Context

Blood-sport includes not only trophy hunting but also the hunting of any animal classed as ‘game’, whether those animals are large, wild animals or smaller animals. Indeed, it is thought that up to nearly 60 million so-called ‘game birds’ (in particular, pheasants and partridges) are mass-reared every year in the UK alone for the sports-shooting industry (Citation2015a, Citation2015b; Animal Aid Citation2010; Weston Citation2020), and that many of these birds are subject to the conditions of the factory farm; conditions which involve severe confinement, barren cages, and little freedom for the birds to protect themselves against extreme heat or cold (2022; Animal Aid Citation2015a; FAWC Citation2008). Sadly, investigations within the UK show that such treatment of game birds is not unusual, despite DEFRA’s Code of Practice (in relation to the welfare of reared game birds in the UK) emphasising that the treatment of these birds should comply with the Animal Welfare Act 2006 which requires, amongst other things, that those responsible for animals’ welfare need to provide a suitable environment for those animals and allow them the freedom to exhibit their normal behaviour patterns (DEFRA Citation2009).

Since 2004 Animal Aid has been tirelessly investigating the use of game birds for the sports-shooting industry:

Their latest reports in May 2022 have shown that living conditions in relation to the breeding of these birds for their use in blood-sport have barely changed in nearly 20 years, with birds still being kept in horrendous conditions that prevent them from exercising their species-specific tendencies (Animal Aid Citation2022).

It should be noted at the outset that it is not the purpose of this paper to provide an ethical analysis of game birding, rather than present a conceptual analysis of blood-sport (for analyses on the ethics of blood-sport, see Curnutt Citation1996; Davion Citation2007; Humphreys Citation2010, Citation2014, Citation2020; Salt Citation1915). However, the actual treatment of these birds does pose serious ethical issues and empirical evidence of the treatment of animals used for sport will play an important role in any conceptual analysis, hence some contextual discussion in this paper on the treatment of game birds. But this paper intends to show that hunting and shooting animals for pleasure is not a sport, properly understood.² It is for the purposes of application and because of the sheer numbers of birds used in the sports-shooting industry that this paper focuses on a discussion of game birding (shooting birds for sport), but its findings are applicable to all so-called ‘blood-sports’.

The British Association for Shooting and Conservation maintains that game-shooting is indeed a sport, and it defines ‘sporting shooting’ as including ‘wildfowling, game, and rough shooting, [and] deer stalking’ (Citation2015b; BASC Citation2015a). It is worth bearing in mind that the BASC aims to protect ‘shooting sports’ (BASC Citation2012) and has a vested interest in emphasising that game birding is in fact a sport. Indeed, in the light of the controversial nature of killing animals as a pastime, or for leisure and/or pleasure, calling this activity ‘sport’ could be said to be ‘sports-washing’ in the sense of promoting an image of game-shooting (or shooting animals for leisure more generally) as a worthwhile or at least respectable pursuit. In examining the extent to which hunting and killing animals considered as game is a ‘sport’, this paper will shed light on whether such an image of shooting animals for leisure is an accurate portrayal of the nature of that activity.

Game Birding and Games

The example of game birding raises issues regarding the nature and norms of sport. ‘What is the nature of sport?’ is a difficult question, and there may not be one definitive answer. But this is not to say that we cannot agree about what sport is in general or agree on some of the norms of sport. A sport is probably an activity that is organised, governed by rules, involves an element of competitive and skilful physical activity, and is an activity taken part in for leisure, competition or exercise. That sport may be defined as such is indicated in Jan Boxill’s claim regarding an ideal definition of sport: ‘Sport in its paradigmatic forms is a freely chosen, voluntary activity that is rule governed and requires bodily excellence, which is highlighted in competition’ (Boxhill Citation2003, 109).

