Evidential propositions as situational scenarios: From semantic structure to meaning construction

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This study examines the interpretation of evidential propositions using insights from the *Lexical Constructional Model* (LCM), including its recent classification of situational scenarios (cognitive models) into three sub-types: descriptive, attitudinal and regulatory. The aim is to show that processing the meaning of an evidential proposition can require profiling parts of all three types of situational scenarios– a process that is activated (at the lexical-constructional, discourse and implicational levels) by such cognitive operations as *echoing*, *contrast* and *metonymy*. This is consistent with the principles of *Relevance* according to which the contextual information required for interpreting the speaker's explicit/implicit meaning (i.e., explicating/implicating it) is not limited to a particular knowledge type or source (encyclopaedic, socio-cultural, religious and so on). The study, thus, complements work on evidentiality by going beyond its features, markers and behaviour in discourse to focus on the interpretation of evidential propositions in connection with cognitive models and operations.

1. Introduction and background

Evidentiality has been dealt with in the literature as a linguistic phenomenon that is associated with different kinds of information, particularly the source of knowledge (or nature of evidence) for a given proposition and the speaker's commitment to the truth value of that proposition (i.e., epistemic commitment) (Rooryck, 2001). The extent of this commitment is modulated by whether the proposition is a claim to first-hand or second-hand evidence, as in "*I saw/heard him*" and "*I heard this about him*" respectively (Murray, 2017; Whitt, 2011). In some languages, evidentiality is encoded by grammaticalised devices like verbal affixes and particles. In others, however, the phenomenon is marked by lexical and syntactic devices (for typologies of evidentiality marking in different languages, see Aikhenvald, 2007, p. 211; Viberg, 1983, p. 136; Whitt, 2009; Willett, 1988). To demonstrate, there are obligatory verbal affixes in Turkish that denote first-hand versus second-hand evidence (Ünal & Papafragou, 2020, p. 118). Such affixes do not exist in English, for instance, but English speakers have the option of using lexical and other syntactic devices as evidentiality markers. These include: modals (e.g., *"She could/might/may have* passed the test*"*), adverbs (e.g., *"She will *possibly/probably/certainly/undoubtedly* pass the test*"*), adjectives (e.g., "It is *obvious/evident/apparent* that she has passed the test*"*), cognition verbs ("think", "guess", etc.), perception verbs ("see", "hear", etc.) and even complete grammatical constructions (e.g., rhetorical questions and reported speech constructions) (Faller, 2002; Ünal & Papafragou, 2020).

It has been noted by Ünal and Papafragou (2020, p. 117) that "The ability to reason about the sources of knowledge is a fundamental aspect of human cognition, since it is crucial for forming and updating beliefs about the world". In addition, an

essential feature of evidentiality is its interaction with other linguistic phenomena (see, for example, Demonte & Fernández-Soriano's (2014) analysis of evidentiality and its illocutionary force). Accordingly, evidentiality needs to be examined within a cognitively-oriented model that also considers inferences at different levels of linguistic description. The Lexical Constructional Model (LCM) (see, for example, Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera Masegosa, 2014) provides the framework needed for a comprehensive analysis of evidential propositions as it considers cognitive models (available assumptions/beliefs about the world) and how they are accessed through the collaboration of operations like metonymy, echoing and contrast (as shown below), thus, giving rise to inferences that can be read at four linguistic levels: the lexical-constructional, implicational, illocutionary and discourse (beyond the sentence) levels. Placing the study of evidential propositions within the LCM, the present study adds to the elaboration of work on evidentiality considering that the phenomenon has not been studied in connection with cognitive models and operations.

The evidential propositions examined in this study are selected from a religious text (the Quran) with the aim of complementing existing literature on the effect of evidential propositions on event perception. Smirnova and Iliev (2014, p. 2943), for example, have demonstrated that the epistemic commitment associated with evidential language triggers the perception of an event as being less certain and psychologically more distant from the here and now. In earlier studies, the amount of visual, spatial and temporal details used in an evidential proposition has been shown to play a decisive role in determining its status with regard to reliability, probability, expectation and so on (see Johnson et al., 1982; Johnson et al., 1993; Rooryck, 2001). This study, however, shows that Quranic evidential propositions (as examples of religious evidential

propositions) trigger the perception of events as certain and psychologically close to the here and now notwithstanding the amount or type of details forming the evidence. This is due to 1) the reliability of the Quran (the word of God) as a timeless source of knowledge and 2) the fact that Quranic evidential propositions focus the reader's attention on creation and the end of time in such a way that they share space and time with the here and now (c.f. Newby, 2003, pp. 333-354).

As evidentiality is not grammaticised in Arabic (the language of the Quran), Quranic evidential propositions are statements, descriptions, reportatives or rhetorical questions that tend to contain evidential verbs at the lexical-constructional level. In addition, they are often embedded in narratives at the discourse level. In this study, evidential inferences that can be read at the lexical-constructional and discourse levels are analysed in terms of the role played by echoing and contrast operations[1]. This role, which is collaborative, involves reporting/repeating (i.e., echoing) a speech or belief to draw attention to its discrepancy (or contrast) with a given reality (see Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera Masegosa, 2014, p. 178). At the implicational level, however, the example evidential propositions are examined in the light of a recent development within the LCM; namely, Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera Masegosa's (2020) work on situational scenarios as comprising three sub-types: descriptive, attitudinal and regulatory. In this development, the interpretation of the implications of an utterance is seen to involve accessing a relevant situational scenario through a chain of metonymically-activated premise-conclusion reasoning schemas. The present study elaborates on these insights demonstrating that the interpretation of the implications of an evidential proposition can

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[1]This is an elaboration of Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera Masegosa's (2014, pp. 178-180) view on the echoing-contrast combination as a marker of ironic remarks (c.f. Galera-Masegosa, 2020; Reda, 2020, 2023).

require accessing all three types of situational scenarios distinguished by the LCM. This is because an evidential proposition is an assertion that involves (at the illocutionary level) a proposal to update a shared body of knowledge, or to take note of a piece of information which can be of more than one type (see AnderBois, 2014; Murray, 2010; Ünal & Papafragou, 2020; Sperber & Wilson, 1995).

