.

487 **Chris:**Yes, there were a few things you guys were saying that you know trailing off some of the um  
488 comments that have been made by some of the young people I work with. Arvind and myself, we  
489 work with predominantly white Welsh working class kids and a lot of things you were saying were  
490 ringing quite true there particularly in relation to stereotyping prejudice that you were both speaking  
491 of – very interesting. Like I say, this is the second time we have done this – the girls and now  
492 with the gentlemen. I couldn't do it without you – you know, it's impossible to do what I intend to do  
493 without you guys and um other than thanking the wonderful Kim for, again, facilitating this  
494 community of enquiry and I know that she said that if any one of you guys want to take it any  
495 further within your own community or want to do some training, Kim does do this type of training  
496 ...

497 **Kim:** How do you find this way of being in a space together and sharing your views? Do you find it  
498 a useful tool, does it help?

499 **Abdullah B:** I come from a social science background .....so this kind of stuff I do kind of enjoy  
500 it.....

501 **Kim:** We need to um to give people opportunities to clarify the concepts and think through the

502 ideas and you know be able to share with each other um where it's open you know where it's not  
503 talked down.....

504 **Arikarikam:** It's a very nice way of getting more information out – a very nice way, in a nice  
505 informal, relaxed manner.

506 **Kim:** And it's very respectful. We all have to be very respectful to each other, listen to each other  
507 and not talk over each other, not put each other down. I thought, you know you're all educated  
508 people but for some of the younger people who perhaps ..... that's quite a challenge for some of  
509 them and this strategy does work very well in terms of you've got your rules and very few young  
510 people actually don't respond well to this um....

511 **Bongo:** I think what would make it more like better for these discussions if we could have also  
512 non-Muslims as well to inside..... us because also it would be a challenge also to us like how  
513 we are going to speak out and how are they going to speak out and how will this information going  
514 to match you see then, from their view you get the picture how society is.....

515 **Abdullah B:** That would be good research in itself (laughs) having non-Muslims and Muslims  
516 together having a frank discussion. Sometimes the non-Muslims they might feel like they don't  
517 want to be offending us, but the one thing about British society, British people – I'm British myself  
518 we're quite you know, we don't like to .....how would you say... intrude into someone else's  
519 space.....sometimes we've got things we want to say but we keep it all in because so to get an  
520 opportunity where we can have a frank discussion where they don't feel intimidated. If they want  
521 to talk about it, you know.... if they want to say 'yes from what I have been hearing  
522 about..Muslims this and that', I want to hear them say it.

523 **Kim:** And the important thing about this style is that you are looking at clarifying concepts of ideas  
524 not scoring points. It's not a debate. It's not about 'I'll win, you'll lose'. Well let's open that up and  
525 let's see what assumptions people are making and what are the implications of thinking like that.  
526 How do we challenge assumptions so that people have to stop and think 'oh, why do I think that?  
527 Where did that come from? I've changed my mind actually'. One of the key things we want people  
528 to say in this kind of thing is 'actually, after listening to your thoughts about it, I think I've changed  
529 my mind about it'. So that it is a genuine – people feel they can be honest, that they can tell the  
530 truth as they see it but realise other people's truths are different and start to – and actually to  
531 unpick – I mean even something like that people are worried about how they name their child in  
532 case that could lead to something. That's a very – you know, that's a really crucial thing isn't it.

533 **Abdullah B:** Well in American it's a big deal because Visa applications with a Muslim name .....  
534 my friend still has got to do his PhD, he has got a two year Research in America. He went to

535 London now and he has been waiting for his Visa for the last six/seven weeks yeah. Crazy. I  
536 mean he was told he was going to get it you know very soon and now he has got fed up and he is  
537 staying with his mates and is just waiting to get his Visa now. I remember his University telling him  
538 and we were like telling him don't worry, you're going to get it but it took extra long because he has  
539 the name Mohammed something, something, something...

540 **Kim:** It's unbelievable!

541 **Abdullah B:** And I think the media two years ago, a two year old got stopped (laughs). Common  
542 sense should alert them yeah, a two year old is going to mastermind a terrorist attack you know.





543 **Chris:** Only in America!

544 **Kim:** Who knows... I mean if you could see all the police stations in London now, they are  
545 absolutely choc o block because every single overseas student has got to go and register with the  
546 police station and fill in massive forms. Well, of course, all the overseas students have just arrived  
547 to do their PhDs and their Masters and things and the police stations are completely overwhelmed.

548 **Chris:** Talking about masses and masses and masses of data, all I'm going to ask you – if you  
549 want to um – if I can ask you if I can use your interview all I will ask you to do is if you could stick  
550 your badge on one side making sure you sign the rest. If you could put your email address when I  
551 get this transcribed -I'll send you a copy but also can you choose a name? Can you choose a  
552 pseudonym so I can swap your proper name for another name – not a girl's name, don't choose  
553 a girl's name. It could be any name but only you know the name. What I'll do, I'll swap the names  
554 and only you will know your conversation in that. Is that ok? Don't forget your email address and I  
555 will send you the word document then.

### 11.3. Appendix 3: Summary of One to One Interviews

#### Colour Coding of Themes

- The lack of knowledge of Islam by Muslims 
- the lack of knowledge of Islam by non-Muslims 
- being made to feel different 
- the media 

<b>Pseudonyms of the Key adults with brief pen pictures.</b>	<b>Lack of knowledge of Islam by Muslims and lack of knowledge of Islam by non-Muslims and Muslims.</b>	<b>Being made to feel different and the media.</b>
Arvind. Male adult youth worker (Revert/Asian). Born in Britain into a distinct Indian culture and religion but reverted to Islam in his 20s.	<p>Line 248,- Imams in the Mosque only representing one part of the Muslim community i.e. Bengali (Sunni).</p> <p>Lines 260, 337-339- (Our support organisation) gives the information that young Muslims can't get at the Mosque.</p> <p>Lines 374, 377-380,- Been taught the right way, "getting new knowledge", "going to carry on learning cos you never stop learning"</p>	<p>Line 217,- Faced 'racism' in the Muslim community from a Pakistani man as Arvind (not Pakistani, although a Muslim) wanted to marry his daughter.</p> <p>Line 351,- "I do my Islamophobia sessions with the non-Muslims and with the Muslim kids"</p>