Whilst one can recognise that this list of criteria (sport as organised, rule-governed, competitive, and involving physical skill, and as partaken for leisure, competition, or exercise) is debatable (particularly with regard to its inclusion of ‘bodily excellence’) and not exhaustive, the aim here is not to provide a strict or fixed definition of sport (it is not even clear if one is possible, as we shall see in a later section) but rather to consider whether game birding satisfies a kind of generalised or unspecialised notion of the nature of sport; a notion which draws on the norms of sport and which can be linked to the activity of game birding.

Of course, from the perspective of the humans involved, shooting animals may satisfy these criteria. For example, with regard to sports having to involve competition, hunters may compete against each other for the highest number of birds shot, although this raises the issue that such a competitive aim is hardly part and parcel of the shared activity, and there is no mention of such a competitive aim within the rules laid out in the BASC’s codes of practice (BASC Citation2015b). If there is such a competitive element, then it would arise merely when individual players decide to introduce another element into their activity (in order to add interest, perhaps); it is certainly not a necessary or an established part of the activity. Further, there is no official count of the dead birds, nor any official prizes for who wins, and unlike clay shooting, there are no levels of competition, and there is no official competitive aim. So, the claim that game birding has a genuine competitive element is dubious.

With regard to sport being a rule-governed activity, sport is commonly thought of as a gaming activity, and rules play a key role in the characterisation of games. Bernard Suits, well known for his characterisation of games, argues that an activity could be classified as a ‘game’ insofar as it may be seen as embedding certain necessary and sufficient elements:

Relatedly, for Suits, games involve the ‘voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles’ (Suits Citation2014 [Citation1978], 43) and can be characterised by the following conditions:

1. engagement in activity which is directed towards a specific goal using specified rules—that goal is to be determined prior to the activity (what Suits calls a ‘pre-lusory’ goal) (Suits Citation2014 [Citation1978], 38);

2. the means permitted by these specific rules are more limited or inefficient (Suits Citation1967, 148-49) than they would be without the rules; and

3. the person engaging in the activity accepts the rules as rules which make that activity possible.

With regard to criterion (1), sports-shooting is directed towards a specific goal using specific rules (see BASC Citation2012); that goal, as S. P. Morris plausibly claims, most obviously being dead animals and less obviously being ‘the process of hunting’ (Morris Citation2013, 301), the latter which I take to mean the activity leading up to the attempted kill (which would include stalking the animals as part of the overall hunt). But while the activity of game birding and blood-sports more generally are beset by certain rules, whether those rules are gaming ones is still open to question.

In respect of (2), it is not clear that the means used in order to pursue the most obvious goal are purposely inefficient. Indeed, the Respect for Quarry code of practice emphasises that subjects participating in the activity of shooting animals for sport should ensure that they shoot within their range and never beyond it (BASC Citation2010). That said, perhaps shooting a bird which is flying very low would be considered as too easy a shot, or participants may consider it unfair to shoot it. But these latter considerations are not part of the sport itself (shooting a bird which is flying too low is not disallowed or termed ‘unfair’ in the code of practice), unlike inefficient means used in proper sports. Karate, for example, does not allow punches to the back of the head, boxing does not allow kicking, and the 400-metre sprint does not allow for runners to leave their lane; these rules make these games more inefficient than they would have been otherwise.

However, Morris claims that condition (2) can be satisfied by some hunting which employs fair-chase rules, ‘where those rules prescribe less efficient means instead of more efficient means’ (Morris Citation2013, 303). To illuminate the fair-chase code in the context of sports-shooting, Morris refers to Jose Ortega y Gasset’s claim that ‘As the weapon became more … effective, man imposed more … limitations on himself as the animal’s rival in order to leave it free to practice its wily defenses, in order to avoid making the prey and hunter excessively unequal’ (Ortega Y Gasset Citation1995, 59; cited by Morris Citation2013, 302).

