The Political and Military Impact of Henry II's Campaigns in Wales

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A thesis submitted to the University of Wales Trinity St David in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MRes in Medieval Studies

August 2020

DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

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Date: 10/03/2021

STATEMENT 1

This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Where correction services have been used the extent and nature of the correction is clearly marked in a footnote(s). Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended.

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STATEMENT 2

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Abstract

This study examines the Welsh campaigns of Henry II and the impact they had on his policy making and the military efforts throughout his reign. What emerges from scholarship is a historiographical tradition governed by two themes. Firstly, that there was a degree of continuity in the conduct and organisation of the warfare of Henry's reign as change was gradual until the reigns of Richard I and John. Secondly, that Henry's campaigns in Wales are often condemned to the periphery, dismissed as English displays of power or responses to Welsh territorial ambitions, with little fighting and indeterminate outcomes. These campaigns are mentioned in passing and considered less deserving of scholarly attention when compared to the many notable events of the time. Rather than relegate them to a minor role, this work demonstrates that within contemporary and near-contemporary materials from both England and Wales there is evidence that Henry's Welsh campaigns had a lasting impact upon his reign, especially in the progression of knight service, mercenaries and policy witnessed during this period. These campaigns bring into focus two clashing cultures with political, economic and military differences. As Welsh troops became increasingly important in English armies, it seemed only to strengthen the perception of Welsh warfare being primitive and barbaric. This view, established during the twelfth century, was promoted through the writings of Gerald of Wales and would become the enduring image of the Welsh at war. The aim of this work therefore is to give a better understanding of the impact Henry II's Welsh campaigns had upon his reign. In doing so, it will demonstrate that the campaigns shed light on the tactics, planning and diplomacy involved in warfare and show how twelfth-century armies were raised, financed, provisioned and transported before the emergence of more detailed records in the following centuries.

Abbreviations

Annales Cambriae	*Annales Cambriae*, ed. J. Williams ab Ithel (London: Rolls Series, 1860)
ASC	*The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, ed. and trans. M.J. Swanton (London: J.M. Dent, 1996)
AWR	*The Acts of Welsh Rulers: 1120-1283*, ed. H. Pryce (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2005)
Bren	*Brenhinedd y Saesson, or, the Kings of the Saxons: BM Cotton MS. Cleopatra B v and the Black Book of Basingwerk, NLW MS. 7006*, ed. and trans. T. Jones (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1971)
Brut (Pen. 20)	*Brut y Tywysogyon, or, the Chronicle of the Princes: Peniarth MS. 20 Version*, ed. and trans. T. Jones (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1952)
Brut (RBH)	*Brut y Tywysogyon, or, the Chronicle of the Princes: Red Book of Hergest Version*, ed. and trans. T. Jones (Cardiff University of Wales Press, 1955)
CB	*Cartae Baronum*, ed. N. Stacy (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2019)
Chronicles	*Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I*, ed. R. Howlett, 4 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1884-1889)
CTB	*The Correspondence of Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury, 1162-1170*, ed. and trans. A.J. Duggan, 2

	vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000)
De Nugis Curialium	*De Nugis Curialium: Courtiers' Trifles*, ed. and trans. M.R. James, revised C.N.L. Brooke and R.A.B. Mynors (Oxford: Clarendon Press, reprint 1994)
Dialogus	*Dialogus de Scaccario: The Dialogue of the Exchequer; Constitutio Domus Regis*, ed. and trans. E. Amt and S.D. Church (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)
Diceto	*Opera Historica: The Historical Works of Master Ralph de Diceto, Dean of London*, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1876)
Draco Normannicus	*Draco Normannicus* in *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I*, ed. R. Howlett, 4 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1884-1889), II
Early Sources of Scottish History, II	*Early Sources of Scottish History, A.D. 500-1286*, II, ed. and trans. A.O. Anderson (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1922)
EHD, II	*English Historical Documents, II: 1042-1189*, ed. D.C. Douglas and G.W. Greenaway, 2nd edn. (London: Eyre Methuen, 1981)
Expugnatio	*Expugnatio Hibernica: The Conquest of Ireland*, ed. and trans. A.B. Scott and F.X. Martin (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 1978)
Feudal Assessments	T.K. Keefe, *Feudal Assessments and the Political Community under Henry II and his Sons* (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983)

Gerald of Wales	*Gerald of Wales: The Journey through Wales and The Description of Wales*, trans. L. Thorpe (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978)
Gervase	*The Historical Works of Gervase of Canterbury*, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1879-1880)
Gesta Stephani	*Gesta Stephani*, ed. and trans. K.R. Potter (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976)
GH	*Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi Benedicti Abbatis: The Chronicle of the Reigns of Henry II and Richard I, AD 1169-1192*, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1867)
Glanvill	*The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm of England Commonly Called Glanvill*, ed. and trans. G.D.G. Hall (Oxford: Clarendon Press, reprint 2002)
Henry II	W.L. Warren, *Henry II* (London: Meuthen, reprint 1991)
Henry II: New Interpretations	*Henry II: New Interpretations*, ed. C. Harper-Bill and N. Vincent (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2007)
History of Wales, II	J.E. Lloyd, *A History of Wales from the Earliest Times to the Edwardian Conquest*, II, 2nd edn. (London: Longmans, 1912)
Howden	*Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Houedene*, ed. W. Stubbs, 4 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1868-1871)
HWM	*History of William Marshal*, ed. A. J. Holden, trans. S. Gregory, and historical notes D. Crouch, 3 vols

	(London: Anglo-Norman Text Society, 2002–2006)
JF	*Jordan Fantosme's Chronicle*, ed. and trans. R.C. Johnston (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981)
Jocelin	*The Chronicle of Jocelin of Brakelond, Concerning the Acts of Samson, Abbot of the Monastery of St. Edmund*, ed. and trans. H.E. Butler (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949)
Letters	*The Letters of John of Salisbury,* ed. and trans. W.J. Millor, H.E. Butler and C.N.L. Brooke, 2 vols (1955 and 1979)
MTB	*Materials for the History of Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury*, ed. J.C. Robertson and J.B. Shepherd, 7 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1875-1888)
Opera	*Giraldi Cambrensis Opera*, ed. J.S. Brewer, J.F. Dimock and G. Warner, 8 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1861-1891)
OV	*The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis*, ed. and trans. M. Chibnall, 6 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969-1980)
PR	*The Great Rolls of the Pipe for the Second, Third, and Fourth Years of the Reign of King Henry II, 1155-1158*, ed. J. Hunter (London: Record Commission, 1844)
	The Great Roll of the Pipe of the Reign of King Henry the Second, 5th to 34th years, 30 vols (London: Pipe Roll Society, 1884-1925)

RHF	*Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France*, ed. M. Bouquet et al., 24 vols (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1869-1904)
Roman de Rou	*The History of the Norman People: Wace's Roman de Rou*, trans. G.S. Burgess (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2004)
Song	*The Deeds of the Normans in Ireland, La Geste des Engleis en Yrlande: A New Edition of the Chronicle Formerly Known as The Song of Dermot and the Earl*, ed. and trans. E. Mullally (Dublin: Four Courts, 2002)
Torigni	The Chronicle of Robert of Torigni, in *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I*, ed. R. Howlett, 4 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1884-1889), IV
WN	William of Newburgh, *Historia Rerum Anglicarum*, in *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I*, ed. R. Howlett, 4 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1884-1889), I and II

Introduction and Evidence

This work examines the Welsh campaigns of Henry II and the impact they had on his wider policy making and the military efforts throughout his reign. Henry led armies into Welsh territories in 1157, 1158, 1163 and 1165; campaigns designed to recover lands lost during Stephen's reign or to establish royal authority over the Welsh princes. In July 1163 as the leading Welsh rulers paid homage to England's king at Woodstock, it appeared that his problems had abated. Within two years, however, Henry was leading another campaign into Wales, a campaign noted for its exhaustive preparations, innovative methods of finance, and, ultimately, for its lack of success. Henry II's campaigns in Wales bring into focus two clashing cultures with political, economic and military differences. They shed light on the tactics, planning and diplomacy involved in warfare, but also provide evidence of how twelfth-century armies were raised, financed, provisioned and transported. It will be suggested that the impact these campaigns had on Henry and his warfare is reflected in both policy and the progression away from tenure-based knight service towards the use of mercenaries witnessed during this period.

Henry spent much of his early life surrounded by war and by the time of his coronation, aged 21, he was already an experienced leader.[1] Even at this young age, he would have been acutely aware of the uncertainty and fear caused by the turbulence of Stephen's reign. The precarious nature of loyalty meant that concerns and suspicions would linger across the wide geographical expanse of Henry's influence. Civil war had highlighted the speed and extent with which disloyalty could spread, and as Henry's reign progressed extending lands and enhancing prestige became less important than maintaining order, by diplomacy or force, throughout his dominions and along their disputed or vulnerable border regions. Given this emphasis on control, it is little surprise that Gerald of Wales would look back at Henry II's reign and consider the formal assertion of overlordship over Scotland, through the Treaty of Falaise in 1174, as its pinnacle:

[1] Henry of Huntingdon portrayed a youthful Henry as divinely favoured and, reflecting the widespread hope of a lasting peace in England, declared that through the young duke God 'was already in His great kindness preparing the tranquillity of His realm' (D. Greenway, ed. and trans., *Historia Anglorum: the History of the English People* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, reprint 2007), p.769). William of Newburgh would later note that despite his youth, Henry had the appearance of a great prince (WN, I, p.101: '*magni principis jam in ipsis suis primordiis praeferret imaginem*').

Contrary to anything which had occurred before, adding so noble an increase to the English crown, he gloriously extended the kingdom's limits and boundaries from the southern ocean to the northern islands of the Orkneys.[2]

If this was one of the high points of Henry's reign, then a low was surely reached in the Berwyn Mountains in 1165. There was nothing glorious as the king and his army, hungry from lack of supplies, sought shelter in tents from strong winds and heavy rain; this was the reality of securing lands and maintaining order. The scale and nature of Henry's territories meant that various conflicts, both large and small, developed during his lifetime and he had some involvement in over 30 campaigns.[3] The reality for his armies, as with most medieval armies, was that campaigns were rarely swift or decisive, often requiring long periods of discomfort in difficult conditions.[4] Stories of Henry I's victories had become so familiar that contemporaries believed they needed no repeating, but opportunities to win glory as his grandfather had so memorably done at Tinchebrai (1106) or at Brémule (1119) were rare.[5] The chances of securing decisive victories as William I had achieved in 1066 were even more elusive. Expensive preparations and complicated logistics meant battles were often avoided in favour of threats, intimidation, sieges, or campaigns of devastation. The indecisive nature of campaigns and the less-than-glorious policy of non-engagement may explain why accounts of the warfare of Henry II's reign usually consist of little more than short descriptions and vary considerably in their treatment of his Welsh campaigns.

[2] *Opera*, VIII, p.156; translation adapted from J. Stevenson, trans., *The Church Historians of England*, 8 vols (London: Seeleys, 1853-1858), V.I, pp. 137-8. After his capture, William had to pay homage to Henry and his son, surrender key castles and recognise the subjection of the Scottish Church and its clergy (J. Stevenson, ed., *Chronica de Mailros* (Edinburgh: Typis Societatis Edinburgensis, 1835), pp. 87-8; Torigni, pp. 267-8; *GH*, I, pp. 95-9; Howden, II, pp. 80-2; Diceto, I, pp. 396-7).

[3] See 'Appendix 1: Henry Plantagenet's Military Campaigns', in J. Hosler, *Henry II: A Medieval Soldier at War, 1147-1189* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 233-6. Henry appears to be present in 36 separate campaigns from 1147 to 1189. Though the definition of campaign could be strengthened, it does clearly illustrate the amount of warfare Henry was involved in.

[4] M. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middles Ages: The English Experience* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), p.9.

[5] 'I deliberately pass over to avoid becoming tedious by repeating matters which are well known, since his victory is famous … so too the story of how he captured the duke of the Normans' (C.C.J. Webb, ed., *Policraticus sive de Nugis Curialium et Vestigiis Philosophorum*, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), II, VI:18, p.48; translation J. Dickinson, trans., *The Statesman's Book of John of Salisbury* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1963), p.233).

Scholarship has often encouraged historians to look for continuity in English warfare from the arrival of the Normans, if not earlier, through to the reign of Edward I and beyond.[6] It is possible, however, to suggest that Henry II attempted something that was new. Having access to vast resources certainly helped as his treasurer, Richard FitzNigel, noted 'wealth and poverty can raise up princely power or cast it down.'[7] Henry's ability to manage his military resources became clear during the rebellion of 1173-4 as his opponents fell short in their efforts to match his financial reach. At the onset of hostilities, where Henry was able to rely on his government to manage effectively in his absence, Louis VII resorted to levying a special tax and stripping lands of supplies and draught animals to provide for his army.[8] Henry's actions may not have been revolutionary, but his ability to finance warfare was an impressive legacy for his sons and one that would have a lasting impact in the following centuries.[9] Michael Prestwich argued there was 'no single medieval military revolution, but experiment and change.' He suggests there were two periods of particular importance: the first, under Richard I and John, when war was organised and financed on a new level and the second, from the late thirteenth century to the 1340s, when resources were deployed on a massive scale.[10] Importantly, Henry II's efforts and experimentation to find answers to the unique questions he encountered in Wales and the impact they made on his reign deserves attention.

Before discussing John's 1185 expedition to Ireland in his *Expugnatio Hibernica*, Gerald of Wales paused to consider some of the notable recent events in England and was so impressed that he compiled a list.[11] Among the many incidents he listed were Henry II's accession and the restoration of peace in England, the murder of Thomas Becket, the rebellion of 1173-4, the

[6] Many of the important articles on change or continuity in methods of fighting, composition of armies and military structures like tenure-based service before and after 1066 are reprinted in M. Strickland, ed., *Anglo-Norman Warfare: Studies in late Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman Military Organization and Warfare* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1992). Research on the degrees of continuity in military institutions is extensive and the following represents a sample featuring the key areas of debate: M. Powicke, *Military Obligation in Medieval England. A Study in Liberty and Duty* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); J.O. Prestwich, 'Anglo-Norman Feudalism and the Problem of Continuity', *Past & Present*, 26 (1963), pp. 39-57; C.W. Hollister, *The Military Organization of Norman England* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965); J. Gillingham, 'The Introduction of Knight-Service into England', *Anglo-Norman Studies*, 4 (1982), pp. 53-64; S.D.B. Brown, 'The Mercenary and his Master: Military Service and Monetary Rewards in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries', *History*, 74 (1989), pp. 20-38; S. Morillo, *Warfare Under the Anglo-Norman Kings, 1066-1135* (Woodbridge, Boydell Press, 1994); S.D. Church, *The Household Knights of King John* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), especially pp. 1-7 for the royal military household surviving from at least the Anglo-Saxon period to the Edwardian kings.
[7] *Dialogus*, p.3.
[8] This special levy for his army at Verneuil was referred to as '*descriptio generalis*' (Diceto, I, p.372).
[9] Where Henry II levied eight scutages in 34 years, John in contrast would levy 11, including annually between 1201 and 1206, in his 17-year reign. See Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix IV for scutage rates and frequency.
[10] M. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, pp. 345-6.
[11] '*Notabiles in Anglia nostri temporis eventus*' in *Opera*, V, pp. 372-80.

many quarrels of the king's sons, the death of Henry's intended heir, and the urgent request from Patriarch Heraclius for aid in the Holy Land. Though Henry's Welsh campaigns receive a brief mention, the number of important events that inspired the list force them firmly into the background. Henry's actions in Wales in 1157 and 1158 wane in significance compared to the larger and more impressive Toulouse campaign that followed in 1159. The aborted siege of the city, with Louis VII within its walls, was considered the catalyst for years of continental strife and for making the two kings enemies.[12] The campaigns of 1163 and 1165 are eclipsed, to some extent, by the escalating Becket crisis.[13] The invasion of Ireland in 1171 and the bitter struggle against the substantial coalition in 1173-4, arguably the greatest threat to the king's position, force his Welsh campaigns further from the light.

Competing for attention with so many critical events has often led historians, both past and present, to overlook Henry's campaigns in Wales in favour of the other important episodes on Gerald's list. Consequently, modern scholarship tends to follow the thorough chronology and detailing of events in Wales originally presented in 1911 by J.E. Lloyd.[14] Rees Davies continued Lloyd's substantial and significant work with more emphasis on analysis and less on chronology, but with greater importance on the relationship between England and its neighbours some of the details of Henry's Welsh campaigns become truncated.[15] As with Lloyd, there is only a limited appreciation of Henry II and a tendency to stress his inexperience, poor judgment and limitations rather than provide a more balanced view. The interpretation of Owain Gwynedd's correspondence with France in the mid-1160s, for instance, illustrates this occasional lack of balance. Davies portrays Owain as having such vision that 'he anticipated the policies of his successors by forming a Franco-Welsh alliance'. Owain's lengthy struggle for power in Gwynedd, securing and expanding territories, and, ultimately, his efforts to

[12] Diceto, I, p.303. In his capacity as chancellor, Thomas Becket would play an active role in this campaign and William FitzStephen recorded him with 700 knights from his own household, 1,200 cavalry and 4,000 infantry (*MTB*, III, pp. 34-5). Though inflated, these figures give some indication of the scale of the campaign. Scutage was paid by lay and ecclesiastical tenants, but it was supplemented by a voluntary gift (*donum*) asked of the ecclesiastical tenants. This dual assessment saw the bishop of Winchester, for instance, pay scutage at 2 marks per knight's fee and a further 500 marks (£333 6s. 8d.) '*de dono*' (PR 5 Henry II, p.46).

[13] Signs of friction between the king and archbishop had already started to appear, but it was at Woodstock in July 1163 that direct confrontation surfaced (*MTB*, IV, pp. 22-5).

[14] J.E. Lloyd, *A History of Wales from the Earliest Times to the Edwardian Conquest*, vol. II, 2nd edition (London: Longmans, 1912). Despite its early publication date, this volume covering the period from 1066 to 1282 remains an essential reference work.

[15] R.R. Davies, *Domination and Conquest: The Experience of Ireland, Scotland and Wales 1100-1300* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); *idem*, *The Age of Conquest: Wales 1063-1415* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). As an example of the brief treatment Henry's Welsh campaigns receive, Davies describes the events of 1157 as little more than the English king being 'taught a timely lesson in the tactics of ambush by a Welsh patrol' (R.R. Davies, *The Age of Conquest*, p.51).

survive against a powerful English adversary become secondary to pursuing a diplomatic policy 'to embarrass Henry.'[16] In being so quick to praise Owain and dismiss Henry, there is a failure to fully appreciate the difficulties of fighting against the Welsh in Wales. Works by Frederick Suppe and Sean Davies attempt to redress this, but in providing broad overviews of the period, detailing the differing forms of warfare of the two nations, inevitably Henry's campaigns are not the primary focus.[17]

The specific details of Henry II's Welsh campaigns, however, are provided by four articles. The first two discuss the events and locations of 1157, with J.G. Edwards concluding that the fighting took place five or six miles from the location originally proposed by D.J.C. King.[18] In the third article, Paul Latimer examines the impressive preparations, logistics, and sergeantry assessment for 1165.[19] In the final article, John Hosler provides a tactical re-assessment of the fighting that occurred in the campaigns of 1157 and 1165.[20] This work, however, is undermined by a number of errors and inaccuracies that create confusion rather than provide clarity. At the very outset in 1157, for instance, Owain Gwynedd's brother Cadwaladr, exiled from the last of his lands on Anglesey and living in England since 1152, is erroneously described as heir to Powys.[21] Such misapprehensions only serve to distract from what is an important discussion on the decisions and actions taken by both sides during the two campaigns. As with these four articles, Henry's Welsh campaigns are rarely viewed as a whole and discussion of the aftermath, lessons taken, or their impact is limited.

What emerges from this scholarship therefore is a historiographical tradition governed by two prevailing themes. The first: that there was a degree of continuity in the conduct and organisation of the warfare of Henry II's reign as the process of change was gradual until the

[16] R.R. Davies, *The Age of Conquest*, p.49.
[17] F.C. Suppe, *Military Institutions on the Welsh Marches: Shropshire 1066-1300* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press 1994); S. Davies, *War and Society in Medieval Wales, 633-1283. Welsh Military Institutions* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2004). Importantly, Suppe promotes the idea of a gradual blending of military techniques along the border of England and Wales.
[18] D.J.C. King, 'The Fight at Coleshill', *Welsh History Review*, 2 (1965), pp. 367-373; J.G. Edwards, 'Henry II and the Fight at Coleshill: Some Further Reflections', *Welsh History Review*, 3 (1967), pp. 251-263.
[19] P. Latimer, 'Henry II's Campaign against the Welsh in 1165', *Welsh History Review*, 14 (1989), pp. 523-552.
[20] J. Hosler, 'Henry II's Military Campaigns in Wales, 1157 and 1165', *Journal of Medieval Military History*, 2 (2004), pp. 53-71.
[21] J. Hosler, 'Henry II's Military Campaigns in Wales', pp. 58, 63; *idem*, *Henry II: A Medieval Soldier*, pp. 53, 139. Cadwaladr's exile from his lands is mentioned in the *Brut* (*Brut* (Pen. 20), p.58) and his presence in Shropshire is confirmed in the Pipe Rolls (PR 2 Henry II, p.43; PR 3 Henry II, p.68). His appeal to Henry for help to reclaim his inheritance in Gwynedd, lands seized by Owain, and the subsequent campaign make less sense if Cadwaladr is heir to Powys. This example, and others, are expanded on below in Chapter One.

reigns of Richard and John. The second is that Henry's campaigns in Wales are often condemned to the periphery, dismissed as English displays of power or responses to Welsh territorial ambitions, with little fighting and indeterminate outcomes. Though there are a few exceptions, all too often these campaigns are mentioned in passing and considered less deserving of scholarly attention when compared to the many notable events of the time. It is difficult, for example, to view Henry's reign without considering the king's relationship with the Church and especially Thomas Becket, his struggles with both his own family and the kings of France, the evolving nature of government and as a period of significance in the history of English law. Rather than relegate Henry's Welsh campaigns to a minor role, this study suggests that within the primary materials there is demonstrable evidence that makes it possible to propose an alternative to these traditional views, one in which Henry's campaigns in Wales can be shown to have had a lasting impact upon his reign. Any fresh assessment of this potential impact must begin by examining the quantity and quality of the available evidence from both England and Wales.

The murder of Thomas Becket, in Michael Staunton's words, 'prompted a burst of literary activity' and this inevitably cast a shadow over the historical writing of the period.[22] Whether taking inspiration from this dramatic event or a general pessimism about the present, the result was a proliferation in historical writing.[23] In her thorough examination of English medieval historiography, Antonia Gransden suggested: 'If we can speak of a golden age of historiography in England it was probably the last twenty years of the twelfth century.'[24] This literary revival has generated much discussion on a number of individual writers and their works, and presented historians with an impressive array of perspectives, observations and insights into how contemporaries viewed the world in which they lived.[25] Yet all this potential

[22] For a summary of Thomas Becket's death representing a turning point in the history and historiography of Angevin England, see 'In Becket's Shadow', in M. Staunton, *The Historians of Angevin England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 282-8 (quote at p.282); *idem*, 'Thomas Becket in the Chronicles', in P. Webster and M.-P. Gellin, ed., *The Cult of St Thomas Becket in the Plantagenet World, c.1170-c.1220* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016), pp. 95-113.

[23] C.S. Jaeger, 'Pessimism in the Twelfth-Century 'Renaissance'', *Speculum*, 78 (2003), pp. 1,151-1,183. Any perceived contemporary crisis was often countered with nostalgia, drawing inspiration from the earlier tradition of Geoffrey of Monmouth, and the story of England and the British Isles. For the growing sense of English nationalism, see J. Gillingham, 'Henry of Huntingdon and the Twelfth-Century Revival of the English Nation', in J. Gillingham, *The English in the Twelfth Century: Imperialism, National Identity and Political Values* (Woodbridge, Boydell Press, 2000), pp. 123-144; "*Nos Engleis*': War, Chronicle, and the New English', in L. Ashe, *Fiction and History in England, 1066-1200* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 81-120.

[24] A. Gransden, *Historical Writing in England, I: c.550 to c.1307* (London and New York: Routledge, reprint 1998), p.219.

[25] For details and discussion on twelfth-century writing, see 'Historians of the Reigns of Henry II and Richard I: the 'Seculars'' and 'Historians of the Reigns of Henry II and Richard I: the 'Religious'', in A. Gransden,

is not without problems for the study of Henry's campaigns in Wales. There was no contemporary biography of the king and the events in his reign appear as part of a broader picture.[26] References to his Welsh campaigns are often incidental and occasionally blurred through the partisan and distorting lens of chroniclers writing at a distance from Wales and with the benefit of hindsight. It is important, however, to briefly consider the values and limitations of the writers and works that provide much of the focus of this study.

There is a paucity of chronicle material for the beginning of Henry II's reign, with Robert of Torigni's chronicle proving the most useful.[27] Robert began writing before Henry's accession with the intention of describing events in different provinces, but mainly Normandy and England.[28] His prologue follows convention, stating didactic aims, encouraging people to follow the good and avoid the bad examples from the past.[29] Robert considered his chronicle significant enough that he presented the king with a copy in 1184. This not only helped disseminate his work, but also reinforced his close relationship with Henry's family.[30] Robert stood as godfather to Henry's daughter Eleanor in 1161, and his royal affiliation gave him both political importance and potential access to information.[31] Robert's contacts and location placed him in a key position to gather evidence from the king's cross-Channel lands and he

Historical Writing in England, pp. 219-246 and pp. 247-268; N.F. Partner, *Serious Entertainments: the Writing of History in Twelfth-Century England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); P. Damian-Grint, *The New Historians of the Twelfth-Century Renaissance: Authorising History in the Vernacular Authority* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1999); R. Kennedy and S. Meecham-Jones, ed., *Writers of the Reign of Henry II: Twelve Essays* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); M. Staunton, *The Historians of Angevin England*.

[26] It may represent a lack of demand for a contemporary life of Henry II, especially after Becket's death as within 20 years at least 14 Lives of the saint had been written (M. Staunton, *The Historians of Angevin England*, p.37). After 1170, Nicholas Vincent suggests, 'it was impossible for any writer to pen a straightforwardly panegyric biography of Henry II.' For possible reasons for the absence of a royal biography, see N. Vincent, 'The Strange Case of the Missing Biographies: The Lives of the Plantagenet Kings of England 1154-1272', in D. Bates, J. Crick and S. Hamilton, ed., *Writing Medieval Biography, 750-1250: Essays in Honour of Professor Frank Barlow* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press. 2006), pp. 237-257 (quote at p.254). Even discussing the king could present problems and Ralph Niger, for instance, would describe him as the 'king under whom St Thomas suffered' (R. Anstruther ed., *Radulfi Nigri Chronica* (London: Caxton Society, 1851), p.93: '*Rex Angliae, sub quo passus est beatus Thomas*').

[27] Robert was a monk at Le Bec from 1128, where he later became prior (1149-1154), before being elected abbot of Mont-Saint-Michel (1154-1186). For Robert of Torigni and his works, see E.M.C. van Houts, '*Le Roi et son Historien: Henri II Plantagenêt et Robert de Torigni, Abbé du Mont-Saint-Michel*', *Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale*, 37 (1994), pp. 115-118; D. Bates, 'Robert of Torigni and the *Historia Anglorum*', in D. Roffe, ed., *The English and Their Legacy: 900-1200. Essays in Honour of Ann Williams* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2012), pp. 175-184.

[28] Torigni, p.64: '*ea quae in diversis provinciis, et maxime in Normannia et Anglia, evenerunt, et ad meam notitiam pervenerunt*'.

[29] Torigni, pp. 61-2.

[30] Torigni, pp. lix-lx. Henry visited Mont-Saint-Michel in 1158 and 1166 when Robert was abbot (Torigni, pp. 197, 228).

[31] Torigni, p.211. It is from Robert's chronicle, for instance, that we learn Henry's son William was named after Eleanor's dynasty: '*quod nomen quasi proprium est comitibus Pictavorum et ducibus Aquitainorum*' (Torigni, p.176).

does provide some important details in his accounts of Henry's Welsh campaigns, but it is from a distance and not personal experience.[32] Although he is often well-informed on continental campaigns and sieges, warfare was not Robert's priority, a fact that he seems to admit in 1168, during hostilities between England and France, when Henry, apparently, 'did many things in this war of which we have not heard, or if we have heard of them, we have forgotten.'[33]

Much of the chronicle evidence for Henry's reign is provided by Roger of Howden and Ralph of Diss.[34] Roger was parson of Howden in Yorkshire, and worked as a royal clerk, diplomat and justice while writing the *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi*. He began working on it in about 1170, writing entries year-by-year, until 1192 when he started re-working its content into the more extensive *Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Hovedene*, which covers English history from 732 to 1201.[35] Ralph began writing his most important work, *Ymagines Historiarum*, in the 1180s as dean of St Paul's Cathedral. Chronologically it continued his previous work, *Abbreviatones Chronicorum*, a history from Creation to 1148, focusing in more detail on recent events to the end of the century.[36] Together the *Gesta* and *Ymagines* provide a thorough account of the major events, especially in England, of the last 20 years of Henry's reign. These works are of great importance for 1173-4, with Roger providing the most detailed account of the background to the rebellion.[37] Through his travels with the royal court, Roger directly witnessed and recorded many of the events on both sides of the Channel.[38] Ralph may not have

[32] Robert visited England in 1157 and again in 1175 (Torigni, pp. 269, 356).
[33] Torigni, p.239: '*Multa etiam fecit rex Angliae in hac guerra, quae non audivimus, vel si audivimus, non occurrunt memoriae*.'
[34] Following the charter evidence highlighted by Dauvit Broun, with Ralph appearing as '*de Disci*' and '*de Disei*', the name Ralph of Diss has been used here. For this identification, see D. Broun, 'Britain and the Beginnings of Scotland', *Journal of the British Academy*, 3 (2015), pp. 107-37 (at p.117, n.66). For references from the Rolls Series edition of his works (W. Stubbs, ed., *Opera Historica: The Historical Works of Master Ralph de Diceto, Dean of London*, 2 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1876), the Latin form *Diceto* has been retained.
[35] For Roger of Howden, see D. Corner, 'The Earliest Surviving Manuscripts of Roger of Howden's '*Chronica*", *English Historical Review*, 98 (1983), pp. 297–310; *idem*, 'The *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi* and *Chronica* of Roger, Parson of Howden', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 56 (1983), pp. 126-44; J. Gillingham, 'Writing the Biography of Roger of Howden, King's Clerk and Chronicler', in D. Bates, J. Crick and S. Hamilton, ed., *Writing Medieval Biography*, pp. 207-220; *idem*, 'The Travels of Roger of Howden and his Views of the Irish, Scots and Welsh', in J. Gillingham, *The English in the Twelfth Century*, pp. 69-92.
[36] For Ralph of Diss, see C. Duggan and A. Duggan, 'Ralph de Diceto, Henry II and Becket (with an Appendix on Decretal Letters)', in B. Tierney and P. Linehan, ed., *Authority and Power: Studies on Medieval Law and Government presented to W. Ullmann* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 59-81. Ralph last mentions himself in connection with the consecration of the bishop of London in May 1193, and his work may have been finished by another writer (Diceto, II, p.166). For the end of his career, see D. Greenway, 'Succession to Ralph de Diceto, Dean of St Paul's', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 39 (1966), pp. 86-95.
[37] *GH*, I, pp. 34-5; Howden, II, pp. 40-8.
[38] Roger was following Henry on the continent in 1173 before returning to England and then back to Normandy towards the end of the rebellion, when he recorded the text of the peace treaty of September 1174 (*GH*, I, pp. 77-9; Howden, II, pp. 67-9).

travelled as widely, but his senior position brought him into contact with some of the leading figures in Henry's reign.[39] Despite their accounts of Henry's Welsh campaigns borrowing from others, much original information emerges in their works from the 1170s.[40] Roger's position in Yorkshire and his involvement in Anglo-Scottish relations meant England's northern border was of greater interest to him than Wales.[41] He did, however, travel extensively and connections with king and court took him through Wales in 1171 and kept him informed on Welsh matters, either through witnessing Welsh troops in Henry's armies or through attendance at councils with Welsh rulers present.[42] Like many others, Ralph's views of the Welsh were expressed primarily when England came into contact with Wales and though such views were not always formed through personal experience, they are still relevant as a reflection of contemporary attitudes towards Wales.[43]

Not only did Roger and Ralph have access to events they describe through direct witness and informants, but their use of archives to reproduce laws, treaties and documents offers an insight into the workings of government. Proximity to the king and his court allowed access to detailed information with Roger, for instance, meticulously recording details of Henry's Christmas courts and the dates and places of royal channel crossings.[44] This courtly association, however, was not without its limitations. Walter Map's *De Nugis Curialium*, written as a work of history

[39] In 1174 he describes Henry discussing plans with friends for the defence of borders and protection of castles, it is not difficult to envisage such information finding its way to Ralph through shared acquaintances (Diceto, I, p.382). Important ecclesiastical visitors to St Paul's included the archbishops of Canterbury (Diceto, II, p.47), Cologne (II, p.31) and Rouen (II, p.115). For Ralph's important friends, see A. Gransden, *Historical Writing in England*, pp. 230-1.

[40] Roger's *Chronica* followed the Melrose Chronicle for the years 1148 to 1170 and Ralph's *Ymagines* relied on Robert of Torigni until 1171.

[41] In November 1174 Roger was sent on a diplomatic journey to Gilbert and Uhtred of Galloway (*GH*, I, p.80).

[42] John Gillingham described Roger of Howden as the 'most widely travelled of all medieval English historians' (J. Gillingham, 'The Travels of Roger of Howden', p.69). For Roger's experience of Welsh troops, see *GH*, I, p.74; *GH*, II, pp. 46-7, 68. For his presence at the same councils as various Welsh rulers at Gloucester (1175), Oxford (1177), and at both Worcester and Gloucester (1184), see *GH*, I, pp. 92, 162, 314, 317.

[43] Through councils or his interest in legal matters, Ralph provides details of the council at Woodstock (1163) and the death of Cadwallon ap Madog of Maelienydd, who was killed in 1179 returning from court under the king's safe conduct (Diceto, I, pp. 311, 437-8). Gervase, a monk of Canterbury, for example, writing his *Chronica* in the late 1180s includes much information, both national and international, but from a local perspective with emphasis on Canterbury, the monastic community of Christ Church and the archbishops. Henry's 1165 campaign, for instance, is instigated to avoid possible papal pressure over his dispute with Thomas Becket and is described as little more than '*ad debellandam Walliam profectus est*' (Gervase, I, p.197). For Gervase, see M.-P. Gellin, 'Gervase of Canterbury, Christ Church and the Archbishops' *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 60 (2009), pp. 449-463.

[44] Roger of Howden's maritime interest is suggested by his identification as the author of three related guides to navigation, geography, and sailing, see P.G. Dalché, *Du Yorkshire à l'Inde: Une 'Géographie' Urbaine et Maritime de la fin du Xlle siècle (Roger de Howden?)* (Geneva: Droz, 2005), especially pp. 21-48. Walter Map described Henry I's itinerary as being common knowledge to allow merchants and supplies to be prepared as all changes were 'arranged long beforehand, and publicly known' (*De Nugis Curialium*, p.439).

and fiction from the perspective of someone at court and observing it, noted the unique importance of the king at court with those present 'all striving to please one individual.'[45] The poet and historian Wace, who for a time had a strong association with court, was aware of the benefits of pleasing the king. In his verse chronicle, the *Roman de Rou*, he states his expectations for remuneration and observes how historians and chroniclers could be handsomely rewarded. He remarks how the king had given him gifts for his efforts, but also alludes to the precarious nature of his courtly work which kept him busy until he was suddenly replaced by Benoît de Sainte-Maure.[46] Financial motivation or the need to gain or maintain favour meant writing close to court could impact on the content of works. Roger of Howden's later revision of the *Gesta* allows a look at how events could be viewed differently with the passing of time, but also shows an awareness of his evolving audience. When Roger compiled a list of the rebels in 1173-4, it was an immediate reaction to the situation, but with peace restored and enemies reconciled his views may have mellowed and the episode is omitted from the *Chronica*.[47] Other changes, however, were more deliberate to reflect his potential royal audience. In the *Gesta*, Richard and Eleanor were involved against the king from the outset in 1173, but in the *Chronica* it was Richard's brother, Henry, conspiring with Louis against their father.[48] As an important public figure, immersed in contemporary public affairs, close to both Henry II and court, Ralph of Diss developed an admiration for the king and his authority.[49] Though he could be critical, Ralph's loyalty remained even after the king's death and his belief that Henry's authority could be used for public good was reflected in his views. In 1176 with Anjou and Maine experiencing famine, it was Henry, according to Ralph, who used his position to find enough food to feed the poor until sufficient new crops were available.[50] Ralph often

[45] *De Nugis Curialium*, p.3. Walter, writing in the 1180s before making later additions, described his work as entertainment and moral instruction (*De Nugis Curialium*, p.36), but it also contained elements of contemporary history with the Young King's death occurring 'in the month in which I wrote this page' (p.281). For Walter Map, his subject matter and audience, see R.R. Edwards, 'Walter Map: Authorship and Space of Writing', *New Literary History*, 83 (2007), pp. 273-292.
[46] *Roman de Rou*, pp. 3, 92-3, 150, 220. For Wace and royal patronage, see P. Damian-Grint, *The New Historians of the Twelfth-Century Renaissance*, pp. 132-140.
[47] *GH*, I, pp. 45-7.
[48] *GH*, I, p.42; Howden, II, p.46. A similar revision occurs in 1183 with the brothers at war. The *Gesta* relates Henry, the Young King, invades Richard's lands on behalf of the oppressed barons there. In the *Chronica*, any suggestion of Richard mistreating his barons is replaced with the impression that it was rebellious barons working with the Young King (*GH*, I, p.292; Howden, II, p.274). For the growing sense of hostility towards the Young King in Roger's work, see M. Strickland, *Henry the Young King, 1155-1183* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2016), pp. 6-7.
[49] For the development of their relationship after 1162, see C. Duggan and A. Duggan, 'Ralph de Diceto', p.64.
[50] Diceto, I, pp. 406-7.

highlighted the king as a positive force and adapted his narrative to depict an idealised vision of Henry bringing peace and prosperity.[51]

The restrictions of their close association to the king and court meant neither Roger nor Ralph would challenge prevailing views, but rather, as Michael Staunton suggests, reflect 'some of the more mainstream opinions among the political community of England.'[52] The wealth of information they provided and the materials they reproduced, however, were of undoubted value and helped lay firm foundations for future writers and historians.[53] One of these writers was William of Newburgh, who began a history of England from 1066, the *Historia Rerum Anglicarum*, in 1196 before it ended unfinished in 1198.[54] Despite only leaving Yorkshire once to visit a hermit near Durham, William was not lacking information.[55] As John Gillingham has highlighted, he had access to Roger of Howden's work and, at times, not only followed passages of events, but even reproduced documents directly from it.[56] William had been encouraged to write by Ernald, abbot of Rievaulx, and was able to select and combine information from sources mainly accessed through libraries of the neighbouring Cistercian houses.[57] Rachel Fulton suggests 'the world came to William in books, and it was through

[51] In 1174, for instance, Henry's actions are aimed specifically at restoring peace in England and he only accepts surrender on the continent to achieve peace for his sons (Diceto, I, pp. 382, 394). In 1186 with his continental lands 'rejoicing in the pleasant tranquillity of peace', Henry crosses to England. The following year with England now 'rejoicing in the delights of peace', the king departs for Flanders (Diceto, II, p.40: '*jocundae pacis tranquillitate gauderent*'; p.47: '*regno suo guadente pacis jocundae commoditatibus*').

[52] M. Staunton, *The Historians of Angevin England*, p.81.

[53] Ralph may even have taken measures to make his work more accessible to readers. To help them navigate through the long and detailed text of *Ymagines*, it was prefaced with a brief summary listing the important points for each year and featured a series of marginal symbols designed to draw attention to specific events. For these symbols, see L. Cleaver, *Illuminated History Books in the Anglo-Norman World, 1066-1272* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 88-95.

[54] William is commonly associated with the name of the Augustinian priory of Newburgh where he spent most of his life (WN, I, p.51). For an introduction to William of Newburgh and his works, see A. Gransden, *Historical Writing in England*, pp. 263-8; J. Gillingham, 'Two Yorkshire Historians Compared: Roger of Howden and William of Newburgh', *Haskins Society Journal*, 12 (2002), pp. 15-37; 'William of Newburgh: Historian and Commentator', in M. Staunton, *The Historians of Angevin England*, pp. 83-8.

[55] WN, I, p.150.

[56] Gillingham describes William's *Historia* as being 'Howden re-written and re-interpreted' (J. Gillingham, 'Two Yorkshire Historians Compared', p.25). For a similar view, see N. Vincent, 'William of Newburgh, Josephus and the New Titus', in S.R. Jones and S. Watson, ed., *Christians and Jews in Angevin England. The York Massacre of 1190: Narratives and Contexts* (York: York Medieval Press, 2013), pp. 57-90.

[57] By the late twelfth century, the catalogue for Rievaulx library reveals it housed 225 books, including many historical works (E. Freeman, 'Aelred as a Historian among Historians', in M. Dutton, ed., *A Companion to Aelred of Rievaulx (1110-1167)* (Leiden: Brill, 2017), pp. 113-146 (at p.140)). For an insight into the circulation of manuscripts in twelfth-century Yorkshire, see J.P. Slavin, 'Observations on the Twelfth-century *Historia* of Alfred of Beverley', *Haskins Society Journal*, 27 (2015), pp. 101-128, especially pp. 113-116. Access to works by Symeon of Durham, Henry of Huntingdon, Aelred of Rievaulx and Jordan Fantosme could have come from Byland and Rievaulx, but also second-hand through Roger of Howden. In his prologue, William remarks that someone may have already written a history of these times (WN, I, p.18). For the suggestion that this is a subtle reference to Roger of Howden's *Chronica*, see J. Gillingham 'Two Yorkshire Historians', pp. 25-6.

books that he was making sense of it.'[58] Given his limited travelling, this highlights the very local nature of William's bibliographical sources, but to some extent neglects his own observations and the oral testimony he received from a wider network of informants.[59] He placed great emphasis on the reliability of eyewitnesses, especially those corroborated by important ecclesiastics.[60] William gathered and shaped this information into his comprehensive *Historia*, which purported to be of the great and memorable events of his time.[61] It was, however, more than a record of recent events as he offered a reflection and commentary, judging and explaining history. It is of great importance as not only does William describe Henry's Welsh campaigns and his use of Welsh troops, but he also considers the nature of both the Welsh and their warfare.