The study is structured as follows. Work on evidentiality is first sketched. Then, the LCM is introduced to pave the way for presenting its typology of situational scenarios and the chains of metonymically-activated reasoning schemas involved in the interpretation of these scenarios at the implicational level. At the lexical-constructional level, the examples analysed within this typology are complete constructions that contain evidential verbs like "see" and "hear" and/or clauses that introduce the following types of evidence: visual and reported. The inferences at this level and the discourse level are shown to activate the interpretation process by taking the addressee(s) beyond what they perceive or cognise prompting them (at the illocutionary level) to update explicitly/implicitly echoed beliefs that contrast with the reality pointed out. The study closes with a summary of points and a suggestion for further research.

2. Evidentiality

Evidentiality in language can be introduced through the following features characterising its semantic structure: *evidence holder* and *evidence*. The evidence holder is the person who bears a direct or indirect relationship to a claim. An eyewitness of an event, for instance, bears a direct (first-hand) relationship to an evidential proposition. Hearing about an event from somebody, however, makes the relationship between the evidence holder and the evidential proposition indirect (second-hand) (Murray, 2017).

As for the evidence, it is "a secondary event variable that allows us to capture a relationship between the matrix event and another event that forms the evidentiary basis for the claims about the matrix event" (Asudeh & Toivonen, 2017, p. 49). For example, in the sentence *"John sounds like he is upset"*, the sound of John serves as the evidence (marked by verb "sound") of the evidence holder's claim that JOHN is *like he is upset* (the matrix event described by the predicate). These semantic structure features are behind the fact that evidentiality is non-contentiously defined as the linguistic encoding of the speaker's source of knowledge or evidence type (i.e., whether [VISUAL±], [REPORTED±] or [DIRECT±]) (Asudeh & Toivonen, 2017, pp. 49, 59). Approaches to evidentiality, however, may be said to have developed out of the different positions on the issue of whether the encoding of the speaker's epistemic commitment should be included in the category of evidentiality.

Dendale and Tasmowski (2001, pp. 341-342) placed the different approaches to evidentiality on a continuum, with the *disjunction* and *inclusion* approaches at the opposite ends of the continuum and the *overlap* approach in between. The disjunction approach draws a demarcation line between evidentiality and epistemic commitment showing that evidentiality concerns the assertion of the evidence and, therefore, has nothing to do with the speaker's evaluation of it (e.g., Aikhenvald, 2004, pp. 3-6; De Haan, 2005, p. 379; Mushin, 2001, p. 9). However, the inclusion approach (see Chafe & Nichols, 1986; Palmer, 1986[2001]) deals with evidentiality as a sub-category of epistemic modality– *propositional modality* (in Palmer's (1986 [2001], p. 24) terminology). The idea behind this approach stems from the fact that the speaker's epistemic commitment is determined by the evidence type. That is, when a piece of information derives from direct visual, auditory or any other type of sensory evidence

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(e.g., "*John came back from holiday, I just saw/heard him*"), a high level of epistemic commitment tends to be shown. A lower level of such a commitment is normally shown when the evidence is derived indirectly by inference (e.g., "*John looks/sounds sick*") or through reports (i.e., hearsay evidence like "*Sara told me that John came back from holiday*"). Evidentials like "they say" and "allegedly" are often used by English speakers to assert the unreliability of the information source or evidence. As for the *overlap* position, it focuses on the communicative and interactional functions of evidentiality and epistemic modality treating the two categories as distinct but interrelated. That is, the two categories co-occur at the discourse level to encode the speaker's intention to share with the interlocutors an assertion and a relevant experience, action or thought (e.g., Cornillie, 2009, 2010; Hoye, 2008; Ifantidou, 2001).

Pragmatically-oriented work on evidentiality is in line with the inclusion approach in the sense that it deals with epistemic commitment as an inference that is conventionally associated with evidentially-realised grammatical constructions (from words to complete constructions like rhetorical questions and reported speech constructions)[2] and/or derived from the situational context. Hence, the speaker's attitude towards the factual status of the proposition forms part of its meaning (see Faller, 2012). The illocutionary value of this meaning has also received attention within this stream of studies (e.g., Sbisà, 2014; Demonte & Fernández-Soriano, 2014) that springs not only from Speech Act Theory (e.g., Austin, 1962; Searle, 1975) and Relevance Theory (e.g., Sperber & Wilson, 1995), but also from Update Semantics as some of the studies (e.g., AnderBois, 2014; Murray, 2010; Ünal & Papafragou, 2020) deal with evidentiality as

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[2] Morphological constructions have not been included because the study does not deal with a language in which evidentiality is encoded at this level of grammar.

an assertion that has the value of a proposal to update a shared body of knowledge or to take note of a piece of information.

3. The Lexical Constructional Model (LCM)

The LCM is a model of meaning interpretation that brings together and refines insights from such traditions as Speech Act Theory (e.g., Austin, 1962; Leech, 1983; Searle,1979), Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Lakoff, 1987), Frame Semantics (e.g., Fillmore, 1982), Relevance Theory (e.g., Sperber &Wilson, 1995), Panther and Thornburg's (1998) cognitive approach to inferencing in conversation, Functional Grammar (Kay & Fillmore, 1999), Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 1987, 1999) and Construction Grammar (e.g., Goldberg, 1995). The main point that distinguishes the LCM from other cognitively-oriented linguistic traditions is its compositional view on the meaning of clausal constructions (e.g., the English ditransitive and resultative constructions). For example, unlike Construction Grammar, the LCM does not deal with such constructions as having schematic meaning independent of the lexical items that instantiate them. Rather, it considers the inferences that result from the integration of lexical items into sentence-level constructions. Put differently, the meanings of clausal constructions are examined within the LCM at the lexical-constructional level, as elaborated on below.

Representing its compositional view on grammar, the LCM links language inferences to *propositional* and *situational* cognitive models. Propositional cognitive models are non-situational notions involving the structure and properties of entities (e.g., cake, candles, presents, etc.). As for situational cognitive models, they are scenarios that combine dynamic propositional models or events (e.g., the birthday

scenario as involving the actions of blowing out candles on a cake, eating the cake and giving a birthday present to someone) (Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera Masegosa, 2014, p. 74, 2020, p. 286).

As far as situational cognitive models are concerned, they are categorised under two levels: low and high. Situational low-level scenarios, on the one hand, are specific knowledge *frames* (in Fillmore's (1982) terminology) which capture everyday social interactions that are accessible to direct perception. Situational high-level scenarios, on the other hand, are knowledge structures formed by making generalisations over low-level scenarios (e.g., a conventionalised complaint).

