Do humans have special duties and moral obligations towards, rather than ‘rights’ over, nonhuman animals? And if such duties exist, what does our collective treatment of nonhumans say about human morality?

Camp, John (2025) Do humans have special duties and moral obligations towards, rather than ‘rights’ over, nonhuman animals? And if such duties exist, what does our collective treatment of nonhumans say about human morality? Doctoral thesis, University of Wales Trinity Saint David.

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Abstract

This thesis supports the case against all forms of animal exploitation and speciesist assumptions that prevail in most human societies. It falls broadly into (a) evidential and philosophical bases for recognising the basic interests and moral entitlements of nonhumans, and (b) criticism of anthropocentric beliefs, systems and strategies that deny such interests and entitlements and rationalise our collective misuse of nonhuman beings. It begins by presenting evidence that it is not necessary to use animal products to meet human needs, since viable alternatives are available. And without necessity, claims of ‘rights’ to exploit animals are invalid. Accordingly, nonhumans have, by default, entitlements to life, liberty and non-interference, which underpin our moral obligations towards them. It is increasingly evident that many, or most, animal species can experience pain and suffering, and many share important cognitive capacities with humans - including self-awareness and intentionality. This contradicts Neo-Cartesian claims that nonhumans are not phenomenally conscious or sentient and weighs against a categorical distinction between humans and other species. As sentience underpins the baseline moral requirement of non-harm, it is consistent to apply this principle to all beings with this capacity. This entails an obligation not to abuse our power over others, but to use such powers to protect them. Here, the virtue of mercy is considered, with reference to Seneca’s exposition in De Clementia. On the basis of their interests, capacities and telos, nonhumans can be recipients of justice. The thesis argues against versions of contractualism that make this conditional upon the ability to claim rights or fulfil obligations; it also challenges theories that link moral standing to a hierarchical model of cognitive capacities. I contend that humans rely on an artificial normative-ethical framework, which contrasts with the apparent proto-moral homeostasis (‘respectivity’) that seems naturally to govern nonhumans. On this basis it is argued that moral sensibility is not derived from reason but from a shared evolutionary capacity. This links into the proposition that humans inhabit an artificial cultural-technological ‘shell’, which conditions our experience and perception of the world. This is related to concepts of ideology and various social-psychological misconstructions which rationalise our exploitation of nonhuman beings. The discussion then moves to the human egoic self – the ‘I’ as a constructed entity, rather than simple self-awareness – which conditions our relationships with other living beings. This is linked in to the ‘fascism hypothesis’, wherein the fetishised ego manifests collectively and inverts the primal relational dynamic of nature. Others have suggested that humans have undergone some fundamental break with nature. This thesis argues (referencing mythopoeic narratives such as ‘the Fall’) that this estrangement may stem from humans’ acquisition of abstract-conceptual reasoning. It then considers the view (from Schopenhauer, among others), that moral intuition (rather than reason alone) is the key to reconnecting with the wider, nonhuman world. Finally, these themes are linked to natural law theory (NLT), which posits moral truth as integral to the rational plan which orders the universe and governs all living things. For Aquinas, this can be grasped only by (human) reason, but against this anthropocentric interpretation, I argue that only nonhumans abide by the principles of natural law. And without Aquinas’ anthropocentrism, NLT could offer a comprehensive framework for modern animal ethics.

Item Type:	Thesis (Doctoral)
Additional Information:	Redacted material (as discussed with Open Access office) is on page 23 of the thesis.
Uncontrolled Keywords:	ahimsa; animal rights; anthropocentrism; alienation; animal ethics; cognitive ethology; compassion; consciousness; deep ecology; duties; egoic self; evolution; mercy; morality; natural law theory; non-harm; ideology; intuitionism; justice theory; nonhumans; pain response; pain scepticism; proto-morality; reason; sentience; speciesism; sympathy theory; telos; veganism; vital interests.
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Divisions:	Theses and Dissertations > Doctoral Theses
Depositing User:	John Camp
Date Deposited:	13 Aug 2025 12:55
Last Modified:	13 Aug 2025 12:55
URI:	https://repository.uwtsd.ac.uk/id/eprint/3875

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