The ability to look back on Henry II's reign provided William with the opportunity to consider and objectively judge events from a distance, but it also allowed him to cast a critical eye over an issue that bothered him: Geoffrey of Monmouth's version of British history. Geoffrey's *Historia Regum Britanniae*, written some 60 years earlier, was still popular, but it contradicted the northern tradition of historical writing.[62] When presented with the evidence, he had to choose between the history presented by Bede or the fiction presented by Geoffrey of Monmouth. William emphatically favoured Bede and prefaced his *Historia* with a vehement condemnation of both Geoffrey and his concept of ancient British glory.[63] His lengthy denunciation of Geoffrey of Monmouth sharpened his critical skills and encouraged a diligent

[58] R. Fulton, *From Judgement to Passion: Devotion to Christ and the Virgin Mary, 800-1200* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p.433.
[59] From personal experience William relates how he witnessed two suns in the sky (WN, II, pp. 482-3) and also famine and disease in 1196 (pp. 484-5). He remembers from his youth being told stories of the Second Crusade by a monk returning from the East (WN, I, p.67). As John Taylor indicates Newburgh was on the road from York to the mouth of the Tees and a convenient place to obtain information from travellers (J. Taylor, *Medieval Historical Writing in Yorkshire* (York: St Anthony's Press, 1961), p.11).
[60] William's use of eyewitness accounts is often accompanied by a statement indicating the reliability of the witnesses: '*viro veracissimo referente*' (WN, I, p.28), '*viri venerabiles et fide digni tradidere*' (WN, II, p.434), '*vir fide dignus*' (p.457), '*ut a viris fide dignis accepimus*' (p.472). William's version of Henry's visit to Becket's tomb in 1174, for example, apparently came from Roger of Byland, who had heard it from trustworthy persons (WN, I, pp. 187-8). In the same way, William adds authority to events that would seem unbelievable. He describes a pilgrim confronted by a demon and freed by an apparition of St James. This story was told by men worthy of belief and had been confirmed by the bishop of Le Mans (WN, II, pp. 434-5). He also provides details of a haunting in Buckinghamshire which he had partially heard from friends before receiving a full account from Stephen, archdeacon of Buckingham (p.474).
[61] WN, I, p.18.
[62] For this northern, or Northumbrian, tradition, see A. Lawrence-Mathers, 'William of Newburgh and the Northumbrian Construction of English History', *Journal of Medieval History*, 33 (2007), pp. 339-357.
[63] WN, I, pp. 11-19. For this criticism of Geoffrey of Monmouth, see J.C. Crick, 'The British Past and the Welsh Future: Gerald of Wales, Geoffrey of Monmouth and Arthur of Britain', *Celtica*, 23 (1999), pp. 60-75.

approach to his own sources.[64] William's critical ability and thoroughness helped strengthen his reputation, with Antonia Gransden believing him to be 'a man of outstanding ability' and his chronicle 'the most unusual and interesting of this period.'[65] His criticism of Geoffrey, however, may have affected his opinion of the Welsh. They were, after all, 'the remnants of the Britons, who were the first inhabitants of this island' and he considered them to be 'men of barbaric behaviour, reckless and untrustworthy, thirsting for the blood of others.'[66] It also confirmed this was history from an English perspective. From the very outset, in his prologue, William makes this clear with a statement that he is following Bede with 'a history of our race, that is, the English.'[67] John Taylor described William's *Historia* as being of 'first-rate historical value for the period of Henry II's reign', but like many others writing about Henry's reign with an Anglocentric focus they viewed the Welsh with suspicion and their verdicts were almost always harsh.[68]

Charters, writs and other documents can be used to offset the partisan nature of the chroniclers. Roger of Howden and Ralph of Diss filling their works with official documents, accessed by chance or design, showed the importance of records to the working of government, but also to their understanding and writing of history. Legal and administrative changes in Henry II's reign meant history was also becoming increasingly important to the work of a growing number of administrators.[69] As administrative writing increased and government archives expanded, the importance of record-making and record-keeping became more apparent.[70] When Henry's will

[64] The clearest example of this diligence is perhaps best reflected in William's personal investigation into the rumours that the archbishop of York, William FitzHerbert, had been poisoned in June 1154. His examination of the evidence involved interviewing a former canon of York, now a monk at Rievaulx, who had been close to the archbishop, a household clerk and even talking to doctors about the effects of poisoning (WN, I, pp. 80-1).
[65] A. Gransden, *Historical Writing in England*, p.264.
[66] WN, I, p.107; translation P.G. Walsh and M.J. Kennedy, ed. and trans., *The History of English Affairs*, II (Oxford: Aris & Phillips, 2007), p.23). For the political importance of William's attack on Geoffrey of Monmouth, see 'Bede's Reputation as an Historian in Medieval England', in A. Gransden, *Legends, Tradition and History in Medieval England* (London: The Hambledon Press, 1992), pp. 1-30 (at pp. 20-3).
[67] WN, I, p.11: '*historiam gentis nostrae, id est Anglorum*'. William also displays unfavourable views of both the Scots and the Irish (WN, I, pp. 177, 239).
[68] J. Taylor, *Medieval Historical Writing in Yorkshire*, p.10.
[69] For the connection between administrators and historians and the importance of knowledge of the past, for example, in revising legal arrangements and establishing land claims, see J. Hudson, 'Administration, Family and Perceptions of the Past in Late Twelfth-Century England: Richard FitzNigel and the Dialogue of the Exchequer', in P. Magdalino, ed., *The Perception of the Past in Twelfth-Century Europe* (London: The Hambledon Press, 1992), pp. 75-98.
[70] To help these officials, Richard FitzNigel wrote an account of the workings of the exchequer in the late 1170s, and a legal text intended for practical use, known as *Glanvill*, emerged in the 1180s (E. Amt and S.D. Church, ed. and trans., *The Dialogue of the Exchequer; Constitutio Domus Regis: Disposition of the King's Household* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); G.D.G. Hall, ed. and trans., *The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm of England Commonly Called Glanvill* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, reprint 2002)).

was drawn up in 1182, he insisted on there being one copy for the monastic archives at Canterbury, another for the treasury at Winchester, and a third for his coffers.[71] Richard FitzNigel commented that the clerk running the exchequer's *scriptorium* experienced 'almost endless work'.[72] The treasury, serving as a depository for the exchequer, housed Domesday Book, writs, rolls and other records and from a seemingly haphazard approach to preserving documents emerged two important sources.[73] The first came from the returns made to Henry's enquiry into knights' fees, known collectively as the *Cartae Baronum*, communicated in the aftermath of his 1165 Welsh campaign.[74] The second, and critical to this study, was the annual accounts maintained by the exchequer, known as the Pipe Rolls. Part of their importance is in their survival as an unbroken series from the second year of Henry's reign allowing trends to be analysed over a clear timeline.[75] For Henry's actions in Wales they give an impression of the financing and logistics of his campaigns, revealing expenditure on castles, troops, equipment and provisions. They also provide an insight into Anglo-Welsh relations with patterns of military expenditure increasing during periods of heightened tension, and payments, individual and recurring, reveal an expanding network of Welsh contacts. As they only record the movement of local money for which sheriffs were expected to account, the Pipe Rolls can only be a useful guide and not a complete picture of royal income and expenditure. Larger amounts of money were often released from the chamber, or the king's treasure, that went unrecorded. When Walter Map describes Henry being able to promise 60,000 marks to the bishop of Acre, raised within a month without resorting to taxation, it was presumably to be supplied from royal reserves or through loans.[76] Public displays of wealth and generosity were

[71] Gervase, I, pp. 298-300.
[72] *Dialogus*, p.41. He also informs us that the role of the chancellor's clerk is 'infinite and the most burdensome after the treasurer's' (*Dialogus*, p.53). To help him in his role as chancellor, William FitzStephen recorded that Thomas Becket had 52 clerks in his service (*MTB*, III, no. 18, p.29).
[73] *Dialogus*, p.95.
[74] Working in the thirteenth century, Alexander of Swerford, with access to the treasury archive, transcribed the returns to Henry's enquiry of 1166 and through his efforts the *Cartae Baronum* survives. For Alexander and his works, see N. Vincent, 'New Light on Master Alexander of Swerford (d. 1246): The Career and Connections of an Oxfordshire Civil Servant', *Oxoniensia*, 61 (1996), pp. 297-309; *CB*, pp. xxvii-xxix.
[75] The earliest Pipe Roll dates from 1129-1130, but it is the only one available before Henry II's reign. The importance of the survival of this series of financial records is highlighted by the fact that of the thousands of financial writs issued throughout Henry II's reign, only six survive (J. Gillingham, 'Bureaucracy, the English State and the Crisis of the Angevin Empire, 1199-1205', in P. Crooks and T.H. Parsons, ed., *Empires and Bureaucracy in World History: From Late Antiquity to the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 197-220 (at p.210)).
[76] *De Nugis Curialium*, pp. 482-4. It is less clear, however, when or even if this event took place, but it does still suggest that the king could access large sums of money when required.

important and that large sums of cash circulated is often suggested, but without official records precise details remain obscure.[77]

Though this financial information is sometimes lacking, it can be supplemented by a range of other sources. The contemporary letters of John of Salisbury and the correspondents of Thomas Becket offer occasional glimpses of Henry's campaigns, but also provide important perspectives on power and politics in the relationships between England and the various Welsh rulers.[78] Most of these letters, however, were intended for an audience of ecclesiastics to whom details of warfare and accurate reports of royal expeditions were rarely as important as the more pressing concern of the archbishop's struggles with the king. It is, however, often secular texts that afford the most detailed descriptions of the warfare of Henry's reign. Of particular importance are Stephen of Rouen's *Draco Normannicus* concerning the dynastic history of Normandy and Jordan Fantosme's French-verse poem of the rebellion of 1173-4.[79] Both writers had connections to Henry and feature contemporary history in their descriptions of battles and sieges as they detail the impact warfare had on both its participants and those who witnessed it.[80] Both works, however, reflect the agenda of their authors as they balance history and

[77] One suggestion of the abundance of resources available to the king comes from Gerald of Wales, who claimed that when Henry died, he left his castles in England and France filled with gold and silver (*Opera*, VIII, p.306).
[78] In writing to the pope, for instance, Thomas Becket reveals how assuming a new title, 'the self-styled Prince Owain' had left the king 'greatly angered and annoyed' (*CTB*, I, no. 12, p.33). For the change in terminology for Welsh rulers from king to prince and the evolution of titles and styles in charters, see H. Pryce, 'Culture, Power and the Charters of Welsh Rulers', in M.T. Flanagan and J.A. Green, ed., *Charters and Charter Scholarship in Britain and Ireland* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 184-202; C. Insley, 'Kings, Lords, Charters, and the Political Culture of Twelfth-Century Wales' *Anglo-Norman Studies*, 30 (2008), pp. 133-154.
[79] *Draco Normannicus* was written in the late 1160s and included contemporary events, such as Matilda's death in September 1167 (*Draco Normannicus*, p.708) and describes the conflict between Henry and Louis in 1168 as '*praesens discordia*' (line 171, p.717). Jordan Fantosme's account of 1173-4 was written shortly after the establishment of peace in 1174. Other relevant verse histories, poems, and literary evidence from Geoffrey of Monmouth, Wace, Chrétien de Troyes, Marie de France and *La Geste des Engleis en Yrlande*, popularly translated and known as *The Song of Dermot and the Earl*, have been used throughout for illustration and comparisons. The *History of William Marshal*, for example, though composed between 1224 and 1229 and requiring caution, as a reflection of its audience's military and aristocratic life, of tournaments and the emerging chivalric culture, provides an interesting contrast between the concept of knightly fighting and the reality of warfare. For an introduction to the work and its poet, see *HWM*, III, pp. 3-9; D. Crouch, 'Writing a Biography in the Thirteenth Century: The Construction and Composition of the 'History of William Marshal'', in D. Bates, J. Crick and S. Hamilton, ed., *Writing Medieval Biography*, pp. 221-235.
[80] Stephen of Rouen probably became acquainted with Henry's mother, Matilda, while she lived in retirement at the Priory of Notre Dame du Pré, near Rouen. He may even have been the messenger that took the news of Matilda's death to Henry in Brittany (*Draco Normannicus*, pp. lxxix, 708). For the author and his work, see I. Harris, 'Stephen of Rouen's *Draco Normannicus*: a Norman Epic', in L.S. Davidson, S.N. Mukherjee, and Z. Zlatar, ed., *The Epic in History* (Sydney: Sydney Association for Studies in Society and Culture, 1994), pp. 112-124; E. Kuhl, 'Time and Identity in Stephen of Rouen's *Draco Normannicus*', *Journal of Medieval History*, 40 (2014), pp. 421-438. Jordan Fantosme was probably a clerk of the bishop of Winchester and so in connection with Henry's trusted adviser Richard of Ilchester, who was elected to the bishopric of Winchester in 1173. For the author, see I. MacDonald, 'The Chronicle of Jordan Fantosme: Manuscripts, Author and Versification', in

entertainment. Jordan declares his poem concerns the king, but its focus on events in northern England while Henry was in Normandy suggests it is as much about the loyalty and courage of those fighting for him.[81] At times fiction is more important than history especially in Stephen's poem, with its chronological leaps, invented dialogue and the exchange of letters between King Arthur and Henry designed to target emotions and manipulate opinion.[82] As Martin Aurell suggests, it brings together 'literary fiction, recollections of past history and allusions to contemporary events in a work of propaganda in support of Henry II'.[83] Touched by epic and romance traditions, imperfect and impressionistic though it often is, such evidence provides vivid images of the warfare of the period and reflects contemporary views of the Welsh which resonated with audiences outside Wales.

Despite the impressive circle of writers with connections to Henry's court, the most detailed narrative of his Welsh campaigns can be found within three closely-related Welsh chronicles collectively known as *Brut y Tywysogyon*. These three chronicles were compiled from the late thirteenth century and are independent Welsh translations from different earlier versions of a lost Latin chronicle.[84] The late date of these accounts and the extent to which the translators amended the underlying Latin text or were faithful to it necessitates caution. There is some consistency, however, in the details provided by the *Brut*, both within the versions and with the Latin chronicles of the period. David Stephenson and Owain Wyn Jones have demonstrated,

E.A. Frances, ed., *Studies in Medieval French, Presented to Alfred Ewert in Honour of his Seventieth Birthday* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 242-258.

[81] 'The desire to compose verses about the best king who ever lived has come over me, and it is fitting that I tell you them' (JF, p.3). For its intended courtly audience Jordan balances noble images of knights at war with the need for peace during the process of reconciliation after the rebellion. Henry is praised as wise and a man 'who mends his ways from the examples of others' (JF, p.3). For discussion of the poem and its purpose, see R.C. Johnston, 'The Historicity of Jordan Fantosme's Chronicle', *Journal of Medieval History*, 2 (1976), pp. 159-168; M. Strickland, 'Arms and the Men: War, Loyalty and Lordship in Jordan Fantosme's Chronicle', in C. Harper-Bill and R. Harvey, ed., *Medieval Knighthood, IV: Papers From the Fifth Strawberry Hill Conference* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1992), pp. 187–220; A. Lodge, 'Literature and History in the Chronicle of Jordan Fantosme', *French Studies*, 44 (1992), pp. 257–270.

[82] As a literary device the invented dialogue between a Norman and a Frenchman helps express contemporary fears about the troubled relationship between Normandy and France by discussing history, identity and the French right to rule. The taunting of the Frenchman promotes both Henry and Normandy, ending with the bold claim that Louis should be worried about holding on to his throne (*Draco Normannicus*, p.695). The exchange of letters with Arthur is used to support Henry's recent campaign to assert his claim over Brittany (pp. 695-708).

[83] M. Aurell, 'Henry II and Arthurian Legend', in *Henry II: New Interpretations*, pp. 362-394 (at pp. 385-6). It does, however, provide the fullest account of the Welsh mercenaries working for Henry at Chaumont in 1167. The Welsh, their actions in the destruction of the town, and the staged response by Louis at Andely clearly made an impression on Stephen (*Draco Normannicus*, pp. 681-6, 688-91).

[84] The three versions of the *Brut y Tywysogyon* take their names from the manuscripts from which they are identified: Peniarth MS 20, Red Book of Hergest and *Brenhinedd y Saesson*. For the Latin annalistic chronicles (*Annales Cambriae*), of which the so-called B- and C-texts cover the twelfth century, see K. Hughes, 'The Welsh Latin Chronicles: *Annales Cambriae* and Related Texts', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 59 (1973), pp. 233-258.

based on the preservation of British terminology rather than a shift to the more modern Welsh terminology prevalent when the versions were compiled, that minimal amendments were made to the source material.[85] As evidence for Henry's campaigns, the details in the *Brut* are strengthened by Owain Gwynedd's efforts to establish diplomatic contact with France.[86] The three letters he sent to the Capetian court offer a unique view from within Wales and a valuable contemporary reaction to facing Henry's army in 1165. A further Welsh perspective is provided by the literary evidence of story-tellers and poets, with twelfth-century Welsh princes and nobles well served by court poets, who glorified leaders and warriors for their prowess in battle and generosity in life, and lamented their passing in death.[87] At times, the poets fought in the battles they describe and they frequently deal with contemporary events and figures, but historic themes, images and vocabulary were often more important than historical reality to their audience.[88] Though these works require caution, there use here is primarily in providing a Welsh perspective into the conduct of war and the ideals to which Welsh warriors aspired.

It was not these Welsh sources, however, that most powerfully shaped posterity's perception of the Welsh, but rather a more hostile and enduring image that emerged during the twelfth century.[89] This damning verdict towards England's neighbours was continued by contemporary writers in the sphere of Henry's court. Key to this movement, and to this study, are the four

[85] D. Stephenson, 'Welsh Chronicles' Accounts of the Mid-Twelfth Century', *Cambrian Medieval Celtic Studies*, 56 (2008), pp. 45–57; O.W. Jones, '*Brut y Tywysogion*: The History of the Princes and Twelfth-Century Cambro-Latin Historical Writing', *Haskins Society Journal*, 26 (2014), pp. 209-227.

[86] Owain addressed two letters to the French king and one to his chancellor. For the letters, translations and dating, see H. Pryce, 'Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII: the Franco-Welsh Diplomacy of the First Prince of Wales', *Welsh History Review*, 19 (1998), pp. 1-28.

[87] 236 Welsh poems, the work of 40 poets, have survived from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (R.M. Andrews, ed., *Welsh Court Poems*, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2007), p.xxxii). For the work of these court poets, see J.J. Parry, 'The Court Poets of the Welsh Princes', *PMLA*, 67 (1952), pp. 511-520. One such poet was Bleddyn Fardd, who died fighting for Powys with Henry in 1157. His elegy was composed by Cynddelw Brydydd Mawr, the leading poet of Powys, who may also have been fighting alongside him that day, see R.G. Gruffydd, 'A Welsh Poet Falls at the Battle of Coleshill, 1157: Cynddelw Brydydd Mawr's Elegy for Bleddyn Fardd of Powys', *Flintshire Historical Society Journal*, 36 (2003), pp. 52-58.

[88] For recurring themes like the use of royal propaganda in poems, see R.M. Andrews, ed., *Welsh Court Poems*, pp. xxviii-xxix. For the use of animals, such as wolves, ravens and eagles, as motifs from early Welsh poetry, see D.N. Klausner, 'The Topos of Beasts of Battle in Early Welsh Poetry', in R.A. Taylor, et al, ed., *The Centre and Its Compass: Studies in Medieval Literature in Honour of Professor John Leyerle* (Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University, 1993), pp. 247-263. For the recycling of ideas, words, phrases and lines, see C. Lewis, 'The Court Poets: Their Function, Status and Craft', in A.O.H. Jarman and G.R. Hughes, ed., *A Guide to Welsh Literature*, I, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, rev. edn. 1992), pp. 123-156.

[89] For the suggestion that William of Malmesbury initially promoted the view of 'Celtic' peoples as barbarians, see J. Gillingham, 'The Context and Purposes of Geoffrey of Monmouth's *History of the Kings of Britain*', in J. Gillingham, *The English in the Twelfth Century*, pp. 19-39, especially pp. 27-9. It may be an oversimplification to credit this development to a single writer, but as Gillingham demonstrates this negative image soon became the dominant one (J. Gillingham, 'Conquering the Barbarians: War and Chivalry in Twelfth-Century Britain and Ireland', in J. Gillingham, *The English in the Twelfth Century*, pp. 41-58 (at pp. 43-4).

influential works by Gerald of Wales on Ireland and Wales originally created in the 1180s and 1190s.[90] These works portrayed 'Celtic' societies as unruly, in need of central authority and religious reform, highlighting inappropriate forms of marriage and family life, and the primitive warfare they waged.[91] Gerald's perceptions of the Welsh and the nature of their warfare would come to heavily influence later assessments, but his views were inevitably coloured by his own experiences from a time when he sought royal patronage before disappointed ambitions turned him against the king and his family.[92] The stereotypes of the 'Celtic' peoples that he promoted reflected a new sense of English identity and were heavily influenced by his family's involvement in Wales and especially in the initial invasion of Ireland. His portrayal of brutal and primitive societies may have been partly in response to contemporary experiences, such as the atrocities witnessed at Coupar in November 1186 when one man was beheaded before the church's altar and 58 were killed and burned in the abbot's dwelling.[93] Though such stories were often used as war propaganda promoting racial hatred, their impact could be long-lasting as Gerald's vivid recounting of the 1175 massacre of Abergavenny would suggest.[94] Before the completion of his two works on Wales, there was a fresh escalation of violence with Owain Fychan murdered by family members and Llywelyn ap Cadwallon blinded by his brothers in 1187 and then in 1193 Anarawd ab Einion seized his brothers, Madog and Hywel, and gouged their eyes out.[95] Such incidents probably helped to

[90] *Topographia Hibernica*, *Expugnatio Hibernica*, *Itinerarium Kambriae* and *Descriptio Kambriae*. For Gerald's life, career and works, see J.C. Davies, '*Giraldus Cambrensis*, 1146-1946', *Archaeologia Cambrensis*, 99 (1947), pp. 85-108. For recent discussion, see A.J. McMullen and G. Henley, ed., *Gerald of Wales: New Perspectives on a Medieval Writer and Critic* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2018).

[91] Another contemporary from the Welsh marches, Walter Map, offers less detail, but draws similar conclusions depicting Wales as in a constant state of upheaval, with a warlike population often angered and ready for bloodshed (*De Nugis Curialium*, pp. 182, 188, 202). Gerald confirmed methods of fighting in Ireland, Scotland and Wales were very different to those familiar to the English and French. Though these differences are often exaggerated, Gerald created the lasting impression of the Welsh with few heavily-armed knights, avoiding battles and campaigns in favour of surprise attacks, harassment and ambush. For Gerald's views on the nature of the Welsh at war, see his chapter '*Qualiter gens ista sit expugnanda*' in *Opera*, VI, pp. 218-222.

[92] His early praise for Henry evaporated and he became increasingly hostile towards a family seemingly destined for destruction. Gerald's disappointment expressed in *De Principis Instructione*, written between 1190 and 1217, presented Henry as raised by God only to fall from glory as divine punishment. His personal frustrations were clear as he describes the promotion of many unworthy persons and in return for his services there are only 'empty promises void of all truth.' (*Opera*, I, p.60; translation H.E. Butler, ed. and trans., *The Autobiography of Gerald of Wales* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2005), p.81).

[93] Chronicle of Holyrood in *Early Sources of Scottish History*, II, p.311.

[94] *Opera*, VI, p.54. For details of the event, see below p.89. In the same way, the castrating of three priests and the killing of a multitude of innocents at the Church of St Lawrence by the Scots in 1174 was a shocking event which clearly affected contemporaries (*GH*, I, p.66). Jordan Fantosme refers to the incident on several occasions (JF, pp. 141, 180, 200).

[95] Owain was murdered 'at night by betrayal' at Carreghofa by Gwenwynwyn and Cadwallon, the sons of his first-cousin Owain Cyfeiliog (*Brut* (Pen. 20), p.73). Gerald was clearly moved by contemporary incidents and records the murder of Owain ap Caradog by his brother Cadwallon, before November 1183, as an important event in our days (*Opera*, VI, p.69: '*accidit autem his nostris diebus*'). Anarawd's actions were supposedly inspired by 'his greed for worldly power' (*Brut* (Pen. 20), p.74).

strengthen Gerald's views on fostering and the Welsh inheritance practices that could result in bloodshed within and between dynasties. His experiences, and the urge to articulate a good story, may have affected Gerald's ability to look back objectively on Henry's reign and clouded his view of Wales, and the inhabitants of England's 'Celtic fringe', but his works are significant as he knew something of the people and places he described.[96]

When added to the other sources, Gerald helps provide an impression of both Henry II and his actions in Wales. Though not always clear, this evidence may allow a different view of Henry's Welsh campaigns and their role in the fortunes of his reign. In light of this, the subsequent discussion will take the following form: Chapter one looks to reconstruct the important events of Henry's four campaigns in Wales before assessing their legacy and discussing some of Gerald's influential views. It is suggested that Henry's thorough preparations and actions in 1165 were shaped by his earlier experiences and that the lack of a decisive victory contributed to the mistreatment of the Welsh hostages. A new emphasis on foot soldiers for 1165 reveals lessons in terrain and the nature of Welsh warfare had been taken, but it could also point to a more significant shift in approach to military obligations, one that would have an impact beyond Wales.[97] Chapter two highlights Henry's desire for stability in England after the failure of 1165 and focuses on the key areas to emerge from the campaign: finance and the suitability of knight service. The *Cartae Baronum* (1166) and the Assize of Arms (1181) are used to argue that Henry's political and military systems were adapting to cope with the demands of his dominions; the escalation and intensification of warfare abroad, the need for security at home, especially during periods of royal absence, and the continued efforts to sustain the levels of finance achieved in 1165.[98] The result of this evolution was an increasing reliance on mercenaries, and this is the central theme of Chapter three. This chapter draws upon examples from throughout Henry's reign, especially 1173-4, to illustrate how important mercenaries had

[96] Having been born in Wales, Gerald describes himself as descended from both the English and the Welsh (*Opera*, VI, p.226). For Gerald's view of his heritage, see Y. Wada, 'Gerald on Gerald: Self-presentation by *Giraldus Cambrensis*', *Anglo-Norman Studies*, 20 (1998), pp. 223-246. With family links in south Wales, and later in Ireland, connections to Henry's family and court, and a continental education, Gerald had the experience and potential to provide an informed view of societies on the fringes of Henry's dominions. His works display an evolving personality and career aspirations which at various times saw his allegiances shift. For his career progression, Gerald claimed to be held him back as Canterbury wanted no Welshman or those born in Wales to be promoted (W.S. Davies, ed., *De Invectionibus, Y Cymmrodor*, 30 (1920), pp. 1-248 (at pp. 84-5)).

[97] This shift to infantry sergeants raises question about knight service and military obligations, and the extent to which those holding knights' fees were suitable for the warfare of Henry II's reign.

[98] The focus is primarily on England as Henry's administration had to manage, after the unsuccessful Welsh campaign of 1165, while he concentrated on his continental dominions. Also, the existence of the *Cartae Baronum* and the Pipe Rolls allow us to view the exchequer's response to financial pressures after 1165.

become to his armies. It examines Henry's use of Welsh troops, their numbers and roles, to suggest that they became integral to his efforts to assert authority over his territories, maintain peace and contain the conflicting interests of his sons and the kings of France. Chapter four charts how in 1171 Henry returned to Wales to implement a policy based more on co-operation than confrontation, exploring the circumstances of this apparent *volte-face* and its links to the invasion of Ireland. The propaganda justifying this invasion promoted and continued themes of English cultural superiority over neighbouring 'Celtic' regions, and the study closes with a brief examination of the contrasting perceptions of the Welsh. Henry's use of Welsh mercenaries encouraged the belief that they were ferocious and untamed, and in his armies were something to fear. At the same time, Owain Gwynedd's letters to France present a different view from within Wales. Henry's campaigns forced these seemingly opposing worlds, civilised and barbarous, into conflict, and the conclusion contends that this clash of cultures had a lasting impact on the king, his actions, and the warfare of his reign.

Chapter One

Welsh Campaigns: 1157-1165

Henry II crossed the Channel in January 1156, travelling through his lands in Normandy and Aquitaine before celebrating Christmas in Bordeaux.[1] By the time of his return to England in April 1157, he seemed to have Normandy, Anjou, Aquitaine, Maine and Touraine under his control.[2] With a growing sense of security, Henry could look towards England's borders and reassess the nature of his relationships with Scotland and Wales. In July he met Scotland's king at Chester, with Malcolm IV performing homage and surrendering Northumbria and Cumbria in return for the earldom of Huntingdon.[3] With Scottish relations restored to the days of Henry I, Wales required attention. The problems Stephen encountered in his reign were exacerbated by difficulties in Wales. The successful campaign of Morgan ab Owain and his brother Iorwerth in 1136, and their relationship with Robert of Gloucester, marked a significant shift in power in south Wales.[4] Henry II's immediate priority was Owain Gwynedd, who had used England's civil war to expand his territories and establish dominance in northern Wales. In 1150 Owain secured Tegeingl in the north-east, posing a threat to Chester, which became more significant when Earl Ranulf died in 1153 leaving his six-year-old son, Hugh, as successor.[5] Owain had strengthened his position by expelling his brother, Cadwaladr, in 1152 and from exile in England Cadwaladr appealed for help to reclaim his rightful inheritance.[6] It was this plea,

[1] Diceto, I, p.268; *RHF*, XII, p.121. For the short crossing from Dover to Wissant, see L. Delisle and E. Berger, ed., *Recueil Des Actes de Henri II*, 4 vols (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1909-1917), I, nos. X-XII, pp. 105-8.
[2] For Henry's early successes, see Torigni, p.189; Howden, I, p.215; WN, I, pp. 112-4; Gervase, I, p.162.
[3] Chronicle of Holyrood in *Early Sources of Scottish History*, II, p.235. Henry had successfully secured the important Bamburgh, Carlisle and Newcastle (Torigni, p.192; Howden, I, p.217; Diceto, I, p.302).
[4] As the author of the *Gesta Stephani* noted the Welsh reversed their fortune to become 'the stern masters of those before whom a little earlier they had bent compliant necks' (*Gesta Stephani*, p.19). For a brief summary of this period in which Morgan gained control of much of lowland Gwent, see D. Crouch, 'The Slow Death of Kingship in Glamorgan, 1067-1158', *Morgannwg*, 29 (1985), pp. 20-41 (at pp. 33-35). Morgan received royal favour from Henry in the form of an annual payment of 40s. from Gloucestershire (PR 2 Henry II, p.49; PR 3 Henry II, p.100). After his death in 1158, the payment passed to his son (PR 4 Henry II, p.167).
[5] *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.57; *Brut* (RBH), p.129. Owain's success was secured with victory over Madog ap Maredudd of Powys and Ranulf of Chester at Coleshill in 1150. It is unclear whether Madog or Ranulf featured in the fighting or whether the force that met Owain was from Powys, Chester, or both, but it shows an awareness of the threat Owain's expansion presented to both territories. For Tegeingl's proximity to Chester, see Appendix I.
[6] *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.58. John Hosler confuses the issue by asserting that 'first came the exiling of his two brothers Cadwaladr and Madog who were also the heirs to Powys' (J. Hosler, *Henry II: A Medieval Soldier*, p.53. This is repeated on p.139 and also appears in J. Hosler, 'Henry II's Military Campaigns in Wales, 1157-1165', pp. 58, 62-3). The three were not brothers, but kinsmen through the marriage of Owain and Cadwaladr's sister, Susanna, to Madog. Madog was the son of Maredudd ap Bleddyn and Hunydd, and Owain and Cadwaladr were sons of Gruffudd ap Cynan and Angharad (*AWR*, pp. 22, 37).

according to Seán Duffy, that provided the pretext for Henry's campaign of 1157 aimed at 'English recovery of every inch of ground lost (literally and metaphorically) since the death of Henry I.'[7] The chance to display his authority in the marches, restore some of the political and territorial balance of power that had collapsed, and influence other Welsh rulers with the submission of Owain Gwynedd was an irresistible opportunity for the young king.

The details of the 1157 campaign are vague, but Robert of Torigni hinted at its ambition and scale by suggesting that Henry summoned a third of his host as part of a strategy to invade by land and sea.[8] As Henry's army travelled to muster at Chester, Owain moved to Basingwerk, preparing for the king's arrival.[9] At this point the various accounts differ, causing some confusion, but it is possible to reconstruct the principal events.[10] Henry's army headed along the coastal road towards Owain and his fleet moved towards Anglesey.[11] Owain, blocking the king's path, had fortified his position with ditches and earthworks to limit the effects of a frontal attack. Henry divided his force with the main body continuing along the road and a smaller group moving through the woods in an attempt to confront Owain on two fronts.[12] Henry's

[7] S. Duffy, 'Henry II and England's Insular Neighbours', in *Henry II: New Interpretations*, pp. 129-153 (at p.132).

[8] Torigni, p.193. The size of Henry's army is unclear, but it included a contingent of archers from Shropshire and various Welshmen with Cadwaladr ap Gruffudd, Madog ap Maredudd, Iorwerth Goch and Hywel ab Ieuaf of Arwystli all recorded as receiving payments (PR 3 Henry II, pp. 89-90). There is some evidence of preparations in the Pipe Roll for 1157 with an entry under Oxfordshire recording '*thesauro conducendo ad Waliam*' and in Dorset the abbot of Abbotsbury paid 2 marks '*de exercitu Walie*' (PR 3 Henry II, pp. 82, 99). There are also several references to victuals accounted for in the border counties of Shropshire, Staffordshire and Gloucestershire probably related to the campaign (PR 3 Henry II, pp. 91, 97, 100).

[9] *Annales Cambriae*, p.46; *Brut* (Pen. 20), pp. 58-9; *Brut* (RBH), p.135; *Bren*, p.159.

[10] Some of this confusion can be seen through the difficulty in determining the role of Madog ap Maredudd. John Hosler places him with Henry's fleet, but there is no mention of him as the fleet reaches Anglesey: 'Henry sent a separate force from Pembroke to the Isle of Anglesey. Led by Madog, the disinherited prince of Powys' (J. Hosler, *Henry II: A Medieval Soldier*, p.161). Madog was not a disinherited prince, but ruler of Powys, and that one of Henry's leading allies would be sent from Powys to Pembroke to Anglesey seems both unlikely and impractical. Madog's involvement with Henry seems to be confirmed through a gift of £8. 10s. to '*Maddoch*' (PR 3 Henry II, p.89). The elegy for Bleddyn Fardd suggests that it was a military role as the young poet dies fighting for him against Owain (R.G. Gruffydd, 'A Welsh Poet Falls', p.54). The Red Book of Hergest version of the *Brut* provides the fullest account and, perhaps, appreciating the situation of Powys fighting for the English, noted that Madog 'chose a place for himself to encamp between the king's host and Owain's host, so that he might receive the first assaults' (*Brut* (RBH), p.135). For the confusion over Madog's role in the Welsh sources, see *History of Wales*, II, p.496, n.45; *Bren*, p.317.

[11] The Pipe Rolls suggest the fleet may have departed from Pembroke: '*et in locanda una navi ad portandum corredium regis usque Pembroc*' (PR 3 Henry II, p.108).

[12] The exact location of the woods is not clear: Gerald of Wales, Jocelin of Brakelond and the Annals of Chester all suggest Coleshill and the Welsh sources point to Hawarden (*Opera*, VI, p.137; Jocelin, p.70; R.C. Christie, ed. and trans., *Annales Cestrienses; or, Chronicle of the Abbey of S. Werburg, at Chester* (Chester: Lancashire and Cheshire Record Society, xiv, 1886), p.22). The *Brut* explicitly refers to the 'wood of Hawarden' and two poems by Cynddelw Brydydd Mawr both suggest Hawarden (*Brut* (Pen. 20), p.59; R.G. Gruffydd, 'A Welsh Poet Falls', pp. 55-6; '*Arwyrain* Owain Gwynedd', in R.M. Andrews, ed., *Welsh Court Poems*, pp. 3-4, 55). For a full discussion on the possible locations of the fighting, see D.J.C. King, 'The Fight at Coleshill', pp. 367-373

contingent was ambushed in the woods by Owain's sons, Dafydd and Cynan, suffering heavy casualties.[13] In the confusion the standard-bearer, Henry of Essex, fearing the king dead threw down the royal standard causing a panic that was only halted once Roger de Clare raised the flag and rallied the troops.[14] Having recovered some composure, Henry moved out of the woods to re-group with the main army.[15] Owain withdrew from Basingwerk and harassed the English as they moved towards Rhuddlan. The fleet landed at Anglesey, but were defeated by the local inhabitants and in the 'great slaughter' Henry FitzHenry, the illegitimate son of Henry I, was killed.[16] William of Newburgh noted the clouds of war parted as Henry and Owain made peace.[17] The price Owain paid for facing Henry included rendering homage, renouncing his claims to Tegeingl, restoring Cadwaladr to his former lands and surrendering hostages.[18] Henry fortified Basingwerk and Rhuddlan; establishing the latter as a border castle once more, before returning to England.

Robert of Torigni proclaimed that by the end of 1157 Henry had restored the lands and castles taken during Stephen's reign and had successfully subjected the Welsh to his will.[19] Such bold statements have made it possible to view the events in south Wales of 1158 as a postscript to the campaign against Owain. The Annals of Tewkesbury, for instance, simply noted that in 1158 the king made peace with Rhys ap Gruffudd.[20] The *Brut* adds some details and reveals the precarious nature of Anglo-Welsh relations and the agreements that tried to hold them in place. Gwynedd's submission and Powys's compliance left Deheubarth as the remaining Welsh power and Rhys, its ruler, isolated.[21] His response was to prepare for war by moving

and J.G. Edwards, 'Henry II and the Fight at Coleshill', pp. 251-263, especially p.262 for details of the *vill* of Coleshill and the *commote* of Coleshill.

[13] *Annales Cambriae*, p.46; *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.59; *Brut* (RBH), p.135. William of Newburgh's account added that Eustace FitzJohn, constable of Chester, and Robert de Courcy died in the ambush (WN, I, pp. 105-9).

[14] Jocelin, pp. 68-71. Jocelin of Brakelond's account, though written some years after the events, is of interest as its details come from Henry of Essex. Following his disgrace and trial by combat in 1163, Henry became a monk at Reading where he told his story to a group of monks, including Abbot Samson and Jocelin, visiting from Bury St Edmunds.

[15] It is not clear if Henry emerged from the woods to the rear or the flank of Owain (*Brut* (Pen. 20), p.59; *Brut* (RBH), p.135). The *Brenhinedd y Saesson* offers a different version of events after the ambush, as Owain's men 'pursued them as far as the strand of Chester slaughtering them' (*Bren*, p.159). The elegy for Bleddyn Fardd may support this by describing it as the 'battle of Chester Strand' (R.G. Gruffydd, 'A Welsh Poet Falls', p.57).

[16] *Annales Cambriae*, p.47. This defeat was seen as divine retribution after the invaders had pillaged many churches on the island (*Brut* (Pen. 20), p.59; *Brut* (RBH), p.137; *Opera*, VI, p.130).

[17] WN, I, p.109: '*belli nubilum*'.

[18] *Brut* (RBH), p.137. That Owain surrendered hostages is confirmed in the Pipe Rolls with 72s. '*pro pannis obsidum Oeni Regis*' (PR 4 Henry II, p.114).

[19] Torigni, p.195.

[20] H.R. Luard, ed., *Annales Monastici*, 5 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1864-1869), I, p.48.

[21] Madog's good faith was encouraged with further payments (PR 4 Henry II, p.170). Of interest is a reference to 51s. 8d. for '*armis filii Maddoc*'. The knighting of Madog's son in a ceremony at Worcester, according to

'all of Deheubarth … into the forest land of *Ystrd Tywi*.'[22] A peace was agreed, but Henry's apathy towards Rhys's appeal over Walter de Clifford plundering local lands and killing people was viewed by his nephew, Einion ab Anarawd, as freeing Rhys 'from the pact and every oath he had given the king.'[23] Rhys began an aggressive campaign taking and burning castles around Ceredigion and with the fall of Llandovery, Henry was forced to move west towards Deheubarth. With the threat of Henry approaching, and to avoid facing the king alone, Rhys sought peace once more. Walter de Clifford and Roger de Clare were restored to lands lost during Stephen's reign, and Rhys had to deliver hostages and settle for Cantref Mawr and some scattered lands.[24]

Henry II's return to Wales in 1163 followed a similar pattern to the events of 1158; a campaign where intimidation and the threat of war was enough to secure submission. After 1158 Rhys continued feuding with his neighbours and in 1162 seized Llandovery from Walter de Clifford.[25] Henry prepared for another Welsh campaign and in the summer of 1163 moved unopposed to Pencader, where Gerald of Wales relates a story of him crossing the ford of Pencarn to Merlin's prophecy of impending Welsh defeat. Having watched 'Henry ride at full speed through the water, they were quite sure … their side would be beaten.'[26] There was no doubt reluctance to fight on both sides, but it shows the power prophecies held by Gerald's day. According to Gerald, a Breton knight was instructed to report on the strength of Dinefwr. His guide, the dean of Cantref Mawr, escorted him through the harshest terrain, stopping to eat grass for nourishment, before the knight concluded the area was uninhabitable, inaccessible and only capable of supporting those 'content to live there like animals.'[27] This apparently

David Stephenson, was designed to show the continuing good relations between Henry II and Powys (PR 4 Henry II, p.155; D. Stephenson, *Medieval Powys: Kingdom, Principality and Lordships, 1132-1293* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016), p.50).

[22] *Brut* (RBH), p.137. Gerald of Wales described it as a safe place 'for the inhabitants of south Wales, because of its impenetrable forests' and it was in this area 'wild with woods and difficult to approach' that Rhys's father sought refuge in 1116 (*Opera*, VI, p.80; translation Gerald of Wales, p.139; *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.44).

[23] *Brut* (RBH), p.139.

[24] *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.61; *Brut* (RBH), pp. 137-9; *Bren*, pp. 159-161.

[25] *Annales Cambriae*, p.49. Llandovery's importance to Henry is reflected by the scale of investment at the castle between 1158 and 1162. In 1160-1 over £190 went towards its garrison and an undisclosed payment to Walter de Clifford (PR 7 Henry II, pp. 22, 54). In total, over £300 was spent by the exchequer at the castle with payments of £94 8s. 6d. appearing in 1159-60 and a further £21 in 1160-1 (PR 6 Henry II, pp. 23, 28, 30; PR 8 Henry II, p.56). For a full discussion, see R.K. Turvey, 'Llandovery Castle and the Pipe Rolls, 1159-62', *The Carmarthenshire Antiquary*, 26 (1990), pp. 5-11.

[26] *Opera*, VI, p.63; translation Gerald of Wales, p.122. The *Brut* records Henry was accompanied by a mighty host (*Brut* (Pen. 20), p.62; *Brut* (RBH), p.143) and there is some evidence of preparations along the border, including £39 3s. 4d. '*in munitione portata in Wal*' in Worcestershire, and £31 7s. 6d. '*pro munitione portata in Wal*' and £70 9s. 1d. '*militum et servientum in exercitu de Wal*' in Gloucestershire (PR 9 Henry II, pp. 4, 8, 9).

[27] *Opera*, VI, p.82; translation Gerald of Wales, p.140.

convinced Henry the area was incapable of supporting war and not worth attacking. Living off the land may have been a reality in times of need, but it was a perception of the Welsh that Gerald's audience would find believable. It is unlikely that Henry was so easily led, but he accepted Rhys's surrender, allowing him to keep Dinefwr and Cantref Mawr.[28]

Rhys, Owain Gwynedd and the other leading Welsh princes, as well as Malcolm of Scotland, were summoned to attend the council of Woodstock on 1 July 1163 to perform homage.[29] Rees Davies argues that Henry was intent on securing a definition of his overlordship 'which was novel in its precision and demeaning in its character … it was almost certainly seen as an ominous threat.'[30] Malcolm's terms included submitting 'his brother David and other noble boys of his kingdom as hostages.'[31] Details of the terms for the Welsh princes are elusive, with Robert of Torigni stating only that they submitted to the terms imposed upon them.[32] Paying homage, even surrendering lands and hostages, was not new for the Welsh and was probably not regarded as too demeaning or threatening.[33] An agreement involving Henry's son, the Scottish king and the Welsh princes, concerning the overlordship of Britain, was perhaps more contentious. Whether Henry was intending to redefine his relationship with the Welsh rulers by stressing their subordinate position is not clear, but bringing them together at Woodstock no doubt contributed to the difficulties that followed, when the *Annales Cambriae* noted 'all the Welsh of Gwynedd, Deheubarth and Powys with one accord cast off the Norman yoke.'[34]

The Welsh response, however, was neither immediate nor as co-ordinated as this implies. Rhys returned from Woodstock, but his conflict with the marcher barons was not over. In his absence, Einion ab Anarawd was killed by Walter ap Llywarch with suspicion falling on Roger de Clare,

[28] *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.62; *Brut* (RBH), p.145; *Bren*, p.165.
[29] Diceto, I, p.311.
[30] R.R. Davies, *The Age of Conquest*, p.52. W.L. Warren offers a similar view suggesting that Henry may have been reformulating his relationships, demanding a more explicit subordination and 'dependent vassalage' (*Henry II*, pp. 162-3).
[31] Chronicle of Holyrood in *Early Sources of Scottish History*, II, p.251. Roger of Howden described it simply as a 'firm peace' (Howden, I, p.219: '*pax firma*').
[32] Torigni, p.218.
[33] Submission could be used as a positive, Madog ap Maredudd relied on Henry's help to stop Owain Gwynedd's expansion and in doing so provided a degree of protection for Powys. After Henry's departure in 1157 Madog's half-brother, Iorwerth Goch, was able to destroy the castle of Iâl which Owain had built in 1149 (*Brut* (Pen. 20), p.60; *Brut* (RBH), p.137). David Stephenson suggests this action may have been part of a wider offensive against Gwynedd which drew strength from the partnership between Powys and England (D. Stephenson, *Medieval Powys*, p.49).
[34] *Annales Cambriae*, p.50; translation from *History of Wales*, II, pp. 514-5.

who provided protection for Walter.[35] Gerald of Wales noted how the Welsh 'avenge with great ferocity any wrong done to their relations' and, as Paul Latimer suggests, this was a powerful motive and a more immediate concern to Rhys than the theoretical nature of any overlordship imposed at Woodstock.[36] The hostility and mutual mistrust made any agreement difficult; with the Welsh, passionate about freedom, perceiving terms as a form of bondage and the English believing the Welsh hated them and had no respect for oaths.[37] The king was failing in his duty to provide protection for Rhys and seeing that Henry 'would not keep aught of his promise to him … he manfully made for the land of Roger, earl of Clare.'[38] As Rhys ravaged Ceredigion, Henry responded by preparing for another campaign. At the council of Northampton in October 1164 he appealed for help and secured promises for a significant number of infantry sergeants to take to Wales.[39] The campaign was thoroughly prepared, with an army impressive for both its size and diversity. Mercenaries were recruited from the continent and a fleet was hired from Dublin, hinting that Henry was looking to find a lasting solution in Wales.[40] This is, perhaps, confirmed by a trip to make peace with France and Flanders to ensure they would not take advantage in his absence.[41] Henry returned to England in May 1165 to the news that Owain's son Dafydd, encouraged by Rhys's success in the south, had moved to ravage Tegeingl in the north. Now, more than at any other time in his reign, it may have seemed the Welsh were indeed uniting to cast off the Norman yoke.[42]

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[35] *History of Wales*, II, pp. 513-4; *Annales Cambriae*, p.49; *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.62; *Brut* (RBH), p.143; *Bren*, p.165.

[36] *Opera*, VI, p.200; translation Gerald of Wales, p.251. P. Latimer, 'Henry II's Campaign against the Welsh', p.526. Vengeance as a motive should not be underestimated as Gerald noted it was often the motivating factor for violence in Wales (*Opera*, VI, pp. 49-50, 100, 130, 142-3, 211-2).

[37] *Opera*, VI, pp. 180, 226; WN, I, p.107.

[38] Brut (Pen. 20), p.63. The *Brenhinedd y Saesson* adds that Rhys was also motivated 'because of his poverty' (*Bren*, p.165). This may have been a factor as the agreements of 1158 and 1163 had left him in a weaker position than his father had been on his death in 1137.

[39] William FitzStephen specifically stated the request was for '*bellatorum peditum*' (*MTB*, III, p.70). For the experimental levy designed to finance these sergeants, see T. K. Keefe, 'The 1165 Levy for the Army of Wales', *Notes and Queries*, 227 (1982), pp. 194-196; 'The 1165 Levy for the Army of Wales', in P. Latimer, 'Henry II's Campaign against the Welsh', pp. 545-552.

[40] The sheriffs of London are recorded clothing and arming mercenaries with £137 9s. 8d. '*pro uestiendis coterellis*' and £30 for 300 '*targis coterallorum*' (PR 11 Henry II, p.31). Although chronicles often inflate the size of armies, there is some agreement on the diversity of the army for 1165. William of Newburgh described it as coming from both England and foreign provinces, with the Welsh sources suggesting it included English, Normans, Flemings, Angevins, Scots and others in its number (*Annales Cambriae*, p.50; *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.63; *Brut* (RBH), p.145; *Bren*, p.167). John Hosler includes Picts in this number, possibly as a misreading of the *Annales Cambriae*'s reference to '*Pictaviae et Aquitaniae, et Scotiae*' (J. Hosler, 'Henry II's Military Campaigns', p.68; *idem*, *Henry II: A Medieval Soldier*, p.164).

[41] A letter to Thomas Becket, from early 1165, shows the desire for a 'firm peace' so Henry could 'more securely attack the Welsh' (*CTB*, I, no. 43, pp. 176-9).

[42] Henry's position in north Wales had been weakened by the death of his ally Madog ap Maredudd in 1160 and the successional problems that followed in Powys. For these successional issues, see *AWR*, pp. 37-8; 'Crisis and Renewal: 1160 and its Aftermath', in D. Stephenson, *Medieval Powys*, pp. 58-74.

Henry II moved to Oswestry in July aiming to cross the Berwyn Mountains towards the Welsh forces encamped at Corwen. Owain Gwynedd assumed leadership of the Welsh army, with Rhys ap Gruffudd, Owain Cyfeiliog, Iorwerth Goch and the two sons of Madog ab Idnerth joining the coalition.[43] Henry's route may have looked to exploit any weakness in the coalition's unity by travelling through the lands of England's former Powysian allies.[44] His army was probably harassed as it moved towards the mountains, but both sides seemed content to avoid each other and remained in their tents 'without one daring to attack the other.'[45] Henry gave the order for trees to be felled to clear a path through the wooded Ceiriog Valley. It was a bold strategy as it highlighted his route, but it also shows the difficulty of the terrain and that memories of the ambush in 1157 were still fresh. A Welsh detachment slowed their progress, though there is little agreement on the scale of fighting.[46] Henry reached the higher ground, but strong winds and heavy rain halted his movement and forced him to make camp. Exposed to the elements, fearing attack, with provisions running out and little available to forage, Henry had to withdraw after a few days.[47] He returned to England, dismissing the fleet at Chester, before punishing the Welsh hostages in his possession.[48] Henry looked to strengthen the border, making arrangements for troops and castles, as he hoped to contain the problem within Wales before departing for the continent and not returning to England for four years.[49]

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[43] *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.63; *Brut* (RBH), pp. 145-7.

[44] Although Powys was represented, the loyalty of their leaders may have been questionable as the Pipe Roll for 1165-6 has Iorwerth receiving £14 6s. 8d. for horses and a payment of 100s. is recorded '*nuntiis Oeni de Chiuiliac*' (PR 12 Henry II, p.59; see *History of Wales*, II, p.521, n.130).

[45] *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.63.

[46] Owain's letter to Louis, shortly after the events, stated that in the fighting Henry lost more men and the *Brut* added that 'many of the bravest men on either side were slain' (H. Pryce, 'Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII', p.7; Brut (Pen. 20), p.63). J.E. Lloyd implies there was little or no fighting as 'Henry failed to lay his hands on the Welsh' and Max Liberman suggests Henry was 'ambushed by Welsh raiders' (*History of Wales*, II, p.517; M. Lieberman, *The Medieval March of Wales: The Creation and Perception of a Frontier, 1066 -1283* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.164). John Hosler promotes the events into a battle with the Welsh charging to engage the English, but also admits 'we have scarcely any details of the battle' (J. Hosler, *Henry II: A Medieval Soldier*, p.141).

[47] *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.63: *Brut* (RBH), p.147. The *Brenhinedd y Saesson* adds that the English had started dying 'some of cold; others of hunger' (*Bren*, p.167). Owain Gwynedd suggested Henry's departure was 'not through our merits, perhaps, but through the prayers of the humble to the saints' (H. Pryce, 'Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII', p.7). Gerald also pointed to divine retribution with the burning of churches leading to the change in weather (*Opera*, VI, p.144). See above p.23, n.16.

[48] The fleet was considered inadequate or insufficient and rewarded, though the *Brenhinedd y Saesson* claims Henry 'sent them back to fetch a force which would be greater' but is then silent on the matter of their return (*Brut* (Pen. 20), p.63; *Brut* (RBH), p.147; *Bren*, p.167).