<p>Mr Barre. Imam (Somali). Islamic academic.</p>	<p>Lines 26-29, 78-80, - Knowledge needs to come from a safe source- if not then Muslims could be vulnerable to radicalisation.</p> <p>Line 30,- need for Muslim role models (concur with women CoE).</p> <p>Line 109,- living as a closed culture (parallel lives, concurs with Parekh, 2000).</p> <p>Lines 133-160, - Education is key. those who are educated are active economically and socially. Those who are not, who do not speak English, work in limited areas with limited contact with wider community. Also can't assist their children, who may inherit their parents complexities.</p> <p>Line 163,- Need role models in the Muslim community (concur with CoE Muslim women).</p> <p>Lines 174-200,- The Ummah, or transnational loyalties- Young people need educating that their first loyalty is to the country they live in.</p> <p>Lines 216-224,- culture v faith. (Line 234) cultures that belong in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sudan may not work in this society.</p> <p>Lines 245-254,- lack of communication between parents and youngsters.</p> <p>Lines 252- 254,- Sometimes Muslims as a community have a victim mentality.</p> <p>Line 254,- Muslims not represented in this country.</p> <p>Line 265,- Misunderstanding of Islam by media and internet.</p>	<p>Line 81,- radical views promote Islamophobia.</p>
---	---	--

	<p>Lines 272-277,- need communication between Muslim and wider community.</p> <p>Line 283,- when Muslims feel they have confidence to seek knowledge away from their parents, is the real age of vulnerability.</p>	
--	---	--

<p>Benoy. Male adult youth worker (Revert/ white). Born into a non religious family. Reverted to Islam in his 20s.</p>	<p>Lines 18-76,- searching for knowledge in a wide range of religions before reverting to Islam.</p> <p>Lines 169-175,- too much culture in some Muslim households at the expense of Islamic knowledge.</p> <p>Lines 192-193,- boys learning the Koran (rote) but not having a clue what they are saying.</p> <p>Lines 211-213,- Mosques not young people friendly.</p> <p>Lines 245-248,- lack of knowledge by non-Muslims about Muslims and Islam.</p> <p>Lines 267-270, 447-461,- I'd like to educate people about Islam. When non-Muslims know that I am Muslim they usually make bad jokes about bombers and Asians, they treat me differently but only when they know I can't go out clubbing, and there is respect for that.</p>	<p>Line 461,- comment about bombers and Asians when Benoy's workmates know he is Muslim. (also included in claims for Muslims/non Muslims to have knowledge).</p>
--	---	---

<p>Raahi. Female (Asian). Wears the Hijab but not face covering. Born into a liberal Muslim family. Encouraged to mix with non-Muslims. Qualified to degree level.</p> <p>Raahi is educated to degree level but sometimes she and her sister (who were born in Wales), work behind the counter at the family take away. Her sister is a qualified and practicing secondary school teacher</p>	<p>Lines 13-27,- One of my Grandfather's biggest regret was not completing his studies- financial pressures to support my grandmother.</p> <p>Lines 155, 579-581,- Parents very supportive of Raahi having an education, and to mix with non-Muslims.</p> <p>Lines 466-467,- People with hate have the wrong information.</p> <p>Line 591,- "I'm Bengali Welsh you know".</p>	<p>Lines 42-52,- Raahi's eldest sister bullied by fellow Bengali girls for being poor.</p> <p>Lines 228-241,- The drunks come in after 11 and make fun of my accent and don't believe we are both educated.</p> <p>Lines 281-309 Raahi worked in a perfume shop and was abused on occasions by being called a "Pakki". She didn't have the support of the shop assistant manager. Raahi cried to her mother who made an excuse for her female abuser saying "they must have had a bad day". Raahi said it was, "something I haven't been through".</p>
---	---	--

<p>Oanez. Female adult youth worker (Asian)</p> <p>Wears the Hijab (headscarf and Abbiya (Full dress, but not face covering). Born into a non-practicing Muslim family. Qualified to degree level.</p>	<p>Line 159,- mosques have been failing young people for generations.</p> <p>Line 182,- my family wasn't Islamic, they didn't know why we pray and cover up. I went to the Mosque and I was told why. The Imam was a (Line 196) "man of balanced character".</p> <p>Line 217,- Young people need to have knowledge of true Islam (concurs with CoE men)</p> <p>Line 232,-Mosque not giving young Muslims knowledge</p> <p>Line 240,- 80% of the Bengali community are ignorant about the true message of Islam. (concurs with claim for Muslims to have knowledge of Islam in CoEs)</p> <p>Line 278,- Some families living like guests in Wales (concurs with CoE men, and a Postcolonial stance)</p> <p>Line 283,-Schools not meeting young Muslims' needs.</p> <p>Line 424,- after my father died suddenly my RE teacher in school became a father figure and advised me on everything. He got me through my A levels. He told the other teachers and they supported me through finding my faith.</p> <p>Lines 428-520, Muslims not having a voice and not engaging in politics</p> <p>Lines 520-593, Muslims living parallel lives (Parekh report 2000).</p> <p>Line 598,- individuality not good for society.</p>	<p>Line 177,- Elders in the Mosque not respecting Muslim young people (concurs with COE men)</p> <p>Line 221,- In secondary school staff assumed her English language skills were poor so she was initially placed in a remedial class, even though her English language skills were good.</p> <p>Line 254,- racism and inequality in schools.</p> <p>Lines 323, 322-334,- There are racist teachers and ignorant teachers.</p> <p>Line 337- Teachers assuming she is from another country, "what do they do in your country"</p> <p>Line 343, No mention of Muslims in history lessons at school, "I thought OK did the Muslims exist?".</p>
--	---	---

Line 630,- (our support organisation) doing the work of the Mosque in giving young Muslims basic Islamic information, where we should be focusing on education and employment, instead of family and cultural problems.

Line 653,- no facilities at the Mosque (locally) for women to engage (unlike the bigger cities in Britain), but they can at the University Mosque.

