A Sartrean (or new intentionalist) analysis of the fallacy of the intentional fallacy: thought, consciousness and conflicts of interests

Davis, Adrian and Humphreys, Rebekah (2025) A Sartrean (or new intentionalist) analysis of the fallacy of the intentional fallacy: thought, consciousness and conflicts of interests. Metodo: International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy: Ethics, climate and the environment, 12 (1). pp. 61-82. ISSN 2281-9177

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Abstract

Incorporating Sartre’s work on consciousness and adapting those dualistic elements of the literary argument over the ‘intentional fallacy’, this paper involves a critique of the new-materialist trend that typifes agency and intentionality in materialist terms. It will argue that attempts to dissolve all dualist distinctions (as, for example, posthumanists are inclined to do) are problematic when dealing with conficts of interests especially those of non-human animals. This critique applies particularly well to environmental ethics and animal ethics because ethicists and decision-makers need to be able to make moral judgments regarding cases in which the interests of creatures (conscious and nonconscious ones included) confict, and where many diferent interests need to be weighted.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Consciousness; Sartre; New materialism; Intentionality; Agency; Applied ethics.
Divisions:	Institutes and Academies > Institute of Education and Humanities > Academic Discipline: Humanities and Social Sciences
Depositing User:	Lesley Cresswell
Date Deposited:	12 Feb 2025 12:25
Last Modified:	12 Feb 2025 12:25
URI:	https://repository.uwtsd.ac.uk/id/eprint/3371

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