[49] Torigni, p.266. Provisions were made to strengthen the walls and garrisons of castles under threat. Knights, sergeants, watchmen, equipment and supplies were being sent to castles in the south and all along the border to help in Hereford, Bridgnorth, Shrewsbury and Chirk all the way to Basingwerk, Prestatyn and Rhuddlan in the north. St Briavels, for instance, received £20, with Hereford and Worcestershire both recording payments for 100 sergeants, and 110 marks was assigned to Reginald of Cornwall for sergeants '*de wallia*' (PR 12 Henry II, pp. 78, 80-3, 95).

With the benefit of hindsight and knowledge of the successful conquest of parts of Ireland, secured with noble contributions from his own family, Gerald of Wales delivered a critical assessment of Henry's Welsh campaigns:

> He was unsuccessful in all … these expeditions, simply because he placed no confidence in the local leaders, who were experienced and familiar with conditions, preferring to take advice from men who lived far from the marches and knew nothing of the habits and customs of the inhabitants.[50]

Though likely clouded by his own experiences with Henry, and his sons, Gerald's view that the king's shortcomings in Wales could be explained by experience and advice are worth considering. J.E. Lloyd, following Gerald's appraisal, suggested that 'Henry knew nothing of Welsh methods of warfare' and this led directly to the ambush of 1157.[51] Though lacking personal experience, there were opportunities for Henry to gain valuable insights into Wales and the Welsh before 1157.[52] He travelled extensively near the border, especially in the lands of Hugh de Mortimer in 1155, and could also take lessons from his predecessors.[53] Gerald noted that the king had a wonderful memory and 'had at his finger-tips an almost complete knowledge of history'.[54] Details of Harold's 1063 campaign were familiar to contemporaries with John of Salisbury referring to it in 1159, highlighting some awareness in Angevin court circles of earlier attempts to subdue the Welsh.[55] This campaign featured a fleet to north Wales and an overland route to meet in Gwynedd, prompting surrender, hostages and the promise of tribute. It was so successful that not only was Gruffudd ap Llywelyn killed by his own men

[50] *Opera*, VI, p.138; translation Gerald of Wales, p.197.
[51] *History of Wales*, II, 497.
[52] As a child Henry spent time with Robert of Gloucester and may have experienced stories of his uncle's recent success over Stephen at the battle of Lincoln. For the suggestion that Henry was in England with Robert in 1142-3, see A.L. Poole, 'Henry Plantagenet's Early Visits to England', *English Historical Review*, 47 (1932), pp. 447–452. It was also possible that he had access to the works of Vegetius, perhaps through his father owning a copy, with its advice on the nature of warfare and lessons in guerrilla tactics (J. Hosler, *Henry II: A Medieval Soldier*, p.126; C.R. Shrader, 'A Handlist of Extant Manuscripts containing the *De Re Militari* of Flavius Vegetius Renatus', *Scriptorium*, 33 (1979), pp. 280-305).
[53] As punishment for not submitting to the threat of force, Henry besieged Hugh's castles of Cleobury, Wigmore, and Bridgnorth in the Welsh marches (WN, I, p.105; Gervase, I, pp. 161-2).
[54] *Opera*, V, p.306; translation from *Henry II*, p.208.
[55] C.C.J. Webb, ed., *Policraticus*, II, VI:6, pp. 17-20. For details, see K. DeVries, 'Harold Godwinson in Wales: Military Legitimacy in Late Anglo-Saxon England', in R.P. Abels and B.S. Bachrach, ed., *The Normans and Their Adversaries at War: Essays in Memory of C. Warren Hollister* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2001), pp. 65-85, especially pp. 79-85.

and his head delivered to England, but Gerald believed that as a result the following three Norman kings had no troubles with their Welsh neighbours.[56]

Henry may have entered Wales in 1157 with limited experience, but with superior equipment and numbers, and having achieved a number of successes already in his reign, probably believed there was little to fear. It may have been this confidence that was behind the 'youthful ardour and rash enthusiasm' that Gerald believed led him into the ambush.[57] Henry may even have been looking at history and the example of his grandfather at Tinchebrai (1106) or Bourgthéroulde (1124), with a detachment hidden in reserve to surprise and confirm the victory.[58] The ambush was a blow to the king's confidence, but the experience remained with him and in 1165 he refused to be caught out by the terrain again. He raised a significant number of infantry sergeants to negate the difficulties of the land and adapted to the situation by felling trees to open the route and limit the chances of another ambush.[59]

Gerald's criticism of Henry placing no confidence in those familiar with Wales is harder to determine, but during the preparations for 1157 he was surrounded by men with experience of Wales. Cadwaladr ap Gruffudd, Madog ap Maredudd, Iorwerth Goch and Hywel ab Ieuaf all fulfilled Gerald's criteria of having 'long practice of waging war in local conditions.'[60] Though most of their roles are unclear, the campaign was partly aimed at regaining Cadwaladr's lands and as Owain's brother he would have possessed a wealth of valuable information. Cadwaladr also had strong connections with the English through the earls of Chester, having fought with Ranulf at Lincoln in 1141 and taken refuge with him after 1152. During this exile, he witnessed

[56] *ASC*, 1063; *Opera*, VI, pp. 217-8.
[57] *Opera*, VI, p.157; translation Gerald of Wales, p.196. Henry had developed a reputation for being bold. In 1153, for instance, he crossed to England during a winter storm to everyone's surprise, an action, according to Henry of Huntingdon, 'his supporters considered to be heroic, while others thought it rash' (D. Greenway, ed. and trans., *Historia Anglorum*, p.763).
[58] Henry I's success over his elder brother, Robert Curthose, at Tinchebrai became the template for strategy in open battle: dismounting knights, dividing troops and a decisive cavalry charge by a reserve hidden on the flank. This tactic was revisited several times in Geoffrey of Monmouth's *Historia Regum Britanniae*, notably when the intervention of the Breton cavalry helped Aurelius defeat Hengist (M.D. Reeve, ed. and N. Wright, trans., *Geoffrey of Monmouth. The History of the Kings of Britain: An Edition and Translation of De Gestis Britonum* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2007), pp. 164-6.
[59] Cutting down trees was a tactic employed by William Rufus in Wales, with the anonymous author of the *Vita Griffini filii Conani* suggesting: 'He also embarked upon a scheme of cutting down and destroying the forests and groves so that not even … a shadow might be left by which the weaker might protect themselves' (P. Russell, ed. and trans., *Vita Griffini Filii Conani: The Medieval Latin Life of Gruffudd Ap Cynan* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2005), p.79).
[60] *Opera*, VI, p.220; translation Gerald of Wales, p.269.

several charters for the earls and even married Ranulf's sister Adeliza.[61] Eustace FitzJohn is perhaps a more important figure as he was recorded fighting, and dying, for Henry during the ambush. As constable of Chester, he had knowledge of the local terrain, Welsh methods of fighting and, more importantly, experience as a royal adviser. In Henry I's reign, Eustace was placed in the strategically important castle of Alnwick and made custodian of Bamburgh, Knaresborough and Tickhill defending the major Scottish routes into England.[62] The *Gesta Stephani* described him as a 'great and influential friend of King Henry' and Eustace remained loyal to the Angevin cause by taking up arms with David I against Stephen in 1138.[63] Henry II had some experience of working with him and the charter conferring the lands of William FitzNigel on Eustace confirmed him as constable of Chester, but also chief counsellor.[64] Eustace was a well-respected man of unquestionable loyalty, known to be with the king in 1157, with local knowledge and experience as an adviser; it seems unlikely he would not have been consulted.

In 1165 Henry had a better understanding of Wales and payments in the Pipe Rolls suggest he may have used local contacts to access information.[65] During the 1160s both Roger of Powys and his brother Jonas received regular sums for services and had custody of a number of castles.[66] The weather and the Welsh resistance played a significant role in the campaign, but the choice of route from Shrewsbury to Oswestry, followed by a perilous journey along the Ceiriog Valley and across the Berwyn Mountains often receives criticism. Rees Davies, for instance, suggests 'Henry's ambitions were undone not by the Welsh but by his own ineptitude in choosing a difficult overland route.'[67] Not only was a similar path taken by Henry I in 1114,

[61] G. Barraclough, ed., *The Charters of the Anglo-Norman Earls of Chester, c.1071-1237* (Chester: Lancashire and Cheshire Record Society, cxxvi, 1988), nos. 28, 64, 84; for Cadwaladr's marriage, see *AWR*, p.330.
[62] *De Gestis Regis Stephani et de Bello Standardii* in *Chronicles*, III, p.158. As Paul Dalton suggests Henry I entrusted these castles 'to a man skilled in the art of war' (P. Dalton, 'Eustace Fitz John and the Politics of Anglo-Norman England: The Rise and Survival of a Twelfth-Century Royal Servant', *Speculum*, 71 (1996), pp. 358-383 (quote at p.365)).
[63] *Gesta Stephani*, p.55; *De Gestis Regis Stephani et de Bello Standardii* in *Chronicles*, III, p.158.
[64] Henry directed Eustace to oversee an annual rent of 40s. from the mills at Olney and the gift of the mill at Tathwell which were given to St Peter's Abbey in Gloucester. Henry likely issued these instructions in April-May 1153 when he was at Gloucester with Earl Ranulf (G. Barraclough, ed., *The Charters of the Earls of Chester*, no.116, pp. 131-2). On becoming constable, Eustace is described as '*supremum consiliarium*' and was viewed by Aelred of Rievaulx as 'a man of highest prudence, and in secular matters of great counsel' (no. 73, p.86; *Relatio de Standardo* in *Chronicles*, III, p.191: '*vir summae prudentiae et in secularibus negotiis magni consilii*'). For the suggestion that Aelred knew Eustace personally, see P. Dalton, 'Eustace Fitz John', p.382.
[65] PR 11 Henry II, pp. 89-90. Payments from Shropshire were made to Roger and Jonas of Powys, Morgan, and Owain of Porkington (Owain Brogyntyn) and some unnamed sons of Madog.
[66] The Pipe Roll of 1159-60 includes payments in Shropshire of £12 to Roger for keeping the castle of Overton and a further £4 3s. 4d. for the castle of Dernio (PR 6 Henry II, p.26). The following year includes a payment to Roger of £30 3s. 8d. for half a year and £5 to Jonas for a castle (PR 7 Henry II, p.39).
[67] R.R. Davies, *The Age of Conquest*, p.53.

but Frederick Suppe suggests that advice for this strategy may have come directly from Roger and Jonas as they acted as advisers and guides for the campaign.[68] Roger previously held the castle at Corwen and was familiar with the area and the people with intimate knowledge of the best approach. The route gave Henry the option to divide his force or even arrive behind the Welsh, who had come to Edeirnion and encamped at Corwen, but the weather intervened and prevented him from seeing any of the strategic advantages the route may have offered.[69]

Looking back at Henry II's reign Ralph of Coggeshall claimed the king had conquered the Welsh, but appreciated that this was not 'without great loss of his leading men and expenditure of his army'.[70] Of contemporary and near-contemporary writers only Gerald of Wales, echoed by William of Newburgh, approach the difficulties of campaigning in Wales.[71] They advocated stirring up dissension through promises and bribes to turn the Welsh against each other, while using sanctions and blockades to apply economic pressure. The borders should be strengthened, and an invasion carried out predominantly with infantry troops, lightly armed and agile, supplemented by mercenaries, with regular reinforcements. Gerald further emphasised the need for seeking advice from 'those resident in the country … familiar with local conditions and who know the manners and habits of the local people.'[72]

To some extent, Henry's actions mirrored this advice. He used Welsh allies, making regular payments to Powys to counter Gwynedd, and the choice of route in 1165 looked to undermine Welsh unity. Though the campaigns were too short for sanctions to take effect, 1157's attack on Anglesey may have recognised its economic importance with Gerald suggesting the island was 'so productive that it could supply the whole of Wales with corn'.[73] Not all financial transactions relating to Henry's military endeavours appear on the Pipe Rolls, but it is clear that border castles were strengthened to coincide with his campaigns. Robert of Torigni

[68] In 1114 Henry I followed the *Ffordd y Saeson* across the Berwyn range to Tomen y Mur (*History of Wales*, II, pp. 463-4). For the roles of Roger of Powys and his brother Jonas, see F.C. Suppe, 'Roger of Powys, Henry II's Anglo-Welsh Middleman, and his Lineage', *Welsh History Review*, 21 (2002), pp. 1-23, especially pp. 9-12.
[69] *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.63; *Brut* (RBH), p.145. For Edeirnion's location in relation to Oswestry, see Appendix I.
[70] J. Stevenson, ed., *Radulphi de Coggeshall Chronicon Anglicanum* (London: Rolls Series, 1875), p.25: '*Gualenses etiam regibus Angliae semper rebelles, non sine magna suorum principum amissione et exercitus sui dispendio*'.
[71] *Opera*, VI, pp. 218-222; WN, I, pp. 106-9. For the strategic importance of the chapter on how to conquer Wales in Gerald's *Descriptio Kambriae*, see C.J. Rogers, '*Giraldus Cambrensis*, Edward I, and the Conquest of Wales', in W. Murray and R.H. Sinnreich, ed., *Successful Strategies. Triumphing in War and Peace from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 65-99.
[72] *Opera*, VI, p.220; translation Gerald of Wales, p.268.
[73] *Opera*, VI, p.177; translation Gerald of Wales, p.230.

commented that a third of the royal host was summoned in 1157, but there is little evidence of expenditure on infantry or mercenaries and the composition of Henry's army remains unclear.[74] There is evidence, however, that foot soldiers were recruited for 1163 and especially 1165.[75] Paul Latimer suggests that the money received from the sergeantry assessment in 1164-5 was sufficient to pay over 3,000 infantry sergeants for six months.[76] For Gerald's final point on advice, the *Brut* hinted that Henry both received and reacted to advice as in 1157 'when the king heard that, he divided his host', and in 1165 'after taking counsel moved his host as far as Chester'.[77] Gerald ends his *Descriptio* with Henry talking to an old man in Pencader in 1163 to stress the defiant message that Wales will never be destroyed 'by the wrath of man'.[78] What is of interest, however, is that the man is fighting for England against his own people and Henry is seeking his opinion. This seems to confirm that Gerald's view that the king was 'impervious to advice and he took no notice whatsoever, being obstinate and obdurate by nature' was more a reflection of his belief and disappointed ambitions than the reality of Henry's Welsh campaigns.[79]

In a letter of early 1166, John, bishop of Poitiers, referring to Henry's recent campaign, noted 'they say he often complains that he has been deprived of sound and reliable advice.'[80] It is worth briefly considering some of the advice that Henry may have received before his Welsh campaigns, most of it was probably based on what to expect from the landscape and the people. Gerald's *Itinerarium*, following his tour of Wales with Archbishop Baldwin in 1188, provides a valuable insight into his views of Wales. Though intended to be a contemporary history, focusing on six weeks from March to mid-April, it did leave Gerald well-positioned to comment on the geography of Wales. He described a land that was difficult to access on account of its high mountains, deep valleys, and extensive forests, rivers and marshes.[81] The

[74] There is little evidence to suggest scutage was levied that year, with only the Abbot of Abbotsbury paying a sum of 2 marks, see below p.122, n.1.
[75] There are references in 1163 to '*militum et servientum in exercitu de Walis*' and William Cade received £100 for Flemish mercenaries, possibly destined for Wales (PR 9 Henry II, pp. 9, 71).
[76] P. Latimer, 'Henry II's Campaign against the Welsh', p.552. The assessment in total accounted for £3,360, of which £2,309 was received in 1164-5.
[77] *Brut* (RBH), pp. 135, 147.
[78] *Opera*, VI, p.227; translation Gerald of Wales, p.274.
[79] *Opera*, VI, p.66; translation Gerald of Wales, p.125.
[80] *CTB*, I, no. 66, pp. 262-5. Poor advice was often blamed for disappointing campaigns, William FitzStephen commented on the Toulouse campaign of 1159 that it was not a success as the king was led astray by 'reverence to the counsel of others' (*MTB*, III, pp. 33-4; translation M. Staunton, trans., *The Lives of Thomas Becket* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), p.57).
[81] *Opera*, VI, p.165. William of Newburgh suggested that Wales was difficult to attack because of a lack of level ground and the multitude of inaccessible forests (WN, I, p.107). Even Gerald was surprised by the difficulties of

experience of men like Eustace FitzJohn and years of marcher conflict, with lessons from Harold, William Rufus and Henry I, must have made the king aware of the difficulties of the terrain, but he may not have fully appreciated them until after 1157. John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*, written in 1159, often refers to the need for lightly-armed infantry in Wales. This came too late for Henry in 1157, but was close enough to events to suggest contemporary opinion favoured the use of foot soldiers in Wales.[82] Owain Gwynedd's response to the English approach was to dig defensive ditches, hinting that he was facing mounted opponents.[83] If this was indeed an error by Henry, it was not to be repeated as more infantry were recruited in both 1163 and notably in 1165.

If Henry received advice on what to expect from the terrain, what could be expected from the people he encountered? Gerald suggested of the Welsh that their 'sole idea of tactics is either to pursue their opponents or else to run away from them' and that they 'never draw up forces to engage an enemy army in the field.'[84] There was sufficient evidence for this in history as the *Brut* recorded in 1098 that rather than fight 'the men of Gwynedd, as was their custom, retreated to the strongest and wildest places they had.'[85] Henry of Huntingdon stated that one of the first actions at the battle of Lincoln in 1141 was the flight of a Welsh contingent.[86] Henry travelled to Wales in 1157 full of confidence to find that Owain did not retreat west, but brought his forces east to confront him. Sean Davies highlights the importance of this as 'a unique post-1066 development', with a Welsh leader opting to face a royal expedition from England.[87] It also served as a reminder that even experience and advice could not guarantee success in Wales. After the events of 1157, the glorified processions of 1158 and 1163, it would have been difficult to know what to expect in 1165. Any hopes of avoiding confrontation would surely

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the Welsh landscape and recorded on his journey to Bangor that a valley had so many steep climbs that his party were forced to dismount and continue on foot (*Opera*, VI, pp. 124-5).

[82] C.C.J. Webb, ed., *Policraticus*, II, VI:16.

[83] Though the actions of lower-status soldiers rarely received attention in the chronicles, it is interesting to note that the only men recorded with Henry in the woods in 1157 were knights (Henry of Essex, Roger de Clare, Robert de Courcy and Eustace FitzJohn). Ditches could break the legs of charging horses and digging patterns of holes and pits became one of the most effective ways of narrowing or preventing a cavalry charge.

[84] *Opera*, VI, pp. 210, 215; translation Gerald of Wales, pp. 260, 267.

[85] *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.21. The movement of goods and people as a deliberate tactic to avoid war is, perhaps, exaggerated as transhumance was part of everyday life in Wales, see G.R.J. Jones, 'The Tribal System in Wales: a Re-assessment in the Light of Settlement Studies', *Welsh History Review*, 1 (1961), pp. 111-132.

[86] D. Greenway, ed. and trans., *Historia Anglorum*, p.736.

[87] S. Davies, *War and Society*, p.129. In discussing the events of 1157, D.J.C. King and J.G. Edwards may have disagreed on the location but both stress the unusual nature of Owain's strategy (D.J.C. King, 'The Fight at Coleshill', pp. 370-2, and J.G. Edwards, 'Henry II and the Fight at Coleshill', pp. 255-6).

have rested upon an impressive display of power, one that would be enough to intimidate the combined armies of Wales into submission.

The preparations for 1165 indicate an acute awareness of the problems Henry would have to overcome as he prepared with remarkable thoroughness to finance and muster a vast army. Pipe Roll entries reveal the scale of Henry's preparations as his army moved towards Shropshire from across England and beyond.[88] Weapons, equipment and foodstuffs being purchased and transported hint at the size of the army being gathered.[89] Paul Latimer highlights the problems of supply by looking at the movement of corn towards Wales: payments were made in Oxfordshire and Berkshire for 1,000 horse-loads of corn, in Gloucestershire for 849 horse-loads, in Lincolnshire for 235½ sesters, and in Worcestershire for 509 horse-loads carried to Shrewsbury.[90] Though not everything had to travel into Wales, moving men and supplies through difficult countryside created new problems. John France suggests that it would take 140 packhorses to carry enough food to feed a force of 3,000 for a single day.[91] Wagons were more effective with teams of horses or oxen, but working animals, as well as warhorses, also required their own supplies. The importance of cattle on campaign, not just as a food supply, or sellable commodity, but to help move supplies should not be underestimated.[92] The movement of wheeled transport, however, relied on roads and the weather; neither of which could be guaranteed in Wales. The experience of 1158 and 1163 probably persuaded Henry that intimidation and avoidance would be enough to force a submission. He had foot soldiers to fight if required, but he did not expect the Welsh resistance to delay him unduly as he moved towards Corwen. The delays he experienced proved crucial, though, when the weather changed. The army was too large to move quickly, and the combination of strong winds and heavy rains forced them to a standstill, leaving them dangerously exposed in the mountains. Any supply line would probably have been in single file, extended over a considerable distance,

[88] The numbers were swollen by courtiers, household knights, officials, retinues and servants. Henry even summoned the bishops to Shrewsbury, dismissed them and retained their retinues (*CTB*, I, no. 51, pp. 218-9).
[89] The Pipe Roll for 1164-5 shows hauberks, helmets, shields, lances, arrows, axes, iron, rope, charcoal and pitch among other items being purchased in large quantities (PR 11 Henry II, pp. 12, 31, 40, 68, 73, 89-90, 98). For a full account of the logistics of the 1165 campaign, see P. Latimer, 'Henry II's Campaign against the Welsh', pp. 523-552.
[90] PR 11 Henry II, pp. 68, 73, 12, 34, 98; P. Latimer, 'Henry II's Campaign against the Welsh', pp. 533-4.
[91] J. France, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000-1300* (London: UCL Press, 1999), p.35.
[92] Though not necessarily accurate of the events of facing an invasion, Meilyr Brydydd's elegy for Gruffudd ap Cynan suggests the importance of cattle: 'The king of England came accompanied by hosts, though he came he did not return with cattle … he did not break into (any) pasture lands that contained herds' (J.E.C. Williams, 'Meilyr Brydydd and Gruffudd ap Cynan', in K.L. Maund, ed., *Gruffudd ap Cynan: A Collaborative Biography* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1996), pp. 165-186 (at p.184)). For a similar story, see P. Russell, ed. and trans., *Vita Griffini*, p.156; D. Simon Evans, ed and. trans., *The Life of Gruffudd Ap Cynan*, p.15.

and difficult to defend by day and night.[93] Trees and undergrowth had been cleared along the route, but mobility would have been severely restricted by wet and muddy tracks. With little to forage from the land and no supplies forthcoming, Henry was compelled to abandon the campaign. Owain's achievement could not be celebrated as the lack of a decisive victory left him both 'uncertain of the outcome … because he (Henry) arranged neither a peace nor a truce with us' and believing the English would return 'against us again after next Easter.'[94]

Matthew Strickland describes William I's Harrying of the North as 'an act *sui generis*, born of desperation and the failure of statesmanship, designed to break the power of a turbulent and separatist region.'[95] Though the circumstances were very different, the rare instance of royal retaliation against the Welsh hostages in 1165 may represent something similar: an act of desperation designed to force a decisive outcome. This was Henry's last opportunity to salvage his reputation and, perhaps, leave an impression on the Welsh as the *Brut* believed his grandfather had done:

> King Henry, the man who had tamed all the chieftains of the island of Britain through his might and power and who had subdued many lands beyond the sea to his rule … the man against whom none can contend save God Himself.[96]

Previous loyalties and agreements had all failed and the penalty of blinding and mutilating, possibly castrating the males and disfiguring the females, was a vivid warning to the Welsh, and other potential rebels, of the price of standing against Henry II. It is widely accepted that the treatment of the hostages was the result of anger and frustration at the failure of the

[93] For the light of the moon being used to successfully track and pursue enemies in Wales, see P. Russell, ed. and trans., *Vita Griffini*, p.71; D. Simon Evans, ed. and trans., *A Medieval Prince of Wales: The Life of Gruffudd Ap Cynan* (Felinfach: Llanerch, 1990), p.68.
[94] H. Pryce, 'Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII', p.7. There was confusion elsewhere as the letter from John of Poitiers, from early August 1165 and before the conclusion of the campaign, admitting stories are often exaggerated, noted: 'the lord king has just engaged the Welsh … attacking and scattering a great multitude of their number. They say in fact that the king lost only a small number of his own men.' (*CTB*, no. 51, pp. 216-7 and n.10). Roger of Howden recorded that Henry lost many nobles, barons and men (Howden, I, p.240).
[95] M. Strickland, *War and Chivalry: The Conduct and Perception of War in England and Normandy, 1066-1217* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.309.
[96] *Brut* (RBH), p.91.

campaign.[97] In condemning Henry's actions, the suggestion by Roger of Howden, and others, that the punishment in some way represented justice, is often overlooked.[98]

The legal treatise known as *Glanvill* noted the king's duties included 'crushing the pride of the unbridled and ungovernable with the right hand of strength.'[99] It also highlighted the contrast between lesser crimes and capital offences: "*lèse-majesté*' namely the killing of the lord king or the betrayal of the realm … are punished by death or cutting off of limbs.'[100] As death was appropriate for crimes against the king, then mutilation could be seen as a form of royal clemency.[101] Suger of St Denis observed that a counsellor plotting against Henry I was 'condemned to losing his eyes and genitals when he deserved to be choked to death by a noose.'[102] As early as the seventh century blinding was used as an alternative to death; it became increasingly regarded as a political punishment, often associated with treason.[103] Castration also became accepted as a political penalty and Klaus van Eickels highlights the connection between castration and cutting off a woman's nose as 'disfiguring a woman's face could be considered tantamount to castrating her.'[104] It is therefore important to note that judicial blinding and castration was not new and a legal possibility, angry or not, for the king.[105] Who was accused made little difference as Guernes of Pont-Sainte-Maxence remarked 'secret

[97] J.E. Lloyd has the hostages 'cruelly mutilated to satiate the king's rage' and Rees Davies suggests that 'all he could do was to visit his spleen on Welsh hostages' (*History of Wales*, II, p.517; R.R. Davies, *Age of Conquest*, p.53). W.L. Warren connects it to one of the king's notorious 'fits of rage'; Paul Latimer views Henry as 'understandably furious'; John Hosler suggests 'frustration getting the better of him' and Sean Davies has Henry reacting 'with fury' (*Henry II*, p.210; P. Latimer, 'Henry II's Campaign against the Welsh', p.536; J. Hosler, *Henry II: A Medieval Soldier*, p.56; S. Davies, *War and Society*, p.236). For more details of the Welsh hostages of 1165, see Appendix II.

[98] Howden, I, p.240; The Melrose Chronicle in *Early Sources of Scottish History*, II, pp. 259-60; *Annales Cestrienses*: '*justicia de obsidibus Walensium*' (R.C. Christie, ed. and trans., *Annales Cestrienses*, p.24 and n.1); *Annales de Waverleia*: '*justitia obsidibus Wallensium*' (H.R. Luard, ed., *Annales Monastici*, II, p.238). Conversely, rage or anger was the motivation according to the *Brut* (*Brut* (Pen. 20), pp. 63-4; *Brut* (RBH), p.147; *Bren*, p,167).

[99] *Glanvill*, p.lxxxix.

[100] *Glanvill*, p.2.

[101] J. Hudson. *The Formation of the English Common Law: Law and Society in England from the Norman Conquest to Magna Carta* (London and New York: Longman, 1996), p.78.

[102] R. Cusimano and J. Moorhead, trans., *Suger, The Deeds of Louis the Fat* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1992), p.114.

[103] C.W. Hollister, 'Royal Acts of Mutilation: The Case against Henry I', *Albion*, 10 (1978), pp. 330-340 (at pp. 337-8). For its development as a punishment, see G. Bührer-Thierry, "Just Anger' or 'Vengeful Anger'?: The Punishment of Blinding in the Early Medieval West', in B.H. Rosenwein, ed., *Anger's Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 75-91. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, for instance, recorded in 1075 that Breton rebels were blinded as traitors (*ASC*, 1075, p.212: 'thus were traitors to William laid low').

[104] K. van Eickels, 'Gendered Violence: Castration and Blinding as Punishment for Treason in Normandy and Anglo-Norman England', *Gender & History*, 16 (2004), pp. 588–602 (at p.598).

[105] Blinding and castrating may have had Scandinavian origins in Normandy, but it was also in place in England before 1066. The Laws of William the Conqueror, though having no official status and written later, show the punishment was recognised: 'let his eyes be put out and let him be castrated' (*EHD*, II, pp. 423-4).

traitors' were subject to mutilation and death, regardless of their status.[106] For crimes against the Crown, it did not even matter how many were accused as Henry I ordered all financiers in England to be castrated and have their right hand removed for collectively debasing the currency.[107]

Though Owain Gwynedd was critical that Henry had not presented his hostages 'for the keeping of the peace', he could have fewer complaints about the punishment. He had actively practised it himself in 1152 when he deprived his nephew, Cunedda ap Cadwallon, 'of eyes and testicles.'[108] The punishment was often associated with successional violence and family feuding in Wales. In 1129-30 at least seven family members in Arwystli were either blinded and castrated, or killed.[109] Owain's letter to Louis VII bemoaning the lack of a peace or truce in 1165 indicates he expected new terms. The oaths taken at Woodstock in 1163 were to Henry, at least, structured and binding and had been violated. Gerald of Wales warned the Welsh 'rarely keep their promises … a formal oath never binds them.'[110] As William of Newburgh suggested by breaking their agreements, the Welsh had exposed their hostages to danger.[111] For the English, Henry's anger was righteous and the punishment of the hostages was just, but for the Welsh the king had neglected his duty to protect against marcher encroachments. The Welsh feared the king, but in his absence, the marcher barons were weakened and vulnerable. Through his failed campaign and the subsequent treatment of the hostages, looking to force an outcome on the Welsh, Henry had, as Ralph Niger commented, 'not overcome them; but on the contrary embittered them against him.'[112]

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[106] J. Shirley, trans., *Garnier's Becket: Translated from the Twelfth-Century Vie Saint Thomas le Martyr de Cantorbire of Garnier of Pont-Sainte-Maxence* (Chichester: Phillimore, 1975), p.31. Noblemen and political rivals were not spared, and *Girart de Vienne*, the late twelfth-century *chanson de geste* by Bertrand de Bar-sur-Aube, has King Charles, in a display of anger, swearing 'there is no lord, however proud a peer, whom he'll not hang upon a well-branched tree' (M. Newth, trans., *The Song of Girart of Vienne by Bertrand de Bar-sur-Aube: A Twelfth-Century Chanson de Geste* (Tempe: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 1999), lines 5,817-9, p.160). For the dating of *Girart de Vienne* to c.1180, see L. Sunderland, *Rebel Barons: Resisting Royal Power in Medieval Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 57, 267.
[107] *ASC*, 1125; the Annals of Margam recorded there were 94 (H.R. Luard, ed., *Annales Monastici*, I, p.11).
[108] *Brut* (RBH), p.131.
[109] *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.50; *AWR*, p.2. Between 1100 and 1125 at least six members of the Powys dynasty were murdered, blinded or castrated by other family members (R.R. Davies, *Age of Conquest*, p.43). In 1175 Iorwerth ab Owain's son increased his chances of succession by seizing 'Owain Pen-Carn, his uncle; and he gouged the eyes out of his head and castrated him, lest he should beget issue who might hold authority over Caerleon' (*Brut* (Pen. 20), p.70).
[110] *Opera*, VI, p.206; translation Gerald of Wales, p.256.
[111] WN, I, p.145.
[112] R. Anstruther, ed., *Radulfi Nigri Chronica*, p.170; translation *Early Sources of Scottish History*, II, p.261.

In March 1166 Henry sailed from Southampton for the continent, abandoning his attempt to force the Welsh into submission. In his absence, the measures designed to contain the Welsh rulers proved ineffective as they pressed with renewed vigour against marcher lords. Within months Rhys had re-taken the lands he surrendered in 1158, occupying Cilgerran and triumphantly destroying Cardigan.[113] In the north, Owain moved east once more to take Basingwerk. The surprise of the raid was captured in a letter to Thomas Becket which noted repair works were being made when 'they were suddenly attacked … and most were killed and a great many wounded.'[114] In 1167 Rhys joined Owain and Cadwaladr to take Rhuddlan and Prestatyn as Owain recovered Tegeingl, and the lands disputed with the earls of Chester, restoring his territories to the extent they had been before 1157.[115] That Gwynedd and Powys combined for 1165 given their long history of animosity was a remarkable achievement, but there was little chance to see what a united Wales could achieve as old tensions resurfaced and the coalition crumbled. Iorwerth Goch was forced from his lands in 1166 and Owain Cyfeiliog was exiled in 1167; possibly the result of working too closely with the enemy.[116] Any hopes of unity suffered a further blow with the death of Owain Gwynedd in 1170. Owain remained defiant to the end, resisting Canterbury over the election of the bishop of Bangor and resisting the pope over his marriage to Cristin, his first cousin.[117] He also continued to defy Henry by styling himself as prince and leader of a nation, and in a bold diplomatic initiative bypassed England to approach Louis VII, possibly even offering him assistance against Henry in 1168.[118]

The outcome of 1165 makes it easy to overlook Henry's earlier campaigns in Wales, but there was some promise with submissions, homages and the recovery of lands lost during Stephen's

[113] *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.64; *Brut* (RBH), p.147.
[114] *CTB*, I, no. 113, p.553.
[115] *Annales Cambriae*, p.51; *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.65; *Brut* (RBH), p.149.
[116] *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.64; *Brut* (RBH), p.149. The king's policy of reward may have had some bearing on these internal divisions. It is clear that both Iorwerth and Owain were on friendly terms with England and in contact soon after Henry's departure in 1165. Iorwerth received payment for 15 horses for the king in 1166 and Owain was recorded in Wales with 'a host of the French' (PR 12 Henry II, p.59; *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.64).
[117] *CTB*, I, nos. 57-60, especially pp. 234-5 and n.1; *CTB*, II, no. 190. Thomas Becket appealed to Owain in 1169: 'we enjoin you for the remission of your sins to listen kindly to the apostolic mandate concerning the giving up of your relative and the election of the church of Bangor' (*CTB*, II, no. 202, p.877).
[118] After the council of Woodstock in 1163, according to Thomas Becket, Owain had angered Henry by assuming the title of prince, as if defiantly projecting himself to a new status as leader of his nation (*CTB*, I, no. 12, pp. 31-33). Becket does not miss the significance of the 'self-styled prince Owain', continuing to address him as king (*CTB*, I, no. 59, pp. 238-9). As Huw Pryce indicates the title of prince held by one ruler distinguished Owain as the principal ruler of Wales (H. Pryce, 'Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII', pp. 22-3). For Owain's approach to Louis, see H. Pryce, 'Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII', pp. 1-28; G. Brough, 'Welsh-French Diplomacy in the Middle Ages', in P. Skinner, ed., *The Welsh and the Medieval World: Travel, Migration and Exile* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2018), pp. 175-214. John of Salisbury noted messengers from the kings of Wales promising aid and hostages to Louis in July 1168 (*Letters* II, no. 279, pp. 606-7). For Owain's diplomatic involvement with Louis, see below pp. 99-100.

reign. Intimidation had proved successful in 1158 and 1163, but thereafter the effort to end the cycle of rebellions and meaningless submissions by treating the Welsh rulers together at Woodstock ended in failure. With Owain ascendant and Henry's influence rapidly declining, his departure in 1165 marked a low point in his relationship with Wales. The *Brut* had suggested that Henry II entered Wales 'thinking to annihilate all Welshmen', but this did not materialise and on his return in 1171 he looked to replace a policy of confrontation and containment with one of peace and co-operation.[119] The damage, however, had been done and the setback in 1165 encouraged a Welsh recovery, threatened loyalty to Henry, and gave hope to other potential enemies. Tensions were growing on the continent and the relationship between Louis and Henry was strained as not only Owain, but rebels from Brittany, Aquitaine and Poitou all looked to France for support.[120] The fear of his continental dominions being broken up was considered a more pressing concern than Wales as Henry turned his attentions overseas.

[119] *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.63. The Red Book of Hergest version of the *Brut* suggested that in 1165 Henry was 'purposing to carry into bondage and destroy all the Britons' (*Brut* (RBH), p.145). These descriptions are reminiscent of views expressed on the eve of Henry I's campaign of 1114, in which he apparently looked 'to exterminate all the Britons completely' (*Brut* (RBH), p.79).

[120] In 1166 Louis had granted Thomas Becket refuge at Sens and in 1167 ordered raids into the Vexin and Normandy (*MTB*, II, p.415; Diceto, I, p.329). For details of the events of 1166-8, see *Henry II*, pp. 102-8.

Chapter Two

The Political Impact of Henry's Welsh Campaigns

Part I: The *Cartae Baronum*

The impact of Henry II's Welsh campaigns was not immediately clear, but the financial burden and lack of success in 1165 had the potential to cause friction, divide loyalties amongst the nobility, and possibly even threaten the king's position. In England, Henry had to restore royal prestige and authority and his actions and policy in the aftermath of 1165 showed a renewed emphasis on stability, loyalty, and a strengthening of royal control. In a letter of early 1166, John of Poitiers reported that within a few months of Henry's departure from Wales he was 'already thinking of the succession of his son.'[1] William of Newburgh recorded that it was not only young Henry that the king was concerned with, but the future prosperity of his family: providing lands for his sons to govern and marriages for his daughters.[2] Discussions were being held, possibly finalised in 1165, over a proposed marriage of his daughter, Matilda, to the duke of Saxony.[3] Henry's immediate priority, however, appears to have been with rebels in Brittany. He crossed the Channel in March 1166, but before departing various measures were put in place designed primarily to maintain order and royal control in his absence.[4] Within these measures was an inquest into fiefs made through a direct application to tenants-in-chief with the returns, collectively known as the *Cartae Baronum*, to be made before Henry's planned departure in March.[5]

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[1] *CTB*, I, no. 66, p.263. The issue of his son's coronation had surfaced with the Becket dispute and stories of a prelate other than Thomas performing the ceremony circulated. In early 1164 John of Salisbury informed Becket of a rumour that, in order to evade his authority, a papal visit was desired and 'that the coronation of the king's son has been postponed that he may be blessed by the pope himself' (*Letters*, II, no.136, p.11). These unrealistic plans did not materialise and despite his supposed concern, Henry appears to have made no active moves in regard to his son's coronation (M. Strickland, *Henry the Young King*, p.61).

[2] WN I, pp. 145-6.

[3] Robert of Torigni and Ralph of Diss suggest an agreement was in place by the end of 1165 (Torigni, p.224; Diceto, I, p.318).

[4] Eleanor had been left to oversee Henry's continental dominions as preparations were being made in 1165, but her influence was in decline, especially in Maine and Brittany, by the time Henry entered Wales (Torigni, p.228; WN, I, pp. 147-8). The fact that the king was accompanied by his seven-year-old son Geoffrey in March (PR 12 Henry II, pp. 100-1, 109), while the younger Henry waited until Christmas 1166 to join his father at Poitiers, suggests plans for Geoffrey's role in Brittany may already have been determined (Torigni, p.229).

[5] Ralph Niger placed the survey in 1166 and the archbishop of York's *carta* revealed the deadline was set for the first Sunday in Lent, 13 March (R. Anstruther, ed., *Radulfi Nigri Chronica*, p.171; *CB*, no. CCXXXIII).

When the writ initiating the *Cartae Baronum* was issued is unclear, but the introductions to a number of *cartae* suggest the survey was communicated through local sheriffs and shire courts.[6] It is clear from the returns, however, that the time between the issue of the writ and the king's deadline was brief. Hugh Woke admitted that his return was completed in haste while others stated with additional time they could provide comprehensive or more accurate answers.[7] In 1177 Roger of Howden noted sheriffs and bailiffs were able to complete a careful and diligent inquest into tenures in their jurisdictions between 22 February and 24 April.[8] As Henry was not relying on a small number of officials, but personal responsibility, a short timeframe was, perhaps, not considered unreasonable. Though the content of the king's writ is unknown, its nature is inferred by the replies themselves. The archbishop of York's *carta* reveals it contained specific demands and posed four questions.[9] Firstly, each baron had to inform the king how many of his knights' fees were of the old enfeoffment, *de veteri*, defined as existing before the death of Henry I, in 1135. Secondly, how many knights had been enfeoffed on the new enfeoffment, *de novo*, after 1135. Thirdly, how many knights remain on the baron's demesne. Fourthly, the names of all the knights should be recorded, so that they might be checked against the king's roll to see whether any had yet to perform homage to him. Finally, all the *cartae* were to be sealed patent and returned by the deadline. The fact that there was no standard reply shows some barons had difficulties with their returns, or even different interpretations of the requirements as they tried to answer how they thought best.[10] The abbot of Ramsey, for instance, listed knights according to hides, with the four knights of the abbey's quota being the responsibility of the hides of Ramsey, with all landowners contributing towards scutage assessments or the expense of equipping knights summoned for service.[11] Richard de

[6] *CB*, nos. LIX, LXXXVII, CCXXXIII. The instructions were not addressed individually, as William FitzSiward indicated the writ was revealed through the sheriff of Northumberland to those present and Baderun of Monmouth heard it through the court in Hereford (nos. CCLVI, CI). Though issued through the courts, not all the returns were made through the sheriffs as the postscript to the earl of Hertford's return stated that it had been sent directly to the king (no. CCXXIV).

[7] *CB*, no. CCII, p.215: '*Domine, carta ista oportebat festinanter fieri*'. See also *CB*, nos. XXVII, XXXVI, LXXVIII, CLXXXVIII and pp. xiv-xv. Hugh de Lacy added a knight's fee at the end '*quod oblitus sum*' (no. CIII, p.105). The postscript to the earl of Hertford's *carta* was made as further information was recalled after its completion (no. CCXXIV).

[8] *GH*, I, p.138.

[9] *CB*, no. CCXXXIII. The bishops of Coventry (no. LXXXVII), Durham (no. CCXXXIV) and Exeter (no. LXXII), and several lay barons, such as Herbert de Castello in Shropshire (no. XCIII) and Baderun of Monmouth in Herefordshire (no. CI), also reveal the questions.

[10] The bishop of Worcester, for example, referred to enfeoffments not by Henry I, but in the times of bishops Samson and Theulf (*CB*, no. CXIX).

[11] *CB*, no. CXCV. The return for the honour of Wallingford listed enfeoffed knights and also free tenants, by hides and virgates (nos. CXXXIII, CXXXIIIa). Geoffrey Ridel, in Northamptonshire, recorded having no new enfeoffments with the burden of supporting his *servitium debitum* of 15 knights distributed amongst his tenants according to the carucates they held (no. CLIII).

la Haye's *carta* revealed his knights served by carucates, with five carucates making a knight.[12] The many exceptional examples provide a wealth of information that the survey probably had no intention of discovering, and it is difficult to draw any conclusions on the purpose of the *Cartae Baronum* from them.[13]

The deadline mentioned in the archbishop of York's return can be seen as part of the precautions Henry took before leaving England in 1166. When viewed with the containment policy in Wales, it implies a long royal absence was expected. The importance of having access to the names of sub-tenants for homage is highlighted by Osbert FitzHugh's *carta* being described as '*in defectu'* for omitting them and returned with instructions to make good this deficiency.[14] The paying of homage in large numbers before leaving the country was not uncommon and for Henry loyalty was a feature throughout his reign, with the act of submitting to his authority helping to maintain order as part of the recovery from years of bitter civil war.[15] As early as April 1155 the barons swore oaths of allegiance to the new king and his sons to maintain the due order of succession.[16] The importance placed on the recognition of succession is, perhaps, reflected in a number of returns revealing that homage had already been done to both Henry and his son.[17] As the primary motive of the *Cartae Baronum*, homage is unlikely as within a few years the Inquest of Sheriffs of 1170 repeated the request: 'let inquiry be made as to those who owe homage to the lord king and have not paid it, either to him or his son, and let their names be recorded'.[18] Henry's desire to reaffirm loyalty before his imminent departure,

[12] *CB*, no. CCXI, p.225: '*quinque carrucate faciunt i militem*'. James Holt argues that this *carta* may provide evidence of continuity from pre-conquest England based on ancestral tradition (J.C. Holt, 'The *Carta* of Richard de la Haye, 1166: A Note on "Continuity" in Anglo-Norman Feudalism', *English Historical Review* 84 (1969), pp. 289-97). This may be supported by Robert Caro, who also listed five carucates of land for the service of one knight (*CB*, no. CCLXV). Alexander FitzGerald's return noted that 14 carucates makes a knight's fee (no. CCXLIV). For discussion of five hides representing a unit for pre-conquest military assessment, see M. Powicke, *Military Obligation*, pp. 19-23.

[13] William de Beauchamp stressed that he had seven knights on the old enfeoffment, while listing 17, with a total service of 16 (*CB*, no. CXVIII). Henry de Scalers owed 15 knights, but only had 8 and a third enfeoffed on his lands (no. CXCII).

[14] *CB*, no. CVIII, p.110.

[15] In 1086 William I demanded homage from all men of standing in England before leaving for Normandy (*ASC*, 1086). The need to reaffirm loyalty was important in what could be a distant, and potentially difficult, relationship with the barons as the king had to devote time between England and his cross-Channel interests. For relations between the Norman aristocracy and Henry, for instance, see D. Power, 'Henry, Duke of the Normans (1149/50- 1189)', in *Henry II: New Interpretations*, pp. 85-128, especially p.117.

[16] Torigni, p.184.

[17] Robert of Brimpton (*CB*, no. XCVIII), William of Colkirk (no. CCXVIII) and Godfrey Baiard (no. CCLXIII) all mention their loyalty to the king and his son. There is no mention in the archbishop of York's *carta* of the younger Henry, so this appears to be added information to stress loyalty to the Crown (no. CCXXXIII).

[18] *EHD*, II, no.48, p.486.

a clear point of reference, explains the sense of urgency for returns to be made before 13 March, but other contemporary events need to be considered.

The marriage of the king's daughter to Henry of Saxony was one such event. Discussions had taken place at Rouen in 1165 with Archbishop Rainald of Cologne, the imperial chancellor, and by 1166 it would have been clear that negotiations were prospering.[19] Once an agreement was reached, conceivably by the end of 1165, thoughts would have turned to the marriage portion. Henry would have been aware how costly this could be through the agreement made in 1158 over the projected marriage of his son to Louis VII's daughter. Louis agreed to grant Henry the Vexin, with its important castles of Gisors, Neaufles and Châteauneuf-sur-Epte, as Margaret's dowry.[20] The Pipe Roll for 1168 recorded the aid for Matilda's marriage that year was based on the knight's fee, and that information in the *Cartae Baronum* was used in its calculation.[21] Geoffrey de Mandeville's return stressed a *servitium debitum* of 60 knights, but in 1168, based explicitly on the evidence of his *carta*, the assessment was on 98⅓ knights' fees *de veteri*.[22] This new level of assessment was not confined to the marriage aid and was used for the scutage of 1172, suggesting that the updated exchequer records would be put to use. Before 1166 the archbishop of York accounted for only seven knights, but his *carta* listed over 43 knights' fees and it was this higher figure that was used for the assessments after 1166 as it had become clear those who had enfeoffed over their *servitium debitum* could pass the demands on and profit from aids and scutages.[23] The new information in the *Cartae Baronum* provided an opportunity for the exchequer to remove these discrepancies and attempt to divert any profits into royal hands.

[19] Torigni, p.224. Rainald visited England in 1165 (PR 11 Henry II, pp. 77, 108), before returning to Germany with John of Oxford and Richard of Ilchester, who accompanied him at the council of Würzburg in May 1165.
[20] Torigni, p.196; *Continuatio Beccensis* in *Chronicles*, IV, p.318; M. Strickland, *Henry the Young King*, p.26. In 1110, Henry I's barons granted a marriage aid, according to Henry of Huntingdon, based on 3 shillings on every hide in England (D. Greenway, ed. and trans., *Historia Anglorum*, p.456.). The Annals of Winchester claimed a sum of up to £10,000 was required (H.R. Luard, ed., *Annales Monastici*, II, p.43: '*quindem milibus marcis argenti*') and the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle recorded the difficulty in the country that year on account of the bad weather, but also the tax the king had raised for his daughter's marriage (*ASC*, 1110).
[21] The link between the marriage arrangement, the date of the returns and the assessment being based on information in the *cartae* encouraged Thomas Keefe to argue that the main purpose of the survey was the marriage aid (*Feudal Assessments*, p.14). This, however, does not explain why it was not conducted by royal officials into total enfeoffments. It also sheds no light on the need for haste that seemingly contributed to errors and omissions when the aid was not to be levied immediately.
[22] *CB*, no. CLXIX; PR 14 Henry II, p.39. Geoffrey II died in Oct 1166 and his brother William accounted at the exchequer in 1168.
[23] PR 2 Henry II, p.28; PR 5 Henry II, p.31; PR 7 Henry II, p.37; PR 8 Henry II, p.3, p.51; *CB*, no. CCXXXIII. The archbishop was assessed on 43½ fees in both 1168 (PR 14 Henry II, p.88) and 1172 (PR 18 Henry II, p.61).