Line 678,- English language barriers between parents and young Muslims, means they can't support their children in education nor help them deal with problems.

Lines 743-783, young Muslims going crazy on Facebook, because they are restricted in free mixing between sexes. They are not hiding identities because their parents will never find out.

Lines 800-819, need positive Muslim role models (concur with CoE Muslim women). Line 841,- the chain is broken for Muslims to be able to influence Government policy. Think tanks who are supposed to represent Muslims don't.

Line 490,- Lost a lot of friends when she started wearing the Hijab in secondary school.

Deeba. Female adult social worker (Asian)

Lines 1-37,-Born into a British Pakistani Muslim family, parents taught her from their interpretations of the Koran but at 16 she was westernised, moved from England to Wales, didn't have contact with her family for 8 years or so, avoided Asian girls as she had nothing in common with them. Worked in a pub behind the bar, became a practicing Muslim after working in a women's refuge with other Muslim women. Started wearing the Hijab in her 30s.

Lines 323-350,- Deeba was told to dress down by her manager due to the nature of the young people she was going to be working with. Deeba says that her manager (who usually wears a suit) wears a tracksuit when having contact with the young people. Deeba wants to be able to wear the Abiyya in front of her clients but chooses not to due to the relationship she has made with them, knowing that it could change for the worse if they saw her wearing the Abbiya. Lack of knowledge by non-Muslims

Lines 149-159,- started wearing the Hijab and lost 40 or so of her non-Muslim friends.

Lines 159-172,- Deeba sometimes gets "mocked" by people who used to be her friends for wearing the hijab.

Lines 210-216,- Racism. When Deeba worked in a pub sometimes someone would use the word "niggo" about someone else but would then apologise to me saying "not you".

Lines 244-270,- Deeba is a Swansea City Football Club supporter. She was driving her car and became stuck in traffic when a minibus full of Swansea supporters started shouting "Pakki" and holding up pieces of paper with Pakki written on them at her. At the forthcoming victory parade she wore her Hijab and supporters scarf.



		<p>Lines 272-279,- verbal abuse in the street where she is called a Pakki.</p> <p>Lines 277-278,- She avoids situations and scenarios where racism can happen.</p> <p>Lines 291-319,- Deeba will choose not to wear the Abiyya on some occasions in her contact with some members of the public but will continue to wear the headscarf.</p> <p>Lines 300- 302,-" it's very visually impactive and I think that from the outside perspective they look at me and think she's not educated, she doesn't speak English, I can say it and I can get away with it where if I'm dressed more westernised they might feel as if no I'm not going to take it". (Deeba has been objectified within a Postcolonial context by her wearing the Abbiya, concurring with the CoE with the Muslim women.</p>
--	--	---



#### 11.4. Appendix 4: Research Information Leaflet: An Analysis of the ways in which young Muslim Men and Women construct their identities.

Dear Friend,

My name is Chris Mort and I am studying for a PhD research degree at Swansea Metropolitan University, Townhill Road, Townhill, Swansea. My supervisor is Dr [REDACTED].

The title of my research is: *An analysis of the ways in which young Muslim men and women construct their identities?*

Basically, this means, how do young Muslims see themselves within society? What are the issues that they think are important and what obstacles are there that may stop them being who they want to be? What is, or what was, your time at school like, and what were the difficulties, if any, that you experienced? Where do young Muslims get their information from? Is it from friends, family, the internet? How does your religion help you? How do you see your culture? Does racism affect you and if so in which ways? How can someone overcome this? What do YOU want to say about these issues? These are some of the areas that I want to explore, and with your help I will achieve this.

I have been fortunate to have worked with young Muslim men and women from my work with [REDACTED] where we produced an anti-Islamophobic DVDs entitled 'What if?' and 'Being Me'.

Why choose this area to research?




Firstly, I have an interest and respect for Islam, which has caused me to study how some of the negative images of Islam and Muslims has hurt and angered some young Muslims. This is wrong, and must be addressed. I believe that by finding out what issues affect young Muslims, this can lead to a raft of information that can be used to educate and inform non-Muslims and allow them to see a positive and peaceful side of Islam. It is my hope then that this will change some peoples' views and not to see Muslims as 'being different'.

It is my intention to audio/video record each interview, but all of your personal information, such as your name etc, will be kept confidential. I will be the only one who will know your name. You can choose a pseudonym so only you will be able to recognise yourself in anything written about the interviews. Also, no-one other than myself will see any of the video recordings, which are carried out for ease of transcribing each conversation. I will show you *your* transcript to make sure you are ok with it before using it.

I can't carry out this research without you. This is your opportunity to have your say and hopefully allow others to learn more about young Muslims.

Thank you.

*Chris*



An analysis of the ways in which young Muslim Men and Women construct their identities?

This consent form is to check that you are happy with the information you have received about the study, that you are aware of your rights as a participant and to confirm that you wish to take part in the study.

1. Have you read the research information leaflet (overleaf)?
2. Have you had an opportunity to discuss further questions with me?
3. Have you received enough information about the study?
4. Do you understand that you are free to refuse to take part?
5. Do you understand that you may withdraw from the study at any time?
6. Do you understand that all information will be treated as confidential, and that your name will not be used?
7. Do you agree to take part in the study?

Yes	No

Your signature.....Date.....

Name in block letters please.....

Date of Birth.....

Your contact details (How can I contact you)? E mail/ Mobile/ Home address

.....

I confirm that quotations from the interview(s) can be used in the final research report and other publications. I understand that these will be used anonymously.

Signature.....Date.....

Name in Block letters please.....

Please choose a pseudonym (first name only) that I can use to refer to you instead of your actual name.

.....


11.5. Appendix 5: CMSS Workshop: Building Resilience – Countering Extremism and Racism.

FACULTY OF ARTS

# CMSS Workshop Building Resilience: Countering Extremism and Racism

CENTRE FOR MUSLIM STATES AND SOCIETIES

وَمَنْ يُؤْتَ الْحِكْمَةَ فَقَدْ أُوتِيَ خَيْرًا كَثِيرًا  
"and he to whom wisdom is granted necessarily received a benefit overflowing" (Al-Baqara 2:269)



UWA Students are invited to participate in a workshop organised by  
The Centre for Muslim States and Societies  
by  
**Christopher Mort**

This workshop will enable you to learn about a range of issues such as extremism, refugees and migration, Islam and ethnicity. Each day, you will be encouraged to express your opinions, enter debate with one another, challenge misconceptions, and explore different cultures and views. By the end of the workshop you would have developed specialized learning skills. You will also learn to impart this training to students in schools

The workshop is divided into two groups, Group A and group B. Students must attend the same group for all three sessions.