The LCM links situational scenarios to inferences across four levels of linguistic description as follows. Level 1 addresses inferences produced by the integration of the lexical and constructional layers. For example, in "*The audience laughed the actor off the stage",* a negative inference is triggered by the integration of the lexical item "laugh" and the caused-motion construction. Level 2 addresses implicated meaning– a type of inferencing that is conventionally associated with constructions– thus adding to level-1 representations further implications that highlight the speaker's attitude. An example of this is a rhetorical question like *"Who's been fiddling with my stamp collection?"*, which makes sense at level 2 (rather than level 1) if it is uttered in a low-level situation where someone has touched/disorganised the speaker's stamp collection (Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera Masegosa, 2014, p. 82). Level 3 addresses illocutionary inferencing based on situational high-level scenarios that regulate how speakers express gratitude, ask for something, make a promise and so on in low-level situations. Finally, level 4 addresses implicational (or discourse-bound) meaning which is derived from the application of premise-conclusion reasoning schemas (e.g., cause-effect and evidence-

conclusion). For example, a cause-effect relation would underlie the interpretation of a sentence like "*There was a traffic jam on the M1*" if it is uttered in a low-level situation where the speaker needed to apologise for being late (see Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera Masegosa, 2014, p. 30-33; Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera Masegosa, 2020, p. 285).

4. The view of the LCM on the interpretation of situational scenarios

The account of the LCM on the interpretation of situational scenarios explores the metonymic grounding of traditional implicature derivation– a process shown in Relevance Theory as based on premise-conclusion reasoning patterns (see Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Metonymy within the LCM is to be understood in terms of Langacker's (1987, 1999) notion of *profile-base* relationship where meaning is the result of evoking a scene (*domain*, or *base*) and highlighting part of that scene (profile). Hence, the interpretation of the meaning of a low-level scenario within the LCM is a matter of domain highlighting that takes place through metonymic expansion and metonymic reduction operations. The former operation underlies SOURCE-IN-TARGET metonymies (e.g., ABILITY FOR ACTION) and involves profiling a sub-domain and mapping it onto the expanded notion of the whole domain. The latter operation, however, underlies TARGET-IN-SOURCE metonymies (e.g., ACTION FOR (ASSESSED) RESULT) since it involves profiling a whole domain and mapping it onto a sub-domain (see Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera Masegosa, 2014, 2020; Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez, 2002). Domain expansion and domain reduction operations collaborate in the process of interpreting situational scenarios, activating chains of premise-conclusion reasoning schemas. As mentioned above, Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera Masegosa (2020) consider this process under three sub-types of situational scenarios: descriptive,

attitudinal and regulatory. In addition, they analyse the interpretation of these scenarios on high and low levels of situationality, as detailed below.

4.1. Descriptive scenarios

Descriptive high-level scenarios are cognitive models generalised over low-level events and actions. Take as an example the 'hunting scenario'– a model that involves a hunter and a hunted entity. The metonymic exploitation of such a scenario relies on the relation between the profiled sub-domains. For example, the interpretation of the following exchange, which requires implicature derivation, activates a chain of premise-conclusion reasoning schemas based on the profiled ability-success relation and the result-success relation:

(1) A: Did you have a good hunt?

  B: Jim is an excellent marksman.

Based on the implicit premise (retrieved from world knowledge) that an excellent marksman is likely to kill much game while hunting, the description of Jim as an excellent marksman (explicit meaning) leads to the following chained conclusions: 1) Jim probably killed much game and 2) killing much game makes the hunt successful (based on a second implicit premise that killing much game makes a hunt successful). Hence, conclusion 1 is implicated through metonymic expansion (ABILITY FOR ACTION) and conclusion 2 through metonymic reduction (ACTION FOR ASSESSED RESULT) (Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera Masegosa, 2020, pp. 290-291).

4.2. Attitudinal scenarios

Attitudinal high-level scenarios are generalisations that capture a typical speaker's emotional or attitudinal response to low-level situations (e.g., happiness and sadness scenarios). Such scenarios are often exploited metonymically (rather than through direct statements) via the use of such a construction as "*What's X Doing Y?"*. This construction is conventionally associated with an attitudinal response to a low-level situation perceived by the speaker as inappropriate and, therefore, worthy of enquiry (c.f. Kay & Fillmore, 1999). The process of analysing the profiled attitude takes place through two consecutive premise-conclusion reasoning schemas. Consider as an example the process of interpreting the attitudinal implications of the following question: "*What's your sister doing in my lab?"* (explicit meaning). First, based on implicit premise 1 (retrieved from world knowledge) that people ask for information they already have when they want to draw attention to it, the speaker is not asking about the behaviour of the hearer's sister, but drawing attention to it (implicated conclusion 1) and, then, based on implicit premise 2 that people draw attention to other people's behaviour when they find it worthy of attention, the speaker finds the behaviour of the hearer's sister to be worthy of the hearer's attention (implicated conclusion 2). Conclusion 1 is implicated through metonymic expansion, in the sense that a preliminary event (someone is doing something wrong) that the speaker has presently witnessed is profiled as an attitudinal trigger. Conclusion 2, however, is implicated through metonymic reduction considering that drawing the brother's attention to his sister's behaviour is made to stand for the action perceived by the speaker as wrong or inappropriate– an instance of the ACTION FOR RESULT metonymy (Ruiz de

Mendoza & Galera Masegosa, 2020, pp. 293-296). The brother is expected to enquire about his sister's wrong behaviour and possibly take action to correct it.

4.3. Regulatory scenarios

Regulatory high-level scenarios are cognitive models representing social conventions that regulate the use of illocutions (c.f. Leech, 1983; Panther & Thornburg, 1998). For example, illocutions that bear the value of a request are often made less direct through metonymic exploitation of regulatory scenarios, as in "*Can you lend me your pen?"* and *"Will you lend me your pen?"* where the speaker's ability/willingness to lend their pen is made to stand for the whole request. Within the LCM, a metonymic exploitation that involves a manifestation of a need is regulated by the following specific social convention belonging to the Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model (see Ruiz de Mendoza & Baicchi, 2007, pp. 111-112): When people have needs, we have to do our best to satisfy these needs (Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera Masegosa, 2020, p. 299).