The *carta* of William FitzRobert hinted that some barons believed the survey was for royal financial gain as he claimed poverty with one poor knight and no new enfeoffments because it was barely enough for him.[24] The general interpretation, though, cannot have been that pleading poverty would lead to leniency and exemptions, or similar sentiments would have appeared in many other returns. With non-payments and pardons, scutage became less important to Henry after 1166 and Thomas Keefe argues it was 'never a major source of royal income' as officials increasingly looked for alternative methods to generate revenue.[25] The annual audited income from England as recorded on the Pipe Rolls, however, did see an increase after 1166 from £13,300 to £20,400 thereafter.[26] This increase was not a result of the *Cartae Baronum* alone, but there can be no doubting the financial benefits of the up-to-date information the exchequer now possessed. It provided the opportunity to fully exploit lands in royal custody. This had been highlighted by Canterbury, in royal hands after 1164, being assessed in 1165 for £113 '*de militibus de Archiepiscopatu*' or two marks on 84¾ knights' fees. This may not represent the archbishopric's total enfeoffment, but exceeded the *servitium debitum* of 60 knights that it had been assessed upon in 1161.[27] The *Cartae Baronum* extended this beyond Canterbury and thus provided information for any future levies or dues based on the knight's fee with an updated list of tenants to collect from. W.L. Warren argues this was the lasting importance of the survey as the returns 'equipped the government to exploit more fully the residual rights of the Crown over lands granted out as fiefs to tenants-in-chief.'[28]

In 1168 the aid was based on the knight's fee, but not necessarily on how much service was owed. The financial benefit of the exchequer's new records was clear and where enfeoffment exceeded knightly quotas the assessment was based on the higher figure. Henry de Lacy, for instance, was assessed on over 80 fees and not on his *servitium debitum* of 60 knights.[29] If the *Cartae Baronum* created the opportunity for assessments to be based on every knight's fee, it

[24] *CB*, no. CLXXXVI. Walter, abbot of Tavistock, noted the poverty of the abbey: '*de paupercula domo nostra*' (no. LXXIII, p.72) and Hugh Wake mentioned in Hertfordshire he had '*pauperes homines qui tenent de mei*' (no. CV, p.215).
[25] *Feudal Assessments*, p.3. This may explain why so few scutages were levied by Henry after 1166, see Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix IV for scutage under Henry II, Richard I and John.
[26] From 1180 the annual exchequer income had risen to about £22,000, see N. Barratt, 'Finance and the Economy in the Reign of Henry II', in *Henry II: New Interpretations*, pp. 242-56 (at p.249).
[27] PR 11 Henry II, p.109; PR 7 Henry II, p.63. The tenancies-in-chief, lay and ecclesiastical, assessed for scutage in 1165 were charged on the basis of one mark per knight's fee and Canterbury's double assessment was recorded for '*ii exercitibus*'.
[28] *Henry II*, p.281.
[29] PR 14 Henry II, p.88; *CB*, no. CCXXXVII. The bishop of Winchester revealed he had over 70 knights' fees, but owed the service of only 60 knights, and was charged on the higher number (*CB*, no. XVII; PR 14 Henry II, p.180)

also laid the foundations for a revision of quotas. Thus in 1168 and 1172 the archbishop of York acknowledged a revised *servitium debitum* of 20 knights.[30] The returns revealed that Henry was able to increase the military service owed by tenants-in-chief by 1,211 knights.[31] Ralph Niger suggested Henry initiated the survey to assess knight service according to the number of fees, and fear of a revision to quotas can be detected in the returns.[32] The bishop of Exeter reminded Henry that he had not asked how much military service they owed him.[33] William of Colkirk was more explicit, stating that he did not want his service to be increased because he did what he should.[34] Several barons complained that services attached to their fees were being withheld; the bishop of Exeter highlighted that Henry de la Pommeraye denied the duty of service in respect to his half fee in Devon.[35] If revising quotas to better reflect resources was the intention, then the complication of 'old' and 'new' enfeoffments could have been avoided and to not address *servitia debita* seems a surprising omission.[36]

The first point before addressing the questions in the archbishop of York's *carta* highlighted that returns should be made by letters carrying seals and this legal importance is often overlooked. Seals legitimised the contents within the returns, thus they could be used in the resolution of tenurial cases. The land dispute in which Thomas Becket claimed Rochester, Saltwood and Hythe castles, and the service of William de Ros resulted in an inquiry being carried out in Kent in 1163.[37] Several *cartae* raise legal issues and allegations; the abbot of

[30] In 1168 and 1172 he accounted for 20 that he recognised and 23½ that he did not (PR 14 Henry II, p.88; PR 18 Henry II, p.61).
[31] *Feudal Assessments*, pp. 41-52.
[32] R. Anstruther, ed., *Radulfi Nigri Chronica*, p.171. In much the same way a survey in Sicily, the *Catalogus Baronum*, was initially undertaken as early as 1150 to provide details of military services and resources. Thomas Brown having worked for Roger II (1095-1154) in Sicily and, having been approached by Henry, was now working in a new role in England's exchequer (*Dialogus*, pp. 52-4). For the possible links between the *Cartae Baronum* and the *Catalogus Baronum*, see J.A. Makdisi, 'The Islamic Origins of the Common Law', *North Carolina Law Review*, 77 (1999), pp. 1,635-1,739, especially pp. 1,729-30. The reference on the Pipe Rolls to the *Cartae Baronum* described it as '*Cartas Baronum de militibus*' (PR 12 Henry II, p.72).
[33] *CB*, p.xviii; no. CXXII.
[34] *CB*, no. CCXVIII, p.236: '*Nolo enim ut servitium meum celetur quin fecerim quod facere debeo*'. Others were less sure, William FitzAlan, for instance, stated he was unsure what service was owed to the king from the holding of Ernulf de Hesdin: '*Sed non sumus certi quod servitium debeat regi de hoc tenemento quod fuit Ernulfi de Hesdinges*' (no. XCIX, p.95).
[35] *CB*, no. LXXII. The Bishop of Exeter also complained about Joel of St Winnow and Roger, son of Roger of Larcevesque.
[36] The distinction between 'old' and 'new' was unlikely to have been introduced with the *Cartae Baronum* as a scutage of £4 5s. 2d. on '*noviter feffatis*' is recorded in 1165 (PR 11 Henry II, p.38). Variations of the phrase *noviter feodatis* appears in several *cartae* (*CB*, nos. VII, LVII, CI, CX, CLXXVIII, CXC, CXCII).
[37] Diceto I, p.311; Gervase, I, p.174. It may also add some context to the statement in the *carta* of William de Ros that service was due to his lord the king: '*vii milites unde Willelmus de Ros debet servitium domino suo regi*' (*CB*, no. IX, p.13).

Cerne, for instance, reported Robert de Vere over tax he ought to pay on his land.[38] Some of the allegations of injustices placed the blame firmly upon war, as the legacy of compromises made at the end of Stephen's reign reappeared. Ecclesiastic tenants-in-chief were especially aggrieved with several claiming to have been deprived of lands, or to having services withheld, without clearly stating when such grievances had begun.[39] The bishop of Salisbury claimed that Walter Waleran held one fee, but failed to do half the service due upon it '*a tempore guerre*'.[40] Walter, abbot of Tavistock, noted that '*in tempore gwerre*' Geoffrey of Leigh and his son had extorted half a fee from the church.[41] Complaints also appeared from lay barons, as William Blund claimed his father had been disseised '*tempore gwerre*' of five fees and Reginald of Cornwall was accused of having disseised Mabel de Bec '*tempore gwerre*' of 30 liberates.[42]

There is no doubt that the returns could be used for legal disputes and the information also provided potential financial and military gains, especially when lands came into royal custody. As Neil Stacy suggests 'the intelligence offered by the barons' *cartae* ticked more than one box in the king's agenda in 1166.'[43] A definitive explanation for the survey's purpose, however, remains elusive. Many barons constructed returns in such a way as to avoid classification of enfeoffments, but only Osbert FitzHugh's *carta* was returned.[44] This can, perhaps, be explained by Henry's impending departure, but after the deadline there appears to be no pressure applied upon those who failed to respond. Had the political conditions prevailing in 1166 which produced demand for the survey in that year changed? The arrangement of Matilda's marriage was important in 1166 and the returns were instrumental in the collection of the aid for 1168. The level of compliance and honesty was impressive if the only purpose was to extract more money from barons. Despite opposition to payments on new enfeoffments, the marriage aid

[38] *CB*, no. XXIV, p.30: '*et preter hoc hidam et dimidiam unde censum reddere debet'*. Six returns reveal that the king's pleasure was either awaited, had recently been made known or where his court had been involved in land disputes (*CB*, p.xix; nos. LXIII, CLI, CLXI, CLXVI, CLXVIII, CCVII). Lambert of Scotenni even appealed directly to the king to send his judgment concerning Richard of Hay's service in the belief that it can only be obtained by royal command (no. CCVII, p.221: '*nisi per preceptum vestrum*').
[39] The bishops of Bath, Chichester, Ely, Exeter, Hereford, Norwich, and Worcester, and the abbots of Abingdon, Bury St Edmunds, Cerne, Glastonbury and Westminster, all expressed grievances, see G.J. White, *Restoration and Reform, 1153–1165: Recovery from Civil War in England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), especially pp. 166-7.
[40] *CB*, no. LVII, p.59.
[41] *CB*, no. LXXIII, p.73: '*ab ecclesia extorserunt*'.
[42] *CB*, no. CCXXVI, p.243; no. CCXX, p.237.
[43] *CB*, pp. xviii-xix.
[44] There were 23 in total (*CB*, p.xxiii).

raised over £4,300 in 1168.[45] The sums left unpaid from both the 1168 and 1172 levies were finally cancelled in 1203.[46] The exchequer clearly did not give up, but seemingly with a lack of royal pressure to force payments, is it possible to suppose that the *Cartae Baronum* was not entirely part of the king's agenda in 1166? The answer to this may reveal why there was a survey that year, not at some other point, and may shed some light on its purpose. John Hudson, discussing Angevin legal reforms, suggests that 'localities participated in the application of the reforms and, crucially, provided much of the demand which stimulated them.'[47] If the *Cartae Baronum* was indeed initiated by demand, what factors may have influenced an inquest into fiefs in 1166? Two contemporary events stand out: Henry's Welsh campaign of the previous summer and the council of Clarendon in early 1166.[48]

The fallout from the disappointing campaign of 1165 obviously triggered some degree of debate. The return made for the earl of Arundel, William d'Aubigny, revealed a dispute on his lands about what service was owed in Wales.[49] The earl of Pembroke, who owed £76 5s. for the campaign, is recorded receiving a pardon as he provided 20 knights and 40 sergeants, but there is no such record for William.[50] This may imply he served rather than paid scutage, with the disagreement possibly arising from a failure to provide a respectable-sized contingent. On the preparations for 1165, John of Poitiers noted: 'we do not know what was done at the Shrewsbury conference, except that the king fleeced the bishops'.[51] This may refer to Henry relieving the bishops of their retinues, but equally they were forced to bear a heavy financial burden for the campaign. The Pipe Rolls reveal scutage for 1165 was £1,607 and the experimental sergeantry assessment was £3,360, of which the Church accounted for 13.4 per

[45] N. Barratt, 'Finance and the Economy', p.253. Expecting that there might be opposition to the tax, the Pipe Rolls adopted two methods for recording debts. For lay barons, it was expressed in terms of old and new enfeoffments. Thus, Hugh of Bayeux is recorded owing £6 '*de veteri feoffamento*' and 56s. '*de novo*' (PR 14 Henry II, p.64). For ecclesiastical barons, it was represented as fees they recognised. The bishop of Lincoln, for example, acknowledged the service of 60 knights, despite listing over 100 and is recorded as owing £40 '*quos recognoscit*' and £28 '*quos non recognoscit*' (*CB*, no. CXCIX; PR 14 Henry II, p.64).
[46] *Feudal Assessments*, p.42.
[47] J. Hudson. *The Formation of the English Common Law*, p.144.
[48] For the dating of this council at Clarendon to early 1166, see *GH*, II, pp. lix-lxi.
[49] The return for the honour of Arundel noted that four of the oldest and wisest were consulted to testify to the obligations: '*elegit quatuor milites de honore de melioribus et legalioribus et antiquioribus*' (*CB*, no. XIII, p.17).
[50] PR 11 Henry II, p.13. The bishop of Hereford is also recorded as owing £76 5s. for the Welsh campaign before receiving a pardon the following year for providing 100 sergeants (PR 11 Henry II, p.101; PR 12 Henry II, p.84). Though on a much lesser scale, Ralph de Salcei and Hugh de Buckland are also recorded receiving pardons for providing sergeants (PR 11 Henry II, pp. 71, 75).
[51] *CTB*, I, no. 51, p.217.

cent of the scutage, but 48.5 per cent of the sergeantry assessments by value.[52] Unsuccessful campaigns were often followed by complaints and recriminations. Referring to Thomas Becket as chancellor, overseeing the financing for the campaign of 1159, Gilbert Foliot stated: 'your own hands plunged into the bowels of holy mother Church … when you despoiled her of so many thousands of marks to lead an army to Toulouse.'[53] In 1165 Owain Gwynedd feared another invasion and if so, given the recent disappointment, how would it be financed with similar expectations for both men and money? The Arundel dispute seemed to confirm that issues over quotas, attendance and financing of future campaigns would not go away. 1165 had set new standards of finance and personnel, and the burden on the Church, through the extraordinary sergeantry assessment, would not always be met with such ease. The fear from the barons was that these obligations would not only be repeated, but become expected, or normal, and threaten the customs that many of them fought to protect.

The significance of customs was expressed in the Constitutions of Clarendon of 1164, which described themselves as a recognition of 'a certain portion of the customs, liberties and privileges … which ought to be observed and maintained'. They concluded with the hope that the customs of the Church, king and barons 'be observed undamaged forever.'[54] A number of *cartae* reveal the importance of history and tradition in relation to obligations and some barons even took measures to protect their rights and avoid situations like the earl of Arundel.[55] The bishop of Exeter relied on oral testimony and the bishop of London referred to court in determining the service of William de Wokindune.[56] Wace's *Roman de Rou*, written in the 1170s, may be linked to contemporary fears and the baronial concerns expressed in 1066 are similar to those of 1166.[57] William FitzOsbern stresses the Normans would follow the duke to England and 'he who normally serves with a hundred will gladly bring two hundred.' The barons object, in amazement, fearing 'the service, which had been doubled, would become an

[52] For the figures, see 'The 1165 Levy for the Army of Wales', in P. Latimer, 'Henry II's Campaign against the Welsh', pp. 545-552.
[53] *CTB*, I, no. 109, p.505.
[54] M. Staunton, trans., *The Lives of Thomas Becket*, pp. 91, 96.
[55] William FitzAlan based his *carta* on the testimony of old men: '*sicut antiqui testantur*' (*CB*, no. XCI, p.93). William of Colkirk dated his half fee back to 1066: '*a conquestu Anglie*' (no. CCXVIII, p.236). Even Thomas Brown's appointment at the exchequer to make up a third roll was considered 'against ancient custom' (*Dialogus*, p.53).
[56] *CB*, no. LXXII, p71: '*sicut a multis audivi*'; no. I, p.2: '*ex testimonio curie mee*'. *Glanvill* suggested the legal importance of oral testimony: 'although the laws of England are not written, it does not seem absurd to call them laws' (*Glanvill*, p.xci).
[57] For the suggestion that the *Roman de Rou* may be reflecting contemporary situations, see M. Bennett, 'Poetry as History? The '*Roman de Rou*' of Wace as a Source for the Norman Conquest', *Anglo-Norman Studies*, 5 (1982), pp. 21-39, especially p.34.

hereditary obligation, be regarded as a custom.' To ease the confusion and anger, everything was put in writing so that in the future the barons would owe only 'what their ancestors were accustomed to give'.[58] The possible revision of quotas was signalled in 1165 with the archbishop of York's *servitium debitum* being ignored in favour of 140 sergeants, confirming his resources warranted a greater contribution than seven knights.[59] This fear that the new assessments would become custom is reflected in a number of *cartae*. The abbot of Bury St Edmunds, for instance, disclosed that the abbey held 52¾ knights' fees, but stressed the service was of no more than 40 knights.[60] The council at Clarendon in 1166 provided an opportunity to raise concerns over the novel demands of the recent Welsh campaign and the threat it presented to customs.[61] The Assize of Clarendon, emerging from the same council, described itself as having been made with the 'assent of the archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls and barons.'[62] The people most affected by the demands of 1165; the ones most likely to have an opinion and participate in the survey.

By early 1166 Henry had ordered local officials to implement a series of wide-ranging legal and administrative measures, designed in part to help maintain order during his absence. The Assize of Clarendon helped to bring the king's courts and royal justice throughout the country by placing Richard de Lucy and Geoffrey de Mandeville as itinerant justices. The Assize of Novel Disseisin may have been proposed at the same council at Clarendon; aiming to provide the solution for accusations of recent, unjust, dispossession of land.[63] In this environment, it is little surprise that *cartae* reflected contemporary fears over land disputes, and drew attention to the disruption that the civil war had created. The demand for a survey into knight service had probably been created by baronial fears for their customs after 1165's unsuccessful campaign, with its issues over both funding and recruitment. If grievances following the Welsh

[58] *Roman de Rou*, p.159. It is possible that Wace is referring to contemporary Norman fears over knight service and the *Infeudationes Militum* of 1172, but equally the new demands made for the Welsh campaign of 1165 must have been a cause for concern. The *Infeudationes Militum*, instigated in Normandy soon after Henry's campaign in Ireland, contained similar information to the *Cartae Baronum*: assessing the numbers of knights and their service (Torigni, p.349).
[59] PR 11 Henry II, p.49.
[60] *CB*, no. CCXIII, p.229: '*sed ecclesia non debet nisi servitium xl militum*'.
[61] The importance of the council is suggested in the Pipe Rolls with the younger Henry, treasure, sealing wax and wine all being transported to Clarendon (PR 12 Henry II, pp. 72, 101, 109, 130-1).
[62] *EHD*, II, no. 24, p.436.
[63] J. Hudson, *The Formation of the English Common Law*, pp. 130-1. The assize may have come as result of the litigation over tenure between the archbishop of Canterbury and John Marshal in 1164. It is likely that the king and advising council were aware that dispossession not only occurred at the hands of tenants' lords, but also neighbours and other lords with rival claims to the same land. For the assizes of Henry II, see P. Brand, 'Henry II and the Creation of the English Common Law', in *Henry II: New Interpretations*, pp. 215-41.

campaign did emerge at Clarendon in early 1166, it may explain some of the curious issues surrounding the *Cartae Baronum*.[64] It may also be more than coincidence that, with Clarendon in Wiltshire, it was Wiltshire's sheriff who provided the chest for storing the returns.[65] With impetus from the Welsh campaign; Henry, possibly weakened by the disappointment, certainly with his prestige diminished, would have to placate the barons. Any friction could undermine enthusiasm for his containment policy in Wales and threaten political stability in England, with royal control paramount given his plans for Brittany and prospective period overseas.[66]

Glanvill described English laws as being promulgated 'about problems settled in council on the advice of the magnates and with the supporting authority of the prince.'[67] In the same way, the *Cartae Baronum* provided some solutions to both parties. It offered the barons a level of protection referring to the *status quo* of Henry I and avoiding the issues of Stephen's reign.[68] The survey was self-assessed, but being sealed it legitimised the contents; thus ensuring a level of compliance which may explain why many were eager to put into writing, recording for posterity, their customs and grievances over lands and services.[69] They also included details of their new enfeoffments, even if they were not so willing to acknowledge them when being assessed for levies based on total enfeoffment. For the king, possession of Canterbury in 1164 confirmed the discrepancy between military obligations and reality, and its assessment for 1165 indicated the direction Henry would take when lands came into royal custody. The barons' *cartae* could act as evidence of what constituted reasonable payments or respectable numbers when serving in the king's army. As Richard FitzNigel commented 'let no one, however rich, flatter himself that he can misbehave with impunity' and the returns could both preserve and limit baronial strength by revealing relative financial and military capabilities.[70] The survey

[64] Issues such as the haste of the returns, allowing little preparation to answer thoroughly before the March deadline, and why the survey was self-assessed rather than carried out by royal officials.
[65] PR 12 Henry II, p.72: '*Et pro I huchia ad custodiendas Cartas Baronum de militibus*'; *CB*, p.xix, n.56.
[66] On arriving in Brittany in 1166, Henry's presence was not enough to force compliance and the resistance of Ralph de Fougères was met with force as his castle at Fougères was taken in July and in a public display of strength, perhaps to compensate for the setback of 1165, was destroyed (Torigni, p.228; *Letters*, II, no. 173; L. Delisle and E. Berger, ed., *Recueil Des Actes de Henri II*, I, nos. CCLVI, CCLVII, pp. 402-3).
[67] *Glanvill*, p.xci.
[68] The removal of King Stephen was repeated in many of Henry's charters, grants and writs, and as early as 1156 he decreed that the laws of his grandfather were to be observed throughout the kingdom (Howden, I, p.215). For the importance of Henry I's reign in establishing Henry II's royal rights, see 'To Renew Grandfatherly Times', in G. Garnett, *Conquered England: Kingship, Succession and Tenure, 1066-1166* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 299-326.
[69] Sealing helped with honesty; omissions of any fees could be seen as an admission of non-ownership and, in theory, conceding legal rights. It was thus in the best interests of barons to complete their returns accurately. The abbot of Ramsey, however, may have made two drafts; revealing as many as 13 knights' fees had been established by 1135 and not the four presented in the returned *carta* (*CB*, p.xxiii; no. CXCV, p.205).
[70] *Dialogus*, p.3.

also dealt with the contemporary issues of land disputes and royal control. Henry had experience of the threat to stability that disputed land ownership could cause while he was overseas and the returns were certified statements of tenures if issues should arise in the future.[71] Land disputes and complaints often followed the king abroad, with plaintiffs seeking definitive royal judgment, and the prospect of escalation with barons taking their own measures always threatened in his absence.[72] Henry hoped the new Assize of Novel Disseisin and also the barons' *cartae* would help minimize that threat.

Part II: Knight Service and the Assize of Arms

Robert of Torigni noted Henry required a third of his host to serve in Wales in 1157, but further details are lacking. The full potential of the host that the king could summon is revealed by the *Cartae Baronum* to be over 5,000 knights.[73] The returns highlight the potential each tenant-in-chief could supply and though providing an illuminating insight into tenure, there is little evidence as to how knight service was performed. There are, however, some hints as the *carta* of the abbey of Evesham revealed the abbot paid the expenses of *de veteri* knights when they served in the king's army.[74] William de Londres, on the other hand, stated: 'I have no knight enfeoffed ... but I am bound to discharge the obligations of my fee by service of my own body.'[75] William FitzAlan's *carta* shows how knight service owed by the barons could be limited, stating that ten knights were owed in Shropshire and only five outside, with a further knight to serve in Norfolk for defence against the Danes.[76] Henry's potential host for 1157 was further diminished by historic arrangements as he received no knight service from ecclesiastic tenants in Cheshire.[77] This confused situation was emphasised by the earl of Arundel's

[71] In 1165, for example, the king's absence gave Dafydd ab Owain the confidence to return to the disputed Tegeingl. Henry's arrival at Rhuddlan, and presence for three nights, shortly before the 1165 campaign ensured Dafydd stopped ravaging the area (*Brut* (Pen. 20), p.63; *Brut* (RBH), p.145; *Bren*, p.67).
[72] Herbert of Bosham noted of the dispute over land and the services of William de Ros that 'some who either felt they had been injured or feared injury made their way to the king who was still outside the realm' (*MTB*, III, p.250; translation M. Staunton, trans., *The Lives of Thomas Becket*, p.71). In the Anstey case, Richard famously followed the king to Auvillar in pursuit of justice, see P. M. Barnes, 'The Anstey Case', in P. M. Barnes and P. F. Slade, ed., *A Medieval Miscellany for Doris Mary Stenton*, (London: Pipe Roll Society, 1960), pp. 1-24.
[73] According to the returns, 7,525 knights' fees owed service in the royal host of 5,300 knights (*Feudal Assessments*, p.86). This full potential, however, assumes that there were enough knights in England to answer for all the knights' fees.
[74] *CB*, no. CXX.
[75] *CB*, no. LXVII; translation *EHD* II, no. 234, p.1,120.
[76] *CB*, no. XCI, p.93: '*unum militum in Northfolc ... contra Dacos*'.
[77] J. Tait, 'Knight Service in Cheshire', *English Historical Review*, 57 (1942), pp. 437-459 (at pp. 446-7). The bishop of Coventry, for example, revealed that he had never heard of any definite service due from two small

argument over the requirement to serve in Wales and a number of returns reveal barons consulting tenants to determine what service they owed.[78] This strongly suggests, as Michael Prestwich argues, 'that by this period knight service did not bear a close relationship with military reality.'[79]

Once gathered in 1157, the role the host played and how they fulfilled their service is unclear.[80] Much of the evidence about the length of service comes from outside Henry II's reign, but it appears that the obligation to serve in the king's host was limited to 40 days.[81] This service period was useful for short campaigns, such as 1158 and 1163, but campaigns were rarely so swift. William FitzStephen noted that Becket's contingent for Toulouse were to serve for 40 days, but the expedition may have lasted as long as six months.[82] The 40-day period was presumably overcome with many troops being taken into royal pay at the end of it, while others continued in the hope of securing rewards in victory. In 1173 Theobald of Blois agreed to fight for the Young King and Louis VII 'for forty days in the first instance' and thereafter was swayed by the offer of the castle of Amboise, jurisdiction in Touraine and an annual revenue of 500 *livres angevins*.[83] In Wales, Henry tried to overcome the limitation of the 40-day period in 1165 with the assessments for sergeants being based on service for six months.[84] The service

estates held of the see in Cheshire (*CB*, no. LXXXVII). Also, the purchase or gifting of land could impact on knight service as arrangements had to be made for its performance. For exemptions on land purchased by religious houses, see D. Postles, 'Tenure in Frankalmoign and Knight Service in Twelfth-century England: Interpretation of the Charters', *Journal of the Society of Archivists*, 13 (1992), pp. 18-29.

[78] *CB*, nos. LIX, LXXII, XCI, CLXIX, CLXX, CLXXII.

[79] M. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, p.66. The fact tenants-in-chief listed the number of knights on their lands in 1166 suggests there was no record of what service had been done and what was still owing in any single year.

[80] There were no continuous records of summonses before the reign of John and it is difficult to determine the exact content of the writ Henry issued to summon his host in 1157. The process was probably similar to arranging naval service. The charter of Maldon (1171) revealed the town had to provide one ship when summoned by royal letter to a certain place and day, as had been done in the time of Henry I (A. Ballard, ed., *British Borough Charters, 1042-1216* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1913), p.90).

[81] Jocelin of Brakelond, for instance, recorded that in 1197 Abbot Samson paid four stipendiary knights to serve King Richard for 40 days as replacement for the service the abbey owed (Jocelin, p.86). C. Warren Hollister suggests that during Stephen's reign there was a downward revision of obligations and the service period of the host was reduced from the two months of Anglo-Saxon tradition to 40 days. He concluded that 'only in the middle years of the twelfth century could there be any uncertainties or ambiguities regarding the term of service required' (C.W. Hollister, *Military Organization*, pp. 95-9). The silence from the *Cartae Baronum* suggests that the term of service required was not in transition, any ambiguities would have been mentioned as the barons would surely not have passed up the opportunity to remind the king, and place in writing to preserve it, that their service was only 40 days as opposed to two months.

[82] *MTB*, III, pp. 34-5. The army for 1159 was summoned in mid-Lent to meet in June and the protracted lawsuit of Richard de Anstey had to be adjourned until the end of October to allow for the campaign (*Letters*, I, no. 110, p.178; Torigni, p.201; *Continuatio Beccensis* in *Chronicles*, IV, p.323; P. M. Barnes, 'The Anstey Case', p.8).

[83] JF, p.77; *GH*, I, pp. 44-5. In 1174 the bishop of Durham paid Hugh, count of Bar, his knights and Flemish mercenaries for 40 days' service (Howden, II, p.63).

[84] John of Salisbury writing to Thomas Becket in 1165 may suggest it was an issue. He stated: 'I hear that some of your household … have returned to you from the Welsh campaign' before requesting an update on the campaign's progress. If these members of Becket's household were fighting for Henry, they must have returned

period could therefore be extended, but only at a price and it must have presented many difficulties in planning to use the host at any distance from the muster point and especially for travelling abroad.[85]

During the preparations for 1066, Wace has the Norman barons protesting: 'we are afraid of the sea, we are not obliged to serve beyond the sea.'[86] William FitzAlan's *carta* exposed some of the limitations of distance on knight service and several royal charters also reveal the restrictions that could be placed on military service in general. The charters of Pembroke and Swansea stated that burgesses were not required to serve beyond a distance from which they could not return the same night.[87] A similar restriction on distance was also evident on the continent in the charters of Sées and Lorris, and the burgesses of Verneuil were only bound to serve when Henry fought in the same army.[88] The problem of uneven quality in armies was also common as once summoned there was no guarantees of age, equipment, ability, or even discipline and cohesion. The frustration this caused can be seen in the accusation by William Rufus that not only had Anselm provided too few knights for his Welsh campaign in 1097, but they were also poorly trained.[89] In 1159 Henry's desire to not burden '*agrarios milites*' may have been an acceptance of their quality as much as wanting scutage.[90] The idea of impoverished knights was certainly relatable and recognisable to contemporary courtly audiences, with the eponymous knight in Marie de France's *Lanval* being 'reduced to penury … disrespected and unrewarded'.[91] In 1165, the amount of weapons transported to Wales suggests that bodies were available, but raises questions about the quality or lack of equipment they possessed.

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before the conclusion of the campaign (*Letters*, II, no. 152, p.153). Also, Hugh Bigod accounted for £227 10s. for knights and sergeants '*exercitus Walie de quarta parte anni*' (PR 11 Henry II, p.7). This may imply knight service was extended but as it is the only reference to three months, it is far from conclusive.

[85] To gather for campaigns abroad, the host probably mustered inland before moving to cross overseas as in February 1177 when Henry summoned the earls, barons and knights of England to assemble at London on 8 May ready to serve him in Normandy (*GH*, I, p.138)

[86] *Roman de Rou*, p.159. Abbot Samson's four replacement knights were hired in 1197 because the ones that owed service were not obliged to serve overseas, nor were their parents before them (Jocelin, p.86).

[87] A. Ballard, ed., *British Borough Charters*, p.89. If the expedition was at the insistence of the burgesses of Pembroke, they had to garrison the town and act as a royal bodyguard ('*ad presidium meum serviant salva*').

[88] A. Ballard, ed., *British Borough Charters*, p.xci. The *carta* of the abbot of Evesham also revealed something similar, with the abbey only providing knights on expeditions in the king's presence (*CB*, no. CXX).

[89] M. Rule, ed., *Eadmeri Historia Novorum in Anglia, et opuscula duo* (London: Longman, 1884), p.78. For the *ad hoc* nature of medieval armies and the potential for poor quality, see J. France, *Western Warfare*, p.69.

[90] Torigni, p.202.

[91] D.R. Slavitt, trans., *The Lays of Marie de France* (Edmonton: AU Press, 2013), p.56.

The *Cartae Baronum* revealed that the obligation to serve in the royal host was often coupled with the duty to serve in a castle's garrison as the king looked to use networks of well-defended castles as deterrents.[92] Supplying and strengthening garrisons in the Welsh marches played an important role in Henry's policy to contain the Welsh after 1165. Oswestry had a basic annual garrison of one knight, two porters and two watchmen between 1160 and 1175, but as tensions escalated 100 sergeants were provided for the first 158 days of 1165.[93] The Pipe Rolls do not provide a complete record, but imply the investments of 1165 remained, even at a reduced level, for a number of years.[94] Different arrangements emerged along the border as barons developed solutions in response to particular local conditions.[95] William FitzAlan's return stated that castle-guard service from his lands was to be performed at Oswestry and also revealed non-knightly service from a different class of military tenants: *muntatores*. They were almost entirely confined to Shropshire, based mostly around Oswestry, providing service for 40 days a year at specified castles. *Muntatores* developed after 1086 as a very specific response to, and in imitation of, Welsh methods of fighting as a solution to the local problems of rapid, disruptive raids and border warfare.[96] They were expected to possess a horse, hauberk, iron helmet and lance, acting as a mobile defence against Welsh attacks. John of Salisbury noted the disruption and frequency of Welsh raids, with the Welsh wasting and ravaging across the

[92] Knight service and castle-guard duty often differed, see *CB*, nos. XXIV, LIX, LX. Each castle could present its own problem and historical or personal agreements led to differing methods of castle guard. After a purchase of land in c.1180, Shrewsbury Abbey had to assume the related obligations which included providing an archer for 15 days a year at Ludlow castle (D. Postles, 'Tenure in Frankalmoign and Knight Service', p.26). Important royal castles, or castles in sensitive areas, such as on the coast or areas exposed to border raids, required different arrangements. At Richmond 186 knights served in six groups for two months each, with 42 knights during the summer at the height of the threat from Scottish incursions and 26 in winter (C.W. Hollister, *Military Organization*, pp. 142-9). Service was not always demanded in person and the reality was that large garrisons were only required all year in strategic or threatened areas, and service was commuted or extended as circumstances dictated.

[93] F.C. Suppe, 'The Garrisoning of Oswestry: A Baronial Castle on the Welsh Marches', in K. Reyerson and F. Powe, ed., *The Medieval Castle: Romance and Reality* (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1984), pp. 63-78 (at pp. 67-70). In 1160 wages of £7 15s. went towards sergeants at Clun, Ruthin and Oswestry and by 1164 this figure had risen to £18 5s. at each (PR 6 Henry II, p.27; PR 10 Henry II, p.9). Similar investments were evident elsewhere as castles like Shrawardine also accounted for 100 sergeants (PR 12 Henry II, p.59).

[94] Geoffrey de Vere, for instance, received £100 '*ad custodiendam Marchias Walie*' in 1168 and he accounted for £29 4s. in sustaining sergeants of the March the following year (PR 14 Henry II, p.199; PR 16 Henry II, p.154). In 1171 payments of £20 were made from both Staffordshire and Worcestershire to Guy and John Lestrange for sergeants serving in the Welsh marches (PR 17 Henry II, pp. 53, 96).

[95] In Herefordshire, the *carta* of Robert de Chandos revealed that Ralph Tornai owed half a fee to royal service, but one knight for host, *chevauchée* and castle-guard duty to Robert (*CB*, no. CV).

[96] For *muntatores*, see *CB*, no. XCI; F. Suppe, *Military Institutions*, pp. 63-87. Other non-knightly obligations also developed with local influence. Through its charter (1155-8), Hastings had to provide Henry with 20 ships for 15 days every year: '*per annum xx naves ad custamentum suum xv diebus*' (A. Ballard, ed., *British Borough Charters*, p.90).

border, seeking spoils and despite living in relative poverty, they 'make luxurious holidays at our expense'.[97]

It was a widely accepted general rule that all free men should bear arms in defence of their country. Henry had witnessed how effective this principle could be in 1157 when local inhabitants routed his fleet at Anglesey. Gerald of Wales famously stated of the Welsh appetite for war: 'sound the trumpet for battle and the peasant will rush from his plough to pick up his weapons.'[98] People defending their localities, towns and country was an important part of the Crown's military resources and this was especially true during the rebellion of 1173-4. The earl of Leicester landed in Suffolk in 1173 and failed in his attempt to take Dunwich, where the inhabitants defended their walls like 'valiant knights', despite the erection of gallows outside the town to intimidate them.[99] Not all towns were this successful, though, and in 1174 the garrison and burgesses of Northampton suffered a heavy defeat while engaging rebels outside their walls.[100] On the continent, burgesses helped block Rouen's gate in 1174 and a spirited defence resisted the combined strength of the Young King, France and Flanders until relief arrived.[101] Towns could serve as more than defensive strongholds, and Henry took the inhabitants of Poitiers with him to help relieve Saintes.[102] Rural inhabitants also proved useful at Fornham in 1173, with the rebels in disarray, Jordan Fantosme recounted, 'there was neither villein nor peasant who did not go after the Flemings with fork and flail.'[103] Geoffrey, bishop-elect of Lincoln, used knights, mercenaries and the men of Lincolnshire to help at the siege of Kinnard, and it was a peasant who captured Roger de Mowbray's son as he attempted to get reinforcements.[104] County levies combined with knights to great effect in July 1174 when the army of Yorkshire helped capture William the Lion at Alnwick.[105]

[97] C.C.J. Webb, ed., *Policraticus*, II, VI:16, p.43; translation J. Dickinson, trans., *The Statesman's Book*, p.227.
[98] *Opera*, VI, p.179; translation Gerald of Wales, p.225.
[99] JF, p.65. The earl of Leicester was also resisted by the small garrison at Walton (Diceto, I, p.377).
[100] Many of the force led by Bertran de Verdun, sheriff of Warwickshire and Leicestershire, were killed and over 200 were captured (*GH*, I, p.68; JF, p.85). The burgesses of Nottingham experienced a similar fate when the earl of Derby surprised the gate in the early hours, killing and taking many of the inhabitants before plundering and burning the town (*GH*, I, p.69).
[101] Diceto, I, p.386; WN, I, pp. 190-4.
[102] Diceto, I, p.380.
[103] JF, p.79.
[104] *Opera*, IV, pp. 364-5. The garrison promptly surrendered, and the castle was destroyed (Diceto, I, p.379; *GH*, I, p.68).
[105] *GH*, I, p.67; JF, pp. 129-135. It was a sergeant armed with a lance who brought down William's horse to effectively end Scottish involvement in the revolt and isolate the northern rebels (JF, p.133).

It was only a matter of time before Henry would try to tap into this success and two assizes were introduced to initiate a policy of regulating the military equipment each man should possess and bring it under greater control. The Assize of Le Mans (1180) covered his continental territories and the Assize of Arms (1181) specified the arms and armour each free man should possess in England. The owner of a knight's fee, in England, had to have a cuirass, helmet, shield and lance; significantly, the assize required all free men to swear oaths of allegiance to bear their arms in the king's service at his command.[106] Justices were to travel the country to ensure all the requirements were met. The assizes secured the loyalty of those already armed and enrolled greater numbers to maintain stability and order in their localities. As early as 1169 Henry had recognised the value of local militia in internal policing, as part of an oath concerning Canterbury and the pope, when knights and free men aged over 15 were bound for the arresting of newcomers without royal permissions to travel.[107] The importance of co-ordinated local initiatives was evident in 1173-4. The inhabitants of London of an age to bear arms were fully equipped and this was sufficient to deter the rebels and hold the city for the king.[108] In 1174 the people of Sées fiercely defended their town against the Young King and 500 knights, and when Henry moved south shortly after, Ralph of Diss observed, the local inhabitants flocked to him from all directions to offer allegiance. Maine had been successfully secured for Henry in his absence.[109]

A significant portion of the Assize of Arms was dedicated to controlling arms, threatening punishment to those retaining more than their allocation. This may have been part of an ongoing process as the carrying of bows, arrows, and pointed knives east of the Severn was prohibited at the council of Woodstock in 1175. Michael Powicke argues this betrayed the king's concern 'with the danger to peace from too many rather than too few weapons in the hands of the people.'[110] This assertion is correct as there was an element of royal control, but in this instance

[106] England's assize also stated those with 16 marks or over in chattels had to possess a hauberk, iron cap, shield and lance. All burgesses and free men had to keep a gambeson, iron cap and lance (*GH*, I, pp. 278-80; Howden, II, pp. 261-3). One of the most significant differences between the two assizes was the inclusion on the continent of those with over 100 *livres angevins* of chattels having to possess a horse (*GH*, I, p.269; Howden, II, p.253).
[107] Gervase, I, p.215. This idea of local policing can be seen in the Capuchin movement which spread through southern and central France in the 1180s in response to the number of mercenaries present and the local disruption they caused. Townsfolk formed the backbone of the movement, armed by the Assize of Le Mans they looked to defend their livelihoods and remove the mercenary problem (Torigni, p.309). For the movement's origins in Le Puy and growth, see J. France, 'People against Mercenaries: The Capuchins in Southern Gaul', *Journal of Medieval Military History*, 8 (2010), pp. 1-22.
[108] JF, p.121.
[109] Diceto, I, p.379. Ralph of Diss noted this success was made more incredible by the fact that it was achieved without any leadership: '*civibus etiam sine principe, etiam sine duce'*.
[110] M. Powicke, *Military Obligation*, p.52.

the context of the council reveals the steps were related to suspicions at court. As Matthew Strickland suggests these were weapons of stealth and, as Roger of Howden recorded, the measures specifically related to the rebels of 1173-4. Henry's recent enemies could not attend court without special summons, they were not to travel there under the cover of darkness and were not to wear arms.[111] These impractical measures were not upheld, but reveal the climate of fear that lingered after the rebellion. Henry's efforts to control the amount of weapons in his lands could represent another attempt to prevent a return to civil war or further rebellions by taking weapons away from potential enemies and ensuring all arms were pledged only to him. In England, the assize stopped the stockpiling of arms, specifying if anyone had over their allocation they were to sell or gift them to others without the correct arms. It also gave the king theoretical control over the movement of arms with none being allowed out of the country without royal permission. In January 1181 Pope Alexander made an appeal for crusade and if Henry was to go, the assize can be seen as another step to ensure control in his absence.[112] In 1182, however, the Young King, possibly receiving advice from France, demanded possession of Normandy and any thoughts of crusade soon evaporated.[113]

Troubles with his sons in the 1180s obscure the impact of the assizes, but the principle behind them had wide appeal as both France and Flanders were quick to imitate.[114] Gerald of Wales claimed that Welsh military success was based on a desire to defend their homeland.[115] Henry had experienced this in Wales and, according to Gerald, even praised the Welsh for being 'so ready to shed blood for their country'.[116] The assize did not create a standing army, but critically in swearing allegiance to Henry and his kingdom, it did arm free men for defending the realm,

[111] M. Strickland, *Henry the Young King*, pp. 221-2; *GH*, I, p.93; Howden, II, pp. 78-9. The 1175 council also made commitments to royal forests, dealing with prosecutions for breaches of forest laws and the taking of the king's venison while he was overseas, and the practical purpose behind controlling weapons associated with hunting should not be overlooked (*GH*, I, p.93; Howden, II, p.79).
[112] *GH*, I, pp. 271-5.
[113] *GH*, I, p.289; Howden, II, p.260. 1173-4 reaffirmed the threat to Henry's lands and the difficulty of returning to power after crusade was, perhaps, a risk he was no longer willing to take in person, but he could and did provide financial support. In 1182, his will included bequests to the Knights Templar, Knights Hospitaller and to religious houses of the Holy Land (Gervase, I, pp. 298-300). Crusading thoughts still circulated as late as 1188 with Henry symbolically taking the Cross, levying the Saladin Tithe and Archbishop Baldwin's recruitment tour in Wales (*GH*, II, p.31; Howden, I, pp. 335-6).
[114] *GH*, I, p.270; Howden, II, p.253. There was much interest in the assizes at a time when both France and Flanders were contemplating crusade, but their crusading intentions soon disappeared as shortly after agreeing peace hostilities broke out between the two rulers in 1181 (*GH*, I, p.277; Howden, II, p.260).
[115] *Opera*, VI, p.226.
[116] *Opera*, VI, p.181; translation Gerald of Wales, p.235.

even in periods of royal absence.[117] This notion was not uniquely English, or necessarily of Welsh influence, but Geoffrey of Monmouth had promoted the idea with the recurring theme of fighting for king and country.[118] As with the *Cartae Baronum*, the Assize of Arms reaffirmed, and expanded, loyalty to the king and would help to maintain order in his absence. It may have successfully overcome some of the limitations of knight service by uniformly equipping knights and, in theory, ensuring a level of quality not guaranteed before 1181. At the end of Henry's reign, in a distinct change to earlier policy, it was reported that all knights of England, even if 'feeble and poor', were summoned to serve in France.[119] It is tempting to suggest that 1181 had ensured knights were better equipped and, in a time of need, the assize made knight service a viable possibility overseas; an option that Henry believed could not be relied upon in 1159.

[117] Howden, II, p.262: '*et regni sui*'. For comparisons between the assessment based on chattels in the assize and the recruitment of the Anglo-Saxon *fyrd*, see M. Powicke, *Military Obligation*, p.56; C.W. Hollister, *Military Organization*, p.260.
[118] M.D. Reeve, ed., and N. Wright, trans., *The History of the Kings of Britain*, pp. 113, 133, 165, 171-3, 199, 247. John Hudson suggests the earliest thirteenth-century version of the *Leges Edwardi Confessoris* included a flavour of Geoffrey's work with its suggestion that King Arthur introduced a law calling upon the great men, knights and free men of Britain to swear to defend the realm against foreigners and enemies (J. Hudson, 'Administration, Family and Perceptions of the Past', pp. 75-98). For the concept of 'fatherland' referring to a national kingdom or to the crown as its visible symbol, see E.H. Kantorowicz, '*Pro Patria Mori* in Medieval Political Thought', *The American Historical Review*, 56 (1951), pp. 472-492.
[119] Gervase, I, p.447: '*ut omnes Angliae milites licet extenuatos et pauperes*'.

Chapter Three

Mercenaries and the Military Impact of Henry's Welsh Campaigns

The Welsh campaign of 1165 and the Arundel dispute helped highlight the limitations of knight service, whether it was the 40-day period, distances to travel, suitability or even numbers, it was clear that military obligations were not always effective. As a result, Henry II looked to other means of obtaining service by using systems of pay and rewards to hire mercenaries that were better suited to the warfare he was waging. Within this number, Welshmen started to appear after 1165 before becoming firmly established by the end of Henry's reign.[1] The term 'mercenary' traditionally applied to professionals who fought for pay, where 'soldiering was an occupation not an obligation.'[2] Their motivation was primarily financial, and the monetary element of their work was a distinctive factor. The term could be applied to those who served for pay beyond any obligation: retinues, small landowners or aspiring younger sons with no resources who wished to gain recognition and status.[3] The mercenary elements in Henry's armies tended to be distinguished by being foreign, reflecting the contemporary view of Richard FitzNigel that Henry used mercenaries rather than 'his own people'.[4] The majority of the mercenaries he employed were of low status and, whatever their own individual origins, were usually referred to by geographical regions; the most common of which were Brabançons,

[1] Welsh troops became an important part of English warfare and the Pipe Rolls reveal that towards the end of Henry's reign he came to increasingly rely upon their numbers. In 1187 Herefordshire, Shropshire and Worcestershire accounted for over 500 sergeants from Wales and the border to travel to Normandy (PR 33 Henry II, pp. 40, 45, 63, 130-1, 215). With Oxfordshire accounting for the movement of treasure to London '*ad faciendas liberationes walensibus transfretaturis in Normannia ad Regem*' (PR 33 Henry II, p.45). In 1188 Welsh mercenaries from Glamorgan and Gwent, including over 700 infantry sergeants, were moved to Gloucester before joining the king's army (PR 34 Henry II, pp. 8-9, 106-7).