However, the relationship between hunter and hunted may indeed be classed as ‘excessively unequal’. While some sports-shooting enthusiasts may attempt to implement an element of fair-play, it is not clear that such an element is a constitutive part of the supposed game (at least not in the UK). But perhaps more importantly, there is a sense in which it seems illusionary to suppose that a level ‘playing’ field can be created between a side that does not know they are part of game and which is no match against the barrel of a gun, and a side which possesses means not possessed by their ‘opponents’, and which pursues a game with the aim to kill, unbeknownst to its ‘opponents’ (an aim which is held—and capable of being held—by one side only). If the latter is true, then any fair-chase code undermines itself, irrespective of the use of inefficient means, but more than this, it seems that the very idea of a fair-chase code with regard to hunting appears incoherent. Moreover, although game-shooting may well involve an element of making the task more difficult than it needs to be in order to practise one’s shot, it is not clear that game birding enthusiasts are required to use inefficient means to kill their target, rather than efficient ones.

With regard to the less obvious goal of sports-shooting, that being the process of the hunt, many of the animal targets will remain concealed throughout part of the process. But in relation to game birding, the birds are often ‘flushed’ into shooting range, either by the use of dogs or by human ‘beaters’ who scare the animals from their concealed place. Once within the target range, the animals do not have a fair chance, and may well be like sitting ducks. This is very different from the hunting Morris talks of; that uses inefficient means while employing a fair-chase code. This is very much true also of hunting big game, as such hunting does not usually employ inefficient means of the kind that would satisfy such a code.

Indeed, contrary to some perceptions (such as the perception that big game is stalked across vast tracts of land), animal welfare groups claim that lions are often captive-bred for the purpose of being ‘hunted’ for sport. Indeed, what has become known as ‘canned hunting’ involves captive-bred lions being taken to a designated, fenced-off area, in relatively open terrain before being shot by trophy hunters. The Humane Society of the United States claims that ‘[c]aptive hunts, also known as “canned hunts”, are the very opposite of fair-chase. Shooters at captive hunts pay to kill animals—even endangered species—trapped behind fences’ (HSUS Citation2015). The term ‘canned hunting’ certainly points to the idea that the animals are easy targets. As Patrick Barkham writes, ‘The easy slaughter of animals in fenced areas is called “canned hunting”, perhaps because it’s rather like shooting fish in a barrel’ (Barkham Citation2013). Overall, although some hunters may well make the process of hunting more inefficient than it could be, it is far from clear that such inefficiency is a necessary part of shooting for sport; rather, such inefficiency may well be something that the individual hunters themselves value, rather than something that is typical of shooting-sports generally.

It is noteworthy that making the means to the kill less efficient than it could be means that (even when there are some participants who have an excellent shot) there are bound to be some participants who merely injure the target animals, resulting in unnecessary suffering for those animals. This casts further doubt on the claim that the ‘game’ is a fair one: animals lose not only when they face skilled shooters (they lose their lives, and quickly), but they also lose when faced with less skilled ones (for example, by being injured, or dying a slow or painful death). As such, even if one assumes that the means used are less efficient than they could be, the use of inefficient means in sport-shooting—even in what Morris calls ‘fair-chase hunting’, according to which ‘the idea is to maintain some semblance of balance in the … relationship between hunters and the hunted’ (Morris Citation2014, 394)— does not appear to be conducive to creating a level playing field for all the ‘players’, animals included, and thus fair-play does not so far appear compatible with the ‘game’.

It is also open to doubt as to whether the activity of sports-shooting fulfils criterion (3), which states that the person engaging in the activity accepts the rules as rules which make that activity possible. The person engaging in the activity of game birding may well accept the rules of that activity as rules which make that activity possible, but only in the sense that following such rules is part of the health and safety aspect of the game, rather that constitutive of the game itself. Indeed, the codes of sports-shooting in the UK (as laid out in the Code of Good Shooting Practice and the other codes devised by the BASC) look nothing like rules of a game. The ‘Five Golden Rules’ relate primarily to the safe conduct of participants and to conservation (BASC Citation2012), not to what one might call ‘playing the game’.