However, when the request is a remark (rather than a manifestation of a need) on a state of affairs that is not beneficial to the speaker, it may call for a chain of metonymically activated premise-conclusion reasoning schemas. For example, "*My pen won't write*" is a remark that triggers two consecutive reasoning schemas. The first one (see below) is activated by profiling the speakers' need– a case of metonymic expansion where a condition forming part of the convention is made to stand for the whole convention according to which we are expected to satisfy other people's needs if we can (Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera Masegosa, 2020, p. 300)[3].

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[3]Note that in such consecutive reasoning schemas, the first schema combines an implicit premise, an explicit meaning statement and an implicated conclusion. The second schema, however, includes a previously implicated meaning statement (Conclusion 1) rather than an explicit meaning statement (see Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera Masegosa, 2020).

Implicit premise 1: Stating a non-beneficial state of affairs involves the speaker's

   incapability to resolve it by himself.

Explicit meaning: The speaker says his pen won't write.

Implicated conclusion 1: The speaker cannot resolve the problem about his pen.

As for the second reasoning schema (given below), it is activated by profiling the

expectation for the hearer to satisfy the speaker's need– a case of metonymic reduction

as the whole convention is made to stand for part of it (Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera

Masegosa, 2020, p. 301).

Implicit premise 2: The social convention.

Previous implicated meaning: the speaker cannot resolve the problem about his pen.

Implicated conclusion 2: The hearer is expected to satisfy the speaker's need (thereby

   changing the state of affairs to the speaker's benefit, e.g., by giving him another

   pen).

Drawing on the above insights, the section to follow provides a systematic

analysis of the cognitive models and operations involved in the interpretation of

evidential propositions.

5.   The Interpretation of evidential propositions

As mentioned above, the evidential propositions used in this study are complete

constructions that contain evidential verbs like "see" and "hear" and/or clauses that

introduce two different types of evidence: visual and reported. The aim is to demonstrate that, regardless of the type or amount of evidence provided by the evidence holder, processing the meaning of an evidential proposition can require profiling parts of all three types of situational scenarios distinguished by the LCM. At the implicational level, the process calls for chains of metonymically-activated premise-conclusion reasoning schemas. The cooperation of echoing and contrast operations at the lexical-constructional and discourse levels plays a vital role in initiating the interpretation process, conferring on evidential propositions an illocutionary value.

5.1. Evidential propositions based on visual evidence

The examples used to demonstrate this type of evidential propositions have the illocutionary value of a proposal to the addressee(s) to go beyond what their eyes can see in order to infer a piece of information that is incompatible with some of their existing sets of beliefs. The first example (in (2) below) is a proposition, selected from Chapter 67 of the Quran, that evidences the perfect ability of the Creator on the basis of an observable reality (the perfect creation of the heavens). Chapter 67 was descended as a response to disbelievers' scheming against the Prophet in private lest God would hear them[4], which is an indication of their belief that God has limited abilities.

(2) [And] who created seven heavens in layers. You do not see in the creation of the
    Most Merciful any inconsistency. So return [your] vision [to the sky]; do you see

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[4]Verse 13 of Chapter 67 is an explicit response to this attempt: "*And conceal your speech or publicize it; indeed, He is Knowing of that within the breasts*".

any breaks? Then return [your] vision twice again. [Your] vision will return to you humbled while it is fatigued. (Quran, 67:3-4)[5]

At the lexical-constructional and discourse levels of example (2), some attitudinal implications can be inferred from the statements describing God's perfect creation of the heavens (an observable reality) and the closed question that follows them. The question, which triggers a negative answer, challenges the addressees to see signs of imperfection in the creation of the heavens. The expected failure of the addressees to find such signs, as indicated by the statement that follows (i.e., "*[Your]vision will return to you humbled while it is fatigued"*)*,* will form the evidence, thus, conferring on the addressees, who are disbelievers, the status of eye witnesses (i.e., evidence holders) who attest to the truth of God's omnipotence. This, in turn, evokes (or implicitly echoes) disbelievers' original belief in regard to God's abilities in its contrast to the implications of the observable reality pointed out, thus highlighting the Speaker's attitude. At the implicational level, the interpretation of the speaker's attitude first happens– through metonymic expansion– against the attitudinal high-level scenario below, where (c)– a preliminary event that the Speaker has witnessed (someone said/did something reflecting a wrong belief)– is profiled as an attitudinal trigger (after Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera Masegosa, 2020).

(a) The speaker notices that X believing Y is wrong.

(b) The speaker assumes that X believing Y is wrong.

(c) The speaker attests that X believing Y is wrong.

(d) The speaker believes assumptions (a)–(c) to be the case.

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[5]All the translated verses used in this study are from Sahih International
(https://quranenc.com/en/browse/english_saheeh).

Drawing the addressees' attention to their wrong belief in its contrast to the implications of an observable reality involves attesting that they are on the wrong path. Put differently, what the addressees have said or done (reflecting a wrong belief) is made to stand– through metonymic reduction– for their wrong way of life– an instance of the ACTION FOR RESULT metonymy. In this way, the process of interpreting the attitudinal dimension of the evidential proposition in question may be said to be based on the following chain of metonymically-activated reasoning schemas:

Implicit premise 1 (retrieved from world knowledge): When an observable reality is pointed out, attention is likely drawn to it.

Explicit meaning: You do not see in the creation of the Most Merciful any inconsistency. So return [your] vision [to the sky]; do you see any breaks? Then return [your] vision twice again. [Your] vision will return to you humbled while it is fatigued.

Implicated conclusion 1: The Speaker is not indicating the flawlessness of the heavens, but drawing attention to the implications of this reality in regard to the Creator's perfect abilities (a fact that is incompatible with the addressees' original thought about God).

Implicit premise 2 (retrieved from world knowledge): People's attention is drawn to their way of life when it is worthy of attention.

Previous implicated meaning: The Speaker is not indicating the flawlessness of the heavens, but drawing attention to the implications of this reality in regard to the

Creator's perfect abilities (a fact that is incompatible with the addressees'

original thought about God).

Implicated conclusion 2: The Speaker attests that the addressees are on the wrong path.

Figure 1 below represents the metonymic operations underlying the implicated

conclusions examined above. In this figure (and figures 2-6) below), the upwards and

downwards arrows represent the operations of metonymic expansion and metonymic

reduction respectively, S stands for the speaker and ADs for the addressees.