[2] K. DeVries 'Medieval Mercenaries: Methodologies, Definitions and Problems', in J. France, ed., *Mercenaries and Paid Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 43-60 (quote at p.54). Despite the reservations of Ifor Rowlands that modern historians are prone to see mercenaries where contemporaries did not, the term mercenary has been used here to describe Welsh troops in Henry's employment (I.W. Rowlands, 'Warriors Fit for a Prince: Welsh Troops in Angevin Service, 1154–1216', in J. France, ed., *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, pp. 207-230 (at p.224)). There are no records to suggest they were serving in English armies out of obligation and most appear to have been sent by Welsh rulers to encourage favour from the English king or were motivated by the desire for regular pay and the chance for reward.

[3] William of Ypres, the illegitimate son of Philip of Low, '*quasi dux … et princeps*' of Flemish hired troops, rose to prominence in Stephen's reign to lead part of the royal cavalry at Lincoln in 1141 and be entrusted with control of Kent (Gervase, I, pp. 105, 121; OV, VI, p.542).

[4] *Dialogus*, p.81. The inference being that mercenary numbers were drawn from outside his dominions. For military service, paid and unpaid, and perceptions of 'foreignness', see S. Morillo, 'Mercenaries, Mamluks and Militia: Towards a Cross-cultural Typology of Military Service', in J. France, ed., *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, pp. 243-260, especially pp. 244-7.

often recruited in the Low Countries.[5] The nature of their work attracted labels such as *Cotereaux* or *Routiers*, portraying a roving existence and their purpose as ravagers, pillagers and killers.[6] In reality, mercenaries were a diverse mix, but the criminal and outcast elements, fighting for money with often little or no connection to their employer beyond payment, received the most attention as representing a threat to social order. Despite the vilification and disapproval of contemporary authors, mercenaries were clearly in demand.

Gerald of Wales observed that casualties were of little concern to English armies because of the number of expendable mercenaries, but for the Welsh 'those who fall in battle are irreplaceable'.[7] Richard FitzNigel believed them to be worthy replacements for Henry's soldiers, noting the king 'prefers to expose mercenaries … to the hazards of war.'[8] This probably stemmed from an awareness of the difficulties of knight service coupled with the potential to exploit the fiscal opportunities available through commutation of service.[9] Roger of Howden even suggested that in 1173-4 the king placed more confidence in Brabançon mercenaries than in his own men, but the only effective indicator of their reliability was in their use.[10] In August 1173 Henry's faith was rewarded when a contingent of Brabançons, dispatched from Rouen to Brittany, defeated the rebels and besieged Dol before he arrived to accept the castle's surrender.[11] When the king crossed from Barfleur to restore order in England in July 1174, it was not with barons but a small retinue and a contingent of Brabançons sailing from Ouistreham.[12] They may have been considered expendable; but, given the gravity of the situation, Henry's use of mercenaries was an important indicator of the trust he was willing to place in them.

[5] It is unlikely they all came from Brabant, and many may have identified themselves as Brabançons simply because it could be beneficial to them in terms of pay and employment (K. DeVries, 'Medieval Mercenaries: Methodologies, Definitions and Problems', pp. 45-6).
[6] Geoffroy de Vigeois observed the mercenaries at Limoges and listed those afflicting Aquitaine as '*les Flamands, et selon l'expression patoise, les Brabançons, les Hannuyers, Aspères, Paillers, Navar, Turlaux, Vales, Roux, Cotereaux, Catalans, Aragonais*' (F. Bonnélye, trad., *Chronique de Geoffroy, Prieur de Vigeois* (Tulle: Imprimerie de Mme Veuve Detournelle, 1864), p.146).
[7] *Opera*, VI, p.219; translation Gerald of Wales, p.268.
[8] *Dialogus*, p.81.
[9] Some of the limitations of knight service are discussed above in Chapter Two, but there is little contemporary evidence to show how unreliable the king's armies were as non-attendance and desertion rates went unrecorded.
[10] Howden, II, p.51: '*Braibancenos suos, de quibus plus caeteris confidebat*'.
[11] *GH*, I, pp. 56-8; Howden, I, p.176; JF, pp. 15-8.
[12] Torigni, p.264; Diceto, I, p.382. William of Newburgh stated that Henry came to England with one contingent of Brabançons (WN, I, p.181: '*una Bribantionum turma*').

Henry was able to rely on these mercenaries to work independently of him because their numbers included military captains and experienced troops working with trusted allies. The mercenaries sent to Dol, for example, were under the leadership of William du Hommet, the son of the constable of Normandy.[13] Training and experience in battle gave them a distinct advantage over much of Henry's army. It was only through participating in tournaments and mock battles, Roger of Howden noted, that the necessary skills of battle could be acquired.[14] For many of Henry's troops the closest to training in numbers they experienced came through hunting in groups or entering competitions at tournaments. Tournaments, however, created their own problems: prohibited under both Henry I and Henry II, held mainly in France, they received a papal ban in 1179 only to reappear on a regular basis in the 1190s.[15] Any Englishman wishing to enter one was forced to look abroad as the younger Henry had done when he spent three years attending tournaments on the continent.[16] Only nobles and knights possessed the finances to train regularly for war, though their training was not always successful and the death of Henry's son Geoffrey from injuries received at a tournament in Paris in August 1186 demonstrates the risks.[17] Tournaments also placed a greater emphasis on horsemanship as opposed to training in numbers on foot, and it was these infantry skills that would become most associated with mercenaries.

The dismounted knights at the Standard in 1138 served as a celebrated example of the impact trained, experienced, and well-equipped knights could have in battles: strengthening resolve and helping infantry remain in a dense, immoveable formation.[18] Henry's mercenaries may have lacked some of the equipment, and the same level of respect as dismounted knights, but they were experienced on foot, professional in battle and siege, with a desire to impress and, most importantly, were readily available. Michael Powicke suggested Henry used them 'on a scale not perhaps matched again in intensity until the Hundred Years War' and W.L. Warren believed 'Henry II's military success was founded on his use of mercenaries.'[19] It is clear that

[13] William du Hommet became constable of Normandy in 1180. For William and his family, see D. Power, 'Aristocratic Acta in Normandy and England, c.1150-c.1250: The Charters and Letters of the Du Hommet Constables of Normandy', *Anglo-Norman Studies*, 35 (2012), pp. 259-286.
[14] Howden, II, pp. 166-7.
[15] WN, II, p.422.
[16] Diceto, I, p.428.
[17] Geoffrey was knocked to the ground in a group of knights and trampled by their horses (*GH*, I, pp. 350, 361). Orderic Vitalis recorded two sons of Giroie d'Échaufflour died from injuries received while practising at their leisure. Arnold broke three ribs being thrown on stone steps while wrestling and Hugh was pierced by a 'carelessly thrown' javelin (OV, II, pp. 25-31).
[18] D. Greenway, ed. and trans., *Historia Anglorum*, p.716.
[19] M. Powicke, *Military Obligation*, p.49; *Henry II*, p.232.

mercenary numbers were greatly increased over earlier periods and Henry used them to varying degrees in all important military activities. Exact numbers, however, are difficult to determine from contemporary descriptions and evidence from the Pipe Rolls being limited to the exchequer. Chronicle references are misleading, with numbers often inflated for the agenda of the author or the audience to emphasise a point. At Fornham in 1173, for instance, the royalist victory was made more remarkable by the fact the rebel army was apparently enlarged with between 3,000 and 10,000 Flemings.[20] In Normandy, to show Henry's continuing strength, Jordan Fantosme placed him at the head of a force of 10,000 Brabançons and Roger of Howden suggested 20,000.[21] A better indicator to the probable level of mercenaries, perhaps, comes from Pipe Roll entries recording payments for garments for 163 *Coterelles* in the king's service in Ireland, or the issue of cloth for 166 sergeants from overseas.[22] It is clear, however, that Henry used mercenaries frequently and at times in significant numbers. This has led to the suggestion that in his reign mercenaries assumed the proportions of a professional standing army or, at least, acted as a forerunner.[23] The Brabançons in royal pay for nearly two years in 1173-4 probably created the impression of permanence, but this was a response to the scale of the rebellion. It seems unlikely that their presence was ever planned to be a lasting solution as they were readily employed by others throughout Europe and were used only once in England.[24]

[20] The Chronicle of Saint-Aubin suggested 3,000 Flemings were killed, William of Newburgh up to 5,000 and Roger of Howden 10,000 (*Early Sources of Scottish History*, II, p.287; WN, I, p.179; *GH*, I, p.62; Howden, II, p.55). Similarly, Rigord of St Denis records the royal army of Philip Augustus entering Berry in 1183 and defeating an army of 7,000 mercenaries (H.-F. Delaborde, ed., *Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton, Historiens de Philippe-Auguste*, 2 vols (Paris: Librairie Renouard, 1882-1885), I, p.36). They were all killed, according to William le Breton, 'in a single day' (p.182: '*uno solo die*').

[21] JF, p.7; Howden, II, p.47.

[22] PR 18 Henry II, p.144; PR 20 Henry II, p.8. As with the payments '*pro uestiendis coterellis*' and for 300 '*targis coterallorum*' for the 1165 Welsh campaign, it is unclear if these entries represent whole mercenary contingents, as opposed to clothing and arming poor or inadequate troops (PR 11 Henry II, p.31).

[23] In the 1940s Jacques Boussard attempted to provide a figure and determined 6,000 as the maximum number of mercenaries in Henry II's army (J. Boussard, 'Les Mercenaires au xii^{e} Siècle: Henri II Plantegenet et les Origines de l'Armée de Métier', *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*, 106 (1946), pp. 189-224 (at pp. 200, 218-220). His evidence was based on William de Mandeville crossing the Channel in 1174 with the royal military household and mercenaries in 37 ships, but as Michael Prestwich argues the assumption that only mercenaries, with no equipment or horses, crossed in ships that were similar in size to contemporary Mediterranean vessels is unlikely (PR 20 Henry II, p.135; M. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, p.149). When Henry's Brabançon mercenaries crossed to England in 1174, Ralph of Diss even noted that it was '*cum armis et impedimentis*' and William of Newburgh that it was a considerable force of cavalry (Diceto, I, p.382; WN, I, p.181). By contrast when Henry crossed to Ireland in 1171 with, according to Gerald of Wales, 500 knights and a multitude of archers, the force was transported by up to 400 ships (*Opera*, V, p.275; *GH*, I, p.25; Howden, II, p.29).

[24] A solitary reference to Brabançons can be found in the account for the honour of Wallingford before they return to Normandy (PR 20 Henry II, pp. 88, 134). Mercenaries were employed by both sides in 1173-4 and in the quarrels between Henry's sons in the 1180s. Frederick Barbarossa had as many as 1,500 mercenaries in 1166-7 and after 1173-4 Brabançons immediately returned to his service to campaign in Italy (P. Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, translated by M. Jones (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), pp. 244-5).

One of the reasons Henry tried to avoid using foreign mercenaries in England was their unpopularity and association with periods of political unrest or instability. It was perceived that foreign mercenaries dominated the landscape and represented many of the ills of Stephen's reign. On his accession, Henry was not in a position to retain their services and won public approval by ordering them to leave the country by an appointed day.[25] Despite expelling these unpopular remnants of the civil war, the new king could appreciate the benefits of their use. The advantages of being able to draw upon military strength from outside the realm, without the added complexity of political allegiances was obvious. As early as 1156, perhaps as a measure towards recruiting and controlling the number of Flemings in the country, annual payments to Flanders appear in the Pipe Rolls.[26] The long-standing treaty between England and Flanders, following Henry I's agreements of 1101 and 1110, whereby Flanders was paid annually to supply 1,000 knights to defend England, was formally renewed in 1163.[27] The treatment Flemish mercenaries received on English shores, following a fresh influx in 1173-4, suggests that memories of Stephen's reign still lingered. Their reputation had been built on stories like the burning of the abbey church at Wherwell in 1141. It was Flemish mercenaries, seeking Empress Matilda's troops as they fled the siege of Winchester, who set fire to the building and killed many of its occupants, including some of the local nuns taking refuge. The incident was still relevant in the *History of William Marshal*, and its version has John Marshal facilitating Matilda's escape from Winchester before making a stand in the flames at Wherwell.[28] Before Henry's accession, William FitzStephen describes the nation despairing of ever driving the Flemish out or seeing peace restored.[29] Jordan Fantosme reflected the strength

[25] Diceto, I, p.297; WN, I, p.101.
[26] PR 2 Henry II, pp. 16, 24, 36-40; PR 3 Henry II, pp. 82-3, 89; PR 4 Henry II, pp. 125, 136, 149, 152; PR 5 Henry II, pp. 34, 51, 64; PR 6 Henry II, pp. 1, 8, 43, 45.
[27] P. Chaplais, *English Diplomatic Practice in the Middle Ages* (London and New York: Hambledon and London, 2003), pp. 50-2. For the suggestion that the early payments in Henry II's reign represent the re-establishment of the Anglo-Flemish money fief, see E. Okansen, 'The Anglo-Flemish Soldiers in England 1101-1161', in J. France, ed., *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, pp. 261-74 (at pp. 267-8). For the counts of Flanders being able to raise more knights than the kings of France in the twelfth century, see J. France, *Western Warfare*, p.74.
[28] The episode made sufficient contemporary impact to be recorded by the *Gesta Stephani*, the continuation of Florence of Worcester and by William of Malmesbury (*Gesta Stephani*, pp. 126-133; P. McGurk, ed. and trans., *The Chronicle of John of Worcester: Vol. III: The Annals from 1067 to 1140 with the Gloucester Interpolations and the Continuation to 1141* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p.302; E. King, ed., K.R. Potter, trans., *William of Malmesbury: Historia Novella* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 103-5). It was at Wherwell that John Marshal lost an eye as molten lead dripped from the tower on to his face (*HWM*, I, lines 208-265).
[29] *MTB*, III, pp. 18-19. This changed with the arrival of Henry II and his expulsion of mercenaries was, to many, the clearest sign that peace had been restored after Stephen's reign (Torigni, p.183; Gervase, I, p.161).

of feelings still involved in the 1170s with Roger Bigod's declaration: 'Never in my life did I want anything so much as to destroy these Flemings.'[30]

It was not just Flemish mercenaries who were unpopular, but the whole mercenary profession. Many were seen as non-knightly, low-born, with a reputation associated with insurrection or invasion during periods of royal weakness. Their dedication to violence for profit was at odds with the emerging chivalric culture. In 1173 as Henry accepted the surrender of Dol, he sent Brabançons further into Brittany to strike against the lands and castles of Ralph de Fougères and the other rebels.[31] Where the king was lauded for his clemency and not extracting ransoms from the captured, the Brabançons only enhanced their reputation as 'wicked destroyers of castles, slaughterers of peasants, burners of churches and oppressors of nuns.'[32] The presence of mercenaries was often associated with disruption to daily life and chroniclers witnessed the impression they made on the continent in the 1170s and 1180s. Walter Map, who was with Henry's court at Limoges in 1173 to observe the mercenaries there, later described them as 'armies of Leviathan' burning monasteries, towns and villages hated by 'God and man.'[33] Ralph of Diss noted the hardship created in 1181 when Brabançons removed 5,000 yoke of oxen as booty from the lands of the count of Sancerre.[34] The figure may be exaggerated, but the threat to the local economy that could be caused by mercenaries was a reality. They had developed a fearsome reputation; in pay they were well-drilled and effective, but out of service they were regarded as an unsavoury itinerant band of criminals threatening local communities. The situation became so grave that the Third Lateran Council took steps to condemn mercenaries in 1179, which also helped inspire the Capuchin movement to oppose them.[35]

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[30] JF, p.75. If his audience was in any doubt about his personal view, Jordan leaves his narrative of events in 1174 to comment that the Flemish were undeserving of God's help 'because of their vast thievery' (JF, p.77).
[31] They burned Le Porhoët, destroyed the castles of La Guerche and Fougères along with Ralph's other castles (Torigni, p.261; WN, I, p.176). According to the Chronicle of Saint-Aubin, 'they completely destroyed the castles of those who were fomenting the war' (*Early Sources of Scottish History*, II, p.287).
[32] Diceto, I, p.395. Roger of Howden lists the knights taken at Dol and William of Newburgh praised Henry for his merciful actions (*GH*, I, pp. 57-8; Howden, II, pp. 52-3; WN, I, p.176). The colourful description is from Ralph of Diss commenting on the reputation of the Brabançons employed by the count of Angoulême in 1176 (Diceto, I, p.407: '*Nefariis igitur illis eversoribus Castellorum, agrorum depopulatoribus, incentoribus ecclesiarum, monialium oppressoribus*').
[33] *De Nugis Curialium*, p.119.
[34] Diceto, II, p.9.
[35] WN, I, p.209. The Church was against violence, but as John France suggests there was a distinction between those serving the king, defending the social order, and those fighting only for money, who were regarded as sinful (J. France, 'People against Mercenaries', p.6). It was '*Brabanconibus et Arragonesibus, Navariis, et Basclis, et Coterellis*' singled out for showing no respect to churches or monasteries, and for their cruelty as they acted like pagans ravaging the land (Howden, II, p.179). In the 1180s when the Capuchins, with Ebles de Charenton and other nobles, defeated a large group of mercenaries near Bourges, Geoffroy de Vigeois noted the goods recovered included chalices of gold and silver, and crosses plundered from churches (F. Bonnélye, trad., *Chronique de Geoffroy*, p.173).

There was, however, value in the terror of their reputation and Henry used this to his advantage. In August 1173 with Louis VII attacking Verneuil, confident with the backing of his Brabançons and from the safety of Breteuil, Henry formally challenged his enemies to face him or withdraw. Louis opted to flee rather than confront Henry and his army.[36] Henry had witnessed a similar sense of dread in the reaction of some of his troops ambushed by the Welsh in 1157. After 1165, he looked to try and harness this fear and the Welsh became increasingly prominent in his armies.

Gerald of Wales created an image of a Welsh nation trained to fight, where even in times of peace the inhabitants would dream of war.[37] Years of internal conflicts and border warfare meant violence was very much a part of everyday life for some. According to Gerald, the Welsh paid 'no attention to commerce, shipping or industry' as their 'only preoccupation was military training.'[38] Huw Pryce, focusing on Deheubarth, confirms this view and suggests competition for control of the limited resources meant 'war was the means to both immediate and long-term profits.'[39] In 1136 Owain Gwynedd and Cadwaladr were apparently able to take 6,000 infantry and 2,000 'mailed horsemen' to fight the Normans in south Wales.[40] These impressive figures require caution, but may indicate there was a significant number of Welshmen available to fight within Wales or as mercenaries outside it. In 1173 Dafydd ab Owain Gwynedd and Owain Cyfeiliog supported Henry in Normandy and in 1174 Rhys ap Gruffudd accompanied a force to help with the siege of Tutbury.[41] After Tutbury's surrender the Welsh travelled to the continent, probably under the leadership of Rhys's son Hywel. The ability to move many Welshmen to Normandy, at short notice, proved invaluable in Henry's time of need.[42]

[36] Diceto, I, p.375. Louis requested peace talks, deceived the inhabitants of Verneuil into believing no help would arrive and set the town on fire after promising safe conduct for its surrender (*GH*, I, pp. 53-4; WN, I, pp. 174-5). According to Roger of Howden, Louis then to his everlasting shame fled (*GH*, I, p.54: '*et sempiternum sui opprobrium cum exercitu suo viliter et ignominiose aufugit'*). For details of the events surrounding Henry's calculated show of strength at Verneuil, see M. Strickland, *Henry the Young King*, pp. 166-7.
[37] *Opera*, VI, p.179.
[38] *Opera*, VI, p.180; translation Gerald of Wales, p.233.
[39] H. Pryce, 'In Search of a Medieval Society: Deheubarth in the Writings of Gerald of Wales', *Welsh History Review*, 13 (1987), pp. 265-281 (at p.268). For a similar view, regarding Wales as a whole compared to Western Europe, see S. Davies, *War and Society*, pp. 62-3.
[40] *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.51. The Life of St Illtud has an army of 3,000 horsemen and infantry gathered to burn and waste Glamorgan in the uprising against the Normans in the 1090s (A. Wade-Evans, ed. and trans., *Vitae Sanctorum Britanniae et Genealogiae* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1944), p.233). In 1162 Owain Gwynedd is recorded facing 300 men while raiding in Arwystli (*Brut* (Pen. 20), p.62).
[41] Roger of Howden noted '*David et Evayn reges Walliae*' (*GH*, I, p.51). For their identification as Dafydd and Owain, see *History of Wales*, II, p.553. Rhys is recorded at Tutbury (Diceto, I, p.384), with the sheriffs of Gloucestershire, Oxfordshire and Herefordshire providing supplies for his army (PR 20 Henry, pp. 21, 77, 121).
[42] The siege of Tutbury ended in the last week of July and the Welsh were in Normandy for early August (*GH*, I, pp. 73-4; WN, I, p.195).

Ambiguous terminology in recording Welsh troops in the king's service means it is not always clear whether they are from the borders, English-controlled peripheries, or deeper within Wales. Most references are to Welshmen in general or unidentified sergeants, but one of the few examples of origin appears in 1186 as Yorkshire accounted for troops from both north and south Wales for Henry's Galloway campaign.[43] The availability of large numbers of Welshmen may have provided the king with an affordable option to expand his armies, but his use of them does not suggest he viewed them in any way as a lesser alternative.[44] On the contrary, he often gave them specific roles in which they excelled to such an extent that by 1188 he refused to face Philip II without first summoning Welsh mercenaries to join him in Normandy.[45]

Gerald stated the Welsh fought in leather armour with round shields, spears and a handful of arrows.[46] It is his comments on Welsh archers, however, that have received considerable attention. The men of Gwent, he remarked, 'are more skilled with the bow and arrow than those who come from other parts of Wales.'[47] This has often been used as evidence of Welsh specialism and F.M. Powicke commented that it was 'well known from the writings of Gerald of Wales, the favourite weapon of his fellow countrymen was the longbow.'[48] There is no evidence that the Welsh were hired specifically as archers in Henry II's reign, but the misconception persists that this was an area of Welsh expertise.[49] Michael Powicke questioned

[43] PR 32 Henry II, p.86: '*Servientum de Nordwal'*' and '*servientum de Sudwalis*'. Herefordshire, Chester, and Shropshire accounted for mounted and foot sergeants travelling to Carlisle for the campaign, though it is not clear if all the sergeants were Welsh (PR 32 Henry II, pp. 29, 55, 86, 150). In 1188 Cadwallon and Maredudd of Senghenydd led troops in Normandy and mounted and foot sergeants from Glamorgan are recorded in the Pipe Rolls (PR 34 Henry II, pp. 106-7). For Cadwallon and Maredudd serving both Henry and Richard in Normandy, see I.W. Rowlands, 'Warriors Fit for a Prince', p.223. It should be noted, however, that the pair were the brothers of Gruffudd ab Ifor and not his sons as suggested in this article; for clarification, see *AWR*, pp. lvi, 46.
[44] Evidence from outside the period may suggest hiring Welsh soldiers could be financially expedient. By 1212 Flemish knights in John's service received 2s. a day, and Flemish sergeants 1s. a day. In contrast, the Welsh infantry in his pay received just 2d. a day (M. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, p.84).
[45] Howden, II, p.343; J. Hosler, 'Revisiting Mercenaries under Henry Fitz Empress, 1167-1188', in J. France, ed., *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, pp. 33-42 (at p.38).
[46] *Opera*, VI, p.180. Walter Map also hints at the handful of arrows in his tale of a youth carrying 'a bow and two arrows' (*De Nugis Curialium*, p.201).
[47] *Opera*, VI, p.54. Gerald's view that the men of north Wales were skilful with long spears (*Opera*, VI, p.177) receives far less attention, even though he suggests that the Welsh regularly practised with spears (*Opera*, VI, p.181) and their attacks often commenced with a 'shower of javelins which they hurl' (*Opera*, VI, p.209; translation Gerald of Wales, p.259).
[48] F.M. Powicke, *The Loss of Normandy (1189-1204): Studies in the History of the Angevin Empire* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1913), p.335.
[49] John Hosler, for instance, describes the men of south Wales as being 'predominantly archers' (J. Hosler, *Henry II: A Medieval Soldier*, p.120). Max Lieberman attributes Henry's withdrawal from Wales in 1165 to Welsh archers harrying the English before the weather ultimately intervened (M. Lieberman, *The Medieval March of Wales*, p.121). It is probable that archers were involved, but had their role been so prominent the silence from the sources seems surprising.

whether fear of the Gwentish bow led to it being banned east of the Severn in 1175.[50] The reality was that Henry employed archers, but there is little to suggest they were exclusively Welsh or that English archers were less capable. At the Standard in 1138, it was English archers who provided the decisive intervention: killing and halting the charging Galwegians, sending them into retreat, according to Aelred of Rievaulx, resembling 'hedgehogs with spines'.[51] The role archers played in Henry's reign is difficult to determine as opportunities for them to influence battles were limited and records of their actions are often obscured by the cultural fascination, in historical and literary works, with knightly activity. This meant the contributions, and sometimes even the presence, of the mass of infantry could be overlooked in favour of highlighting the exploits of great individuals.

Occasional references are made to symbolic acts or individual feats by archers, but when not used for hunting, bows were considered non-knightly and associated with those of low status.[52] Wace's portrayal of the siege of Rouen in 946, reflecting contemporary opinion, highlighted this contrast with Norman knights 'jousting and striking with lances and swords.' The skirmishing outside the city walls, however, was with slings, bows and axes, and during the retreat 'the peasants arrived … carrying poles and bows.'[53] Even the wording of the Assize of Le Mans, with its general categories, ends with a reference to bows suggesting that those in the poorest category could at least produce one.[54] In Wales, bows were often associated with youth and in 1121 when Henry I was struck by an arrow it came from a group of Maredudd ap Bleddyn's young archers.[55] The twelfth-century bards exalting heroic princes and nobles, often against English invaders, provide no indication of the bow being a celebrated Welsh weapon. Status, symbolism and nobility were commemorated, military exploits were vague and

[50] M. Powicke, *Military Obligation*, p.52. It seems unlikely that if such a fear existed it would be ignored in the Assize of Arms which was, in part, designed to control arms in England. For the suggestion that the temporary ban held little relation to the fear of Welsh bows, see above pp. 56-7 and n.111.
[51] D. Greenway, ed. and trans., *Historia Anglorum*, p.716; *Relatio de Standardo* in *Chronicles*, III, p.196: '*ut hericium spinis*'. References to the Welsh at Lincoln in 1141 do not suggest the actions of archers: Orderic Vitalis, for instance, recorded them simply as armed with knives (OV, VI, p.536).
[52] Robert of Torigni, for example, recorded the abbot of Lagny was hit in the eye by an arrow (Torigni, p.218). The fatal arrow that struck Geoffrey de Mandeville in the head, after he raised his helmet at the siege of Burwell in 1144, was delivered by a lowly foot soldier (D. Greenway, ed. and trans., *Historia Anglorum*, p.744). For Geoffrey's death, see Torigni, pp. 147-8; Gervase, I, pp. 128-9.
[53] *Roman de Rou*, pp. 70-3.
[54] Howden, II, p.253; J. France, 'People against Mercenaries', p.19. The categories of the assize ranged from men worth 100 *livres angevins*, being expected to own a horse and knightly equipment, down to those possessing 40, 30 or 25 livres. Those with under 25 *livres* were expected to have some padding, an iron helmet, lance, sword, or at least a bow and arrows (Howden, II, p.253: '*caeteri autem omnes ... vel arcum et saggittas*').
[55] These 'young men' were sent to engage Henry I's army 'with bows and arrows to cause confusion' (*Brut* (Pen. 20), p.48).

descriptions, influenced by conventions and constraints, conveyed traditional heroic images expected by the audience rather than historical reality. Gruffudd ap Cynan was praised as a 'hurler of spear' and with sword in hand a 'destroyer of armies'.[56] In all his skills, defending his lands and men, archery receives no mention. In 1157 when one might expect skilled archers to be referenced during the ambush, the elegy for Bleddyn Fardd recorded that the poet fell 'under blades dealing out death'.[57] This is not to suggest that Wales had no skilled archers, but references to them in Henry II's reign are limited and do not allow any firm conclusions to be made on levels of expertise with short or longbow, or their availability in numbers.[58]

The bows described by Gerald were of dwarf elm, firm and strong, but only powerful at short range and clearly not yet the deadly weapons that reached distances of 400 yards and could pierce armour at 200 yards.[59] In all Gerald's references to Welsh military training there are no hints that archery was practised regularly in the numbers required to achieve the cohesion and discipline necessary to provide the terrifying, audible and visible, spectacle of a shower of arrows in battle.[60] The Welsh archers in Henry's armies were not the specialist units that could change the course of battles; they were not recruited in vast numbers, or being used in a system that depended upon them.[61] In celebrating the martial ability of the Welsh in his letter to Manuel Komnenos, whether Gerald's reproduction from the letter was genuine or not, Henry would surely have reserved praise for their archery skills had they been so prominent.[62] It was more

[56] Translation from J.E.C. Williams, 'Meilyr Brydydd and Gruffudd ap Cynan', pp. 183-4.
[57] It is noted that Bleddyn himself had 'lengthy practice of horsemanship' and fought with spear and sword 'at the ready' (R.G. Gruffydd, 'A Welsh Poet Falls', pp. 56-7). In *Trioedd Ynys Prydein*, the sacred weapons that God gave to Arthur were 'Rhongomiant his spear, Caledfwlch his sword and Carnwennan his dagger' (J.B. Coe and S. Young, ed. and trans., *The Celtic Sources for the Arthurian Legend* (Felinfach: Llanerch, 1995), p.93).
[58] Gerald's famous story about one of William de Braose's men being pinned to his horse by an arrow shot through his thigh suggests there were skilled Welsh archers (*Opera*, VI, p.54). In 1188 at Gisors, apparently mocked by a French knight a Welsh archer under Henry II was able to respond by hitting him in the head with an arrow (*HWM*, I, lines 7,408-7,432).
[59] *Opera*, VI, p.54. The inconsistency of these bows is suggested by the fact that the Welsh arrow that hit Henry in 1121 failed to pierce his armour, but Gerald recorded arrows from the siege of Abergavenny in 1182 being left in an oak door as a lasting reminder of the strength of their impact (*Brut* (Pen. 20), p.48; *Opera*, VI, p.54). For the distances achievable with later longbows, see K. DeVries, 'Longbow Archery and the Earliest Robin Hood Legends', in T. Hahn, ed., *Robin Hood in Popular Culture: Violence, Transgression and Justice* (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2000), pp. 41-60 (at p.48).
[60] The skill to be able to fire at specific and moving targets on command took discipline, co-ordination and hours of practice. At Bourgthéroulde in 1124 archers were recorded playing a prominent role, shooting at the weaker right-hand sides of the enemy, unprotected by shield, and aiming for horses (OV, VI, pp. 348-52; J. Bradbury, *The Medieval Archer*, (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1985), pp. 49-50).
[61] J. Bradbury, *The Medieval Archer*, pp. 83-90. The length and draw-weight of later bows may have been different, but it was the numbers and tactics that made them so effective in the fourteenth century, see K. DeVries, 'Longbow Archery', p.52.
[62] *Opera*, VI, p.181. Roger of Howden records a letter from Manuel to Henry which included details of his army's defeat at Myriokephalon in 1176 (*GH*, I, pp. 128-130; Howden, I, pp. 102-4).

for their destructive capabilities, skirmishing and skills at close-quarter fighting, in which archery no doubt played a part, that Henry looked to them.

Years of border warfare had provided the Welsh with tried and tested methods that differed to tactics for a pitched battle, but at times could prove remarkably effective. As Gerald of Wales stated 'they may not shine in open combat and in fixed formation, but they harass their enemy'.[63] Where the Welsh had little hope of achieving sustained success against the superior numbers and technology in England, they refined their skills in ambushes, harassment and lightning raids of destruction or plunder. In 1188 Roger of Howden noted their ravaging skills as they burned villages and the castle of Damville in France.[64] The nature of the devastating Welsh cross-border raids relied on their ability to surprise opponents with a sudden onslaught before disappearing. It did not always guarantee success, but at times they operated at night to create panic and confusion.[65] Much of the element of surprise relied on speed, and this was important to Henry in policing his dominions and for his warfare in general. His ability to arrive unexpectedly meant rebels and enemies could never feel safe. In an invented speech, Louis VII witnessed Henry travelling between countries in 1172 and commented 'he must fly rather than travel by horse or ship.'[66] In 1173, with a small retinue, Henry caused amazement by riding from Rouen to Dol, approaching 200 miles, in just two days.[67] Being lightly armed was often used as a criticism of the Welsh and it did have drawbacks, principally against cavalry on flat grounds, but the agility it allowed encouraged tactical diversity on the continent.[68] Tactics in Wales were restricted by the landscape, economy, internal politics and border history, but in Henry's armies Welsh experience of swift and disruptive raids helped expand his tactical options. In June 1167 Welsh mercenaries were sent swimming across the Epte to surprise and

[63] *Opera*, VI, p.210.
[64] Howden, II, p.345. Though their actions were supposedly carried out without the king's knowledge (*GH*, II, pp. 46-7; Gervase, I, pp. 433-4).
[65] Gerald described how as young men the Welsh would train by moving by both day and night, using the cover of darkness to observe their enemies (*Opera*, VI, pp. 181-2). The castles of Gwyddgrug (1147), Tenby (1152), Cardiff (1158) and Abergavenny (1175) were all either taken or attacked at night (*Annales Cambriae*, p.43; *Brut* (RBH), p.131; *Opera*, VI, pp. 63-4, 50-1).
[66] Diceto, I, p.351: '*Rex Angliae modo in Hybernia, modo in. Anglia, modo in Normannia, volare potius judicandus est quam vel equum vel navem conscendere*.' In 1152 as duke, Henry's army moved with such haste from Barfleur to the Norman border that he relied on relays of horses with several apparently dying on the road (Torigni, pp. 169-70; Gervase, I, pp. 149-50).
[67] Torigni, pp. 259-60; Diceto, I, p.378; *GH*, I, pp. 56-7; WN, I, p.176.
[68] To audiences outside Wales, the Welsh were often mocked and derided as being naked. John of Salisbury described them as 'men without arms' (*Letters*, II, no. 184, p.217) and Gerald noted how they often fight without any protection (*Opera*, VI, p.180). By commenting on their lack of equipment, writers were able to fulfil the dual purpose of belittling the Welsh while promoting the idea of English military superiority, see J. Gillingham, 'The Foundations of a Disunited Kingdom', in J. Gillingham, *The English in the Twelfth Century*, pp. 93-109, especially pp. 101-5.

burn Chaumont.[69] This well-planned attack on an important target highlighted how useful Welsh troops could be to the king. Its planning appreciated their skills at river-crossing and utilised Welsh strengths of stealth, speed and destruction.[70] The relief of Rouen in 1174 is well documented and provides the clearest example of how these Welsh skills were successfully employed by Henry II.[71]

The king's penance at Canterbury in July 1174 and his reconciliation with St Thomas had, to many contemporaries, helped secure the capture of William the Lion, brought peace to England and placed Henry back on the throne.[72] In Normandy, all depended on Rouen with the combined army of the king of France, the Young King and the counts of Flanders, Burgundy, Blois and Champagne pitched outside the city.[73] Control of Rouen was critical, not just for its population, wealth and commercial potential, but for what it symbolized as the power and authority of Normandy, a significance appreciated by Orderic Vitalis who has Henry I describing it as 'rightly the capital of all Normandy from the earliest days.'[74] Rouen received natural protection from the Seine and surrounding hills, and with its impressive walls, strengthened in 1161, besieging the ancient city required an investment of time and resources.[75] Henry arrived at Barfleur on 8 August, reaching Rouen three days later with his household knights, under William de Mandeville, Brabançons and 1,000 Welshmen.[76] As at Chaumont,

[69] Once across the river, they waited for Henry to draw the garrison out of the town before entering through the unguarded gates and surprising the French by burning the buildings behind them. In the confusion of the garrison returning to the fire, Henry secured the gate and control of the heavily fortified town (*Draco Normannicus*, pp. 683-6; Torigni, p.251). Henry's success at Chaumont clearly had a profound impact on Stephen of Rouen, who not only recorded the details in his contemporary Latin-verse poem, but refers to it several times and uses it as an example of Norman martial superiority over their French rivals (*Draco Normannicus*, pp. 681-6, 688, 691).

[70] Gerald's story of Henry crossing the ford at Pencarn to fulfil a prophecy suggests the importance the Welsh placed on crossing rivers (*Opera*, VI, p.63). Possibly based on earlier tradition, *Ymddiddan Gwenhwyfar ac Arthur* hints at the cultural significance with Melwas claiming: 'I would wade a ford, though it were a fathom deep' (J.B. Coe and S. Young, ed. and trans., *The Celtic Sources for the Arthurian Legend*, p.111).

[71] Roger of Howden was in France with the king in August 1174 (J. Gillingham, 'The Travels of Roger of Howden' p.83 and n.99) and Mathew Strickland maintains that William of Newburgh's account of Rouen's siege 'is so detailed that it suggests access to an eye-witness account' (M. Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, p.127).

[72] William's capture at Alnwick was a sign of divine forgiveness (Diceto, I, pp. 383-5; *MTB*, II, p.445; WN, I, pp. 187-9) and apparently delivered at the very hour Henry took Mass on 13 July (WN, I, p.188: '*Quippe ipsa die, atque ipsa, ut dicitur, hora*'). The powerful link between success and Henry's all-night vigil was promoted so successfully that his enemies of 1173-4, including Louis, Philip of Flanders, Theobald of Blois and Henry's sons, Henry and Richard, all visited the shrine at Canterbury courting saint and king (T.K. Keefe, 'Shrine Time: King Henry II's visits to Thomas Becket's Tomb', *Haskins Society Journal*, 11 (2003), pp. 115-122.

[73] *GH*, I, p.73; described as '*cum tremendo exercitu*' (WN, I, p.193) and '*innumerabili multitudine peditum*' (*ex Chronica Rotomagensi* in *RHF*, XII, p.786).

[74] OV, IV, p.227.

[75] Torigni, p.209. Wace described Rouen as 'fortified and enclosed by walls and ditches … by rivers which run alongside it and fortified by towers, by other strongholds and by good knights' (*Roman de Rou*, p.72).

[76] PR 20 Henry II, p.135; *GH*, I, p.74: '*mille Walenses*'; Howden, II, p.65.

Henry trusted a contingent of Welsh troops to deliver the decisive blow. They crossed the Seine, concealed themselves in the woods and observed the French, before successfully ambushing Louis's supply train at night.[77] After a few days, with their supply line disrupted and fatigue setting in, the sight of Henry filling ditches outside the city to threaten confrontation prompted the coalition to depart and dispatch envoys to arrange talks.[78] With the city safe, 16 months of fighting was at an end and a triumphant Henry was left to dictate the terms of peace, which he did in September.[79] If Henry's reconciliation with St Thomas had secured England in July, then the Welsh had surely played their part in securing Normandy in August. It was their surprise attack and the fear it created that had given Henry the advantage and allowed him to relieve the city in a matter of days. The lasting impression of the siege of Rouen is William of Newburgh's image of the panic-stricken French terrified as word spread that the woods 'were full of Welshmen'.[80]

The fear Henry, and his armies, could inspire apparently spread far beyond his own reign and realms. In a speech attributed to Saladin's brother by Richard of Devizes, ultimately in praise of Richard I, he says:

> It is no new thing for us to fear the English, for Richard's father had such fame among us that had he come to our land unarmed we would have all fled, for it would have been no disgrace to flee him.[81]

Sephadin's speech may be invented, but the reality of being wounded, maimed or killed in combat produced some degree of fear. For some the psychological challenge presented by fear was overcome through experience of war and combat, but to others it was visible signs such as

[77] Wagons were destroyed, many of the French were killed, some of the draught horses were taken and barrels of wine were smashed (*GH*, I, pp. 74-5; *MTB*, I, p.493, WN, I, pp. 195-6).
[78] Torigni, p.265; *GH*, I, p.75; Howden, II, pp. 65-6; WN, I, p.196; Gervase, I, pp. 249-50. The Chronicle of Saint-Aubin noted Louis's decision to depart was based on his army being 'heavily oppressed by hunger' (*Early Sources of Scottish History*, II, p.287), with Ralph Niger adding they were on the point of starvation: '*exercitu suo fame et inedia pene deficiente*' (R. Anstruther, ed., *Radulfi Nigri Chronica*, p.176).
[79] Torigni, p.265; *GH*, I, pp. 76-7; WN, I, p.196. A meeting was initially arranged for 8 September at Gisors, but talks were rearranged for 29 September at Mountlouis.
[80] WN, I, p.196: '*Tunc vulgatum est silvas Walensibus esse refertas*'. French authors would also come to associate the Welsh with fighting in woodlands, see H.-F. Delaborde, ed., *Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton*, I, pp. 131-2, 198; II, pp. 135-6.
[81] The Chronicle of Richard of Devizes in *Chronicles*, III, pp. 445-6; translation J.T Appleby, ed. and trans., *The Chronicle of Richard of Devizes of the Time of King Richard the First* (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1963), pp. 76-7.

the presence of the king, his standard, or dismounted knights.[82] John Gillingham and Matthew Strickland have illustrated that the conduct of war was evolving and chivalric ideals made fighting less dangerous and less barbaric for nobles and knights.[83] Truces, respites, technological advances, tactics and the conventions of surrender and ransom meant, in theory, they could preserve honour in defeat and had less to fear from fighting. Gillingham even suggests that by the twelfth century an English or French noble 'was very unlucky indeed if he died in battle.'[84] At tournaments knights witnessed innovations and improvements in armour, but also gained the opportunity to refine techniques and learn new skills.[85] The *History of William of Marshal* reveals the methods knights used to seize opponents and avoid causing serious injury.[86] Once mastered these skills became interchangeable between tournament and battle, leading to situations as at Brémule in 1119 where Orderic Vitalis recorded only three knights out of about 900 were killed. This occurrence was explained by the effectiveness of their mail and an effort to 'spare each other on both sides out of fear of God and fellowship in arms'.[87] Armour provided some protection as Henry I was struck on the helmet in the battle, but tactics developed to protect knights in the mêlée allowing them to be taken for ransom. Though charges often provided the greatest spectacle at tournaments, in the *estor*, and could prove decisive in battles, they were rare for Henry II as battles were avoided in favour of intimidation, raids, ravaging and sieges. These were areas mercenaries, especially Welshmen, excelled, but knights and nobles did play their part in destructive campaigns. Chrétien de

[82] For a consideration of factors such as drink, prayers and money in helping to overcome fear, see 'The Will to Combat', in J. Keegan, *The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo and The Somme* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978), pp. 114-6. For some examples of fear in medieval warfare, see R.W. Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 165-9.

[83] For evidence of this evolution, see J. Gillingham '1066 and the Introduction of Chivalry into England', in J. Gillingham, *The English in the Twelfth Century*, pp. 209-232; 'Conduct in Battle: A Brotherhood of Arms', in M. Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, pp. 132-158.

[84] J. Gillingham, "Holding to the Rules of War (*Bellica Iura Tenentes*)': Right Conduct Before, During, and After Battle in North-Western Europe in the Eleventh Century', *Anglo-Norman Studies*, 29 (2007), pp. 1-15 (quote at p.13).

[85] In one famous incident William Marshal emerged unscathed despite his helmet being so dented a blacksmith was required to remove it (*HWM*, I, lines 3,104-3,108). Helmets were considered such an important part of a knight's equipment that stripping an opponent of his was comparable to disarming him and this became a favoured method of capture at tournaments (*HWM*, I, lines 1,438-1,461; 4,899-4,902 and 4,935-4,970).

[86] There are many instances of horses being halted by knights trying to pull their riders to the ground (*HWM*, I, lines 4,862 and 3,816-3,819) and seizing the bridle of an opponent's horse was a technique perfected by William Marshal and performed expertly in the streets of Anet (*HWM*, I, lines 2,840-2,856). For the methods used at tournaments, see 'Tactics', in D. Crouch, *Tournament* (London and New York: Hambledon and London, 2005), pp. 92-6; with reference to the younger Henry, see 'A School of Arms: The Nature of the Tournament', in M. Strickland, *Henry the Young King*, pp. 245-53.

[87] OV, VI, p.241. For the rise in the tactic of stopping horses or deliberately aiming for them and not the knights riding them, see M. Strickland, War and Chivalry, pp. 180-2.

Troyes, comparing war with a storm, described them as 'barons who devastate the world, just as winds devastate the waves.'[88]

The French romance epic *Garin le Loherenc*, written between 1160 and 1190, captures the expectation that knights should be viewed differently. Garin's brother, Begon, believed to be a poacher, is approached in the woods and pleads for favour because '*je suis chevalier*'.[89] The count of Flanders protested that Henry I had acted contrary to custom towards knightly prisoners at Bourgthéroulde, highlighting a clear assumption that even as enemies knights should receive preferential treatment.[90] Richard FitzNigel praised Henry II for his 'unprecedented mercy' in sparing the knights captured at Fornham, Dol and Alnwick, with few suffering 'the loss of their possessions, and none lost their rank or life.'[91] Such conventions, however, were abandoned when opponents were regarded as different or inferior and especially across cultural boundaries where enemies were viewed with greater fear and disdain. Against the Welsh, neighbouring counties developed methods of countering border warfare, but for many outside these areas, with limited experience of Wales, racial hatred and propaganda helped writers strengthen the stereotype of the 'Celtic' barbarian.[92] At war, the Scots were compared to wild animals in 1138 and the Welsh were likened to cattle in 1141.[93] Gerald of Wales highlighted the issue in his *Expugnatio Hibernica* with a discussion over the fate of the prisoners after the invaders' victory at Baginbun in 1170. The debate centred around clemency, with Hervey de Montmaurice successfully arguing the enemy would show them no mercy if

[88] D. Staines, trans., *The Complete Romances of Chrétien de Troyes* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p.479. Though ravaging was widely accepted as a tactic, it could have a lasting effect on the landscape and the economy, see for example M. Newth, trans., *The Song of Girart of Vienne*, lines 6,207-6,211; *HWM*, I, lines, 2,210-2,222, p.113.

[89] A. Iker-Gittleman, ed., *Garin le Loherenc*, 3 vols (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1996-7), II, line 9,001, p.364: '*Portez m'anor, que je suis chevalier!*' For the dating, see L. Sunderland, *Rebel Barons*, p.177.

[90] Orderic Vitalis relates how Henry I had to justify mutilating three knights, contrary to custom. Two were punished for treason having violated their homage and the third for joking about the king and returning to fight having been captured and released (OV, VI, pp. 352-5).

[91] *Dialogus*, p.117. The *Chanson de Girart de Roussillon*, which first appeared in the second half of the twelfth century, provides some graphic descriptions of the fate of lower classes injured or captured during war. Men returned having lost body parts or suffered injuries from fighting (P. Meyer, trad., *Girart de Roussillon, Chanson de Geste: Traduite pour la Première Fois* (Paris: H. Champion, 1884), no. 343, p.171: '*qui ont perdu pied ou poing ou ont la tête tranchée*'). The fate of the non-knightly troops is revealed as those not ransomed arrive at court having been mutilated: 'sergeants or crossbowmen, all disfigured: each having a foot or a fist cut off, hair shaved like a fool, or eyes gouged' (no. 607, p.283: '*sergents ou arbalétriers, tout défigurés: chacun avait le pied ou le poing tranche, le chef tondu en façon de fol, ou l'oeil crevé*').

[92] The use of lightly-armed *muntatores* developed in Shropshire to defend against Welsh raids, see above p.54. Gerald of Wales noted the continuous cycle of border violence (*Opera*, VI, pp. 49-50) and Geoffrey of Monmouth even suggests the failure of the Britons to recover was because the Welsh 'squabbling pettily amongst themselves and sometimes with the Saxons, kept constantly massacring the foreigners or each other' (M.D. Reeve, ed., and N. Wright, trans., *The History of the Kings of Britain*, p.280).