That said, Morris argues that shooting for sport does fulfil condition (3) insofar as that activity can be classed as ‘fair-chase hunting’; ‘the strongest indication that the hunt has been made into a game is the adoption of a fair-chase ethic. In fact, the very purpose of adopting a fair-chase ethic is to make a game of the hunt’ (Morris Citation2014, 396). However, as said above, there is a contention regarding whether fair-play can or does constitute an element of the activity of shooting animals for sport in a meaningful or genuine sense. Moreover, insofar as taking part in a game is, in Suits’s words, the ‘voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles’ then it remains even more unlikely that blood-sports can fulfil this condition for what counts as a game because the ‘players’ on one side of the game are certainly not voluntary participants (the claim that the animals are not players but objects in the game will be discussed in what follows).

Blood-Sport and Sport

Of course, even if one accepts for argument’s sake that game birding can be classed as a game, it does not follow that it is a sport, for while it is generally accepted that all sports are games, not all games are sports. Suits provides direction on whether a game can be classed as a sport by presenting necessary and sufficient conditions the fulfillment of which make a game a sport (Suits Citation1973, 48–64). For the sake of brevity, the author refers to the work of Mike McNamee who concisely outlines these conditions as follows:

1. That the game be a game of skill;

2. That the skill be physical;

3. That the game has a wide following;

4. That the following achieve a wide level of stability (Mcnamee Citation2008, 15).

The first two conditions form part of the definition of sport mentioned at the beginning of this paper; a definition which admittedly is not precise, but which nevertheless outlines the general features of sport. The second two conditions appear to be ones which are quite exclusive in the sense that were they accepted as necessary then some lesser-known activities currently classed as sports would no longer be classed as such. Consider, for example, aerial skiing, a free-style skiing activity which is now an Olympic sport, but which has relatively few followers. Or one could consider the example given by McNamee himself: bog-snorkelling. Whilst noting that, as McNamee claims (Ibid., 15), conditions (3) and (4) are quite vague, many would be quick to claim that bog-snorkelling falls short in terms of fulfilling these conditions due to its lesser popularity (and perhaps because it is a relatively new activity) compared with many other sports. On the other hand, bog snorkellers could argue otherwise:

But even if one goes some way with Suits and accepts for argument’s sake that his proposed conditions for what constitute a game are at least necessary ones (notwithstanding arguments claiming that they constitute neither necessary nor sufficient conditions) (Ellis Citation2011, 381–92) and that game birding fulfils these necessary conditions, and even if one further accepts some of Suits’s proposals regarding the conditions necessary for games to count as sports, it is far from clear that these conditions alone sufficiently express that which constitutes a sporting activity. Nor do they capture one of the central norms of sports, that which is related to the idea of a sporting chance, even chance or at the very least, a fair chance.

Overall, while conditions (1) and (2) are generally accepted as necessary conditions for sport, it is reasonable to reject (3) and (4) as necessary. Besides, as indicated in the above quotation, McNamee argues that the concept of sport is not fixed but open to revision over time and in the light of new circumstances (Mcnamee Citation2008, 16). That said, he plausibly also recognises that ‘there must be a limit to the range of revisions possible for the social activity to retain its referent: sport’ (Ibid., 17). Certainly, in order for the term ‘sport’ to have a referent, there must be some resemblances between those activities we commonly class as sport; resemblances which allow us to recognise those activities as sporting ones. Such resemblances point to the norms of sport, a central one of which is fair-play (which will be discussed in what follows).