Figure 1 here

The attestation that the addressees are on the wrong path can be further seen as an

implicit indication of the addressees' failure to perform God's order/guidance to

humans to contemplate the signs, an order that can be demonstrated by the following

verse: *"And on the earth are signs for the certain [in faith]. And in yourselves. Then*

will you not see?" (Quran, 51:20-21). Accordingly, the evidential proposition in

question may be said to have additional evidence against the addressees that concerns

their violation of God's order/guidance to humans to contemplate the signs. This order

can be described in terms of the following convention of the Cost-Benefit Cognitive

Model (regulatory high-level scenario) related to orders: "If it is manifest to A that a

particular state of affairs is not beneficial to B, and if A has the capacity to change that

state of affairs, then A should do so" (Del Campo Martínez & Ruiz de Mendoza, 2012,

p. 18). Part of this convention is the notion that "the speaker has authority over the

addressee. The kind of authority the speaker is endowed with allows him to perform an

order and reduces the addressee's options to refuse to act" (Ruiz de Mendoza &

Baicchi, 2007, p. 111).

To demonstrate, in the evidential proposition in question, the addressees are

ordered to "return" (rather than "turn") their vision to the sky, which implies that they

turned their vision to the sky (or looked at it), but never contemplated its perfect

creation. This implication is first interpreted through a metonymic expansion operation

in the sense that the addressees' failure to contemplate the signs provides access to the

above-mentioned religious convention. This then leads to profiling the expectation for

the addressees to perform God's order– a case of metonymic reduction where the whole

convention is made to stand for part of it (after Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera Masegosa,

2020, p. 301). These metonymic operations may be said to activate the following chain

of premise-conclusion reasoning schemas:

Implicit premise 1: The religious convention according to which if a state of affairs is

not beneficial to B (humans), and if God orders B to change it, B should perform

the order.

Explicit meaning: Return your vision to the sky.

Implicated conclusion 1: The Speaker attests that the addressees did not perform God's

order to humans to contemplate the signs.

Implicit premise 2: The religious convention.

Previous implicated meaning: The Speaker attests that the addressees did not perform

God's order to humans to contemplate the signs.

Implicated conclusion 2: The addressees were expected to perform God's order.

Figure 2 below represents the metonymic operations underlying the implicated conclusions examined above. Conclusion 2 is treated as an attitudinal trigger.

Figure 2 here

The addressees' failure to perform God's order adds a descriptive dimension to the evidential proposition in question considering that it brings into focus their cognitive abilities through the sense of sight. That is, based on human experience of vision as a path to the mind (see Radden, 2002; Reda, 2014), pointing out an observable reality to draw the addressees' attention to its implications in regard to God's perfect abilities is an attestation that the addressees lack the ability to see (i.e., consider) the signs and follow God's guidance. This is a case of metonymic expansion, or an instance of the ABILITY FOR ACTION metonymy, which may be said to activate the following premise-conclusion reasoning schema:

Implicit premise 1 (retrieved from experience): Vision is a path to the mind.

Explicit meaning: You do not see in the creation of the Most Merciful any
    inconsistency. So return [your] vision [to the sky]; do you see any breaks? Then
    return [your] vision twice again. [Your] vision will return to you humbled while
    it is fatigued.

Implicated conclusion 1: The Speaker attests that the addressees lack the ability to see
    (i.e., consider) the signs and follow God's guidance.

The first conclusion is part of the subsequent reasoning schema below which focuses on the result of the addressees' failure to consider the signs, thereby evidencing that they are astray– an instance of the ACTION FOR ASSESSED RESULT metonymy.

Implicit premise 2 (retrieved from experience): Seeing is believing.

Previous implicated meaning: The Speaker attests that the addressees lack the ability to see (i.e., consider) the signs and follow God's guidance.

Implicated conclusion 2: The Speaker attests that the addressees are astray.

Figure 3 below represents the metonymic operations underlying the implicated conclusions examined above.

Figure 3 here

The implicated conclusions in Figure 3 are consistent with the following explicit Quranic descriptions of those who lack the ability to consider the signs and follow God's guidance– they are deaf and blind and, as a result of these disabilities, astray:

(3) Say, "Observe what is in the heavens and earth." But of no avail will be signs or warners to a people who do not believe. (Quran, 10:101)

(4) Or do you think that most of them listen or understand? …, they are … astray from the 'Right' Way! (Quran, 25:44)

(5) Then will you make the deaf hear or guide the blind or he who is in clear error? (Quran, 43:40)

Other examples of evidential propositions based on visual evidence are given in (6) and (7) below. These are constructions of the form "*It is X (Allāh) Who did Y*" where the observable reality in the Y slot evidences God's omnipotence.

(6) It is Allāh who erected the heavens without pillars that you [can] see… He details the signs that you may, of the meeting with your Lord, be certain. (Quran, 13:2)

(7) It is Allāh who subjected to you the sea so that ships may sail upon it by His command and that you may seek of His bounty; and perhaps you will be grateful. (Quran, 45:12)

In both examples, the emphasis that the observable reality in the Y slot is the work of God gives rise to attitudinal implications. The process of interpreting these implications starts by first accessing– through metonymic expansion– the above-mentioned attitudinal high-level scenario and profiling the following as an attitudinal trigger: someone said or did something wrong (reflecting a wrong belief). Details of what has been said or done are implicitly echoed by the closing statements of the evidential propositions in question (i.e., "*He details the signs that you may, of the meeting with your Lord, be certain*" and *"that you may seek of His bounty; and perhaps you will be grateful"*). These details, which are placed in contrast with the observable reality in the Y slot of each example, can be demonstrated by the speech reported in the verse in (8) below.

(8) And he entered his garden while he was unjust to himself. He said, "I do not think that this will perish– ever. And I do not think the Hour will occur. And even if I

should be brought back to my Lord, I will surely find better than this as a return."

(Quran, 18:35-36).

In this way, the Speaker in each of the examples in (6) and (7) is not understood as emphasising– through the "*It is X (Allāh) Who did Y*" construction– that the observable reality in the Y slot is His work per se (explicit meaning), but as drawing the addressees' attention to the implications of this reality in regard to the Creator's omnipotence. This is implicated conclusion 1, which may be said to be based on implicit premise 1 (retrieved from world knowledge) that when an observable reality is pointed out, attention is likely drawn to it. The attitudinal trigger, or what the addressees have said or done reflecting a wrong belief, is then made to stand– through metonymic reduction– for the effect of this wrong belief on their way of life (an instance of the ACTION FOR ASSESSED RESULT metonymy). The premise-conclusion reasoning schema activated by this metonymy is as follows. Based on implicit premise 2 that people's attention is drawn to their way of life when it is worthy of attention, the Speaker attests that disbelievers are on the wrong path (implicated conclusion 2).