[93] *Relatio de Standardo* in *Chronicles*, III, p.188; D. Greenway, ed. and trans., *Historia Anglorum*, p.734.

the situations were reversed and Alice of Abergavenny, who had lost her lover in the battle, was handed an axe and decapitated all 70 prisoners.[94] Gerald's debate showed an awareness of the victors' own standards, but the outcome could be justified against barbarous enemies and such enemies often received brutal treatment in defeat. At Le Mans in 1189, following Henry's flight across a deep ford, the Welsh were trapped and killed by the pursuing forces of Richard and Philip II.[95] Though allowances should be made for dramatic licence in poetry, the contrast between the recording of Henry's mercy in 1173-4 and a victorious Owain Gwynedd, celebrated by Cynddelw Brydydd Mawr, 'blade in hand and lopping heads' is clear.[96]

In this clash of cultures, the chivalric expectations of knights were often at odds with 'Celtic' concepts of warfare. For the Welsh, as Gerald suggested, it was 'a disgrace to die in bed but an honour to be killed in battle.'[97] The survival of the ancient traditions of killing able-bodied men and enslaving women, and especially the practice of taking the heads of defeated warriors reinforced fear, but also revulsion at the primitive and barbaric nature of 'Celtic' warfare.[98] Gerald portrayed Wales as a nation embroiled in thievery, treachery, murder and arson, and was equally critical of the Irish, concluding they were 'a barbarous people, literally barbarous'.[99] Though such views often lacked substance, they became increasingly stereotyped with England's 'Celtic' neighbours portrayed as bestial, wild and barbarous.[100] Tales of successional violence from Wales and the brutal conflicts that ensued only served to heighten the fear of the unknown when facing the Welsh. Gerald noted internal feuds, quarrels and

[94] *Opera*, V, pp. 249-53; *Song*, lines 1,475-87. For the suggestion that the conventions of capture and ransom needed a highly monetised society and were unlikely to cross cultural boundaries, see J. Gillingham, 'Conquering the Barbarians', pp. 41-58, especially p.53.
[95] *GH*, II, p.68; Howden, II, pp. 363-4. For the impact fear, revenge and cultural disdain could have on the treatment of enemies in flight, see S. Morillo, 'Expecting Cowardice: Medieval Battle Tactics Reconsidered', *Journal of Medieval Military History*, 4 (2006), pp. 65-73 (at p.73).
[96] Translation from J.J. Parry, 'The Court Poets of the Welsh Princes', p.516. The poem's audience would recognise such heroic scenes, with Cynddelw continuing that 'I saw them cut to pieces 300 corpses' (p.517). Henry's clemency in 1173-4 was very different compared to his treatment of the Welsh hostages in 1165.
[97] *Opera*, VI, p.180; translation Gerald of Wales, p.233.
[98] A victorious Gruffudd ap Cynan is recorded dragging 'wives and daughters into captivity' in 1081 and as he approached Powys 'he employed the greatest cruelty against his enemies' (P. Russell, ed. and trans., *Vita Griffini*, p.71). For the custom of taking heads by 'Celtic' warriors dating back to pre-Christian times, see 'The Taking of Heads', in H.R. Ellis Davidson, *Myths and Symbols in Pagan Europe. Early Scandinavian and Celtic Religions* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1988), pp. 71-7.
[99] *Opera*, V, p.152; translation J.J. O'Meara, trans., *The History and Topography of Ireland* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), p.102. For some of Gerald's criticisms of the Welsh, see *Opera*, VI, pp. 207, 211, 224.
[100] William of Newburgh labelled the Irish as barbarous (WN, I, p.166) and the Scots as both barbarous and bloodthirsty (WN, I, p.177). For the development of these views, see W.R. Jones, 'England against the Celtic Fringe: A Study in Cultural Stereotypes', *Journal of World History*, 13 (1971), pp. 155-71; J. Gillingham, 'The Foundations of a Disunited Kingdom', pp. 93-109.

never-ending disputes led to 'inhuman crimes … bloodshed, and many other savage acts.'[101] Status in England and France came with the prospect of capture and ransom; preserving honour and providing personal gain. In Wales men of status may be seen as worthy opponents, with prestige attached to possessing the head of a valiant opponent, their head may even be hunted for that very reason. The stark contrast in outlooks between French warfare and the warfare practised in Ireland and Wales was eloquently captured by Gerald: 'There in France, knights are held captive, here they are decapitated; there they are ransomed, here killed.'[102]

Mercenaries transformed Henry's armies; their numbers and the tactical diversity they offered made it possible for him to maintain and protect his lands. Their presence could prove the difference and, at times, was even enough to encourage terms without conflict, but the advantages they provided came at a price. In England, they served as an unwelcome reminder of the disruption of Stephen's reign and on the continent, where they appeared with great regularity, it was a financial price. The king's treasurer commented that in times of war money was indispensable and 'lavished on fortifying castles, on paying soldiers, and on many other expenses.'[103] Henry's Brabançon mercenaries may have been more trustworthy than some of his nobles, but their loyalty was only assured, observed Roger of Howden, through the pay they received.[104] As Richard FitzNigel correctly asserted, it was access to financial resources that could 'raise up princely power or cast it down'.[105] Henry himself had experienced how humbling the lack of resources could be in 1147, as a teenager looking to make an impact in England, he ran out of money and his mercenaries deserted him. He was forced to seek help from Stephen, imploring him 'to regard with pity the poverty that weighed upon him.'[106]

The Young King's experience of 1173-4 ended with a similar result. Roger of Howden recorded him offering Philip of Flanders an income of £1,000 and Kent, with the important

[101] *Opera*, VI, p.36; translation Gerald of Wales, p.96. For issues regarding succession, see J.B. Smith, 'Dynastic Succession in Medieval Wales', *Bulletin of the Board of Celtic Studies*, 33 (1986), pp. 199–232. For an indication of some of the violence that it could cause, see above pp. 18-9, 37.
[102] *Expugnatio*, p.246. The same phrase is repeated in *Descriptio Kambriae* (*Opera*, VI, p.220). The taking of heads was witnessed in *Gereint filius Erbin*: 'At Llongborth I saw hewing, and men in battle with blood about the head.' It was celebrated in *Marwnat Uthyr Pen*, 'I cut a hundred heads' (J.B. Coe and S. Young, *The Celtic Sources for the Arthurian Legend*, pp. 119, 151). For the survival and importance of decapitation in Wales, see F.C. Suppe, 'The Cultural Significance of Decapitation in High Medieval Wales and the Marches', *Bulletin of the Board of Celtic Studies*, 36: (1989), pp. 147-160.
[103] *Dialogus*, p.5. On campaign, money helped provide provisions, transport, bribes and diplomatic rewards.
[104] WN, I, p.172. Howden, II, p.47: '*et non sine magna mercede*'.
[105] *Dialogus*, p.3.
[106] *Gesta Stephani*, p.206.

castles of Dover and Rochester.[107] This generosity reflected the difficulty of facing his father, but also showed a distinct lack of financial experience. Where Henry's Welsh campaign of 1165, with its extensive expenditure, may have revealed the limits he could hope to achieve, it also provided valuable lessons associated with pragmatism and efficiency in raising and handling large sums of money for war. The Young King's strategy was high risk, relying entirely on success and without it his extravagant promises evaporated to leave mounting debts. Where Henry was able to free 969 knightly prisoners without ransom, Ralph of Diss noted his son extracted ransoms from 100 or more of his prisoners.[108] In the end, it was left for the father to pay off his son's debts.[109] The Young King's supporters were not so fortunate and the *History of William Marshal* describes how many of them were so desperate they were forced 'to sell their arms, their palfreys and their chargers … There was no means of recovery in any other direction.'[110] Henry II also felt the financial drain of 1173-4, with the burden on the treasury he sent his coronation sword to his Brabançons as a guarantee of his debt to them.[111] His command of resources was critical during the rebellion and the sieges of Verneuil and Leicester in July 1173 highlight how the continued functioning of government in most areas gave Henry an advantage his opponents could not match. As Louis made no headway for a month at Verneuil, he resorted to stripping the land and levying a special tax to supply his army.[112] Henry's army, under Richard de Lucy and Reginald of Cornwall, met with similar resistance at Leicester, but they had no need to resort to such measures as the sheriffs supplied them with equipment for siege engines, 180 carpenters and other essentials, including spades and

[107] Matthew of Boulogne and Theobald of Blois also received generous offers (Howden, II, pp. 46-7).
[108] Diceto, I, p.395. Though Henry did look to secure hostages in lieu of ransom, he also took the opportunity to seize the lands or chattels of some rebels. William Patrick senior and his three sons, for instance, committed to the Young King's cause and in response Henry destroyed their houses and woodlands (Torigni, p.256). William, or his son, was taken outside Dol in August 1173, and Robert and Engeram Patrick were captured with Dol (*GH*, I, pp. 56–8). Lands belonging to William Patrick in Essex, Kent and Gloucestershire were seized and taken into royal hands by local sheriffs (PR 19 Henry II, pp. 20, 88-9, 155; PR 20 Henry II, pp. 24, 74; PR 21 Henry II, pp. 218–19). For the treatment of some of the tenants of the rebel earls of Chester and Leicester, see P. Latimer, 'How to Suppress a Rebellion: England 1173-74', in P. Dalton and D. Luscombe, ed., *Rulership and Rebellion in the Anglo-Norman World, c.1066-c.1216* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), pp. 163-178 (at p.171).
[109] Diceto, I, p.404.
[110] *HWM*, I, lines 2,255-2,259, p.115. For discussion of the younger Henry not heeding these financial lessons and in the 1180s still following a romantic economic system, based on honour and reputation, see L. Ashe, 'William Marshal, Lancelot, and Arthur: Chivalry and Kingship', *Anglo-Norman Studies*, 30 (2007), pp. 19-40, especially p.29.
[111] F. Bonnélye, trad., *Chronique de Geoffroy*, p.118: '*de mettre en gage l'épée de la couronne*'. The total payments made to Robert de Stuteville and Ranulf de Glanville to help defend northern England against Scottish invasions clearly show the financial burden of 1173-4. The Pipe Rolls reveal the amount paid to Robert as sheriff of Yorkshire for knights and sergeants came to £1,228 16s. 10d. (PR 21 Henry II, pp. 164, 173-4). Ranulf, as custodian of both the honour of Lancaster and the honour of Richmond, received £918 10s. 1d. (PR 21 Henry II, pp. 3, 7, 8).
[112] Torigni, pp. 257-8; *GH*, I, p.50; Diceto, I, p.374.

pickaxes.[113] William of Newburgh stressed that royal treasure was not to be spared in times of crisis and the ability to continue collecting revenues allowed Henry to supply and pay garrisons in castles throughout England and maintain mercenaries on the continent.[114] Control of the Channel was an important factor in this strategy as it enabled the movement of money and men to areas under threat. The Normans joked about the number of messengers arriving from England, but it showed lines of communication remained open and confirmed beyond doubt that Henry controlled the Channel.[115]

One of the most remarkable features of 1173-4 was the loyalty of the Welsh. The nature of Welsh culture, with its emphasis on vengeance and blood feuds, created the impression they were untrustworthy and notoriously difficult to hold to treaties and oaths as present wrongs overshadowed past agreements.[116] Gerald of Wales warned that they feigned friendships and were driven by greed and material gain.[117] In Stephen's reign Morgan ab Owain, Madog ap Maredudd and Cadwaladr ap Gruffudd all fought against the English king and Owain Gwynedd looked to profit from the situation by expanding his territories.[118] Even with the Young King's generous pay and offers of handsome rewards, the Welsh appear to have remained loyal to the Old King during the rebellion.[119] Rhys ap Gruffudd looked to the stability offered through

[113] Equipment for siege engines was supplied from Northamptonshire, with 115 carpenters from Warwickshire and Leicestershire, 41 carpenters and their master from Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, and a further 24 with a master from Staffordshire (PR 19 Henry II, pp. 33, 58, 173, 178). 10,000 arrows were supplied from Gloucester, with spades and pickaxes coming from Worcestershire (PR 19 Henry II, pp. 156, 163). Leicester's large garrison and strong walls stood firm until a fire broke out and forced the townsmen to sue for peace (Diceto, I, p.376).
[114] WN, I, p.172. The use of royal treasure rather than expenditure authorised through the exchequer highlights why Pipe Roll records do not provide a complete account of military spending.
[115] Diceto, I, pp. 381-2. A naval force with ships from Yorkshire, Essex, Norfolk, Suffolk, and Lincolnshire '*ad custodiam maris*' was held off Sandwich to protect the Channel in 1173-4 (PR 19 Henry II, pp. 2, 13, 31, 117, 133, 134; P. Latimer, 'How to Supress a Rebellion', p.176). The royal vessel (*esnecca*) made at least four trips before the end of September 1173 (PR 19 Henry II, pp. 54-5; *Henry II*, p.127, n.2) and armed escorts were provided for crossings transporting treasure (PR 20 Henry II, pp. 134-5). The importance of the Channel to Henry is illustrated by his use of the Hand of St James, with the relic being brought to him so that he could invoke its protection before he crossed (B. Kemp, ed. and trans., 'The Miracles of the Hand of St James: Translated with an Introduction', *Berkshire Archaeological Journal*, 65 (1970), pp. 1-19 (no. xxvi, p.18)). For the significance Henry attached to the relic, see N. Vincent, 'The Pilgrimages of the Angevin Kings of England 1154-1272', in C. Morris and P. Roberts, ed., Pilgrimage: The English Experience from Becket to Bunyon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 12-45 (at pp. 24-5, 29-30).
[116] W.R. Jones, 'England against the Celtic Fringe', p.162.
[117] *Opera*, VI, pp. 207, 224. Walter Map suggested 'the glory of the Welsh is in plunder and theft' (*De Nugis Curialium*, p.197).
[118] In 1146, with Ranulf of Chester imprisoned, Owain destroyed the castle of Mold and built a castle at Iâl in 1149, threatening both Chester and Powys, before securing Tegeingl in 1150 (*Brut* (Pen. 20), pp. 55-7; *Brut* (RBH), pp. 125-9).
[119] Wales remained relatively peaceful during 1173-4, with important figures from Deheubarth, Gwynedd and Powys all sending support to Henry II. Iorwerth ab Owain of Caerleon's siege of Caerleon, while Henry was occupied by the rebellion, was the only noteworthy disturbance (*Brut* (Pen. 20), p.70). For Welsh opposition to Henry in 1173-4, see below p.86.

Henry II for profit, supporting at Tutbury and sending Hywel to Normandy 'so that the king might place greater trust in him'.[120] This transformation in outlook was, in part, due to the mutually beneficial relationship that had developed between the two rulers. The relative peace it created in Wales even made it possible for Henry to use marcher lords from south Wales and Ireland to assist in Normandy.[121] It was this policy in Wales, especially after Owain's death in 1170, that allowed the king to draw on the continued support of Welsh troops and the role they played in helping to end the rebellion at Rouen in 1174 was only made possible by Henry's relationship with Rhys.

[120] *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.69.
[121] In 1173 Richard de Clare and Hugh de Lacy, with their wealth of military experience, were positioned in the strategically important castles of Gisors and Verneuil respectively (*Song*, line 2,885; Howden, II, p.49).

Chapter Four

Anglo-Welsh Relations and Propaganda

Part I: Anglo-Welsh Relations

Henry II's Welsh campaigns had opened his eyes to the difficulty of fighting in Wales, but also to the possibilities Welsh troops could provide in his service. Their rise to prominence in the armies he deployed on the continent owed much to the invasion of Ireland in 1171-2. Preparations for this invasion would force Henry to return to Wales for the first time since 1165; failure to secure a meaningful conclusion then would now lead him to revisit his relationship with Wales. The decision to march to Pembrokeshire, before sailing to Ireland, would place the king at the head of an army in south Wales and compel him to meet with his former adversary Rhys ap Gruffudd once more.[1] This meeting led to a change in policy and the relationship that developed between the two would ultimately ensure Welsh troops became increasingly available to Henry. Though the timing would help divert attention in the wake of Thomas Becket's murder, Ireland had become politically important to England following the success of the marcher lords from south Wales who had gone to assist Diarmait Mac Murchada, king of Leinster, in recovering his lands.[2] The rapid rise of these adventurers alarmed the king, especially the success of Richard de Clare, now commonly known as Strongbow, who inherited Leinster on Diarmait's death in May 1171.[3] With his success Strongbow was, according to William of Newburgh, 'now nearly a king', and fearing that his subjects may establish

[1] Henry II often looked for truces, alliances or friendships near his intended target. At Toulouse in 1159, for instance, he made peace with Ramón Berenguer, count of Barcelona, and Raymond Trencavel to the south and William of Montpellier to the east (WN, I, pp. 123-5).

[2] Gervase of Canterbury suggested the main reason for Henry's expedition to Ireland and its timing was to avoid a sentence of interdict over Thomas Becket's murder (Gervase, I, pp. 232-6). In his *Vita S. Remigii*, Gerald of Wales offers a similar view with Henry fleeing to Ireland to avoid judgement (*Opera,* VII, pp. 61-2). Henry's invasion, however, was not completely unprecedented and as early as 1155 Robert of Torigni noted plans to conquer Ireland for Henry's brother William were discussed, but postponed after opposition from his mother (Torigni, p.106).

[3] Strongbow married Diarmait's daughter, Aoife, less than a year before the king of Leinster died (W.M. Hennessy, ed., *The Annals of Loch Cé: A Chronicle of Irish Affairs, 1014–1590,* 2 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1871), I, pp. 143-5). For the background to Henry's Irish campaign, see M.T. Flanagan 'Strongbow, Henry II and Anglo-Norman Intervention in Ireland', in J. Gillingham and J.C. Holt, ed., *War and Government in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of J.O. Prestwich* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1984), pp. 62-77.

independent territories beyond his control, Henry now determined to travel to Ireland and assert his authority.[4]

Once the decision to invade had been taken, thoughts would have turned to legitimizing royal actions. The propaganda justifying this invasion would strengthen perceptions about the English and their 'Celtic' neighbours and Gerald of Wales, with his family participating in the invasion, provides the strongest defence of the campaign. He suggested that England had both an ancient claim through the kings of Britain and modern claims through papal confirmation.[5] As with the Welsh campaigns, money was not spared in raising and supplying the army.[6] Henry's approach in Ireland appeared in the blueprint for how to conquer Wales, where Gerald advocated an economic blockade, fortifying the interior with castles, and using displays of power to intimidate the enemy into compliance. Gerald observed that Ireland could not survive without the goods and trade which came to it, and naval restrictions were put in place to stop men, money and supplies going there.[7] Once the important ports of Dublin, Waterford and Wexford were under royal control trading links were re-established.[8] Castles were used as aggressive statements of intent and symbols of stability, administration and control. The *Song of Dermot* commented that it was through castles, keeps and strongholds that the invaders 'put

[4] WN, I, p.168: '*jam paene regnantem*'.
[5] *Opera*, V, p.149. Colin Veach suggests that arguments for Henry's invasion continued to be made after its initial discussion in 1155 and by 1171 there were a number of clerics ready to justify actions based on religious and cultural superiority (C. Veach, 'Henry II and the Ideological Foundations of Angevin Rule in Ireland', *Irish Historical Studies*, 42 (2018), pp. 1-25). In 1159, for example, John of Salisbury claimed the pope granted and entrusted Ireland to Henry II 'to be possessed by him and his heirs, as the papal letters still give evidence' (D.D. McGarry, trans., *The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury: A Twelfth-Century Defence of the Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955), p.274).
[6] After holding a council at Argentan in July 1171 to complete plans for the expedition, Henry left for England on 3 August (Torigni. p.252; *GH*, I, p.24). The Pipe Rolls show 6,424½ measures, probably quarters, of wheat, 2,000 of oats, 584 of beans, with 4,106 bacon pigs, 160 quarters of salt and 840 weys of cheese were provided for the campaign (M. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, p.249). In 1170-1 Gloucestershire accounted for 300 horse-loads of wheat, 24 measures of beans and 200 bacon pigs for the king's army in Ireland. 2,000 picks, 1,000 spades, canvas, twigs and hay were also provided with sailors hired to transport the goods to Bristol (PR 17 Henry II, p.84). Berkshire accounted for 30 carts to transport provisions to Bristol and five carts were hired in Gloucester for the king's use in Ireland (PR 17 Henry II, pp. 17, 88-9).
[7] *Opera*, V, p.259. For the connection between commercial dependence and political control, see 'Patterns of Domination', in R.R. Davies, *Domination and Conquest*, pp. 1-24, especially pp. 7-11. William of Newburgh noted Henry reacted to news of Strongbow's success by confiscating his lands and stopping naval traffic between England and Ireland (WN, I, pp. 168-9). The Pipe Rolls include references to financial punishments for men going to Ireland without the king's permission (PR 17 Henry II, pp. 29, 92; PR 18 Henry II, p.49).
[8] The exchequer recorded £27 20d. paid for wine bought at Waterford and Gloucestershire accounted for £40 of herrings purchased at Wexford, while Dorset and Somerset recorded the passage of 100 horses from Ireland to England (PR 18 Henry II, pp. 72, 119). The importance of these commercial and strategic centres was further illustrated by Henry's placement of trusted representatives within them. Hugh de Lacy was made constable of Dublin, Robert FitzBernard constable of Waterford, with the help of Humphrey de Bohun and Hugh de Gundiville, and William FitzAdelin, Philip de Hastings and Philip de Braose were left to govern Wexford (*GH*, I, p.30; *Opera*, V, p.286).

down firm roots' in their new lands.[9] In Wales Henry had invested heavily in castles, but in Ireland there was no royal infrastructure and his preparations suggest he would have to clear woodlands, open tracks and rapidly erect buildings to create a presence.[10] As for displays of power, William of Newburgh noted that the sight of Henry's army inspired such terror in the Irish that it led to the country being subdued.[11]

The impressive military display was matched by a demonstration of English royal wealth and sophistication *par excellence*. The see of Winchester accounted for 1,000lbs of wax, 569lbs of almonds, scarlet and green materials, silks, spices and various pelts sent to Ireland.[12] Henry entertained Irish nobles at his Christmas court in Dublin, where Gerald noted their amazement at 'the most sumptuous and plentiful fare … and the most elegant service.' He suggested that in obedience with the king's wishes they ate crane 'which they had hitherto loathed'.[13] This symbolic event, perhaps, goes further than the Irish bending to Henry's will or returning to a 'civilised' diet, as Gerald previously remarked that eating cranes 'will tame and soften hearts that were once as hard and unyielding as iron and compel … them to the union of brotherly peace.'[14] Gerald thus suggests Henry was effectively feeding peace to Ireland. The cost of this extravagant display of power was great, but also the logistics involved in the campaign were

[9] *Song*, line 3,205, p.135. William of Newburgh suggested it was through strategic castles that Strongbow was able to extend his lands (WN, I, p.167). The Annals of Loch Cé noted that Hugh de Lacy was a prolific builder of castles in Meath, to such an extent that the area became 'full of castles and foreigners' (W.M. Hennessy, ed., *The Annals of Loch Cé*, I, p.173). For the use of castles as a symbol of domination in Ireland, see (R.R. Davies, *Domination and Conquest*, p.41).

[10] Lancaster accounted for two wooden towers to be sent to Ireland possibly to be used in construction (PR 17 Henry II, p.29). Building materials and equipment flowed into Ireland, including 7,000 planks of wood transported from Carlisle, 140 spades, 140 pickaxes and 7,000 nails from Staffordshire, and 1,000 shovels, iron for 2,000 spades and 60,000 nails from Gloucester (PR 18 Henry II, pp. 69, 103, 122). In addition to these, a number of axes were supplied for the army in Ireland: 100 came from both Yorkshire and Gloucestershire, with a further 60 each from Herefordshire, Berkshire, Oxfordshire, Worcestershire, Buckinghamshire and Bedfordshire, Northumberland, Carlisle, Dorset and Somerset, Winchester, Warwickshire and Leicestershire, Shropshire, and Wiltshire (PR 18 Henry II, pp. 55, 119, 2, 13, 18, 21, 69, 71, 84, 106, 110, 123). A further ten axes and apparatus for 90 more were accounted for in Staffordshire (PR 18 Henry II, p.103).

[11] WN, I, p.169.

[12] PR 18 Henry II, p.86. A palace of wicker was constructed for Henry in Dublin and ships were hired to carry the king's treasure with wine and garments to Ireland (*GH*, I, p.29; Howden, I, p.32; PR 18, Henry II, p.119). 2,000 yards of burel were sent to Ireland and five carts were hired to carry clothing for the king's retinue from Oxford to Warwick and from Stafford to Chester before being shipped to Ireland (PR 18 Henry II, pp. 18, 84, 103). Henry's swords were polished and adorned with gold and silver (PR 18 Henry II, pp. 84, 103, 144).

[13] *Expugnatio*, p.97.

[14] *Opera*, V, pp. 46-7; translation J.J. O'Meara, trans., *The History and Topography of Ireland*, p.41. There may be some truth behind cranes being on the menu as not only were they popular at royal feasts, but their hunting may have formed part of the royal display. Gerald provides an anecdote about Henry using a Norwegian hawk in Pembrokeshire as he waited for favourable winds to carry him to Ireland (*Opera*, VI, p.99). Lincolnshire accounted for five gyrfalcons for the use of the king (PR 18 Henry II, p.89) and Gloucestershire for horses and garments for the king's fowlers (PR 18 Henry II, pp. 89, 119). Gyrfalcons, from Norway, were highly valued for their ability to catch cranes (R.S. Oggin, *The Kings and their Hawks: Falconry in Medieval England* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004), p.13).

significant. Roger of Howden observed Henry setting sail with 400 large ships to transport his army with horses, equipment and provisions. This figure may be inflated, but Pipe Roll evidence suggests over 1,000 sailors were hired for the fleet, or series of fleets.[15] The scale of this operation hinged, in part, on stability in Wales. Historically, the king's extended absence from England had proved problematic and often provided the catalyst for the Welsh to look to rectify past disagreements. Planning for what could be a potentially lengthy campaign, the need to maintain transport and communication links was of paramount importance and for this Henry's policy in Wales was crucial.

By early September 1171, the royal army had set out for Pembrokeshire to sail to Ireland from Milford Haven. As it gathered at Newnham, Rhys ap Gruffudd met with Henry to establish his allegiance and offer a tribute of 300 horses and 4,000 oxen, with the added surety of hostages as a show of good faith.[16] Failure to deliver the full amount did not affect their reconciliation and before Henry departed he bestowed important gifts upon Rhys.[17] As a sign of goodwill Rhys's son Hywel Sais, who had been held as a hostage in England since 1158, was returned. Henry also confirmed Rhys's possession of various lands, including some taken from marcher lords, as a possible indication that he was placing Rhys's interests above others in south Wales.[18] There were practical considerations behind this dramatic reconciliation: Henry required a centre for his campaign and needed to apply pressure on the Welsh lands of those who had gone to Ireland against his wishes. Milford Haven was not the only port available, and Henry's route there does not provide the evidence, as W.L. Warren believes, that a *détente* had taken place in Anglo-Welsh relations shortly after 1165.[19] With this route, the army could still be turned towards Rhys if necessary, but it may also have been a statement that Henry was now in control of Ireland's invasion. From the muster at Newnham, following the Roman road to Caerleon would take him through Chepstow and Strongbow's powerbase in south-east Wales.[20]

[15] *GH*, I, p.25; Howden, II, p.29. The Ulster Annals recorded 240 ships, but the account of Roger of Howden, as a possible eyewitness, confirms that the fleet was considerable (*Early Sources of Scottish History*, II, p.171; J. Gillingham, 'The Travels of Roger of Howden', p.83). For the hiring of sailors for Henry's Irish campaign, see Appendix III.
[16] The number of hostages varies, depending on the version of the *Brut*, between 14 (*Brut* (Pen. 20), p.67; *Bren*, p.173) and 24 hostages (*Brut* (RBH), p.153).
[17] Rhys chose 86 horses for Henry, who accepted the best 36 (*Brut* (Pen. 20), p.67).
[18] *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.67; *Brut* (RBH), p.155. Rhys received Ceredigion and Ystrad Tywi, with Emlyn, Ystlwyf and Efelffre in Dyfed. These confirmations included William FitzGerald's lands in Emlyn, taken in 1165, for which William's son Odo received 20 librates of land in Devon as compensation (PR 20 Henry II, p.87; *History of Wales*, II, p.542, n.28: '*in escambium castelli et terrae de Emelin quamdiu Resus filius Griffini ea habuerit*.'
[19] *Henry II*, p.165.
[20] *Expugnatio*, p.89; Howden, II, p.29; *Song*, line 2,228. A £10 payment by king's writ for the fortification of the castle of Striguil suggests Chepstow and Strongbow's lands had been taken into royal hands after he travelled to

In Pembrokeshire, the king could also apply pressure on the lands and supporters of the FitzGeralds, Robert FitzStephen, Meiler FitzHenry and others who had a new interest in Ireland.[21]

Lines of communication and safe passage for armies and provisions to Ireland relied on stability in Wales. The struggle of the containment policy after 1165 and the king's continued absence from England damaged his relations with the marcher barons. Henry seemed unwilling or unable to continue supporting them unconditionally.[22] The drain of both men and money towards a process that started in 1157 proved impossible to maintain from the continent after 1165, and it was increasingly difficult to justify years of campaigns and the building, repairing and garrisoning of castles that had not successfully subdued the Welsh. Ireland offered the disaffected marcher barons a chance to change their fortunes, but their success angered Henry and he landed near Waterford on 17 October 1171 intending to resolve the issue.[23] His expedition met with little opposition as he received homage from the English invaders, returning their new lands in Ireland as fiefs, and accepted the submission of many of the Irish rulers.[24] Henry's Christian purpose in Ireland was to be delivered through a reforming council at Cashel to implement a number of measures aimed, in part, to align the Irish Church with English liturgical practices.[25]

The weather delayed Henry's return until Easter 1172 and after landing near St David's on 17 April, he was quick to reward Welsh loyalty and to ensure continued unity he appointed Rhys 'justice on his behalf in all Deheubarth.'[26] It is not clear what this novel position entailed, but

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Ireland and Caerleon was taken and fortified as Henry's army moved through Wales towards Milford Haven (PR 16 Henry II, p.75; PR 18 Henry II, p.119). For the Roman road, classified as 60a, which started near Newnham, stretching 28.5 miles, and finished near Caerleon, see I.D. Margary, *Roman Roads in Britain* (London: John Baker, 1967), pp. 317-324.

[21] For the Geraldine lands in south Wales, see *Opera*, I, pp. 58-9. With the route through Wales, Henry employed similar tactics in 1165 as he travelled through Powys to apply pressure on those who stood against him. In 1168 his first act against rebels in Brittany was to target the lands and possessions of his enemies, notably Eudo de Porhoët and his family's principal castle of Château de Josselin (Torigni, pp. 236-7).

[22] P. Latimer, 'Henry II's Campaign against the Welsh', pp. 541-2.

[23] According to Roger of Howden, Henry sailed on 16 October (*GH*, I, p.125).

[24] *Expugnatio*, pp. 91-7. Strongbow crossed to England to surrender to Henry and was granted Leinster as a fief, with constables appointed to protect royal interests in Dublin, Waterford and Wexford (*Opera*, V, pp. 259, 286; Gervase, I, p.235; WN, I, p.168).

[25] *GH*, I, pp. 26-8; *Opera*, V, pp. 280-3. This Christian mission may also be reflected in the fact that, as Nicholas Vincent has shown, it was at about this time in 1172 that the formula *rex Dei gratia* was added to all letters and charters issued under Henry II's seal (N. Vincent, 'The Court of Henry', in *Henry II: New Interpretations*, pp. 278-334 (at p.324)).

[26] *GH*, I, p.30; *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.68. The importance of peace with Wales was suggested by Ralph of Diss, who noted Henry had no contact with his kingdom and dominions for almost 20 weeks (Diceto, I, p.350). After rewarding Rhys, Henry moved swiftly to the south coast and on to Normandy to meet the papal legates at

the shift in Henry's policy marked a significant change from the events of 1165 as both parties could see the benefits of a relationship based more on co-operation than conflict. The death of Owain Gwynedd in November 1170 made Rhys the most influential Welsh ruler, but also diminished the military threat from Wales and eased tensions with Henry. Successional disputes in Gwynedd and Powys, and the early successes secured in Ireland, deprived Rhys of a number of potential allies against the English.[27] Despite his own position of strength, less than a month after his attack on Owain Cyfeiliog had resulted in the death of Iorwerth Goch, Rhys had much to fear from Henry's appearance in Wales.[28] His calculated decision was to support Henry and rely on the English king's strength to guarantee his own. Thus, in 1173-4 when presented with an opportunity to take advantage of the king's absence from England, where William the Lion tried to capitalise by invading Northumbria, Rhys assisted Henry by offering his support. This was an unequivocal statement that he believed his interests were best served by siding with Henry II and not the rebels. Though their relationship experienced strains, notably after 1183-4, it was Rhys in his role as justiciar who helped provide some of the stability in the early years of *détente* with Henry.[29] In a public display of his allegiance, he led the native princes of south Wales to the council at Gloucester in June 1175. The council, mostly devoted to Welsh matters, concluded with an agreement between marcher barons and the Welsh leaders to preserve peace.[30] This was followed by councils at Geddington and Oxford in 1177 in which Dafydd ab Owain Gwynedd and Rhys, as the rulers of north and south Wales, formally recognised Henry as overlord in the presence of many Welsh nobles.[31]

Gorron on 16 May, before his ceremonial reconciliation with the Church at Avranches (Diceto, I, p.351; *MTB*, VII, no. 771, pp. 513-6).

[27] After Owain's death his son Hywel was killed by his half-brothers, Dafydd and Rhodri, at the battle of Pentraeth before the end of 1170 (*Annales Cambriae*, p.53; *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.65; *Brut* (RBH), p.165; *Bren*, p.171). By 1174 Dafydd had imprisoned, expelled or killed his rivals and started to emerge as the dominant force in Gwynedd. For the civil war in Gwynedd after November 1170, see *History of Wales*, II, pp. 549-552.

[28] *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.66; *Brut* (RBH), p.153. David Stephenson has plausibly suggested that killing Iorwerth, one of the mainstays of Henry II's Welsh policy after 1165, would have been considered a serious offence (D. Stephenson, *Medieval Powys*, p.68).

[29] The death of William of Gloucester on 23 November 1183 led to disturbances in his lands in south Wales, but as John Gillingham suggests this may have been less to do with the violence that often followed the death of an important figure and more that his daughter's betrothal to Henry's son John effectively placed Glamorgan in royal hands. Henry then strengthened his position in Wales with the purchase of Gower after the earl of Warwick's death in 1184. The king prepared an army to enter Wales, but Rhys met him at Worcester in July 1184 to make peace (GH, I, p.314; Gervase, I, p.309). For their complex relationship and the suggestion that Henry and Rhys were not always committed to peace, see J. Gillingham 'Henry II, Richard I and the Lord Rhys', in J. Gillingham, *The English in the Twelfth Century*, pp. 59-68.

[30] *GH*, I, p.92. The Welsh who accompanied Rhys included the rulers of Elfael, Glamorgan, Gwent Uwch-Coed, Gwerthrynion, Gwynllŵg, Maelienydd and Senghenydd (*Brut* (Pen. 20), p.70; *Brut* (RBH), p.165).

[31] *GH* I, pp. 159, 162; Howden, I, pp. 133-4.

Dafydd's loyalty had been encouraged through his marriage to Henry's half-sister, Emma of Anjou, in the summer of 1174. Whether the marriage came through Dafydd's request or as reward for support in 1173-4, its importance in facilitating relations between Gwynedd and England should not be underestimated.[32] This marriage formed part of Henry's long-term policy of offering Welshmen rewards for service. In return for lands, financial gifts and bribes, Henry hoped to maintain some control in the marches, provide protection for England and influence the balance of power in Wales. Rees Davies argues Henry's strategy provided 'reward for acknowledging subjection' with the incentives on offer proving almost 'irresistible to the impoverished and cashless'.[33] This policy created a number of intermediaries, or middlemen, employed as interpreters to communicate and negotiate on the king's behalf. As the political alliance between Powys and England countered Owain Gwynedd in the north, Iorwerth Goch, Roger of Powys and his brother Jonas received regular payments for their services.[34] Iorwerth, for instance, received over £250 from the exchequer between 1168 and 1171 as part of Henry's attempts to contain the Welsh.[35] Gerald of Wales noted the excellent stud farms in Powys and the prized horses of 'majestic proportions and incomparable speed'.[36] Given the emphasis Henry placed on travel, one of the benefits of his relationship with Powys was access to a regular supply of horses.

[32] Diceto, I, pp. 397-8. Dafydd was made to wait until the council at Oxford to formally receive his marriage gift, which included the Shropshire manor of Ellesmere (*GH*, I, p.162; Howden, II, pp. 153-4). The Pipe Rolls reveal expenses, including £28 17s. for clothing and apparel, as Emma was escorted to Wales by trusted royal administrator Wiliam FitzJohn (PR 20 Henry II, pp. 9, 16, 94). Emma's appearance with the title '*Domina Emma*' in a grant to Haughmond Abbey (August 1186 x 25 April 1194) suggests she maintained a high-profile position and likely played a diplomatic role (*AWR*, no. 202, p.335).

[33] R.R. Davies, *Domination and Conquest*, p.54.

[34] Madog ap Maredudd had strong links with England through Chester, supporting Ranulf II at both Lincoln (1141) and Coleshill (1150). The earl's death in in 1153 placed Chester in royal hands and Madog's political relationship was now with Henry II, who he supported against Gwynedd in 1157 and even received the honour of having his son knighted at Worcester (PR 3 Henry II, p.89; PR 4 Henry II, p.155). Iorwerth Goch received Sutton and other Shropshire manors for his role as an interpreter in 1157 (*History of Wales*, II, p.520).

[35] These payments to Iorwerth Goch again highlight the financial drain of Henry's policy towards Wales before 1171. Iorwerth received £91 in both 1168-9 and in 1169-70, and over £80 in 1170-1 (PR 15 Henry II, p.108; PR 16 Henry II, p.132; PR 17 Henry II, p.32). Roger and Jonas, among many payments, are recorded collecting £14 annually from Wrockwardine from 1172 until Jonas's death in 1174-5, when Roger received the full amount until his death in 1186-7 (PR 18 Henry II, p.110; PR 19 Henry II, p.107). For the careers of Roger and Jonas, see F.C. Suppe, 'Roger of Powys', pp. 1-23.

[36] *Opera*, VI, p.143; translation Gerald of Wales, p.201. Gerald described them as descended from Spanish horses imported by Robert de Bellême in the eleventh century. Cynddelw Brydydd Mawr portrayed Madog ap Maredudd as a 'companion of Gascon horses' and Nerys Ann Jones suggests he may have received a diplomatic gift of Spanish horses, shipped from Bordeaux, and crossed with Welsh mares (N.A. Jones, 'Horses in Medieval Welsh Court Poetry', in S. Davies and N.A. Jones, ed., *The Horse in Celtic Culture: Medieval Welsh Perspectives* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1997), pp. 82-101 (at p.91)). The quality of Powysian horses is confirmed by Roger of Powys receiving £3 by writ of the earl of Leicester for a destrier in 1166-7 and a further £4 as compensation for a horse the following year (PR 13 Henry II, p.59; PR 14 Henry II, p.93).

Henry's middlemen played an important military role and were often trusted with the custody of royal castles. After 1157 Roger of Powys was established at St Briavels and during the 1160s, with his brother, controlled Chirk, Overton and Whittington.[37] They were paid for garrisoning the castles and compensated for supplying victuals.[38] In return, Henry was able to rely upon local knowledge for diplomacy and access to experienced troops for use in the marches and further afield.[39] Despite John Gillingham's reservations concerning Welsh loyalty in 1173-4, especially in the south, several influential Welsh leaders came to Henry's aid with a significant number of men for use both in England and on the continent.[40] Rhys's role as justiciar would presumably have been to prevent Welsh opposition to Henry escalating into violence and disorder. His participation at Tutbury and willingness to allow men to cross to Normandy would suggest there was little threat of disruption near his lands. Henry was confident enough to concentrate his efforts on the continent and his faith in Rhys meant he could ignore Wales during his brief return to England in 1174.[41]

Rhys was the main beneficiary of Henry's new policy towards Wales. Sustained periods of relative peace after 1171 allowed him to initiate a castle-building programme to secure his lands, both historic and newly acquired. With the king's patronage, and threats of punishments for those opposing his will, Rhys accepted the opportunity to move away from conflict to concentrate on consolidation. Dinefwr was the historic capital of his dominions, but Cardigan

[37] PR 6 Henry II, p.26. Roger also received payment for repair work carried out on the tower of Shrewsbury (PR 11 Henry II, pp. 89-90).
[38] In 1166-7, for instance, Roger provided 20 horse-loads of corn for Whittington, Jonas 20 horse-loads of corn for Overton and Iorwerth 40 horse-loads of corn for Chirk (PR 14 Henry II, p.110). Iorwerth had been rewarded for his return to favour in 1166 with custody of Chirk.
[39] Roger of Powys may have assisted in England as he received a payment of 102s. for providing sergeants at the royal castle at Haughley in Suffolk (PR 19 Henry II, p.108). For the suggestion that '*Daggenot*' possibly referred to *Haganet* or Haughley, see F.C. Suppe, 'Roger of Powys', p.15.
[40] Gillingham's suggestion is based primarily on the reference in the *Brut* to rulers 'who had been in opposition to the king' attending at Gloucester in 1175 (J. Gillingham 'Henry II, Richard I and the Lord Rhys', pp. 60-2). Whether this entry is referring specifically to actions in 1173-4 or at any point after 1165 is unclear. Iorwerth ab Owain of Gwynllŵg had an obvious reason to oppose Henry, but even this opposition may have been aimed primarily at marcher lords. Strongbow had taken both Caerleon and Usk from him before going to Ireland, and Iorwerth's son Owain was murdered by William of Gloucester's men in 1172. In response Iorwerth and his other son Hywel captured Caerleon and ravaged lands in the king's absence in 1173 (*Brut* (RBH), p.159; *Opera*, VI, p.60). Whether any other opposition was expressed through violence though is less clear. Cadwallon ap Madog of Maelienydd and Einion Clud of Elfael, also present at Gloucester in 1175, appear to have relieved any tensions through the promise of 1,000 cattle. The Pipe Rolls record '£333 6s. 8d. *de fine Cadewallan et Enial Clut quem fecerunt cum Rege de animalibus, quisque de mille*' (PR 21 Henry II, pp. 88-9). An initial payment of £122 12s. was received, but the balance remained unpaid in 1189 (J. Hunter, ed., *The Great Rolls of the Pipe for the First Year of the Reign of Richard I*, 1189-1190 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1844), p.142).
[41] Evidence from the Pipe Rolls suggest sheriffs were more concerned with England than Wales. Herefordshire accounted for 100 sergeants sent to Normandy, Shropshire accounted for 330 sergeants for the siege of Leicester and a further 80 sergeants sent overseas to the king (PR 19 Henry II, pp. 38-9, 107-8). The sheriffs of London and Middlesex accounted for 166 sergeants '*de Marchia*', under Miles de Cogan from Glamorgan, before their departure was recorded in Sussex (PR 20 Henry II, pp. 8, 118).

was to become the contemporary focal point representing his new status. Rhys had built castles before, usually in response to threats of invasion and out of military necessity.[42] Cardigan, however, was not intended as a frontier outpost, but a display of strength and permanence as the first stone castle built by a Welsh ruler.[43] Cardigan's importance was confirmed by the festival for bards, poets and musicians it hosted in 1176 and in 1188 Archbishop Baldwin was entertained there.[44] Rhys's programme of rebuilding provided opportunities to develop trade and to encourage this he resisted tradition by not destroying the boroughs of Llandovery and Cardigan after taking them. Through his relationship with Henry, Rhys had greater access to construction materials from England and by protecting the boroughs he could access the financial and trading connections needed to fulfil his ambitions.[45] A grant to Chertsey Abbey issued from Cardigan suggests the borough maintained both its community of foreign settlers and its commercial links. The presence of Aylbrutus of Bristol and Lambert of Flanders among the witnesses imply these links went at least to Bristol and confirm Rhys's commitment to peaceful co-existence extended beyond his relationship with Henry.[46]

Rhys also looked to consolidate his territories and confirm his ascendancy by marrying his daughters into influential Welsh families. A successful policy of establishing strong local links became clear when he arrived for the council at Gloucester in 1175 and of the seven rulers he accompanied, he was related to six of them by marriage.[47] Marriage also provided Rhys with the opportunity to increasingly influence marcher families, with his daughter Angharad

[42] In 1156 Rhys erected Aberdyfi in response to Owain Gwynedd threatening Ceredigion. Castles of earth and timber were built by Rhys at Ammanford, Llanegwad, and Pencader during the 1160s (R.K. Turvey, 'The Defences of Twelfth-century Deheubarth and the Castle Strategy of Lord Rhys', *Archaeologia Cambrensis*, 144 (1995), pp. 103-132 (at p.107).
[43] R.A. Griffiths, 'The Making of Medieval Cardigan', *Ceredigion*, 11 (1990), pp. 97-133 (at p.105). Henry's departure from Wales in 1165 allowed Rhys to take and destroy Roger de Clare's castle at Cardigan and after 1171 it was to be rebuilt in 'stone and mortar' (*Brut* (Pen. 20), p.64; *Brut* (RBH), pp. 147, 155).
[44] *Brut* (Pen), p.71; *Brut* (RBH), p.167; *Opera*, VI, p.112. For the festival's cultural importance, see M. Richter, 'National identity in Medieval Wales', in A.P. Smyth, ed., *Medieval Europeans: Studies in Ethnic Identity and National Perspectives in Medieval Europe* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), pp 71-84, especially p.76.
[45] Between 1171 and 1189 castles at Cardigan, Cilgerran, Dinefwr, Llandovery, Rhayader and Ystrad Meurig were all rebuilt or refortified with stone and a wooden castle was also erected near Aberystwyth (R.K. Turvey, 'The Defences of Twelfth-century Deheubarth', pp. 111-120). Kidwelly may also have been rebuilt in stone on earlier foundations (*Brut* (RBH), p.173). Rhys's building programme was not limited to castles, with stone from Somerset shipped from Bristol to Aberarth and transported to Strata Florida (E.G. Bowen, 'The Monastic Economy of the Cistercians at Strata Florida', *Ceredigion*, 1 (1950), pp. 34-7 (at p.37)). For Rhys's monastic patronage, see B. Golding, 'Trans-border Transactions: Patterns of Patronage in Anglo-Norman Wales', *Haskins Society Journal*, 16 (2006), pp. 27-46.
[46] *AWR*, no. 26, pp. 168-70. Names like Walter Palmer, Jordan Coterell, John the Reeve and his son Turstin as witnesses to the Chertsey grant suggest the presence of an established non-Welsh community in Cardigan.
[47] A.J. Roderick, 'Marriage and Politics in Wales, 1066–1282', *Welsh History Review*, 4 (1968), pp. 3-20 (at pp. 10-11).

marrying William FitzMartin, lord of the neighbouring Cemais.[48] The most significant marriage, however, was that of his designated heir Gruffudd to William de Braose's daughter.[49] Cross-culture marriages were not uncommon for political, economic or even dynastic motives; Iorwerth Goch, for instance, married the daughter of Roger de Manley of Cheshire in the late 1140s.[50] Deheubarth, though, had historically looked within Wales for matches, this break with tradition for a closer union with his marcher neighbours confirmed Rhys's position of power and an acceptance that Gwynedd and Powys were currently not the strengths they once were.[51] For now, Rhys looked to forge stronger links with England to establish his lands and confirm his position as the most powerful Welsh ruler.[52] Despite this policy of co-existence with the English, the process of integration between the culturally and linguistically distinct groups of the marcher society and Wales remained slow.[53] The environment that created a demand for interpreters, middlemen, and cross-cultural marriages, especially at the top of society, only highlighted the slow progress of assimilation. Gerald's tour with Archbishop Baldwin in 1188 provides several examples of the difficulties created by the culture and language barriers. Baldwin's first act upon entering Wales was to deliver a public sermon and then wait while it was translated to the public. Gerald preached at Haverfordwest first in Latin and then French, with many present unable to understand either language.[54] The clearest example, however, can be found at Llandaff where Gerald observed that 'the English stood on one side and the Welsh on the other.'[55]

Neither alliance nor marriage could completely prevent conflict. Years of feuding and fighting between the native Welsh and the marcher barons was not easily forgotten. The fear and