Christopher Mort is a 4th year PhD student at the University of Wales (formerly Swansea Metropolitan University). His research focuses on an analysis of the construction of identity among young Muslim men and women. Christopher Mort is also co presenting workshops around the educational approaches in Huddersfield University and at a conference on extremism in Sweden in June 2014.

**Group A**  
Date: 23rd April 2015  
1st May 2015  
8th May 2015

**Group B**  
Date: 24th April 2015  
30th April 2015  
8th May 2015

Time: 9:00am - 5:00pm  
Venue: Nedlands Office Centre  
18 Stirling Hwy, Nedlands 6009

**For more information or  
to RSVP contact:**

Mehwish Bangash  
Oliver Mitchell

E: cmss-sscs@uwa.edu.au  
Ph: (08) 6488 4554

RSVP Essential  
Please note places are  
limited.

Sponsored by: UWA Diversity Initiates Fund

CRICOS Provider Code: 00126G

ACHIEVE INTERNATIONAL EXCELLENCE

## 11.6. Appendix 6: Glossary of Terms

Abbiya:	Also used to describe the hijab.
APPG:	All party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims is an informal cross-party group formed by MPs and members of the House of Lords who share a common interest in a particular policy area, region or country.
Burqa:	A one piece veil covering the face and body often leaving a mesh screen to see through.
Colonised:	'Colonised' refers to Muslims affected by the argument forwarded in this research. Colonised (without single quotation marks) denotes those referred to by the wider literature for example, postcolonial theory.
Colonising:	Being 'othered' or marginalised as a consequence of state policy and legislation.
Colonising of the mind:	A state of mind for some Muslims living in Britain brought about by postcolonial conditions.
CONTEST:	Counter-terrorism strategy employed by the British government which includes Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare.
Extremism:	The vocal or active opposition to our shared values (FBV). These include democracy and the rule of law, mutual respect and tolerance of other faiths and beliefs ( <i>Counter-terrorism and Security Act 2015</i> ).
Fundamental British values (FBVs):	Defined by the government as 'democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths' (see Chapter 3). Criticised in this research by being vaguely defined and having wording taken from the Prevent anti-extremist policy.
Hijab:	Means covering up but generally used to describe head-scarves worn by Muslim women.
Imam:	The leader of prayers in a Mosque.
ISIL:	An acronym for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.
ISIS:	An acronym for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.
Islam:	The religious system established through the prophet Muhammad; the Muslim religion; the body of Muslims, the Muslim world.
Islamophobia:	Hatred or fear of Islam or Muslims. The dread, hatred and hostility towards Islam and Muslims perpetuated by a series of closed views that imply and attribute negative and derogatory

stereotypes and beliefs to Muslims (Runnymede, 1997, p.1). A contested term as it may not reflect accurately hate crime perpetrated against Muslims.

Madrassa:	An Islamic educational establishment.
Media:	Used in this research to denote sections of the British print media who negatively report on Islam and Muslims. When other media platforms are discussed they are referred to as 'the wider media', or referred to by name and appropriately referenced.
Mosque:	Place of worship for Muslims.
Multiculturalism:	Has generally allowed for the celebration of diversity. It has been subjected to different interpretations. Within the context of this research it refers to the ability of Muslims living in Britain to be able to publicly celebrate being a Muslim.
Muslim:	A follower of the religion of Islam.
Muslimness:	Degree of agency of being a Muslim and ability to express Muslim identity in public spaces..
Niqab:	A veil for the face that leaves the eyes clear.
Othered, Othering:	Marginalised under postcolonial conditions.
Postcolonial conditions:	A state of being 'othered' by state policy and legislation.
Postcolonialism:	In the context of this research, the marginalisation, securitisation and control of British Muslims by the actions of the state in its policies, restricting the political agency of British Muslims by 'colonising the Muslim mind' limiting their agency to allow their voices to be heard. The theory of Postcolonialism is used to support how Muslims living in Britain are controlled and 'othered' by state policies.
Prevent:	Initially a 'hearts and minds' education approach. Has grown to encompass many areas of surveillance. This research has positioned Prevent as central to marginalising British Muslims by the introduction of Fundamental British values (FBV's) (see Chapter 3).
Quran or Koran	The central religious text of Islam.
Securitisation:	Being made to feel different, in fear of being arrested or prosecuted for displaying Muslimness while living in Britain.
Sharia law:	There are many interpretations but in simple terms it is how the Quran and sayings of the prophet Muhammad are interpreted in ways that Muslims should live their lives.

Throbe:	A long garment used to cover up the body.
Ummah:	The Muslim community. Comprising individuals bound to one another by religious ties. A feeling of global solidarity with fellow Muslims.
Wider non-Muslim Public or British public:	This is used to refer to the majority non-Muslim population in Britain. It is not meant to generalise everyone but present a representation of the public who do not have knowledge of Islam or Muslims (74% of the British public claim that they know 'nothing or next nothing about Islam' (Allen, 2012, p.2)



## 11.7. Appendix 7: Summaries of Relevant Acts, Policies and Reports from Chapter 2.

### ***[The] Race Relations Act 1965, 1976, Race Relations Amendment Act 2000, [The] Equality Act 2010***

[The] *Race relations Act* of 1965 was the first legislation attempting to combat discrimination, particularly regarding skin colour, with limited success. In its latter stage the *Act* created public regulatory agencies charged with promoting greater equality of opportunity regarding employment, education, housing and public facilities. The *Act* was later incorporated and amended by the introduction of the *Race Relations Amendment Act* in 2000. In 2010 The *Equality Act* came into force incorporating many previous pieces of legislation into one *Act (Equality Act 2010)*. The introduction of amendments to the *Race Relations Act 1965* may be seen as society's reaction to incidents of injustice and that events triggering changes in the law often arise from conflict and the need to define legislatively what is and what is not acceptable in the maelstrom of human interaction.