The attestation that the addressees are on the wrong path may be said to have a descriptive dimension considering that it brings into focus disbelievers' cognitive abilities as the attested reason behind their being on the wrong path. The interpretation of this dimension is activated by a metonymic expansion operation in which vision provides access to the mind or cognitive abilities in general (based on implicit premise 1 that vision is a path to the mind). This leads to the attestation that disbelievers lack the ability to contemplate the signs (implicated conclusion 1– an instance of the ABILITY FOR ACTION metonymy). This conclusion, along with the understanding that seeing is

believing (implicit premise 2), then highlights the result of disbelievers' failure to contemplate the signs as an attestation that they are astray (implicated conclusion 2)– a case of metonymic reduction, or an instance of the ACTION FOR ASSESSED RESULT metonymy.

In the light of the preceding evidence, the attestation that disbelievers are astray may be said to have further implications that concern the failure of the addressees to perform God's order to humans to contemplate the signs (the regulatory dimension of the scenario). These implications provide access– through metonymic expansion– to the religious convention according to which if a state of affairs is not beneficial to B (humans), and if God orders B to change it, B should perform the order (implicit premise 1). This leads to the attestation that the addressees are on the wrong path in that they failed to perform God's order to humans to contemplate the signs (implicated conclusion 1). Based on this conclusion as well as the religious convention (implicit premise 2), the expectation for the addressees to perform God's order is profiled (implicated conclusion 2). This is a case of metonymic reduction as the whole convention is made to stand for part of it.

The closing statements in the examples in (6) and (7), which support the above implicated conclusions, are explicit proposals to the addressees to take note of the realities pointed out– realities that can help them update their original belief about God to be able to see the signs and follow His guidance.

The above examples demonstrate that the attitudinal, descriptive and regulatory dimensions of evidential propositions can be inextricably intertwined. This point can be further demonstrated by the evidentially-realised rhetorical questions in (9-11) below.

The examples are of the form "*Do X not see Y?"*, which contains the evidential verb "see" and the negative construction "not".

(9)   Do they not see the birds controlled in the atmosphere of the sky? None holds them up   except Allah. Indeed in that are signs for a people who believe. (Quran, 17:59)

(10)   Do they not see that We made the night that they may rest therein and the day giving sight? Indeed in that are signs for a people who believe. (Quran, 27:86)

(11)   Do you not see that Allah drives clouds? Then He brings them together, then He makes them into a mass, and you see the rain emerge from within it. And He sends down from the sky, mountains [of clouds] within which is hail, and He strikes with it whom He wills and averts it from whom He wills. The flash of its lightening almost takes away the eyesight. (Quran, 24:43)

The Speaker in each of examples (9-11) is drawing disbelievers' attention to the implications of the realities pointed out in the Y slot in regard to God's omnipotence, wondering how they failed to see them. This involves implicitly echoing the following attitudinal trigger: the Speaker witnessed a preliminary event where the addressees said or did something wrong, or something that inarguably contrasts with the realities pointed out (conclusion 1). The scenario of wondering implied in the construction "*Do X not see Y?"* is not only an attestation (related to the attitudinal dimension) that the addressees are on the wrong path (conclusion 2), but also a testimony of the omnipresent Witness (related to the descriptive dimension) that, due to the inability of disbelievers to see (as consider) the signs and follow God's guidance (conclusion 1),

they are astray (conclusion 2). This, in turn, is an attestation (related to the regulatory dimension) that disbelievers failed to perform God's order to humans to contemplate the signs (conclusion 1), an order they were expected to perform in accordance with religious conventions (conclusion 2). These implicated conclusions, which are activated by metonymic expansion and metonymic reduction operations (as shown above), are supported in examples (9-10) by the concluding statement *"Indeed in that are signs for a people who believe"*, a statement which attests that only believers have the ability to see the signs and follow God's guidance. The evidential propositions in (9-11) may, therefore, be described as assertions that involve a proposal to the addresses to update their original belief about God so that they gain the ability to see the signs and follow God's guidance/perform His orders.

More examples of evidentially-realised rhetorical questions are the hypothetical questions in (12) and (13) below. These may also be considered as evidential propositions based on visual evidence in the sense that they prompt the readers to draw conclusions on the basis of situations they imagine by reframing observable reality.

(12) Say, "Have you considered: if your water was to become sunken [into the earth], then who could bring you flowing water?" (Quran, 67:30)

(13) Say, "Have you considered: if Allāh should make for you the day continuous until the Day of Resurrection, what deity other than Allāh could bring you a night in which you may rest? Then will you not see?" (Quran, 28:72)

As with examples (9-11) above, the interpretation of the hypothetical questions in (12-13) requires accessing all three types of situational scenarios as follows. At the lexical-

constructional level, they implicitly echo a preliminary event witnessed by the Speaker involving people saying/doing something that reflects a wrong belief (the attitudinal trigger). The hypothetical situation (explicit meaning) suggests that the addressees are those who associate partners with God considering that the explicit meaning draws their attention to the fact that there is no deity worthy of worship except God (implicated conclusion 1, based on premise 1 that a deity that is worthy of worship has no match). The expected failure of the addressees to find a deity who can reverse changes to reality brought by God then stands for the effect of the addressees' wrong belief on their way of life (an instance of the ACTION FOR EFFECT metonymy). This is an attestation that the addressees are on the wrong path (implicated conclusion 2). This is also an attestation (related to the regulatory dimension of the evidential propositions in question) that the addresses failed to perform an order they were expected to perform (conclusions 1 and 2, based on religious conventions accessed through metonymic expansion and reduction operations); namely, God's order to humans not to associate partners with God (e.g., *Say, "O People of the Scripture, come to a word that is equitable between us and you - that we will not worship except Allah and not associate anything with Him and not take one another as lords instead of Allah."...* (Quran, 3:64)). The addressees' failure to perform God's order involves a descriptive dimension considering that it brings into focus disbelievers' cognitive ability as the attested reason behind their failure to believe in God. The word "consider" in the hypothetical questions in (12) and (13) is translated into English from the Arabic word "see". Accordingly, the interpretation of the descriptive dimension of the examples in question may be said to be activated by a metonymic expansion operation in which vision provides access to the mind or cognitive abilities in general (based on implicit premise 1