[48] *Opera,* VI, p.111.
[49] The marriage had taken place by 1189, when the Annales Cambriae records William de Braose as Gruffudd's father-in-law (*Annales Cambriae*, p.57: '*Willielmoque de Breusa socero suo*').
[50] F.C. Suppe, 'Interpreter Families and Anglo-Welsh Relations in the Shropshire-Powys Marches in the Twelfth Century', *Anglo-Norman Studies*, 30 (2008), pp. 196-212 (at pp. 209-10). As part of the process of conquering Ireland Richard de Clare, Hugh de Lacy, William de Burgh and John de Courcy married into native dynasties (S. Duffy, 'The First Ulster Plantation: John de Courcy and the Men of Cumbria', in T.B. Barry, R. Frame and K. Simms, ed., *Colony and Frontier in Medieval Ireland: Essays Presented to J.F. Lydon* (London: Hambledon Press, 1995), pp 1-27 (at p.25)).
[51] Gruffudd ap Rhys's marriage to Matilda broke a tradition that had been observed for over a hundred years (A. J. Roderick, 'Marriage and Politics', p.9).
[52] Roger of Howden acknowledged Rhys's position and regal status at the council of Oxford in 1177, describing him as '*regem Resus filius Griphini regulus de Suthwales*' (Howden, II, p.133).
[53] For discussion on marcher integration, see I. Rowlands, 'The Making of the March. Aspects of the Norman Settlement of Dyfed', *Anglo-Norman Studies*, 3 (1981), pp. 142-158; 'The Anglo-Norman Settlement and the Making of the Marcher Society', in R.R. Davies, *The Age of Conquest*, pp. 82-107.
[54] *Opera,* VI, pp. 14, 83. Alexander, archdeacon of Bangor, was called upon to act as interpreter for Baldwin at Usk and at Anglesey (*Opera*, VI, pp. 55, 126).
[55] *Opera,* VI, p.67; translation Gerald of Wales, p.127.

suspicion surrounding these local conflicts often spread from the border and penetrated deeper into society. Gervase of Canterbury recorded a series of articles, introduced in late 1169, which included measures to arrest any Welsh cleric or layman arriving in England without letters from the king and ordered the exclusion of all Welshmen from schools in England.[56] The first part of these instructions would prevent communication with Thomas Becket, but the expulsion from schools went further and suggests, as Huw Pryce maintains, 'that the Welsh were regarded as enemies in their own right rather than just supporters of Becket.'[57] Despite Henry and Rhys's reconciliation a deep level of mistrust and unease existed between the two countries. Gerald of Wales hinted at the perpetual cycle of border violence: 'sometimes by the local inhabitants at the expense of those in command of the castles, and then, the other way round, the vindictive retaliations.'[58] He is referring to the massacre of Abergavenny in 1175, when Seisyll ap Dynfwal, his wife, young son, and some of Gwent's leading men were killed, but his comments on the cycle of violence could be applied to any number of events.[59] In 1179, for example, Cadwallon ap Madog of Maelienydd, returning from court charged with breaking the peace, was ambushed and killed by Roger de Mortimer's men.[60] The culprits received royal justice as Cadwallon was under safe conduct, but the feud lasted into Richard I's reign and beyond.[61] The continuing private wars and pursuit of ancestral ambitions did little to aid relations between England and Wales. William of Newburgh opined that the Welsh were 'hostile to the English race with an almost inbred hatred.'[62] Reports of Welsh, and indeed Irish and Scottish, hatred towards England became repetitive and often appeared in stories of brutality and barbarous acts

[56] Gervase, I, p.215: '*Si quis Walensis, clericus vel laicus, applicuerit, nisi habeat litteras domini regis de passagio suo, capiatur et custodiatur, et omnes Walenses qui sunt in scolis in Anglia eiciantur*.'
[57] H. Pryce, 'Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII', p.12. This may serve as evidence of Henry's efforts to contain the Welsh within Wales, but also casts further doubt on W.L. Warren's belief that *détente* between England and Wales had started soon after 1165 (see above p.82).
[58] *Opera*, VI, pp. 49-50; translation Gerald of Wales, p.109.
[59] *Opera*, VI, pp. 47-54. Seisyll was considered responsible for the death of Miles of Gloucester's son. Gerald noted Miles had five sons, but 'all died without issue; and every one of them, by some extraordinary act of vengeance or by some fatal misfortune, came to an untimely end' (*Opera*, VI, pp. 29-30; translation Gerald of Wales, pp. 89-90). William de Braose invited Seisyll and the leading chieftains of Gwent to Abergavenny at Christmas; once unarmed and inside the castle, they were murdered (*Opera*, VI, p.54).
[60] Diceto, I, pp. 437-8. In 1145 Hugh de Mortimer's efforts to dominate neighbouring Welsh territories through reconquest and expansion led to the capture and imprisonment of Rhys ap Hywel and the death of Maredudd ap Madog of Maelienydd a year later (*Annales Cambriae*, pp. 43-4; *Brut* (Pen. 20), pp. 53-4; *Brut* (RBH), p.121).
[61] Roger was imprisoned, his lands were confiscated and Cymaron castle was placed in the king's hands (Diceto, I, pp. 437-8). Payments were made for the transfer of prisoners to Worcester and Windsor for trial over the death of Cadwallon as some of Roger's men were hanged, while others were imprisoned, suffered forfeiture or were exiled (PR 25 Henry II, p.39). In 1195 Roger returned with an army, expelled Cadwallon's sons, Maelgwyn and Hywel, from their lands and rebuilt Cymaron (*Brut* (RBH), p.175). For the struggle for Maelienydd continuing between the families into the thirteenth century, see *AWR*, pp. 16-18.
[62] WN, I, p.107; translation P.G. Walsh and M.J. Kennedy, ed. and trans., *The History of English Affairs*, II, p.23. Gwalchmai ap Meilyr, celebrating Owain Gwynedd, captured this opposition to England: 'Gwalchmai am I called, a foe to all English' (quoted in *History of Wales*, II, p.532).

committed against the English. In 1171, Gerald has the Irish searching the houses of Waterford for the English before cruelly putting them to death 'without respect for sex or age'.[63] In 1174 after the failed Scottish invasion, William of Newburgh has the Scots turning on the English and killing any they could find in the towns and boroughs of Scotland.[64]

Part II: Propaganda

If Gerald's sermon at Llandaff highlighted the divide between England and Wales, it also showed a belief that religion and warfare could unite people towards a common cause as once he had finished many from both countries took the Cross.[65] While the invasion of Ireland was not a crusade, the ideological justification tapped into the same uniting themes and defended violence as necessary to usher in essential religious and cultural reforms.[66] Its propaganda was founded in the twelfth-century renaissance and reaffirmed the views expressed by the likes of William of Malmesbury that 'Celtic' nations were religiously and culturally backwards and inhabited by barbarians. Rotrou of Rouen, condemning war in 1173, shows how acceptable it had become to fight barbarians: 'You fight not against barbarian nations, but your own followers and household.'[67] To Gerald, the Irish were barbarians; outside the normal practices of other Christians, not attending church with due reverence, they were 'wallowing in vice' and guilty of indulging in any number of 'adulterous, incestuous … horrible practices'.[68] Not all views were so extreme, but they did encourage the belief that strong government was required in Ireland to implement necessary ecclesiastical reforms and, as Ralph of Diss suggested, Henry went there to provide order and authority.[69] This also allowed the king to

[63] *Expugnatio*, p.141
[64] WN, I, p.186.
[65] Gerald suggested about 3,000 took the Cross as a result of the 1188 tour (*Opera*, V, p.147). Crusading was important to him and the loss of Jerusalem in 1187 weighed heavy. Gerald took the Cross while assisting Archbishop Baldwin's preaching tour, was critical of delays to the crusade (*Opera*, VI, p.147), and would even dream of the threat posed in the East (*Opera*, V, pp. 369-72; *Opera*, VIII, pp. 264-9).
[66] Crusader narratives justifying violence and conquests in the Holy Land feature prominently in Gerald's view of the reforming and civilising mission required in Ireland. For crusade-inspired justifications and the use of religious correction to explain the invasion, see C. Veach, 'Henry II and the Ideological Foundations of Angevin Rule in Ireland', pp. 1-25. Religious justification for violence was a common theme across Europe and Girart de Vienne's feud with Charlemagne, for instance, is stopped by the visit of an angel proclaiming that God wants them to unite against a different enemy (M. Newth, trans., *The Song of Girart of Vienne*, lines 5,906-5,913).
[67] *RHF*, XVI, no. 23, p.630: '*Non barbaras impugnas nations, sed familiares et domesticos*.' The letter was composed for the archbishop of Rouen by Peter of Blois.
[68] *Opera*, V, pp. 164, 182; translation J.J. O'Meara, trans., *The History and Topography of Ireland*, pp. 106, 118.
[69] Diceto, I, pp. 350-1. William of Newburgh provides a similar assessment, concluding that the Irish were ignorant of law and order having never been subject to foreign control (WN, I, p.166).

demonstrate his good faith and concern for the Church and deflect some of the mounting criticism over his role in Becket's murder.[70] Through a letter of Alexander III in 1172, Henry received papal backing for his actions and the right to control Ireland because he had extended peace over 'that barbarous and uncouth people'.[71]

Renewed interest in classical literature in the twelfth century and increased exposure to views like Cicero's progress from savagery to civilisation revived the concept of the barbarian: 'civilised man's degenerate, deceitful, and deadly antagonist.'[72] The great civilisations compared themselves favourably with barbarians and by defining others as inferior and primitive, it was the English, fuelled by the belief of superiority, who could bring necessary reform and provide the law and order that was lacking in barbarous countries.[73] A belief that dictated their actions as it was necessary, Gerald of Wales noted, for Hugh de Lacy to subdue Meath before making the Irish obey and observe laws.[74] Henry of Huntingdon has Ralph, bishop of Orkney, delivering the speech before the Standard in 1138, reminding the English of their superiority: 'you should call to mind your reputation and origin: consider well who you are and against whom and where you are fighting'.[75] It would be through English efforts that divine punishment was to be delivered upon the Scots for their sins. This sense of superiority and confidence could be alluring, Jordan Fantosme even has William the Lion succumbing: 'He cherished, loved and held dear people from abroad. He never had much affection for those of his own country'.[76] As Huw Pryce suggests, 'identity is not simply a matter of self-

[70] There was growing outrage over Thomas Becket's death, including 'letters and epistles containing complaint and calumny … now with threats, now with insistent warnings they instructed him (Henry) to make appropriate satisfaction to the Catholic Church' (*MTB*, IV, p.159; translation M. Staunton, ed. and trans., *The Lives of Thomas Becket*, p.213).
[71] *EHD*, II, no. 162, p.923. The pope also contacted the Irish prelates urging them to assist Henry so that 'this undisciplined and untamed people may in every way be led to respect the divine law and the practice of the Christian faith' (no. 160, p.920).
[72] W.R. Jones, 'Image of the Barbarian in Medieval Europe', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 13 (1971), pp. 376-407 (quote at p.406).
[73] For the strengthening of the view of 'Celtic' peoples as barbarians during the 1130s and 1140s and the re-emerging sense of English solidarity and identity, see J. Gillingham 'The Context and Purposes of Geoffrey of Monmouth's History of the Kings of Britain', pp. 19-39; *idem*, 'The Foundations of a Disunited Kingdom' pp. 93-109; *idem*, 'Henry of Huntingdon and the Twelfth-century Revival of the English Nation', pp. 123-44. For the trend of defining groups and opponents across Europe to justify actions, see R.C. Hoffmann, 'Outsiders by Birth and Blood: Racist Ideologies and Realities around the Periphery of Medieval European Culture', *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History*, 6 (1983), pp. 3-34.
[74] *Opera*, V, p.353. The belief that the English were conquerors is reflected in the *Brut* with Henry I saying to Gilbert FitzRichard 'I will give you the land of Cadwgan ap Bleddyn. Go and take possession of it' (*Brut* (Pen. 20), p.34). The *Song of Dermot* has Henry II granting Ulster to John de Courcy if he can conquer it by force (*Song*, line 2,736).
[75] D. Greenway, ed. and trans., *Historia Anglorum*, p.715.
[76] JF, p.49.

perception; it is also a matter of how one is seen, and wishes to be seen by others.'[77] Scottish behaviour had prompted England to act in 1138 and it did again in 1173-4. Ralph of Diss has the English nobles taking up arms to defend churches and protect innocents against Scottish cruelty.[78] This view of how the English wished to be seen was, perhaps, captured by their portrayal in the *Song of Dermot* as 'noble and courtly' knights.[79] William of Newburgh made a very clear distinction between knights and the others in the Scottish armies of 1173-4. He believed the low-status Scots to be 'more savage than wild animals in seeking their prey' and guilty of committing acts 'which are dreadful even to mention.' The knights with courtly and English connections who accompanied the Scottish king, however, were 'a more honourable and less savage troop'.[80] Views of 'Celtic' barbarians and their contrast to knightly virtues would come profoundly to shape expectations and perceptions of warfare and help create fear of the Welsh in Henry's armies.

English depictions of their 'Celtic' neighbours became increasingly stereotyped and derivative. The Scots, for example, were condemned in 1138 for atrocities that included dismembering priests, killing children and drinking blood. One of the most vivid scenes is of them ripping unborn children out of pregnant women. This image was often repeated to represent the savage nature of Scottish warfare and it clearly possessed great value as propaganda.[81] Though Gerald dismissed the Scots as 'people about whom there is nothing good to say', it was his works on Ireland and Wales that would see him emerge as a leading propagandist against the 'Celtic' regions.[82] His five-fold English claim to Ireland and consistent depiction of its primitive and

[77] H. Pryce, 'British or Welsh? National Identity in Twelfth-Century Wales', *English Historical Review*, 116 (2001), pp. 775-801 (at p.795).
[78] D. Greenway, ed. and trans., *Historia Anglorum*, p.714; Diceto, I, p.376. Aelred of Rievaulx notes that Thurstan, archbishop of York, issued an edict urging people: 'to defend the church of Christ against the barbarians' (*Relatio de Standardo* in *Chronicles*, III, p.182: '*ecclesiasm Christi contra barbaros defensuri*').
[79] Richard de Marreis is labelled 'a noble and courtly knight' and Walter de Riddlesford 'noble and warlike' as they gathered with as many as 20 noble barons (*Song*, lines 1,800-1812, p.99).
[80] WN, I, pp. 182-3; translation P.G. Walsh and M.J. Kennedy, ed. and trans., *The History of English Affairs*, II, p.135. For connections between the Scottish court and the northern English lords, see M. Strickland, 'Arms and the Men', p.219. William the Lion's younger brother had been knighted by Henry II in April 1170 and these knighting ceremonies could involve the dubbing of a number of young men to further strengthen bonds (*GH*, I, p.4). At Périgneux in 1159 when Malcolm IV was knighted by Henry, it was followed by the dubbing of 30 young nobles who had travelled to Toulouse with him (F. Bonnélye, trad., *Chronique de Geoffroy*, pp. 92-3).
[81] D. Greenway, ed. and trans., *Historia Anglorum*, pp. 714-6; *De Gestis Regis Stephani et de Bello Standardii* and *Relatio de Standardo* in *Chronicles*, III, p.152 and p.187. Ralph of Diss includes Scots venturing into northern counties in 1173, plundering and tearing children half-alive from their mothers' wombs (Diceto, I, p.376). Roger of Howden's description of the Scottish invasion of 1174 closely follows Henry of Huntingdon's version of the atrocities committed in 1138, with the invading Galwegians ripping open pregnant women (*GH*, I, p.64). William of Newburgh also includes the Scots ripping open the bowls of women (WN, I, p.183).
[82] *Opera*, VI, p.208; translation Gerald of Wales, pp. 257-8. In his *Vita Galfridi*, Gerald refers to 1173-4 and the Scottish invasion as the work of barbarians (*Opera*, IV, pp. 358, 365, 367).

uncivilised inhabitants contained many key themes that would influence later thoughts and words.[83] He portrayed the Irish and Welsh as falling below modern standards in appearance, dress, customs and habits.[84] The ecclesiastical reaction towards the 'Celtic' resistance to conform to more modern ideas about monogamy and restrictions on consanguineous marriages was expressed in derogatory terms. There was a trend to depict 'Celtic' peoples as morally corrupt, embroiled in adulterous and incestuous relationships, with Gerald even suggesting the Irish indulged in bestiality and that historically the Welsh had been unable to resist homosexuality.[85] A letter of John of Salisbury lamented how the Welsh kept concubines and 'ignoring the guilt of incest, they do not blush to uncover the nakedness of those who are their kin by ties of blood.'

John's letter also draws attention to the Welsh practice of slavery: 'they carry on a regular slave trade and sell Christians into foreign parts.'[86] This was another indicator of their barbarity and as John Gillingham suggests slavery was 'plausible in the twelfth-century Celtic world, but was inconceivable in chivalrous England.'[87] Indeed, 'modern' societies found it so repugnant that Gerald of Wales even went as far as to suggest the invasion of Ireland represented divine punishment for their involvement in slavery and purchasing English slaves.[88] As David Wyatt argues 'slave raiding and slave holding were important expressions of identity and patriarchal power', but slaves could also be a lucrative commodity.[89] As the slave trade disappeared in England in the early twelfth century, the export of slaves, often through Dublin, still formed part of the Irish and Welsh economies.[90] Gerald describes economic potential going unfulfilled

[83] *Opera*, V, pp. 149, 319-20. A new translation of Gerald's *Expugnatio Hibernica* circulated amongst the English community in Ireland in the fifteenth century. For its purpose in offering historic parallels for contemporary struggles and providing a foundation myth for the English settlers, see C. Whelan 'The Transmission of the Expugnatio Hibernica in Fifteenth-century Ireland', in A.J. McMullen and G. Henley, ed., *Gerald of Wales: New Perspectives*, pp. 243-258.
[84] Gerald even states that he was judging the Irish according to modern ideas and their diet, appearance, morals and customs were all considered barbarous (*Opera*, V, 150-3). For a view specifically of the Welsh, see R.R. Davies, 'The Manners and Morals of the Welsh', *Welsh History Review*, 12 (1984-5), pp. 155-179.
[85] *Opera*, V, pp. 108-10; *Opera*, VI, pp. 213-5.
[86] *Letters*, I, no. 87, p.135.
[87] J. Gillingham, 'Conquering the Barbarians', p.55.
[88] *Opera*, V, p.258.
[89] D. Wyatt, 'Slavery, Power and Cultural Identity in the Irish Sea Region, 1066-1171', in J.V. Sigurðsson and T. Bolton, ed., *Celtic-Norse Relationships in the Irish Sea in the Middle Ages, 800-1200* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2014), pp. 97-108 (at p.98). Richard of Hexham noted in 1138 the Galwegians carried off English women to be sold or exchanged for cattle (*De Gestis Regis Stephani et de Bello Standardii* in *Chronicles*, III, pp. 152, 156-7).
[90] For the possible links between Cardiff and Swansea with the Bristol-to-Dublin slave movement, see E.I. Bromberg, 'Wales and the Medieval Slave Trade', *Speculum*, 17 (1942), pp. 263-69 (at p.265). William of Malmesbury stated that it was through the preaching of Wulfstan that the slave trade between Bristol and Dublin was ended (M. Winterbottom and R. M. Thomson, ed. and trans., *William of Malmesbury, Saints' Lives: SS. Wulfstan, Dunstan, Patrick, Benignus and Indract* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), p.100).

as not only did the Irish weather make growing crops difficult, but the process was hindered by a lack of farmers and the laziness of the people. Similarly, he believed outdated agricultural methods meant the Welsh cultivated little and relied on England.[91] The emphasis Gerald placed on the wildness of the two countries, with mountains, forests and swathes of inaccessible land, reflected both the wildness of the inhabitants and also the need for urbanisation. Where England could boast technological advancements associated with its successful urban and arable economies; the Irish, for instance, had not progressed 'from the primitive habits of pastoral living.'[92]

To Gerald, the Welsh were also out of step: 'They do not live in towns, villages or castles, but lead a solitary existence deep in the woods.'[93] England had become the model of a modern state through its church, government and central authority, and provided the shining example Philip Augustus, as the new king of France, was encouraged to follow in 1181.[94] The legacy of Gerald's *ex post facto* justification for the conquest of Ireland showed the influence propaganda could have.[95] The propaganda that helped create the 'perfect barbarian', provide an English sense of identity and feelings of superiority, could be used to justify military actions now or in the future to drag barbarous nations into the modern civilised world.[96] Gerald would even muse over how different the Welsh could be 'if only they had good prelates and pastors, and one single prince.'[97] His works on Wales did not need to provide the same justification as he had done for the invasion of Ireland, but by creating the impression of a mostly primitive and lawless nation, 'in a deep abyss of vice - perjury, theft, murder, fratricide, adultery, incest, and obstinately ensnared and entangled in wrongdoing', Gerald had paved the ideological path for the Edwardian conquest in the following century.[98]

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[91] *Opera*, V, pp. 151-2; *Opera*, VI, p.201. Gerald's proposed economic blockade of Wales revealed how far he believed the Welsh relied on England for the import of products like cloth, salt and corn (*Opera*, VI, pp. 218-9). William of Newburgh also blamed Irish character defects for holding agricultural production back and not capitalising on the fertile soil (WN, I, pp. 165-6).

[92] *Opera*, V, p.151; translation J.J. O'Meara, trans., *The History and Topography of Ireland*, p.101.

[93] *Opera*, VI, p.200; translation Gerald of Wales, p.251.Geoffrey of Monmouth equated the move to towns with progress and prosperity, with the Saxons 'living in peace and harmony, tilling the fields and rebuilding the cities and towns' (M.D. Reeve, ed., and N. Wright, trans., *The History of the Kings of Britain*, p.280).

[94] Diceto, II, pp. 7-8. In contrast to England's example, William of Newburgh commented that before Henry II, Ireland was divided into many kingdoms and suffering from the endless warfare and violence associated with dynastic feuds and disputes (WN, I, p.167).

[95] For the use of Gerald of Wales in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see J. Gillingham, 'The English Invasion of Ireland', in J. Gillingham, The English in the Twelfth Century, pp. 145-160, especially pp. 146-151.

[96] W.R. Jones, 'England against the Celtic Fringe', p.159.

[97] *Opera*, VI, p.204; translation Gerald of Wales, p.254.

[98] *Opera*, VI, p.216; translation Gerald of Wales, p.265. His portrayal of the Irish is very similar, for example *Opera*, V, pp. 137, 150-3, 165. In a letter to Edward I in 1284, John Peckham, archbishop of Canterbury, advocated the forcible imposition of urban life upon the Welsh. He confirmed Gerald's views that many of the

The trouble with taking the opinions of writers like Gerald of Wales as characteristic of twelfth-century views is that he had a restricted audience. In discussing the writing of Plantagenet history, Nicholas Vincent cautions how the audience for some works could be 'restricted to a tiny minority even of the minority of the elite who regularly attended court.'[99] Gerald hints at his struggle to attract patronage and lamented that neither Henry II nor Richard I, to whom he dedicated his works on Ireland, held much interest in them.[100] Through his studies in Paris and time as a royal clerk, Gerald travelled extensively and had experience of England, Ireland and Wales. He was in an advantageous position to provide contemporary attitudes towards these countries, especially Wales as a product of the twelfth-century march and living between the two worlds, modern and primitive, that he tried to present. His *Descriptio Kambriae* displays the complexities of life in a frontier society, but his desire to show objectivity, highlighting the positives and negatives of an argument, present modern audiences with difficulties. The Welsh are unblemished examples of humanity, generous and hospitable, but at the same time steal anything and live on plunder and theft.[101] This juxtaposition of images, civilised and barbarous, would highlight his own classical learning and present his moral and religious agenda in a powerful message to encourage action to reform the negative points.[102]

Gerald's caricatures of 'Celtic' barbarians influenced later representations, but it is clear that not all contemporaries agreed. He confronted this opposition and dismissed doubts about invading Ireland as 'the English were not guilty of injustice such as is foolishly attributed to them by the ill-informed.'[103] William of Canterbury recounts the miracle of a knight fighting in Ireland being restored to life, and through his description of the campaign he voices his

moral and social problems in Wales could be attributed to the Welsh living great distances apart and not together in towns (A.W. Haddan and W. Stubbs, ed., *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents Relating to Great Britain and Ireland*, vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1869), no. XV, pp. 570-1).

[99] N. Vincent, 'The Strange Case of the Missing Biographies', p.251.

[100] *Opera*, VI, p.7. Gerald would claim that a public reading of the *Topographia* at Oxford attracted not only the poor, but scholars, knights, and townspeople (*Opera*, I, p.73). He also described his *Expugnatio* as having been written for the benefit of laymen and princes with limited literacy, but his attempts to reach a wider audience are hinted at in a revised dedication of the work. He suggests John should employ someone to translate it into French because there were so few who could understand his books (*Opera*, V, pp. 207-8). For Gerald's ambitions for patronage, see J. Harris, 'Giraldus as Natural Historian: Transformation and Reception', in K. Cawsey and J. Harris, ed., *Transmission and Transformation in the Middle Ages: Texts and Contexts* (Dublin: Four Courts, 2007), pp. 77-97.

[101] *Opera*, VI, pp. 182-3, 207.

[102] In his *De Iure et Statu Menevensis Ecclesiae*, Gerald even encouraged the archbishop of Canterbury to visit St David's to help keep in check the barbarous manners of the Welsh (*Opera*, III, pp. 113-4: '*et pastorali sollicitudine barbaros mores eliminet*').

[103] *Expugnatio*, p.149.

disapproval. He describes Ireland as defenceless and a nation, however uncultivated and barbarous, that was still Christian.[104] The lengths which Gerald went to justify the invasion, perhaps, suggest he may not have been entirely at ease with the image he was creating. He praised Henry's clemency in 1173-4 as worthy of being remembered and imitated, but it is clear that not all those who went to Ireland were willing to show such compassion.[105] Gerald's discussion of the debate and decision to execute the prisoners at Baginbun provides a clear contrast.[106] He also describes a series of miraculous punishments visited upon the invading English who, despite their own supposed civilising intentions, seemed willing to embrace the native practices of raiding and pillaging.[107] Gerald blamed the Irish as 'foreigners coming to this country almost inevitably are contaminated by this, as it were, inborn vice of the country - a vice that is most contagious.'[108]

Works in French from the second half of the twelfth century reinforced the general feeling of disdain towards 'Celtic' societies, but these works of history and literature do not create such an aggressive image of barbarism. Jordan Fantosme's account of 1173-4 included existing stereotypes familiar to its courtly audience with English knights, for instance, possessing superior equipment and believing themselves the 'equal of a Welsh king.'[109] The invading Scots are accused of atrocities and acts of cruelty, and as a further indication of their barbarity their country is labelled as 'wild'.[110] William the Lion, described as Henry's 'cousin of Scotland' is exempt from some criticism, having been led astray by 'evil counsel' and at his

[104] *MTB*, I, pp. 364-5: '*Factum est igitur non sine causa in conspectu eorum qui sine causa proximos suos inermes inquietabant, nationemque, quamvis incultam et barbaram, tamen cultricem fidei et Christianae religionis observatricem, facinus praeclarum et memoria dignum*.' For William of Canterbury's condemnation of the campaign, see M. Bull, 'Criticism of Henry II's Expedition to Ireland in William of Canterbury's Miracles of St Thomas Becket', *Journal of Medieval History*, 33 (2007), pp. 107-129.
[105] *Opera*, V, pp. 190, 300. In 1171 Áskell Ragavalsson, leader of the Dublin Norse, was beheaded after a failed attempt to take Dublin from the English (*Opera*, V, pp. 264-5; W.M. Hennessy, ed., *The Annals of Loch Cé*, I, p.145). Later that year, Murchad Ua Brain was captured by Strongbow's men and was publicly beheaded with his body thrown to hounds (*Song*, lines 2,166-2,174, and summary p.15).
[106] The two leaders, Raymond FitzGerald and Hervey de Mountmaurice, provide the opposing arguments. Gerald's relation, Raymond, argues for showing mercy and Hervey counters that a foreign land, with rebellious inhabitants, could never be subdued by merciful means. He believes their victory should be used as a statement to the enemy, who would show them no mercy in defeat. Hervey's argument wins and the captives had limbs broken and were thrown into the sea (*Opera*, V, pp. 250-3).
[107] The youth from the FitzMaurice household, for example, plundered a church and immediately went mad. There were punishments for soldiers who stole food and other goods as one seized the lands of St Finbar and was cursed so the lands would not produce corn. Hugh Tyrell was cursed for stealing a large cooking-pot from clerics and as a fire destroyed his lodgings only the pot remained undamaged. Philip of Worcester was struck down by a severe illness having extorted a large tribute from the clergy of Armagh (*Opera*, V, pp. 130-4).
[108] *Opera*, V, p.168; translation J.J. O'Meara, trans., *The History and Topography of Ireland*, p.109.
[109] JF, p.15. Though his figure of 60,000 is a clear exaggeration, it may reflect the belief that there were a significant number of knights in England considered on equal terms with Welsh royalty.
[110] JF, pp. 49, 53, 55, 71, 73, 77.

capture at Alnwick, trapped beneath his horse, he is weighed down by 'the sin of the Scots'.[111] The English knights were thus superior, but the hatred and hostility was the language of war directed towards an enemy for invading and disrupting lives and livelihoods rather than for them being barbarians.[112] The *Song of Dermot* is also less concerned with barbarians as Diarmait appeals for assistance having been exiled and betrayed. It is presented as a legitimate war against rebels and traitors, and the offer of money with the prospect of acquiring land by conquest is shown to appeal to the invaders more than any notion of reforming and civilising.[113]

The vernacular fiction of Chrétien de Troyes also shows an awareness of contemporary perceptions. In *Le Conte du Graal*, a knight observes that 'all Welshmen are, by nature, more stupid than grazing cattle.'[114] As a Welshman, young Perceval has his intelligence, manners and appearance all brought into question; reinforcing the view that a contemporary audience would be willing to accept the Welsh as uncultured.[115] Chrétien, however, while clearly aware of these views separates himself from them as Perceval's lack of culture is as much a result of his age as his heritage and his development from naïve youth to chivalric knight can be seen as part of his heroic journey.[116] Themes designed to denigrate 'Celtic' peoples and portray authors and audiences as more refined and superior had become so familiar that, as John Gillingham suggests, even 'learned men such as Dean Ralph, Richard of Hexham and William of Newburgh began to refer routinely to those crude, stupid and feckless people as 'barbarians'.'[117]

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[111] JF, pp. 27, 51, 133.
[112] To Jordan Fantosme, the Flemings were not primitive like the Scots but their only interest was plunder. He describes them not as knights but 'weavers … come to pick up plunder and spoils' (JF, p.73). The Pipe Rolls show some evidence of this, as the provisioning of the castle at Dover recorded cheese and corn to the value of 41s. stolen by the Flemings (PR 20 Henry II, p.2).
[113] *Song*, lines 266-277, 282-291, 336-8. Diarmait offers great rewards of gold and silver to those willing to help, but also promises land: 'I will enfeoff him generously: I will also give him plenty of livestock and a rich fief' (lines 436-8, p.64). William of Newburgh suggested Strongbow's motivation for going to Ireland was to escape creditors (WN, I, pp. 167-8). His lack of finances may be supported by an entry in the Pipe Rolls for 1169-70 with Josce the Jew of Gloucester owing 100s. for money he lent to those who travelled to Ireland against the king's prohibition (PR 16 Henry II, p.78).
[114] D. Staines, trans., *The Complete Romances of Chrétien de Troyes*, p.342.
[115] Perceval is both 'ignorant of all manners' and 'an offensive and despicable fool' (D. Staines, trans., *The Complete Romances of Chrétien de Troyes*, pp. 342, 349).
[116] For hero journey cycles in literature, see E.L. Smith, *The Hero Journey in Literature: Parables of Poesis* (Latham: University Press of America, 1997), especially 'The Quest for the Holy Grail', pp. 134-154. Naïve and youthful attempts at chivalry became a familiar motif in romances. A young Fouke Fitz Waryn, for instance, is portrayed wearing a rusty hauberk and ill-fitting helmet, armed with an axe and riding a pack-horse (T.E. Kelly, 'Fouke Fitz Waryn', in T.H. Ohlgren, ed., *Medieval Outlaws: Twelve Tales on Modern English Translation* (West Lafayette: Parlor Press, 2005), pp. 165-247 (at p.185).
[117] J. Gillingham, 'Foundations of a Disunited Kingdom', pp. 103-4.

What of the king, is it possible to determine his views, and whether his campaigns in Wales had an impact on shaping opinions towards the Welsh? One problem lies in differentiating between authentic contemporary attitudes and the literary devices that were used. Through political necessity Henry had long-standing links to Wales, strengthened through patronage, but during the 1170s he was drawn closer by family ties and even friendships.[118] The *Brut* may have overstated their relationship with the assertion that by 1175 Rhys ap Gruffudd was 'the most beloved friend of the king', but Henry does appear to have been friendly with Owain Cyfeiliog.[119] In his letter to Manuel Komnenos, Gerald stressed Henry's desire to draw the emperor's attention to the Welsh: 'who are so brave and untamed that, though unarmed themselves, they do not hesitate to do battle with fully armed opponents.'[120] This reflection of the Welsh at war may not have been one that Henry entirely agreed with, as he placed increasing trust in them, but it is the one that was promoted. The belief that they were fierce and destructive, but lacking knightly qualities, was instrumental in the tactics of fear and intimidation that his armies employed. It was the actions of the Welsh, especially on the continent after 1165, that helped promote this view away from the traditional areas of cross-border conflict and deeper into Normandy and France. The *Draco Normannicus* recorded a contemporary impression of amazement at the destruction of Chaumont in 1167, describing the actions as 'the devil of Wales'.[121] This image of the Welsh persisted and even by the end of Henry's reign it was still being exploited. In 1188 Roger of Howden praised Welsh ravaging skills as they entered French territory, burning Damville and surrounding villages. The king, however, could be absolved of blame as it was stressed they were acting against his orders, a suggestion that would appear believable to many.[122] In his desire to make peace Henry dismissed his mercenaries, the fact that the Welsh are recorded separately may indicate their importance, but also that their reputation was such that peace was considered more likely in

[118] The marriage of his half-sister, Emma, to Dafydd in 1174 strengthened his relationship with north Wales and the betrothal of his youngest son, John, to Isabella of Gloucester in 1176 increased royal presence in south Wales through Glamorgan and Gwynllŵg (*GH*, I, p.124).
[119] *Brut* (RBH), p.165. According to Gerald, Henry and Owain Cyfeiliog developed a close friendship. Owain dined with the king at Shrewsbury and impressed with his wit and humour (*Opera*, VI, pp. 144-5). The prospect of royal friendships with Welsh rulers probably seemed very distant after Henry's treatment of their hostages in 1165, but the rewards for being in the king's favour were evident as Owain's clerk is recorded receiving a gift of £20 for his master's use (PR 28 Henry II, p.128). The protection royal friendship provided Owain also allowed him to develop Strata Marcella (*AWR*, no. 539).
[120] Gerald was so eager to highlight this point that he claims it is a direct quote from Henry's letter: 'the following sentence is worth quoting'. He also notes that 'the Welsh show no sign of losing their ferocity' (*Opera*, VI, p.181; translation Gerald of Wales, pp. 234-5).
[121] *Draco Normannicus*, line 918, p.694: '*Walensis zabulus*'.
[122] Howden, II, p.345. The thought that the Welsh lacked the knightly qualities and discipline of their English counterparts, and could act against orders, had become so well established that it seemed believable (*GH*, II, pp. 46-7; Gervase, I, pp. 433-4).

their absence.[123] To some extent, the image that Gerald provided of the Welsh at war was even perpetuated by official records. Pipe Roll entries for the army of 1188 seem to confirm how established this view had become, with Welsh troops raised from Glamorgan and Gwent, for instance, still being recorded as foot and mounted sergeants. As David Crouch suggests, despite having sufficient resources to afford horses, the Welsh were still termed '*servientes*' not knights because the exchequer 'could not conceive of Welshmen as possessing more than the outward trappings of knighthood.'[124]

Owain Gwynedd's attempt to establish diplomatic contact with France, perhaps, offers the clearest contemporary insight into Wales from a Welsh perspective. The contact came in the form of three letters; two sent to Louis VII and one to Hugh de Champfleury, his chancellor. These letters offer a valuable reaction to Henry's Welsh campaigns and reveal concepts of power, status and politics from Owain's perspective. At first glance, they appear to confirm some of the preconceptions about Wales being remote, away from European politics, with untrustworthy inhabitants who lacked courtly etiquette and desired nothing more than vengeance.[125] Far from being an isolated nation seeking vengeance, Owain's letters offer a more nuanced reality of Wales. They show a development in style towards a more refined third letter, designed specifically to appeal to Louis.[126] The letters indicate that Owain had access to skilled secretaries and, as Huw Pryce suggests, there was 'at least one cleric in Gwynedd who had mastered the technical rhetoric skills of epistolary composition essential to the conduct of international diplomacy.'[127] Where north Wales once looked to Ireland for support against

[123] *GH*, II, p.50: '*solidarios suos et Walenses suos domum redire*'.
[124] PR 34 Henry II, pp. 8-9, 106-7; D. Crouch, *The Image of Aristocracy in Britain, 1000-1300* (London: Routledge, 1992), p.120. In the same way Chester accounted for '*servientum cum equis et haubergellis … et servientum peditum*' to travel to Carlisle in 1186 (PR 32 Henry II, p.150). There could also have been a financial motive to recording them as mounted sergeants as opposed to knights. The difference in terminology may have qualified them for greater pay. For the suggestion that knights in Henry's reign generally received 8d. as a daily wage, rising to 1s. in the 1170s, see C.W. Hollister, 'The Significance of Scutage Rates in Eleventh- and Twelfth-Century England', *English Historical Review*, 75 (1960), pp. 577-588; *idem, Military Organization*, pp. 208-9
[125] To elicit sympathy, Owain admits that Wales is 'largely unknown' to the French and communications are hampered by the 'rarity of travellers' between the two countries. In the first letter, Owain is offering to place himself and his possessions at the command of the French king. This approach, dated 1164 x July 1165, so soon after Woodstock, shows how quickly his relationship with England had deteriorated, but could also be seen as an indicator of Owain's unreliability as he looked to sever ties with Henry having paid homage to him in July 1163. In the third letter it is revealed that it is through Hugh de Champfleury's assistance that Owain is able to create a more worthy letter with which to approach Louis and Owain explicitly states that he wants vengeance against Henry (H. Pryce, 'Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII', pp. 4-8).
[126] It concentrates more on themes of piety and religion to appeal to Louis, even crediting prayer and saintly intervention for Henry's reversal in 1165 (H. Pryce, 'Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII', p.7).
[127] For discussion on the *salutatio* formulas employed and the suggestion that the use of *cursus* indicates the scribe may have been educated in France, see P. Malone, "'*Se Principem Nominat*:" Rhetorical Self-Fashioning

invasion, Owain showed an awareness of wider politics and hoped to exploit divisions in the relationship between England and France.[128] The third letter may also suggest a ruler who was growing in confidence, with a belief that Wales should be operating in the circles of the Capetian court rather than seeking more discussions with England.[129]

Owain's diplomatic exchange may have resulted in an invitation for Welsh representatives to attend the talks at La Ferté-Bernard in July 1168. Few details of the conference are known, except for John of Salisbury's enigmatic suggestion that all those present offered hostages and promised aid to Louis before leaving 'under an obligation.'[130] Gideon Brough suggests that this 'obligation' was a peaceful one: a message to Henry that 'if Louis could bring those powers to peace, he might also bring them to war.'[131] If peace was Louis's intention, it was only temporary as Robert of Torigni noted discussions amounted to little and war continued.[132] Any message was further diluted when Louis was involved in the burning of Chênnebrun in Normandy. Henry avoided a direct assault on the French king, continuing instead against his supporters and their lands around the Norman border until peace was restored at Montmirail in January 1169.[133] The presence of Welsh envoys in Europe in 1168 could only strengthen Owain's position against Henry, but it was also critical as their first appearance at such a conference.[134] Propaganda encouraged the belief that the English had a religious and cultural superiority over the British Isles. In a real sense, Owain's letters and the Welsh attendance at La Ferté-Bernard demonstrate they were not too uncivilised and barbarous to operate within Europe. His appeal to Louis for aid, however, also shows an awareness that the numerical,

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and Epistolary Style in the Letters of Owain Gwynedd', *Proceedings of the Harvard Celtic Colloquium*, 28 (2008), pp. 169-184.

[128] Gruffudd ap Cynan's claim to Gwynedd received support from Ireland and he often looked to recruit military assistance from the Irish and from the Scandinavians of Dublin (P. Russell, ed. and trans., *Vita Griffini*, pp. 64, 68-71, 135, 152-3). That these links remained strong throughout his life is suggested by the fact that he left 20 pieces of silver to the church of Christ in Dublin and both Irish and Danes mourned his death (pp. 89-91).

[129] Whether Owain's confidence had been renewed after Henry's failure in 1165 or it was for the benefit of Louis is not clear, but it was expressed in his use of the title 'prince' as opposed to the more common 'king of Wales' he used in the two earlier letters. This change in title had apparently angered Henry and its continued use can only be viewed as further evidence of his continuing defiance (see above p.38, n.118).

[130] *Letters*, II, no. 279, pp. 602-9. Bretons, Poitevins and Scots were also present at the conference.

[131] G. Brough, 'Welsh-French Diplomacy in the Middle Ages', p.197.

[132] Torigni, pp. 237-8

[133] The lands of the count of Ponthieu, including 40 villages, were burned before Henry targeted Hugh de Châteauneuf-en-Thymerais, torching the castle at Brézolles, and then ravaged the lands of the count of Perche (Torigni, p.238; *Henry II*, p.108). The count of Perche was also punished in England, with the exchequer receiving the profits after goods to the value of £79 15s. were sold off from his lands in Wiltshire (PR 14 Henry II, p.158).

[134] For the suggestion that this was the first time that the Welsh had been invited to such a conference, see G. Brough, 'Welsh-French Diplomacy in the Middle Ages', p.180.

financial and technological advantages of Henry's armies could not be held back by Welsh endeavours forever and that England's military potential was no literary device, but a reality.[135]

[135] As Owain admitted: 'I have no way of evading his snares unless you grant me advice and help' (H. Pryce, 'Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII', p.8.)

Conclusion

The aim of this research has been to challenge the two prevailing themes connected with Henry II's campaigns in Wales. The first that there was much continuity in the warfare of his reign and the second that the importance of his Welsh campaigns has been overlooked because of limited fighting and no decisive victories. Although Henry was influenced by the past and his royal ancestors, much of his efforts were focused on making improvements for the future. His Welsh campaigns would encourage him to combine old and new methods as he attempted to overcome the problems they posed. The evidence presented in this study demonstrates Henry's Welsh campaigns were characterised not by continuity but rather by progress. In 1157 he summoned his host for knight service, but the preparations for 1165 would see a new and greater emphasis on infantry with promises obtained to finance a substantial army of foot soldiers. Michael Prestwich describes the sergeantry assessment as a 'unique experiment' pointing to the fact that 'no precedent was made of it, and no future attempt was made to establish a system along such lines for the provision of infantry soldiers.'[1] It was unique, but this interpretation overlooks Henry's diplomatic efforts and his policy of co-operation supported by further innovations, including the appointment of Rhys ap Gruffudd as justiciar and councils held at Gloucester, Geddington and Oxford dealing with Welsh issues. The measure taken in Wales by 1172 meant the king would not have to lead a comparable campaign there again, but it also confirmed Wales as a source of royal recruits which had a transformative effect on English armies and warfare by the end of Henry's reign. When a number of infantry sergeants were required for the Galloway campaign in 1186, Henry was able to use his relationship with Wales to recruit men from both north and south Wales.

The nature of the evidence, the accuracy and dating of the *Brut* and the inconsistent coverage from Anglocentric chronicles, has led to some confusion over the details of Henry's Welsh campaigns and the lack of a clear victory has obscured the outcomes.[2] Gideon Brough suggests that Owain Gwynedd wrote to Louis VII 'after twice defeating Henry II on the battlefield' and that the victory in 1165 'has not yet received the wider recognition it deserves'.[3] Despite the

[1] M. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, pp. 120-1.
[2] William of Newburgh, for instance, provides a chapter on the campaign of 1157; but, possibly as the outcome was not as desired, only mentions the larger campaign of 1165 in passing before discussing the king's actions in Brittany (WN, I, pp. 106-9, 145).
[3] G. Brough, 'Welsh-French Diplomacy in the Middle Ages', p.197 and p.179.

surprise of Owain's initial tactics in 1157, the ambush and the failure of the fleet, the terms agreed meant Henry's campaign had achieved its aim. There is much evidence on the English preparations and the appalling weather that forced Henry's to leave Wales in 1165, but details of the fighting are limited. After Owain's death, Cynddelw Brydydd Mawr's poem praising his military exploits does not celebrate 1165, but returns to 1136 and Owain's heroic role at Crug Mawr.[4] Despite the impressive opposition, the suggestion in the *Brut* that only 'a few picked Welshmen, in the absence of their leaders,' were actually present when the two armies met may explain why 1165 has not received wider recognition.[5] The change in weather and the speed of Henry's departure left Owain, by his own admission, 'uncertain of the outcome'.[6] The campaign, however, was still important for Owain and although his achievement did not arrive on the battlefield, he had managed to successfully unite a divided Wales against a common threat and had tentatively established diplomatic links with France.

The 1165 campaign ended as an expensive failure and a blow to Henry's prestige, with John of Salisbury noting 'the English king, who once struck terror on the neighbouring princes, now … is beaten by men without arms.'[7] In this context, the mutilation of the Welsh hostages can be seen as another example of Henry II's volatile temper. W.L. Warren described the king's fits of rage as 'notorious', but from Henry's perspective there was legal and historical precedent notably from Henry I - 'the Lion of Justice'.[8] The threat of anger could be an effective deterrent to opposing the king, but there were also times when displays of royal anger were expected or even encouraged.[9] After Chaumont was destroyed in 1167, Louis could only be pacified by burning the Norman town of Andely in a public show of revenge.[10] Punishing the hostages gave Henry the opportunity to try and force an outcome on an ineffective campaign: a statement

[4] J.J. Parry, 'The Court Poets of the Welsh Princes', p.517. Cynddelw compares Owain's actions in the successful uprising against the Normans in south Wales to the Battle of Badon, where the *Historia Brittonum* has Arthur killing 960 men (N.A. Jones, ed., *Arthur in Early Welsh* Poetry (Cambridge: Modern Humanities Research Association, 2019), p.77).
[5] *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.63.
[6] H. Pryce, 'Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII', p.7.
[7] *Letters*, II, no. 184, p.217.
[8] *Henry II*, p.210. John of Salisbury, echoing the *Prophecies of Merlin*, described Henry I as '*leo iustitiae*' (C.C.J. Webb, ed., *Policraticus*, II, VI:18, p.48; M.D. Reeve, ed., and N. Wright, trans., *The History of the Kings of Britain*, p.146).
[9] In *Girart de Vienne* after the murder of his seneschal, a messenger informs the king: 'You'll lose our love, if you do not avenge him' (M. Newth, trans., *The Song of Girart of Vienne*, line 535, p.15). For royal anger in relation to the Welsh hostages of 1165, see Appendix II.
[10] According to Stephen of Rouen the town was cleared to allow this display of royal anger (*Draco Normannicus*, pp. 689-90). Given that Andely was on land owned by the archbishop of Rouen (Torigni, pp. 231-2; *Draco Normannicus*, pp. 688-9) and Henry's permission was granted following advice from his mother (*Draco Normannicus*, pp. 690-1), Stephen was likely to be well informed on the incident. Despite placing the events in 1169, Roger of Howden described the actions as not being resisted (Howden, I, p.282).

of intent to those who opposed him. Henry took the embarrassment of 1165 personally and, according to John of Poitiers, 'was more than usually disturbed by what happened to him in Wales'.[11] The damage to his prestige, however, would prove to be temporary as he recovered on the continent and emerged victorious against the many threats in 1173-4 with his military reputation restored, even earning comparisons to Moses, and winning admiration for the clemency he showed towards the defeated.[12] This remarkable turnaround in less than a decade owed much to his experiences in Wales; to lessons in finance, personnel and tactics that would help throughout the remainder of his reign.