### ***[The] Scarman Report (1981)***

Following the Brixton riot in 1981, Lord Scarman was appointed to lead an enquiry into the riots. The Scarman Report (1981) made major recommendations to policing, including the condemnation of wide-scale use of indiscriminate stop and search powers, which were identified as being overused against black youths. The recommendations later resulted in the formulation of the *Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984* marking major changes in codes of practice for the police, including the stopping and searching of suspects. The Report (Scarman, 1981) additionally identified racial disadvantage and inner-city decline as requiring urgent action. In identifying the causes of the disturbances, Scarman reported three

contributory factors. 1. The heavy handed stop and search or 'hard' policing, that created a lack of trust, culminating in the introduction of the *Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984*. 2. A pathological image of black youth and the image of the stereotypical black family suffering from cultural and family disadvantage. This replicates itself, creating material conditions which maintain poverty, reproducing their own troubles, which mirror stereotypical views of black family life, rather than a focus on racism (Solomos, 1988; Gilroy, 2002). 3. The question of bilingualism among Asian children not being able to communicate effectively with parents due to their parents having a limited command of English (Anwar, 1988).

Although Scarman (1981) recognised policing failures, the report focused on the perceived weak culture of the African-Caribbean community and the need for a multicultural solution for problems that were rooted in unemployment, poor education and ill-health (Gilroy, 2002). Tyler (2010) argued that little emphasis was given to the *British Nationality Act 1981* which removed the automatic right to citizenship of Commonwealth subjects, in effect creating second class citizens, which contributed to fuelling the riots.

### ***[The] Rampton (1981) and Swann (1985) Reports***

When black and latterly, Asian children began attending British schools from the 1960s onwards, there were generally two approaches adopted to lessen the impact that racial stereotyping was having. One was the colour blind approach advocated by Dr Martin Luther King, judging people on their "merits" (Modood and May, 2001, p. 306), and the second, encouraging cultural practices labelled as the three "S's: saris, samosas and steel bands" (*ibid*). Although these initial



approaches were well meaning they ignored the cultural isolation that many young people felt when attending school. The Labour Government at that time ordered a review to be carried out. The Rampton Report (1981), was critical of teachers being ill-prepared for teaching in multicultural classrooms, negatively stereotyping African-Caribbean boys, and finding evidence of cultural bias during IQ testing. The report caused a furore with its emphasis on teacher racism causing the conservative government of the day to put pressure on Rampton into resigning, subsequently replacing him with Michael Swann. Swann directed his final report away from anti-racist strategies to one of "inclusive multiculturalism" which saw multicultural education as enabling:

...all ethnic groups, both minority and majority, to participate fully in shaping society, while also allowing, and where necessary assisting the ethnic minority communities in maintaining their distinct ethnic identities within a framework of commonly accepted values (Department of Education and Science, 1985, p. 5).

The report (*ibid*), although acknowledging underachievement in African-Caribbean students, presented a differentiated research finding revealing Asians and whites were achieving similar results, perhaps confirming the second conclusion that Scarman (1981) arrived at when he presented the stereotypical image of black families as being weak, once again placing the blame within the families rather than society. Modood and May (2001) argue that the ensuing debate polarised the differences between antiracist and multicultural education, the former being responsible for the rejection of culturalism, thereby hiding cultural racism from view. This had the effect of reinforcing the black and white dichotomy finally forcing an amalgamation of the two, minimising the distinctive experiences and concerns of Asians, and the multiculturalism being seen as fostering cultural

understanding and awareness, at the expense of neglecting the wider "political dimension and power structures" (Grinter, 1990, p. 212).

Between the publication of the Swann Report (Department of Education and Science, 1985), which dealt with black, Asian and white academic achievement, and the Runnymede Report (Runnymede Trust, 1997) twelve years later which dealt with Islamophobia, there were several key events notable for the negative impact they had on Muslims living in Britain. These events marked a shift in the social imagination in the 'othering' of Muslims and are central in the stereotyping of the Muslim community in Britain.

### ***[The] Burnage Report (Macdonald, 1989)***

On Wednesday the 17th September 1986, Ahmed Iqbal Ullah, a 13 year old Asian pupil at Burnage high school, Manchester, was stabbed to death after an altercation in the schoolyard with Darren Coulburn, a fellow white pupil. The school believed that the murder of Ahmed was racially motivated, but the Police disagreed. The inquiry team were criticised for putting forward their views when they were not in possession of the facts, and in doing so they alienated both the Asian and white communities which resulted in further tensions including violence in the aftermath of Ahmed's murder. In the years leading up to the murder of Ahmed, the education system in Britain had gone through many changes with schools choosing to adopt anti-racist policies. The Head-teacher of Burnage High school Dr. Gough, had embraced the ideology of anti-racism and multicultural policies, which he implemented throughout the school. Section 11 of the *Local Government Act 1966*, allowed for grants to be accessed "for certain expenditure

due to immigrant population" (Macdonald, 1989, p. 176). In practice at Burnage this meant the recruitment of staff that were Black or Asian. The multicultural side of the school included:

... the soft underbelly of multiculturalism, Indian music, Eid festivals, multi-faith assemblies, and section 11 continued to give Burnage High School its image of a school implementing the local authority's policies on race' (Macdonald, 1989, p. 167).

The more cynical refer to this kind of multiculturalism as "Sari's, Samosas and Steel Bands" (Macdonald, 1989, p. 299), and the Burnage report was one of the earliest reports to criticise the interpretation and implementation of multicultural policies. Following the murder of Ahmed Iqbal Ullah, Mr Ian Macdonald QC was asked to chair the inquiry into the circumstances leading to Ahmed's murder and to report its main findings to Manchester City Council. However, the publication of his report was prevented by a legal challenge from Manchester City Council that sparked a National debate on anti-racism in education. The report therefore was eventually published by the authors of the inquiry team independently in 1989.