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that vision is a path to the mind). This leads to the attestation that disbelievers lack the ability to follow God's guidance (implicated conclusion 1– an instance of the ABILITY FOR ACTION metonymy). Conclusion 1, along with the understanding that seeing is believing (implicit premise 2), then highlights the result of disbelievers' failure to follow God's guidance as an attestation that they are astray (implicated conclusion 2)– a case of metonymic reduction, or an instance of the ACTION FOR ASSESSED RESULT metonymy. The above conclusions are supported by the closing statement of the example in (13) (i.e., *"Then will you not see*?"). In the light of these conclusions, the evidential propositions in (12) and (13) can be described as assertions that involve a proposal to the addresses to update their original belief about God so that they gain the ability to see the signs and follow God's guidance/perform His orders.

Readers of the Quran who reason about the evidential propositions examined above will see them as timeless attestations to the truth of God's omnipotence and, therefore, as orders to humans (anywhere/anytime) to contemplate the signs and walk on the right path.

5.2. Evidential propositions based on reported evidence

The evidential propositions considered below have the illocutionary value of a proposal to the addressee(s) to take note of something wrong they have said or done. The first example reports an event of covenant breaking.

(14) And [recall] when We took your covenant and raised over you the mount, [saying], "Take what We have given you with determination and listen." They said [instead], "We hear and disobey." ... (Quran, 2: 93)

This evidential proposition has different implications. At the lexical-constructional level, some attitudinal implications derive from the reported speech construction that contains what the covenant breakers have said (i.e., "*We hear and disobey*"). That is, the reported inappropriate response of the covenant breakers to God's order/guidance (in its contrast to the implicitly echoed expected response) highlights the Speaker's attitude. The interpretation of this attitude first happens– through metonymic expansion– against the attitudinal high-level scenario below where (c)– a preliminary event that the Speaker has witnessed (someone said/did something wrong)– is profiled as an attitudinal trigger.

a. The speaker notices that X saying Y is wrong.

b. The speaker assumes that X saying Y is wrong.

c. The speaker attests that X saying Y is wrong.

e. The speaker believes assumptions (a)-(c) to be the case.

At the implicational level, the first premise-conclusion reasoning schema involved in the interpretation of the Speaker's attitude has to do with the reason behind reporting the covenant breakers' speech, as follows.

Implicit premise 1 (retrieved from world knowledge): Someone's speech is reported for drawing attention to it.

Explicit meaning: They covenant breakers said, "We hear and disobey".

Implicated conclusion 1: The Speaker attests that the covenant breakers said something wrong.

This then activates the premise-conclusion reasoning schema given below where the reported speech stands for the result of the addressees' action; that is to say, their deviation from the right path. This is a case of metonymic reduction, or an instance of the ACTION FOR RESULT metonymy in which the covenant breakers' verbal action stands for the effect of breaking the covenant on their way of life.

Implicit premise 2 (retrieved from world knowledge): People's attention is drawn to their way of life when it is worthy of attention.

Previous implicated meaning: The Speaker attests that the covenant breakers said something wrong.

Implicated conclusion 2: The Speaker attests that the covenant breakers deviated from the right path.

Figure 4 represents the metonymic operations underlying the implicated conclusions examined above.

Figure 4 here

The possibility of making "hear and disobey" to stand for a wrong action is that it is a response that represents a violation of a religious convention. The chained metonymically-activated premise-conclusion reasoning schemas involved in the interpretation of the regulatory dimension of the scenario in question are given below. The first one is a case of metonymic reduction where what the covenant breakers have

said/done provides access to the religious convention mentioned above, thereby leading to the attestation that the addressees failed to perform God's order.

Implicit premise 1: The religious convention according to which if a state of affairs is not beneficial to B (humans), and if God orders B to change it, then B should perform the order.

Explicit meaning: "Take what We have given you with determination and listen." They said [instead], "We hear and disobey."

Implicated conclusion 1: The Speaker attests that the addressees failed to perform God's order.

As for the second reasoning schema, it is activated by profiling the expectation for the addressees to perform God's order. This is a case of metonymic reduction as the whole religious convention is made to stand for part of it (see Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera Masegosa, 2020, p. 301).

Implicit premise 2: The religious convention.

Previous implicated meaning: The Speaker attests that the addressees failed to perform God's order.

Implicated conclusion 2: The addressees were expected to perform God's order.

Figure 5 below represents the metonymic operations underlying the implicated conclusions examined above. Implicated conclusion 2 is treated as an attitudinal trigger.

The reported response of the covenant breakers to God's order (in its contrast to the expected response) gives rise to implications that may be said to be descriptive of the covenant breakers' cognitive abilities. That is, the covenant breakers' unwillingness to perform God's order is indicative of their inability to understand that it is meant to guide them to the right path. Two chained premise-conclusion reasoning schemas are involved in the interpretation of the descriptive dimension of the scenario in question. The first one (given below) is activated by a metonymic expansion operation in which the sense of hearing (a path to the mind) provides access to the covenant breakers' cognitive abilities in general, thereby leading to the attestation that disbelievers lack the ability to hear (i.e., understand) God's guidance– an instance of the ABILITY FOR ACTION metonymy.

Implicit premise 1 (retrieved from experience): Hearing is a path to the mind.

Explicit meaning: The covenant breakers heard God's order and disobeyed it saying, "We hear and disobey".

Implicated conclusion 1: The covenant breakers lack the ability to hear (i.e., understand) that God's order is meant to guide them to the right path.

The first conclusion is part of the subsequent reasoning schema in which it is attested that the covenant breakers cannot be guided. This is an instance of the ACTION FOR ASSESSED RESULT metonymy, or a case of metonymic reduction in which reporting

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what the covenant breakers said is made to stand for their resulting state, hence evidencing that they are astray.

Implicit premise 2: (retrieved from world knowledge): People who do not listen cannot be guided.

Previous implicated meaning: The covenant breakers lack the ability to hear (i.e., understand) that God's order is meant to guide them to the right path.

Implicated conclusion 2: The Speaker attests that the covenant breakers are astray.

Implicated conclusion 2 is consistent with the following explicit Quranic description of disbelievers which shows that they cannot be guided as though they are dead or deaf.