That which Morris refers to as ‘fair-chase ethics’ deserves further discussion here, for his presentation of such an ethic is resonant of the notion of a sporting chance:

For Morris, the method by which such imbalances in equality can be prevented involves ‘the deliberate rejection of more efficient means in favor of less efficient’ (Ibid., 395) (and, as we have seen, such a rejection serves to satisfy one of Suits’s conditions for a game). But, while individual sports-shooting enthusiasts may well attempt to use less efficient means to achieve their goal, this hardly can be said to create anything close to a balance between the hunter and the hunted, even when one assumes that the hunted are wild animals (and thereby well habituated to their territory), stalked over a vast tract of land, much less animals which are captive-bred for the purpose of shooting-sports and are more often than not confined to a certain area for the purpose of being shot (preventing them from having an opportunity to properly escape) and are often lured or ‘flushed’ into the open.

Furthermore, no animal is even capable of using the same means as the human participants by taking up arms; no animal is even aware of the apparent game (let alone aware of the supposed rules of the ‘game’); and no animal has a sporting chance against the bullet of a gun (if they do survive they are either shot at close range soon afterwards, or they may manage to crawl away, in which case they probably face a lingering death). The relationship is drastically unequal, and this is true whether or not the animals used for sports are wild or captive-bred and this is so even assuming that the hunter employs inefficient means. Further, as in the above section, it is reasonable to assume that the use of such means could well result in animals being merely maimed, thereby causing more suffering than necessary, but if hunting were to somehow incorporate something called a ‘fair-chase ethic’ then surely it would require that animals be killed quickly and painlessly; the best way to ensure this would be to promote efficient rather than inefficient means. Besides, in the UK at least, the codes of practice for sports-shooting (Citation2015b; BASC Citation2012) are strongly suggestive of efficiency, rather than inefficiency, with regard to shooting animals.

Moreover, it is significant that it makes no sense to say that the animal could ‘win’ the ‘game’. And if they cannot win, it makes little sense to say that they have a sporting chance. In respect of commercial game-shooting, the playing field is clearly in favour of the hunter. This is particularly true with regard to intensively reared birds, but also applies to birds reared by less intensive methods. Between the period of their release and the hunt, the birds will have to adapt quickly to their environment. Many will take time to respond to their surroundings and to build the strength to have any real chance of fleeing from the hunter. By the time of the hunt, it is likely that such birds will be more vulnerable than wild game birds. (And most birds which are hunted for the purpose of sport have been commercially reared for that very purpose, so the concerns just outlined relate to the majority of birds used for sport.) That said the Game Farmers’ Association states that ‘[g]ood game farming ensures that these birds … are strong, fit and ready for the natural environment in which they will live’ (GFA Citation2022), and DEFRA lays out welfare requirements regarding game birds (DEFRA Citation2009). Yet it is far from clear that such requirements are sufficiently enforced (as suggested in the introduction), and for this reason it is not obvious that those involved in the rearing and releasing of game birds are rearing birds that will be physically well adapted for release into the countryside or that will have anything like a sporting chance.

With all that said, of course some may argue that the animals are in fact not players at all, but merely take the role of objects in the game, much the same as a football or tennis ball in their respective sports. Indeed, as Morris argues ‘hunting necessitates the objectification of the hunted. A hunter is not competing with the hunted, he or she is competing with themselves and, sometimes, with one another’ (Humphreys Citation2014, 401). But this omits an obvious difference between objects used in sports, such as tennis balls, hockey sticks and footballs, and animals used for sports. The latter are living, sentient creatures, who are significantly harmed via the hunt and whose vital interests in not suffering and in continued existence are clearly at stake. They do stand to lose a lot via the hunt, unlike sports-objects such as balls. Morris recognises this, claiming that ‘hunted animals are not merely objects’ (Ibid., 403) and that this creates a ‘very serious moral problem with hunting’ even though ‘hunting necessitates the objectification of the hunted’ (Ibid., 401). In other words, despite the deeply morally problematic nature of hunting, it does not follow, according to Morris, that it is not a sport.