The findings of the inquiry were scathing of the management at Burnage High school, accusing them of failing to mediate between white and Asian groups at the school, which was hampered by a lack of communication between staff, senior management and students. This led to an increase in racial identity and a closing of ranks among Asian pupils, and a lack of management to deal with divisions between staff who saw some as 'informers'. Some members of staff were violent toward pupils, some staff were racist toward pupils, some staff were racist to fellow staff, and some staff were hankering for a return to the past, reluctant to change their style of teaching or to engage with management (Macdonald, 1989).

The Head-teacher Dr Gough, was reported to have been so "obsessed with the ideology of anti-racism" (Macdonald, 1989, p. 117) that he failed to see how the discriminatory treatment of white students not only impacted on the school but on the neighbourhood outside the school, leading to racial conflict between white and Asian pupils which the school ultimately had no control over.

In our view an adherence to some kind of cosmetic anti-racism, which carries with it a failure to deal with the real racism experienced by the black community is a very dangerous thing (Macdonald, 1989, p. 117).

Multiculturalist policies failed to recognise the need for an understanding of the realities of living together with different cultures under the umbrella of a community.

The change from a multicultural approach by Burnage High School, towards an equal opportunities approach came about in 1984 when Manchester Education Committee developed an Anti-Racist policy. The message sent to its 20,000 employees by the Education Committee reinforced the message that all staff were expected to contribute fully to an education service founded on equal rights and that practices that work against this would lead to dismissal (Macdonald, 1989).

It is clear that this shift in policy is one of several changes being made in the wake of the recommendations by Lord Scarman (Scarman,1981), following the events of the Brixton rioting. The legislative framework which placed a duty on bodies to uphold equal opportunities is a positive step forward. However, punitive policies alone do not address the need for community cohesion, which must start with communities, rather than a top down approach favoured by politicians who may see legislation as a quick fix to a particular problem.

### ***International Conflicts and Muslim Reaction (1990-2012)***

On the 2nd August 1990, Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, ordered the military invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Following the United Nations Security Council call for Iraq to withdraw, the United States and its Western NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) allies, mobilised troops to Saudi Arabia. On November 29th, the United Nations Security Council authorised the use of force if Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait by the 15th January 1991. Between January 16th and February 24th allied air and ground offensives had resulted in Arab and United States forces retaking Kuwait. Following the ceasefire the terms of peace required Iraq to recognise the sovereignty of Kuwait, and to rid itself of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Pending those conditions being met, economic sanctions would continue (Hickman, 2016).

The effects of such an international conflict for Muslims in Britain, following on from the Rushdie Affair, is difficult to quantify. What is evident are the reactions of British Muslims from varying alliances. At a national Muslim meeting in Bradford on the 20th January 1991 Lewis, (1994, p. 167) reported:

...the resolutions insisted that 'the USA led aggression against Iraq' must stop and these forces withdraw from Muslim territories; the Saudi ruling family was condemned for allowing non-Muslim forces access to the Islamic heartlands and declared unfit to be the custodian of Mecca and Medina; therefore it was every Muslim's duty to 'restore the Khilafat [Caliphate]'.

It is interesting to note that what was seen internationally as an act of aggression on the part of Iraq, has been transposed for many Muslims into a question of solidarity for the Ummah or global Muslim brotherhood, and revulsion for the Saudis for allowing non-Muslims on to Muslim holy soil. The final part of the

resolution called for during the meeting, was the restoration of a land for Muslims, calling attention to Western support for Israel and opposition towards Muslim Palestinians. A further national meeting of 35 British Muslim organisations on 12th August 1990 reiterated the anti-Western view and once again viewed the incursion of American and allied troops into Kuwait and Iraq through a different set of political and religiously structured lenses:

We cannot tolerate the intervention of non-Muslim powers in the essentially internal Muslim affair. The build up of non-Muslims [sic] military forces in the vicinity of Islam's most holy shrines (Makkah, Madinah and Jerusalem) is not acceptable. Any government in Muslim lands co-operating with the non-Muslim armies cannot demand the support of Muslims worldwide (Muslim News, 1990, p. 1).

As the conflict in Iraq continued, Muslims in Britain who protested against the incursion were largely reported by the media to be supporters of Saddam Hussein and viewed as being anti-British in their loyalties. The West Yorkshire police reported a 100% increase in racist attacks in Bradford and a 58% increase in West Yorkshire as a whole (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 10). Some Muslims believed they had been intellectually attacked by Rushdie and now they were being militarily attacked and abandoned by the custodians of Islam (McRoy, 2006). Following on from one military conflict, the war in Bosnia was an important event for Muslims.

The Bosnian conflict 1992 to 1995, was an ethnically based war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a former republic of Yugoslavia. The lead up to the war involved several social, economic and political changes involving Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Serbs, and Croats as well as the Yugoslav army. The conflict was notorious for its so-called ethnic cleansing, the first of which involved the Bosniaks

and resulted in catastrophic loss of life. For the purposes of this research, and not to marginalise the plight of the other groups involved, this account will only consider the impact of the war on Muslims in Britain (Reuters, 2008).

Bosniaks had once been considered a distinct nation with a recognised 'Muslim' identity. For many Muslims and non-Muslims living in Britain, the war highlighted their 'existence' and the fact that there were so many indigenous Muslims living in Western Europe and in particular, a country traditionally thought of as non-Islamic rather than being described as Middle Eastern in geographical terms. The systemic killing of Bosniaks caused sharp psychological trauma for Muslims living in Britain who likened it to a Muslim holocaust in Europe (McRoy, 2006). Many Bosniaks were native "European Muslims" (LeBor, 1997, p. 20), white skinned, largely secular and "indistinguishable in culture and language from their neighbours" (McRoy, 2006, p. 23).

Bosnian Muslims were 'ethnically cleansed' because they came to be identified as a 'racial' group by people who were phenotypically, linguistically and culturally the same as themselves (Modood, 2006, pp. 51-62).

They were also part of a multi-faith and multi-ethnic community which did little to calm British Muslim fears. The British Government stance was not to lift the arms embargo or intervene militarily to support the Bosniaks, but to support a negotiated settlement. Some Muslims viewed this decision as one of a series of recurring themes running from Rushdie, the Gulf war, to Bosnia (McRoy, 2006).