(15) So you [O Prophet] certainly cannot make the dead hear [the truth]. Nor can you make the deaf hear the call when they turn their backs and walk away. (Quran, 30:52)

Figure 6 below represents the metonymic operations underlying the implicated conclusions examined above.

Figure 6 here

More examples of evidential propositions based on reported evidence are given in (16-18) below. Note that all three examples report disbelievers' inappropriate response to God's orders/guidance attesting that they are astray. The different amount of

details that distinguish the three examples at the lexical-constructional level does not seem to have an effect on the fact that they are all understood against knowledge structures belonging to three types of situational scenarios: attitudinal, regulatory and descriptive (as elaborated on below).

(16)   And when it is said to them, "Do not cause corruption on the earth," they say, "We are but reformers." (Quran, 2:11)

(17)   And when it is said to them, "Believe as the people have believed," they say, "Should we believe as the foolish have believed?" Unquestionably, it is they who are the foolish, but they know [it] not. (Quran, 2:13)

(18)   And when it is said to them, "Come to what Allah has revealed and to the Messenger," they say, "Sufficient for us is that upon which we found our fathers." Even though their fathers knew nothing, nor were they guided? (Quran, 5:104)

As with the example in (14), the different implications of the evidential propositions in (16-18) can be inferred from disbelievers' real response to God's order/guidance in its contrast to the implicitly echoed expected response. The closing descriptive statement in (17) (i.e., "*Unquestionably, it is they who are the foolish, but they know [it] not*") and the rhetorical question in (18) (i.e., "*Even though their fathers knew nothing, nor were they guided?*") simply support the conclusions to be implicated by accessing all three types of situational scenarios through metonymic expansion and metonymic reduction operations; namely, the following attestations:

1. The addressees said/did something wrong (attitudinal trigger)/the addressees are on the wrong path (ACTION FOR ASSESSED RESULT).

2. The addressees failed to perform God's order/the addressees were expected to perform God's order (in accordance with religious conventions).

3. What the addressees have said/done evidences that they lack the ability to understand God's orders and follow His guidance (ABILITY FOR ACTION)/they are astray (ACTION FOR ASSESSED RESULT).

These same attestations can be read in the evidential propositions in (19) and (20), which differ from the ones examined above in regard to the amount of evidence. More specifically, the evidential propositions in (19-20) are based on more than one type of evidence in such a way that the reported fact to be considered is supported by an observable reality that disbelievers have failed to contemplate (thus failing to perform God's order to humans to contemplate the signs). In example (19), the reported fact about the destruction of the generations (i.e., those who disobeyed God like the generations of Noah and pharaoh), which evidences God's omnipotence/punishment, is supported by the observable reality that those (and others who died) never came back to this life. In example (20), however, the reported argument that evidences God's absolute Lordship is supported by the indisputable, unalterable observable reality that the sun rises in the east. Still, the different pieces of evidence in such examples simply form the explicit meaning on the basis of which the metonymically-activated premise-conclusion reasoning schemas summarised above operate providing access to all three types of situational scenarios.

(19) Have they not seen how many generations We destroyed before them– that they to them will not return? (Quran, 36: 31)

(20) Have you not considered the one who argued with Abraham about his Lord [merely] because Allah had given him kingship? When Abraham said, "My Lord is the one who gives life and causes death," he said, "I give life and cause death." Abraham said, "Indeed, Allah brings up the sun from the east, so bring it up from the west."So the disbeliever was overwhelmed [by astonishment], and Allah does not guide the wrongdoing people. (Quran, 2:258)

The examples in this section demonstrate that, notwithstanding the amount of details/evidence, Quranic evidential propositions form an amalgam of three situational scenarios (attitudinal, descriptive and regulatory scenarios) in such a way that the three dimensions are inextricably intertwined. It can be further argued that all the Quranic evidential propositions considered above are perceived as equally reliable considering that the Speaker in all cases is God (the omnipresent Witness). For example, the evidential propositions in (21) and (22) below, in which God makes an explicit attestation that disbelievers are liars, are claims to first-hand evidence that are as reliable as any other Quranic evidential proposition.

(21) Have you not considered those who practice hypocrisy, saying to their brothers who have disbelieved among the People of the Scripture, "If you are expelled, we will surely leave with you, and we will not obey, in regard to you, anyone– ever;

and if you are fought, we will surely aid you." But Allah testifies that they are

liars. (Quran, 59:11)

(22) And [there are] those [hypocrites] who took for themselves a mosque for causing

harm and disbelief and division among the believers and as a station for whoever

had warred against Allāh and His Messenger before. And they will surely swear,

"We intended only the best." And Allāh testifies that indeed they are liars. (Quran,

9:107)

In the light of the above, it can be said that Quranic evidential propositions, regardless of the type or amount of evidence forming them, are perceived as psychologically close to the here and now in the sense that they are timeless attestations to God's omnipotence and omnipresence (the Witness) and, therefore, as orders to humans (anywhere/anytime) to walk on the right path.

Conclusion

This study provided an analysis of evidential propositions drawing on insights from the LCM. It demonstrated that evidential propositions in religious texts are three-dimensional in the sense that their interpretation provides access to all three sub-types of situational scenarios distinguished by the LCM (i.e., descriptive, attitudinal and regulatory scenarios). At the implicational level, the interpretation process was shown to happen through premise-conclusion reasoning schemas that are activated by metonymic expansion and metonymic reduction operations. These operations, in turn, are activated by the collaboration of echoing and contrast operations at the lexical-constructional level. On the one hand, the study contributes to the LCM by studying the phenomenon

of evidentiality within its insights into meaning construction and typology of situational scenarios. On the other hand, placing the study in the LCM adds to the elaboration of existing work on evidentiality as the model deals with inferences at four levels of linguistic description (i.e., the lexical-constructional, implicational, illocutionary and discourse levels) and links these levels to the cognitive models and operations involved in the process of meaning construction. In addition, the study complements available conclusions about the effect of evidential propositions on events perception. The analysis of religious evidential propositions demonstrates that evidential propositions can trigger the perception of events as certain and psychologically close to the here and now regardless of the amount of details or evidence provided by the evidence holder. Further research is needed to examine the points explored in this study, particularly the possibility for non-religious evidential propositions to form three-dimensional situational scenarios. Using insights from the LCM to conduct such research would produce thorough results.

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