A Review of the Principal Questions in Richard Price’s Moral Intuitionism

Nesseler, Andrew (2025) A Review of the Principal Questions in Richard Price’s Moral Intuitionism. Masters thesis, University of Wales Trinity Saint David.

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Abstract

Richard Price (1723-1791) was a Welsh philosopher who defended, among other views, what contemporary philosophers would label as “intuitionism.” Adherence to this metaethical theory assumes, at minimum, the following: 1) Moral claims can be true stance independently, or, in other words, morality exists independently of our whims, beliefs, or desires, 2) There are moral truths that can be discovered through some rationalist capacity (be it “intuition” or “the understanding”), and 3) Morality includes some form of irreducibly moral properties (that is, moral concepts such as good cannot be reduced to or be identical with natural properties). Here, I explore Price’s defense of intuitionism by drawing from his most complete work on moral philosophy, A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals (1758), while primarily using the third edition (1787). Additionally, along with other secondary sources, I will rely on the commentaries of Price as found in W.D. Hudson’s (1967, 1970) work. This examination of Price’s intuitionism will take place over four sections. The first section will briefly cover Price’s philosophical influences. Specifically, I have in mind the influence of Plato, Ralph Cudworth, and René Descartes. However, I also note how Price differs from Plato and Cudworth, as well as how Price may still face difficulties associated with their views. Noting Price’s influences will give a fuller picture of the intuitionism he defends (as well as later intuitionists). In the second section, I turn to the debate between Price’s intuitionism and Francis Hutcheson’s moral sense theory (also known as sentimentalism). After dealing with the relation between virtue and satisfaction, I turn toward the ostensible problem of moral motivation for intuitionists. Contemporary evaluations of Price’s position have held that it does not adequately deal with the Humean account of moral motivation. To help amend this, I will look at some contemporary responses to the Humean. The third section examines the epistemology separating Price and his anti-intuitionist interlocutors. Specifically, I turn to the rationalist epistemology underlying Price’s view and contrast it with empiricism. One of the more obvious cases, I believe, comes from J.L. Mackie, who makes explicit reference to Price’s metaethics in the 1977 publication Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. For example, Mackie (1977, p. 39) engages with Price’s view as “an important counter to the argument from queerness,” with Price arguing that empiricism has severe inadequacies—namely, by precluding important non-moral truths by discounting rationalism. I argue that Mackie and empiricists at large have not overcome Price’s counter. The fourth section looks at Price’s intuitionism in comparison to contemporary developments of the theory. First, I compare Price’s normative view to other intuitionists, such as G.E. Moore and W.D. Ross—with Moore showing the possible normative differences the theory can produce, while Ross shows its enduring deontological side as implied in Price’s work. Then, referencing the intuitionists of today, I will turn to contemporary philosophers such as Michael Huemer and Robert Audi. The comparison between Price and these philosophers will be, in part, explored through the ways in which ethical intuitionism is defended and its concepts defined. Lastly, I will conclude by noting Price’s continued relevance in metaethics and philosophy at large. Throughout, I will have aimed to establish that this relevancy extends from his commentary on subjectivism to moral epistemology and, taken as a whole, intuitionism as a still important and enduring view.

Item Type:	Thesis (Masters)
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions:	Theses and Dissertations > Masters Dissertations
Identification Number:	https://doi.org/10.82227/repository.uwtsd.ac.uk.00003930
Depositing User:	Victoria Hankinson
Date Deposited:	23 Sep 2025 14:40
Last Modified:	25 Sep 2025 14:49
URI:	https://repository.uwtsd.ac.uk/id/eprint/3930

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