***[The] Macpherson Report (Macpherson, 1999)***

A vital part of developing Britain's race relations began with the publication of the Macpherson Report in 1999. Although the report was the result of an enquiry into the murder of a British African-Caribbean teenager, its findings had a profound influence on all ethnic minorities in Britain and is therefore deeply relevant to the aims of this research. The Macpherson report into the circumstances surrounding the murder of Stephen Lawrence (Macpherson, 1999), was a given a high profile status following its publication which charted the serious failings of the police investigation highlighting race and racism among the criteria for its investigatory failings. Macpherson recommended that the definition of a racist incident should be changed to (recommendation 12): "A racist incident is any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person" (Macpherson, 1999). The change in definition would address the requirement for the police to decide whether an incident is reportable and in need of investigation, making reporting victim focused. Recommendations 67 to 69 consider amending the National Curriculum aimed at valuing cultural diversity and preventing racism, in an attempt to better reflect the needs of a diverse society. Recommendations include, the reporting and recording of all racist incidents as well as the ethnicity of 'excluded' pupils and that the Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED) record such in their examination (Macpherson, 1999).

A major criticism made by Macpherson was that the Metropolitan police (and elsewhere) were guilty of institutional racism. Macpherson defines this as:

The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour



which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racial stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people' (Macpherson, 1999, p. 28).

For Muslims, the Macpherson report offered little comfort either in the definition of racism, which did not cover Muslims specifically in relation to religion, and in the identification of institutionalised racism, which failed to include religion.

Macpherson's report (1999) overlooked the impact the report on Islamophobia (Runnymede Trust, 1997) may have had, and failed to plug the gaps in the *Blasphemy Act* (Abolished in England and Wales in 2008) that Runnymede had recommended, and which Muslims desperately wanted, leaving Islam open for further attack. In contrast to the Runnymede Trust (1997) recommendations, the Government embraced the Macpherson report with its emphasis on diversity training and police reform. The report was also the catalyst for the implementation of the *Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000*, requiring public bodies to actively promote racial equality (*Race Relations Act 1976*). It did not however result in protection for Muslims or realise the potential to reduce Islamophobia, "since non-ethnic religious identities were not recognized under existing provisions as in need of protection" (Morey and Yaqin, 2011, p. 50).

## 11.8. Appendix 8: Summaries of Relevant Acts, Policies and Reports from Chapter 3

### ***The Channel Programme (HM Government, 2015)***

"The Channel programme in England and Wales is a voluntary initiative providing a multi-agency approach to support people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism" (Home Office, 2017, p. 5). Panels, which are cited in each local authority, meet to discuss the needs of the person referred and where appropriate tailor a package of support which may include ideological, educational, mental health and other vulnerabilities. The Channel programme is a pre-crime initiative, legislated by the *Counter-terrorism and Security Act 2015* placing a duty on local authorities to provide support for vulnerable people.

Recently published statistical data from the Home Office (2017a) allows us to interrogate some of the referrals made under Prevent (Home Office, 2011a) by the educational sector. Between April 2015 and March 2016 a total of 7,631 individuals were subject to a referral due to concerns that they were vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism (Home Office, 2017a, p. 4). The education sector made the most referrals (2,539) accounting for 33% of referrals. Of the 7,631 referrals, 2,766 left the process requiring no further action, 3,793 (50%) were signposted to alternative services and 1,072 (14%) were deemed suitable, through preliminary assessment, to be discussed at a Channel panel. Subsequently, 381 people received Channel support, 365 having left the process with 16 young people still receiving support. Of the 7,631 individuals referred, 78% were male, with those under 20 years of age accounting for 56%. Of the 1,072 individuals discussed at Channel panel meetings, 63% were under 20 years of age and those receiving support (72%) were under 20 years of age. The total referrals accounted for 65%

in relation to 'Islamic extremism' concerns and 10% for far right-wing extremism concerns.

The percentage of Muslim students varies greatly in England and Wales dependant on geographical locations, however, they only make up 1 in 12 children (Office for National Statistics, 2012), yet are more likely to be referred under Prevent (Home Office, 2011a) than young people who exhibit far right-wing views in educational establishments.

A more recent survey from Channel, April 2017 to March 2018 (Home Office, 2018a) showed the education sector still making the most referrals at 33%. Of the total number of referrals, 44% were for concerns about 'Islamic extremism' (down from 78% between 2015-16), and 18% for far right-wing extremism indicating a rise in concern about young people with far-right views. Those discussed at Channel panel meetings and required support accounted for 50% 'Islamic extremism' and 32% for far right-wing extremism, with the percentage of those under 20 years of age at 62% compared with 63% in 2015-16. The figures suggest a rise in concern for young people with far right-wing views.

The most recent survey (Home Office, 2019) shows the education sector with 33% of all referrals. Of these, 24% were for concerns relating to Islamist 'radicalisation' and 24% for concerns of right-wing 'radicalisation'. These figures suggest a rise in concern for right-wing 'radicalisation' and a decrease for Islamic 'radicalisation'. It is of note that the terminology of the survey (*ibid*) has changed from 'extremism' to 'radicalisation'.

Channel has not been without criticism with a vague definition employed to assess

'vulnerability' in respect of 'at risk of radicalisation' (O'Donnell, 2017), which has implications in educational settings, potentially silencing debate for fear of being reported as being vulnerable.

### ***[The] Casey Review (2016)***

The Casey Review (2016) is a report by Dame Louise Casey into integration and opportunity of deprived communities, which includes recommendations associated with the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a). I argue that the report continues to advance the government's promotion of British values into Muslim spaces.

In July 2015, at the request of the then Prime minister and Home Secretary, Dame Louise Casey was asked to undertake a review into integration and opportunity into the most isolated and deprived communities in Britain (Casey Review, 2016). The report showed that some of the most deprived and segregated communities comprised of citizens having Pakistani and Bangladeshi heritage. A poll (*ibid*) additionally showed 55% of the public agreed there was a fundamental clash between Islam and the values of British society. Furthermore, 46% of British Muslims felt that being a Muslim in Britain was difficult because of prejudice against Islam, together with a growing sense of grievance and a strong identification with the Ummah or global Muslim community (Casey, 2016, pp. 12-13). Recommendations included the need for schools to teach integration as part of the National Curriculum to halt the spread of racism and extremism, attaching more weight to British values, laws and history (Casey, 2016, p. 168). Also, the need for an integration oath for immigrants intending to settle in Britain and promotion of integrated schools allowing pupils to mix with others from different backgrounds (*ibid*).