However, the fact that the animals are sentient creatures who stand to lose a lot is one reason, one must presume, that a fair-chase code even applies in terms of attempts to create some balance between hunter and hunted; as Morris claims, ‘Hunters have … a vast array of machinery capable of generating tremendous inequalities … but the expressed intent of fair-chase is to prevent this inequality becoming excessive’ (Ibid., 394–95). And in attempting to create more of a level playing field between the hunter and hunted, the hunter employing a fair-chase ethic makes a hidden assumption that the hunted (the animals) are players in the game. If they were not—if they were merely a means to play the game, like tennis balls or other sports-objects rather than players—then it would make little sense to appeal to a fair-chase code as way of creating a more equal balance between the hunter and hunted. And if they are players, then there is nothing resembling a level playing field or a fair-chase when the animals fleeing are up against a gun.

The concept of a sporting chance and fairness as essential norms of sport are missing from the game when the animals are viewed as living things with real interests at stake, but they are also missing from the game when the animals are viewed as mere objects (for they are not simply mere things in the game and it is wrong to treat them as such, as they do stand to lose a lot). In this sense, hunting does not conform to the standards we tend to expect in relation to sport. We could make analogies to hunting humans for sport here and could imagine a scenario where humans take part in activities or a process in which they go about hunting other humans for ‘sport’ (see Humphreys Citation2014, 331–45). If we want to class this as sport, then we would certainly have to class hunting nonhumans as ‘sport’. But we should resist the suggestion that such activities can be classed as sport, rather than killing for entertainment or enjoyment purposes; indeed, we need to resist this if we want to say that fair-play is constitutive of proper sports and should inform us of which activities are and which are not sporting one.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to answer the question as to whether blood-sport is actually a sport via reference to a particular blood-sport—that of game birding. In doing so, it first asked whether blood-sports are games; that is, when people ‘play’ blood-sport is there really a game going on? Applicably, are people who take part in game birding participating in a game in relation to Suits’s definition of a game? The answer to this must be ‘no’. Of course, one could attempt to utilise alternative definitions and apply different criteria than Suits’s, but it would still be at the very least questionable as to whether people who take part in blood-sport really are participating in a game. But although all sports are games, not all games are sports. So, for argument’s sake, even if we assume that blood-sport is a game and that it fulfils Suits’s ‘gaming’ conditions, it does not follow that it is a sport.

The paper then asked whether blood-sport is actually a sport, on the assumption that it is in fact a gaming activity. With regard to gaining definitional clarity on the conditions that make a game a sporting one, Suits’s conditions for sport were examined. It was found that at least two (out of four) of Suits’s conditions for sport can be accepted as necessary ones, those being that it is a game of skill and that the skill is physical (see (1) and (2) laid out in the section above). In addition, our generalised notion of sport (as activity that is rule-based and organised, involving an element of competitive and skilful physical activity, taken part in for leisure, competition or exercise) may too be accepted alongside these criteria activity. But such conditions and such a general definition are not sufficient, even taken together, without incorporating some notion of fair-play (a notion which is bound to ideas surrounding a sporting chance).

Some blood-sports may well promote a fair-chase code and may consider that this code reflects the notion of a sporting chance or the norm of fair-play. But the code ends up undermining itself, for fair-play between the players is not possible in context of blood-sport where one side is incapable of even being aware of the game, or of using the same means as the other side. Of course, blood-sport enthusiasts could attempt to employ less efficient means in relation to killing animals, but the idea of a sporting chance is still missing from the ‘game’ itself despite such employment; as is the idea that players agree to the rules of the game or to be in the game. And so, the fair-chase code appears redundant and impossible to implement.

In conclusion, it has been found that game birding not only does not satisfy conditions that allow us to say that it is a game, but in any case, even if we assume that it does, it does not satisfy conditions that allow us to call it ‘sport’. This conclusion applies to not only game birding but to blood-sports more generally. The author accepts that there may not be one definition of sport. Nevertheless, game birding does not conform to our general ideas about the nature of sport, norms of sport, and sport ethics. As such, game-shooting and blood-sports generally, cannot properly be called ‘sports’.