The 1165 campaign was so unsuccessful it left Owain believing the English army would return, but his fears proved unfounded as Henry turned his immediate attention to rebels on the continent. Part of the legal and administrative reforms that emerged over the winter of 1165 and into early 1166 was the *Cartae Baronum*. The exact purpose of Henry's survey into knights' fees remains ambiguous, but what is clear is that it was a product of its time, influenced by the political atmosphere after 1165 and by, or even in response to, the unsuccessful Welsh campaign. For both the barons and the king the dual scutage and sergeantry assessments for 1165 to be followed by failure was a cause for concern. The prospect for future campaigns was that such exactions would have to be repeated or even surpassed to ensure success. The returns offered the barons reassurance by referring to Henry I and the process of sealing recorded lands, customs, agreements, and grievances for future legal disputes. For the king, there was an abundance of information and also the names of all the knights yet to perform homage to him. The *Cartae Baronum* tried to cement the work at Clarendon in early 1166 and strengthen royal control in England without the king himself needing to be directly involved. It secured the barons' lands and in return they reaffirmed their loyalty before his departure. Thus, it maintained Henry's coronation promise to protect customs while continuing his mandate of restoring peace and maintaining law and order.[13]

Gerald of Wales described the king as an 'oppressor of the nobility' and information in the barons' *cartae* provided the opportunity to increase revenue from assessments based on

[11] *CTB*, I, no.66, p.263.
[12] Shortly after 1174, Jordan Fantosme described Henry as 'the most honourable and the most victorious king who ever was anywhere on the earth since the times of Moses, save only Charlemagne' (JF, p.11).
[13] Henry II's coronation charter sent a clear message that the traditions of Henry I were being followed, with customs and liberties granted 'as freely and peaceably and fully in everything as King Henry, my grandfather granted and conceded' (*EHD*, II, no. 23, p.435).

knights' fees by diverting baronial profits into the exchequer.[14] Henry was aware that their loyalty was critical to political stability in his absence, especially with the prospect of discontent over 1165's heavy financial burden, and it was lands in royal custody that the new information would help fully exploit.[15] There were both financial and military benefits of a policy to increase the amount of land in royal hands. Possession of land increased the potential to offer rewards and supplement income, but it also allowed the king to influence a significant amount of the knight service in England. In 1166 he held over 1,000 knights' fees, rising to over 2,000 in the 1180s.[16] Henry's Welsh campaigns highlighted a number of the existing issues surrounding the performance of knight service and grievances, such as the discussion on the earl of Arundel's lands concerning the obligation to serve in Wales, may have prompted the survey.[17] The returns made in 1166 revealed the confused situation and the actions of men like Walter FitzRobert, in seeking the opinion of others to determine what service they owed, confirm that military obligations had limited association with military reality.[18]

Though the *Cartae Baronum* revealed little about how knight service was performed, it did disclose relative financial and military strengths and highlighted what constituted respectable contingents for barons to provide when summoned for service. There could be no guarantee of quality once summoned, however, and there is some evidence of knightly poverty within the returns. With the possibility of crusade and the prospect of another extended period of royal absence, the issue of quality was revisited in England in 1181 through the Assize of Arms. It did not replace knight service; but, in swearing allegiance to Henry and his kingdom, the assize did uniformly arm free men for defending the realm, even without the king. The continental and English assizes may have regulated the amount and type of weapons and armour, but issues of knightly numbers and ability were never fully resolved. In a rare instance of a summons

[14] *Opera*, V, p.304: '*nobilitas oppressor*'.
[15] The importance of loyalty from nobles is highlighted by the example of Hugh Bigod, earl of Norfolk. Hugh fought for and against Stephen and would fight for and against Henry. Henry constructed Orford near the earl's castle of Framlingham to assist in the defence of the Suffolk coastline and, if Hugh's loyalty wavered, it served as an impressive reminder of the king's presence. For the 1165 Welsh campaign Hugh accounted for £227 10s., a similar level of assessment to the earl of Gloucester (£228 15s.) despite answering for over 100 fewer knights' fees (PR 11, Henry II, pp. 7, 13; *CB*, nos. CCXV, CX). Thomas Keefe highlights that Hugh was the most heavily assessed earl in Henry's reign, with assessments totalling £1,186, but 'this comes to over 6s. per year per knight's fee, an amount more characteristic of an average baron than an earl' (T.K. Keefe, 'King Henry II and the Earls: The Pipe Roll Evidence,' *Albion*, 13 (1981), pp. 191-222 (quote at p.203). Despite their complex relationship, Henry remained aware of the need for the loyalty and support of influential nobles.
[16] For the figure of 1,224 knights' fees in 1166 rising to 2,034 by 1183-4, see *Feudal Assessments*, p.92.
[17] In the same way Becket's land dispute in 1163 led to a local inquiry (Diceto I, p.311; Gervase, I, p.174).
[18] *CB*, no. CLXX, p.181: '*et hoc michi antiqui homines mei intelligere faciunt quod debeo inde regi servitium de L militibus*.'

surviving from Henry's reign, William Marshal was requested in 1188 simply to attend 'prepared and with as many knights as you can provide'.[19] The recovery from 1165, with the inquest into fiefs and the legal reforms of 1166, helped increase royal revenue and to some extent allowed the king to circumvent the issues of knight service and pay to recruit men more suited to the warfare of his reign.

The main beneficiaries of Henry's efforts to manage his resources were mercenaries. This greater reliance on hiring troops was the beginning of what John France has termed 'the golden age of mercenaries.'[20] It was no coincidence that the number of Welshmen in English armies increased. There was the geographical convenience, with rapid recruitment possible through the border counties, marcher barons and Welsh contacts, but there was also the country itself. Years of border warfare, internal fighting and feuding had, according to Gerald of Wales, created a nation devoted to warfare and military training.[21] Gerald claimed his brief tour of Wales in 1188 resulted in almost 3,000 experienced soldiers taking the Cross.[22] Numbers were exaggerated for effect, but it does suggest Wales could be a productive recruiting ground for the English.

The presence of Welshmen in Henry's armies has not received the consideration it deserves, perhaps because the nature of the evidence prevents any satisfactory conclusions.[23] In contrast, Gerald's comment on the skilled archers of Gwent has received much attention with Huw Pryce, for instance, discussing Gerald's journey through Wales, suggesting 'Henry knew it was a ready source of effective troops, especially archers.'[24] The evidence, however, does not support this and of the 3,000 recruited for crusade, Gerald surprisingly only refers to 12

[19] N. Vincent, 'William Marshal, King Henry II and the Honour of Châteauroux', *Archives*, 25 (2000), pp. 1-15 (at p.9).
[20] J. France, *Western Warfare*, p.68.
[21] *Opera*, VI, pp. 179-180. The author of the *Gesta Stephani* offered a similar assessment, noting that Wales breeds men 'accustomed to war' (*Gesta Stephani*, p.15).
[22] *Opera*, VI, p.147.
[23] For an example of the difficulty surrounding the terminology of Welshmen in Henry's armies, and hence making details of numbers, pay and roles difficult to determine, see above p.66 and n.43. Jacques Boussard highlighted the importance of mercenaries in Henry II's reign, but concentrated mostly on those recruited from the Low Countries (J. Boussard, 'Les Mercenaires au xii^{e} Siècle', pp. 189-224). John Hosler discusses how and why Henry used mercenaries, but only Ifor Rowlands looks in detail at Welsh troops in Angevin service (J. Hosler, 'Revisiting Mercenaries under Henry Fitz Empress', pp. 33-42; I.W. Rowlands, 'Warriors Fit for a Prince', pp. 207-230).
[24] H. Pryce, 'Gerald's Journey through Wales,' *Journal of Welsh Ecclesiastical History*, 6 (1989), pp. 17-34 (at p.25).

archers.[25] In discussing Henry dismissing his mercenaries in 1188, W.L. Warren's interpretation of Roger of Howden's phrase '*Walenses suos*' as 'Welsh archers' probably indicates how strongly Wales has become associated with archery.[26] The Pipe Rolls rarely offer details beyond payments for Welsh mounted and foot sergeants and do not show significant or regular payments being made to Welsh archers. Within Wales, the bow was associated with youth and poems focused more on symbols of wealth and status, such as possessing horses, or owning studs and herds.[27] Outside Wales, archery was not viewed as having a strong connection with the Welsh and Chrétien de Troyes even associates the young Welshman Perceval with a spear rather than a bow.[28] John of Salisbury related English success in Wales with the ability to imitate Welsh arms and tactics. By 1159, his view of the Welsh was that they dressed in light armour with small round shields, fighting with swords and javelins.[29] Though success in Wales was something Henry never fully mastered with his campaigns, he had experienced how effective Welsh tactics could be. Rather than hire Welshmen as specialist archers, he looked to the skills that he had witnessed: close-quarter fighting, surprise attacks, raiding and ravaging.

According to Gerald, the king feared the uncertainty of battle and 'tried all other means before he had to recourse to arms.'[30] Henry of Huntingdon portrayed a youthful Henry as divinely favoured and when facing Stephen at Malmesbury in early 1153 the weather changed as if 'God Himself seemed to be fighting on the duke's side.' When the two sides met at Wallingford later that year, they prepared for battle before withdrawing to negotiate.[31] The consequence of failure in this trial before God could be disastrous in terms of prestige, money and loss of life. Although Henry II often threatened, he never actually took part in a full-scale battle, preferring sieges, threats and intimidation, relying on destructive raids and ravaging lands, before the last resort of facing enemies on the battlefield.[32] This was the approach the Welsh had employed

[25] *Opera,* VI, p.82. Gerald does not make it clear whether these archers were Welsh, only that they were garrisoned at the castle of St Clears and took the Cross as punishment for killing a young man from Wales.
[26] *GH*, II, p.50; *Henry II*, p.620.
[27] According to Gerald, the 300 archers and foot soldiers Robert FitzStephen took to Ireland were '*de electa Gualliae juventute*' (*Opera*, V, p.230). Gerald's figure of 300 is unreliable, however, as Robert apparently takes about 400 men, with equipment and horses, but sails in only three ships. For the horse as a symbol of military strength and wealth, see N.A. Jones, 'Horses in Medieval Welsh Court Poetry', p.84.
[28] Perceval's mother has to persuade her son not to carry three javelins, fearing it would make him appear 'too much like a Welshman' (D. Staines, trans., *The Complete Romances of Chrétien de Troyes,* p.347).
[29] C.C.J. Webb, ed., *Policraticus*, II, VI:6, pp. 17-20.
[30] *Expugnatio*, p.129.
[31] D. Greenway, ed. and trans., *Historia Anglorum*, pp. 765-6.
[32] In William Marshal's long and distinguished military career, he took part in only two pitched battles and in the warfare described in the *History of William Marshal* there are 17 sieges, but only three or four battles (J.

across the border for years and their experience could provide a tactical advantage. Gerald dismissed Welsh warfare as primitive as they did not understand or simply ignored contemporary conventions by refusing to engage in battle and not allowing themselves to be besieged.[33] These primitive skills of ambush, harassment and disruption, delivered by stealth or with speed, added flexibility to English armies over a variety of terrains. Henry's most celebrated use of Welsh troops came at Chaumont in 1167 and Rouen in 1174, and both examples show how their experience of surprise attacks could be used to great effect. The tactical diversity the Welsh could offer became increasingly important in Henry's armies and so important to his strategic planning that by 1188 he would not confront Philip Augustus without Welsh mercenaries crossing to Normandy.[34]

Stephen of Rouen recorded the contemporary shock of the Welsh actions at Chaumont and this ability to surprise enemies and generate fear could be very effective. Campaigns always carried elements of risk: cold, wet, insanitary conditions with limited food could leave armies facing hunger or disease.[35] There were, however, some elements that were predictable as warfare tended to be determined by season, travel was often along predetermined routes and battles were usually avoided. Knights were offered protection as armour improved, tactics evolved, and the influence of tournaments helped promote the mentality that worthy feats of arms were conducted between equals, encouraging rules for capture and ransom. There was a 'fellowship in arms' that helped protect the knights at Brémule, but the Welsh were viewed as firmly outside this select group.[36] John of Salisbury described them as being 'unarmed, warlike and barbarous' and the perception was they participated in a more brutal warfare, featuring primitive acts such as head hunting and taking slaves.[37] In this clash of cultures, the presence of the Welsh in English armies was more likely to promote fear. For opposing knights there would be no guarantee that they would be fighting equals, and this increased the risk of being wounded or killed. This contrast is highlighted by the differing fortunes of the kings of England and Scotland in 1157 and 1174. In 1157 when Henry was surprised by the Welsh, it was

Gillingham, 'War and Chivalry in the History of William Marshal', in M. Strickland, ed., *Anglo-Norman Warfare*, pp. 251-263 (at p.262)).

[33] *Opera*, VI, p.218.

[34] Roger of Howden, stressing the Welsh presence in Henry's army, makes a clear distinction between '*solidarios suos*' and '*Walenses suos*' (Howden, II, 343).

[35] The younger Henry contracted dysentery in May 1183, while at war with his father in Limousin, before dying on 11 June (*GH*, I, p.300). Welsh experience of difficult terrains, where hardship and seasonal movement was a way of life for many, gave them a physicality and resilience that was useful on campaigns. Gerald even suggests they were not affected by hunger or cold (*Opera*, VI, pp. 165, 182).

[36] OV, VI, p.241.

[37] C.C.J. Webb, ed., *Policraticus*, II, VI:16, p.43; translation J. Dickinson, trans., *The Statesman's Book*, p.227

believed he had been killed in the woods.[38] In 1174 when the Scots were surprised by the English at Alnwick, many of the knights on the opposing sides knew and recognised each other, William the Lion's horse was targeted and he was captured.[39]

The thawing of Anglo-Welsh relations in the 1170s had a dramatic effect on the number of Welsh troops available to Henry. Four royal campaigns and an expensive policy to contain the Welsh resurgence had failed to secure a lasting solution. Owain Gwynedd's death in 1170 alleviated tensions and Henry's desire to be involved in Ireland, especially with Richard de Clare inheriting Leinster in 1171, provided the catalyst for a new relationship between England and Wales. With Powys and Gwynedd experiencing dynastic disputes, Henry's decision to take an army through south Wales before sailing to Ireland was a statement to both Rhys, as the most powerful Welsh ruler, and to the marcher families who had travelled to Ireland. Both sides could see the benefits of peace over continued hostility and Rhys met Henry in September 1171 and again in April 1172, and together they paved the way towards a greater level of co-operation between England and Wales.[40] To reinforce order and stability the council of Gloucester in 1175 was designed to preserve peace between Welsh rulers and marcher barons. This was followed two years later by many of the Welsh rulers swearing oaths to Henry at Geddington and Dafydd ab Owain Gwynedd and Rhys, as the rulers of north and south Wales, acknowledging Henry as their overlord at Oxford.[41]

Beneath the surface at these councils simmered a deep sense of mistrust between the two peoples encouraged by both recent disputes and years of marcher fighting. When Owain Gwynedd wrote to Thomas Becket in 1165, he expressed his firmly held belief that 'the king of England hates us'.[42] This divide was encouraged by tradition and even those with established links to England promoted hatred between the two nations. Madog ap Maredudd, with a long history of English collaboration, is praised with his warband by Cynddelw with a tone of resistance: 'woe betide the warriors of England'.[43] Dynastic ambitions, feuding and long-

[38] WN, I, pp. 105-9; Jocelin, pp. 68-71.
[39] Jordan Fantosme claimed to be a witness to the events: 'I relate no fable for I saw it all myself … the king lay felled to the ground … between his thighs the horse lay on him' (JF, pp. 133-5).
[40] For Henry, stability in Wales was key to transporting men and supplies to Ireland, especially given the prospect of him being away from England for a length of time. Appendix III below hints at the scale of the expedition to Ireland as preparations had to be made for an extensive campaign.
[41] *GH*, I, p.159: '*ubi multi Wallenses ad eum confluebant, et ei fidelitatem juraverunt*'; *GH*, I, p.162; Howden, I, pp. 133-4.
[42] *CTB*, I, no. 57, p.235.
[43] N.A. Jones, ed., *Arthur in Early Welsh Poetry*, p.83.

standing grievances with marcher lords had the potential to erupt into violence and destabilise relations between England and Wales, but both Henry and Rhys showed a commitment to maintaining order. In 1179 Henry reacted swiftly to punish Roger de Mortimer and his men after they killed Cadwallon ap Madog as he returned from court. This level of royal justice had been absent from Wales for some time and contrasts with the king's indifference to complaints made against Walter de Clifford in 1158.[44] With Henry gathering an army to enter Wales after violence erupted in Glamorgan in 1183-4, Rhys travelled to Worcester to meet him and restore peace.[45] The periods of relative stability in Wales in the 1170s and 1180s allowed Rhys to improve his position and consolidate his lands. With royal support, many Welshmen were able to benefit through trade, alliances and marriages as they strengthened ties to England.[46] Efforts at harmony were reflected by Gerald of Wales, who praised Dafydd ab Owain and Hywel ab Iorwerth for 'observing a strict neutrality between the Welsh and English.'[47] With the possibility of a sustained period of peace and prosperity in Wales, Gerald provided a note of caution that the policy of *détente* could only ever be a temporary solution. In conversation with Henry's representatives, Archbishop Baldwin and Ranulf de Glanville, he has Rhys imply that 'the Welsh and Irish, feed continually on the hope of recovering all the lands which the English have taken from them.'[48]

Henry II's campaign in Ireland met with little opposition, but Gerald's efforts to justify the invasion as a necessary undertaking to bring in essential reforms built on earlier works that portrayed 'Celtic' areas as being inhabited by barbarians. Similar elements appeared in his two works on Wales, where one of the most important features to emerge was his description of the Welsh at war. Throughout the twelfth century this image had been defined by outsiders with limited experience of Wales. At Lincoln in 1141, for instance, the Welsh were viewed as

[44] Roger was imprisoned (Diceto, I, pp. 437-8) and Walter received royal support (*Brut* (RBH), pp. 137-9).
[45] *GH*, I, p.314; Gervase, I, p.309. These disturbances in south Wales may have led to the recruitment of Gerald of Wales as an adviser on Welsh affairs. Gerald suggested that his role provided 'great assistance in the pacification of Wales' (*Opera*, I, p.57; translation H.E. Butler, ed. and trans., *The Autobiography of Gerald of Wales*, p.81). Whatever the reality, his employment highlights both the fragile nature of peace while learning to live with marcher neighbours and also serves as evidence of the ongoing effort to maintain stability in Wales.
[46] The clearest example is Dafydd ab Owain's marriage to Henry's half-sister, but men like Roger of Powys also saw their stock rise by establishing a working relationship with the king of England. Roger's son Meurig married Gwenwhyfar, daughter of Dafydd and Emma, and his son Owain married Angharad, daughter of Hwyel Sais, linking his family to both Gwynedd and Deheubarth, but also England (F.C. Suppe, 'Interpreter Families and Anglo-Welsh Relations', p.206).
[47] *Opera*, VI, p.145; translation Gerald of Wales, p.203. Hywel's commitment to peace was impressive after the murder of his brother in 1172. With his family restored to Caerleon in 1175, however, Hywel was further encouraged by payments for supporting the king in the 1180s (PR 30 Henry II, pp. 59-60; PR 31 Henry II, p.7).
[48] *Opera*, I, p.60; translation H.E. Butler, ed. and trans., *The Autobiography of Gerald of Wales*, p.84.

aggressive, unruly and primitive. Orderic Vitalis described them as a 'fierce mob', the *Gesta Stephani* as a 'dreadful and unendurable mass', and Henry of Huntingdon highlighted their lack of skill.[49] Gerald, however, had more experience of the people he was writing about, but his view of the Welsh and the nature of their warfare was influenced by his own situation. He believed his association with Wales hampered his ambitions as 'his nation and his kinship' held him back, and the numerous reports of Welsh violence during his lifetime encouraged his vision of a nation prepared for war.[50] In his lengthy descriptions of the primitive and brutal warfare they practised, Gerald helped create the enduring image of the Welsh at war.[51] His inclusion of Henry's letter to Manuel Komnenos drew attention to how Welsh troops were viewed towards the end of the twelfth century, with the king highlighting their lack of equipment but also how ferocious and untamed they were.[52]

The reality was more nuanced and to some extent many in Wales were drawing closer to England and Europe than Gerald suggests. Religion, immigration, trade, marriage, diplomacy and the growing use of Latin in Wales opened lines of communication with the world outside.[53] Henry's campaigns and subsequent policy towards Wales show this process in action with Owain Gwynedd's approach to France and the marriage of Rhys ap Gruffudd's designated heir to Matilda de Braose. These actions may have been taken in response to pressures from England, but still show the two most important Welsh rulers taking unprecedented steps and looking beyond Wales to strengthen their positions. The self-perception at the top of Welsh society was similar to the chivalric identity of the knights of England and France. Much of the focus of chivalry was the warhorse, and horses were celebrated in Welsh culture as indicators of wealth. Seisyll Bryffwrch hailed Owain Gwynedd as a distributor of 'swift steeds of the plain, trained for war', but the reality was well-trained horses and the accompanying equipment

[49] OV, VI, p.542; *Gesta Stephani*, p.111; D. Greenway, ed. and trans., *Historia Anglorum*, pp.726, 734.
[50] *Opera*, I, p.60; translation H.E. Butler, ed. and trans., *The Autobiography of Gerald of Wales*, p.85. On his journey through Wales, Gerald often refers to murder, violence, revenge and the lust for conquest as occurring 'in our days' or 'in our times' (*Opera*, VI, pp. 50, 61, 63, 69, 81).
[51] Walter Map also had experience of both countries and promoted anti-Welsh sentiment, noting the anger of the Welsh and 'how swift they are to shed blood' (*De Nugis Curialium*, p.203). Although offering some similar opinions, Walter's anecdotes and tales do not provide the same depth on Welsh warfare. In his critique of the Welsh in *Descriptio Kambriae*, Gerald has chapters dedicated to the Welsh living on plunder and not keeping peace, their weakness in battle, and their quarrels between brothers (*Opera*, VI, p.169).
[52] *Opera*, VI, p.181.
[53] For the increase in the use of Latin in twelfth-century Wales and the transition towards embracing being identified as Welsh, see H. Pryce, 'British or Welsh? National Identity in Twelfth-Century Wales', *English Historical Review*, 116 (2001), pp. 775-801.

were beyond the means of most men.[54] The proliferation of written documents during the twelfth century was reflected by the growth in the use of seals and, like their European counterparts, members of leading Welsh families displayed their status with equestrian motifs.[55] Despite the appearance of heavy cavalry in Welsh seals, the difficulty of the terrain and expense of both horses and armour restricted their role.[56]

In 1157 as Henry entered Wales, the *Brut* noted his army was 'fully equipped' as if fighting without equipment was more common in Wales.[57] Tradition may have contributed to the lack of armour in circulation and on meeting Cynwrig ap Rhys, Gerald observed he was dressed 'according to the custom ... his feet and his legs were bare'.[58] Despite the significance of some traditions, Welsh warfare was not static and increasing exposure to tactics, equipment and technology provided an opportunity for it to evolve. One area where external influences can be seen to have made an impact is in the rise of stone castles. The castle-building programme led by Rhys after 1171 reflected his new wealth and the stability that his relationship with Henry provided. Experience for and against the English had highlighted the benefits of strong defences and the use of stone meant Rhys no longer had to rely on geography alone for protection.[59] As Welsh building methods became more advanced, so too did siege warfare and the *Brut* provides evidence of the rapid progress from the use of hooked ladders at Cilgerran in 1166 to being surprised that the siege of Painscastle in 1198 had lasted three weeks without the appearance of siege engines.[60] Despite this increasing sophistication, bards still praised the

[54] N.A. Jones, ed., *Arthur in Early Welsh Poetry*, p.79. Likewise, Gruffudd ap Cynan was praised as the 'owner of a glorious line of horses from the long-maned stud' (J.E.C. Williams, 'Meilyr Brydydd and Gruffudd ap Cynan', p.184).

[55] The seal of Maredudd ap Hywel (dated 1176), for instance, features a rider in mail, wearing a helmet with nasal bar and carrying a sword and triangular shield (M.P. Siddons, 'Welsh Equestrian Seals', *National Library of Wales Journal*, 23 (1984), pp. 292-318 (at p.301). For the suggestion that this was a national rather than a regional phenomenon in twelfth-century Wales, see E.A. New, 'Lleision ap Morgan Makes an Impression: Seals and the Study of Medieval Wales', *Welsh History Review*, 26 (2013), pp. 327-350.

[56] A payment of £16 6s. 8d. for a helmet ('*galea*') and belt ('*zona*') for Henry II in 1159 gives an impression of how expensive the best equipment could be and very few in Wales could afford such finery (PR 5 Henry II, p.2). It is little surprise that Owain is recorded rejoicing after Crug Mawr (1136) as the spoils included 'horses carried off into captivity' and 'costly raiment and armour' (*Brut* (RBH), p.115).

[57] *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.59.

[58] *Opera*, VI, p.119; translation Gerald of Wales, p.178.

[59] Rhys's son Hywel was with Henry's army at Rouen in 1174 to witness the king of France, the Young King and the counts of Flanders, Burgundy, Blois and Champagne unable to breach the walls of Rouen. William of Newburgh noted that to take advantage of their numbers, the coalition's army was divided into 3 groups attacking the walls in eight-hour shifts (WN, I, pp. 191-2).

[60] *Brut* (Pen. 20), pp. 71 and n.1, 79). In 1193 Maelgwyn ap Rhys breached Ystrad Meuring with 'slings and catapults' and in 1196 contingents from Gwynedd, with English help, used 'diverse engines and siege contrivances' at Welshpool. The *Brut* was impressed by the 'wonderous ingenuity' as engineers undermined the walls prompting the garrison to surrender (*Brut* (Pen. 20), p.75; *Brut* (RBH), p.177).

fighting methods employed by heroic ancestors, celebrating bravery and aggression, and applied them to contemporary situations.

The celebration of Welsh violence contrasted with the image of knightly behaviour, stories of atrocities and plunder encouraged disparaging accounts of the savage and barbarous nature of the Welsh. The use of Welsh troops in important operations at Chaumont, Rouen and Damville are among the few instances of non-knightly roles being recorded in the warfare of Henry's reign. This may reflect that Welsh status had risen after Henry's campaigns, but within the evidence a further explanation may be suggested. The image of the Welsh at war, so well-established with audiences, through Latin and vernacular depictions, as wild and destructive served the convenient purpose of enhancing the knightly qualities of the aristocracy and England's king.[61] Chrétien de Troyes, reflecting audience taste, stated that knighthood is 'the highest honour God had created'.[62] Despite prohibiting tournaments in England, Ralph of Diss noted Henry's great pride in his son's exploits on the French tournament circuit and in 1179 describes how the younger Henry 'was transformed from a king into a knight'.[63] In 1167 and 1174, the Welsh actions were critical to success, but it is Henry who provides the chivalric gloss as the worthy adversary bravely offering face-to-face combat with the enemy. At Chaumont he is the visible leader, readying men to fight outside the walls, drawing the garrison out, to allow the Welsh to launch their surprise attack. At Rouen, William of Newburgh places great emphasis on the spectacle of the king's arrival in full view of the enemy and this audacious display contrasts with the Welsh secretly slipping into the woods to prepare an ambush.[64] According to Roger of Howden, it was the sight of Henry filling the great ditch outside the city to provide level ground so he could face his enemies in battle that leads to them burning their siege equipment and fleeing.[65] Even in 1188 as Welsh mercenaries torched Damville and several French villages, Henry can be seen as shrewd diplomat sending them

[61] Lack of skill and primitive warfare was used as propaganda against the Scots at the Standard in 1138. Henry of Huntingdon illustrated not only the belief of English, and knightly, superiority but also hinted that the Scots favoured guerrilla-style tactics as the only way they could compete against the English. In a speech that could be describing opinions of the Welsh in the twelfth century, Bishop Ralph is made to say: 'Your head is covered by a helmet, your breast by a hauberk, your legs by greaves, your whole body by a shield … you are enclosed in steel. What is there to doubt as we march forward against the unarmed and naked?' (D. Greenway, ed. and trans., *Historia Anglorum*, p.715).
[62] D. Staines, trans., *The Complete Romances of Chrétien de Troyes*, p.360.
[63] Diceto, I, p.428: '*de rege translatus in militem*'.
[64] WN, I, p.195: '*Rothomagum in conspectu hostium pompatice ingressus est*'.
[65] *GH*, I, p.75; Howden, II, pp. 65-6.

home in his desire for peace.[66] The image of the Welsh, and the clash of cultures, is thus used to enhance the image of Angevin monarchy. The king is both skilled military leader and peacemaker: an image of kingship suitable for Henry II and the great agglomeration of territories he controlled.

Henry held more lands than any previous English king and was aware of the economic limitations of trying to wage war on multiple fronts. Gerald of Wales, while still courting royal favour, celebrated him as king and conqueror: 'our Alexander of the West', but equally important were skills of diplomacy and the ability to bring peace, law and order.[67] Peace was associated with a strong ruler and Henry played an active personal role, constantly moving around his dominions, trying to maintain order. His efforts to avoid a return to the disastrous civil war of Stephen's reign were reflected in domestic and legal policies to ensure stability in England in his absence. The setbacks he experienced in Wales were followed by statements of royal power and a need to find more efficient ways to wage war.[68] The solution that emerged in the aftermath of the failed campaign of 1165 was a strengthening of royal control and a growing desire to expose mercenaries to the harsh realities of war. Welsh troops became increasingly valuable as they could be hired in large numbers and swiftly transported across the Channel as a deterrent to disobedience. At Lincoln in 1141 William of Malmesbury has Stephen's earls expecting jousts, ransoms and glory only to flee once they find their opponents wanting to fight.[69] The Welsh in Henry's armies had experience of fighting in difficult conditions and were raised with the expectation that they would be fighting in return for reward.[70]

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[66] *GH*, II, pp. 46-7, 50. As in 1185, when Ralph of Diss suggested Henry refused to go on crusade because of the threat to his kingdom posed by the Scots and Welsh, the Welsh were considered contrary to peace (Diceto, II, pp. 8, 34).

[67] *Opera*, V, p.189: '*Alexander noster occidentalis*'. The theme of Alexander the Great was continued at Henry's death in July 1189, with Ralph of Diss recording the inscription on his tomb: 'This tomb must suffice to one whom the world was not enough' (Diceto, II, p.65: '*sufficit huic tumulus, cui non suffecerat orbis*'). Henry's expansion into Ireland had been achieved through the threat of force, but there were other methods and opportunities to add to his lands. In 1177, for example, he acquired the county of La Marche for 15,000 *livres angevins*, 20 mules and 20 palfreys to allow Count Adalbert to end his days in the Holy Land (*GH*, I, p.197; Howden, II, pp. 147-8; Diceto, I, p.425).

[68] After the 1157 campaign, Henry celebrated Christmas with a crown-wearing ceremony at Lincoln (Howden, I, p.216; WN, I, pp. 117-8; PR 4 Henry II, pp. 132, 153, 155). Symbolically, he wore the crown outside the city walls in the place Stephen had been captured by his uncle in 1141 (M. Strickland, *Henry the Young King*, p.46). The 1165 campaign was a greater setback and followed by the punishment of the Welsh hostages as a display of the king providing justice and protecting his subjects from the disturbances of, in William Newburgh's words, 'untamed and ferocious people' (WN, I, p.145: '*gens effrenis et effera*').

[69] E. King, ed., K.R. Potter, trans., *William of Malmesbury: Historia Novella*, pp. 84-5.

[70] Poems praised the generosity of Welsh rulers in victory, but also hint at the personal wealth that could be accrued through fighting. Meilyr Brydydd suggested Gruffudd ap Cynan used a golden shield and golden

Mercenary numbers and loyalty were linked to wages and financing was the essential ingredient in preparing for campaigns. The efforts to raise money to feed, clothe, supply and pay Henry's army in 1165 and the need to replicate those levels meant much of the legal and administrative innovations instigated in 1166 were aimed at increasing royal revenue. There was no revolution, but the lack of success in Wales had exposed weaknesses in the system of knight service and provided the catalyst for a period of experimentation as Henry worked to get the most out of his resources of men and money.[71] The transition from tenure-based to cash-based military service was not a simple process as both services remained important.[72] Henry's answer was efficient management: a policy promoting strong, stable rule supported by loyal and able officials working to provide funds on a scale not witnessed before and warfare based increasingly on using mercenaries, especially on the continent. Having taken lessons from his Welsh campaigns and established a working political relationship with the native rulers, Henry's military activities developed a Welsh flavour in both personnel and tactics as Welsh troops became firmly established as an important component in English armies. Henry II's actions may not have been revolutionary, but he had highlighted the value of Wales as a military recruiting ground and by the end of his reign had shown his sons a way of financing and conducting warfare that would lay the foundations for the extravagant military expenditure of their reigns and beyond.[73]

drinking horns, but also praised him as a 'great distributor of wealth' who 'made me wealthy' (J.E.C. Williams, 'Meilyr Brydydd and Gruffudd ap Cynan', p.184).

[71] Henry's Irish campaign, for example, saw the introduction of a fine for those who provided neither men nor money. For examples of this fine, see PR 19 Henry II, pp. 18, 27, 42, 48, 60, 66, 100, 147, 153, 170, 180.

[72] The role of knights may have been evolving as they played an increasing part in local justice (*Glanvill*, pp. 30-7), for instance, but fighting beside the king retained its importance and for some barons it provided a clear opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty. Despite the need for infantry in 1165, the Pipe Rolls reveal a number of knights receiving pardons for scutage as they served in person. For examples, see PR 11 Henry II, pp. 13, 42, 49, 80, 83. For the link between pardons and personal service in 1165, see P. Latimer, 'Henry II's Campaign against the Welsh', p.550 and n.27.

[73] After Henry's death, England continued to use Welsh troops and in July 1191 Richard of Devizes claims that John took 4,000 Welshmen to a meeting with the chancellor, William Longchamp, who also arrived at Winchester with an army of Welsh mercenaries (The Chronicle of Richard of Devizes in *Chronicles*, III, p.409). In 1195 Hampshire accounted for the transport of over 1,300 foot sergeants to Normandy and at the same time the Norman exchequer records Welsh troops at Vaudreuil, Pont de L'Arche, crossing to Ouistreham, and their wounded being moved to Rouen (D.M. Stenton, ed., *The Great Roll of the Pipe for the Seventh Year of the Reign of King Richard the First: Michaelmas 1195* (London: Pipe Roll Society, 1929), pp. xviii, 207; T. Stapleton, ed., *Magni Rotuli Scaccarii Normanniae sub Regibus Angliae*, 2 vols (London: Society of Antiquaries, 1840-1844), I, pp. 155, 185, 236, 275). The following year over 2,000 Welsh sergeants were recruited and shipped to Normandy, with further Welsh contingents transported across the Channel in 1197 and 1198 (I.W. Rowlands, 'Warriors Fit for a Prince', p.214). As army sizes expanded, the Welsh were increasingly integrated into English armies and by 1277, for example, Edward I had as many as 9,000 Welsh infantry in his pay (M. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, p.116).

Appendix I

Regional Divisions of Medieval Wales[1]



[1] Adapted from Map 2 in R.K. Turvey, *The Welsh Princes, 1063-1283* (London: Longman, 2002), p.xxi.

Appendix II

The Welsh Hostages of 1165

It was the right and duty of a just king to punish offenders, but criticism followed if the punishment exceeded the limits of the law, was imposed on the innocent or motivated by anger.[1] Following the turmoil of Stephen's reign there was a general desire for Henry to restore law and order, and in response the king vowed to enforce laws and maintain peace as in the days of his grandfather. Severe punishments were seen as an essential deterrent to serious offences and Henry I, Suger of St Denis noted, promised 'nothing but the ripping out of eyes and the swing of the gibbet' to bring order to England and impose peace on Normandy.[2] Righteous anger was a legitimate prerogative of kings, rooted in biblical precedent.[3] Henry II in conversation with the abbot of Bonneval, according to Peter of Blois, used the Bible as justification for his anger as Old Testament kings could be angry and observed that 'God himself grows angry.'[4] This righteous anger could be used as a deterrent as one of Henry's charters of the early 1180s confirmed; threatening anyone infringing a donation with the malevolence, indignation and anger of both 'Almighty God and me.'[5] Nicholas Vincent suggests royal anger was often exaggerated to highlight 'the king's need to fortify himself with rational, clerical counsel.'[6] Exaggerated or not, visual displays of royal anger were expected, especially when the king's position or areas under his protection were threatened. In one display, Henry famously took to eating straw 'aflame with his usual rage' when angered by Richard du Hommet at Caen in 1166.[7]

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[1] Patricia Skinner argues that there was potential for injustice 'in a moment of irrational anger' (P. Skinner, 'Corpora and Cultural Transmission? Political Uses of the Body in Norman Texts, 1050–1150', in D. Bates, E. D'Angelo, E. van Houts, ed., *People, Texts and Artefacts: Cultural Transmission in the Medieval Norman Worlds* (London: University of London, 2017), pp. 213-231 (at p.227). For the king's duty to provide justice, see C.W. Hollister, 'Royal Acts', pp. 330-340.

[2] R. Cusimano and J. Moorhead, trans., *Suger, The Deeds of Louis,* p.70.

[3] Annette Parks suggests 'the king's anger, like the anger of God himself, was legitimate in the chastisement of wrongdoers' (A. Parks, 'Blind Anger or Blind Justice? Henry II and His Welsh Hostages in 1165', *Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences,* 5 (2001), pp. 83-90 (at p.87)).

[4] Cited in R. E. Barton, "Zealous Anger' and the Renegotiation of Aristocratic Relationships in Eleventh and Twelfth-Century France', in B.H. Rosenwein, ed., *Anger's Past,* pp. 157-170 (at p.160).

[5] L. Delisle and E. Berger, ed., *Recueil Des Actes de Henri II,* II, no. DCXXXIII, p.244: '*omnipotentis dei malivolentiam, iram et indignationem incurrat et meam*.'

[6] N. Vincent, 'The Court of Henry', p.312.

[7] *CTB*, I, no. 112, p.543. Henry's need to be seen as angry was balanced by displays of calmness and in 1173, W.L. Warren suggests, 'when it seemed that his whole empire was crumbling about his ears, he waited calmly at Rouen for his enemies to make a move, and passed his time hunting' (*Henry II*, p.210; Diceto, I, pp. 373-4). The point is, perhaps, missed here, but this was as much political theatre as any show of anger. It was a reassuring

Failure in Wales demanded a reaction and, to some extent, Henry's response towards the Welsh hostages in 1165 can be seen as a display of royal anger. There is some confusion, however, about the treatment and identities of the hostages, but it is clear that a number were mutilated, with some blinded and possibly castrated. The Melrose Chronicle, followed by Roger of Howden, noted that Henry 'put out the eyes of the boys, and cut off the noses and ears of the girls.'[8] Some may even have been killed, with Gerald of Wales claiming that the king 'murdered out of hand the hostages'.[9] Owain Gwynedd's letter to Louis VII shortly after the event, however, only mentions that his hostages had been 'wrongfully and harmfully mutilated'.[10] As he is appealing directly to Louis for support against Henry, it seems a surprising omission and had his hostages been killed Owain would surely have conveyed the details to France as further evidence of how tyrannical and unjust the English king could be.[11]

The C Text of the *Annales Cambriae* recorded that Henry's punishment was visited upon 22 hostages.[12] The *Brut* adds that within this number were two sons of Owain Gwynedd and a son of Rhys ap Gruffudd, and provides the names Cadwallon, Cynwrig and Maredudd.[13] Possibly following the reference in the *Brenhinedd y Saesson* to Henry going to Rhuddlan and taking hostages, shortly before the campaign of 1165, John Hosler suggests that Owain's sons Dafydd and Cynan were with the hostages.[14] Given their importance to Gwynedd, it seems unlikely that Owain's diplomatic contact with the Capetian court, describing them only as 'my hostages', and the Welsh sources would remain silent over their specific involvement and possible punishment.[15] The appearance of Dafydd and Cynan is not consistent with what is known about the hostages in 1165: the Red Book of Hergest version of the *Brut* provides the

display of confidence in the face of mounting pressure and an act he repeated the following year at Rouen to the surprise of his opponents (F. Bonnélye, trad., *Chronique de Geoffroy*, pp. 118-9).

[8] *Brut* (Pen. 20), pp. 63-4; *Brut* (RBH), p.147; *Bren*, p.167 (blinding); *Annales Cambriae*, p.50 (castration); J. Stevenson, ed., *Chronica de Mailros*, p.79; translation *Early Sources of Scottish History*, II, pp. 259-60; Howden, I, p.240.

[9] *Annales de Waverleia* and *Annales Cestrienses* both suggest that Owain's hostages were killed - '*et perdidit obsides*' (H.R. Luard, ed., *Annales Monastici*, II, p.239; R.C. Christie, ed. and trans., *Annales Cestrienses*, pp. 24-5); *Opera*, VI, p.143; translation Gerald of Wales, p.201. W.L. Warren adds that they were hanged (*Henry II*, p.164).

[10] H. Pryce, 'Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII', p.7.

[11] Owain's version of the 1165 campaign suggests he is innocent as it was 'preceded by no evil deeds of mine' and was the result of 'the harshness of his (Henry's) tyranny' (H. Pryce, 'Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII', p.7).

[12] *Annales Cambriae*, p.50: '*et obsides eorum numero xxii*'.

[13] *Brut* (Pen. 20), p.63; *Brut* (RBH), p.147; *Bren*, p.167. For the connection to Rhys's son Maredudd Ddall (the Blind), see *History of Wales*, II, p.517 and n.120.

[14] *Bren*, p.167; J. Hosler, 'Henry II's Military Campaigns', p.70, n.93; *idem*, *Henry II: A Medieval Soldier*, p.56.

[15] H. Pryce, 'Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII', p.27: '*meos obsides*'.

fullest account and describes the hostages as having 'been held in fetters for a long time.'[16] This strongly implies they were from previous encounters, possibly in 1157, 1158 or 1163, and not taken in 1165. This may be further supported by evidence from the Pipe Rolls which recorded hostages at Bridgnorth, Shropshire and at Worcester being moved for the 1165 campaign.[17] Dafydd was in Teigengl in 1165 and there are no references to either his or Cynan's capture, punishment, or release.[18]

Charlene Eska's study of castration in Welsh and Irish sources argues there was a 'widespread belief that a ruler had to be without a physical blemish.'[19] This explains some of the politically motivated violence, the blindings and castrations, linked to the many dynastic and successional disputes in Wales. It also confirms Dafydd and Cynan were not victims of mutilation in 1165, as they were both involved in the contest to succeed Gwynedd after their father's death in 1170. Despite the fact that Gerald of Wales considered their older brother, Iorwerth Drwyndwn, to be the only legitimate son of Owain Gwynedd, he would play no part in the successional dispute.[20] J.E. Lloyd suggested that a flat nose meant Iorwerth was 'excluded by his deformity from all share in the succession.'[21] Dafydd and Cynan, however, both played active roles in the protracted dispute, after Cynan was dispossessed in 1173 and killed in 1174 Dafydd started to emerge as Gwynedd's leader.[22] He confirmed his ascendancy by marrying Henry's half-sister, Emma of Anjou, and Roger of Howden records him as '*rex Nortwalliae*' at the council of Oxford in 1177.[23] It certainly seems unlikely that he would have risen to such prominence if he had been mutilated in 1165.

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[16] *Brut* (RBH), p.147. If the identification of Maredudd Ddall is correct, it would support the description in the Melrose Chronicle that the hostages were boys and girls. Maredudd died and was buried at Whitland in 1239, so would have been a child when he was surrendered to Henry before 1165 (*Brut* (RBH), p.235). In 1163 when Malcolm of Scotland surrendered hostages to Henry, they included 'noble boys of his kingdom' (Chronicle of Holyrood in *Early Sources of Scottish History*, II, p.251). Dafydd and Cynan, though young, were old enough to fight against Henry in 1157 and could not be described as boys.

[17] PR 11 Henry II, pp. 89, 90, 98.

[18] Rhys ap Gruffudd's son Hywel Sais, for instance, taken hostage as a child was famously released by Henry in 1171, but there are no such references to Dafydd and Cynan being released for political gain either before or after their father's death.

[19] C.M. Eska, "Imbrued in their owne bloud': Castration in Early Welsh and Irish Sources', in L. Tracy, ed., *Castration and Culture in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2013), pp 149-173 (at p.159).

[20] *Opera,* VI, p.134.

[21] *History of Wales*, II, p.550. Huw Pryce agreed that Iorwerth 'played little or no part … perhaps because he was prevented by a facial disfigurement' (*AWR*, p.25). For the importance of facial difference in 'Celtic' societies, see 'Putting on a Brave Face?', in P. Skinner, *Living with Disfigurement in Early Medieval Europe* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 103-132.

[22] *Annales Cambriae*, p.54.

[23] *GH*, I, p.62. Dafydd appeared as '*rex*' (*AWR*, nos. 198, 199) and then '*princeps*'(nos. 200, 202), and rather than showing signs of resentment, to be expected if he had been held captive and mistreated by Henry, he was praised by Gerald of Wales for maintaining peace between the Welsh and English (*Opera*, VI, p.145).

Appendix III

The Fleet for Ireland, 1171[1]

Counties	Steersmen	Sailors	Wages	Service Period
Norfolk & Suffolk	36	468[2]	£33 13s.	15 days
Dorset and Somerset	7	83	£6 15d.	15 days
Wiltshire	1	15	21s. 3d.	15days
Devon[3]	6	78	105s.	15 days
Hampshire	2	44	60s.	15 days
Herefordshire	1	12	17s. 6d.	15 days
Gloucestershire[4]	28	168	£13 18s. 9d.	15 days
Berkshire	1	7	11s. 3d.	15 days
Warwickshire & Leicestershire	1	9	13s. 9d.	15 days
Worcestershire	2	21	31s. 3d.	15 days

[1] The figures used here are taken from PR 17 Henry II.
[2] Recorded as '*eskiperii*' as opposed to the standard '*nautae*' for sailors, presumably from *eskipare* meaning to man a vessel (PR 17 Henry II, p.2).
[3] It is not as clear that these were destined for Ireland (PR 17 Henry II, p.24)
[4] A further one steersman and 14 sailors were hired at 21s. 3d. for 15 days to transport supplies from Gloucester to Bristol (PR 17 Henry II, p.84).

Counties	Steersmen	Sailors	Wages	Service Period
Cambridgeshire & Huntingdonshire	1	19	49s.	1 month
Essex & Hertfordshire	6	82	116s. 3d.	15 days
Sussex	8	152	£10 10s.	15 days
Oxfordshire	1	6	10s.	15 days
London & Middlesex	2	22	32s. 6d.	15 days

Appendix IV

Henry II's Scutage Policy

Table I: Scutage under Henry II[1]

Year	Rate per knight's fee	Year	Rate per knight's fee
1156	£1	1165	1 mark
1159	2 marks	1168	1 mark
1161	2 marks	1172	£1
1162	1 mark	1187	£1

[1] Despite Robert of Torigni's statement that every two knights should support a third for the Welsh campaign of 1157, the only evidence of a possible scutage on the Pipe Rolls for that year comes from the Abbot of Abbotsbury paying 2 marks of silver for the army of Wales (Torigni, p.193; PR 3 Henry II, p.99). It is clear that the abbot answered for one knight's fee (PR 2 Henry II, p.33; PR 5, Henry II, p.43; PR 7 Henry II, p.47; PR 8 Henry II, p.25; PR 11, Henry II, p.67; PR 14 Henry II, p.144; PR 18 Henry II, p.76). This may suggest a scutage at 2 marks per fee, but a general levy seems unlikely as this is the only reference to a payment in connection to the Welsh campaign that year.

Table II: Scutage under Richard I and John[1]

Year	Rate per knight's fee	Year	Rate per knight's fee
1190	10s.	1203	2 marks
1194	£1	1204	£1 13s. 4d.
1195	£1	1205	2 marks
1196	£1	1206	£1
--------	--------	1209	£1
1199	2 marks	1210	£2
1201	2 marks	1211	2 marks
1202	2 marks	1214	£2

[1] Adapted from Table 2 in *Feudal Assessments*, p.30.

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