Cantle (2016) largely welcomed the review with its emphasis on community cohesion and integration, but was critical of its lack of attention to the white 'host' community, reminding us that integration demands support from both sides of the community.

I argue that Casey (2016) reinforced the government's position by recommending that teachers continue with their responsibilities in implementing Prevent (Home Office, 2011a) by encouraging the ideology of FBVs and failing to acknowledge Britain's colonial past.

### ***[The] Office for Students ([The] Higher Education and Research Act 2017) and Prevent on Campus***

I now look at how the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) came to be implemented in Higher Education, initially as guidance (Office for Students, 2018), and latterly as a statutory obligation (*Higher Education and Research Act 2017*). I show how Prevent is a tool to exercise Counter-terrorism legislation (*Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*), and how government has used Prevent as a conduit to further its policies into education by the introduction of Fundamental British Values (FBV) (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015). I look first at Prevent in universities followed by an examination of the Office for Students and its impact on free speech on campus.

#### *Prevent in Universities*

As early as 2005, the then, Education Secretary Ruth Kelly was telling university leaders they had a duty to inform the police of "possible criminal acts" (Kelly, 2005; Fekete, 2009, p. 107), "adding that freedom of speech did not extend to tolerance

of 'unacceptable behaviour'. There had been "largely positive working relationships with local and regional police" (Thomas, 2012, p. 145) over the years in response to issues such as crime on campus, animal rights activist activities, far-right political activity, as well as incidents of so-called 'Islamic extremism'. (Thomas, 2012). The publication of a report into terrorism and extremism on British campuses (Glees and Pope, 2005), identified one secondary school and 22 universities where terrorists had at one time studied. The report was widely cited by the wider media "under alarmist and scare-mongering headlines" and for its "questionable data" (Fekete, 2009, p. 107) and "turning Prevent into a hot-button issue with Muslims" (Khan, 2016, pp. 151-152). Renton (2008) argued that the Glees report was flawed and accused Glees of trawling newspapers for evidence of Islamist activity and proceeding to try and establish connections to those identified with universities where they had previously been students. Renton (2008) accused Glees of 'naming and shaming' without evidence of wrongdoing and of advocating for greater police and security service activities on campuses with academics encouraged to name those deemed to exhibit suspicious behaviour to the authorities.

Although the Glees report (2005) was subjected to criticism, 14 months following its publication the Minister of State for Higher Education and lifelong learning Bill Rammell MP, issued new guidelines for universities to target "violent extremism in the name of Islam" (Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, 2006), with "universities asked to share information with security services regarding suspicious students and external speakers" (Fekete, 2009, p. 108).

The police are keen to build on existing relationships to support HE institutions in recognising and responding to such incidents (for

example, violent extremism that may lead to terrorism) should they occur (Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, 2009, p. 23).

New guidelines were also issued by the Minister of state for Higher education and Intellectual property, David Lammy MP, on how colleges should respond to the threat of violence (Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, 2009). I suggest that the UK government were not convinced that universities were doing enough to prevent students from potentially being radicalised on campus. This resulted in the government ordering a report from Lord Carlisle of Berriew QC (a previous reviewer of terrorism legislation in the UK) (HM Government, 2011). Lord Carlisle claimed that "universities have been slow or even reluctant to recognise their full responsibilities" (HM Government, 2011, paragraph 51), subsequently leading to criticism of British universities and justifying a punitive approach by government to introduce legislation to ensure compliance (see *Counter-terrorism and Security Act 2015*). Carlisle was later removed as an independent reviewer of Prevent following a legal challenge over his impartiality (Bowcott, 2019). Thomas (2012, p. 142) argued that the figures given in Carlisle's report was "fairly consistent with the number of British young people who now experience higher education". Sutton (2015, p. 47) reported that a culture conducive to promoting non-violent extremism had developed on a number of UK university campuses, but that Prevent has been viewed by some as an abuse of power "to target students and is also open to further abuse". Sutton also argued that Prevent was an example of government controlling academic freedom, which was at the heart of university life (*ibid*; see also Palfreyman, 2007).

***[The] Office for Students ([The] Higher Education and Research Act 2017)***

On 19th October 2017, the then universities minister, Jo Johnson MP, launched a consultation for the creation of an Office for Students (OfS) (see also, Office for Students, 2018) to hold universities to account, to ensure free speech on campus continued and that "no-platforming" and "safe spaces" should not be used to shut down legitimate free speech (*The Telegraph*, 2017). There was no mention made by Johnson or the Chairman of the OfS, Sir Michael Barber, of the rationale behind the consultation, neither were there any references made to Prevent, terrorism or extremism (*ibid*). Johnson criticised a campaign by Oxford university students to take down a statue of colonialist, Sir Cecil Rhodes with Johnson commenting "the mark of a civilisation is a knowledge and understanding of your own past" (*The Telegraph*, 2017a), adding, "freedom of speech is a fundamentally British value which is undermined by a reluctance of institutions to embrace healthy vigorous debate" (Thomson *et al.*, 2017). I argue that it is unusual for Johnson to refer to monitoring and regulating free speech on campus when at that time legislation existed (*Education Act 1986: s.43*; European Convention on Human Rights, 2010). I further argue that by Johnson highlighting freedom of speech and Fundamental British Values (FBV), control of universities by government is underpinned by legislation (*Counter-terrorism and Security Act 2015*) to ensure compliance. The OfS website shows advice for students on a range of issues including well-being, finance and promoting equal opportunities (OfS, 2018). I acknowledge that further research is needed to establish to what extent Prevent (Home Office, 2011a) and the OfS (2018) affect Muslim agency on university campuses in the UK (see for example, Scott-Baumann *et al.*, 2020).



